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[**"Echelon Above Corp." "THE HONOLULU ACCORD," Approved on March 07, 1979 (subj: Transition to War) by then INSCOM Brigadier General James E. Freeze**, Commander; US Army Intelligence and Security Commander, Fort Meade (29 Aug 77 - 30 Nov 78); Deputy Commander, Intelligence (1 Sep 75 - 31 Jul 79); later Assistant Deputy Director of the National Security Agency.]

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[References to **BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES E. FREEZE (ECHELON ABOVE CORP, THE HONOLULU ACCORD 7 Mar 79)** in this document:

[Page 8](#)
[Page 27](#)
[Page 28](#)
[Page 29](#)
[Page 30](#)
[Page 102](#)
[Page 143](#)
[Page 180](#)
[Page 181](#)

References to **PANAMA** operations in this document:

[Page 8](#)
[Page 44](#)
[Page 79](#)
[Page 146](#)
[Page 190](#)]

[Ref. **TOP SECRET - UKUSA Agreement, Mar. 5, 1946, now called "Five Eyes"**]

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

30 2018

This is in further response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of June 10, 2008, for the INSCOM Annual History FY 1979 and supplements our letter of March 11, 2015.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 13526. As a result of this review, information has been sanitized as it is currently and properly classified TOP SECRET, SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.2 (a)(1), 1.2 (a)(2), 1.2 (a)(3) and 1.4(c) of EO 13526. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1). A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.2(a)(1) of EO 13526, provides that information shall be classified TOP SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.

Section 1.2(a)(2) of EO 13526, provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.2(a)(3) of EO 13526, provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.4(c) of EO 13526, provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, and cryptologic information shall be considered for classification protection.

The deleted information is also exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with EO 13526, Section 3.3(b)(1) because its release would clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source, a human intelligence source, a relationship with an intelligence or security service of a foreign government or international organization, or a nonhuman intelligence source; or impair the effectiveness of an intelligence method currently in use, available for use, or under development.

In addition, information has been withheld pursuant to Title 5 U. S. Code 552(b)(3) of the FOIA. Exemption (b)(3) pertains to information that is exempt by statute. The applicable statute is 50 U. S. Code 3024i which protects intelligence sources and methods.

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General Gary W. Johnston, the Commanding General U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 90 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 90-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts. You should state the basis of your disagreement with the response and provide justification for a

reconsideration of the denial. An appeal may not serve as a request for additional or new information. An appeal may only address information denied in this response. Your appeal is to be made to this office, for forwarding, as appropriate to the Secretary of the Army, Office of the General Counsel.

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (APPEAL)
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office
2600 Ernie Pyle Street, Room 3S02-B
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-5910

Coordination has been completed and we have been informed by the National Security Agency (NSA), that their information, contained in the records has been sanitized from the records pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3).

5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1), The information is properly classified in accordance with the criteria for classification in Section 1.4 of Executive Order (EO) 13526, as amended. The information is exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with Section 3.3(b) of EO 13526.

5 U.S. C. 552 (b)(3) – The specific statutes are listed below:
50 U.S.C. Code 3605 (Public Law 86-36 Section 6)
50 U.S.C. 3024(i)

The withholding of the information by the NSA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be sent to NSA/CSS Freedom of Information Act Appeal/Privacy Act Authority. The appeal shall be in writing to the NSA/CSS FOIA Appeal Authority (DJ4), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Mill Road, STE 6248, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-6248. The appeal shall reference the initial denial of access and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which you believe release of the information is required. Please cite FOIA Case #67171 assigned to the case so that it could be easily identified.

Coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been completed and we have been informed by the CIA that their information is partially releasable pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the FOIA.

The withholding of the information by the CIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the Agency Release Panel within 90 days from the date of this letter. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the following: Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC 20505. Please explain the basis of your appeal. Cite CIA #F-2016-00162 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

We have been advised by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that information has been sanitized from the records pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) (b)(3) and (b)(6) of the FOIA and Executive Order 13256 §§ 1.4(a) and 1.4(c). The applicable Statute is 10 U.S.C. §424 .

Their information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(3). The statute invoked under Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(3) is 10 U.S.C. §424 (b)(3), which allows for the protection of organizational and personnel information for DIA.

The withholding of the information by the DIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision directly to the DIA. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Attention: DAN-1A (FOIA), Washington, DC 20340-5100. Please cite DIA MDR-0174-2012 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

There are no assessable FOIA fees for processing this request.

If you have any questions regarding this action, feel free to contact this office at 1-866-548-5651, or email the INSCOM FOIA office at: usarmy.meade.902-mi-grp.mbx.inscom-foia-service-center@mail.mil and refer to case #596F-08. Please note that you now have the ability to check the status of your request online via the U.S. Army Records Management and Declassification Agency (RMDA) website: <https://www.foia.army.mil/FACTS/CaseStatus.aspx>. Please refer to FOIA Control Number: FA-08-2824. You may also seek dispute resolution services by contacting the INSCOM FOIA Public Liaison, Mrs. Joanne Benear at 301-677-7856.

Sincerely,



Michael T. Heaton
Director

Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Office
Investigative Records Repository

Enclosure

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ANNUAL HISTORICAL REVIEW
US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND

FISCAL YEAR 1979

OC 001

History Office
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command
Arlington Hall Station
Arlington, Virginia 22212
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September 1979

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PREFACE


(U) The purpose of the Annual Historical Review is to present a summary of the significant activities, events, and accomplishments of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). The split location of the HQ INSCOM staff between Arlington Hall Station and Fort George G. Meade has discouraged the presentation of a balanced coverage of non-cryptologic disciplines and functions. Nevertheless, there was a significant improvement in coverage of all operations in the FY 1979 Review.

(U) This volume was prepared in compliance with AR 870-5, Military History: Responsibilities, Policies and Procedures. It is intended that it provide a reference and research base as well as a current summary record of INSCOM activities during FY 1979. Principal source materials used in its compilation include the annual historical reports, briefings, INSCOM Quarterly Program Reviews, interviews, and miscellaneous documents and reports.

(U) The FY 1979 Annual Historical Review was the first summary in fifteen years not compiled under the direction of Mr. Lawton L. Sternbeck, who retired from Federal Service in January 1980 after having served as Command Historian since 1965. Although not formally trained as a historian, Mr. Sternbeck had vast experience in the area of intelligence operations and a knowledge of the Army structure and organization; possessed superior administrative skills; and had a good analytical mind required for historical research. Under his leadership, the Command History Program established new standards of excellence, including an improved format for the Annual Historical Review. Other notable achievements included instilling a greater awareness in HQ INSCOM staff to the historical needs of the Command; documentation of USASA's effort during the Vietnam War; preservation of significant historical documents; institution of an Oral History Program; and establishment of a Military Intelligence Historical Properties Collection and Military Intelligence Photograph Collection. Mr. Sternbeck will be remembered as being dedicated to the preservation of the history of military intelligence for future generations.

(U) This summary was prepared by Mr. James L. Gilbert with review and editing being accomplished by Miss Virginia A. Ferrell.

September 1980


JAMES L. GILBERT
Command Historian

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CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. FY 1979 OVERVIEW	1
II. MISSION, FUNCTIONS, AND LOCATION	8
Mission and Functions	8
Location	9
III. COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS	11
Command and Staff Relationships	11
Echelons Above Corps Study by Kuras-Alterman	11
Combat Development/Materiel Acquisition Role	12
Joint Electronic Warfare Center	12
Detachment G, 500th MI Group (Operational Control Issue).	13
Manpower Resources for the Community Support Center	14
The Honolulu Accord	14
IV. ORGANIZATION	17
INSCOM Organization	17
New HQ INSCOM TDA's	24
HQ INSCOM Restationing	24
Relocation of Staff Elements, HQ INSCOM	26
Reorganization of the Civilian Personnel Functions	26
Transfer of Value Engineering	27
Organization of the US Army Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity	27
Reorganization of US Army Field Station Okinawa	27
Activation of the 11th MI Company (Tech Intel) and 641st MI Detachment (Collection)	29
Discontinuance of Detachment G, 500th MI Group	29
Consolidation of INSCOM Aviation Assets in Korea	31
Post Panama Treaty Planning	31
V. RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT	34
Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Funds	34
Military Construction, Army (MCA)	37
Family Housing Units	38
Manpower Program	38
Military Strength by Program	39
Command Personnel Situation	40
Increased Manpower Requirements for Manning Collection	40
INSCOM Key Personnel	41
Communications Programs and Resources	41
Project STREAMLINER	42
Project LEMONADE	42
Project FASTBACK	42
Automated Data Processing Activities	43

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Chapter	Page
V. RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT (Continued)	
Organizational Effectiveness	44
General and Field Grade Officer Promotions	44
Reenlistment Rates	45
Critical MOS Recruitment Posture, FY 1979	46
Critical MOS Shortages by Unit	46
Critical MOS Fill	48
Enlistment and Reenlistment Incentives	49
Additional Skill Identifiers	51
Skill Qualification Test	51
In-Country Language Training	52
Asian Studies Detachment	53
Foreign Area Officer Steering Committee Membership	54
United Kingdom School of Service Intelligence	54
Intermediate Non-Morse Analysis Course	54
Mobile Maintenance Training Team	55
Equipment Training Role	55
Consolidation of Cryptologic Training	56
First INSCOM Training Conference	56
Command Exercise Support	57
Command Post Exercise NIFTY NUGGET/MOBEX 78	58
Command Post Exercise POWER PLAY	59
NATO Command Post Exercise WINTEX 79	60
INSCOM Operational Readiness Report	61
142d Military Intelligence Linguist Company, Utah	
National Guard	61
Army Command and Control Study - 82	62
Mobilization Requirements for Retired Army Personnel	62
Congressional Hearings on Army Security Reserve Units	63
Designation of Arlington Hall Station as Restricted Area	64
Implementation of SCI Interim Pilot Program for INSCOM	64
Marriage to Foreign Nationals	64
Military Justice	65
Polygraph Activities	66
Congressional Inquiries/Requests for Assistance	67
Status of Aircraft Resources	68
US Army Investigative Records Repository	68
Base Operations Support for Field Station Okinawa	
(Torii Station)	69
Japanese Facilities Adjustment Program	70
Rehling Nuclear Power Plant	72
Military Intelligence Historical Collection	73
Consolidation of Civilian Personnel Office Servicing	74
Civilian Hire Lag	74
INSCOM Senior Level Positions	75
Labor Relations	75
Civilian Training	76

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00 005

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ON 25 July 2018
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Chapter	Page
V. RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT (Continued)	
Secretary of the Army's Mobility, Opportunity and Development (SAMOD) Program	76
INSCOM Intern Program	76
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office	78
Equal Employment Opportunity Program	79
INSCOM Human Relations/Equal Opportunity Program	81
Upward Mobility	82
INSCOM Federal Women's Program	82
Public Affairs Activities	82
INSCOM Team Day Awards	83
Commander's Plaque for Operational Achievement (CY 1978).	84
Travis Trophy Award	84
The BG Bernard Ardisana Award	84
INSCOM Honor Guard and Drill Team	85
Camp Peary Meetings	85
Military Intelligence General Officer Conference	85
1978 INSCOM Commanders' Conference	86
SIGINT Analyst Conference	86
VI. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES	90
Multidiscipline Intelligence Information Report	90
Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training (REDTRAIN)	91
INSCOM Mobilization Concept and Plan	95
Korean Situation	99
Intelligence Priorities for Army Planning for FY's 1980-1989	100
Products Produced by US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center	100
Regional Appraisal Program	101
Cover and Deception	101
OPSEC Support Concept	102
SIGINT Publications	103
ELSEC Collection and Analysis System	104
Project CANCEL GAME	104
Joint Producer of Imagery Intelligence Architecture	104
(b)(1) Per CIA	105
The Great Coal Rip-off	105
US Army Master Management Plan for Electro-Optics Intelligence Collection	106
Project GRAVEL STREAM	106
Project GRAVEL WATER	107
NITE LITES System	107
TRIVIAL TIGER	108
(b)(3);50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3);P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA	109
System Development Model	110
On-Site User Test Guide	110
Systems Status Handbook	111

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
00 006

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Chapter

VI. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES (Continued)

Page

USSID 1000 Annex (Resource) Markup	111
USSID 1600 (SIGINT Tasking of US Army Tactical SIGINT Units)	112
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA	
Project [REDACTED]	114
Project STAIRWAY	115
[REDACTED] Modernization Project at Homestead	116
Resumption of Operations at US Army Field Station [REDACTED]	116
Wobeck	118
Traffic Fabrication	118
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per [REDACTED] Army Field Station [REDACTED] (SC)	119
Field Station Position Manning	120
Project [REDACTED]	120
Study of USAREUR Tactical SIGINT System	120
[REDACTED]	120
[REDACTED]	121
[REDACTED]	121
[REDACTED]	122
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA	122
[REDACTED]	122
[REDACTED]	123
[REDACTED]	123
[REDACTED]	124
Fly Away Team to Support Special Collection Operations	124
GUARDRAIL V Fielding [REDACTED]	124
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per [REDACTED]	125
Communications Facility, AN/MSC-67	125
Direction Finding Nets	126
[REDACTED]	127
[REDACTED]	128
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA	128
[REDACTED]	129
[REDACTED]	130
[REDACTED]	131
[REDACTED]	131
Project TRADE SCHOOL	132
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA	133
[REDACTED]	133
[REDACTED]	134
Project TOOL ROOM	134
Discontinuance of Detachment I, US Army Operational Group	134

(b)(3):50 USC 3024
(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;
(b) (1) Per NSA

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1)
Per NSA

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L.
86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-
36;(b) (1) Per NSA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chapter	Page
VII. OVERVIEW OF HUMINT	139
Introduction	139
Overt Collection	147
Clandestine Collection (C)	153

Appendix

A. USA INSCOM Organizational Structure (As of 30 Sep 79)	163
B. TOE Units (As of 30 Sep 79)	165
C. Changes in Status of TOE Units	167
D. TDA Units (As of 30 Sep 79)	168
E. Changes in Status of TDA Units	170
F. USA INSCOM Personnel Strength by Unit (As of 30 Sep 79)	172
G. USA INSCOM Key Personnel	176
H. Travis Trophy Winners	183
I. Photograph, Major General William I. Rolya, Commanding General, US Army Intelligence and Security Command	184
J. Photograph, INSCOM Commanders/Liaison Officers Attending Commanders' Conference, 23-27 Oct 78	185
K. Photograph, INSCOM Staff Officers Attending Commanders' Conference, 23-27 Oct 78	186
GLOSSARY	187
INSCOM Staff Directory - May 1979	

Tables

No.

1. Direct Funding by Subprogram (As of 30 Sep 79)	34
2. Direct Obligations by Element of Expense (FY 1979)	37
3. Military Strength by Program	39
4. OPA Funding - PE 381055A	42

xv

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No.		Page
5.	General and Field Grade Officer Promotions	44
6.	Unit Reenlistments, FY 1979	45
7.	Critical MOS Recruitment Posture, FY 1979	46
8.	Recruitment by Language (MOS 98G)	46
9.	Enlisted Personnel Posture by Critical MOS, FY's 1978-1979 . .	48
10.	Enlistment Incentives	49
11.	Reenlistment Incentives	50
12.	Serious Crime Offenses	65
13.	FY 1979 Administrative Eliminations	66
14.	Disposition of Other Offenses, FY 1979	66
15.	Polygraph Activities, FY 1979	67
16.	Aircraft Resources	68
17.	INSCOM Intern Program, FY 1979	77
18.	FOI and PA Requests During FY 1979	78
19.	Products Produced by ITAC	100
20.	Position Manning	120
21.	Army HUMINT Resources, 1964-78 (In constant 1978 dollars) . .	140
22.	Army HUMINT Manpower 1963-78	141
23.	Authorized HUMINT Strength—FY 1979	141
24.	INSCOM HUMINT Management and Administration Resources	147
25.	Overt Collection Resources	147
26.		
27.		
28.		
29.		
30.	AARCS Resources (C/NOFORN)	162

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

Figures

No.		
1.	Organizational Chart Showing INSCOM Executive Agent Responsi- bilities for REDTRAIN	93
2.	European Theater Army Intelligence Command	96
3.	Pacific Theater Army Intelligence Command	98
4.	The Army HUMINT Organization	142
5.	The Army HUMINT Slice, National Foreign Intelligence Program .	143
6.	The Army HUMINT Slice, Army Intelligence TOA	144
7.	Intelligence Tasking and Response	146
8.	Army Clandestine HUMINT Activity, FY 1978 (C)	154

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER II. MISSION, FUNCTIONS, AND LOCATION

1. AR 10-53, Organization and Functions, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, 15 Jun 78 (C), pp. 1-2.

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CHAPTER I

FY 1979 OVERVIEW

(FOUO) Even though FY 1979 appeared to be a year of stabilization, there were indications that underlying organizational problems, particularly at HQ INSCOM, would resurface. There was a general perception among the INSCOM Commander, subordinate Commanders, and staff officers at all levels that HQ INSCOM was not functioning as expected. These perceptions were recorded in statements from the staff, Organizational Effectiveness seminars, and the INSCOM Commanders' Conference, all showing a high degree of uniformity of view. A preponderance of opinion indicated that command goals and objectives were not effectively communicated to the staff; that even when effectively communicated, these goals and objectives were often not accepted by the staff; and that even though understood and accepted, staff performance was not totally effective in achieving goals and objectives. In August, the Mission and Analysis Office, HQ INSCOM, was tasked to prepare a study addressing the functional organization of HQ INSCOM and the problem areas, and to propose solutions. Although the study was unfinished at the close of FY 1979, the mere on-going concern and awareness that organizational problems exist indicate that more change is in the offing. Much has been accomplished during the three years since the initial merger of the Army intelligence disciplines, but full implementation of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS) cannot be completed as long as split headquarters continue to exist at Arlington Hall Station and Fort George G. Meade.

(U) FY 1979 witnessed little of the turbulence which characterized the organizational structure of INSCOM during the early years of formation. The new units which were activated included the 11th Military Intelligence (MI) Company and the 641st MI Detachment. The 11th was one-of-a-kind unit whose resources had been previously assigned to US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) to perform exploitation of foreign equipment and equipment support to the Army's Opposing Force Program. The 641st Detachment was designated as the INSCOM operating control element for human intelligence (HUMINT) readiness training in addition to its primary mission of providing HUMINT collection augmentation to the 66th MI Group. On 1 October 1978, the US Army Russian Institute was transferred from the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) to INSCOM. Located at Garmisch, Germany, the Institute offered an excellent facility to support INSCOM's unique training requirement. The transfer was motivated by US Army, Europe's (USAREUR) desired policy of having only the responsibility for activities which contributed to its mission. (Civilian instructors and support personnel were included in USAREUR's personnel authorization.)

(U) FY 1979 also concluded several organizational actions remaining from IOSS decisions. These included discontinuance of the INSCOM Personnel Detachments at Fort Dix, New Jersey; Fort Jackson, South Carolina; and

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Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, whose functions were transferred to the US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN). The INSCOM Detachment, Southern Command was discontinued on 16 November 1978 long after the unit's mission had become part of the multidiscipline 470th MI Group. On 30 November 1978, the US Army Technical Support Activity was also officially discontinued although its target exploitation (TAREX) functions had for some time been integrated into the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (ODCSOPS), HQ INSCOM, and MI Groups worldwide.

(U) Resource-wise, INSCOM grew proportionally during the report period. The Command's Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funding program stood at over \$83 million as opposed to over \$72 million in FY 1978. The predominant amount of the increase came in Subprogram P3I (Intelligence Activities), which rose from \$52 million to \$60 million. Manpower totals were up slightly both in authorized and actual numbers. At the close of FY 1978 strength figures stood at 10,754 authorized and 9,743 actual (foreign nationals not included), while FY 1979's end of year totals were 11,481 authorized and 10,682 actual (foreign nationals not included). With few exceptions, military strength grew across the board by program; an exception was Program 3 in which counterintelligence and investigative activities as a subprogram fell from 993 to 921 spaces.

(U) INSCOM unofficially adopted the motto, "Mission First—People Always," symbolic of its two on-going concerns. Recruitment and training of its personnel required much of INSCOM's energies. During FY 1979, the INSCOM Intern Program was launched for the purpose of selecting 28 highly talented and highly motivated persons and developing them by a systematic rotation and intensive training program. This would provide INSCOM with a broader base in the future from which to select senior action officers, first level supervisors, and managers. Those selected entered at a GS-5 level and would be required to advance at a reasonable rate to the GS-9 journeyman target job or be removed from the program. The 28 positions were divided among ten career fields.

(U) Looking at the enlisted personnel situation, the fill of the critical MOS 05 improved; however, in both 05K and 05H, improvements were negated by significant shortfalls in overseas units. CONUS units were overstrength due primarily to the return of overseas personnel. Other major problem areas included MOS 96B and MOS 96D whose shortages were attributable to decreasing Army strength grade imbalance, competing Army priorities, and security requirements. With the exception of the 501st MI Group, all MI Groups assigned to INSCOM experienced significant declines in MOS 97B. Although some of INSCOM's MI Groups experienced slight increases, the critical shortage of MOS 97C Army-wide was 50.3 percent and was expected to decrease even further.

(U) In July 1978, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) formally recognized its responsibility to train maintenance personnel to support strategic intelligence systems which had been fielded but original

contractor training had ceased. As a result, in March 1979, the Mobile Maintenance Training Team concept was developed to fill the training void created by many one-of-a-kind or station unique systems, particularly in Europe, for which there was no formal training available. It was designed to provide required maintenance training, mainly to MOS 33S personnel, by highly qualified instructor personnel from the US Army Intelligence School Devens (USAISD).

(U) During the fiscal year, steps were taken to aid INSCOM in being able to support NSACSS-developed strategic SIGINT systems. In December 1978, NSACSS and DA agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in which each would recognize the system documentation of the other. In addition, INSCOM Pamphlet 11-25 (Systems Development Model) was published and the Training Support Work Group began operating. The Training Support Work Group, chaired by the USA Communications and Electronics Materiel Readiness Command, met in October 1978 to assist in development of New Equipment Training Plans and Quantitative and Qualitative Personnel Requirements Information documents. Despite these steps, no agreement was reached among the major Army commands themselves for the responsibility of strategic SIGINT materiel developed by NSACSS.

(U) AR 350-3, Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training (REDTRAIN), was published and became effective on 1 July 1979. The objectives of REDTRAIN as stated by the AR were to: Provide the tactical commander proficient tactical intelligence personnel to support combat operations; provide the tactical commander with combat data and intelligence to support operational planning; and contribute to the satisfaction of Army intelligence requirements. Perhaps the most significant REDTRAIN milestone for FY 1979 was in the area of HUMINT. The recently activated 641st MI Detachment provided, for the first time, training in a HUMINT MOS to personnel of Company C, 826th MI Battalion (Reserve). Additionally, the 641st was involved with REDTRAIN in support of the US Army Operational Group and USAREUR in contingency situations. Despite evidence of progress, REDTRAIN faced uncertain future resource problems both in the area of budgeting sufficient funds and low manning levels in the SIGINT/EW Entry Military Occupational Specialty (EMOS).

(U) FY 1979 represented the end of the first phase of the Army's Organizational Effectiveness (OE) effort—the systematic military application of selected management and behavioral science skills and methods to improve how an organization functions to accomplish assigned missions and increase combat readiness. This phase was called the "Establishment Years." In January 1979, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCSPER), HQ INSCOM, hosted a worldwide conference of INSCOM S-1's/Directors of Personnel and Community Activities and Reenlistment NCO/Officers to address major personnel issues of the Command. The conference was significant in that it represented the first "macro-intervention"—the first time OE had been applied within INSCOM in a forum composed of command-wide representatives.

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(S-~~CCO~~) Several actions were undertaken to assist the coordination and development of strategic SIGINT systems within the Army. On 15 July 1979, the System Development Model (INSCOM Pamphlet 11-25) was completed. The model was to be used within the intelligence community and participating major Army commands (MACOM's) to monitor and coordinate Army participation in the development, support planning, fielding, and transition of strategic SIGINT systems. At the same time, the On-Site User Test Manual (INSCOM Pamphlet 70-1), the first of its kind, was published. The pamphlet was prepared to provide guidance for personnel in the INSCOM units conducting on-site user tests (OSUT) of fielded low density systems used in fixed or non-tactical operations. It established guidelines from early planning through publication of OSUT results. Finally, on 1 February 1979, the first Systems Handbook was published. This reference document for validated strategic SIGINT systems provided a base upon which INSCOM/DA resource requirements could be identified and appropriate programming action initiated.

(U)
(S) During FY 1979, INSCOM's Mobilization Concept and Plan was being developed as it interacted with other planning efforts. In December 1978, both the Pacific and European operation plans (OPLAN's) were briefed to the CDR INSCOM and were accepted. However, little more definitive progress was made concerning the European plan, which faced unresolved questions concerning doctrine of field station closures, inter/intra theater transportation, lack of sufficient equipment to support the plan, and absence of all-source mechanism to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the other hand, the Pacific concept was sent to DA for approval; however, it still faced serious resource problems before it could be implemented.

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(U) Within operational security (OPSEC), an action of long range significance was the formulation of the OPSEC Support Concept and the implementing plan which provided guidance to INSCOM as to the manner in which INSCOM units would meet OPSEC support responsibilities as delineated in AR 530-1. The concept was scheduled for submission through DA to TRADOC in FY 1980. In its draft form, INSCOM's OPSEC Support concept defined the relationship between OPSEC and OPSEC Support as distinct—OPSEC being a Command responsibility met first through organic resources; OPSEC Support reviewing the threat, vulnerabilities and countermeasures taken, but not performing the OPSEC mission for the supported command.

(u)
(c) At the direction of CDR INSCOM, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Counter-intelligence, HQ INSCOM, and the 902d MI Group initiated actions to conduct an evaluation of the Army's nuclear community and determine the vulnerabilities that were susceptible to hostile intelligence exploitation. The plan known as CANCEL GAME, was to be an 18-month effort examining units in both CONUS and Europe.

(U) As a part of a joint effort with TRADOC, INSCOM contributed to the writing of the first "Imagery Intelligence Architecture," dated 25 January 1979. It delineated the battlefield commander's functions by echelons above corps, corps, and division and related the role of imagery to these functions. However, because it was an overview, many areas were left for future definition.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(C) During FY 1979, the long awaited deployment [] of GUARDRAIL V and [] took place. In February, four RU-21's were deployed to [] as part of GUARDRAIL V, a COMINT/DF collection system. A month later, six RV-1's were flown to [] These were [] II aircraft equipped for ELINT identification and location. [] was initially plagued by lack of specific tasking and reporting guidance from the J2, US Forces [] computer software inconsistencies, and the absence of experienced [] and ELINT analyst personnel; however, by 15 September 1979, [] reporting was in process.

(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i);(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36;
(b) (1) Per NSA

(TSC/LIMDIS) Undoubtedly, the most sensational TAREX contribution was TOTAL DISCOVERY, the name given a bundle of 800-1,000 documents found in July 1979 washed ashore on Kwajalein Island in the Pacific. The papers appeared to be the working papers of a Soviet shipborne SIGINT collector. The documents included intercept of US communications (primarily plain text) between Navy ships, DF logs, Soviet TEXTA, US codename identifications, and logs of intercepted US telephone conversations. NSACSS was in the process of fully evaluating the documents.

(C) In the area of HUMINT, the US Army Operational Group initiated the Latin Emigre Exploitation Program (LEEP) to overtly debrief Cuban emigres entering the United States through, or living in, Miami, Florida. It was hopeful that LEEP would not only provide substantive intelligence information

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but would also provide a realistic training opportunity for FORSCOM interrogators/analysts under the aegis of REDTRAIN. In September 1979, CDR INSCOM approved the Overt Operational Proposal, and the Chief of Staff, HQ INSCOM forwarded a signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to the Chief of Staff, FORSCOM for his signature. In light of the anticipated MOU approval, personnel began arriving in Miami prior to the close of the fiscal year to establish LEEP.

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(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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CHAPTER II

MISSION, FUNCTIONS, AND LOCATION

Mission and Functions. ^(U)~~(S)~~ The mission for the Commanding General, US Army Intelligence and Security Command (CG INSCOM), as set forth in AR 10-53, effective 15 June 1978, was to-

1. Conduct intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), and electronic warfare (EW) operations in support of the Army at Echelons Above Corps (EAC).
2. Conduct Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) operations as a member of the United States SIGINT System (USSS).
3. Command the Army component of the Central Security Service (CSS) and serve as Chief of the Army Service Cryptologic Agency (SCA).
4. Conduct Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations in general support of Army and other authorized United States intelligence community collection requirements.
5. Conduct CI investigations and operations, collection, production, and related CI support activities.
6. Provide Army-wide all-source multidisciplined Operational Security (OPSEC) support.
7. Conduct Army-wide signal security (SIGSEC) support operations.
8. Analyze, produce and disseminate all-source counterintelligence and general intelligence (less medical) and provide all-source threat analysis support to the Army, as authorized by pertinent statutory and regulatory authorities.
9. Provide technical advice and operational assistance to other functional and operating Major Army Commands (MACOM's) in the discharge of their intelligence, EW and security responsibilities.
10. Act as the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Executive Agent for the management of the Military Intelligence Peacetime Utilization Program, Active and Reserve.
11. Provide advice, assistance and technical/operational support to insure maximum exploitation of national intelligence assets in improving ground processing and dissemination for tactical support from Special Activities Office (SAO) systems.

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12. Act as the Initial Denial Authority (IDA) and Access Amendment Refusal (AAR) authority for all requests involving US Army intelligence investigative files.

13. Act as the HQDA Executive Agent for target exploitation (TAREX), a cryptologic directed activity dealing with the collection and exploitation of cryptologic associated information, equipment and documents.

14. Conduct, or participate in, photographic intelligence (PHOTINT) operations in general support of Army and other authorized United States intelligence community collection requirements.

Location. (U) Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command was located at Arlington Hall Station, 4000 Arlington Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22212. Until a final stationing decision is effected, certain staff functions will continue to be located at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755.

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CHAPTER III

COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

Command and Staff Relationships. (C) AR 10-53, Organization and Functions, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, effective 15 June 1978, established the basic command and staff relationships for INSCOM. The regulation outlined the following relationships:

1. The CG, INSCOM, is under the supervision of the Chief of Staff, US Army. Directives, authorities, policy, planning and programming guidance, approval programs, and resource allocations, and other methods of command direction are issued to CG, INSCOM, by the Chief of Staff, US Army.

2. The CG, INSCOM—

a. Commands the Army component of the Central Security Service (CSS) and is subordinate to the Chief, Central Security Service (CHCSS) for the conduct of SIGINT operations.

b. Manages SIGINT resources to accomplish SIGINT operational tasks assigned by DIRNSA/CHCSS.

c. Provides specified military personnel and administrative, logistic, and operational support to the DIRNSA/CHCSS as authorized by HQDA.

d. (b)(1) Per DIA

3. INSCOM and other MACOM's are coordinate elements of DA. The CG, INSCOM, is authorized to communicate directly with other major Army commands or with heads of Army Staff agencies on matters of mutual interest.

4. The CG, INSCOM, will maintain liaison as necessary with MACOM's field operating agencies, other cryptologic and intelligence activities, and other governmental agencies to maintain an awareness of, to exchange information on, and to insure coordination of matters of mutual concern.

Echelons Above Corps Study By Kuras-Alterman. (U) In March 1979, the Intelligence, Security, and Electronic Warfare Support to Echelons Above Corps Study, conducted by the Kuras-Alterman Corporation, McLean, Virginia, was completed. The study was then coordinated within the Department of the Army (DA) for comments, and its findings were overall favorably received. However, the study raised several major points of contention

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which remained to be addressed apart from the study itself. These included the question of proponentcy for combat development functions covered by the study and what charter the implementing organization would possess. A second major issue was the defining of the INSCOM Commander's role relating to tactical intelligence at echelons above corps (EAC).

(U) Another result of the Kuras-Alterman Study was the surfacing of the larger issue of EAC. Not only did the requirement to address the intelligence aspects of echelons above corps exist, but there was the need to focus on other combat support and combat services support areas. The Vice Chief of Staff, US Army was considering directing TRADOC (US Army Training and Doctrine Command) to continue development of EAC doctrine with participation from the Army community. At the close of FY 1979, no formal decision in this regard had been made.²

Combat Development/Materiel Acquisition Role. (U) Based on the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study, INSCOM's predecessor, the US Army Security Agency, was divested of its combat developments and materiel acquisition functions. These functions were transferred to TRADOC and DARCOM (US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command) in 1976; however, after three years, DARCOM still has not fully assumed the strategic SIGINT systems development and acquisition burdens, and TRADOC has ignored doctrine and units for echelons above corps. To date, TRADOC has not proven to be an effective "user" representative for INSCOM requirements nor is it likely to be in the foreseeable future. While DARCOM subcommands are attempting to come to grips with strategic SIGINT systems development and deployment, NSA development philosophies are so alien to the Army philosophies that a total disconnect results unless INSCOM is centrally involved to translate operator requirements for both institutions. Attempts to formalize INSCOM involvement (the Life Cycle Management Model) have generated significant tension between DARCOM and INSCOM. INSCOM's attempts to determine its own future essentially are perceived by the Army as attempts to revive ASA/USAINTA or some analogous vertical structure and blocked accordingly despite lack of problem solution by those who impose the blockages.

(U) Although INSCOM could ignore the combat development and materiel acquisition arena, allocating its resources to the solution of other problems, the combat development and materiel acquisition problems remain and continue to impact. For example, the discrepancy in philosophies between Army and NSA contributes to the chronic cryptologic personnel shortfalls. Lack of a mechanism to introduce planning requirements associated with new systems into the Army procurement cycle early enough (two to three years) insures that when demand for position fill is exercised, those personnel who end up doing strategic collection and processing are those programmed several years before for tactical requirements.³

Joint Electronic Warfare Center. (U) By Memorandum, dated 28 November 1977, the Secretary of Defense established a Joint Electronic Warfare Center

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(JEWEC), to function under the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the Director for Operations, J3. On 26 August 1978, the Secretary of Defense directed that the services assign personnel to the already existing Air Force EW Center (AFEWC) by 1 February 1979. At DA's direction, INSCOM transferred eight spaces from Field Station San Antonio to the JEWEC on 11 December 1978. These spaces were already working in AFEWC but were carried by FS San Antonio. On 1 November 1978, again at DA's direction, INSCOM was told to provide \$234,000 to the JEWEC for automatic data processing (ADP) support. These funds were provided by HQDA (DCSOPS) through INSCOM as the Army's portion of the DOD-directed ADP support.

(U) INSCOM requested to be appointed the Army's Executive Agent/proponent for the Army element of the Joint Electronic Warfare Center but was turned down by HQDA, since the Center was a joint organization and an element under the supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), a separate Army, Navy, or Air Force element per se would not be required for a Service Executive Agent or proponent.⁴

Detachment G, 500th MI Group (Operational Control Issue). ^(u)~~(C)~~ In July 1976, the 500th MI Group Headquarters was relocated from Hawaii to Japan. This move was viewed as possibly being politically sensitive, and the relocation was approved only after thorough research into whether it would cause embarrassment to the Japanese Government or a strain in US-Japan relations. Informal discussions were held with selected Japanese officials, senior US military officials in Japan, and with the US Embassy. Two of the Japanese officials whose views were solicited were the Administrative Vice Minister, Japan Defense Agency and the G-2, Ground Service Organization (GSO). The consensus was that the Japanese would have no objection to this move provided (1) the move would be accomplished in a low-key manner, without publicity or ceremony, and (2) the Headquarters, 500th MI Group in Japan would not direct operational activities from bases/countries outside Japan.

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Manpower Resources for the Community Support Center (CSC). (U) In the summer of 1978, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), DA, requested that the two officer spaces of INSCOM within the Community Support Center be transferred to the US Army Element, Committee on Imagery Requirement and Exploitation (COMIREX). ACSI viewed CSC functions as a DA staff responsibility. The Air Force representatives were directly under Air Staff control, and the Navy was considering placing theirs under the Naval Staff. ACSI also believed that INSCOM should not be in the position of validating and prioritizing collection requirements for other MACOM's. This function, as performed by the CSC, constituted daily policy making and was in fact an extension of the COMIREX.

(U) INSCOM nonconcurred with transfer of spaces since it believed the functions performed at the CSC were mostly operational and not policy making and therefore was an INSCOM responsibility under ACSI policy guidance in accordance with the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS). To ACSI's argument that INSCOM should not validate collection requirements from other MACOM's, INSCOM contended that other functional MACOM's perform their functions for INSCOM, therefore, INSCOM should be able to perform intelligence operations for them. Validating and prioritizing collection requirements was an operational implementation of policy.

(U) On 10 October 1978, a Memorandum of Understanding was effected between the Director of Intelligence Systems, OACSI and DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, wherein INSCOM would provide two officers for duty at the CSC to represent Army's interests. These CSC resources were placed on Special Duty from INSCOM under the operational control of Intelligence Systems through 31 July 1979. The personnel were to be rated and indorsed as specified by the Director of Intelligence Systems. The evaluation would be reviewed as directed by INSCOM. Effective 1 August 1979, operational control was passed to INSCOM for a 90-day transition period. INSCOM was slated to receive the operational portion of the CSC mission on 1 November. The Director of Intelligence Systems would retain the policy aspects for Army and by 1 November would issue policy guidelines for CSC operations for use when INSCOM assumed the CSC operational mission.⁶

The Honolulu Accord. (U) The Honolulu Accord addressed actions related to intelligence, security, and electronic warfare (ISE) support to the new Pacific Major Command, US Army Western Command (WESTCOM). It provided guidelines for continued joint development of a support concept between the US Army CINCPAC Support Group (Prov)(later a part of WESTCOM) and

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INSCOM. On 7 March 1979, BG Freeze, DCG-I, INSCOM and MG Wolff, CDR, WESTCOM signed the Accord.

