Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal Law

Second Edition

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Preface

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Introduction

For centuries, impartiality has been a defining feature of the Anglo-American judge’s role in the administration of justice. The reason is clear: in a constitutional order grounded in the rule of law, it is imperative that judges make decisions according to law, unclouded by personal bias or conflicts of interest. Accordingly, upon ascending the bench, every federal judge takes an oath to “faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties” of judicial office; and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution has been construed to guarantee litigants the right to a “neutral and detached,” or impartial, judge. Moreover, in a democratic republic in which the legitimacy of government depends on the consent and approval of the governed, public confidence in the administration of justice is indispensable. It is not enough that judges be impartial; the public must perceive them to be so. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges therefore admonishes judges to “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” and to “avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.”

When the impartiality of a judge is in doubt, the appropriate remedy is to disqualify that judge from hearing further proceedings in the matter. In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., a case concerning disqualification of a state supreme court justice, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that litigants have a due process right to an impartial judge, and that under circumstances in which judicial bias was probable, due process required disqualification. The Court noted, however, that disqualification rules may be and often are more rigorous than the Due Process Clause requires. So it is with disqualification requirements for

3. Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 2A.
federal judges, which require disqualification when a judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.”

In common parlance, some use “disqualification” and “recusal” interchangeably, while others distinguish between the two, using “recusal” to mean withdrawal on the judge’s own initiative, and “disqualification” to mean withdrawal on the motion of a party. Because applicable federal statutes use “disqualification” broadly to embrace withdrawal on motion and sua sponte and do not refer to “recusal,” this monograph will follow their lead and do the same, except to the extent that quoted material from the cases speaks of recusal.

Disqualification has ethical and procedural dimensions. The ethical dimension is governed by Canon 3C of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, as construed by the Codes of Conduct Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States.6 Readers are encouraged to consult the Code of Conduct, Published Advisory Opinions of the Committee, and a Compendium of Selected Opinions of the Committee, all of which are in Volume 2 of the Guide to Judiciary Policy (revised April 2010).7

The procedural dimension, in contrast, is governed by four sections in Title 28 of the United States Code: §§ 47, 144, 455, and 2106. While the text of Canon 3C on disqualification8 is substantially similar to 28 U.S.C. § 455, and both seek to promote public confidence in the judiciary, the focus of the two is different: Whereas the goal of the Code of Conduct, including Canon 3C, is to inform federal judges of their ethical obligations to the end of advising them on how judges should conduct themselves, § 455 is a procedural statute aimed at articulating disqualification standards to the end of preserving the rights of litigants to impartial justice. This monograph focuses on the procedural dimension of federal judicial disqualification through an analysis of the applicable statutory law.


6. The D.C. Circuit has stated that “[t]he Code of Conduct is the law with respect to the ethical obligations of federal judges.” United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2001).


8. See Appendix, infra, for text of Canon 3C.
The two principal statutes governing judicial disqualification are 28 U.S.C. § 455, “Disqualification of justice, judge or magistrate judge” (discussed in Part II, infra), and 28 U.S.C. § 144, “Bias or prejudice of judge” (discussed in Part III, infra). The relationship between the two has been a source of some confusion. While the two sections provide overlapping remedies for bias, there are some important differences. First, § 144 aims exclusively at actual bias or prejudice, whereas § 455 deals not only with actual bias and other forms of partiality, but also with the appearance of partiality. Second, § 144 is triggered by a party’s affidavit, whereas § 455 may be invoked in a motion by a party or sua sponte by the judge. Third, § 144 applies only to district judges, while § 455 covers “any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States.”

A third disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 47 (discussed in Part IV, infra), provides that “[n]o judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him.” The statute applies to judges sitting on courts of appeals who were recently appointed from the district court or who are district judges sitting by designation, and directs their disqualification from appeals of cases they decided as trial judges. Given its limited applicability, this statute has been utilized infrequently, and for the most part uneventfully.

A fourth statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (discussed in Part V, infra), is not a disqualification statute as such, but has been employed to serve a comparable purpose. The statute authorizes the Supreme Court of the United States and circuit courts to “remand the cause and . . . require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.” This provision effectively enables an appellate court to disqualify a district judge by remanding a matter to a different judge for further proceedings if the appellate court doubts the original judge’s impartiality.

I. History of Judicial Disqualification

Disqualification standards in the United States have been a work in progress, gaining in complexity and strength over time. Under English common law, the only accepted basis for judicial disqualification was financial interest—disqualification for bias was not recognized. In 1792, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation that was the precursor to 28 U.S.C. § 455. This legislation codified the common law by calling for disqualification of a district judge who was “concerned in interest,” but added that a judge could also be disqualified if he “has been of counsel for either party.” The statute was expanded in 1821 to require disqualification when relatives of the judge appeared as parties.

In 1891, Congress enacted legislation, later codified at 28 U.S.C. § 47, forbidding a judge from hearing the appeal of