(U) Fundamental principles in developing ISE support to WESTCOM were: (1) There would be no disruption of existing peacetime intelligence production and collection tasking channels; (2) Army intelligence-related capability developed to support WESTCOM should not functionally duplicate other support available to WESTCOM; (3) only needed intelligence capability would be developed; (4) a new Army intelligence production effort should not be developed to exclusively support WESTCOM; and (5) intelligence support should be "all-source" support.

(U) The central inhibitor of the overall support concept was the lack of resources. Without adequate resources, particularly automatic data processing equipment, the concept was unworkable. The planned INSCOM Theater Intelligence Center (ITIC), Fort Shafter, Hawaii, initially would have no in-house ADP capability and would have to rely upon "borrowed" time from other on-island computer facilities which could not handle classification higher than Confidential. However, methods to obtain necessary resources were being explored by INSCOM/WESTCOM joint effort.⁷

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER III. COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

1. AR 10-53, Organization and Functions, INSCOM, 15 Jun 78 (C), pp. 5-6.
2. Interview, Mr. C. F. Schofield, ODCSS, HQ INSCOM w/Mr. Gilbert, History Office, 10 Jan 80 (U).
3. Camp Peary Book 2 (Jun 79)(S/NOFORN).
4. Black Book Item, IAOPS-SE-0, 14 May 79, subj: Joint Electronic Warfare Center (JEWIC). (U)
5. Black Book Item, IAFM-OPS-HU-FE, 20 Sep 78, subj: Detachment G, 500th MI Gp (Operational Control Issue). ~~(C)~~(U)
6. MOU, DAMI-ISP, 10 Oct 78, subj: Manpower Resources for the Community Support Center. (U); Talking Paper, IAOPS-I, 17 Aug 78, subj: Manpower Resources for the Community Support Center. (U)
7. The Honolulu Accord, 7 Mar 79 (U); AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/LIMDIS), p. 181; AHR, Automated Management Office, FY79 (U), p. II-4.

CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZATION

INSCOM Organization. (U) At the close of FY 1979, there was a total of 54 units (17 TOE and 37 TDA) in the INSCOM organizational structure. This TDA figure does not include Augmentation, Augmentation (Carrier), or Provisional units. Worldwide organization and deployment, as of 30 September 1979 is indicated in appendix A. For lists of TOE and TDA units at the close of the report period, see appendixes B and D, respectively. Changes in the status of TOE and TDA units occurring during the fiscal year are depicted in appendixes C and E, respectively.

(U) Major General William I. Rolya commanded the US Army Intelligence and Security Command throughout the year. Brigadier General James E. Freeze served as Deputy Commander for Intelligence until 31 July 1979, at which time Brigadier General Thomas J. Flynn assumed the position. With the changeover, there was also a relocation of the position's duty station from Fort George G. Meade (FGGM) to Arlington Hall Station (AHS). The rationale was that the primary operations element (ODCSOPS) was at AHS. At the same time, Brigadier John A. Smith, Jr., who served the entire year as Deputy Commanding General for Security and Production, transferred from AHS to FGGM.

(U) At the end of FY 1979, Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command was organized to consist of a Command Group, General Staff, and Personal Staff as shown below:

Command Group:

Commanding General (CG). (U) The CG, US Army Intelligence and Security Command was responsible to the Chief of Staff, US Army, for accomplishment of the missions and functions prescribed by AR 10-53 and was concurrently responsible to the Chief, Central Security Service, for all SIGINT activities for which National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSACSS) was responsible.

Deputy Commanding General for Intelligence (DCG-I). (U) The Deputy Commanding General for Intelligence assisted the CG in the management of all intelligence operations of USAINSCOM to include electronic warfare in its offensive role (electronic warfare support measures and electronic countermeasures).

Deputy Commanding General for Security and Production (DCG-SP). (U) The Deputy Commanding General for Security and Production assisted the CG in the management of all threat analysis production and intelligence countermeasures operations of USAINSCOM to include electronic warfare in its defensive role (electronic countermeasures).

Command Sergeant Major (CSM). (U) The CSM served as a personal advisor and principal enlisted assistant to the CG on those matters pertaining primarily to enlisted personnel including, but not limited to, morale, welfare, customs and courtesies of the service; enlistment and reenlistment, discipline, and promotion policies.

Chief of Staff (CofS). (U) The CofS acted as the principal coordinating agent of, and advisor to, the CG and DCG's on those matters pertaining to USAINSCOM; directed and coordinated the staff to achieve efficiency and unity of action; and assisted the CG and DCG's in the supervision of the execution of orders. Directly subordinate to the CofS were the Liaison Officers, the Mission Analysis Office, the Office of Public Affairs, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Office.

Assistant Chief of Staff (ACofS). (U) The ACofS acted for the CofS during his absence and performed other duties as assigned by the CofS. Supervised the activities of the Secretary of the General Staff, Office of Public Affairs, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Office.

Chief, Mission Analysis Office (CMAO). (U) The Chief, MAO provided advice and assistance to the CG in formulating future goals for the command and the broad strategies to achieve them. On 1 October 1978, the Office of Plans, Programs and Analysis, OCofS, was redesignated as the Mission Analysis Office. The name change reflected a modification and redirection of mission.

Public Affairs Officer (PAO). (U) As the PAO for USAINSCOM, he served the CG and staff on all public affairs matters. On 1 October 1978, the audio-visual functions of the office were transferred to the US Army Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity (Provisional). (For further discussion, see "Organization of the US Army Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity," in this chapter.)

Equal Employment Opportunity Officer (EEOO). (U) The EEOO provided staff leadership and guidance to the EEO Program, the Federal Women's Program, and the Spanish-Speaking Program. On 5 February 1978, the EEO functions and personnel were transferred from the DCSPER and placed as a separate element under supervision of the CofS. This was in keeping with the Department of the Army's instructions regarding the placement of command EEO offices.

Liaison Officers. (U) The Liaison Officers provided liaison representation to DARCOM, FORSCOM, TRADOC, and other commands as required. The liaison officer's primary duty was to maintain continuity in the exchange of information and to promote cooperation and coordination of effort by personal contact between representatives of HQ INSCOM and those of the host Headquarters. During FY 1979, there were full-time INSCOM liaison positions at DARCOM, FORSCOM, and TRADOC. Although letters of instruction from the

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CG to these liaison officers were promulgated in June 1978, the actual spaces transferring the officers to the OCoFS did not occur until the publication of the new HQ INSCOM TDA, effective 30 November 1978. A previous policy of having INSCOM personnel assigned to a subordinate unit located in the vicinity of another MACOM attempt to represent the CG in a liaison capacity proved impractical and was discontinued.

General Staff:

Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCSPER). (U) The DCSPER served as the principal staff officer for the administration of military and civilian personnel. He acted for the CG in the direction, supervision, and coordination of plans, policies, and procedures for personnel administration, distribution, and management; maintenance of order and discipline; safety; welfare; morale; organizational effectiveness; human affairs; and non-appropriated fund activities. Dramatic changes occurred in ODCSPER during FY 1979. On 1 October, the training functions were transferred to DCSOPS. The transfer of training functions had been debated for sometime, and always resolved in favor of the DCSPER. However, with the transfer of training functions to the DCSOPS at DA level, the Command Group, HQ INSCOM, took the opportunity to follow suit. With the exception of two civilian spaces, manpower resources assigned to the training functions within ODCSPER were also transferred.

(U) On 5 February 1978, the Equal Employment Opportunity and Federal Women's Program functions were transferred from DCSPER and made a separate office, Equal Employment Opportunity Office, under the CoFS. This was done to provide greater visibility for the functions as recommended by DA regarding the placement of command EEO Offices.

(U) Many of the former functions of the Adjutant General's Office that were integrated into the ODCSPER in January 1978 were transferred to the US Army Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity (Provisional) on 1 October 1978. On 6 November 1978, DA formally approved the reorganization of the civilian personnel functions which had been in effect since February 1978. HQ INSCOM staff functions concerning civilian personnel were separated from operating functions. As a result, a Staff Civilian Personnel Officer position was created under DCSPER and the civilian personnel operating functions were transferred to US Army Garrison, Arlington Hall Station.

(U) At the close of FY 1979, organizationally, the ODCSPER consisted of a Human Relations/Equal Opportunity Office; Plans, Policy and Management Division; Military Personnel Division; and Civilian Personnel Division.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (DCSOPS). (C) The DCSOPS formulated and implemented INSCOM policy on multidiscipline collection and electronic warfare activities; coordinated and supervised conduct of INSCOM operations

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involving human intelligence (HUMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and electronic warfare (EW) resources; provided organizational and operational analysis and evaluations; provided operational advice and assistance on intelligence collection, exploitation, and EW matters to major Army commands and activities; developed, coordinated, and promulgated operational directives for the conduct of specified collection operations; managed multidiscipline intelligence collection requirements; maintained appropriate liaison with elements of the Department of the Army (DA), National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSACSS), Department of Defense (DOD), (b)(3) Per DIA, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other governmental agencies, major Army commands and military services; served as the principal deputy for military planning, training and reserve activities; supervised the command historical program; provided representation on specified boards, committees, and working groups involving Army intelligence and EW activities; developed, coordinated, and promulgated appropriate planning incident to collection (strategy), programming, budgeting, and the conduct of intelligence and EW operational and contingency plans; acted as the INSCOM Program Manager for SIGINT, EW, HUMINT, and IMINT, and SAO (Special Activities Office) appropriations; served as the Chairperson for the command's Field Visitation Program Review Committee (FVPRC), providing an executive secretary for the committee and maintaining a central file for the program. Served as the primary INSCOM representative on the Army Electronic Warfare and Intelligence Board Working Committee (AEWIBWC). Served as the Chairman for the OPSEC Steering Committee.

(U) On 1 October 1978, the training functions were transferred from DCSPER to DCSOPS. This meant that matters pertaining to AIT (advanced individual training), specialized training enroute to units, functional training, ASI (additional skill identifier) justification, SQT (skill qualification test), Program 8 (Training), language training, education matters, etc., would in the future be handled by DCSOPS.

(U) There was only one major reorganization within ODCSOPS during FY 1979. The Operations Readiness Division was disestablished on 26 July 1979. The primary reason was the need to recognize the elevated role of the Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC), formerly a subordinate element of Operations and Readiness. The ICC was directly subordinated to DCSOPS, and another former subordinate element of the Readiness Division, the Staff Aviation Office, was also made a separate entity directly under the DCSOPS. The remaining Readiness functions were merged with those of the Management Office, which was redesignated as the Programs, Policy, and Readiness (PPR) Division.

(U) At the close of FY 1979, the ODCSOPS was comprised of the following subordinate elements: History Office; Intelligence Coordination Center; Administrative Office; Staff Aviation Office; Plans, Training, and Reserve Affairs; Program, Policy, and Readiness Division; ADCSOPS (SIGINT/EW);

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Imagery Division; and ADCSOPS (HUMINT).

Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics (DCSLOG). (U) The DCSLOG served as the principal staff assistant in matters pertaining to logistics to include integrated logistics planning, programming, procurement, budgeting, distribution, storage, disposition and maintenance of electronic equipment/systems (less telecommunications), engineering, construction, support services, transportation, materiel readiness, and real property management activities. Served as Program Area Director for budgeting of requirements in the logistics area. Developed INSCOM requirements for Base Rights overseas and represented the CG at conferences with other governmental agencies to develop guidelines for negotiation of treaties with foreign governments. Acted as the Command G-2, as defined in AR 381-143 (u) (C). Served as the INSCOM Project Manager for re-stationing, consolidations, and realignment studies of INSCOM units/activities worldwide.

(U) During FY 1979, the organization of ODCSLOG remained the same. It consisted of Assistant DCSLOG at Arlington Hall Station, Assistant DCSLOG at Fort George G. Meade, the Supply and Services Division (portions of the division were located at both AHS and FGGM), Maintenance Division, Installation Division, Fixed Station Engineering Division, Management Office, and Administrative Office.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems (DCSS). (U) The DCSS was the principal assistant in matters pertaining to planning, development, and acquisition of the INSCOM's requirements, conceptual planning, interoperability, and systems management in support of field stations and intelligence, electronic warfare, counterintelligence, operations security, HUMINT, and imagery units at theater echelons above corps (EAC). (EAC is defined as those organizations providing intelligence support to area theater commands and above.) The DCSS interfaced with NSA, other services, national intelligence organizations and other major Army commands in matters pertaining to the development of intelligence and EW systems. Represented INSCOM at formal NSA reviews and Department of the Army in-process reviews (IPR's) during the conceptual and development phase of new intelligence systems. Reviewed and evaluated, in coordination with HQDA, TRADOC, and other major Army commands, the Army materiel requirements, concepts, doctrine, operational testing, and other developmental activities associated with EAC. Developed and coordinated the INSCOM position on materiel research, development and acquisition projects which had application at EAC; coordinated, within INSCOM, intelligence concepts, systems requirements, procurement plans, and related actions to include organizational and operational concepts, doctrine, user tests and other plans relating to total INSCOM intelligence requirements in support of DA, major Army commands, and other services and governmental agencies. Provided technical advice and assistance concerning intelligence, EW, counterintelligence and OPSEC support materiel requirements, concepts and deployment in response to requests by other commanders and major Army commands.

(U) During the reporting period, ODCSS continued to consist of two major elements: Concepts and Requirements Division and Systems Division.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Threat Analysis (DCSITA).

(U) The DCSITA served as the principal advisor to the CG in matters pertaining to general intelligence (less medical) threat and counterintelligence and imagery analysis support, production and dissemination. Developed and coordinated implementation of plans, programs and policies of INSCOM activities in these areas. Assured that INSCOM production responded to and satisfied customer needs. Requested information from, and provided intelligence related assistance to Army scientific and technical producers. Assured that requests to INSCOM for production of finished intelligence represented valid production gaps and were feasible for production; that scientific and technical intelligence was incorporated in Army general intelligence production and threat analysis efforts; and that finished products met user, legal and regulatory requirements. Coordinated INSCOM participation in the Defense Intelligence Production Schedule (DIPS) and developed the intelligence and threat analysis production portions of INSCOM participation in The Army Studies Program (TASP).

(U) ODCSITA was comprised of a Management Division, a Requirements Division, and an Administrative Office at the end of FY 1979.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Counterintelligence (DCSCI). (U) The DCSCI directed and coordinated counterintelligence and signal security activities in INSCOM. Acted for the CG in the management, direction, control, monitoring and coordination of signal security, selected counterintelligence operations security support, and polygraph activities, and as the program manager for CI/SIGSEC funds and resources. (The definition of the term operations security (OPSEC) support includes those CI and SIGSEC functions which primarily support the US Army OPSEC program.) The DCSCI exercised staff supervision over the US Army Central Security Facility.

(U) During FY 1979, the ODCSCI underwent several major changes organizationally. On 19 February 1979, the Office of the Assistant DCSCI (Operations)(OADCSCI(O)) was established and consisted of a Support Division and Counter-HUMINT Division at FGGM and a SIGSEC Division at VHFS. The Security Support Branch was redesignated the Support Division on 20 February. The Counter-HUMINT Division was formed on 20 February, using a portion of the former Operations Division CI as a basis; the other portion being transferred to the newly formed Support Division. On 22 February, the Policy and Program Management Division, SIGSEC was redesignated as Policy and Program Management Division. Plans Division, OADCSCI(O) was formed on 1 September 1979.

(U) At the close of FY 1979, ODCSCI consisted of an executive officer and Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Counterintelligence as in the previous year. The ADCSCI(O) oversaw the Support Division (FGGM), Counter-HUMINT Division (FGGM), Plans Division (FGGM), and SIGSEC Division (VHFS). The

other major elements were the Command Security Office (AHS) and the Policy and Program Management Division (AHS).

Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management (DCSRM). (U) The DCSRM was the principal staff officer in matters concerning management, financial management, and manpower management. Established and maintained administrative control of appropriated funds for which the CG is responsible under the provisions of AR 37-20. Exercised responsibility for manpower management and The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS) to include responsibility for activations/organizations, inactivations/discontinuances, and reorganizations of the active force. Developed and supervised the implementation of force requirements, administered the structure strength program, and exercised control over the manpower survey and equipment survey programs. Administered the comptroller and the manpower/force management civilian career programs. Organizationally, DCSRM consisted of an Administrative Office, Cost and Economic Analysis Office, Manpower Division, Internal Review Division, Program and Budget Division, Management and Analysis Division, Finance and Accounting Division and Quality Assurance Division. The former Program Analysis and Evaluation Office and the Budget Division were combined to form the Program and Budget Division on 1 October 1978. The Quality Assurance Division became a part of ODCSRM in October 1977 with the integration of staff elements at Arlington Hall Station and Fort George G. Meade.

Chief, Automation Management Office. (U) The Chief, Automation Management Office served as the principal staff officer in matters pertaining to the use of automation within the command; exercised operational control over the Automated Systems Activity (ASA); and supervised and controlled automation design and development centers throughout INSCOM. The Chief, Automation Management Office served as the Commander, Automated Systems Activity.

(U) Effective 30 November 1978, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Automated Data Processing (DCSADP) and the Data Systems Activity were combined into one organization—the Automated Systems Activity. At the same time, the Automation Management Office was established. The office consisted solely of the Chief, but plans at the close of FY 1979 were calling for increased personnel.

Assistant Chief of Staff, Telecommunications (ACSTEL). (U) The ACSTEL was principal staff assistant in matters pertaining to telecommunications to include programming, procurement, budgeting, distribution, storage, engineering, installation, disposition, and maintenance of telecommunication equipment/systems. The Director, USA Communications Command-INSCOM served concurrently as the ACSTEL. The CG INSCOM exercised operational control over the USACC-INSCOM. Upon publication of INSCOM Regulation 10-2 on 29 March 1979, The Deputy Chief of Staff, Telecommunications (DCSTEL) was redesignated the Assistant Chief of Staff, Telecommunications (ACSTEL).

Personal Staff:

Inspector General (IG). (U) The IG, as a member of the personal staff, inquired into and reported upon, matters affecting the performance of mission and state of economy, efficiency, discipline, and morale of every phase of activity which was within the sphere of responsibility of the CG and as prescribed by law. Throughout the report period, the IG Office continued to be comprised of an Assistance and Investigations Division and Inspections Division.

Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). (U) The SJA served as legal advisor to the CG, DCG's CofS, and all staff elements of HQ INSCOM and, as necessary, to subordinate elements of the command.

Advisor for Scientific and Cryptologic Affairs. (U) The Advisor served as the principal advisor to the CG on scientific and cryptologic matters.

Command Chaplain. (U) The Command Chaplain served as the Chaplain of the USAINSCOM, and was responsible for all chaplain related activities within the command; provided advice and assistance to the CG and his staff on religious, moral, moral leadership, and human self development matters.

Special Disbursing Officer (SDO). (U) The SDO served as the Special Disbursing Officer for the USAINSCOM, advising the CG and DCG's on all aspects of the control, administration, supervision, and utilization of intelligence contingency funds (ICF).

Command Psychologist (CP). (U) The CP advised the CG on matters pertaining to the mental health, other medical support, and provided guidance on psychological factors pertaining to intelligence operations. The first CP was assigned on 17 September 1979.

New HQ INSCOM TDA's. (U) Three TDA's were in effect for Headquarters, INSCOM during FY 1979. At the beginning of the fiscal year, HQ INSCOM was still organized under TDA ASW00YAA, CCNUM AS0177, which was effective 15 February 1977, but did not encompass the implementation of the IOSS concept that brought about establishment of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command effective 1 January 1977. It was almost two years after the new organization was accomplished before publication of TDA ASW00YAA, CCNUM AS0179, effective 30 November 1978, which reflected the consolidation of staff elements at Arlington Hall Station and Fort George G. Meade. This TDA was superseded by TDA ASW00YAA, CCNUM AS0279, effective 1 June 1979, but contained only minor administrative changes.

HQ INSCOM Restationing. (U) On 1 December 1978, INSCOM submitted a Case Study and Justification Folder (CSJF) to HQDA documenting a "preferred alternative" to terminate Army occupancy at Arlington Hall Station (AHS),

Arlington, Virginia and Fort George G. Meade (FGGM), Maryland and consolidate INSCOM at Vint Hill Farms Station (VHFS), Warrenton, Virginia. The US Army Electronics Materiel Readiness Activity (EMRA) would move from Vint Hill Farms Station to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey and Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania. The US Army General Intelligence Production Detachment (GIPD) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina would relocate to Vint Hill Farms Station. The US Army Signals Warfare Laboratory (SWL) and Company B, 303d Military Intelligence Battalion would remain at VHFS. This CSJF was a modification of one submitted on 15 August 1978 which had been reviewed and guidance furnished in DA Message, DAMI-ZA/DACS-DMA 191730Z Sep 78 for its revision.

(U) Upon receipt of the December 1978 CSJF, the Army Management Office questioned the selection of VHFS over FGGM as the site for the INSCOM consolidation because one-time costs for FGGM could be amortized in 3.8 years as compared to over nine years for VHFS. But, GEN Frederick J. Kroesen, Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, supported MG Rolya's selection of VHFS, and on 7 March 1979, the Honorable Clifford Alexander, Secretary of the Army, approved VHFS as the Army's "preferred alternative." However, the Honorable C. W. Duncan, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense, reversed the Army decision, advising the Secretary of the Army by Memorandum, dated 29 March 1979, of his decision to select the FGGM alternative over VHFS. Rationale was quicker amortization of costs, based on savings from closure of VHFS. On 29 March 1979, Department of the Army made public the proposed move to FGGM. Under the proposal, HQ INSCOM and designated subordinate elements at AHS would move to FGGM. The GIPD at Fort Bragg would also move to Fort Meade. The EMRA would relocate from VHFS to Fort Monmouth and Tobyhanna Army Depot; SWL to Woodbridge, Virginia; and Company B, 303d MI Battalion to Fort Hood, Texas.

(U) If approved, the consolidation and relocation of HQ INSCOM would result in the movement of 627 military and 566 civilian spaces to Fort Meade. These spaces would include 442 military and 449 civilian spaces from AHS, 120 military and 53 civilians spaces from Fort Bragg, and 65 military and 64 civilian spaces from VHFS. The relocation of EMRA would involve moving 95 military and 206 civilian spaces from VHFS to Fort Monmouth and 30 civilian spaces to Tobyhanna Army Depot. The SWL move would mean the transfer of 55 military and 189 civilian spaces. Company B would relocate 275 military and 11 civilian spaces to Fort Hood.

(U) It was anticipated that 80 civilians and 272 military jobs would be eliminated. Those civilians who declined transfer would receive assistance in finding suitable local employment from DA under existing procedures. In addition to the "increased operational benefits" resulting from the consolidation, there would be an estimated annual cost savings of \$8.2 million.

(U) As a result of the selection of Fort George G. Meade, a new CSJF was required, providing detailed costing of consolidation at FGGM for use in

implementing that alternative. The Department of the Army established a submission date of 31 August 1979. In this instance, the requirement to notify Congress, followed by a 60-day hold on announcement of the decision to implement the action was not felt to be applicable, but HQDA directed that the procedure be followed as a precaution. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) signed the summary sheet to the Secretary of the Army on 20 July 1979, who, in turn, submitted it to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Further action was deferred until after the impending August Congressional recess.

(U) Because of several unavoidable circumstances, HQ INSCOM requested and was granted an extension from the original 31 August 1979 due date for the CSJF. At the close of FY 1979, the decision paper was still being held at the Secretary of Defense level, and its release was considered "imminent." However, at HQ INSCOM, a feeling persisted that the consolidation at FGGM would not take place as projected. This was based upon a pessimistic expectation that the construction funds essential for its implementation would not be approved by an economy-minded Congress in the FY 83 MCA program.²

Relocation of Staff Elements, HQ INSCOM. (U) In February 1979, a plan approved by the CofS to reallocate floor space within Building 1, AHS, was implemented. The major staff elements involved were DCSOPS, DCSS, DCSRM, and DCSLOG. The basic rationale behind the shift in space was to realign offices and division according to staff element. Over the months, major reorganizations had left offices isolated from their parent staff. For example, the Training Branch, formerly under DCSPER and located in the basement, was moved to the third floor to be a part of the Plans, Training, and Reserve Affairs Division of DCSOPS. The various reorganizations had also caused an inequitable distribution of space.

Reorganization of the Civilian Personnel Functions. (U) From 1964 to January 1977, the Civilian Personnel Office (CPO) of the US Army Security Agency served as both a staff and operating office. Most of the civilians were serviced by the CPO on a worldwide basis. As a relatively small organization this direct operational control, which was primarily due to the security aspect of the functions, made the "dual-hatted" civilian program workable. However, establishment of INSCOM brought about an increased civilian strength with an expanded civilian personnel mission, a more diverse work force, and considerable geographical dispersion.

(U) On 2 February 1978, HQ INSCOM requested DA approval for a reorganization of the Civilian Personnel organization which would be consistent with the staffing pattern of a major command. A Staff Civilian Personnel Officer position would be established with a small staff of his own under the DCSPER, while the remainder of the CPO personnel at AHS would be headed by a Civilian Personnel Officer under the Commander, US Army Garrison, Arlington Hall Station. Other CPO positions would be established at

the USAG, Vint Hill Farms Station and US Army Administrative Survey Detachment, Fort George G. Meade.

(U) Based on the 2 February 1978 letter, the DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, detailed Dr. Charles Gott to the Staff Civilian Personnel Officer position on 15 February 1978 and Mr. Dale Efflandt as the Acting CPO for AHS. On 6 November 1978, Mr. Frederic Newman, Acting Director of Civilian Personnel, DA, approved the reorganization. Besides the Staff CPO position, three GS-13 spaces were approved for the CPO's at AHS, VHFS, and ASD, Fort Meade. The position at VHFS had not been filled by the end of the report period.³

Transfer of Value Engineering. (U) In FY 1978, the INSCOM Procurement, Supply Facility and the Research and Development Element were transferred to the US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM); however, the value engineering mission related to the transferred functions and funded by OMA appropriation was not addressed. Since this transfer significantly reduce the potential for value engineering in INSCOM, the question was raised as to whether the civilian space should be transferred also or returned to DA. This was resolved when the space was transferred to DARCOM on 1 April 1979.⁴

Organization of the US Army Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity. (U) On 1 October 1978, the US Army Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity was organized provisionally and assigned to HQ INSCOM under staff cognizance of DCSPER. The Activity was organized as a separate TDA unit on 30 November 1978. Its mission centered on the day-to-day management of Command Programs involving publications, audiovisual activities, records management, postal responsibilities, and military awards. The rationale behind the creation of the separate entity was that AR 108-2 required that audiovisual activities be consolidated, and for efficiency's sake, numerous major administrative functions within the Headquarters required central management. Factors which precluded the Activity from remaining under a staff element, such as DCSPER as had been done in the past, was that together the personnel involved in these functions represented a sizable organization in itself. Besides the size, there was also the fact that funding for audiovisual/administrative functions was distinct from that of DCSPER, where many of the administrative functions had previously been placed. The combination of these factors led to the organization of the separate TDA unit.⁵

Reorganization of US Army Field Station Okinawa. (U) During FY 1979, US Army Field Station Okinawa underwent a major reorganization. The changes were precipitated by a number of recommendations based on Organizational Effectiveness surveys, Inspector General findings concerning layering, and requirements identified by the Manpower Survey Report of August 1978, and could also be attributed to an internal dissatisfaction with the two-battalion system which was believed to have encumbered operations at Torii Station. The subsequent relocation of elements, the creation and dissolution of units and the redistribution of personnel resources on the Field

Station TDA were the logical results of this functional streamlining.

(U) At the beginning of FY 1979, FS Okinawa was organized with a Commander, staff, and two battalions. The Operations Battalion consisted of a Headquarters element and three companies, A, C, and D, responsible for the collection, processing, analysis, and reporting mission of the Field Station. The Support Battalion consisted of a Headquarters element, a Headquarters and Service Company, Graphics, and the Torii Club. The Support Battalion was responsible for all activities related to service support, supply and logistics for the entire Field Station. Post services, Headquarters staffing, motor support and mess support were provided by Headquarters and Service Company.

(U) On 22 January 1979, the Operations and Support Battalions were retired during a ceremony on the ballfield and a newly created Troop Command assumed control of all companies. The Support Battalion Commander was redesignated the Troop Commander and the Operations Battalion Commander was redesignated the S-3. The former S-3 staff section was redesignated Plans, Training, and Systems (PT&S) and came under the staff responsibility of the S-3. The S-1 assumed responsibility for Recreation Services and Graphics; the S-2 for the Provost Marshal's Office; and the S-4 took control of the Consolidated Supply and Electronic Maintenance Divisions, all formerly a part of the Support Battalion. Eventually, the Club was made subordinate of the S-1.

(U) During a ceremony on 1 June 1979, Companies A, C, and D were disestablished and the Operations Company established. On 17 July 1979, the Graphics Section was relocated from the S-1 to the S-3 (PT&S) as part of the INSCOM effort to establish dedicated audiovisual support facilities in support of local mission. Finally, on 28 September 1979, the Troop Command was officially disestablished. Company Commanders (Headquarters and Service Company and Operations Company) were made directly subordinate to the Deputy Commander, US Army Field Station Okinawa.

(U) Although ultimately approved by the DCG-I, INSCOM, the reorganization had its critics at HQ INSCOM. The DCSOPS nonconcurred and expressed the belief that the reorganization appeared to be a step backward into a separate operations supervisor/separate "housekeeper" concept. Although recognized that no two field stations could be organized identically, the principles of organization proposed for FS Okinawa were opposite those currently working successfully at FS Augsburg. The concept of holding subordinate commanders fully responsible for both the operational and general "military" performance of their troops seemed to have the greatest advantage. It was believed that FS Okinawa's reorganization would violate this concept.⁶

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Activation of the 11th MI Company (Technical Intelligence) and 641st MI Detachment (Collection). (U) Companies C and D, 519th MI Battalion, were assigned to FORSCOM. The mission of Company D involved exploitation of foreign equipment and equipment documentation, USAREUR reinforcement mission, and equipment support to the Army Opposing Force (OPFOR) program. Company C's mission was HUMINT. However, as a result of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study, they were considered "one-of-a-kind" missions which were echelon above corps in scope. Consequently, it was expected that INSCOM would assume responsibility for the units, but for various reasons, no action was taken at HQ INSCOM. A secondary concern voiced by some at HQ INSCOM was that one of Company D's functions—equipment support to the Army OPFOR program—did not belong with INSCOM. The impasse was finally broken as a result of constant prodding by personnel on the DA staff and the necessity for FORSCOM to take action to transfer the units. FORSCOM needed spaces for the creation of the new CEWI (combat electronic warfare intelligence) Group and planned to use those within the 519th MI Battalion, excluding Company D and part of Company C.

(U) DA approved the transfer of the resources of Company D, 519th MI Battalion from FORSCOM to INSCOM effective 1 October 1978. On the same date, the 11th MI Company (Technical Intelligence) was activated at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. On 16 September 1978, the 73 spaces of Company C were used to form the 641st MI Detachment Augmentation (Carrier). On 16 September 1979, the 521st Interrogation Team was redesignated as the 641st MI Detachment and reactivated at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.

~~(U)~~
~~(C)~~ The 641st MI Detachment assumed the REFORGER mission of Company C, 519th MI Battalion to provide HUMINT collection augmentation to the 66th MI Group (Provisional) in Germany. On 6 April 1979, the 641st MI Detachment was designated the INSCOM operating control element for HUMINT REDTRAIN. The purpose of HUMINT REDTRAIN was to develop and maintain tactical interrogator resources qualified to provide IPW (prisoner of war interrogation) support as required through Live Environment Training (LET), i.e., provide interrogator personnel an opportunity to develop interrogation and language skills through assignment to an INSCOM interrogation unit or facility.

(U) The mission of the 11th MI Company (Technical Intelligence) was to provide tactical technical intelligence support to the Army and to serve as the INSCOM Action Agent to the Opposing Force Foreign Materiel for Training Program as prescribed in AR 350-2. Specifically, the technical intelligence mission included: Exploitation of foreign materiel to determine soldier level vulnerabilities and countermeasures; planning advice and assistance to tactical commanders; intelligence and combined arms training support Army-wide; and assistance to strategic level agencies and contingency deployment in support of REFORGER.⁷

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1) (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b; 50 USC 3024i

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Page(s) 39

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(b)(1);(b)(3):10 U.S.C. 130b;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(1);(b)(3):10 U.S.C. 130b;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

Consolidation of INSCOM Aviation Assets in Korea. (U) On 18 October 1978, the 146th ASA Aviation Company (Forward) relocated from Taegu, Korea to Pyong Taek. Pyong Taek was also the location of FS Korea, the Company's next higher headquarters, and the 704th MI Detachment (Aerial Surveillance). This move allowed command and control, maintenance, and mission effectiveness (interoperability and tasking) of all INSCOM aviation assets in Korea to be consolidated at one location. Upon inactivation of the 704th MI Detachment (AS) on 16 May 1979, its assets were combined with those of the 146th ASA Aviation Company (Fwd).⁹

Post Panama Treaty Planning. (U) Terms of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaties directed that all US Army office space at Fort Amador, CZ, with one exception be transferred to Panama upon implementation of the treaties on 1 October 1979. The 470th MI Group Headquarters and all Fort Amador elements, less the Liaison Detachment, moved from Fort Amador, the Group's Headquarters for the last 21 years, to Fort Clayton during August and September 1979. The official change of address, however, was not to be effective until 1 October. The Liaison Detachment was to remain indefinitely at Fort Amador as an exception. An additional temporary exception was authorized for the Group Motor Pool because its new facilities were not yet ready for occupancy.

(U) The original plan had called for all elements moving from Fort Amador to Corozal to be located in Buildings 18 and 115. However, the move had to be postponed due to cost overruns/funding restraints which prevented completion of building renovations required prior to 1 October. As an interim measure, most elements moved to Building 220, Fort Clayton because it already housed a secure compartmented information facility (SCIF). Although Building 220 underwent some renovation prior to occupancy, an inconvenience existed due to the necessity to share the billets area, dayroom, etc., with the 193d Infantry Brigade's Support Battalion. And, due to lack of space, three elements of the 470th Group were unable to move into Building 220. These included the CI Detachment (Detachment B), which obtained temporary space in a four-room office in Building 519; the Photo Lab, which shared facilities on a part-time basis in the Criminal Investigation Division Office, Building 865, Albrook Air Force Base; and the

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Motor Pool, which remained temporarily at Fort Amador.

(U) Future plans called for housing the Group Headquarters, staff, CI and SIGINT Detachment Headquarters, Collection Detachment Operations Coordinator, and Communications Center in Building 115, a two-level concrete structure which heretofore had housed the 193d Brigade Finance Office. The entire building, less the non-SI Files Room near the entrance, would be a secure compartmented information facility. Building 18, a four-level concrete structure, 350 meters northwest of Building 115, would accommodate the enlisted billets, all S-4 functions, the S-3 Photo Lab, and the Pacific Field Office of the CI Detachment.

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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER IV. ORGANIZATION

1. INSCOM Reg 10-2, 29 Mar 79, Organization and Functions, USAINSCOM, Sec VI.
2. AHR, DCSLOG, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (S), pp. 37-44; Command Information Fact Sheet, INSCOM, No 4, 29 Mar 79.
3. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (U), p. 34; Paper: Reorganization of the CIVPER Function (U).
4. AHR, DCSRM, HQ INSCOM, FY79, (C), p. 44; Interview, Mr. Bruce W. Corley, Mgt & Anal Div, DCSRM (29 May 80).
5. Interview, Mr. Dave Stein, Dir, USA Admin/Audiovisual Spt Actv (10 Jan 80).
6. AHR, USAFS Okinawa, FY79 (TSC), pp. 2-2 thru 2-4; DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 8 Jan 79, subj: Okinawa Reorganization (U); Paper: Noncurrence-Provisional Reorganization of FS Okinawa, 14 Dec 78 (U).
7. AHR, 11th MI Co, FY79 (U), p. 2; AHR, 641st MI Det, FY79 (C), pp. 1, 11; 1978 INSCOM Commanders Conference PreConference Packet (S), p. A-15; Interview, LTC Richard T. Kane, Chief, Opns and Readiness, ODCSOPS (5 Jun 79) (U).
8. AHR, 500th MI Gp, FY79 (S/NOFORN), pp. 48-49; AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/LIMDIS), pp. 38-40.
9. AHR, 704th MI Det, FY79 (FOUO), p. 8; AHR, 146th ASA Avn Co (Fwd), FY79, (S), pp. H-1, H-4; Black Book Item, DCSOPS, Consolidation of the 146th ASA (Co), 25 Sep 78 (U); AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/LIMDIS), p. 60.
10. AHR, 470th MI Gp, FY79 (TSC/NOFORN), pp. 4-6; AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/LIMDIS), pp. 104-105.

CHAPTER V
RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT

Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Funds. (U) The US Army Intelligence and Security Command's OMA funding program at the close of FY 1979 consisted of \$83,578,500 in Direct Funds and \$32,000 in Automatic Reimbursements for a total of \$83,610,500. The table below shows a breakout of end FY 1979 direct funding by subprogram.

Table 1.—Direct Funding By Subprogram
(As of 30 Sep 79)

<u>Subprogram</u>	<u>FY 1979</u>
P2 (General Purpose Forces)	\$ 3,285,600
P3I (Intelligence Activities)	60,395,900
P3C (COMSEC)	1,943,200
P30 (Other)	17,272,800
P8T (Training)	514,000
P80 (Education Services)	167,000
	<u>\$83,578,500</u>

(U) Following is an audit trail from the DA dollar guidance for preparation of the FY 1979 Command Operating Budget (COB) to final 1979 Approved Funding Program (AFP):

Program 2

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 79 COB</u>	\$ 1,888,000
Joint EW Center	+ 234,000
USARI	+ 625,000
FY79 Non POL Stock Fund Price Increase	+ 54,000
OPFOR Program	+ 616,000
Congressional Reduction Flying Hours	- 23,000
Stock Fund Reduction	- 11,000
JCS Exercises	- 26,000
Congressional Reduction SIGINT/EW Opns	- 8,000
<u>FY79 Initial AFP</u>	3,349,000
JCS Exercises	+ 8,000
Admin Staff Travel Reduction	- 2,000
FY79 Pay Raise	+ 40,000
Decrease Flying Hour Program	- 84,000
Returned to DA - Excess Funds	- 25,000
<u>Final FY 79 AFP</u>	<u>\$ 3,286,000</u>

Program 3I

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 79 COB</u>	\$ 56,157,000
FY 79 Non POL Stock Fund Price Increase	+ 82,000
Indirect Hire Foreign National Pay	+ 297,000
Consolidated Cryptologic Program	- 56,000
CCP - Management Hq	+ 56,000
Intelligence Analysis Group	- 400,000
HUMINT Collection	- 77,000
Intelligence ADP	+ 302,000
HUMINT Hq	+ 66,000

<u>FY 79 Initial AFP</u>	55,823,000
Transfer to Med Intel & Info Agency	- 100,000
FY 79 Pay Increase	+ 1,476,000
Decrease Foreign National Pay	- 376,000
Decrease Civilian Pay	- 564,000
Civilian Personnel Reduction	- 139,000
Admin Staff Travel Reduction	- 88,000
FY 79 Civilian Pay	+ 564,000
ADP Systems	- 193,000
Currency Fluctuation	+ 485,000
Foreign National Separation Allowance (FNSA)	+ 614,000
Turkish Lira Fluctuation	+ 1,381,000
Transfer to DARCOM	- 500,000
Program Supplemental	+ 2,404,000
Grill Flame	+ 25,000
Sinop Contract	+ 425,000
Production	- 101,000
HUMINT	- 220,000
General Defense Intelligence Program	- 150,000
Returned to DA - Excess Funds	- 370,000

<u>Final FY 79 AFP</u>	<u>\$ 60,396,000</u>
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Program 3C

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 79 COB</u>	\$ 1,918,000
<u>FY 79 Initial AFP</u>	1,918,000
FY 79 Pay Supplemental	+ 59,000
Decrease Civilian Pay	- 29,000
Admin Staff Travel Reduction	- 5,000
Increase FY 79 Civilian Pay	+ 29,000
TEMPEST Testing	- 29,000

<u>Final FY 79 AFP</u>	<u>\$ 1,943,000</u>
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Program 30

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 79 COB</u>	\$	12,716,000
Congressional Reduction - Service Support	-	21,000
Crude Oil Equalization Tax	-	6,000
Congressional Reduction Supplies	-	3,000
Personnel Casting	+	250,000
CI Operations	+	6,000
FY 79 Non POL Stock Fund	+	3,000
Initial FY 79 Funded VHFS	+	3,700,000
Indirect Hire FN Pay - FY 78	+	2,000
Indirect Hire FN Pay - FY 79	+	66,000
<u>FY 79 Initial AFP</u>		16,713,000
FY 79 Pay Raises	+	890,000
Civilian Pay Reduction	-	42,000
Overtime Reduction	-	10,000
Admin Travel Reduction	-	1,000
CI Security	-	60,000
Investigation Record Respository File	-	200,000
Returned to DA - Excess Funds	-	17,000
<u>Final FY 79 AFP</u>	\$	<u>17,273,000</u>

Program 8T

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 79 COB</u>	\$	549,000
<u>FY 79 Initial AFP</u>		549,000
Admin Travel Reduction	-	27,000
Returned to DA - Excess Funds	-	8,000
<u>Final FY 79 AFP</u>	\$	<u>514,000</u>

Program 80

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 79 COB</u>	\$	139,000
Army High School Completion Program	+	13,000
<u>FY 79 Initial AFP</u>		152,000
FY 79 Pay Raises	+	6,000
Civilian Pay Reduction	-	2,000
Admin Travel Reduction	-	1,000
Civilian Executive Training	+	12,000
<u>Final FY 79 AFP</u>	\$	<u>167,000</u>

(U) The table below reflects direct obligations by element of expense for FY 1979 (\$ in thousands). Obligation of \$83,221,000 and Annual Funding Program of \$83,578,500 resulted in an obligation rate of 99.6 percent.

Table 2.—Direct Obligations by Element of Expense (FY 1979)

Element of Expense	P2	P30	P31	P3C	P8T	P80	Total	Percent of Grand Total
Civ Pay & Benefits	587	12,931	26,357	990		53	40,918	49
Travel & Trans	248	1,291	2,879	384	483	15	5,300	6
Rents/Comm/Util	30	846	2,342	18			3,236	4
Contr Svcs	921	515	18,433	461	7	47	20,384	25
Supplies & Equip	1,476	1,888	9,928	46	3	42	13,383	16
TOTAL	<u>3,262</u>	<u>17,471</u>	<u>59,939</u>	<u>1,899</u>	<u>493</u>	<u>157</u>	<u>83,221</u>	<u>100</u>

Military Construction, Army (MCA). (U) The INSCOM FY 1982-86 Military Construction, Army (MCA) program was submitted to HQDA on 21 August 1979 with the approval of the Commanding General. The total value of the construction requested for FY 1982 was \$18,460,000.

(U) In Korea, the last of a group of seven relocatable BEQ's and a companion administrative building were opened during January 1979. Another project to modernize existing barracks to the Modern Volunteer Army Standards was scheduled for FY 1980 and when completed, the entire housing inventory at USA Field Station Korea would be either renovated or new. In a project related to troop welfare, the dining facility would be enlarged and extensively modernized in FY 1981. Both projects are under design. In the operational category, the power upgrade and improvements in Building 1218 were completed and operations commenced in FY 1979. This made Building 1237 available for other uses. Before the year's end, discussions had begun with the Far East District Engineer on the design for the remodeling of Building 1237 as a communications center.

(U) Work continued on air conditioning at several stations during FY 1979. Although Okinawa's project was awarded in April 1978, actual construction did not begin until July 1979. Phase I, the first of six, was completed in September 1979. The project required a masterpiece of coordination

between the user and the contractor in order to carry out the work with uncleared labor without disturbing the mission.

(U) The air conditioning upgrade for Augsburg took a giant step toward reality when the European Division Engineers accepted the INSCOM concept. That concept was based on putting the machinery rooms outside the SI-secure area for easy maintenance, and delivering air through a variable-air-volume distribution system. With the concept thus determined the price estimate rose to \$2.25 million. DA reprogrammed the project into FY 1981, and subject to congressional approval, the project would be built as planned.

(U) Active design was underway by year's end for FS Berlin's air conditioning upgrade, and construction should commence in the summer of 1980.

(U) Although Sinop had been subject to seasonal water shortages for years, events in the summer of FY 1979 served to crystalize US opinion to the point that something was at last being done about it. During the summer, the Mayor of Sinop reduced the water supply to USA Field Station Sinop to a comparative trickle for a period of weeks. Since this was a contrived rather than actual shortage, it served to underscore the present vulnerability of the station to political pressures. Before the end of FY 1979, plans were underway for a desalinization plant to make the station independent for its water needs. DA recognized the urgency of the need and worked closely with HQ INSCOM to define the project and program it into FY 1982.²

Family Housing Units. (U) The US Army Intelligence and Security Command operated and maintained family housing units at Arlington Hall Station and Vint Hill Farms Station. Funds were also received from DA for leased housing. The Annual Funding Program for these units for FY 1979 was \$706,000 of which \$697,000 was obligated (98.7 percent).³

Manpower Program. (U) Based on DA Program and Budget Guidance, as changed by other DA correspondence, the manpower data shown below is the USAINSCOM Manpower Program for end of FY 1979. Major changes were made during the year as a result of implementation of General End Strength Army Reduction.⁴

1. (U) Program 2 (General Purpose Forces). Manpower resources amounted to 1,125 spaces for FY 1979 or 10 spaces less than FY 1978. The decrease in these spaces was due to the transfer of all eight INSCOM Joint EW Center spaces to DA Joint Activity Account and a two-space reduction in factored aircraft maintenance in the 146th ASA Company (Aviation)(Forward), Korea.

2. (U) Program 3 (Intelligence and Communications). Manpower resources amounted to 9,621 spaces for FY 1979 or a decrease of 68 spaces over FY 1978. The decrease was mainly due to the non-implementation of Project MAROON SCIMITAR (44 spaces), a National Capital Region decrement (21 spaces), a Decision Package Set (DPS) Cryptologic reduction of two

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spaces and Reserve Component decrease of one space.

3. (U) Program 8 (Training, Medical and Other Personal Activities) and Program 10 (Foreign Military Sales) spaces showed no change in the 23 spaces authorized.

4. (U) Joint Activity (Program 3 Army Support to NSA). Spaces at 677 were 47 less than FY 1978 due to changes in mission.

Military Strength by Program. (C) The table below reflects authorized and assigned military strength by program.⁵ Program 2 (General Purpose Forces) and the counterintelligence program both show substantial shortfalls at the end of the fiscal year. The NSA program showed an overage of 110 spaces with most of this overstrength in the CONUS MI Group.

Table 3.—Military Strength by Program

<u>Program</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Plus/Minus</u>
2 Gen Purpose Forces	1,098	905	(-193)
3: Cryptologic Activity	4,959	4,874	(-85)
AMHA CCP	201	183	(-18)
HUMINT	565	496	(-69)
Imagery Intel	58	47	(-11)
Intel Production Actv	148	102	(-46)
Intel Data Handling Sys	47	18	(-29)
AMHA Gen Defense Intel Prog	50	39	(-11)
COMSEC	225	168	(-57)
Base Opns	226	200	(-26)
CI & IA*	1,089	921	(-168)
AMHA IRA and Others	6	7	(+1)
Support to NSA	677	787	(+110)
8: Training	12	7	(-5)
Family Housing	3	0	(-3)
TOTAL	<u>9,364</u>	<u>8,754</u>	<u>(-610)</u>

* Includes 255 Foreign CI spaces.

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Command Personnel Situation. (C) Manpower trends in FY 1979 stabilized. Authorized and actual total command strengths for FY 1978 and FY 1979 are shown below.⁶

	30 September 1978					
	OFF	WO	ENL	TOT MIL	CIV	GRAND TOTAL
Authorized	1,058	472	7,807	9,337	1,417	10,754
Actual	899	453	7,129	8,463	1,280*	9,743

	30 September 1979					
	OFF	WO	ENL	TOT MIL	CIV	GRAND TOTAL
Authorized	1,078	474	7,851	9,403	2,078**	11,481
Actual	952	425	7,377	8,754	1,928**	10,682

*Does not include Wage Board (WB) and Foreign Nationals (FN). Assigned totals, as of 30 Sep 78: WB (worldwide) - 146; FN (direct hire) - 101; FN (indirect hire) - 392.

**Includes 440 authorized FN and 394 actual FN.

(U) For FY 1979 command personnel strength by unit, see appendix F.

Increased Manpower Requirements for Manning Collection. (U) An INSCOM study determined that the manning factor used in computing manpower requirements for manning collection should be increased from 4.8 to 5.65. The basis for the 4.8 factor included those necessary computations to provide staffing for authorized absences from operational duties. These included the areas of medical time off, leaves, legal holidays, and other military duties, training and details. When originally formulated, these non-operational staffing factors realistically considered all of the then current man days required. Since that time many of these considerations changed markedly, but the staffing factor remained static and was no longer a valid planning tool. For example, under the 4.8 guidelines, sick/medical leave was based on 3.12 days per year per person. More recent DA lost time studies indicated that males lose 3.3 and females 9.5 hours per month for medical reasons. At the time of the INSCOM study, 26.18 percent of Army manual Morse operators were female. Using these figures, the loss due to illness was 7.38 days per year per person, not counting lost time due to sick call.

(U) The Collection Objectives Priorities and Evaluation System (COPES) Collection Evaluation System (CES) data from INSCOM field stations during 1978 revealed an average of 2.21 days per year per person lost for sick call. Therefore, a more accurate planning figure for sick/medical leave was 9.59 days per year per person. In addition to sick/medical leave, other non-operational factors changed significantly. Actual increase in

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time necessary for mandatory/required military training, duties and functions occurred based on a review of INSCOM field station statistics.

(U) Because of the unrealistic staffing taking place, both the station's mission and enlisted operator morale was believed to be affected. Much of the actual increase in non-operational time was seen in position downtime while the remainder consisted of duties and training performed by the operator after having already worked an eight-hour shift. To retain and maintain skilled personnel, INSCOM felt the necessity to more closely align their workload and working conditions with those of soldiers in support type jobs.

(U) The net result of the many requirements levied on the shift worker, in addition to the negative aspects of working shift, was reduced morale. In turn, this was reflected in the reenlistment rates which, for INSCOM personnel, was 40 percent lower than the average for the rest of the Army's first term reenlistments. Austere staffing also created a concern related to decreased reenlistment of the enlisted middle manager type. In early 1978, statistics revealed that INSCOM was 46 percent below the Army level in this area.⁷

INSCOM Key Personnel. (U) Appendix G contains a listing of personnel occupying key positions within the US Army Intelligence and Security Command, as of 30 September 1979. Photographs of MG William I. Rolya, CDR, INSCOM, INSCOM Commanders, and HQ INSCOM Staff are at appendixes H, I, and J, respectively.

Communications Programs and Resources. (U) The Assistant Chief of Staff, Telecommunications (ACSTEL) was the Program Manager within INSCOM for Program Element (PE) 381055A, Cryptologic Communications, Army. This program was divided into two subelements (SE). The first subelement SE49, Cryptologic Communications, non-DCS, included all telecommunication resources (except cryptographic equipment) required to provide, operate and maintain US Army Communications Command fixed station Special Intelligence communications. The SE54, Cryptologic Communications, DCS, included funds necessary to support leased or government-owned communication circuits, to include AUTODIN subscriber tails and other circuits in support of the cryptologic effort. It does not, however, include AUTODIN "backbone" costs.

(U) The Department of the Army worldwide Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) manpower levels in PE 381055A declined by 39 spaces from the 550 spaces allocated in FY 1978 to a total of 511 spaces in FY 1979. This reduction resulted from a NSA review of CRITICOMM work loads with respect to the new standards for operation of semi-automated (STREAMLINER) systems. No adverse impact was experienced as a result of these reductions.

(U) Resumption of operations at US Army Field Station Sinop necessitated an increase of 13 spaces at TUSLOG Detachment 169 to accommodate the increased communication work load. These spaces were provided by reductions

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at Field Stations Augsburg, Berlin, and Okinawa.

(U) During FY 1979, only one action impacted on Other Procurement, Army (OPA) funding. Funds programmed for secure telephones were withdrawn and then transferred to the STREAMLINER line item to provide additional capacity for the five STREAMLINER systems already installed.

(U) All PE 381055A funds were apportioned to NSA for budgetary management during the report period. Major expenditures of these funds were limited to procurement of test equipment and Model 40 teletypewriters.

(U) The total FY 1979-84 Other Procurement, Army funding program for PE 381055A, as of 30 September 1979, is depicted in the table below (in thousands (K)).⁸

Table 4.—OPA Funding - PE 381055A

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Secure Telephones	0	(\$200K transferred to STREAMLINER)				
Test Equipment	137K	0	30K	140K	145K	31K
Equip Replacement	581K	125K	426K	400K	400K	400K
STREAMLINER	557K	(\$200K transferred from Secure Phones)				

Project STREAMLINER. (U) A decision was made in 1977 by NSA to establish the STREAMLINER terminal at Osan Air Base, Korea, as the host terminal serving all Special Intelligence communication facilities in Korea and to withdraw the STREAMLINER MACT (medium automated communications terminal) system located at USA Field Station Korea. STREAMLINER circuits were re-routed from Pyong Taek to Osan and placed on LEMONADE trunk 1R83 to FS Korea. The MACT STREAMLINER System at FS Korea was deactivated on 20 July 1979, and a distant remote STREAMLINER terminal has not degraded FS Korea's communications capability. Deactivation resulted in an annual savings in leased circuit costs.⁹

Project LEMONADE. (U) Project LEMONADE was the approved plan that provided red multiplexing and bulk encryption of selected CRITICOMM circuits. The objective of the project was to obtain savings in communications manpower, leased circuit costs, equipment, space and energy without degradation of communications service. INSCOM sites designated to be multiplexing hubs were FS Berlin (three trunks), FS Augsburg (four trunks), FS Korea (four trunks), and FS Okinawa (three trunks). Installed over a year, the last of the trunks were activated in early FY 1979 at FS Okinawa and FS Korea.¹⁰

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

District Engineer reported that since the project was submitted after the start of the construction year (1979) and the extensive construction required before the onset of winter, the project would not likely be completed until early 1980. Should DA not approve a letter contract, construction completion would be pushed further back to October of the same year. Meanwhile, communications outages continued as present equipment was old and difficult to maintain.¹¹

Automated Data Processing Activities. (U) During FY 1979, several new projects were established within the INSCOM Automated Systems Activity. These included TOPSAIL GAFF (the HQ INSCOM management information system (MIS) mainframe upgrade), TRIPLE SWEEP (a HQ INSCOM unclassified MIS mainframe), TREBLE CLEF (a computation capability for the US Army Document Center at Camp Zama, Japan), CHUBBUCK II (an upgrade for FS Berlin MIS mainframe), and TRILOGY FARE (an INSCOM logistics system for distribution, worldwide).

(U) Efforts continued through the year to define the nature and extent of Automatic Data Processing (ADP) support needed by the newly-formed Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC). However, the automation requirements could not be determined until ITAC's internal organization was more settled and mode of operation more fixed. This was difficult to achieve because ITAC was unique and had no pattern to follow; there was a lack of understanding of the total environment in which ITAC must operate; no clearly-defined charter existed; and there was no knowledge of the workloads involved. ITAC itself did not have the resources to study all of these matters and still perform its mission. Realizing that the definition of ADP needs could not be accomplished until all of these matters were resolved, the Automated Systems Activity provided the funding support to ITAC to acquire contractual assistance to perform a study of the total operating environment and to propose alternative organizational structures and operational modes.

(U) During FY 1979, LAFINE WINE II was successfully installed at FS Augsburg. Work also continued on several other projects. Projects TRIPLE SPACE and TRIPLE SCOOP were efforts to provide Field Stations Korea and Okinawa, respectively, with computer capability to support local management and operational information needs on a day-to-day basis. The DESKTOP project was bogged down in the procurement cycle for the entire year largely due to the Intelligence School at Fort Devens not being able to develop applications for the RADIIX system within the scope of the project, and turnover of project managers. A final on-going ADP project was ASSIST Accreditation.

(U) The major problem that was encountered during the year by the Automated

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Systems Activity was the continuing erosion of the manpower resource base, particularly military. Not only was there a constant attrition of personnel, but the few replacement personnel arriving were generally straight out of the Fort Benjamin Harrison basic schools with no prior experience. The Automated Systems Activity was relegated to maintaining the current systems and little effort was expended on new initiatives. Toward the end of the fiscal year, the situation improved slightly with the arrival of several trained personnel and the previously inexperienced personnel becoming productive.¹²

Organizational Effectiveness. (U) Organizational Effectiveness (OE) referred to the systematic military application of selected management and behavioral science skills and methods to improve how an organization functions to accomplish assigned missions and increase combat readiness. FY 1979 represented the end of the first phase of the Army's OE effort. This period was called the Establishment Years. The next phase, Integration Years, were planned to last until the mid-1980's. The final phase, Sustainment Years, would continue on thereafter.

(U) There were three highlights of INSCOM participation during FY 1979. During the third week of January 1979, the DCSPER hosted a worldwide conference for INSCOM SI/DPCA's and Reenlistment NCO/Officers in which OE methodology was used to address major personnel issues of the command. The conference was significant in that it represented the first "macro-intervention"—the first time OE had been applied within INSCOM in a forum composed of commandwide representatives. A Headquarters-wide middle management operation was initiated in July which developed into an action planning conference. The result of the conference was an action plan which addressed seven problem areas within INSCOM. Also during the year, five of INSCOM's eight OE spaces were filled: 3 HQ INSCOM, 1 FS Berlin, 1 66th MI Group. The other three spaces were allotted to FS Augsburg, FS Korea, and USAG, Vint Hill Farms Station.¹³

General and Field Grade Officer Promotions. (U) A comparison between FY 1977, FY 1978, and FY 1979, general and field grade officer temporary promotions is reflected reflected in table below.¹⁴

Table 5.—General and Field Grade Officer Promotions

	<u>FY 1977</u>	<u>FY 1978</u>	<u>FY 1979</u>
GO	2	1	0
COL	19(15 MI)	No selections announced	8(6 MI)
LTC	26(22 MI)	34(23 MI)	No selections announced
MAJ	32(24 MI)	56(50 MI)	66(43 MI)
TOTAL	<u>79(61 MI)</u>	<u>91(73 MI)</u>	<u>74(49 MI)</u>

Reenlistment Rates. (U) INSCOM continued to have reenlistment problems during FY 1979. The table below shows the command's FY 1979 reenlistment rate by unit.¹⁵

Table 6.—Unit Reenlistments, FY 1979

Unit	First Termers			Careerists		
	Obj	Reenl	% Obj	Obj	Reenl	% Obj
<u>*Group I</u>						
USAFS Augsburg	118.64	84	70.80	109.23	82	75.07
CONUS MI Gp	50.55	42	83.09	145.92	125	85.66
501st MI Gp	57.52	58	100.83	64.69	60	92.75
USAFS Berlin	67.35	33	49.00	52.96	23	43.43
USAFS Okinawa	27.69	28	101.12	37.18	37	99.52
**66th MI Gp	19.69	24	121.89	53.94	81	150.17
<u>Group II</u>						
USAFS San Antonio	32.71	39	119.23	48.68	36	73.95
USAG AHS	26.33	9	34.18	86.03	26	30.22
902d MI Gp	8.17	7	85.68	91.83	42	45.74
USAG VHFS	9.57	4	41.80	31.17	23	73.79
USAFS Misawa	7.12	8	112.36	8.71	4	45.92
USAITAC	12.29	6	48.82	38.98	11	28.22
500th MI Gp	.96	0	0.00	12.74	12	94.19
470th MI Gp	7.14	3	42.02	5.25	5	95.24
TUSLOG Det 4	2.59	1	38.61	10.32	2	19.38
<u>Group III</u>						
Det Hawaii	1.08	0	0.00	3.76	0	0.00
USAFS Homestead	.62	0	0.00	2.43	1	41.15
Central Scty Fac	.78	0	0.00	.88	0	0.00
Sp Opns Det	.38	0	0.00	5.66	1	17.67
Admin Survey Det	.81	0	0.00	10.55	3	28.44
Ft Meade Hq Spt Det	.51	0	0.00	9.05	0	0.00
Opnl Gp	.50	0	0.00	4.62	8	173.16
Tech Spt Actv	----	0	----	.40	0	0.00
Pers Det Ft Jackson	----	0	----	3.71	1	26.95
Pers Det Ft Dix	----	0	----	2.09	0	0.00
Pers Det Ft LWood	----	0	----	3.22	2	62.11
Command TOTAL	<u>453.00</u>	<u>346</u>	<u>76.38</u>	<u>884.00</u>	<u>585</u>	<u>69.31</u>

*Units grouped according to size of organization.

**Received Annual INSCOM Reenlistment Award.

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Critical MOS Recruitment Posture, FY 1979. (U) The table below depicts INSCOM's critical MOS recruitment posture for FY 1979.¹⁶

Table 7.—Critical MOS Recruitment Posture, FY 1979

<u>MOS</u>	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Enlistments</u>	<u>Percent of Fill</u>
05D	288	136	47.2
05G	159	127	79.9
05H	1,393	804	57.7
05K	356	226	63.5
33S	364	343	94.2
96B	466	420	90.1
96C	252	147	58.3
96D	163	132	81.0
98C	880	752	85.5
98G	1,119	841	75.2
98J	180	129	71.7

(U) The table below reflects the 98G recruitment by language skill.

Table 8.—Recruitment by Language (MOS 98G)

<u>Language</u>	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Enlistments</u>	<u>Percent of Fill</u>
Arabic-Egyptian	113	3	23.1
Arabic-Syrian	35	33	94.3
Chinese-Mandarin	73	52	71.2
Czech	84	68	80.9
French	15	14	93.3
German	245	107	43.7
Korean	110	87	70.1
Polish	10	2	20.0
Russian	482	448	92.9
Spanish-American	48	13	27.1
Vietnamese	4	4	100.0
TOTAL	<u>1,119</u>	<u>841</u>	<u>75.2</u>

Critical MOS Shortages by Unit. (C) The Army-wide shortage of 05H's and 98G(LA)'s was especially critical to operations (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA With the initiation of high frequency (HF) intercept operations scheduled for FY 1980, it is possible that current and expected shortages in the future may have an adverse impact on operations. Additionally, a critical shortage in 33S personnel (Signal Maintenance) has already adversely affected current operations. At the close of FY 1979, only one of four authorized maintenance personnel was on hand and was a 120-day loss with no

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programmed replacements.

(C-~~CCO~~) [] there were 300 05H's authorized in mid FY 1979 but only 197 assigned. In early January, 12:16 position equivalents were dropped in a priority established by NSA. At the close of the year, of the 288 05H's authorized, there was an 84 percent fill. Despite this improvement, the Field Station closed 14 positions in order to cope with the shortage. The station was also short of 98Z personnel, manned at 54 percent (11 authorized, 6 assigned). The 98G(VN) fill was at 58 percent (12 authorized, 7 assigned).

(C-~~CCO~~) Because of 05H shortage, [] extended its shift schedules to accomplish assigned intercept. In an effort to keep all assigned positions productive, the Commander also exempted 05H personnel from company details. In spite of these efforts, the station was still forced to drop assigned mission coverage.

(C-~~CCO~~) By the close of FY 1978, the assigned strength in 05K manning at [] was only 65 percent of the authorized, causing a loss in the station's collection effort of nearly 1,000 hours over a three-month period. However, by the close of FY 1979, 05K assigned strength had risen to 80 percent of authorized. NSA's decision to drop the [] effort also aided the situation. No programmed hours of coverage were being lost.

(C) Manning of 98G(KP) positions at [] had deteriorated to the point where positions were being closed. There were 121 authorized but only 81 assigned for a 66 percent fill. Reduced 05H manning (at 88 percent fill) resulted in a loss of 224 hours of assigned coverage during the last quarter of FY 1979. Also on a downward trend was 98C manning; [] was authorized 74 of which 65 were assigned for an 87 percent fill.

(C) Due to extreme shortages in MOS's 05H and 05K, [] was required to close numerous manual Morse and printer positions during FY 1979.

(S-~~CCO~~) Field Station San Antonio continued to fulfill its mission in spite of a shortage of 05H's brought about by a reduction of 93 authorized spaces when operations at [] were resumed. This, coupled with increased requirements in [] further reduced authorization and precluded any hopes of eventually making up the shortage. Nevertheless, with increased emphasis on resource management and maximum utilization of operational systems such as the advanced []

and [] there was no degradation in the capabilities of Field Station San Antonio.

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L.
86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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Critical MOS Fill. (U) A comparison of the enlisted personnel posture by critical and critical support MOS's in FY's 1978 and 1979 is shown in the table below.

Table 9.—Enlisted Personnel Posture by Critical MOS
FY's 1978-1979

MOS	FY 1978			FY 1979		
	Auth	Act	Percent of Fill	Auth	Act	Percent of Fill
05D	170	146	85.9	161	185	115
05G	107	104	97.2	77	75	97
05K	613	544	88.7	635	582	92
05H	1172	920	78.5	1079	1120	104
33S	398	383	96.2	425	367	86
96B	No statistics available			106	75	71
96C	No statistics available			120	121	101
96D	No statistics available			58	32	55
97B	No statistics available			456	326	71
97C	No statistics available			123	54	44
98C	947	784	82.8	920	827	90
98G	789	750	95.0	715	749	105
98J	116	145	125.0	150	158	105
98Z	98	79	80.1	105	63	60

(U) The posture of MOS 05D was expected to remain constant (at authorized level); and there was no significant change in the posture of MOS 05G during FY 1979 as compared to FY 1978. Although there was a slight increase in the fill for MOS 05K in FY 1979 when compared to FY 1978, there was a significant shortfall in the overseas units. CONUS units for the most part were overstrength, due primarily to the return of overseas personnel. This MOS was also in the Space Imbalanced MOS program (SIMOS). The retention rate for MOS 05K was very low. DA increased the reenlistment bonus incentive to \$3,000.

(U) Throughout the fiscal year there was a steady increase in the fill of MOS 05H. The only significant problem experienced in the Command was the distribution of these personnel among subordinate units. Corrective action was taken to cross level for fill shortages in overseas units by requesting volunteers from the CONUS units. Continued improvement was expected as surplus personnel were identified and reassigned to overseas units.

(U) The posture of MOS 33S fluctuated throughout the year. Shortages in this MOS were caused primarily by ASI (additional skill identifier) and special training requirements. Posture was expected to be balanced by 3d Qtr FY80, because all accessions chargeable to FY 1979 training programs

should have graduated.

(U) Shortages in MOS 96B and MOS 96D were attributed to decreasing Army strength grade imbalance, competing Army priorities, and security requirements. Their posture was not expected to improve in the near future. DA expanded its FY 1980 training program.

(U) There were no significant problems with the posture of MOS 96C during the year; however, there was a shortage in low density language fills.

(U) Analysis of the MOS 97B posture during the year indicated that the percentage of fill in most units (major using units) had declined as follows: 66th MI Group from 86 percent to 78 percent; 500th MI Group from 88 percent to 65 percent; 470th MI Group from 160 percent to 133 percent; and 902d MI Group from 88 percent to 62 percent. The only unit that had an increase in its percentage of fill was the 501st MI Group which reached 89 percent.

(U) Critical shortage of MOS 97C Army-wide was 50.3 percent and strength was projected to decrease further. Command posture indicated the following: 66th MI Group increased from 91 percent to 95 percent; 500th MI Group decreased from 80 percent to 60 percent; 470th MI Group increased from 59 percent to 140 percent due to reduction in 97C positions and time required for attrition of excess personnel; USA Operational Group decreased from 69 percent to 56 percent; and 501st MI Group stood at 36 percent.

(U) Strength figures for MOS 98C in Table 9 also included linguist requirements. Shortages in this MOS existed primarily in (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) requirements.

(U) Although MOS 98G collectively was overstrength, there were significant shortages in low density languages—(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(U) There were no significant problems with MOS 98J; however, ASI J1 requirements were a problem area. Shortages in MOS 98Z were attributed primarily to low retention rate of senior NCO's. Posture not expected to change in the near future.¹⁸

Enlistment and Reenlistment Incentives. (U) At the close of FY 1979, the tables below depict the enlistment and reenlistment monetary incentives that were in effect.¹⁹

Table 10.—Enlistment Incentives

<u>MOS</u>	<u>Title/Language</u>	<u>Amount</u>
05D	EW/SIGINT Identification Locator	\$2,500
05G	SIGSEC Specialist	

Enlistment Incentives—Continued

<u>MOS</u>	<u>Title/Language</u>	<u>Amount</u>
05H	EW/SIGINT Interceptor	\$3,000
05K	EW/SIGINT Non-Morse Interceptor	\$2,000
96C	Interrogator	\$2,500
98G	EW/SIGINT Voice Interceptor by Language	\$3,000
	(b)(3):50 USC 3024	\$3,000
	(i)	\$2,500
		\$2,500

Table 11.—Reenlistment Incentives

<u>MOS</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>*Bonus</u>	
05D	EW/SIGINT Identification Locator	4A	1B
05G	SIGSEC Specialist	2A	4B
05H	EW/SIGINT Morse Interceptor	4A	1B
05K	EW/SIGINT Non-Morse Interceptor	4A	1B
33S	EW/Intercept Systems Repair	2A	2B
96C	Interrogator	2A	
96D	Image Interpreter	3A	
97B	Counterintelligence Agent	4A	
97C	Area Intelligence Specialist		2B
98C	EW/SIGINT Specialist	2A	1B
98G	(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)	4A	4B
98G		5A	4B
98G		2A	1B
98G		4A	2B
98J	EW/SIGINT Non-Collection	2A	1B

*Zone A applied to 1st Termers (6 or less years active service at ETS). Zone B applied to career soldiers (6-10 years active service at ETS). The numerical multiplier times the service member's base pay (BP) at time of reenlistment determined the amount of bonus to be paid. (Example: An E5 first termor 05H can now draw up to \$14,376 for a 6-year reenlistment - 6 yrs x BP \$599 x 4.)

Additional Skill Identifiers. (U) Two of INSCOM proponent Additional Skill Identifiers (ASI's) were revised during FY 1979 to more accurately identify the duties with which associated or to update associated training course date. ASI DF was revised to change the title to ASHWORTH/BECKER Systems Maintenance, and ASI Y5 was revised to add authorization for use with MOS 32F40. A request for ASI on Specialized Teletype Equipment Maintenance (associated with MOS 31J) was disapproved on 19 April 1979.

(U) HQ INSCOM requested the establishment of an ASI Code for warrant officer and commissioned aviators qualified in RU-21, JU-21, and RV-1 aircraft signal intelligence/electronic warfare systems. An ASI was needed to assist in the tracking and retention of aviators who had gained experience in sophisticated airborne intelligence U-21 systems such as GUARDRAIL, CEFIRM LEADER, and LEFT JAB. Operation of these aircraft systems required the pilot to become qualified on several navigation, life support, and aircraft survivability subsystems which were unique to these systems. In addition to providing the electronic warfare aviation companies in the force structure with an identifiable pool of experienced crew members, the ASI code would enhance the tracking of personnel who had undergone the extensive and costly background investigations required for access to Special Intelligence material. During FY 1979, changes to AR 611-112 and AR 611-101 implemented the new ASI's.²⁰

Skill Qualification Test. (U) As a result of field complaints and problems encountered with the Skill Qualification Test (SQT) system, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) deemed it appropriate to make some major changes in the SQT program.

(U) In July 1979, TRADOC issued the following proposed changes to be discussed at the Army Commanders' Conference in October 1979:

1. Smaller and more frequently tested SQT. This proposed change would reduce the overall SQT component tasks from 45-55 to approximately 30 tasks.
2. Less emphasis on SQT written testing. Future testing would contain 30-40 percent written questions with the remainder tested in a "hands-on" situation. The written component would be changed to Skill Component to reflect greater emphasis on performance based evaluations which used TV tapes, Besseler Cue See, and illustrations.
3. Increased emphasis on hands-on testing. The performance certification component (PCC) would be replaced by the Job Site Component (JSC). This would permit an on-the-job evaluation of the soldier's performance by the soldier's supervisor. Units could train as much as they wished in preparation for the JSC and could test soldiers as they deemed fit.
4. Single Skill Level Training. This proposed change recognized the

reality that units have a full-time job in gaining and maintaining competence of soldiers at skill level at which they actually serve.

5. Improved responsiveness. The increased portion of the test in hands-on and job site components would provide immediate feedback to soldiers and trainers.

6. Test common Army subjects. Each SQT would contain certain tasks common to all soldiers, for example, nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) and First Aid.

(U) Although the proposed changes would go a long way toward improving the SQT, the major problem that existed in INSCOM was that the SQT system was geared toward tactical units whose primary mission during peacetime was training. INSCOM, on the other hand, had an operational mission in peacetime as in war, and training had to be directed toward the accomplishment of this real-time mission. This, coupled with the fact that INSCOM units were spread out geographically, and that personnel required to administer the SQT system had to be taken "out of hide," presented major problems. Efforts to solve them continued to be made with TRADOC and the schools.²¹

In-Country Language Training. (U) The In-Country Language Training Program was designed to give both INSCOM and tactical support linguists refresher maintenance training and/or intermediate level training at civilian institutes in the country in which the linguist was stationed. Initially, it was limited to European theater languages but is expected to expand to countries in the Far East during FY 1980.

(U) The program was first surfaced during 1977. Later, DA letter, DAPE-MPT-E, dated 10 April 1978, authorized the pilot program in both Russian (Garmisch Advanced Russian Review (GARR) Course) and German (Goethe Institute Intermediate level). In June 1978, HQ INSCOM authorized enrollment of two students at the Goethe Institute and provided funds to Field Station Berlin to do so. The first INSCOM member to enroll was SSG David Wallace, who began a full six-month course in August 1978 and graduated in February 1979. At the close of FY 1979, evaluation of the course for Intermediate level was at an impasse. The Defense Language Institute (DLI) wanted the tests administered to Army students, and Goethe Institute was very reluctant to release the tests. DLI also doubted the applicability of some of the lessons to mission related language requirements, but that hindrance was being overcome.

(U) The pilot GARR course was a four-week course conducted during 2 May-2 June 1978. The course was modified and lengthened to five weeks with ten students per class. Class 3-79 began in June 1979. Participation to date consisted of INSCOM Field Station personnel, personnel from the 66th MI Group, the US Marine Corps, Air Force, GUARDRAIL (330th ASA Company), and tactical support units.

(U) The Koenigstein Intensive Russian Course was presented yearly and was funded by and for HQ INSCOM and subordinate units. A total of 12 Russian linguists attended this three-week total immersion training course. Participants were primarily West European students, and the only common language was Russian. The DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, in cooperation with Field Stations Augsburg and Berlin, funded for two participants from the 66th MI Group, and for five from each Field Station for FY 1979.

(U) The largest portion of In-Country Language Training was that provided with the cooperation of the Education Center. Field Station Augsburg used an instructor hired through the Army Continuing Education System (ACES) program to present four 96-hour Russian refresher courses, all during prime duty time. Field Station Berlin presented at least one course on a full-time basis through the same channels, but using a University of Maryland instructor and at least qualifying the students to receive university credits by testing in the language. Field Station Augsburg was attempting to obtain the same type refresher training for Czechoslovakian linguists but was experiencing difficulty in locating a suitable Czech refresher course.

(U) The Far East In-Country Language Training program was to initially concentrate on Korean and Japanese. The reason for this was the availability of courses. Information was received from the 500th MI Group regarding available schools/courses in Japanese and from the 501st MI Group regarding available schools/courses available in Korean. Latest plans called for three personnel to begin school in Korea during 1st Qtr FY80.²²

Asian Studies Detachment. (U) Based on the Group Commander's initiative and in response to verbal tasking of CG INSCOM in March 1979, a concept plan was drawn up for the reorganization of the 500th MI Group. The key factor in this reorganization plan was the establishment of an Asian Studies Detachment that would provide expanded use of the strategic Military Intelligence Detachments, the Asian Language Training Unit, and the US Army Document Center (Pacific) as major subordinate elements.

(U) A critical need existed for the extension of academic language instruction through practical application to intermediate and advanced language training and area studies. The concept plan proposed that this need could best be met by near total immersion among native linguists. The linguistic expertise and foreign document availability in the US Army Document Center and the analytical efforts of strategic MI Detachments formed a natural relationship with a language training capability. The Asian Studies Detachment concept would accomplish this structure to include the Asian Language Training Unit initially designed to handle Japanese and subsequently Chinese; and the Korean language practical application, intermediate and advanced language development.

(U) In July 1979, the 500th MI Group received approval from the CG INSCOM

on the principles of the reorganization plan, including the establishment of the Asian Studies Detachment. The plan was subsequently scheduled to be submitted to HQDA for approval in early 1980. Serious reservations existed about DA approval because there were too few language candidates on hand to merit an Asian Language Institute, and the already existing training programs to meet the present language requirements.²³

Foreign Area Officer Steering Committee Membership. (U) On 24 October 1978, HQ INSCOM sent a message to DA requesting that an INSCOM General Officer be added to the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Steering Committee, and that AR 15-28 be amended accordingly. This would give INSCOM, as proponent for the US Army Russian Institute (USARI), equal vote with TRADOC and the Commandant, US Army Institute for Military Assistance (a TRADOC school) in matters concerning the FAO specialty, a position which INSCOM should have since USARI trained the Russian Foreign Area Officers. The other members were: DCSOPS, HQDA (Chairman); DCSLOG, HQDA; ACSI, HQDA; CG MILPERCEN; and CG USARCPAC. ACSI was listed as the representative for USARI.

(U) The message further requested that an INSCOM representative be named to the FAO Steering Working Group, and invited to the Working Group meeting in November. The position of the Working Group was that there was no requirement for INSCOM representation because US Army Russian Institute interests were adequately represented by ACSI. It was pointed out that the regulation charging ACSI with that responsibility was written when ACSI was the proponent for USARI, and that proponentcy had now changed to INSCOM. INSCOM was subsequently invited to attend Working Group meetings when matters concerning USARI were discussed, but no final decisions were made to name INSCOM a member of the FAO Steering Committee.²⁴

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

Intermediate Non-Morse Analysis Course. (U) The Army's annual training requirement for skilled non-Morse analysts was 52. The Senior Non-Morse Analysis Course (A232-0058) was programmed to produce only four Army non-Morse analysts and a solution to the problem had to be found in order to insure manning of critical field positions. Thus, in November 1977, INSCOM recommended to NSACSS, the establishment of an intermediate level course. The Intermediate Course would be an abbreviated version of the Senior Non-Morse Analysis Course and would train an operator (MOS 05K) to be essentially

an acquisition, signal search, and development operator capable of operating the equipment and identifying signals, but would not be trained to perform the in-depth analysis that was expected of a graduate of the Senior Analysis Course. The proposal for the Intermediate Course was developed and agreed to by NSACSS and the Services at the Non-Morse Signals Search and Analysis Training meeting at Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC), Corry Station, Pensacola, Florida, held during 31 May-2 June 1978.

(U) The Senior Non-Morse Analysis Course (A232-0058) and the new Intermediate Non-Morse Analysis Course (A232-0060) were scheduled to start classes on 1 October 1979. The Army's FY 1980 quotas were 39 for the Intermediate Course and 14 for the Senior Course. The remaining problem was to insure that quotas available to the Army were filled in order to meet the needs of the field units. Even with the start of this new Intermediate Course, effects of the shortages in this highly skilled area of the non-Morse MOS 05K will continue to be felt for at least a year.²⁶

Mobile Maintenance Training Team. (U) In July 1978, TRADOC formally recognized its responsibility to train maintenance personnel to support strategic intelligence systems which had been fielded but original contractor training had ceased. As a result, the Mobile Maintenance Training Team concept was developed to fill the training void created by many one-of-a-kind or station unique systems, particularly in Europe, for which there was no formal training available. It was designed to provide required maintenance training, mainly to MOS 33S personnel, by highly qualified instructor personnel from the US Army Intelligence School Devens (USAISD).

(U) In March 1979, USAISD and INSCOM agreed on the Mobile Maintenance Training Team concept and DCSOPS Training Branch was established as the INSCOM point of contact for all matters pertaining to on-site maintenance training. Procedures were established for the formal identification of INSCOM training requirements to TRADOC on a fiscal year basis.²⁷

Equipment Training Role. (U) Prior to implementation of the Intelligence and Stationing Study (IOSS) in FY 1976/77, the US Army Security Agency (now INSCOM) controlled personnel and materiel development activities for signal intelligence equipment and operations (such as recruiting, training, and assignment of personnel). Subsequent to the IOSS, these functions became the responsibility of other Army major commands and agencies. The lack of coordination between these commands—DARCOM, TRADOC, MILPERCEN—and INSCOM resulted in less than effective personnel and maintenance training requirements programming for strategic SIGINT systems developed by NSACSS.

(U) During the fiscal year, several events occurred which greatly aided INSCOM in being able to support NSACSS-developed strategic SIGINT systems.

In December 1978, NSACSS and DA agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in which each would recognize the system documentation of the other. In addition, INSCOM Pamphlet 11-25 (Systems Development Model) was published and the Training Support Work Group began operating. The Training Support Work Group (TSWG), chaired by USA Communications and Electronics Materiel Readiness Command (CERCOM), met in October 1978 to assist in development of New Equipment Training Plans (NETP) and Quantitative and Qualitative Personnel Requirements Information (QQPRI) documents. Despite these steps, no agreement was reached among the MACOM's themselves for the responsibility of strategic SIGINT materiel developed by NSACSS.²⁸

Consolidation of Cryptologic Training. (U) In July 1978, Deputy Secretary of Defense Duncan issued a memo to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the National Security Agency tasking them to conduct a study of the cryptologic training community. The focus on the study was to be on improved effectiveness and economy of cryptologic training. Under the auspices of the Interservice Training Review Organization (ITRO), a study of cryptologic consolidation was conducted by the three service training commands and NSA. On 2 February 1979, a final report was issued to the Deputy Secretary of Defense recommending that consolidation at Keesler AFB, Biloxi, Mississippi and Naval Technical Training Center, Corry Station, Pensacola, Florida was the most feasible and cost effective option. The operational training would be at one site and maintenance training at the other.

(U) The Army submitted a separate report (consensus was not required under ITRO guidelines) covering the following points: (1) Consolidation should be at one location; (2) combat and training developments should be colocated with the training; (3) Army's non-cryptologic training should be colocated with cryptologic training (IOSS); and (4) Army training should be under Army control (colocated vice consolidated). However, the Deputy Secretary of Defense supported the findings of the ITRO committee and noted that the Army's separate report required that further action be taken before Army cryptologic training could be consolidated with the other services' training.

(U) The Army's plans were effectively blocked by Congressional representatives with an interest in Fort Devens remaining a viable Army installation. The representatives pointed out that they believed the ITRO study was based on a flawed and cursory analysis and that the study incorrectly excluded at least one cost effective stationing option involving Fort Devens. Before the Army could consolidate, it appeared that it would have to find someone to fill the gap left at Fort Devens. Meanwhile, NSA, Air Force, and Navy were going ahead with their consolidation plans which meant that the Air Force and Navy would have the lead in the training process.²⁹

First INSCOM Training Conference. (U) A training conference was held at HQ INSCOM, Arlington Hall Station, during 19-23 March 1979 with INSCOM training officers and NCO's worldwide in attendance. This was the first such conference ever held for INSCOM. The purpose of the conference was

to exchange ideas on unit training innovations for INSCOM; allow the personnel from the units to have direct interchange of information with the Intelligence Schools, ACSI (DA), DCSOPS (DA), and US Army Training Support Center (USATSC); discuss new INSCOM Training Regulation; and discuss ways of bridging the gap between Army training policies designed for combat units and training for INSCOM units. The conference was an overwhelming success based on feedback from all quarters to include TRADOC, USATSC, and INSCOM units. One of the more gratifying aspects of the conference was the interchange of ideas among the INSCOM units—those units with strong training programs pushing their ideas and those units with weak or no training programs gratefully accepting advice and materials from the strong.³⁰

Command Exercise Support. (U) Since the implementation of IOSS, INSCOM had not established a formal program to satisfy exercise support requirements as stated in AR 10-53. It had, however, provided periodic evaluator personnel to Army Readiness/Army Atlantic (ARRED/ARLANT) in response to requests for support to joint exercises. During FY 1979, actual support to Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises included major command activity and operational security (OPSEC) support to the command post exercises (CPX) NIFTY NUGGET/MOBEX 78 and WINTEX/POWER PLAY 79; SIGINT/EW evaluator and OPSEC evaluator personnel to JRX JACK FROST 79; SIGINT/EW evaluators to JTX BRAVE SHIELD 79/BOLD EAGLE 80; and COMSEC planning support to JTX SOLID SHIELD 79. These evaluators were not asked to provide a formal INSCOM evaluation of activities but performed an internal function as did other evaluator personnel. While helpful to the execution of the exercise itself, participation in this fashion restricted INSCOM's ability to give the full, external critique that the provisions of AR 10-53 imply.

(U) INSCOM was charged by AR 10-53 to provide advice and assistance to field exercises through evaluator and observer representatives and to also provide reports to the supported commands on the effectiveness of ISE (intelligence, security and EW) concepts, procedures, and techniques through the experience factor generated by participation in these exercises.

(U) During FY 1979, HQ INSCOM formulated a concept of support to FORSCOM/ARRED/ARLANT exercises. It was determined that INSCOM should establish a capability to provide periodic ISE evaluation to CONUS Army exercises within the framework of echelon above corps concepts outlined in draft FM 100-16. Support should be based on functional responsibilities assigned to INSCOM by AR 10-53 and be executed in the capacity of the Army MACOM for ISE at the echelon above corps. Provision should also be made for participation in these exercises as players and planners as well, but only if these roles correspond to functions assigned to INSCOM rather than as routine ISE operations at echelons corps and below. In addition, emphasis should be placed on utilizing exercise support as an opportunity to develop and refine ISE echelon above corps (EAC) methodology through support mechanisms such as the Theater Army Intelligence Command (TAIC) and the TENCAP

(technical exploitation of national capabilities) program.

(U) Support of the first order was furnishing evaluator personnel as requested and from these experiences, together with continuing coordination with FORSCOM, develop further response roles of mutual benefit. As the program developed other options could be activated, such as further development of TENCAP support activities, field assistance support teams and creation/testing of a CONUS TAIC.

(U) Of the many issues associated with participation in field exercises, the most critical was that of personnel resources. This was a reflection of the complexity of the issues created by IOSS and particularly the transfer of many of the tactical ISE resources to other commands. In the wake of these developments, INSCOM had been left with relatively few operational resources in CONUS and far fewer opportunities to maintain tactical skills. The pool of qualified INSCOM evaluators was small and largely engaged in strategic and national projects. The limited number of available personnel and the significant number of annual joint and Army exercises in CONUS led to far more numerous opportunities for support than INSCOM was able to satisfy. An agreement with FORSCOM was effected to produce an optimum balance of need and available support by identifying those exercises in which INSCOM would participate and define its exercise support functions.³¹

Command Post Exercise NIFTY NUGGET/MOBEX 78. (U) In October 1978, a major mobilization exercise was conducted (9-28 October) by JCS to test US Armed Forces' capabilities for rapid transition to a wartime readiness posture. The Army portion of the exercise was termed MOBEX 78 and continued until 8 November. INSCOM participation for this command post exercise (CPX) took the form of a MACOM (HQ INSCOM) exercise cell and an external OPSEC/COMSEC support force (902d MI Group) at selected exercise headquarters sites. The exercise cell received message traffic, provided telephonic contact with the Army Operations Center, ACSI (DA), and other players, and acted as exercise player for required actions. OPSEC/COMSEC support was provided to selected Army installations, the Pentagon, Hq US Readiness Command, Hq Sixth US Army, and Fort Ritchie.

(U) Several significant events occurred both as a result of and during the exercise. The OPSEC support provided the exercises NIFTY NUGGET and MOBEX was the largest ever given an exercise in terms of number of people, number of locations, and total number of hours of COMSEC coverage. It also represented the first real effort to integrate counterintelligence support to an exercise of this nature. Previous exercises have been supported almost exclusively by COMSEC monitoring and analysis efforts. As a result of the finding that the greatest percent of disclosures resulted from communications related to logistic support of the exercise, a dedicated effort was taken by the JCS staff to provide more secure telephone support to logistics and administrative personnel and staffs.

(U) Due to the relative newness of INSCOM involvement in providing CI support to an exercise of this nature, several mistakes were made. The initial mistake was in not providing specific guidance for CI activities in the OPLAN's governing both exercises. This was caused by both a shortage of time in which to prepare and disseminate the OPLAN's, and some indecision regarding the types of activities that could be engaged in by both the strategic (INSCOM) CI personnel and the tactical (FORSCOM) CI units. With a minimum amount of guidance, CI personnel assigned to the 902d MI Group arranged for and provided more than an adequate amount of CI support to the particular installations and reserve organizations in their areas of operation. Their activities and comments will be used to establish CI support guidelines in future operations of this nature. Unfortunately, there was only a limited amount of participation from tactical CI units to serve this same purpose. A post exercise conference at FORSCOM and REDCOM was used to establish some minimum guidelines for future CI participation in exercises.

(U) The joint aspect of OPSEC support to these exercises provided an exceptionally healthy and educational environment. Both the personnel and the product provided by the US Air Force and US Navy were outstanding examples of professionalism at its best. A number of very junior enlisted personnel from all three services participated in OPSEC support to the exercises both in the COMSEC and CI areas (only Army provided CI support). However, the product of their involvement did not reveal their newness to OPSEC operations. This, from personal observations and telephone inquiries, was not only indicative of their supervision but of their individual efforts and can-do attitudes. Problems related to personalities were virtually non-existent.³²

Command Post Exercise POWER PLAY. (U) In March 1979, the JCS jointly conducted a major war exercise, POWER PLAY 79, with the European theater war exercises of USAREUR (WINTEX) and NATO (CIMEX). As in NIFTY NUGGET/MOBEX 78, HQ INSCOM established an exercise response cell to participate with other exercise players and take required actions. In this exercise an internal OPSEC support capability was utilized for the first time by tasking the 902d MI Group to monitor and evaluate the OPSEC posture of HQ INSCOM during the exercise play.

(U) OPSEC coverage was a joint effort with Army, Navy, and Air Force participating and took place at 20 installations and at Headquarters in Europe, CONUS, and Hawaii. INSCOM participation consisted of COMSEC monitoring of conventional telephones at 12 locations, including Headquarters, USREDCOM, two locations in Hawaii, and nine locations in Europe. Additionally, CI support was provided at the Pentagon; Site R, Fort Ritchie, Maryland; and throughout Europe. At the peak of the exercise, a total of 366 lines were monitored for over 6,623 hours. Monitoring of 26,286 calls resulted in 53 security violations. The security violation rate was less than two tenths of one percent.

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(U) On a worldwide basis, 111 COMSEC personnel were involved in providing COMSEC monitoring and analysis support to the exercise. Seven counter-intelligence agents in CONUS from the 902d MI Group, plus a large portion of the 66th MI Group in Europe, provided dedicated CI support to the exercise. The joint OPSEC analysis center, staffed with representatives from the Army, Air Force, and NSA (Navy), operated within the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon and the Alternate National Military Command Center at Fort Ritchie, Maryland (Site R).

(U) Results of COMSEC monitoring suggested a relatively high degree of COMSEC awareness. Coordination and cooperation of Navy, Air Force, and Army during exercise POWER PLAY 79 was truly outstanding. Lessons learned during exercise NIFTY NUGGET were incorporated in planning for POWER PLAY 79. However, the vast differences in the objectives and scope of the two exercises resulted in entirely new lessons learned. Several areas normally requiring extensive coordination activity were overlooked or approached late. The high degree of service cooperation facilitated overcoming these problems and exercise support activities were not diminished or adversely affected by these oversights. Procedures were established to preclude recurrence and to facilitate an overall improvement in the type of support the services would be able to provide in future exercises. These procedures were mutually established and agreed upon by each of the services, the JCS, and NSA, as appropriate.³³

NATO Command Post Exercise WINTEX 79. (C-CCO) During the NATO Command Post Exercise WINTEX 79 (6-21 March 1979), the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, USAREUR, established the USAREUR Theater Intelligence Center (UTIC) at [redacted] For the first time, both exercise and real-world intelligence functions at [redacted] were accomplished from a field position in which the US Army Cryptologic Support Group, USAREUR (CSG) played a major role. As expected, communications were a major problem, affecting both exercise and real-world operations. Members of the CSG Watch provided essential operations communications (OPSCOMM) support to the UTIC during this period. This included operation of [redacted]

as well as other circuits, which enabled the indications and warning (I&W) mission to eventually be conducted from the UTIC. Two members of the CSG Watch were involved in this effort. Three other members of the Watch, using regular CSG OPSCOMM circuits, provided back-up communications relay support to the UTIC. The existence of a reliable back-up system was a key factor in the UTIC experiment, in that it permitted real-world operations to be deployed and field communications to be tested, without fear of a loss of communications in the event of difficulty.

(C) During WINTEX 79, three military personnel and two civilian contractors from Systems Planning Corporation (SPC) served as an "INSCOM Cell" whose role was to be an interface between national intelligence agencies and the exercise Director's Staff (DISTAFF) in the UTIC. The first half of the

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UTIC play during the exercise was conducted from Hq USAREUR in Heidelberg; the latter half was conducted from a field location at Zweibrucken Air Force Base.

(C) The INSCOM Cell provided several valuable services. For example, in the early stages of the exercise it was found that the hostile forces movement data being reported by NSA was not tracking with the local "play." Upon investigation of the problem, it was learned that the Master Events List being used by NSA was less detailed than those being used in the theater. The problem was corrected by providing NSA the more detailed movement tables. Throughout [redacted]

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[redacted] players and the DISTAFF's at the UTIC and the Corps by collecting timely movement readouts from the DISTAFF's and then passing them to [redacted] for inclusion in the noon and evening NPIC cables. Additionally, while in Heidelberg, the INSCOM Cell developed training/playing aids and preprinted forms that were used by the UTIC players in processing intelligence information received from national agencies for transmittal to the player G-2 cells at the Corps. The INSCOM Cell was also instrumental in identifying and solving some of the internal UTIC data handling problems that were resulting in unreasonable time delays in processing incoming intelligence reports.³⁴

INSCOM Operational Readiness Report. (U) In response to CDR INSCOM tasking, the DCSOPS developed a readiness report vehicle applicable to operational units of the command as the basis for a periodic command status report to DA. The Operational Readiness Report (ORR) was structured as a unit readiness report (AR 220-1) with additional discussion of topics of special or unique interest to INSCOM as the Army's intelligence MACOM. The thrust of the report was to evaluate personnel, equipment, and training readiness, both in a peacetime role and in transition to war. All field units, less garrison and administrative support functions, would submit their reports to HQ INSCOM on a quarterly basis. These field reports would be reviewed and evaluated by HQ INSCOM staff who would provide comment on reported problems, indicate actions that would be taken to assist in the resolution of reported problems, and a report prepared and returned to the unit.

(U) In November 1978, the pilot reports were submitted to HQ INSCOM and were found to be satisfactory for the reporting requirement, and March 1979 was established as the due date for the first reports on a quarterly basis. Based on these ORR's periodic command status reports were prepared and submitted to DA.³⁵

The 142d Military Intelligence Linguist Company, Utah National Guard.

(U) When it was learned that the 142d MI Linguist Company of the Utah Army National Guard had a unique reading and speaking capability in 23 languages, INSCOM obtained a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the National Guard

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Bureau, HQDA, FORSCOM, and the State of Utah, which would allow direct contact and tasking between INSCOM and the 142d Company. The MOU permitted technical utilization of the 142d by INSCOM during peacetime but retained existing command channels. However, CDR INSCOM wanted to have INSCOM more directly involved in training, utilization, and mobilization. At the time, there was no definitive use of the 142d Company after mobilization. The mobilization assignment was Fort Carson, Colorado, without further employment which suggested that unit members would be used as individual fillers as needed. The acknowledged linguistic shortage within the Army and the capable linguistic asset available in the 142d suggested a more definite use for it and the need for transition to war planning. INSCOM wanted the 142d MI Linguist Company to be utilized in an echelon above corps role, particularly to support the Theater Army Intelligence Command in Europe and in the Western Command (Pacific).

(U) In a 13 July 1979 message, INSCOM recommended changes to the MOU. Under the changes, INSCOM would be designated as the MACOM for mobilization giving specifics on the tie-in (for each element of the 142d) with an INSCOM command for mobilization, for annual training/inactive duty training, and Readiness Training for US Army intelligence resources. Hq, Utah Army Reserve and National Guard and the CDR, 142d MI Linguist Company were most desirous of improving their technical MI skills through closer association with INSCOM. However, FORSCOM nonconcurred, expressing appreciation of INSCOM's training support while at the same time acknowledging its own need for the 142d's assets to support tactical intelligence requirements upon mobilization. Although INSCOM still planned to pursue closer relationship with the 142d Company, the emphasis in the future would be to take the lead in addressing the total Army language question. INSCOM would also try to use the experience gained by assisting the 142d to expand the Reserve Component language base by identifying possible solutions including untapped language pools.³⁶

Army Command and Control Study - 82. (U) The Army Command and Control Study - 82 (ACCS-82) was a DA study for the purpose of examining the US Army command and control organization of the active and reserve components to determine improvements necessary to insure wartime effectiveness while striving to maximize peacetime efficiency. INSCOM's primary objective in this study was to provide for the potential for selected reserve units to come under its operational control. The Reserve Officer had the responsibility to correlate the staff input for the ACCS-82 study. This required an extensive effort between October 1978 and September 1979, and it received direct involvement by INSCOM's Deputy Commanding General for Intelligence. The INSCOM objective was met. Significant input to ACCS-82 Study Group tasking was submitted on 6 March 1979. This input addressed common and MACOM unique subject areas dealing with both the Active and Reserve Components.³⁷

Mobilization Requirements for Retired Army Personnel. (U) Among the efforts

made by the Army to alleviate the serious pretrained mobilization manpower shortage was the proposed recall of retired regulars and reservists. The purpose of the program was to identify positions which might be filled by retirees, thus releasing younger personnel for deployment or other critical assignments. The goal of the program was to issue preassignment orders to qualified retirees.

(U) On 15 January 1979, INSCOM was tasked by the DA Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to review all Mobilization Tables of Distribution and Allowances (MOBTDA) and determine which positions were appropriate for fill by retired personnel. Those positions were identified, and on 20 April 1979, a detailed listing of all INSCOM MOBTDA positions which could not be filled by retirees upon mobilization was forwarded to the US Army Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC). It was recommended that future planning to fill those INSCOM positions designated as eligible for fill by retired personnel consider the security clearance requirements, retirees nominated to fill INSCOM positions be screened by this command prior to the issuance of preassignment orders.³⁸

Congressional Hearings on Army Security Reserve Units. (U) On 20 September 1979, as part of the annual budget hearings, the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations heard testimony concerning the state of readiness of the Army Reserve. The Committee had focused on two studies, one by the Army and another by the General Accounting Office (GAO). The purpose of the studies was to give a realistic look at all types of Reserve units across the board. The conclusion was that it was unnecessary to attempt to provide for certain types of units and skills. For example, during periods of mobilization, truck drivers would be readily available from the civilian population and in the meantime there would be little need to expend large amounts of monies to recruit and train such skills. On the other hand, there were certain units whose skills were needed in the Reserves but it was very unlikely that the Army could adequately recruit and train such individuals. Army Security units fell into this category.

(U) The Committee on Appropriations picked up on these findings to recommend a drastic cut in the area of Army Security Reserve units among others. Upon the personal appeal of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower, the Committee agreed to review the status of the units within a year and the Army's plan to correct the adverse trends.

(U) There was a basic fallacy behind the logic of the Congressional thinking that if the Army was unsuccessful in the area of Reserves, it should focus its energies and resources upon the Active Components. The problem with this thinking was that many of the obstacles faced in the Reserves are the same as those in the Active Army. For example, recruitment and retention of personnel and fielding adequate equipment are problems in both the Active and Reserve Components. The ultimate solution to either area is simply adequate support and guidance from the highest levels.³⁹

Designation of Arlington Hall Station as Restricted Area. (U) The Commander, US Army Garrison, Arlington Hall Station designated Arlington Hall Station as a RESTRICTED AREA within the meaning of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and further designated a CONTROLLED AREA, for administrative purposes only, on 30 January 1979.⁴⁰

Implementation of SCI Interim Pilot Program for INSCOM. (U) The pilot program for interim sensitive compartmented intelligence (SCI) access was implemented within the Command and a message giving guidance was dispatched on 6 February 1979. Under this program, certain individuals that met the requirements listed in the message would be eligible for the interim access. On 27 March 1979, the SCI Interim Pilot Program was extended to cover all INSCOM activities. At the end of a six-month period a report was given to OACSI which provided statistics on the program. As a result of the obvious beneficial impact of this program and the moderate number (145) of SCI access requests processed to the Central Personnel Clearance Facility (CCF), the ACSI directed on 6 August 1979 that this program be continued for a 12-month period beginning on 5 August.⁴¹

Marriage to Foreign Nationals. (U) On 11 April 1979, in order to resolve the problem of shortages in CMF 98 and 33, HQ INSCOM requested from OACSI a modification to the procedures in Technical Bulletin 380-35 concerning the marriage of Career Management Field 98 and 33 personnel to foreign nationals. This modification, for the first time, would allow the possession of an MOS to be sufficient justification for submission of waiver package and evidence of a compelling need.

(U) In a 4 May 1979 message from OACSI, the modification request was granted. It stated that when an Army member possessing an MOS in the CMF 98 or 33 series marries a foreign national, the following procedures would apply:⁴²

1. Mere possession of the MOS in CMF 98 or 33 will be sufficient justification for submission of waiver package and evidence of a compelling need.

2. The waiver, if approved, will be equally valid for SCI access in the US, or a country other than that of the prospective spouse's country of origin. This is subject, of course, to the Army member satisfying the other requirements in this paragraph and TB 380-35.

3. The subject will not be allowed to extend his tour of duty in the spouse's native country. (An exception may be made to this requirement only in situations where the loss of the service member's particular skill would seriously hamper the accomplishment of the unit's mission. No more than 12 months extension may be granted and only upon the express approval of the CDR INSCOM or his designee at the Headquarters.)

4. Once reassigned from the country of origin of the spouse, the service member may not be assigned to that country until the spouse has become a US citizen.

5. The spouse must obtain US citizenship within five years of the date first eligible or the service member's SCI access will be terminated.

Military Justice. (U) The number of non-judicial punishments imposed under Article 15 in FY 1979 was 298, a marked reversal in the downward trend of the past few years and from the total of 232 in FY 1978. Courts-Martial in FY 1978 totaled 1 Summary, 4 Special, and 1 General; in FY 1979, 4 Summary, 4 Special, and 1 General.⁴³

(U) The table below gives a breakdown of serious crime by category for FY's 1978 and 1979. There was an overall increase in number of serious crime, particularly in the areas of destruction of property and possession of marihuana

Table 12.—Serious Crime Offenses

	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>
<u>Crimes of Violence</u>		
Rape	0	0
Robbery	0	1
Aggravated Assault	1	2
Assault	9	12
Assault/Battery	1	3
<u>Crimes Against Property</u>		
Larceny	16	21
Burglary	0	2
Breaking/Entering	0	0
Auto Theft	1	1
Malicious Damage	0	0
Destruction of Property	6	17
<u>Drug Offenses</u>		
Use/Possession of Marihuana	23	53
Narcotics	1	1
Sale/Trafficking	2	0

(U) Personnel were administratively discharged for the reasons, shown in the table below, during FY 1979.

Table 13.—FY 1979 Administrative Eliminations

<u>Authority</u>	<u>Hon</u>	<u>Gen</u>	<u>Less Than Hon</u>
Chap 5, AR 635-200	18	9	0
Chap 6, AR 635-200	1	0	0
Chap 8, AR 635-200	4	0	0
Chap 9, AR 635-200	7	1	0
Chap 10, AR 635-200	5	0	9
Chap 13, AR 635-200			
Unsuitability	6	0	0
Chap 14, AR 635-200	2	0	1
AR 600-43	1	0	0

(U) Units were required to indicate the number and method of disposition of certain offenses as shown in table below.

Table 14.—Disposition of Other Offenses, FY 1979

<u>Disposition/Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>
Art 86 (Absences Without Leave)	66*
Art 89 (Disrespect)	7
Art 90 (Disobeying Order of Commissioned Officer)	10
Art 91 (Disobeying Order of WO or NCO)	14
Art 92 (Dereliction of Duty/Failure to Obey Order)	56
Art 95 (Resisting Arrest)	1
Art 111/112 (Drunk Driving/Drunk on Duty)	16

*Includes 8 AWOL's and 58 (Failure to Repair)

Polygraph Activities. (U) During the reporting period, polygraph examiners assigned to MI units in CONUS, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and western Europe conducted 232 field polygraph examinations in support of US Army counterintelligence investigations, offensive and defensive CI operations, HUMINT activities, and the Army Limited Access Authority (LAA) Program.⁴⁴

(U) During the conduct of the 232 field examinations worldwide, examinations occurred in Japan and the Panama Canal Zone in addition to those in geographical areas to which MI examiners were assigned. Of the 232 total field examinations conducted, 77 were adjudged "deception indicated" (DI) by the conducting examiners. During interview portions of the DI examinations, 57 examinees provided significant admissions for a 74 percent admission rate worldwide.

(U) The production of field examinations was comparable among ROK and CONUS-based examiners, but production in both CONUS and Korea was at a

rate less than accomplished in each area during FY 1978. Production of examinations in USAREUR ran at a considerably rate in FY 1979 than during FY 1978. Production figures for the worldwide INSCOM polygraph program for FY 1979 are shown in the table below.

Table 15.—Polygraph Activities, FY 1979

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Total</u>
Technical Review of Polygraph Examinations: (Field Examinations only)	232
Review of Permanent Polygraph Files:	
New Files Created	994
Defense Investigative Service Requests	210
FOIC/Privacy Center Requests	42
Other Authorized Requesters	<u>2,575</u>
TOTAL	<u>3,821</u>
Examiner Certification Actions:	7
Polygraph Examinations Conducted:	
ODCSCI/902d MI Gp (Field Examinations)	38
902d MI Gp for NSA	155
902d MI Gp Research Examinations	59
66th MI Gp (Field Examinations)	147
501st MI Gp (Field Examinations)	<u>47</u>
TOTAL	<u>446</u>

Congressional Inquiries/Requests for Assistance. (U) Responses to Congressional Inquiries during FY 1979 totaled 57 and represented a slight decrease from the 68 accomplished in FY 1978. Contrary to previous years, only one category accounted for more than 10 percent of the total actions processed—Transfer/Reassignment. As had been the case historically, only a comparatively small percentage (21 percent) were found to be substantiated.

(U) Responses to Inspector General Action Requests (IGAR) hardly fluctuated, totaling 153 as compared to 149 the previous year. The shift in IGAR workload toward Acting Inspectors General (AIG) at major subordinate units—first postulated in FY 1978 when they resolved 63 percent of all cases—was tentatively confirmed in FY 1979 when AIG once again accomplished a majority (54 percent) of cases processed. An unofficial objective of the INSCOM Office of the IG was a 70 percent AIG completion rate, an objective in consonance with problem-solving at the lowest possible level.

(U) As with Congressional Inquiries, IGAR in only one category—Administration—accounted for over 10 percent of the total actions processed. The

striking aspect of IGAR within INSCOM continued to be the high percentage found to be substantiated—65 percent in FY 1979. Such a high substantiation rate was believed to reflect that most IGAR truly concern matters which were irresolvable in normal command/administrative channels.⁴⁵

Status of Aircraft Resources. (U) The INSCOM aircraft fleet grew in size during FY 1979 with the completion of the GUARDRAIL and QUICKLOOK Systems fielding. INSCOM aircraft on hand at the end of FY 1979 are shown in table below.⁴⁶

Table 16.—Aircraft Resources

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Type of Aircraft</u>	<u>30 Sep 79</u>
146th ASA Co (Avn)	RU-21H	6
	U-21A	1
	OV-1D	6
	RV-1D	6
FS Korea	UH-1H	3
FS Sinop	U-21A	1
	C-12	1
FS Augsburg	UH-1H	2
66th MI Group	UH-1H	<u>1</u>
TOTAL		<u><u>27</u></u>

US Army Investigative Records Repository. (U) The Investigative Records Repository (IRR) increased its holdings from 3,649,445 records (FY 1978) to 3,654,733 (FY 1979). This vast collection of files compiled over 28-plus years includes Intelligence Reporting Files, Intelligence Collection Files, Counterintelligence Collection Files, DOD Affiliated Personnel and Incident Files, Non-DOD Affiliated Personnel and Organization Files, Counterintelligence Special Operations Files, Intelligence/Counterintelligence Source Files, Foreign Personnel and Organization Files, and United States Prisoner of War (POW)/Missing in Action (MIA)/Detainee Intelligence Files. FY 1979 witnessed increased emphasis directed toward the review/purge, categorization/separation and disposition of records.

(U) On 18 September 1978, the computer terminal to the centralized index located at Defense Investigative Service (DIS), previously under the operational control of the US Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility (CCF), was placed under the operational control of the Investigative Records Repository. Concurrent with the assumption of control by the

IRR, the CCF ceased the indexing of all requests from INSCOM, Fort Meade elements, in-house Liaison Offices, and requests containing a dossier number requesting that the dossier be forwarded. The assumption of this task and the additional processes required in responding to requests, without additional personnel, placed an added workload on the Records Processing Division, IRR. Action is on-going to determine the personnel requirements for the added workload.

(U) With the IRR assuming the function of processing requests to forward dossiers, it became apparent that procurement officers were not fully complying with the Ellsworth Memorandum and AR 381-45, which specified the reasons for requestion files, although valid justification appeared to exist. Also, with the centralization of clearance granting functions, the need for a continued system of file procurement officers was in question. As a result of these conditions, in November 1978, unit with File Procurement Officers were queried and requested to justify the continued need for their file procurement officers. Several assessments resulted from the queries, namely that other Army Regulations authorized the review of files beyond the requirements of AR 381-45, that there were instances where records checks (dossiers) were required with no regulatory basis cited, and that other agencies were not in full compliance with the CCF Letter of Instruction. In March 1979, the IRR recommended that the conflicts between the Ellsworth Memorandum, AR 381-45, and other specified regulations be resolved and a definitive policy be issued regarding the use of IRR files. A joint meeting was convened with DA (DAMI-CI), CCF, and IRR personnel in attendance, to discuss these issues. Action was on-going at the DOD level as the fiscal year ended.

(U) IRR's main mission was furnishing dossiers/information/reproduction to 428 requesters. During FY 1979, 69,023 dossiers, 23,180 Microfilm Files and 389 Impersonal Files were pulled in response to requests. Except for the period November 1978-August 1979, based on the exception to Appendix C, para C-3, AR 380-1, granted by the DCSCI, HQ INSCOM, all files pulled were reviewed for retainability under provisions of AR's 380-13 and 381-45, prior to being forwarded to any requester. Of the 56,325 files reviewed, 6,859 were deleted and destroyed and 4,825 were deleted from the IRR records and forwarded to the Defense Investigative Service. During the same period, 33,226 new pieces of supplemental material were reviewed at the time of acquisition to assure full compliance with the Army regulations; 17,193 new dossiers were created from the supplemental material.⁴⁷

Base Operations Support for Field Station Okinawa (Torii Station). (U) At the end of FY 1978, the Department of the Army and the US Air Force had agreed that action to transfer further functions/facilities on Okinawa from the Army under WESTPAC planning, should be discontinued on the rationale that the objectives of the program had been achieved. In initial coordination with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs & Logistics)(OASD (MRA&L)), DA was advised that Army retention of the Base Operations Support (BOS) function for Torii Station

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would be approved (i.e., responsibility for accountability and maintenance of Torii Station real property, and for the station recreational program). However, action should be continued to transfer Chaplain, Educational Assistance, and Equal Employment Opportunity/Human Relations spaces/functions to other services, from whom support would thereafter be obtained by MOU for Torii Station and other residual Army troops on Okinawa. The CDR, US Army, Japan (USARJ) recommended, and DA concurred, that ASD (MRA&L) be requested to reconsider and authorize retention of these three functions by the Army. In a meeting on 6 November 1978, ASD (MRA&L) approved retention of those spaces/functions by the Army "on Torii Station." Spaces were to be transferred to FS Okinawa TDA or detailed duty station as Torii Station. INSCOM indicated willingness in the best interest of the Army to accept responsibility for support of residual Army troops on Okinawa in these areas, subject to USARJ concurrence and transfer of resources associated. However, CDR, USARJ, by a 17 November 1978 message to DCSLOG, DA, accepted the mission to continue to provide this support. Referring to INSCOM's willingness, he stated his belief that it was his prerogative to determine details of how support would be rendered. In absence of specific DA direction to the contrary, he would continue to do the job as presently configured. In view of this strong USARJ position, and the fact that the major INSCOM objective of assuring continued Army support to Torii Station had been achieved, INSCOM took no further action.

(U) US Army Garrison, Okinawa (USAGO) was redesignated US Army Support Activity Okinawa (USASAO) on 1 October 1978 as a result of drawing down under the WESTPAC III Realignment Plan. With a new TDA effective 25 September 1979, USASAO was again redesignated US Army Garrison Okinawa at the direction of its higher headquarters at US Army, Japan. Its support functions did not change throughout the year, however, they became considerably diminished which in turn affected the base operations support provided Torii Station.

(U) During 1st Qtr FY79, it was noted that the CDR, USASAO (Provisional) became increasingly assertive of his prerogatives as "Installation Commander" (Torii real property being on USARJ accountability). This probably reflected the position of the CDR, USARJ who considered that he should assume all responsibility and control of the Field Station's BASOPS (i.e., all MP functions, all morale/welfare/recreational activities, mess, non-appropriated funds club, and personnel requisitions to include related manpower spaces presently on FS Okinawa TDA). The Field Station Commander, noting that USAGO was a reduced organization struggling for continued identity, strongly opposed this suggestion as not in the best interest of his troops. Notwithstanding this, it was reported that FS Okinawa/USAGO's strained relationships were continuing to improve, and a joint program to improve "quality of life" was being developed.⁴⁸

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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Page(s) 80-81

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Military Intelligence Historical Collection. (U) Since 31 March 1978, the INSCOM History Office has been committed to collecting and maintaining historical properties pertaining to military intelligence disciplines and units. In the fall of 1978, the collection took on added dimensions when many of the items contained in the MI Museum at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, were transferred to INSCOM. The museum was closed in 1976 after losing its curator. In September 1978, the INSCOM History Office learned that the Center of Military History planned to distribute the properties held by the MI Museum to various active Army museums within CONUS. Through

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the efforts of the History Office and MG William I. Rolya, CDR INSCOM, the Center of Military History agreed to send the majority of items, with the exception of several categories of non-MI related material, to HQ INSCOM for its collection. In January 1979, approximately 1,500 items arrived.⁵¹

Consolidation of Civilian Personnel Office Servicing. (U) It was determined that all INSCOM civilians in the National Capital Region were to be serviced from the Arlington Hall Station Civilian Personnel Office (CPO). Consequently, 158 civilians, formerly serviced by the Military District of Washington, were transferred in early 1979 to Arlington Hall Station. Prior to the establishment of INSCOM, these personnel were assigned to Field Operating Activities of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, DA. They were the basic nucleus for the US Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Center, a major subordinate command of INSCOM.

(U) In addition, under the decision to totally decentralize civilian personnel servicing from the Arlington Hall Station CPO, the DA "closest Army CPO" policy was initiated to result eventually in servicing of Field Station, San Antonio by Fort Sam Houston and the servicing of the National Security Agency Liaison Element by Fort George G. Meade. By the end of 1st Qtr FY 1980, all INSCOM personnel, except those within the National Capital Region, would be serviced by the closest Army Civilian Personnel Office regardless of the CPO's parent command. Field Station, Augsburg would be serviced by the Augsburg Area CPO, Field Station Berlin by the Berlin Area CPO, and Field Station Korea by the Eighth US Army CPO.⁵²

Civilian Hire Lag. (U) During HQ INSCOM's Camp Peary Conference, 4-6 December 1978, the Command Group and Deputy Chiefs of Staff identified "an unacceptable civilian hire lag" as one of the problems to be resolved. As a result, staff members of the AHS Civilian Personnel Office met with management representatives from DCSOPS, DCSITA, DCSRM, DCSPER, ITAC, ACSTEL, MAO, DCSCI, and USAG, AHS on 23 and 25 January 1979 to define the problems associated with recruitment of civilians and to propose solutions. The CPO/Management participants recommended that the CPO educate managers in the total recruitment process. Staff Heads and Commanders appointed Points of Contact (POC) to serve in a liaison capacity with the Civilian Personnel Office. The CPO also provided a 10-hour orientation to the POC's during 12-15 March 1979 on civilian personnel administrative procedures and programs. The first session of the Supervisory Development (41B Series) Course was presented 11-15 June 1979 to 20 military and civilian supervisors and POC's. Unlike previous supervisory courses, this course covered only subjects directly related to civilian personnel procedures and programs. The 41B Series course was expanded to 40 hours to include Position Classification, Recruitment and Merit Placement procedures, Equal Employment Opportunity Programs, Training and Career Development, Management-Employee Relations, and Technical Services. The percentage of new civilian supervisors who completed supervisory training reached 100 percent in the fourth quarter.

(U) Management supervisors were directed to submit a Request for Personnel Action (SF-52) against each existing vacancy and submit crediting plans for all positions (non-career field) regardless of whether or not a vacancy existed. All activities were required to submit a monthly SF-52 report. In addition, DCSRM began to distribute 85 spaces against the hire lag.

(U) On 31 January 1979, 13.3 percent of all civilian positions were unfilled. It was determined that by the end of 1979 the lag would be reduced to only 5 percent, a 95 percent fill rate. By 30 September 1979, INSCOM had a 92.3 percent fill, clearly within reach of the 95 percent goal in December 1979. However, despite these efforts, the problem of the civilian hire lag was still present. The attempted solution of educating POC's among the staff elements in the recruitment process had failed to produce the desired results because of the inability of some POC's to effect change. The grade level of the POC's ranged from GS-6 to GS-15. Those on the lower end of the scale had less opportunity to influence policy changes within their elements.⁵³

INSCOM Senior Level Positions. (U) In a letter, dated 18 July 1978, DA placed constraints on INSCOM for the number of high grade senior level positions the command could have filled at the end of FY 1979. The limit was a total of 197 spaces (59 at GS-14/15 level and 138 at GS-13 level). On 6 September 1978, the INSCOM Command Group allocated a ceiling of GS-13 and GS-14/15 filled positions to each Staff Element Head and Commander for their utilization and control.

(U) In a June 1979 letter to DA, INSCOM requested an allocation of an additional 41 senior level positions with accompanying job descriptions and evaluation statements. It further emphasized that INSCOM, being a new command with a new mission of multidisciplined intelligence for the Army, required additional senior level positions to provide for the "corporate headquarters" as well as mission accomplishment. By the end of FY 1979, DA had not replied to INSCOM's request; however, it had informed INSCOM that it would not be required to meet the 2 percent reduction to 194 positions for FY 1980. As of 30 September 1979, INSCOM had 194 senior level filled positions with recruiting action in process to meet its total allocation of 197 filled positions.⁵⁴

Labor Relations. (U) As a result of the Civil Service Reform Act of October 1978, it became necessary to re-justify the exclusion of the INSCOM from the Federal Labor Relations Program so that it could be specified as an exclusion in an Executive Order. The exclusion would disallow a union from obtaining exclusive recognition as the collective bargaining representative of the civilian work force. In November, INSCOM submitted a justification for exclusion to DA for subsequent submission to DOD, Office of Management and Budget, and the Department of Justice. At the close of FY 1979, no Executive Order had been issued.

(U) The General Intelligence Production Division (GIPD), a unit of the Intelligence Threat and Analysis Center, located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, continued to be included in a unit of recognition encompassing all of Fort Bragg. It was still anticipated that at some future date, the Fort Bragg Civilian Personnel Office would be able to obtain the extrication of the INSCOM elements either by petition to the Federal Labor Relations Authority or through direct negotiations with the unit.⁵⁵

Civilian Training. (U) During FY 1979, three members of the Command were selected by the Department of the Army to attend the long-term training program. Mr. Gary S. Colonna attended the National War College; Mr. James D. Davis attended the University of Washington for nine months in the Education for Public Management Program; and Mr. Thomas D. Whelan attended the 14-month Army Comptroller Program and received an MBA degree at Syracuse University. In addition, four members began the Postgraduate Intelligence Course at the Defense Intelligence School, in September. This was a 32-week intelligence course (Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence Degree Program). Those members were: Mr. Bruce W. Stein, ODCSS; Mr. D. Smith, USASD; Mr. James F. Carmody, ITAC; and Mr. R. Clark, ODCSOPS. The selectee to attend the National War College in FY 1980 was Mr. U. Del Toro, USASD. The course started in August 1979.⁵⁶

Secretary of the Army's Mobility, Opportunity and Development (SAMOD) Program. (U) INSCOM received four interns from the SAMOD Program, a pilot program providing high potential individuals to advance in professional and administrative positions. Two of the interns reported in May 1979—Mr. Lonnie D. Holder (Personnel Management), GS-301-07, and Ms Marianne Cranshaw (Computer Management), GS-301-07. Ms Cranshaw was formerly assigned to ITAC prior to her selection. The two remaining interns reported for duty in June 1979: Mr. Byron W. Sickler (Equipment Management), GS-301-05, and Ms Carolyn J. Brown (General Supply), GS-301-07. The DA Civilian Personnel Center was responsible for the selection of candidates and the overall administration and funding of the program. The Department of the Army provided the spaces, and the interns were to complete their training within INSCOM. It was anticipated that they would be absorbed into the workforce when all training phases were completed.⁵⁷

INSCOM Intern Program. (U) On 14 June 1978, the Chief of Staff approved a 4 percent (65 spaces) overhire (recognized but not authorized). Twenty-five of these spaces would serve as the basis for a command-wide intern program. The 25 permanent overhire spaces were carried on the Staff Civilian Personnel TDA for administrative control purposes, but the selection of the trainees, their development, evaluation, promotion, and placement upon "graduation" were to be made by the 16 INSCOM Career Program Managers (CPM's), the Deputy CPM's, and Deputy Chiefs of Staff/Commanders. The interns would be home-based at the HQ INSCOM during their training but would be on TDY throughout the command as a part of their development. Permanent placement upon completing the program would be determined primarily by appropriate vacancies anywhere within INSCOM. The US Army Communications

Command AHS added three positions of its own to bring the total program to 28.

(U) Based upon anticipated losses in their respective career fields, ability to train, and ability to assimilate the interns onto permanent manpower spaces at the completion of the training, the Career Program Managers divided the 28 spaces as shown in the table below.

Table 17.—INSCOM Intern Program, FY 1979

<u>Career Field</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Entrance Level</u>	<u>Target Job</u>
Civilian Personnel	1	GS-5	GS-9
Comptroller	2	GS-5	GS-9
Supply	1	GS-5	GS-9
Materiel Maint Management	1	GS-5	GS-9
Intelligence (132)	12	GS-5	GS-9
Security (080)	2	GS-5	GS-9
Info and Editorial	1	GS-5	GS-9
*ADP	6	GS-5	GS-9
Manpower Management	1	GS-5	GS-9
Records Management	1	GS-5	GS-9

*Three positions were from ACC (AHS).

(U) The purpose of the Intern Program was to select highly talented and highly motivated persons, develop them by a systematic rotation and intensive training program in order to provide the INSCOM with a broader base in the future from which to select senior action officers, first level supervisors, and managers. There were, of course, no guarantees beyond the target job and even in respect to the latter, the "guarantee" was "up or out." Those selected must advance at a reasonable rate to the GS-9 journeyman target job or they would be removed from the program. Further, there would be no guarantees as to where placement would be made within the command upon completion of the training.

(U) The decision as to whether applicants were qualified against X-118 standards were made by staffing specialists in the Arlington Hall Station Civilian Personnel Office. A total of 164 applications were reviewed and 127 rated as eligible, 37 ineligible (lack of general experience, no competitive status, or no questionnaire). A panel of four was convened to rate and rank the eligible candidates from the vacancy announcements. Panel members included Mr. Carl Thorpe (EEO), Mr. Doug Perthel (DCPM for the computer field), Mr. Bruce Stein (Intelligence Operations Specialist), and Ms Joann Killen (Management Analyst).

(U) Though it was projected that all commitments would be made by 24 August 1979 with most interns selected internally and in place by 30 September 1979, permanent change of station (PCS), release dates and security clearance requirements caused some placement delays. Five of the original

positions were not committed due to declinations and lack of best qualified candidates to supplement referrals. These positions—Intelligence Research Specialist (2 positions), Management Analyst (1 Comptroller, 1 Manpower position), and Security Assistant (1 position) were readvertised. In addition to these five positions, two of the three selected for Intelligence Research Specialist and Security Specialist positions were determined to be ineligible for access to Special Compartmented Intelligence and these positions were also readvertised.

(U) By the close of FY 1979, 22 interns had been selected. Seven of these were already INSCOM employees. Fifteen of the selectees were women and seven were men. As of 30 September, seven interns were placed.⁵⁸

Freedom of Information/Privacy Office. (U) During FY 1979, the Freedom of Information/Privacy Office (FOI/PO) received and processed 752 FOI requests and 1,780 Privacy Act (PA) requests for a total of 2,532 requests. This figure represented a five percent decrease over the total of 2,655 requests (937 FOI and 1,718 PA) in FY 1978. The table below shows a breakdown of both FOI and PA requests in FY 1979 by month.

Table 18.—FOI and PA Requests During FY 1979

<u>Month</u>	<u>FOI</u>	<u>PA</u>	<u>Total</u>
Oct 78	67	173	240
Nov 78	71	139	210
Dec 78	51	125	176
Jan 79	56	134	190
Feb 79	50	104	154
Mar 79	111	148	259
Apr 79	76	160	236
May 79	59	175	234
Jun 79	54	152	206
Jul 79	55	137	192
Aug 79	48	164	212
Sep 79	<u>54</u>	<u>169</u>	<u>223</u>
TOTALS	<u>752</u>	<u>1,780</u>	<u>2,532</u>

(U) Although the volume of FOI requests decreased during FY 1979, the complexity of each request and response increased. Referrals from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) involved previously processed requests which appeared to be in Litigation or remanded under Special Court Orders for a closer review or an evaluation under expanded parameters. These required close scrutiny and detailed documentation, a time consuming procedure which could not be accounted for in a numerical chart.

(U) A further indication concerning the complexity of recently received requests was dramatically demonstrated by other statistics maintained by

FOI/PO. For FY 1978, FOI/PO received a monthly average of 25,996 pages of records. The FY 1979 monthly average was 34,789, an increase of 33 percent. This increase impacted on every phase of the processing of a request. Average case officer review time, sanitizations, exemptions taken, number of copies reproduced, and research efforts, all increased proportionately.

(U) The FOI/PO INSCOM continued processing all requests within the time restraints imposed by the law. Few agencies, if any, within the Executive Branch, have matched this record.

(U) On 25 May 1979, the DCSCI, HQ INSCOM, assigned the responsibility of coordinating and executing an OPSEC Support Program to the FOI/PO. The FOI/PO would develop and implement direct support operations with subordinate elements within INSCOM to identify existing vulnerabilities. Actually, the FOI/PO had been performing this function in an advisory role prior to receiving the mission officially.⁵⁹

Equal Employment Opportunity Program. (U) Prior to November 1977, the INSCOM Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Program was administered completely by civilian part-time collateral assignments or by military personnel with less than satisfactory results. The program since November 1977 was administered on a full-time basis with greatly improved results. The EEO Office was staffed with a Command Equal Employment Opportunity Officer, an EEO Specialist, who managed the Federal Women's Program (FWP), and an EEO Clerk, who handled EEO statistics and office administration. However, this staffing was one space short of the HQ INSCOM TDA, and to that degree limited program effectiveness. Other EEO assignees throughout the Command continued to serve on a part-time collateral assignment basis and handled functions in the areas of EEO counseling and special emphasis program administration. The high turnover rates and continuing conflicts in job requirements among part-time EEO personnel/counselors affected both the EEO program image and related supervisory and management cooperation. A prime example of this was the Hispanic Employment Program Manager position which required at least one-half of a man-year to properly administer the program. Monetarily, the EEO Office had a budget of \$12,000 for FY 1979.

(U) The number of formal complaints began to reach an equilibrium after a period of decline. The reason was in part attributable to a massive loss of functions and related personnel as a result of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study. This brought the Command's US Direct Hire civilian personnel strengths down from about 1,600 to approximately 750 primarily professional-level employees and a subsequent influx of about 650 employees from US Army Intelligence Agency (USAINTA), many of whom were also professional-level employees. The trend in reduced formal complaints was expected to be maintained even though present strengths approximated previous levels. During FY 1979, there were five formal complaints, none of which were valid.

(U) There were several major on-going problems facing the EEO Program. The transfer of functions, reductions-in-force, reorganizations, ceilings, and grade constraints impacted heavily on the Command recruitment efforts. With the possible exception of job categories in administrative-clerical fields, job vacancy fill was achieved primarily through internal placement and through such sources as the Priority Placement Program (PPP) and local reemployment priority lists. Impacting on this situation were other programmed manpower space reductions previously directed and President Carter's job hiring limitation and related federal manpower reduction program. These factors coupled with a hire lag presented major obstacles to achievement of action plan objectives in the future.

(U) In grades GS-13 and above, there was little success in meeting the DA objective of one-percentage-point increase each fiscal year in these grades. Presidential hiring constraints and high grade restrictions prevented significant hire action and left little or no margin for personnel accessions from other than internal Federal Government sources at these grade levels.

(U) Although hire of minorities and openings at the GS-13 and above were limited by forces beyond the control of the EEO Office, there was some positive steps taken. Emphasis continued on special programs such as Veterans Readjustment Act (VRA), Worker-Trainee Opportunity, CO-OP, CETA (Comprehensive Employment and Training Act), Stay In School (enhanced opportunities for racial minorities and women), and summer employment. But the most progress was made in the area of attempting to advance on-board minorities and women, using the INSCOM's Career Intern Program and the Upward Mobility Program. (More details on these two programs are contained elsewhere in this Review.) During the intern recruitment process, the EEO Office personnel participated on the selection panels to assure equitable consideration of minority and women applicants. In addition to these programs, there was a limited number of spaces made available through the Secretary of the Army's Mobility Opportunity Development Program.

(U) A lengthy security clearance process continued to reduce civilian personnel productivity after hiring action. Until properly cleared, such personnel could not be placed or allowed to work in security areas and many had to be escorted by cleared personnel while in normal work areas. Knowledge of stringent personnel security requirements at times was a disconcerting factor in the hiring of minority personnel. Some progress was made in expediting security clearances.

(U) Keeping managers and supervisors abreast of EEO policy, practices, and requirements continued to be a problem in achieving satisfactory levels of support for the Command EEO program. Approximately 90 percent of all management and supervisory personnel within this Command were military. While civilian managers and supervisors were, for the most part, trained in EEO, a continuing requirement existed for military personnel training because of an approximate three-year turnover cycle. In this regard, keeping military managers and supervisors trained as scheduled was a real

problem. Many dropped out of training due to press of other business. There was also the view that what was civilian should be a matter for civilians and what was military should be a matter for the military.

(U) INSCOM's Standard Civilian Personnel Management Information System (SCIPMIS) file was utilized to record, quantify, and produce EEO data for evaluation and reporting purposes. This system, however, covered only a portion of INSCOM's civilian workforce. For command-wide statistics, manual compilation and reporting was used with back-up reports from CIVPERSINS (Civilian Personnel Management Information System) and other sources utilized for data verification. This proved to be a time consuming, cumbersome, and largely unreliable method of EEO data collection. Reliable command EEO measurement data was therefore not presently available to HQ INSCOM (a situation also affecting other MACOM's). The CIVPERSINS data was found to be badly outdated especially when the source of data was from outlying servicing Civilian Personnel Offices. The lack of reliable, timely data was a major deficiency in planning, educating, and evaluating processes of the EEO Program.

(U) As directed by the CDR INSCOM, the EEO Office assumed the function of Handicapped Program Coordinator in accordance with Federal Personnel Manual 306 and related DA instructions. Affirmative Action planning associated with the program became a function of the EEO Office. The first INSCOM Affirmative Action Plan for Employment of the Handicapped and Disabled Veterans (FY79-80) (INSCOM Pamphlet 690-2) was published on 1 October 1978.

(U) Undoubtedly, the greatest changes in the EEO Program will be in the future. When the enforcement functions of EEO were transferred from the Civil Service Commission to the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EOEC) under the President's Reorganization Plan No. 1 in January 1979, the EOEC had for the first time, teeth to enforce its policy. There were strong affirmative action overtones also to the Civil Service Reform Act. Although there was little immediate effects of these changes at INSCOM, the long term implications were obvious.⁶⁰

INSCOM Human Relations/Equal Opportunity Program. (U) At the command level, Human Relations/Equal Opportunity (HR/EO) program emphasis was on continued implementation of the Affirmative Actions Plan under the changing conditions within INSCOM. At the end of FY 1979, efforts were still being made to bring some of the newer units in line with the command policy.

(U) Implementation of the program at unit level remained unchanged with all commands carrying out applicable guidance. The command provided visual materials to support unit training as well as funding for individual unit activities. A major assist was the allocation of some \$20,000 in Program 38 funds for use by field units. For many units, this overcame the lack of sufficient funding to support HR/EO training.

(U) The third annual command-wide attitude survey was conducted in March 1979 by the INSCOM HR/EO Office and again provided the CDR INSCOM and field commanders with valuable data concerning the status of the command. The survey provided a yardstick by which the effects of command actions could be evaluated.

(U) As a special project for the CDR INSCOM, a second attitude survey was administered to enlisted women and civilian personnel at field stations to more closely assess their attitudes and perceptions. The survey was conducted in June 1979 and briefed to the Command Group in September 1979. Results were also furnished to field commanders.

(U) Staff assistance visits to units were curtailed sharply due to requirements of conducting the surveys. The command status remained generally calm with only minor incidents (primarily dissemination of racially insulting literature being noted). In all cases, the chain of command took action to counter these occurrences.⁶¹

Upward Mobility. (U) The goal was set for a total of 20 spaces to be committed to the Upward Mobility Program by the end of FY 1980. Fourteen of the spaces were to be at Arlington Hall Station and six at Vint Hill Farms Station. This would equate to 2.1 percent of accountable civilian strength in the program. By the end of FY 1979, the 14 spaces had been identified at Arlington Hall Station. A DCSPER, HQDA survey in August 1978 was critical of the progress in implementing an Upward Mobility Program at Vint Hill Farms Station (VHFS), but even at the end of FY 1979 little progress had been made. Two positions had been identified but neither was actually filled.⁶²

INSCOM Federal Women's Program. (U) The INSCOM Federal Women's Program (FWP) highlights for FY 1979 began with the Women's Week in October 1978. Following Women's Week, Patricia Starkey was appointed HQ/Arlington Hall Station FWP Manager, which allowed more time for the Command FWP Manager to address other aspects of the Equal Employment Opportunity Program. In November, the Command FWP Manager began a concentrated effort to establish an active Federal Women's Program at Vint Hill Farms Station (VHFS), the lack of which had been an area of concern on the DA Civilian Personnel Survey. The result was the establishment of by-laws and a charter for a FWP Committee at VHFS. In December, INSCOM FWP representatives met in a round-table discussion with FWP members from other area agencies and the Federally Employed Women (FEW), Incorporated—the first such dialogue between FEW and FWP members. FWP Managers from the 66th MI Group, from Arlington Hall Station, VHFS, and HQ INSCOM attended a training seminar at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in March 1979.⁶³

Public Affairs Activities. (U) The following is a list of INSCOM publications as of 30 September 1979:⁶⁴

<u>Publication</u>	<u>Unit Publisher</u>
<u>The Journal</u>	HQ INSCOM
<u>Augsburg Profile</u>	USA Field Station, Augsburg
<u>Berlin Bee</u>	USA Field Station, Berlin
<u>Torii Typhoon</u>	USA Field Station, Okinawa
<u>Write On</u>	INSCOM CONUS MI Group (SIGINT/EW)
<u>The Vint Hill Vanguard</u>	USAG, Vint Hill Farms Station
<u>66th MI Scrambler</u>	66th MI Group
* <u>Alamo Wrangler</u>	USA Field Station, San Antonio
** <u>Zephyr</u>	USA Field Station, Korea
*** <u>Misawa Sentinel</u>	USA Field Station, Misawa

*Began publication in May 1979.

**Formerly the Zoeckler Zephyr, USAFS Korea, was renamed in May 1979 following the field station's consolidation with the 501st MI Gp, Korea.

***Publication was suspended in September 1979 when the USAFS Misawa was subordinated to the 500th MI Gp, Japan.

INSCOM Team Day Awards. (U) INSCOM Team Day was the event that started out in FY 1976 as Civilian Day-ASA to foster the military/civilian team concept and to recognize outstanding contributions made by civilian employees. The name was changed later to INSCOM Military/Civilian Team Day, and in 1979 it became INSCOM Team Day. INSCOM Team Day Awards for FY 1979 were presented as follows:

<u>Award</u>	<u>Recipient</u>
The Albert W. Small Award	Mr. Jack McPherson, USAFS San Antonio
The Action Officer of the Year Award	Mr. Orville L. Rehling, ODCSRM
The Virginia McDill Award for Outstanding Secretarial Ability	Miss Elaine M. Wardner, 902d MI Group
The Equal Employment Opportunity Award	Mr. Paul M. Singleton, ODCSCI
The Wage Grader of the Year Award	Mr. Fred E. Williamson, USAG, AHS
The Non-Appropriated Fund Employee of the Year Award	Ms Young Ok Kim, USAG, AHS
The Military- Civilian Team Improvement Award	
Military	CDR Douglas K. Wills, Jr. USN, ODCSOPS
Civilian	Mr. Bruce M. Boyd, INSCOM CONUS MI Group (SIGINT/EW)

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Award

Exceptional Suggestion Award

Recipient

CWO Dale E. Koger,
902d MI Group

(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i);(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36;(b)
(1) Per NSA

(U) The new award, the Exceptional Suggestion Award, was created in March 1979 for an "INSCOMER," military or civilian, whose adopted suggestion resulted in highly significant savings to the Government. It was awarded for development of a relatively inexpensive telephone security device that rendered clandestine audio penetration impossible at a total savings of \$342,000.

(U) Command employees and officials from DA attended the luncheon and heard remarks from MG Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., Director of Human Resources Development, DA and Honorable David O. Cooke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration.⁶⁵

Commander's Plaque for Operational Achievement (CY 1978). (S) Sergeant Danny R. Feathers, analyst at USA Field Station [redacted] was the first recipient of the annual Commander's Plaque for Operational Achievement. The award was to be given annually to the nonsupervisory service member who made the single greatest contribution to the operational effectiveness of USAINSCOM during the preceding calendar year. SGT Feathers was officially notified of the award on 21 May 1979. [redacted]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Travis Trophy Award. (U) USA Field Station Augsburg, as INSCOM's 1978 nominee for the Travis Trophy Award, received honorable mention during the announcement ceremonies which took place at the National Security Agency on 26 September 1979. The winner of the 1978 competition was the Air Force's 6903d Security Squadron in Korea. The Naval Security Group Command's nominee USN-448, also received honorable mention. See Appendix J for a complete list of previous years' winners.⁶⁷

The BG Bernard Ardisana Award. (U) The BG Bernard Ardisana Award, a National Security Agency (NSA/CSS) award, was presented annually by the Director under the sponsorship of the NSA Collection Association. This award was to be given to the intercept operator who, through sustained and exceptional performance, was judged to be the Collector of the Year. The aim of the award was to promote and recognize excellence in the field of collection. All [redacted] (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

ASA Company (Avn)(Fwd), and the [redacted] Company, Operations (Fwd) were eligible to nominate an individual for this award.⁶⁸

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INSCOM Honor Guard and Drill Team. (U) In June 1978, HQ INSCOM obtained approval from DA to form an official Honor Guard and Drill Team to perform at ceremonies and special events at Arlington Hall Station and other activities in the Military District of Washington (MDW) area. Participation was voluntary with members attending practice sessions, for the most part, during off-duty hours. During its first year of existence, the Guard performed at various military ceremonies on post and several off-post activities, including the opening ceremonies at eleven Washington Diplomats soccer games.⁶⁹

(b)(1) Per CIA Meetings. (FOUO) During FY 1979, two meetings, the first of kind, took place (b)(1) Per CIA involving the INSCOM Command Group and Staff. The first occurred during 26-28 February 1979 in which some of the many discussions pertained to assessing INSCOM's first two years; evaluating and prioritizing INSCOM's mission; determining INSCOM's support to the Army versus the National Intelligence Community; identifying problem areas and solutions; and defining INSCOM's short term and long term goals.

(S/NOFORN) MG Rolya, CDR INSCOM, opened the meeting by emphasizing the need to develop a collective new design on issues facing the Command, e.g., the direction of HUMINT, SIGINT, OPSEC, and all-source, while at the same time recognizing the handicap of the absence of a stationing decision and the lack of established production elements. Among specific subjects discussed were CONUS OPSEC support, the Sasai Paper on HUMINT, and the international area and our relationships with other countries.

(FOUO) The second (b)(1) Per CIA Meeting was held during 25-27 June 1979. Discussions began with assessing progress made on resolving questions raised at the February meeting. Some of the other topics pertained to defining OPSEC support/support doctrine; assessing HUMINT; determining INSCOM's role at echelons above corps and below, in imagery, in electro-optics, and vis-a-vis reserve components; and topics pertaining to intelligence doctrine and concepts, e.g., support for deception planning, and INSCOM's role in multi-discipline collection management for the Army.⁷⁰

Military Intelligence General Officer Conference. (U) In July 1979, MG William I. Rolya, CDR INSCOM, participated in a Military Intelligence General Officer Conference which took place (b)(1) Per CIA. Members included senior intelligence officers who came together to discuss and reach agreement on several significant issues facing the intelligence community. The Mission Analysis Office, HQ INSCOM, provided input on these issues and served as primary action office for the development of intelligence principles for the Army. The principles established were scheduled for publication in a DA Pamphlet during early 1980. These principles were intended for use in the development of intelligence policy, plans, doctrine and architecture, and for the conduct of intelligence operations and training of intelligence personnel and units.⁷¹

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(b)(3) 10
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1978 INSCOM Commanders' Conference. (U) The 1978 INSCOM Commanders' Conference was held at Arlington Hall Station during 23-27 October 1978. The approved conference theme was "Multidiscipline Operations—Changing Army Intelligence Strategy for the 1980's." Guest speakers included Dr. James Vance, OSD; Vice Admiral B. R. Inman, DIRNSA; GEN Frederick J. Kroesen, VCSA; and [redacted] See appendix H for photograph [redacted] Commanders Conference.⁷²

SIGINT Analyst Conference. (U) During 6-7 December 1978, the US Army Cryptologic Support Group (USACSG), USAREUR, hosted a Theater SIGINT Analyst Conference in Heidelberg, Federal Republic of Germany. The conference, the first of its kind, brought together analysts from US Army Field Stations in Berlin and Augsburg, the 302d and 307th ASA Battalions, the 328th and 330th ASA Companies, and the CSG. A representative from the INSCOM Collection, Processing, Analysis and Reporting (CPAR) unit at Fort Meade, Maryland also attended the conference as did an observer from NSACSS Europe Intelligence Support Staff at Vaihingen, FRG.

(U) The conference was the culmination of a highly successful exchange program conducted since 1976 by the CSG between the field stations and analysts from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, USAREUR and Seventh US Army. The conference enabled analysts from diverse units in Germany to get together to discuss topics of mutual interest and learn something about each other's organizations. The cryptologic analysts were also introduced to the organization and operations of ODCSI, USAREUR, which was one of their primary customers, and were able to meet their ODCSI counterparts for analyst-to-analyst discussions.⁷³

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER V. RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT

1. AHR, DCSRM, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (C), pp. 12-17.
2. AHR, DCSLOG, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (S-CCO), pp. 74-78.
3. AHR, DCSRM, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (C), p. 17.
4. Ibid. pp. 32-33.
5. Qtrly Prog Rev, HQ INSCOM, 4th Qtr FY79 (C), p. 6.
6. Command Strength Report, ODCSPER, As of 30 Sep 79 (C), 18 Oct 79.
7. Memo For Gen Rolya, 16 Mar 79, subj: Manning Factors; Ltr, CG INSCOM (MG Rolya) to DIRNSA (VADM Inman), 27 Mar 79; Ltr, DIRNSA to CG INSCOM, 23 Apr 79, subj: Army Manning Factors.
8. AHR, ACSTEL, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (S), pp. 8-9.
9. Ibid. pp. 17, 22.
10. Interview, Mr. Howard S. Prye, ACSTEL, HQ INSCOM w/Mr. James L. Gilbert, History Office, 13 Jun 80 (U).
11. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), p. 82; Fact Sheet, IAOPS-SE-0, 19 Sep 78, subj: Project FASTBACK, (S-CCO).
12. AHR, INSCOM Automation Management Office, FY79 (U), pp. ii, II-4, II-7,8, II-11, II-13.
13. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (U), pp. 8-9; Interview, MAJ James Tate, ODCSPER w/Mr. James L. Gilbert, History Office, 27 Mar 80 (U); Ltr, HQ INSCOM, IAPER-M, 3 May 79, subj: Organizational Effectiveness (OE) Information (U).
14. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (U), p. 18.
15. Ibid. pp. 23-24.
16. Ibid. p. 19.
17. Qtrly Prog Rev, HQ INSCOM, 1st Qtr FY79, Suppl (S-CCO), pp. 41-42; 2d Qtr FY79, Suppl (S-CCO), pp. 36-37; 3d Qtr FY79, Suppl (S-CCO), p. 39; 4th Qtr FY79, Suppl (S-CCO), pp. 36-37; AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), pp. 96, 105.
18. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (U), pp. 25-27.
19. Ibid. pp. 20-21.
20. Ltr, HQ INSCOM to DA MILPERCEN, undtd, subj: Additional Skill Indicator [sic] (ASI) Code, (U); Interview, SGM W. Johnston, ODCSOPS w/Mr. James L. Gilbert, History Office, 1 Jul 80 (U).
21. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), pp. 161-162.
22. Ibid. pp. 150-151.
23. AHR, 500th MI Gp, FY79 (S/NOFORN), pp. 52-53; Tab E to 500th MI Gp Reorganization Basic Plan, 29 Jun 79, subj: Concept Plan: Reorganization of the 500th MI Group re Asian Studies Detachment, (U); CMT 2, DF, DCSOPS to CofS, IAOPS-PTR-P (29 May 79), subj: US Army Asian Studies Institute, 5 Jun 79, (U).
24. Fact Sheet, IAOPS-PTR-T, 22 Nov 78, subj: FAO Steering Committee Membership, (U).
25. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), pp. 173-174.
26. Ibid. pp. 152-155.
27. Ibid. pp. 167-168; Staff Note, IAOPS-PTR-T, 8 May 78, subj: INSCOM Fielded Systems Maintenance Training, (U).

28. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), pp. 163-164; AHR, DCSLOG, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (S-CCO), pp. 60-61; Interview, Mr. L. G. Armendariz, ODCSFM, w/Mr. James L. Gilbert, History Office, 24 Jun 80 (U).
29. Fact Sheet, IAOPS-PTR-T, 26 Apr 79, subj: Consolidation of Cryptologic Training, (U); Interview, MAJ H. Ellison, ODCSOPS w/Mr. James L. Gilbert, History Office, 8 Apr 80 (U).
30. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), p. 147.
31. Ibid. pp. 52-53.
32. Ibid. pp. 53-54; AHR, DCSCI, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (C), pp. 57-59; Fact Sheet, IASYS-C, 21 May 79, subj: MOBEX 78/NIFTY NUGGET 78 Analysis Report, (C); DF, IAOPS-OR, 20 Nov 78, subj: CPX NIFTY NUGGET/MOBEX 78 Post Exercise Evaluation, (S).
33. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), p. 54; AHR, DCSCI, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (C), pp. 58-59.
34. AHR, USACSG, FY79 (S-CCO), p. 13; AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), pp. 187-188.
35. DF, IAOPS-OR, 8 Jan 79, subj: INSCOM Operational Readiness Report, (U); AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), p. 52.
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37. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), p. 82.
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40. Ltr, IAG-CDR, USAG, AHS, 30 Jan 79, subj: Designation and Establishment of Arlington Hall Station as a Restricted (Controlled) Area, (U).
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42. Ibid. pp. 72-73.
43. AHR, SJA, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (U), pp. 6-7.
44. AHR, DCSCI, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (C), pp. 40-42.
45. AHR, IG, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (U), pp. 6-7.
46. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), p. 58.
47. AHR, Central Security Facility, FY79 (FOUO), Appendix B.
48. AHR, FS Okinawa, FY79 (TSC), Annex B.
49. AHR, DCSLOG, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (S-CCO), pp. 25-27; AHR, DCSLOG, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (S-CCO), p. 29.
50. AHR, DCSLOG, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (S-CCO), pp. 27-32; Ann Hist Rev, INSCOM, FY78 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), p. 74.
51. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), pp. 26-31.
52. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (U), p. 35; Interview, Mr. J. W. MacKenzie, ODCSPER w/Mr. James L. Gilbert, History Office, 16 Jan 80 (U).
53. AHR, USAG, AHS, FY79 (U), pp. 8-9; Interview, Mr. Dale Efflandt, CPO AHS, with Mr. Gilbert, History Office, 27 Mar 89 (U); DF, CofS (IAG-CIV) to Heads, Staff Elements, et al., 8 Jan 79, subj: MGT Problem Solving Meeting, (U).

54. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (U), p. 36; AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (S), p. 81.
55. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (U), pp. 38-39.
56. Ibid. pp. 39-40; AHR, USAG, AHS, FY79 (U), p. 9.
57. AHR, USAG, AHS, FY79 (U), p. 12; Memo For Civilian Employees Serviced by USAG, AHS and Their Supervisors, 4 Jun 79, subj: Civilian Personnel Office Newsletter, (U).
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61. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (U), pp. 6-7.
62. INSCOM Reg 690-20, 1 Feb 79, Affirmative Action Plan (U), p.43; AHR, USAG, AHS, FY79 (U), p. 9.
63. AHR, EE00, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (U), pp. 1-3.
64. AHR, Office of Public Affairs, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (U), pp. 8-9.
65. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (U), pp. 41-42; NSA Newsletter, Vol XXVII, No. 7 (Jul 79), p. 6.
66. Ltr, FS Augsburg (IAEA-OP-0) to CDRINSCOM, 25 Jan 79, subj: Letter of Recommendation for Commander's Plaque, (SC).
67. Qtrly Prog Rev, HQ INSCOM, 4th Qtr FY79, Suppl (S-CCO), p. 35.
68. INSCOM Reg 672-8, 17 Sep 79, BG Bernard Ardisana Award (U).
69. Interview, SSG Snively, SSO, Ft Monmouth w/Mr. Gilbert, History Office, 8 Apr 80 (U).
70. Minutes Camp Peary Meeting, 26-28 Feb 79 (S/NF), p. 1; Camp Peary Book 1 (TS-CCO/NF) and 2 (S/NF).
71. AHR, MAO, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (U), pp. 2-1.
72. DF, CofS (IAOPS) to Heads, Staff Elements, 3 Oct 78, subj: 1978 INSCOM Commanders' Conference, (U).
73. The Journal, HQ INSCOM, Feb 79 (U), p. 12.

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CHAPTER VI

OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Multidiscipline Intelligence Information Report. (C) The INSCOM MDIIR program was formally initiated on 13 April 1978 with the CDR, 470th MI Group being directed to commence the issuance of initial multidiscipline intelligence reports pursuant to the authority of CDR INSCOM. On 6 November 1978, a decision briefing was presented to BG James E. Freeze, DCG-I, INSCOM, for the purpose of discussing the background and current status of the MDIIR program and recommending new courses of action. Decisions rendered were as follows:

1. Title would be changed from Multidiscipline Intelligence Report (MDIR) to Multidiscipline Intelligence Information Report (MDIIR).
 2. It would be recommended to [] that fragmentary IMINT or HUMINT be favorably considered for inclusion in the MDIIR.
 3. The MDIIR program would be integrated into the future INSCOM theater level organizations such as the Theater Army Intelligence Command (TAIC).
 4. DCSOPS would determine the best method/utilization of/for field stations in the MDIIR concept and would draft and coordinate a concept of operations (CONOP) for the MDIIR program. The CONOP would address methods of analysis and reporting to include both spot-type and in-depth analytical reports (subjective).
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(C) A joint INSCOM-[]-ACSI(DA) meeting was convened at HQ INSCOM on 22 November 1978 in which there was considerable discussion on the inclusion of fragmentary IMINT or HUMINT data in the MDIIR. Subsequently, both [] agreed to the inclusion of the data.
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(C) On 18 December 1978, another decision briefing was given to BG Freeze for the purpose of presenting the proposed concept of operations for the phased implementation of the INSCOM multidiscipline intelligence information reporting program. BG Freeze approved the CONOP for further planning and implementation. In addition, he directed that the CONOP be sent to the field for review and comment. By 1 March 1979, all comments from the INSCOM field elements had been received and evaluated. However, several factors prevented the emergence of a viable MDIIR program. Prior to and since the establishment of INSCOM, myriad numbers of studies, plans, papers, concepts, special projects, DA and [] documentation, and Government contracts addressed to varying degrees the future multidiscipline collection and reporting functions of INSCOM elements, particularly at Echelons Above Corps (EAC) level. Representative examples of this

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documentation are INSCOM Concept Plan, FM 100-16 (EAC), Kuras Alderman Study (EAC), [redacted] USAREUR Theater Intelligence Center (UTIC) concept, Mission Analysis Office MD concept, and the DCSOPS MDIIR CONOP. In addition, the seven originally imposed [redacted] conditions continued to affect the conduct and evaluation of a viable program.

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(U) On 31 March 1979, a DCG-I message was sent to Field Commanders, with the exception of the 470th MI Group, suspending further action on the MDIIR program until a viable program could be molded for echelons above corps.

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Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training (REDTRAIN). (U) REDTRAIN was the program established to improve the performance of tactical intelligence personnel to provide intelligence support to the tactical commander in fulfilling intelligence requirements. Program Budget Decision 286 directed the transfer of tactical SIGINT/EW resources from Program 3 (CCP) to Program 2 (General Purpose Forces) and was approved with the guidance that "critical intelligence resources with a wartime or contingency mission be productively utilized during peacetime." INSCOM was designated by DA as the Army Executive Agent for the REDTRAIN program in 1976 with issuance of INSCOM's mission and function letter with the implementation of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS). Due to the negative connotation of productive utilization, the name Peacetime Utilization Program (PUP) was adopted and this program was carried out by the SIGINT/EW elements of tactical units in conjunction with border sites, field stations, and the 376th ASA Company at NSA.

(U) In the March 1978 Intelligence Systems Program Review, GEN Kerwin, the Army Vice Chief of Staff, tasked CDR INSCOM to expand the PUP to include all intelligence disciplines and the Reserve Component and to brief the INSCOM plan for this requirement at an In-Process Review (IPR) in May 1978. The INSCOM plan for a Multidiscipline Peacetime Utilization Program (MDPUP) was briefed to the Vice Chief of Staff on 26 May and the concept as briefed was approved, thus becoming INSCOM's mandate to carry out an MDPUP as the Army's Executive Agent.

(U) On 8 August 1978, the INSCOM Chief of Staff formally designated staff elements within INSCOM as the focal points for the development of the program within their respective intelligence discipline. These included the ADCSOPS, HUMINT for the HUMINT discipline; the ADCSOPS, SIGINT/EW for SIGINT/EW; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Threat Analysis for PHOTINT, order of battle and intelligence production; and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Counterintelligence for SIGSEC, OPSEC, and counterintelligence. These elements were further tasked to develop a REDTRAIN program within their respective discipline to productively utilize intelligence resources. The proposed program would be presented to the Worldwide Peacetime Utilization (REDTRAIN) Conference held at Arlington Hall Station in February 1979. This conference was attended by representatives of DA, USAREUR, Eighth US Army (EUSA), FORSCOM (and FORSCOM tactical units),

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NSA, and INSCOM subordinate commands. The objective of the conference was to present the REDTRAIN program concept by each discipline and through the working group method, refine and finalize the program for final approval and implementation by the cognizant staff proponent.

(U) The staff proponents designated an operational element to coordinate and administer the REDTRAIN program. The operational authority for SIGINT/EW REDTRAIN was the Control, Processing, Analysis, and Reporting (CPAR) element of the INSCOM CONUS MI Group colocated with NSA at Fort Meade, Maryland. The operational authority for HUMINT was the 641st MI Detachment (Collection), of the US Army Operational Group at Fort Meade. For Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) analysis and production, the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC) provided operational authority which was implemented through the Imagery Intelligence Production Detachment at the Washington Navy Yard and the ITAC Field Support Division. Figure 1 depicts the INSCOM organizational framework for carrying out the INSCOM Executive Agent responsibilities for REDTRAIN.

(U) INSCOM's finalized REDTRAIN programs included tactical intelligence assets of FORSCOM, USAREUR, WESTCOM, and EUSA, participating in training with INSCOM units in CONUS and OCONUS. There were basically two methods of conducting REDTRAIN: First, bring the mission to the unit, i.e., as regards SIGINT/EW, by exporting to tactical units intercept tapes, technical materials and working aids; secondly, sending the personnel to the mission, i.e., dispatching on a TDY basis HUMINT MOS Code 96C Russian linguists to participate in interrogation/debriefing and reporting activities with the 18th MI Battalion, 66th MI Group, Munich, Germany. This type training was known as Live Environment Training (LET).

(U) Another type of training, Specialized Operational Training (SOT), primarily dealt with SIGINT/EW assets and IMINT. In the SIGINT/EW discipline, personnel from FORSCOM tactical units trained with CONUS MI Group's CPAR unit. Participating personnel with MOS Code 98C and 98G were provided training opportunities within A, B, and G Groups at NSA. In the case of IMINT, SOT was provided for tactical imagery interpreters at ITAC's Imagery Interpretation Production Division which periodically conducted two-week imagery workshops. For example, the 265th ASA Company at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, participated in all three aspects of the program. They sent personnel to NSA for SOT, participated in LET at Harrogate, England and Hellinikon, Greece, and conducted an in-unit mission which produced intelligence on the Middle East. Of the 12 personnel in the original group of the 265th ASA Company participating in REDTRAIN, all of whom had intended to leave the service, eight reenlisted.

(U). The following provides an overview of ongoing REDTRAIN activities in the various intelligence disciplines:

CI/SIGSEC/OPSEC. (U) The 902d MI Gp is actively participating in the REDTRAIN program in SIGSEC by the utilization of SIGSEC assets to assist

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


Figure 1. Organizational Chart Showing INSCOM Executive Agent Responsibilities for REDTRAIN.

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the Reserve Components (RC) in training for and providing SIGSEC support to RC units during Active Duty Training (ADT). The Security Support Detachment of the 902d MI Group is providing training for elements of the 224th MI Company (Reserve) in multidiscipline OPSEC and computer security. The activity includes methodology in conducting the Sensitive Activity Vulnerability Estimate (SAVE) mostly applied to Echelons Above Corps (EAC) activities and the Security Vulnerability Analysis (SVA). MOS's are in effect with the 902d MI Group's subordinate battalions' resident offices (RO's) and field offices (FO's) and FORSCOM. Personnel from the RO's and FO's provide advice and assistance to tactical CI personnel to help prepare units for major field training exercise (FTX) and command post exercise (CPX) activities. This support also permits the 902d personnel to enhance their capabilities to perform with tactical units.

HUMINT. (U) The 641st MI Detachment (Collection) is providing HUMINT MOS producing training to "C" Company of the 826th MI Battalion (Reserve). This training is categorized as REDTRAIN and was conducted for the first time for a two-week ADT period in August 1979 by INSCOM. This represents a significant effort and involvement by ADCSOPS, HUMINT in the REDTRAIN arena. Additionally, the 641st is involved in REDTRAIN in both its mission to provide specialized HUMINT support to the US Army Operational Group and in its mission to support USAREUR in contingency situations. The US Army Operational Group is extensively involved in REDTRAIN by providing a means for FORSCOM MOS 96C personnel to conduct activities under Project SEEK. A similar project is now being developed which will utilize FORSCOM MOS 96C personnel to actively participate in a collection program in the Florida area.

IMINT. (U) In the area of production, ITAC actively supports FORSCOM in the REDTRAIN/SPOTLIGHT area by: responding to specific information and imagery requests submitted by FORSCOM units; hosting FORSCOM G-2 personnel for orientations with the national level intelligence producers; and hosting a two-week workshop for experienced FORSCOM II's to provide expertise in assessing the national level data base. Analytic and imagery personnel from the 25th Infantry Division and the 652d Engineer Battalion (Topo), respectively, participated in a North Korea Transportation Study under the aegis of the INSCOM Theater Intelligence Center-Pacific.

SIGINT/EW. (U) Collection, processing, analysis, and reporting (CPAR) is extensively involved in REDTRAIN in developing technical materials and working aids which are exported to tactical units to develop and improve technical skills within the units. CPAR has established an extensive specialized operational training (SOT) program within A, B, and G Groups at NSA. SOT is mainly utilized by FORSCOM and lasts from 60 to 179 days. FORSCOM units, through coordination with CPAR, also participate in live environment training (LET) programs conducted within the forward area at Field Stations (b)(1) In August 1979, a CPAR Detachment, Hawaii was organized, and attached to INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii,

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to develop and coordinate training opportunities for SIGINT/EW personnel from both active and Reserve Components (REDTRAIN) which required access to facilities or units in the Pacific theater. The detachment was authorized one officer and two enlisted spaces.

(U) AR 350-3, Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training (REDTRAIN), was published and became effective on 1 July 1979. The objectives of REDTRAIN as stated by the AR were to: (1) provide the tactical commander proficient tactical intelligence personnel to support combat operations; (2) provide the tactical commander with combat data and intelligence to support operational planning; and (3) contribute to the satisfaction of Army intelligence requirements.

(U) The relative newness of REDTRAIN has created budgetary problems which cannot be resolved fully until February 1981 when it is anticipated that full funding at approximately \$2.3 million will be authorized for REDTRAIN. Prior to FY 1979, monies for the program were taken from other funded programs. INSCOM requested \$331,000 in the command operating budget estimate (COBE) as an unfinanced requirement for FY 1980. The amount requested was initially approved by DA, however, this amount was subsequently cut to \$200,000 by DA in order to redistribute \$121,000 to FORSCOM due to FORSCOM not having identified their unfunded REDTRAIN requirement at a high enough priority to receive DA approval.

(U) An additional but a more significant problem affecting FORSCOM, and to a lesser extent INSCOM, was the drastically low manning levels in the SIGINT/EW Entry Military Occupational Specialty (EMOS), in some cases lower than 50 percent. This was a MILPERCEN problem which did not appear to be resolvable in the immediate future without the benefit of some form of conscription of the civilian population.²

INSCOM Mobilization Concept and Plan. (S) Basically, the INSCOM Mobilization Concept and Plan involved the development of two Theater Army Intelligence Commands (TAIC's) for wartime operation, one in Europe, the other in the Pacific. It also covered the wartime role of HQ INSCOM. The concept utilized both active and reserve elements. While acknowledging that emergencies in other theaters were possible, it was believed that these contingencies could be met with existing resources, organized similarly, but tailored to fit the need.

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☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 105

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(S) Prior to 1970, major Army field stations in Europe had a wartime mission of manning ASA battalions to provide support to the V and VII Corps. Since the consolidation of these resources at Augsburg, and as a result of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study, the wartime mission was to evacuate resources to safehavens or, if that was not feasible, to release personnel to serve as fillers/augmentation for tactical units. Neither of these options readily and adequately addressed the wartime needs of the operational commander. Under the proposed new concept, these field station resources (not already designated by team to augment SIGINT units, US Corps and below, would join other Army intelligence resources from EAC intelligence organizations in Europe plus Reserve Component intelligence units designated to support EAC Commands by current CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4102. The resources would form the European TAIC and its subordinate units.

(S) In transition to war and for wartime operation, command and control of the TAIC would be passed to CINCUSAREUR. Prior to that, the TAIC with its Headquarters elements manned at cadre strength would be under command and control of INSCOM. INSCOM would utilize a brigadier general to command the TAIC in peacetime. It would be essential for INSCOM to have operational control (OPCON) of EAC MI Reserve elements during peacetime, with total command and control passing through INSCOM to the TAIC during transition to war efforts and wartime operation. For peacetime, the TAIC would provide direct support with a transition of OPCON to USAREUR at simple alert, and total command and control to USAREUR at general alert.

(U) The Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study recognized the need for a peacetime Pacific Army Component Headquarters staff to facilitate transition to war and to provide peacetime intelligence and security support. INSCOM action started in December 1977 in recognition of expanded responsibilities of a Theater Army Intelligence Command as postulated by draft Field Manual 100-16. Exercise NIFTY NUGGET reinforced the need for a TAIC.

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an influx of several hundred MOBDES (mobilization designee) personnel to various elements of the command and NSA. Under the MOBTDA currently being revised, it would be safe to assume a considerably larger number than the current 304 spaces would be required in wartime. Because two general officers (O-7) were expected to command the TAIC's, both coming from INSCOM, there existed a requirement for one O-7 MOBDES space to assist with staffing at HQ INSCOM during wartime.

(S) INSCOM's Mobilization Concept and Plan was being developed as it interacted with other planning efforts. The Transition to War Disposition of Field Station Resources Study, the EAC Functional Analysis Study, and the HUMINT Study were all in development at about the time the ACCS-82 Study Group started its broad efforts to streamline the command and control structure of the Army, particularly regarding the Reserve Component and CONUS activities. Next, the TAIC planning for Europe and Pacific were initiated, alongside the NSA Study on SIGINT to Military Operations. The EAC Active Components/Reserve Components Alignment Proposal was underway concurrently with the FORSCOM Reserve Component Mobilization Review. All of these studies, along with INSCOM Mobilization Concept and Plan, were expected to dovetail into DA and DOD.

(U) In December 1978, both the Pacific and European OPLAN's were briefed to the CDR INSCOM and were accepted. In an attempt to solicit constructive recommendations and solutions from interested commands, the concept was briefed to NSACSS (N12 and Group), OACSI, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSI), USAREUR. While little response was elicited from NSACSS and the OACSI, the DCSI, USAREUR opposed the concept as being too long term and as being organizationally rather than functionally oriented. In the interim, the DCSI, USAREUR developed a concept for USAREUR Theater Intelligence Center (UTIC) and tested it during WINTEX 79.

(S) Development of the European concept faced several problems. There was no agreed-upon doctrine for phasing out and closing down the field stations. It was unknown if sufficient inter/intra theater transportation was available to support the concept. As intelligence was a national responsibility, there was no established mechanism for providing all-source intelligence to the NATO Commands. The lack of sufficient equipment to support the concept was also a major obstacle.

(U) The Pacific ITIC/TAIC concept was developed into OPLAN 1-79 and staffed within INSCOM before being sent to OACSI in October 1979 for approval. The greatest inhibitor to the prospect of full ITIC operations was the lack of resources.³

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Intelligence Priorities for Army Planning for FY's 1980-1989. (S) National and Department of Defense intelligence interests were expressed in the Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) and the Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning (IPSP) document. Because Army intelligence needs were not the same as national and DOD needs in all cases, the priorities listed in these documents had limited use as a basis for planning intelligence activities to support internal Army requirements. However, INSCOM's intent in publishing Intelligence Priorities for Army Planning (IPAP) was to express unique Army needs for the ten-year period being addressed. INSCOM published the first IPAP in May 1979. Others would follow on an annual basis.⁵

Products Produced by US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center.
(U) The table below lists significant products produced by ITAC. ⁶

Table 19.—Products Produced by ITAC

<u>Title</u>	<u>Date Published</u>
Base Development Surveys	
Syria (Baniyas)-ATC G1-1930-084-78	4 Dec 78
Cuba - ATC-G1-1930-091-78	1 Mar 79
Syria (Homs) - ATC-GL-1930-006-78	21 Mar 79
Drop Zone Surveys	
Dominican Republic (San Isidoro) - (A6)ATC-G1-2110-022-79	6 Aug 79
Haiti (Croix des Bouquets) - (A7)ATC-G1-2110-023-79	19 Sep 79
Ground Forces Order of Battle Books	
Jordan - ATC-G1-1100-086-78	1 Dec 78
Saudi Arabia - ATC-G1-1100-001-79	1 Dec 78
Tunisia - ATC-G1-1100-005-79	1 Mar 79
Cuba - ATC-G1-1100-071-78	21 Mar 79
Iraq - ATC-G1-1100-025-79	7 Sep 79
Egypt - ATC-G1-1100-011-79	14 Sep 79

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Products Produced by ITAC—Continued

<u>Title</u>	<u>Date Published</u>
Handbook of Military Forces Syria - ATC-GL-1100-080-78	19 Sep 78
Tactical Commander's Terrain Analysis Iran (Tehran) - IAG-25-SNF-78	2 Nov 78
Lebanon (Sidon) - ATC-G1-2600-063-78	26 Feb 79
Lebanon (Tripoli) - IAG-38-SNF-78	26 Feb 79
Studies:	
ATC-CI-2400-019-79, Hostile Intelligence Collection Estimates	Jan 79
ATC-CI-2440-045-79, Estimate of the Hostile Intelligence Threat to the US Army, Oct 78	Oct 79
ATC-CI-2440-055-79, Guenter Guillaume—An Agent in Place	Sep 79
Unclassified Multidiscipline Hostile Intelli- gence Threat Briefing	Jul 79

Regional Appraisal Program. (U) INSCOM's Regional Appraisal Program (RAP) was based upon a concept that required INSCOM to examine its intelligence collection and production effort in support of consumer needs on a geographical or topical basis. Key to the concept were the steps taken to determine INSCOM's ability to satisfy consumer intelligence requirements and essential element of information (EEI) in support of contingency plans, war plans, and other plans where combat forces were employed.

(U) The feasibility of Regional Appraisals concept was demonstrated in practice. One region appraisal and scaled down versions were conducted by the close of FY 1979. The concept provided an excellent means to improve intelligence support to the Army and DOD through the identification of existing gaps related to intelligence collection and production.

(U) DCSITA had management responsibility for the Regional Appraisal Program, but DCSOPS, MAO, and DCSCI were to assist in guiding the effort. However, by the close of FY 1979, over a year had passed and no administering and implementing regulation had been published. The delay was simply the lack of decision making due to proposed reorganizations taking place.⁷

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OPSEC Support Concept. (U) The purpose of the OPSEC Support concept and implementing plan was to provide guidance to the INSCOM as to the manner in which INSCOM units would meet OPSEC support responsibilities as delineated in AR 530-1. AR 530-1 was found to be inadequate for purposes of defining OPSEC support and would require changing in coordination with DCSOPS, DA. Due to the urgency of the requirement to begin operations immediately post IOSS and to allow continuance of operations security, a "fix-gap" OPSEC Support Plan was generated by INSCOM and published prior to a concept being developed. This implementing plan will require revision along with the development of the concept.

(U) In its draft form, INSCOM's OPSEC Support concept identified the relationship between operational security and operational security support as being essentially complementary. While every OPSEC support evaluation may duplicate the process of OPSEC in theory, it does not do so in fact. An OPSEC support evaluation must review the threat, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures taken, but it does not perform the OPSEC mission for the supported command. OPSEC is a command responsibility met first through organic resources. This includes the support activities provided by the elements of CEWI (combat electronic warfare intelligence) organizations at echelons where these resources exist. The commander with his appointed OPSEC officer and OPSEC committee develop an internal program and plan for their operations identifying EEFI (essential elements of friendly information), vulnerabilities, and countermeasures. The concept of INSCOM's role in this process would be to provide threat data and technical advice and assistance. As soon as the planning and evaluation stages of the supported commander's OPSEC program would be completed, INSCOM could provide enhancing support services through evaluations. These OPSEC evaluations (OSE), using counterintelligence and signal security resources to simulate the

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threat spectrum from HUMINT, PHOTINT, and SIGINT exploitation efforts, would determine threats and vulnerabilities and make recommendations for countermeasures to be taken to protect sensitive information. A pre-survey made by the INSCOM OPSEC support specialist would determine the security evaluation services needed in determining a particular command's security profile. Using a tailored or graduated intensity approach to apply more resources and coverage as the sensitivity of the activity required it, was the basis of the OPSEC support doctrine. Using data gathered from the command, from previously applied stand-alone security services and local evaluations, the OPSEC support program could provide the extra coverage needed today to provide total security evaluations.

(U) Within the Army, TRADOC has the responsibility for development of the OPSEC support doctrine and for getting it into the training system, but help is required from INSCOM. To this end, it was hoped that INSCOM's OPSEC Support concept would be the driving force behind development of the OPSEC support doctrine. The concept was scheduled for submission through DA to TRADOC in FY 1980.⁹

SIGSEC Publications. (U) During FY 1979, the following actions were taken in regard to publications on signal security:¹⁰

AR 530-3, Electronic Security. (U) A draft revision of AR 530-3 was submitted to HQDA in August 1977. HQDA then staffed the regulation and submitted to The Adjutant General's Office (TAGO) for publication. TAGO reviewed and edited the draft and returned it to DCSOPS, DA for additional editorial corrections. On 9 March 1978, DCSOPS, DA requested that INSCOM assume proponency for AR 530-3. INSCOM accepted proponency on 31 March, made the required editorial corrections, restaffed the draft with the DA staff and the MACOM's, and resubmitted it to TAGO on 14 August 1978. Subsequently, the AR was published with an effective date of 15 February 1979.

OPSEC Support Notes. (U) Work began in September 1978 to combine the SIGSEC Information Letter (SIL) and the INSCOM Security Support Notes into one publication. The OPSEC Support Notes was the result of that effort. The first issue of the OPSEC Support Notes was published in October 1978 followed by a second issue in March 1979.

The "Omnibus" or INSCOM Security Program Regulation. (U) This regulation was written to provide an internal consolidated listing of INSCOM security support missions and functions. Initially, an attempt was made to have HQDA consolidate all security regulation under one proponent. While HQDA saw merit in the proposal, they agreed only to review AR's for conflicting duplicative information and correct problems wherever possible. The guidance given to INSCOM was to publish this internal document as an interim effort pending DA review in 1980.

INSCOM Regulation 380-40, Certification of Cryptofacility Inspectors. (U) This new regulation was published effective 27 July 1979 and established

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the INSCOM Cryptofacility Inspector Certification Program (CICP) and set forth the policies and procedures certification of INSCOM Cryptofacility inspectors.

ELSEC Collection and Analysis System. (U) During the first half of FY 1979, the US Army Signals Warfare Laboratory (SWL) accepted responsibility as the materiel developer for the ELSEC Collection and Analysis System (ECAS), and INSCOM would be the combat developer of the system. The Draft Proposed Letter Requirement for ECAS stated a need for one system for supporting operational and industrial ELSEC aspects of OPSEC support operations. A Draft Proposed Mission Element Need Statement (MENS) for the ECAS was also completed and forwarded to Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems (DCSS), HQ INSCOM, on 14 March 1979. The MENS provided supporting documentation for the acquisition of the ELSEC Collection and Analysis System.

(U) Cost for the study was estimated between \$50,000 and \$100,000 and remained a problem. During FY 1979, DA retracted \$850,000 programmed for ECAS only to reinstate \$500,000 later in the year. Although the estimated \$1.8 million required for FY 1981 was validated by DA staff, no funding had been earmarked.¹¹

Project CANCEL GAME. ^(u)~~(C)~~ At the direction of CDR INSCOM, the ODCSCI, HQ INSCOM, and the 902d MI Group initiated actions to conduct an evaluation of the Army's nuclear community and determine the vulnerabilities that were susceptible to hostile intelligence exploitation. These actions were precipitated by a DAIG Study, "Special Investigation of Army Nuclear Matters (SIANM)." The 902d MI Group was tasked by an 18 July 1979 letter to develop an OPLAN that would detail the procedures to conduct the OPSEC evaluation and provide an estimate of resources required to accomplish this evaluation. The plan, entitled, CANCEL GAME, was scheduled to begin in the 1st Qtr FY 1980 utilizing elements of the 902d Group along with support from the 66th MI Group. This OPSEC evaluation of the entire US Army's Nuclear Weapons System, from the CONUS Army storage depot to user units and back, was envisioned to be an 18-month effort.¹²

Joint Producer of Imagery Intelligence Architecture. (U) During FY 1979, as part of a joint effort with TRADOC, INSCOM contributed to the writing of the first Imagery Intelligence Architecture. The end result was publication of the interim "TRADOC Imagery Intelligence Architecture" on 25 January 1979. It delineated the battlefield commander's functions by echelons above corps, corps, and division and related the role of imagery to these functions.

(U) The paper gave a very basic review of the field of imagery and was TRADOC's first attempt to objectively correlate the Army's requirements for/uses of imagery with its tactical missions. The paper did not attempt to address personnel skill level requirements, cost versus operational effectiveness questions or current technological state of the art, and only briefly touched on the major problems of communications and multinational

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interoperability. These problems were to be addressed as the architectural effort continued.13

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The Great Coal Rip-Off. (U) On 22 and 23 January 1979, ABC Evening News carries stories concerning illegal coal mining in northern Alabama. The report stated that the Bureau of Land Management had discovered that considerable amounts of government-owned coal in Alabama had been mined and sold without the knowledge of the Federal Government, resulting in losses of over a billion dollars and causing considerable environmental damage.

(U) It was noted at HQ INSCOM that the 440th Strategic Military Intelligence Detachment at Golden, Colorado had the capability to assist the Department of the Interior and recommendation was made that it be called upon to do so. By using aerial imagery, the 440th's photo interpreters, who were also geologists, would be able to shorten the search for illegal mining operations to a period of several months rather than several years. Although the

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recommendation was viewed as offering excellent training for the unit and would no doubt result in financial savings to the Federal Government, there was serious questions raised as to the legality of INSCOM's participation since use of Army intelligence resources in civilian matters was contrary to the intent of Executive Order (EO) 12036.

(U) On 25 January, informal contact was made with the Bureau of Land Management, and possible support to the search for illegal coal mining operations was discussed. In the meantime, the proposal had been reviewed in INSCOM and it was determined that assistance to the Department of the Interior would constitute participation in a law enforcement activity and EO 12036 prohibits such activity by the intelligence community, except as expressly authorized by law. It was recommended that the proposal be withdrawn and pursued no further.

(U) On 8 March 1979, an official from the Bureau of Land Management informed INSCOM that the problem was no longer a physical search problem but a legal one—that of determining exactly which land was federally owned and which was in private hands. Consequently, no support from INSCOM would be required.¹⁵

~~(S/NOFORN)~~

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

System Development Model. (U) On 15 July 1979, the System Development Model (INSCOM Pamphlet 11-25) was completed and produced in sufficient quantity to be distributed throughout the intelligence community and participating MACOM's. The publication of the pamphlet was the result of an ongoing study initiated by DCSS, HQ INSCOM, with research assistance from the Kuras-Alterman Corporation. The model was to be used by all activities to monitor and coordinate Army participation in the development, support planning, fielding, and transition of strategic SIGINT systems. These systems were developed and fielded by NSA for use at INSCOM field stations.

(U) The model was applicable to any SIGINT system under development for INSCOM by NSA. It would apply to a greater or lesser degree depending upon the complexity of the system. The advantage of having the model as a reference was that each activity/event in the model would be reviewed before a decision was made whether or not to waive that activity/event. Ideally, the responsible action office, operational customer (INSCOM), and support organization (DARCOM, TRADOC, and ACC) would refer to common events/milestones in the development model. A narrative description of the event would describe the operational concept, logistic support, manpower requirements, software documentation, training, facilities, plus other support factors which occurred early in the development cycle of the proposed system. The model would highlight decisions resulting from INSCOM and other MACOM participation in the system development. The system development model utilized NSA terminology with a cross reference to DA life cycle terms and abbreviations.²²

On-Site User Test Guide. (U) On 15 June 1979, the On-Site User Test (OSUT) Manual (INSCOM Pamphlet 70-1) was published—the first of its kind. The pamphlet was prepared in order to provide guidance for personnel in the INSCOM units conducting OSUT's of fielded low density systems used in fixed or non-tactical operations. It established guidelines from early planning through publication of the OSUT results. It provided the operational tester and evaluator with methodology and procedures for planning, development of overall objectives, and actual test procedures, implementation of tests, and data reduction. It developed the mechanics and formats for preparation of the final report. This pamphlet also contained an example of an OSUT including abbreviated versions of the test plan, a final report, and an Executive Summary. These procedures, techniques, and formats were designed to be applicable for all OSUT's conducted by INSCOM organizations. Part One contained the detailed instructions and guidance; Part Two provided examples of the various types of OSUT documentation: test plan, reports, and the like.²³

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Systems Status Handbook. (U) On 1 February 1979, the first Systems Handbook was published. The Systems Handbook was a reference document for validated equipment items and systems projected for installation at INSCOM field stations. It provided a base upon which future INSCOM/DA resource requirements could be identified and appropriate programming action initiated. It also provided a common base and working aid for communications among action officers. It was planned that new systems would be added following approval/validation. The complete Systems Handbook was scheduled to be updated semi-annually.²⁴

USSID 1000 Annex (Resource) Markup. (U) Representatives from Program-Evaluation Division participated in the annual markup of the Resource Annex, USSID 1000 (SIGINT Tasking at the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command) at the National Security Agency during 20-30 November 1978. The markup was a detailed review of the programmed spaces in INSCOM's portion of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP). The most significant actions were taken at the following units:

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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USSID 1600 (SIGINT Tasking of US Army Tactical SIGINT Units). (U) In January 1979, NSACSS released the first draft of USSID 1600 to HQ INSCOM for Army-wide dissemination/coordination. HQ INSCOM distributed the draft to all concerned Major Army Commands, tactical SIGINT activities, and ACSI, DA on 6 February 1979. This first coordination effort proved to be so extensive in terms of the number of questions and comments that FORSCOM requested a meeting to address the issues. The requested conference took place at NSACSS during 15-17 May 1979. Three of the highlights of the meeting were the following:

1. The term "Recommended Tasking" was to be amended to "Recommended Collection." This was the term used to describe collection that could be proposed by any SIGINT activity to a Direct Support Company (for example). Tasking was purely advisory in nature and could be declined at the supported commander's option.

2. A long needed clarification on SIGINT Activity Designators (SIGAD) was reached. The question of whether the SIGAD "belonged" to the commander or to the operations officer/operations element was settled by determining that it belonged to the commander.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(U) Following the May meeting, a Revised Draft of USSID 1600 was developed and a final coordination effort launched in July 1979. HQ INSCOM, in coordination with ACSI, DA, forwarded Army comments to NSACSS in late September 1979 for publication.²⁶

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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Page(s) 122-124

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(~~C-CCO~~) Milestones for the installation of the system became clouded as the year progressed due to uncertainties in hardware design and software composition. It was anticipated that initial operating capability of the system would be established for September 1980 while full operational capability would take place in the first half of 1981. Impact on the unit, aside from the time required to provide data inputs, was expected to be minimal particularly in view of the planned relocation of FS

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b) in early 1981.30
(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);
(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1)
Per NSA

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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Page(s) 126

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Wobeck. (S)

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(U) Wobeck was the responsibility of the VII Corps and was manned by members of the 326th Operations Company (Forward). The Company was assigned as a Corps direct support unit but was separated from its parent headquarters by 500 kilometers. The support and operational responsibilities became a burden to the VII Corps, and in January 1978 the Corps queried USAREUR as to the possibility of Wobeck becoming an Echelon Above Corps (EAC) responsibility.

(U) USAREUR hosted a meeting in October 1978 to discuss the Wobeck situation. INSCOM was invited and participated in the discussions. The decision was made that Wobeck should become an Echelon Above Corps responsibility; that a 56-man detachment would be created; and that INSCOM would support the site with technical and maintenance assistance.

(U) In January 1979, INSCOM presented to DA a Program Analysis and Resource Review (PARR) submission incorporating the desired Wobeck changes. This was later withdrawn in light of a USAREUR package which would receive a higher priority for funding. DCSOPS personnel made a trip to Wobeck in March to gather first-hand knowledge of operational capabilities and administrative/logistic support relationships. In May, final DA budget submissions were consolidated. Wobeck had been segregated from the USAREUR package and fell below the funding limit. As the fiscal year ended, Wobeck continued to be operated by out-of-hide assets of VII Corps.

(U) Operational and support problems continued to plague site productivity; however, contractor support was being investigated to promote productivity and effective mission management. As the Army Electro-Optic program develops, the site will increase in importance, as a multidiscipline approach is critical in evaluating E-0 efforts.³²

Traffic Fabrication. (~~SC/LIMDIS~~) Initial evidence of suspected traffic fabrication by a manual Morse intercept operator at [redacted] occurred in mid-April 1979. The intercept operator in question first appeared in the NSA data files on 25 March 1979. The operator personal sign was DZE but was later changed to DXC in mid-April. In addition to

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Page(s) 128

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Position Manning. (~~S-ECU~~) The table below indicates position manning, as of the end of 4th Qtr FY79.35

Table 20.—Position Manning

	Position Equivalents		Percent Manned
	Programmed	Manned	
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i); (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA	111:08	103:21	93
	62:00	52:08	84
	26:00	25:08	97
	14:08	15:00	105
	49:14	47:14	96
	1:08	2:00	150
INSCOM TOTAL	<u>264:14</u>	<u>246:03</u>	<u>93</u>

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Study of USAREUR Tactical SIGINT System. (~~S-ECU~~) On 1 May 1979, the 66th MI Group SIGINT/EW Task Force (SIEWTF) completed a four-month study of the USAREUR tactical SIGINT system. The findings and recommendations were presented to MG Atkeson, as well as other USAREUR participants, and representatives from NSAEUR, INSCOM, and ACSI, DA. Three major problem areas were identified: (1) System management and direction, (2) personnel problems (shortages and training), and (3) equipment problems (shortages and deficiencies). The need for a single SIGINT manager to direct the USAREUR SIGINT effort was evident. It was believed essential that INSCOM's role within the European theater has to be defined as soon as possible and steps taken to define the command and control relationships for the 66th MI Group

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA The overriding theme in the area of equipment was that the equipment was antiquated (not state of the art) and did not meet mission requirements. The personnel problem existed Army-wide. Schooling problems were identified with further investigation recommended.³⁷

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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Page(s) 131-132

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Project [] would provide computerized control, data storage, retrieval, and transfer to aid operators and supervisors through more responsive and accurate equipment operation. It would also allow access to continually update data bases providing both historical and near real-time environmental status, as well as position equipment status. Each subsystem would consist of several micro-controlled operator positions interfaced to a separate subsystem level computer. Each operator position would be capable of performing the functions of any operator position in either subsystem. Additionally, either subsystem computer would be capable of performing in either or both subsystems without software or wiring modifications.

(S-ECO) The original concept was stated in the [] SIMP (SIGINT Integrated Master Plan), dated 16 January 1979. Subsequent proposals, counter-proposals, recommendations and discussions resulted in the contract award to GTE, Sylvania during June 1979. The estimated cost would run to \$5 million. The contract required [] to be fielded in November 1980 and [] in February 1981.⁴⁷

(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i);(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36;
(b) (1) Per
NSA

Fly Away Team to Support Special Collection Operation. (S-ECO) During crisis situations, NSACSS was frequently called upon to man special collection facilities on very short notice. These facilities were sometimes in sensitive locations and were staffed by a minimum number of personnel. Army personnel assigned to NSA have previously been selected to support these short term special collection requirements and each selection had INSCOM approval to deploy before travel processing actions were started. To shorten the administrative process in the future, there existed the need to reduce the time required to process an individual for deployment (getting passport, shots, etc.). To accomplish this, NSACSS solicited INSCOM's concurrence to use military personnel assigned to NSA for quick reaction operations on a routine basis. NSACSS would initiate a program to identify the names of individuals being considered for a Fly Away Team and, with INSCOM coordination, take steps to ready these people for short notice deployment. There would still be a second coordination made before actual deployment. INSCOM approved the contingency plan and concurred in the plan to utilize Army personnel assigned to NSA, with the exception of CPAR (collection, processign, analysis and reporting) personnel.⁴⁸

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Communications Facility, AN/MS-67. (U) The AN/MS-67, Communications Facility (COMFAC), was an automated, transportable communications facility specifically tailored to support the Army Corps tactical electronics warfare and intelligence operations. COMFAC was to provide highly unique automated communication capabilities controlled by an AN/UYK-19 computer system for handling both formal and informal or OPSCOMM traffic.

(U) The COMFAC contract, an 18-month procurement package, was awarded to ECI Division/E-Systems, Incorporated, on 8 September 1977, for \$2.495 million. In June 1978, an extensive overrun of \$2 million was incurred due to an increase of vendor-related hardware and an ECI underestimate of the man-hours and costs. In February 1979, ECI informed the Government that they had mismanaged the software effort and that additional time and money were needed to recover from their mistakes. A new project management staff to deliver the project in October 1979 required \$2.2 million. However, additional difficulties were encountered in June/July 1979 which caused still another cost overrun/schedule slippage. ECI stated they would need a minimum of \$2.9 million to complete the project and deliver the systems in July 1980. This overrun was attributed to a continuing growth of the estimated lines of code needed to complete the software effort.

(U) As a result of this last proposed cost overrun/schedule growth, independent evaluations were conducted in July 1979 by Government representatives and an independent consultant firm from California. It was evident that the Government had little confidence in their proposed plan-to-complete

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Consequently, the Program Manager decided to terminate the contract with ECI and complete the project in-house (using Army resources).

(U) The Contracting Officer notified ECI on 27 August 1979 that the Government was terminating the contract with ECI and that the Government would provide ECI with a list of items to complete in order to effect a smooth transition of the project. It was anticipated that by January 1980, all remaining hardware and software would be transferred to Fort Huachuca, Arizona with the project being completed under the auspices of the Communications Electronics Engineering Installation Agency (CEEIA).⁵¹

Direction Finding Nets. (~~S-ECU~~) At the close of FY 1979, INSCOM direction finding (DF) net configurations were as follows:

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

management capability. The [] System was initially to be debugged and tested in CONUS, but due to slippage in software development and availability of the ACSTEL installation team from HQ INSCOM, the debugging and acceptance testing were to be completed on site. [] accepted the system as operational on 4 May 1978 with the understanding that some program changes and additional operational capabilities were needed to have the system fully meet their requirements. Part of the problem was that the system did not have sufficient capacity to perform all of the functions required.

(C) (U) [] was to be upgraded during FY 1979 to utilize a new executive system, that would permit [] to support multiple functions simultaneously. The new executive would also permit the CASSETTE function to be installed on [] negating the need for the antiquated CASSETTE system used at []. However, these software upgrades could not be initiated until the original [] software and hardware system was fully operational. The finalization of the upgrade was delayed until FY 1980. During FY 1979, extensive hardware damage was incurred by [] and the equipment was not used for an extended period during a scheduled outage for room construction and computer relocation. The damage to the hardware was believed to have been caused, in part, by power fluctuation which overloaded printer circuit boards and by Army maintenance personnel overstepping their capabilities.⁵³

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);
(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1)
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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

~~(C-ECU)~~ On 5 February 1979, a message was received from NSACSS which advised that R7, at NSA, was forming a project team to complete the system definition, initiate a contract and accomplish installation, logistics, and support and planning. NSA solicited INSCOM participation at that time, to be a participant on that acquisition team and assist them in finalizing the system definition and all aspects related. They advised that they hoped to complete an acquisition plan and purchase description by June 1979 and award a contract by January 1980. The meeting was held on 28 February 1979.

128

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per
NSA

In April the Concept Review Group (CRG) announced its approval of [redacted]
as one of the four subsystems/projects listed under the coverall Project [redacted]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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Page(s) 139

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86-36;(b)
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NSA

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(C) Project [] was the short range plan of the HFDF Modernization Strategy, which was an unfunded project intended to utilize residual assets of the terminated NSA project, [], and was a redefinition of the [] requirement on a specific, limited basis for the Army. Following a 31 October 1978 briefing on HFDF Modernization Strategy, the Director, NSA approved a two-fold approach to the implementation of high frequency direction finding strategy involving short and long range proposals. The long range approach was to be developed by a newly created joint NSA/SCA HFDF Task Force under the direction of []

(b)(3):P.L. 86
-36;b (3) Per
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(S-CCO)

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Project TOTAL DISCOVERY. (TSC/LIMDIS) On 4 July 1979, a crudely constructed, cloth-wrapped bundle, washed ashore on Kwajalein Island in the Pacific, was discovered by a dependent of a US Government contract employee. This bundle, weighing approximately 15 pounds and measuring about 18 square inches, was turned over to the local Provost Marshal who forwarded the material to Hawaii where it was reviewed by INSCOM personnel and subsequently forwarded to HQ INSCOM. The TAREX personnel, in turn, transmitted the documents to NSA.

(TSC/LIMDIS) The items in the 800/1,000-page bundle appeared to be the working papers of a Soviet shipborne SIGINT collector (AGI). Judging from

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the date of recovery and the dates on the papers themselves, it was possible that they were from the AGI "Primorye," which was observed in the Kwajalein area during 14 May through 9 July 1979.

(u)
(TSC/LIMDIS) The documents included intercept of communications (primarily plain text) between US Navy ships; DF logs; Soviet TEXTA, intercept priorities listings (i.e., USSR EEI for US Navy Order of Battle), quotations from intercepted phone calls, logs of intercepted phone calls, logs of intercepted phone conversations, hearability logs, message logs, scratch pads, and US codename identifications. The study and evaluation of this material should provide a better understanding of Soviet AGI activities, procedures, successes, targets, etc., and should also be of considerable value in operational security.⁵⁹

(u)
Project TRADE SCHOOL. (S/NOFORN) Project TRADE SCHOOL, listed as TAREX OPLAN 1-79, revised and updated TAREX collection activities in Europe which were previously conducted under US Army Technical Support Activity (USATSA) OPLAN 1-75 (Project TRAIL BOSS). A complete reorganization was included of the then European collection activity known since 1963 as the "Technical Requirements and Purchasing Division," a cover designation reporting as a Department of the Army element. Under the revised OPLAN, the cover designation was changed to reflect the European office of the "Electronics and Telecommunications Evaluation Center," (ETEC-E). The ETEC, an official Department of Defense cover activity, consisted of a main office located in Washington, D. C., and a subordinate office in Tokyo, Japan. Project TRADE SCHOOL proposed the consolidation of a TAREX collection activity under a single cover organization backstopped at the DOD level.

(u)
(C) Considered a viable collection effort, the reorganization of the European collection activity was required to bring into line its functions with those performed in CONUS and Japan. In mid-1978, the TAREX Management Branch, HQ INSCOM, formally initiated Project TRADE SCHOOL under the provisions of US Signals Intelligence Directive (USSID) 117, Subject: Target Exploitation Procedures (C-CCO), 18 January 1974 and AR 10-53, Subject: Organization and Functions, US Army Intelligence and Security Command (U), 15 January 1978. The 66th MI Group assumed responsibility for revising the plan and completed the action in February 1979. In July, HQ INSCOM approved OPLAN 1-79, pending theater level coordination. OPLAN 1-79 was forwarded to ODCSI, USAREUR for approval.

(C) Although there was to be no change to the functions of ETEC-E, excessive delays in coordination have impacted sharply on personnel recruitment and could cause this organization to change its collection methodology. The incumbent Director in Europe must retire on 22 January 1980, but because of personnel recruitment regulations it was not envisioned that the new Director would arrive soon enough to take advantage of the retiree's expertise. A contract for "consultant services" for the retiree was proposed but had not been firmed by the end of FY 1979.⁶⁰

132
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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

technical and professional dictionaries reflecting language use or alteration to reporting on technical specifications of computer formulated language texts, processed vernacular data and diplomatic communications systems having special character capability (primarily non-monographic facsimile).

(S-ECO) While various aspects of collection in this area constituted basic TAREX collection responsibility (understanding requirements imposed by USSID 117), following the breakthrough in technologies dealing with [redacted] in early 1978, requirements were consolidated under TAREX Collection Requirement (TCR) 44-16-78 (IAFM-OPS-HUC-T 241300Z Apr 78) and continue under TCR 44-02-79.

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-36;(b) (1)
Per NSA

(S-ECO) TAREX experienced significant success against all aspects of the TAREX Collection Requirement. Routine collection resources, together with collation research at both field and management levels, enabled TAREX to maintain a close watch on theoretical developments in language reform, particularly in China. TAREX obtained, evaluated, and selectively forwarded literally scores of Chinese [redacted] articles, proposals, etc., in this area. Concrete evaluations of, for example, the p'in-yin movement in China and the expansion of the [redacted] were well covered. In the area of technological development, TAREX and other elements of the 500th MI Group possessed established sources in the major corporations involved in equipment development. One of these, Showa Information Services (SIS) even provided extensive literature and user information. [redacted]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

[redacted] In China, intentions by CAS (Chinese Academy of Sciences) to develop a language-processed, national information network was also disclosed.⁶¹

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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Page(s) 144

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VI. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), pp. 47-50.
2. Ibid. pp. 171-172; Input to CSA Briefing - REDTRAIN, 14 Dec 79, (U); Report, IAOPS-PTR-RT, 21 Nov 79, subj: Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training (REDTRAIN), (U).
3. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), pp. 175-180; (b)(1) Per CIA Book 2 (S-CCO/NF); Msg fm SSO INSCOM to SSO Munich, DTG 091715Z Jan 79, subj: Intelligence Support to EAC-Europe, (S/NF); Black Book Item, IAOPS-PTR-P, HQ INSCOM, 15 Jan 79, subj: Transition to War, (S/NF); Black Book Item, IAOPS-PTR-P, 30 Oct 78, subj: Transition to War, (S/NF); Msg, SSO INSCOM to SSO Hawaii, 1 Mar 79, subj: MG Wolff/BG Freeze Briefing, (S).
4. DF, IAOPS-OR-ICC, DCSOPS to CofS, 31 May 79, subj: Korea Situation, (S/NF).
5. AHR, MAO, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (U), App B (S).
6. AHR, ITAC, FY79, Annex D; Annex E, p. 6 (U).
7. Fact Sheet, IAITA-R, 11 Jun 79, subj: Regional Appraisal Program, (U); Interview, Mr. Suarez, ODCSOPS with Mr. Gilbert, History Office, 17 Mar 80 (U).
8. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), pp. 54-55; CMT 2, DF, IAOPS-OR-AV (8 Feb 79) DCSOPS to CofS, 16 Feb 79, subj: INSCOM Policy on Deception, (S).
9. AHR, DCSCI, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (C), p. 14; (b)(1) Per CIA Book 2 (S/NF).
10. AHR, DCSCI, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (C), pp. 11-12.
11. Ibid. pp. 66-67.
12. Ibid. Vol I, pp. 28,47; Vol II, Tab L (C).
13. AHR, DCSS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (S-CCO), Incl 7.
14. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), pp. 189-190.
15. Staff Note, IAOPS-PTR-P, 14 Mar 79, subj: The Great Coal Rip-off, and attached papers (U).
16. (b)(1) Per CIA Book 2 (S-CCO/NF); Ltr, BG John A. Smith, Jr., Actg ACSI to CDR INSCOM, 7 Nov 77, subj: Army Master Management Plan for Electro-Optics (E-O) Intelligence, (S/NF).
17. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), p. 115; DF, IAOPS-SE-AS, 5 Jun 79, subj: Project TOUR GUIDE, (S/NF); Msg, CDR INSCOM to SSO ACSI, DA, DTG 131545Z Dec 78, subj: After Action Report - GRAVEL STREAM, (S/NF/LIMDIS).
18. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), p. 114; Ltr, IAOPS-SE-AS, CDR INSCOM to USA Night Vision and E-O Lab, undtd, subj: GRAVEL WATER Sensor Configuration, (S).
19. Msg, CDR INSCOM to CDR 307th ASA Bn, DTG 141335Z Sep 79, subj: NITE LITES, (S/NF).
20. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY79 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), p. 114; Ann Hist Rev, INSCOM, FY78 (TSC/NF/LIMDIS), p. 104.
21. CMT 2, DF, IAOPS-SE-AS (12 Mar 79), DCSOPS to DCSS, 23 Apr 79, subj: Millimeter Wave, (S); DF, IAOPS-EW, DCSOPS to DCSR&D, 4 Sep 75, subj: AGTELIS and TEAMPACK Frequency Ranges, (S); Interview, Mr. Tom Sullivan, ODCSOPS with Mr. Gilbert, History Office, 13 May 80 (S).

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CHAPTER VII
OVERVIEW OF HUMINT

Introduction. (S/NOFORN) An added dimension to the various intelligence disciplines is human intelligence (HUMINT). Each discipline makes a unique contribution to the production of an accurate mosaic revealing the capabilities, plans, and intentions of potential enemies; however, HUMINT's contribution has frequently received less attention partly due to the lack of a commonly accepted, quantifiable measure of value for HUMINT products, and partly to the restrictions on openly acknowledging its accomplishments.

(C/NOFORN) Nevertheless, analysis of HUMINT products used in Joint Chiefs of Staff intelligence briefings during mid-July 1977 revealed that HUMINT contributed about 75 percent of the intelligence data in the military/political arena, 25 percent in the situation report/order of battle arena, and 12 percent in the scientific and technical arena. While these HUMINT products represented the take from all US intelligence agencies, examples herein illustrate how essential HUMINT is in completing the mosaic.

(S/NOFORN)

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(U) The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), DA, supervises, manages, and coordinates the Army HUMINT program. INSCOM and subordinate military intelligence groups under its control or the operational control of theater commanders, manages and executes HUMINT operations. The Commander, INSCOM supplies personnel and resources for Army HUMINT activities.

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HUMINT is managed in the context of the Army's multidiscipline collection program and interfaces with the HUMINT programs of other DOD and national agencies. It is part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) which is under the aegis of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

(S//NOFORN) INSCOM's CONUS-based operational HUMINT element is the US Army Operational Group (USAOG) at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. It conducts worldwide strategic clandestine and overt collection activities. It also provides support to HUMINT components of INSCOM's multidiscipline Military Intelligence Groups in Germany, Korea, Japan, and Panama, each of which conducts both overt [redacted] missions in their respective theaters of operation. INSCOM commands the MI Groups; however, Army theater commanders exercise operational control (OPCON) of the 66th and 501st MI Groups in Germany and Korea, respectively. In the event of war, OPCON of the 470th MI Group in Panama also passes to the local commander [redacted]

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(S//NOFORN) Resource requirements for FY 1978 Army HUMINT program were modest compared to benefits derived from the program. The total program was authorized approximately \$22.9 million and 1,101 personnel. Though resources devoted to HUMINT increased steadily between 1973 and 1979, the comparative program cost was only equivalent to that of two infantry battalions or .7 of one percent of the Army's budget. (See Tables 21 and 22.) In FY 1979, HUMINT represented only 13 percent of the Army's Program 3 intelligence budget. (See Figures 5 and 6.) The FY 1979 authorized HUMINT strength stood at 1,083 (Table 23).

Table 21.—(C) Army HUMINT Resources 1964-78
(in constant 1978 dollars)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total (in thousands)</u>
1964	\$43,597
1965	40,226
1966	28,957
1967	26,163
1968	28,986
1969	23,898
1970	23,676
1971	20,361
1972	16,554
1973	13,803
1974	(not given)
1975	17,190
1976	19,097
1977	21,210
1978	22,892

149
140

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Table 22.—(C) Army HUMINT Manpower 1963-78

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total</u>
1963	4,158
1964	3,152
1965	2,662
1966	1,930
1967	1,829
1968	1,710
1969	1,454
1970	1,324
1971	1,185
1972	810
1973	784
1974	607
1975	948
1976	985
1977	993
1978	1,101

Table 23.—(C) Authorized HUMINT Strength—FY 1979

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>US Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
USAINSCOM HQ	50	17	67
US Army Opnl Gp	84	11	145
(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)	15	31	(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 302
66th MI Gp	70	18	91
18th MI Bn	166	67	273
430th MI Det	62	5	109
470th MI Gp	20	4	35
500th MI Gp	69	43	247
501st MI Gp	<u>37</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>70</u>
TOTALS	<u>573</u>	<u>197</u>	<u>1,083</u>

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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151

142

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


Figure 4.

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


Figure 5.

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THE ARMY HUMINT SLICE

ARMY INTELLIGENCE TOA:
(FY 79) \$228 MILLION




Figure 6.

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144

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(S//NOFORN) Allocated resources are not sufficient to allow full exploitation of HUMINT collection opportunities. For example, manning for [] is inadequate to cope with the number of potential knowledgeable sources. Similar shortfalls exist in other covert and clandestine collection activities.

(U) INSCOM is part of the DOD Intelligence Tasking and Response System (Figure 7). The figure depicts the interdependency of the consumer, producer, and collector. The system is driven by identified consumer needs which are submitted to the analytical community (producers). If requested information is available, producers answer the need with finished intelligence. When requested information is not available, the analyst formulates an intelligence collection requirement which is levied on the collection system best able to respond.

(S//NOFORN) []

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(S//NOFORN) Control and coordination procedures preclude duplication of effort and insure that collection is performed in accordance with the laws of the United States and applicable executive orders and directives. Thorough coordination is essential. [] operations cannot be planned and executed in isolation. Coordination is a control mechanism to insure that all elements of the system mesh. Approval and coordination channels vary in different overseas areas depending on the relationship of Army elements to the respective unified commands.

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3024(i)

(S//NOFORN) Approval requires favorable coordination with offices and agencies outside the military chain of command. []

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

proposals are routed through intelligence technical channels from the operating unit to the next higher intelligence staff. Some [] operations require coordination or approval outside intelligence channels, for example, with the Office of the Army General Counsel and, in some cases, the Under Secretary of the Army.

(U) INSCOM HUMINT management and administrative activities include the routine functions of command, administration, logistics support, and communications and specific intelligence support functions. These activities are conducted at HQ INSCOM, MI Group, and operating activity level. Approximately one-third of program personnel are devoted to support (Table 24) routine functions which include administrative services, programming and budgeting activities, automated data processing, maintenance and security of physical facilities, supplies and equipment, transportation and vehicles, and communications other than clandestine communications.

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Page(s) 155

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Table 24.—(S/NOFORN) INSCOM HUMINT Management and Administration Resources

	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 76T</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>
Manpower	272	280	280	306	341
TOA*	\$4,896	\$1,171	\$5,673	\$6,570	\$7,667

*Total Obligation Authority (in thousands)

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Overt Collection. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Army [] HUMINT collection is a highly productive, dependable source of information which is gathered at low risk and relatively low cost. [] collection activities satisfy Army intelligence requirements by interviewing knowledgeable individuals, gathering information from openly published sources, and acquiring foreign materiel and documents. These activities are conducted openly and in such a manner that Army involvement is or can be acknowledged.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Though focused on service-peculiar requirements, Army [] collection activities frequently produce information in support of DOD and national requirements. In many instances, [] HUMINT is the only source of information to satisfy these requirements. It is a vital part of the Army's overall collection program. [] HUMINT activities support the conduct of clandestine operations by producing critical operational data and source leads. For example, [] recently expressed appreciation to the Army for its outstanding support in providing spotting and assessing []

(b)(1) & (b)(3) Per CIA

- (U) ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Resources devoted to [] HUMINT collection constitute approximately 60 percent of the total HUMINT program. Personnel and dollar resources for the overt collection program for the period FY 1976 through FY 1979 appear in Table 25. Most are concentrated in Europe; however, overt HUMINT operations are also conducted in CONUS, the Far East, and the Canal Zone.

Table 25.—(U) [] Collection Resources

	<u>Manpower</u>				
	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 76T</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>
Debrief Fgn Natl	171	178	176	193	186
Debrief US Pers	33	35	34	38	38
Fgn Liaison	66	69	68	78	78
Acquisition—Mat & Docu	122	126	125	134	118
TOTAL	<u>392</u>	<u>408</u>	<u>403</u>	<u>443</u>	<u>420</u>

147

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156

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Overt Collection Resources—Continued

	TOA (in thousands)				
	FY 76	FY 76T	FY 77	FY 78	FY 79
Debrief Fgn Natl	\$2,522	\$ 652	\$2,893	\$3,413	\$3,655
Debrief US Pers	783	202	899	1,063	1,144
Fgn Liaison	957	247	1,097	1,242	1,358
Acquisition Mat & Docu	1,653	427	1,895	2,158	2,192
TOTAL	<u>\$5,915</u>	<u>\$1,528</u>	<u>\$6,784</u>	<u>\$7,876</u>	<u>\$8,349</u>

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~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Army collection activities fall into the following four basic categories:

1. (S/NOFORN) Debriefing of Foreign Personnel. Debriefing of foreign personnel involves the comprehensive exploitation of defectors, refugees, emigres, returnees, illegal border crossers, and in wartime, prisoners of war.

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148

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(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(C/NOFORN) The FY 1980 General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) Program Decision Memorandum (PDM), issued in September 1978, did not authorize an increase in manpower for HUMINT. Instead, the Army was directed to request civilian contractor assistance in debriefing an additional 375 Soviet Jewish emigres annually. The PDM provides \$800,000 annually for FY 1980 through FY 1984 to defray these costs. This will be the first Army HUMINT attempt at contracting Case Officer/Debriefers functions, preparation of specifications and other contracting procedures. The executive agency for implementation is the US Army Operational Group. Potential problem areas include the availability of qualified personnel, security considerations, and conformity with current Civil Service and Federal regulations.

(u)

(C) The Latin Emigre Exploitation Program (LEEP)(also known as LASSO by FORSCOM) is an initiative of the US Army Operational Group (USAOG), INSCOM, to overtly debrief Cuban emigres entering the US through, or living in, Miami, Florida. The objectives of LEEP are twofold: First, to obtain substantive intelligence information which will satisfy validated requirements; and, second, to provide a realistic training vehicle for FORSCOM interrogators/analysts under the aegis of REDTRAIN. In mid-1976, perceiving a

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potential for intelligence collection in the (then) few Cuban refugees entering the US, CPT Bruce Jackson, CDR, USA Field Station Homestead, developed eleven EEI (essential elements of information) from Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) background sheets on three former Cuban military personnel. These EEI were forwarded through HQ INSCOM, and finally levied for action on the Domestic Collection Division (DCD), Central Intelligence Agency. By March 1977, eight of the eleven EEI had been satisfied; however, no concerted efforts to debrief Cuban emigres were taken. Undaunted, CPT Jackson addressed this potential with the Deputy Commanding General for Security and Production (DCG-SP), INSCOM, following the 1978 INSCOM Commanders' Conference and eventually prepared both a Fact Sheet (27 October 1978) and a message (141900Z February 1979) which conveyed his continued belief in the utility of expending some efforts to extract intelligence information from this population.

(C) In fact, INSCOM had already entered into negotiations and discussions with OACSI, DA, the FBI, and the CIA in order to establish parameters, and with FORSCOM to secure the participation of that command's personnel under REDTRAIN. The latter step was considered necessary both to obtain the assistance of linguistically qualified interrogators in what could be an extensive debriefing effort and, concomitantly, to provide a realistic training exercise for the participating FORSCOM personnel. As a result, CDR, INSCOM, approved the Overt Operational Proposal (OPOP) on 5 September 1979.

(b)(1) Per DIA

(C) A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Chiefs of Staff of INSCOM and FORSCOM to delineate the responsibilities of each command in this project was informally negotiated by representatives of USAOG and FORSCOM. This MOU was signed by the Chief of Staff, INSCOM and forwarded to the Chief of Staff, FORSCOM on 2 October 1979 for signature.

(C) Two USAOG personnel arrived in Miami in early September 1979 to finalize coordination procedures with the local FBI and the Domestic Collection Division, CIA offices; the one FORSCOM interrogator arrived in early October 1979. The FBI personnel have been cooperative, within their priorities, to the point of inviting LEEP members to accompany them to interviews, thus permitting acquisition of both background data and substantive intelligence information.

(C) Because of the uncertain potential LEEP holds for answering US Army requirements on Cuba, it has been decided that the program should initially be run on a temporary basis. A review will be conducted not later than six months after publication of the first LEEP intelligence information report (IIR).

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~~(S//NOFORN)~~

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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in this area and operates four separate collection programs. These collection programs use active and reserve military, DOD, and nongovernmental personnel to collect against foreign personnel and activities to which they have gained access through either official or private means.

~~(S)~~

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(1) & (b)(3) Per CIA

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Foreign Officer Contact Program (FOCP) acquires foreign military intelligence and biographic data from US military and DA civilian employees in contact with foreign students attending US Army service schools. FOCP coordinators are assigned to Forts Benning, Bliss, Bragg, Knox, Sill, and Leavenworth and Aberdeen Proving Ground. A large number of these US-trained personnel eventually attain high military or political positions in their native countries. The FOCP provides valuable insight into the individual's political and military outlook and his attitude toward the US. The assessment of foreign officers who attend the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) is particularly significant. Twenty CGSC graduates became heads of state or prime ministers; 154 became ministers, ambassadors, or appointed representatives; 152 chiefs of armed forces or service components; and over 1,250 were promoted to flag rank. Programs such as the FOCP frequently have unanticipated side benefits. For example, half of the 376 Nigerian students studying at US military schools also received training in the Soviet Union.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~

(b)(1) Per DIA

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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● military and civilian intelligence and security services. This effort produces significant information collected by host country unilateral operations which are not normally available to the US intelligence community.

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

4.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3) 10
USC 424 Per
DIA

152

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024
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~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The primary disadvantage of [] HUMINT collection is that it is essentially passive. The collector has little control over what will be available for exploitation; however, the program has consistently been an outstanding producer of intelligence. In fact, available resources are not sufficient to exploit available collection opportunities on a timely basis. In FY 1977, there were 6,940 spaces for foreign military personnel at US Army schools and installations; however, the Army had only eight personnel at seven locations to handle the workload. There is a backlog of 1,251 Project SEEK cases of primary interest to the Army. Also, in Europe, exploitation efforts are strained to screen and debrief the large numbers of refugees arriving in West Germany.

(U)

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ [] collection is the Army's most productive source of HUMINT information. It is extremely responsive to both specific (ICR's) and continuing intelligence requirements (CIR's). Analysis of reports obtained through the Foreign Officer Contact Program is indicative of the value of reporting from overt collection programs. During FY 1977, 563 reports were produced; of these, 66 percent responded to validated collection requirements. Evaluations indicate that over 80 percent of overt collection reports are of high or moderate value to the users.

~~(S)~~ (U) NOFORN

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Army clandestine HUMINT activities provide short and long term access to military and military-related intelligence targets in denied areas, as well as an early warning/indications of hostilities (EW/IOH) capability. Army operations focus on the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact, China/North Korea/Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and other geographic areas, including Latin America. The priority of effort is illustrated by dollar and manpower allocations in Figure 8.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Clandestine collection operations are complex, demanding, and involve a degree of risk; however, they provide unique information that cannot be obtained through other disciplines despite sophisticated technology. HUMINT can provide the enemy's intentions—what he is planning to do, what his doctrine is going to be, and what new equipment he is developing for the future. The best overhead photography does not permit the penetration of buildings or underground facilities. Clandestine HUMINT

153

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162

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1) (b)(3) 50 USC 3024i Per INSCOM

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

☐ Other:

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Page(s) 163-165

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(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(U) Resources expended by the Army for collection activities against the
(b)(3):50 USC nations are shown below in Table 26.

Table 26.—(S/NOFORN) Clandestine Collection Resources Against The

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(Dollars in Thousands)

	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 76T</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>
Manpower	165	165	169	182	169
Total Oblg					
Authority	\$3,088	\$661	\$3,574	\$4,244	\$4,681

(S/NOFORN)

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1) (b)(3) 50 USC 3024i Per INSCOM; (b)(3) 10 USC 424 Per DIA

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

☐ Other:

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Page(s) 167

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~~(S/NOFORN)~~

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

~~(S/NOFORN)~~

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

~~(S/NOFORN)~~

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(U) Resources expended and planned for operations against (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) are shown in Table 27.

Table 27.—~~(S/NOFORN)~~

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

~~(S/NOFORN)~~

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

159

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(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(U) Resources expended and planned for collection against the (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
are depicted in Table 28.

Table 28. — ~~(S/NOFORN)~~

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

~~(S/NOFORN)~~

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

~~(S/NOFORN)~~

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

160

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(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(U) Resources expended and planned by the Army for collection against other geographical areas are depicted in Table 29.

Table 29. — (C)

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(1)

(U) Resources expended and planned for AARCS are depicted in Table 30.

Table 30.—~~(C/NOFORN)~~

(b)(1)

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APPENDIX A

USA INSCOM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
(As of 30 September 1979)

<u>UIC</u>	<u>Unit Designation</u>	<u>Location</u>
WO0YAA	HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
W000AA	US Army Garrison, Arlington Hall Station	Arlington, Virginia
W001AA	USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (SIGINT/EW)	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W002AA	US Army Element, National Security Agency	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W01HAA	US Army Garrison, Vint Hill Farms Station	Warrenton, Virginia
W01KAA	US Army Field Station, Homestead	Homestead Air Force Base, Homestead, Florida
W02BAA	US Army Field Station, Okinawa	Sobe, Okinawa, Japan
W02RAA	US Army Field Station, Berlin	Berlin, Germany
W0DRAA	US Army Field Station, Sinop	Sinop, Turkey
W0KLAA	Classified Unit	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W1U3AA	US Army Administrative Survey Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W372AA	US Army Foreign Area Officers Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W2JBAA	US Army Russian Institute	Garmisch, Germany
W3AGAA	US Army Field Station, Augsburg	Augsburg, Germany
W3BRAA	US Army Field Station, Misawa	Misawa, Japan
W3CCAA	USA INSCOM Automated Systems Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
W3NSAA	USA INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii	Fort Shafter, Hawaii
W3QNAA	US Army Cryptologic Support Group	Heidelberg, Germany
W3YDAA	US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
WH60AA	11th Military Intelligence Company (Technical Intelligence)	Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland
WH6099	Augmentation, 11th Military Intelligence Company (Technical Intelligence)	Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland
W31UAA	US Army Field Station, San Antonio	San Antonio, Texas
W32BAA	US Army Central Security Facility	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W35GAA	USA INSCOM Finance and Accounting Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia

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APPENDIX A

<u>UIC</u>	<u>Unit Designation</u>	<u>Location</u>
	HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND	
W36SAA	USA INSCOM Engineering and Maintenance Assistance Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
W39CAA	US Army Special Operations Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W318AA	USA INSCOM Fort Meade Headquarters Support Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W319AA	US Army Operational Group	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W4DFAA	US Army Systems Exploitation Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W4DKAA	USA INSCOM Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
WBU6AA	902d Military Intelligence Group	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
WBU699	Augmentation, 902d Military Intelligence Group	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W005AA	USA INSCOM Pentagon Counterintelligence Force	Pentagon, Washington, D. C.
W009AA	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Fort Houston	Fort Sam Houston, Texas
W01AAA	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Presidio of San Francisco	Presidio of San Francisco, California
W01BAA	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence Detachment, Defense Nuclear Agency	Alexandria, Virginia
W3S2AA	USA INSCOM Security Support Detachment, Ft Meade	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W32AAA	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Fort Meade	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
WBU7AA	66th Military Intelligence Group	Munich, Germany
WBU799	Augmentation, 66th Military Intelligence Group	Munich, Germany
WGNTAA	18th Military Intelligence Battalion	Munich, Germany
WGNT99	Augmentation, 18th Military Intelligence Battalion	Munich, Germany
WBNVAA	5th Military Intelligence Company	Munich, Germany
WBNV99	Augmentation, 5th Military Intelligence Company	Munich, Germany
WBNVHAA	HHC, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion	Frankfurt, Germany
WBNVH99	Augmentation, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion	Frankfurt, Germany

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173
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<u>UIC</u>	<u>Unit Designation</u>	<u>Location</u>
	HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND	
	66th Military Intelligence Group	
WBVKAA	HHC, 511th Military Intelligence Battalion	Nurnberg Furth, Germany
WBVK99	Augmentation, 511th Military Intelligence Battalion	Nurnberg Furth, Germany
WBVLAA	HHC, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion	Kaiserslautern, Germany
WBVL99	Augmentation, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion	Kaiserslautern, Germany
WBWKAA	430th Military Intelligence Detachment	Munich, Germany
WBWK99	Augmentation, 430th Military Intelligence Detachment	Munich, Germany
WBWVAA	766th Military Intelligence Detachment	Berlin, Germany
WBWV99	Augmentation, 766th Military Intelligence Detachment	Berlin, Germany
WBU8AA	470th Military Intelligence Group	Fort Amador, Canal Zone
WBU899	Augmentation, 470th Military Intelligence Group	Fort Amador, Canal Zone
WBU9AA	500th Military Intelligence Group	Camp Zama, Japan
WBU999	Augmentation, 500th Military Intelligence Group	Camp Zama, Japan
WH6AAA	HHC, 501st Military Intelligence Group	Yongsan, Korea
WH6A99	Augmentation, 501st Military Intelligence Group	Yongsan, Korea
WBWFAA	209th Military Intelligence Detachment	Yongsan, Korea
WBWF99	Augmentation, 209th Military Intelligence Detachment	Yongsan, Korea
W33YAA	US Army Security Detachment, Korea	Camp Hovey, Uijongbu, Korea
W3FTAA	US Army Field Station, Korea	Pyong Taek, Korea
WDLPA	146th ASA Company (Aviation)(Forward)	Camp Humphreys, Pyong Taek, Korea
WEDVAA	332d ASA Company, Operations (Forward)	Pyong Taek, Korea
W4ASAA	US Army Combined Research Detachment	Yongsan, Korea
WGTXAA	641st Military Intelligence Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

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174
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APPENDIX B

TOE UNITS

(As of 30 September 1979)

WBU7	66th Military Intelligence Group
WBU8	470th Military Intelligence Group
WBU9	500th Military Intelligence Group
WH6A	HHC, 501st Military Intelligence Group
WBU6	902d Military Intelligence Group
WGNT	18th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVH	HHC, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVK	HHC, 511th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVL	HHC, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVN	5th Military Intelligence Company
WH60	11th Military Intelligence Company (Technical Intelligence)
WDLP	146th Army Security Agency Company (Aviation)(Forward)
WEDV	332d Army Security Agency Company, Operations (Forward)
WBWF	209th Military Intelligence Detachment
WBWK	430th Military Intelligence Detachment
WGTX	641st Military Intelligence Detachment (Collection)
WBVW	766th Military Intelligence Detachment

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APPENDIX C
CHANGES IN STATUS OF TOE UNITS

ACTIVATED

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority*</u>
WGTX 641st Military Intelligence Detachment (Collection)	16 Sep 78	PO 60-1, 14 Sep 78
WH60 11th Military Intelligence Company (Technical Intelligence)	1 Oct 78	PO 60-1, 14 Sep 78

INACTIVATED

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	
WGQ4 704th Military Intelligence Detachment	16 May 79	PO 58-1, 8 Sep 78

RELOCATED

WDLP 146th ASA Company (Aviation)(Forward) Taegu, Korea	15 Oct 78	PO 140-1, Hq, UN Comd, US Forces, Korea, Eighth USA, 25 Sep 78
RELOCATED to: Camp Humphreys, Pyong Taek, Korea		

*All Permanent Orders are from HQ INSCOM unless stated otherwise.

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APPENDIX D

TDA UNITS
(As of 30 September 1979)

W00Y	Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command
W000	US Army Garrison, Arlington Hall Station
W001	USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (SIGINT/EW)
W002	US Army Element, National Security Agency
W005	USA INSCOM Pentagon Counterintelligence Force
W009	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Fort Houston
W01A	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Presidio of San Francisco
W01B	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence Detachment, Defense Nuclear Agency
W01H	US Army Garrison, Vint Hill Farms Station
W01K	US Army Field Station, Homestead
W02B	US Army Field Station, Okinawa
W02R	US Army Field Station, Berlin
W0DR	US Army Field Station, Sinop
W0KL	Classified Unit
W1U3	US Army Administrative Survey Detachment
W2JB	US Army Russian Institute
W31U	US Army Field Station, San Antonio
W32A	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Fort Meade
W32B	US Army Central Security Facility
W33Y	US Army Security Detachment, Korea
W35G	USA INSCOM Finance and Accounting Activity
W36S	USA INSCOM Engineering and Maintenance Assistance Activity
W39C	US Army Special Operations Detachment
W318	USA INSCOM Fort Meade Headquarters Support Detachment
W319	US Army Operational Group
W372	US Army Foreign Area Officers Detachment
W3AG	US Army Field Station, Augsburg
W3BR	US Army Field Station, Misawa
W3CC	USA INSCOM Automated Systems Activity
W3F1	US Army Field Station, Korea
W3NS	USA INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii
W3QN	US Army Cryptologic Support Group
W3S2	USA INSCOM Security Support Detachment, Fort Meade
W3YD	US Army Intelligence Threat and Analysis Center
W4AS	US Army Combined Research Detachment
W4DF	US Army Systems Exploitation Detachment
W4DK	USA INSCOM Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity
WBU699	Augmentation, 902d Military Intelligence Group
WBU799	Augmentation, 66th Military Intelligence Group
WBU899	Augmentation, 470th Military Intelligence Group
WBU999	Augmentation, 500th Military Intelligence Group

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APPENDIX D

WBVH99 Augmentation, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVK99 Augmentation, 511th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVL99 Augmentation, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVN99 Augmentation, 5th Military Intelligence Company
WBWF99 Augmentation, 209th Military Intelligence Detachment
WBWK99 Augmentation, 430th Military Intelligence Detachment
WBWV99 Augmentation, 766th Military Intelligence Detachment
WGNT99 Augmentation, 18th Military Intelligence Battalion
WH6A99 Augmentation, 501st Military Intelligence Group
WH6O99 Augmentation, 11th Military Intelligence Company

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APPENDIX E
CHANGES IN STATUS OF TDA UNITS

ORGANIZED

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority*</u>
WH6099 11th Military Intelligence Company Augmentation	1 Oct 78	PO 2-1, 9 Jan 79
W4DFAA US Army Systems Exploitation Detachment	1 Oct 78	PO 8-4, 1 Feb 79
W4DKAA US Army INSCOM Administrative/Audio-visual Support Activity	30 Nov 78	PO 8-3, 1 Feb 79
WBVH99 Augmentation, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion	1 Oct 78	PO 15-2, 5 Mar 79
WBVK99 Augmentation, 511th Military Intelligence Battalion	1 Oct 78	PO 15-2, 5 Mar 79
WBVL99 Augmentation, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion	1 Oct 78	PO 15-2, 5 Mar 79
WBVN99 Augmentation, 5th Military Intelligence Company	1 Oct 78	PO 15-2, 5 Mar 79
WGNT99 Augmentation, 18th Military Intelligence Battalion	30 Nov 78	PO 15-2, 5 Mar 79

DISCONTINUED

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority</u>
WGTX90 641st Military Intelligence Detachment (Collection) Augmentation (Carrier)	16 Sep 79	PO 60-1, 14 Sep 78
W3NBAA US Army Technical Support Activity	30 Nov 78	PO 83-2, 22 Nov 78
W3CUAA USA INSCOM Detachment, Southern Command	16 Nov 78	PO 87-1, 6 Dec 78
W31ZAA HQ USA INSCOM, Fort Meade	30 Nov 78	PO 8-2, 1 Feb 79
W01CAA USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Fort Dix	31 Dec 78	PO 9-4, 5 Feb 79
W01DAA USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Fort Jackson	31 Dec 78	PO 9-4, 5 Feb 79
W01EAA USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Fort Leonard Wood	31 Dec 78	PO 9-4, 5 Feb 79
W3RAAA USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, Pacific	1 Apr 79	PO 20-1, 10 Apr 79

*All Permanent Orders are from HQ INSCOM unless stated otherwise.

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APPENDIX E

REDESIGNATED

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority</u>
Old: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Counterintelligence Detachment, Pentagon	1 Oct 78	PO 15-1, 5 Mar 79
New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Pentagon Counterintelligence Force		
Old: US Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies	1 Oct 78	PO 83-3, 22 Nov 78
New: US Army Russian Institute		
Old: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Data Systems Activity	30 Nov 78	PO 82-1, 21 Nov 78
New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Automated Systems Activity		

REASSIGNED

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority</u>
US Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies		
From: ACSI	1 Oct 78	PO 16-1, OACSI,
To: HQ INSCOM		28 Sep 78

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APPENDIX F

USA INSCOM PERSONNEL STRENGTH BY UNIT
(As of 30 September 1979)

Unit	OFF		WO		ENL		MIL TOTAL		DH CIV	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
HQ, US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)	158	138	17	21	109	87	284	246	285	306
USAG, Arlington Hall Station	18	15	2	2	149	192	169	209	164	154
USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (SIGINT/EW)	126	112	37	30	977	1078	1140	1220	4	4
USA Element, National Security Agency	17	16	0	0	0	0	17	16	0	0
USAG, Vint Hill Farms Station	18	13	2	1	149	140	169	154	162	157
USA Field Station, Homestead	1	1	0	0	18	11	19	12	0	0
Classified Unit (WOKL)	1	1	0	0	5	5	6	6	14	13
USA Administrative Survey Detachment	42	33	28	35	45	40	115	108	272	260
USA INSCOM Automated Systems Activity	20	13	2	1	104	65	126	79	77	51
US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center	81	69	25	21	113	73	219	163	182	147
11th Military Intelligence Company (Technical Intelligence)	24	15	8	4	139	122	171	141	0	0
USA Field Station, San Antonio	11	9	6	3	371	478	388	490	5	5
USA Central Security Facility	5	4	0	0	9	6	14	10	93	62
USA INSCOM Finance and Accounting Activity	1	1	0	0	15	18	16	19	19	15
USA INSCOM Engineering and Maintenance Assistance Activity	3	1	2	1	66	57	71	59	10	8
USA Special Operations Detachment	9	6	9	8	28	14	46	28	6	6
USA INSCOM Ft Meade Headquarters Support Detachment	1	1	1	1	7	8	9	10	13	15
USA Operational Group	44	30	17	15	30	23	91	68	13	13

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APPENDIX F

Unit	OFF		WO		ENL		MIL TOTAL		DH CIV	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
USA Systems Exploitation Detachment	15	4	0	0	4	3	19	7	1	1
USA INSCOM Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity	2	2	0	0	24	26	26	28	38	38
641st Military Intelligence Detachment (Collection)	19	8	15	5	39	4	73	17	0	0
902d Military Intelligence Group w/Augmentation	11	9	3	2	13	11	27	22	9	10
USA INSCOM Pentagon Counterintelligence Force	10	7	16	11	39	30	65	48	0	0
USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and SIGSEC Support Battalion, Ft Houston	23	19	17	13	58	56	98	88	2	2
USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and SIGSEC Support Battalion, Presidio of San Francisco	21	17	19	20	39	36	79	73	2	2
USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and SIGSEC Support Battalion, Ft Meade	35	25	29	24	92	62	156	111	6	3
USA INSCOM Counterintelligence Detachment, Defense Nuclear Agency	3	3	5	5	7	5	15	13	2	2
USA INSCOM Security Support Detachment, Ft Meade	19	18	18	15	63	39	100	72	31	27
SUBTOTAL CONUS	(738)	(590)	(278)	(238)	(2712)	(2689)	(3728)	(3517)	(1408)*	(1301)
470th Military Intelligence Group w/Augmentation	13	10	2	3	105	63	120	76	6	3
SUBTOTAL CARIBBEAN	(13)	(10)	(2)	(3)	(105)	(63)	(120)	(76)	(6)	(3)

*Includes 2 Foreign Nationals.

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APPENDIX F

Unit	OFF		WO		ENL		MIL TOTAL		DH CIV	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
USA INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii	6	7	3	1	23	21	32	29	2	2
USA Field Station, Okinawa	23	24	4	5	678	595	705	624	34	34
USA Field Station, Misawa	3	3	1	2	140	158	144	163	0	0
500th Military Intelligence Group w/ Augmentation	18	15	16	15	86	57	120	87	172	160
501st Military Intelligence Group w/ Augmentation	25	29	4	6	153	131	182	166	27	97
209th Military Intelligence Detachment	7	9	6	5	102	87	115	101	28	0
USA Combined Research Detachment	3	2	1	2	13	4	17	8	5	0
USA Field Station, Korea	13	15	8	5	267	239	288	259	41	0
USA Security Detachment, Korea	1	0	0	0	8	7	9	7	0	0
146th Army Security Agency Company (Avn)(Fwd)	8	6	26	20	249	246	283	272	0	0
332d Army Security Agency Company, Operations (Fwd)	7	6	3	3	241	185	251	194	0	0
SUBTOTAL PACIFIC	(114)	(116)	(72)	(64)	(1960)	(1730)	(2146)	(1910)	(309)*	(293)**

*Includes 243 Foreign Nationals.

**Includes 235 Foreign Nationals.

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APPENDIX F

Unit	OFF		WO		ENL		MIL TOTAL		DH CIV	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
USA Cryptologic Support Group	2	2	4	4	11	10	17	16	0	0
USA Field Station, Berlin	29	34	19	17	689	652	737	703	4	3
USA Field Station, Augsburg	69	73	32	32	1623	1484	1724	1589	95	85
66th Military Intelligence Group w/ Augmentation	27	38	10	13	147	157	184	208	232	224
5th Military Intelligence Company	4	4	3	3	46	36	53	43	0	0
18th Military Intelligence Battalion	8	11	9	12	99	107	116	130	0	0
165th Military Intelligence Battalion	9	12	8	5	71	60	88	77	0	0
511th Military Intelligence Battalion	9	8	8	5	71	63	88	76	0	0
430th Military Intelligence Detachment	14	13	15	16	30	29	59	58	0	0
527th Military Intelligence Battalion	10	11	6	5	71	59	87	75	0	0
766th Military Intelligence Detachment	5	5	2	1	17	15	24	21	0	0
USA Field Station, Sinop	24	21	6	7	197	220	227	248	0	0
US Army Russian Institute	3	4	0	0	2	3	5	7	22	19
SUBTOTAL EUROPE	(213)	(236)	(122)	(120)	(3074)	(2895)	(3409)	(3251)	(353)*	(331)**
*Includes 195 Foreign Nationals.										
**Includes 159 Foreign Nationals.										
GRAND TOTAL	<u>1078</u>	<u>952</u>	<u>474</u>	<u>425</u>	<u>7851</u>	<u>7377</u>	<u>9403</u>	<u>8754</u>	<u>2078</u>	<u>1928</u>
TOTAL Foreign Nationals worldwide									(440)	(394)

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APPENDIX G
USA INSCOM KEY PERSONNEL

<u>Position/Name</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
COMMANDING GENERAL MG William I. Rolya	1 Sep 75 - Present
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, INTELLIGENCE BG Thomas J. Flynn BG James E. Freeze	31 Jul 79 - Present 1 Sep 75 - 31 Jul 79
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, SECURITY AND PRODUCTION BG John A. Smith, Jr.	15 May 78 - Present
COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR CSM Lee K. Stikeleather	30 Nov 72 - 30 Sep 79
CHIEF OF STAFF COL John M. Carr	1 Aug 77 - Present
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF LTC Donald York	21 Aug 78 - Present
SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF MAJ John H. Prokopowicz	7 Jul 78 - Present
INSPECTOR GENERAL COL Robert A. Hyatt	1 Sep 77 - Present
STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE LTC Raymond K. Wicker	1 Sep 75 - Present
STAFF ADVISOR FOR SCIENTIFIC AND CRYPTO AFFAIRS Mr. Edwin A. Speakman	12 Aug 68 - Present
CHIEF, MISSION ANALYSIS OFFICE COL Allan R. Stern	10 Jul 78 - Present
CHIEF, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS LTC Robert W. Loomis	24 Aug 77 - Present
COMMAND CHAPLAIN COL Richard W. Mansur	1 Apr 78 - Present
CHIEF, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY OFFICER Mr. Carl P. Thorpe	Nov 77 - Present

APPENDIX G

<u>Position/Name</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
SPECIAL DISBURSING OFFICER Mr. Autmer Ackley	10 Jul 78 - Present
COMMAND PSYCHOLOGIST LTC Richard E. Hartzell	17 Sep 79 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PERSONNEL COL Richard E. Jewett	12 Jul 77 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COL Francis X. Toomey COL Richard L. Cary	15 Sep 79 - Present 18 Sep 78 - 15 Sep 79
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS COL Richard W. Wilmot Mr. Jimmie B. Garrett (Acting) COL Arion N. Pattakos Mr. Jimmie B. Garrett (Acting)	26 Feb 79 - Present 15 Jan 79 - 26 Feb 79 10 Oct 78 - 15 Jan 79 18 Sep 78 - 10 Oct 78
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, LOGISTICS COL Harold D. Yawberg	14 Jul 78 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT COL Lawrence H. Whitt	1 Feb 78 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, SYSTEMS Mr. George A. Harvey, Jr. (Acting)	3 Jan 78 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS COL Albert F. P. Jones	3 Oct 77 - Present
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, TELECOMMUNICATIONS COL Clarence A. Trowbridge	28 Jun 77 - Present
CHIEF, AUTOMATION MANAGEMENT OFFICE COL Joseph J. Megna COL Daniel Moore, Jr.	29 Sep 79 - Present 10 Jan 78 - 28 Sep 79

Unit/Commander

HQ US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND, FORT
MEADE
BG James E. Freeze

29 Aug 77 - 30 Nov 78

APPENDIX G

Unit/Commander

Dates Served

66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP COL Charles F. Scanlon	2 Aug 78 - Present
470TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP LTC Jack L. Brunson LTC Thomas N. Sherburne	29 Jun 79 - Present 9 Jun 77 - 28 Jun 79
500TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP COL Roy M. Strom	24 Jul 78 - Present
HHC, 501ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP COL William D. Fritts COL Julius Parker, Jr.	20 Jul 79 - Present 26 Jul 77 - 19 Jul 79
902D MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP COL Arion N. Pattakos COL Richard E. Littlefield	17 Jan 79 - Present 1 Oct 77 - 17 Jan 79
USA INSCOM CONUS MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP (SIGINT/EW) COL Richard W. Mock COL Joseph D. Howard	10 Jul 79 - Present 13 Jul 76 - 10 Jul 79
US ARMY OPERATIONAL GROUP LTC Monte Bullard LTC Arkadie Novickoff COL Frederick T. Barrett	1 Aug 79 - Present 1 Feb 79 - 31 Jul 79 13 Sep 76 - 31 Jan 79
US ARMY CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT GROUP LTC James T. Reilly LTC Sigmund J. Haber	8 Aug 79 - Present 1 Oct 77 - 6 Aug 79
US ARMY FIELD STATION, AUGSBURG COL James W. Hunt	23 Jun 78 - Present
US ARMY FIELD STATION, BERLIN COL Charles B. Eichelberger	6 Jun 78 - Present
US ARMY FIELD STATION, HOMESTEAD CPT Bruce Jackson	1 Jul 75 - Present
US ARMY FIELD STATION, KOREA LTC Frank Zachar LTC William B. Guild	22 Jun 79 - Present 26 Jun 78 - 21 Jun 79

APPENDIX G

Unit/Commander

Dates Served

US ARMY FIELD STATION, MISAWA
LTC Ralph P. Stevens
LTC Thomas J. Hogan

29 Nov 78 - Present
15 Jul 77 - 28 Nov 78

US ARMY FIELD STATION, OKINAWA
COL Seth W. Burkett
COL Charles E. Schmidt

25 Jun 79 - Present
25 Aug 77 - 22 Jun 79

US ARMY FIELD STATION, SAN ANTONIO
LTC Russell E. Miller
LTC Donald W. Steiger

15 Aug 79 - Present
15 Mar 78 - 14 Aug 79

US ARMY FIELD STATION, SINOP
COL James W. Shufelt
COL James D. Neighbors

24 Aug 79 - Present
31 Aug 78 - 24 Aug 79

18TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION
LTC Roy J. Davis

2 Aug 78 - Present

HHC, 165TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION
LTC Arleigh D. Waterman
LTC Bruce H. Davis

11 Dec 78 - Present
3 Jan 77 - 11 Dec 78

HHC, 511TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION
LTC Arthur L. Henderson

13 Jul 78 - Present

HHC, 527TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION
LTC Nicholas F. Quintarelli

28 Jun 78 - Present

USA INSCOM COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SIGNAL SECURITY
SUPPORT BATTALION, FORT MEADE
LTC William J. Foley

18 Sep 78 - Present

USA INSCOM COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SIGNAL SECURITY
SUPPORT BATTALION, FORT HOUSTON
LTC John E. Riddle, Jr.
LTC Robert M. Weikle

5 Feb 79 - Present
1 Jan 78 - 5 Feb 79

USA INSCOM COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SIGNAL SECURITY
SUPPORT BATTALION, PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO
LTC Dennis S. Langley
LTC Russell E. Cooley

22 Jun 79 - Present
1 Jan 78 - 22 Jun 79

5TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY
MAJ Victor W. Gundersen, Jr.
CPT Alverne C. Mueller

15 Jun 79 - Present
1 Oct 77 - 15 Jun 79

APPENDIX G

<u>Unit/Commander</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
11TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY (TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE) LTC Dwight W. Galda	Jun 78 - Present
146TH ARMY SECURITY AGENCY COMPANY (AVIATION)(FORWARD) MAJ Kenneth G. Loudermilk MAJ Harry E. Cryblskey	17 Nov 79 - Present 1 Dec 77 - 17 Nov 79
332D ARMY SECURITY AGENCY COMPANY, OPERATIONS (FORWARD) CPT Michael J. Baier CPT Danny W. Braudrick	16 Feb 79 - Present 8 Jun 78 - 15 Feb 79
209TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT MAJ Howard W. Moore, Jr.	May 78 - Present
430TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT LTC Robert G. Lunt	24 Jun 77 - Present
641ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT MAJ Laszlo P. Boesze	16 Sep 79 - Present
641ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT (COLLECTION) AUGMENTATION (CARRIER) MAJ Laszlo J. Boesze CPT John C. McGlone	22 Jul 79 - 16 Sep 79 16 Sep 78 - 22 Jul 79
704TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT CPT Mark L. Kogle	15 Jul 78 - 15 May 79
766TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT LTC Raymond S. Olson LTC James L. Ford	19 Jun 79 - Present 1 Oct 77 - 19 Jun 79
US ARMY COMBINED RESEARCH DETACHMENT LTC Gerald R. Lewis LTC David E. Crew	17 Jun 79 - Present 18 Dec 76 - 17 Jun 79
USA INSCOM COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT, DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY LTC John L. Bohach, Jr.	7 Aug 78 - Present
US ARMY SYSTEMS EXPLOITATION DETACHMENT MAJ J. Douglas Mistler	1 Oct 78 - Present

APPENDIX G

<u>Unit/Commander</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
USA INSCOM DETACHMENT, HAWAII LTC Robert C. Rhoads	1 Aug 77 - Present
USA INSCOM SECURITY SUPPORT DETACHMENT, FORT MEADE LTC Robert E. Keenan	12 Jul 78 - Present
US ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS DETACHMENT COL Donald B. Grimes	Apr 75 - Present
US ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE SURVEY DETACHMENT LTC Richard F. Judge	25 Apr 77 - Present
US ARMY SECURITY DETACHMENT, KOREA CPT Michael D. Tipa	15 Aug 78 - 1 Aug 79
US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS CENTER COL Albert F. P. Jones	3 Oct 77 - Present
USA INSCOM PENTAGON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FORCE LTC Joaquim D. Martins	16 Aug 78 - Present
USA INSCOM ADMINISTRATIVE/AUDIOVISUAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY Mr. David Stein	30 Nov 78 - Present
US ARMY TECHNICAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY LTC Richard T. Kane	18 Jul 77 - 30 Nov 78
USA INSCOM AUTOMATED SYSTEMS ACTIVITY COL Joseph J. Megna COL Daniel Moore, Jr.	29 Sep 79 - Present 10 Jan 78 - 28 Sep 79
US ARMY CENTRAL SECURITY FACILITY COL Ernest H. Fountain, Jr. LTC Charles T. Grimes	12 Sep 79 - Present 11 Sep 78 - 11 Sep 79
US ARMY RUSSIAN INSTITUTE LTC John G. Canyock LTC Roland Lajoie	Jun 79 - Present Jan 76 - Jun 79
US ARMY GARRISON, ARLINGTON HALL STATION COL Joseph D. Howard LTC Francis V. Varallo	9 Jul 79 - Present 1 Jul 78 - 9 Jul 79
US ARMY GARRISON, VINT HILL FARMS STATION COL John P. Brown	12 May 78 - Present

APPENDIX G

Unit/Commander

Dates Served

USA INSCOM FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING ACTIVITY

MAJ William E. Daniels

MAJ David A. Cannon

13 Aug 79 - Present

15 Jul 75 - 6 Jul 79

USA INSCOM ENGINEERING AND MAINTENANCE ASSISTANCE
ACTIVITY

COL Harold D. Yawberg

CPT Thomas J. Anthony

1LT Gene L. McClelland

8 Mar 79 - Present

15 Jan 79 - 7 Mar 79

10 Jan 77 - 14 Jan 79

APPENDIX H

TRAVIS TROPHY WINNERS

<u>Calendar Year</u>	<u>Winner</u>
1964	6988th US Air Force Security Squadron [USASA NOMINEE: 53d USASA Special Operations Command]
1965	313th ASA Battalion (Corps)
1966	1st Radio Company Fleet Marine Force (C) (U) [USASA NOMINEE: USASA Training Center and School]
1967	509th USASA Group
1968	6990th US Air Force Security Squadron [USASA NOMINEE: USASA, Europe]
1969	6994th US Air Force Security Squadron [USASA NOMINEE: 330th ASA Company]
1970	USASA Field Station, Udorn
1971	US Naval Security Group Activity, Bremerhaven, Germany [USASA NOMINEE: USASA Field Station, Vint Hill Farms]
1972	6916th US Air Force Security Squadron [USASA NOMINEE: USASA Field Station, Udorn]
1973	USASA Field Station, Berlin
1974	US Naval Security Group Activity, Misawa, Japan [USASA NOMINEE: USASA Field Station, Augsburg]
1975	Consolidated Security Operations Center, San Antonio (USASA Field Station, San Antonio/6993d US Air Force Security Squadron)
1976	USASA Field Station, Sobe
1977	470th Military Intelligence Group
1978	6903d US Air Force Security Squadron, Osan Air Base, Korea [USAINSCOM NOMINEE: US Army Field Station, Augsburg]

GLOSSARY

AAR	access amendment refusal
ACC	[US] Army Communications Command
ACCS	Army Command and Control Study
ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACES	Army Continuing Education System
ACofS	Assistant Chief of Staff
ACSI	Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
ACSTEL	Assistant Chief of Staff, Telecommunications
act	actual
actv	activity
ADCSLOG	Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics
ADCSOPS	Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
ADIL	Assistant Director for Installation and Logistics
admin	administration
ADP	automatic data processing
ADPR	Administration Directorate Project Review
ADT	active duty for training
AEWIBWC	Army Electronic Warfare and Intelligence Board Working Committee
AFB	Air Force Base
AFCENT	Allied Forces, Central Europe
AFEWC	Air Force Electronic Warfare Center
AFP	approved funding program
AGAS	Advanced GOODKIN Acquisition System
AHR	annual historical report; annual historical review
AHS	Arlington Hall Station
AIG	acting inspector(s) general
AIT	advanced individual training; American Institute on Taiwan
AMHA	Army Management, Headquarters Activity
anal	analysis
ann	annual
app	appendix
AR	Army regulation
ARLANT	US Army Atlantic
ARRED	Army readiness
art	article
ASA	Army Security Agency; Automated Systems Activity
ASD	(US Army) Administrative Survey Detachment
ASD (MRA&L)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics)
asgd	assigned
ASI	additional skill identifier
ASSIST	Army System for Standard Intelligence Support Terminals
auth	authorized
AUTODIN	automatic digital network
avn	aviation
AWOL	absent without leave

BASOPS base operations
 BELCAD battlefield electromagnetic cover and deception
 BEQ bachelor enlisted quarters
 BG brigadier general
 bn battalion
 BND Bundesnachrichtendienst
 BOS base operations support
 BP base pay
 BRISMIS British Military Liaison Mission

CAS Chinese Academy of Sciences
 CCF US Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility
 CCO controlled/clandestine collection objective
 CCP Consolidated Cryptologic Program
 CDAA circular disposed antenna array
 cdr commander
 CDRUSNSG Commander, US Naval Security Group
 C&E communications and electronics
 CEEIA Communications Electronics Engineering Installation Agency
 CENTAG Central Army Group Central Europe
 CERCOM US Army Communications and Electronics Materiel Readiness Command
 CES collection evaluation system
 CETA Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
 CEWI combat electronic warfare intelligence
 CG commanding general
 CGG Combined Group Germany
 CGSC Command and General Staff College
 chap chapter
 CHCSS Chief, Central Security Service
 CI counterintelligence
 CIA Central Intelligence Agency
 CICP (INSCOM) Cryptofacility Inspector Program
 CICR continuing intelligence collection requirement
 CI/IA counterintelligence and investigative activities
 CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific
 CINCUSAREUR Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe
 CIPD Current Intelligence Production Division
 CIR continuing intelligence requirement
 civ civilian
 CIVPER civilian personnel
 CIVPERSINS Civilian Personnel Management Information System
 CMAO Chief, Mission Analysis Office
 CMT comment
 co company
 COB command operating budget
 COBE command operating budget estimate
 COF central operating facility

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Per DIA

DCSPER Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
DCSR&D Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development
DCSRM Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management
DCSS Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems
DDF Defense Director for Field Evaluations (NSA)
DEFCON defense readiness condition
det detachment
DF direction finding; Disposition Form (DA Form 2496)
DH direct hire
DI deception indicated
DIPS Defense Intelligence Production Schedule
DIRNSA Director, National Security Agency
DIS Defense Investigative Service
DISTAFF Director's Staff
div division
DLI Defense Language Institute
docu document
DOD Department of Defense
DOE division of effort
DOMEX domestic exploitation
DPCA Director of Personnel and Community Activities
DPS decision package set
DSA Defense Security Agency (Korean)
DSCS Defense Secure Communications System
DTG date-time group

EAC echelon above corps
ECAS electronic security collection and analysis system
ECI ECI Division/E Systems Incorporated
EEFI essential elements of friendly intelligence
EEI essential elements of information
EEO equal employment opportunity
EEOO equal employment opportunity officer
eff effective
ELI emitter location and identification
ELINT electronic intelligence
EMI electromagnetic interference
EMOS entry military occupational specialty
EMRA US Army Electronics Materiel Readiness Activity
enl enlisted
EO Executive Order; equal opportunity
E-O electro-optics/optical
EOEC Equal Opportunity Employment Commission
equip equipment
ERADCOM US Army Electronics Research and Development Command
ESM electronic warfare support measures
ESV earth satellite vehicle

ETEC-E Electronics and Telecommunications Evaluation Center,
Europe
EUSA Eighth US Army
EW electronic warfare
EW/IOH early warning/imminence of hostilities

fac facility
FAO foreign area officer
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDM frequency division multiplexer
FEBA forward edge of the battle area
FEW Federally Employed Women
FGGM Fort George G. Meade
fgn foreign
FLEXSCOP flexible system for collection and processing
fm from
FM field manual
FMOD Federal Ministry of Defense (German)
FN foreign national
FNSA foreign national separation allowance
FO field office(s)
FOCP Foreign Officer Combat Program
FOI freedom of information
FOIC Freedom of Information Center
FOIP Foreign Officer Information Program
FORMICA foreign military intelligence collection activities
FORSCOM US Army Forces Command
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
FS field station
FSD field support division
FSK US Army Field Station Korea
FSM US Army Field Station Misawa
FSO field support office
Ft fort
FTX field training exercise
FVPRC Field Visitation Program Review Committee
fwd forward
FWP Federal Women's Program
FY fiscal year

GAO General Accounting Office
GARR Garmisch Advanced Russian Review
GDIP General Defense Intelligence Program
gen general
GHz gigahertz
GIPD General Intelligence Production Division
GO general officer

GOJ Government of Japan
 GOT Government of Turkey
 gp group
 GS General Schedule-Civilian Employees
 GSFG Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
 GSO Ground Service Organization (Japan)

HF high frequency
 HFDF high frequency direction finding
 HHC headquarters and headquarters company
 hist historical/history
 Hon honorable
 H-P Hewlett-Packard
 Hq/HQ headquarters
 HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army
 HR human relations
 HUMINT human intelligence

IATS Improved AG Terminal System
 ICC Intelligence Coordination Center
 ICF intelligence contingency funds
 ICR intelligence collection requirement
 ID infantry division
 IDA initial denial authority
 IDT inactive duty training
 IG inspector general
 IGAR inspector general action requests
 II imagery interpreter; imagery intelligence
 IIPD imagery intelligence production division
 IIR Intelligence Information Report
 I-LIDS Improved Laser Identification and Detection System
 ILS installation, logistics and support
 IMINT imagery intelligence
 incl inclosure
 info information
 INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
 INSCOM (US Army) Intelligence and Security Command
 intel intelligence
 IOH imminence of hostilities
 IOSS Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study
 IPAP Intelligence Priorities for Army Planning
 IPR in-process review
 IPSP Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning
 IPW prisoner of war interrogation
 IRA intelligence-related activity
 IRR (US Army) Investigative Records Repository
 ISA International Security Affairs

ISE intelligence, security, and electronic warfare
 ITAC US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center
 ITIC INSCOM Theater Intelligence Center
 ITRO Interservice Training Review Organization
 I&W indications and warning

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
 JEWG Joint Electronic Warfare Center
 JFAP Japan Facilities Adjustment Program
 JGSDF Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces
 JIC Joint Interrogation Center
 JROC-B Joint Refugee Operations Center, Berlin
 JSC job-site component
 JSEOGMTP Joint Services Electro-Optic Guided Missile Test Program
 JTX joint training exercise

K thousand(s)
 km kilometer(s)

LA Latin American
 LAA limited access authority
 lab laboratory
 lang language
 LEEP Latin Emigre Exploitation Program
 LET live environment training
 LFP LEFOX PURPLE
 LFV LAFAIRE VITE
 LFW LAFINE WINE
 LHTA Letzlinger-Heide Training Area
 LIDS laser identification and detection system
 LIMDIS limited distribution
 LITES laser intercept and technical exploitation system
 ln liaison
 LO local oscillator
 LRF laser rangefinder
 LT lieutenant
 LTC lieutenant colonel
 ltr letter
 LWood (Fort) Leonard Wood

MACOM major Army command
 MACT medium automated communications terminal
 MAJ major
 MAO Mission Analysis Office

mat materiel
 MBA Master in Business Administration
 MCA Military Construction, Army
 MDIIR Multidiscipline Intelligence Information Report
 MDPUP Multidiscipline Peacetime Utilization Program
 MDW Military District of Washington
 MENS mission element need statement
 MERADCOM Mobile Equipment Research and Development Command
 MG major general
 mgt management
 MHz megahertz
 MI military intelligence
 MIA missing in action
 MICECP Military Intelligence Civilian Excepted Career Program
 MID military intelligence detachment
 MIG military intelligence group
 mil military
 MILPERCEN US Army Military Personnel Center
 MIS Management Information System
 MMW millimeter wave
 MOB mobilization
 MOBDES mobilization designee
 MOBEX mobilization exercise
 MOBTDA mobilization tables of distribution and allowances
 MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)
 MOP Memorandum of Policy
 MOS military occupational specialty
 MOSC military occupational specialty code
 MOU Memorandum of Understanding
 MRA&L Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics
 MSG master sergeant
 msg message

natl national
 NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 NBC nuclear, biological, chemical
 NCEUR NSACSS Representative, Europe
 NCO noncommissioned officer
 NCRJ NSACSS Representative, Japan
 NETP new equipment training plans
 NF NOFORN
 NFIP National Foreign Intelligence Program
 NID National Intelligence Daily
 NOFORN not releasable to foreign nationals
 NORTHAG Northern Army Group, Northern Europe
 NPIC National Photographic Interpretation Center
 NSA National Security Agency
 NSACSS National Security Agency/Central Security Agency

OACSI	Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
OADCSCI(0)	Office, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Counterintelligence (Operations)
OASD	Office, Secretary of Defense
OB	order of battle
obj	objective
oblig	obligated
OCofS	Office, Chief of Staff
OCONUS	outside continental United States
ODCSCI	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Counterintelligence
ODCSFM	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Force Modernization
ODCSITA	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Threat Analysis
ODCSLOG	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics
ODCSOPS	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
ODCSPER	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
ODCSRM	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management
ODCSS	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems
OE	organizational effectiveness
off	officer
OMA	Operation and Maintenance, Army
OPA	other procurement, Army
OPCON	operational control
OPFOR	Army Opposing Force
OPI	office of primary interest
OPLAN	operation plan
opnl	operational
opns	operations
ops	operations
OPSCOMM	operations communication
OPSEC	operations security
ORR	Operational Readiness Report
OSE	operations security evaluation
OSUT	on-site user test
OVOP	overt operational proposal

201

PE program element
 pers personnel
 PGIC Post Graduate Intelligence Course
 PHOTINT photographic intelligence
 photo photographic
 PI Philippine Islands
 PIC PACOM Imagery Center
 PO Privacy Office; permanent orders
 POC point of contact
 POEI position equipment indicators
 POL petroleum, oils and lubricants
 POW prisoner of war
 PPR Programs, Policy and Readiness
 PRC People's Republic of China
 prod production
 prog program(med)
 prov provisional
 PTC Pacific Topo Center
 PTR Plans, Training and Reserve Affairs
 PT&S Plans, Training and Systems
 PUP Peacetime Utilization Program

QQPRI quantative and qualitative personnel requirements infor-
 mation
 qtr/qtrly quarter(ly)

RA regional appraisal
 RAP Regional Appraisal Program
 RC Reserve Component
 RCF remote collection facility
 RCPAC US Army Reserve Components Personnel and Administration
 Center
 RCS reports control symbol
 R&D research and development
 REDCOM (US) Readiness Command
 REDTRAIN Readiness Training for US Army Intelligence Resources
 reenl reenlistments
 REFORGER Redeployment of Forces from Germany
 reg regulation
 REP Reserve Exploitation Program
 rept report
 rev review
 RF radio frequency
 RO resident office(s)
 ROC Republic of China
 ROK Republic of Korea
 RWE Rheinisch Westfaelische Elektrizitetswerke

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SAMOD Secretary of the Army's Mobility, Opportunity and
Development (Program)
SAO Special Activities Office
SAVE sensitive activity vulnerability estimate
SBI special background investigation
SCA Service Cryptologic Agency
SCC Special Coordinating Committee
SCI sensitive compartmented intelligence
SCIF secure compartmented information facility
SCIPMIS Standard Civilian Personnel Management Information System
SCP system concept paper
scty security
SDO Special Disbursing Officer
SE subelement
sec section
SF standard form
SGS Secretary of the General Staff
SGT sergeant
SI special intelligence
SID special intelligence detachment
SIEWTF SIGINT/EW Task Force
SIGAD SIGINT Activity Designator
SIGINT signal intelligence
SIGSEC signal security
SIL SIGINT Information Letter
SIMOS space imbalanced military occupational specialty
SIMP SIGINT Integrated Master Plan
SIS Showa Information Service (Japan)
SJA Staff Judge Advocate
SMIO Special Military Intelligence Office

(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

SOT specialized operational training
SP/SAP Systems Plan/Systems Acquisition Plan
SPACOL space collection
sp special
SPC Systems Planning Corporation
spt support
SQT skill qualification test
SSG staff sergeant
SSL single station locator
SSO special security officer
STARS staring TV atmospheric recording sensor
STRATMID strategic military intelligence detachment
subj subject
SUPCOM support command
suppl supplement
SUSLOL Special US Liaison Officer London
SVA security vulnerability analysis
svcs services

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~~HANDLE VIA COMINT
CH. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100~~

SWL US Army Signals Warfare Laboratory
 sys system

TAADS The Army Authorization Documents System
 TAGO The Adjutant General's Office
 TAIC Theater Army Intelligence Command
 TAREX target exploitation
 TASP The Army Studies Program
 TB technical bulletin
 TCR TAREX collection requirement
 TDA tables of distribution and allowances
 TDY temporary duty
 tech technical
 TENCAP tactical exploitation of national capabilities
 tm team
 tng training
 TOA total obligation authority
 TOE table(s) of organization and equipment
 topo topographic
 tot total
 TRADOC US Army Training and Doctrine Command
 trans transportation
 TSARCOM Troop Support, Aviation and Readiness Command
 TSWG Training Support Work Group
 TTW transition to war
 TUSLOG The United States Logistics Group

UFD unintentional frequency deviation
 UHF ultra high frequency
 UIC USAREUR Interrogation Center
 UK United Kingdom
 UN United Nations
 undtd undated
 US United States
 USA United States Army; United States Air (Force)
 USAASD US Army Administrative Survey Detachment
 USACC US Army Communications Command
 USACSF US Army Central Security Facility
 USACSG US Army CINCPAC Support Group
 USAF United States Air Force
 USAFS US Army Field Station
 USAG US Army Garrison
 USAGO US Army Garrison, Okinawa
 USAINTA US Army Intelligence Agency
 USAINSCOM US Army Intelligence and Security Command
 USAISD US Army Intelligence School, Devens
 USAITAC US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center

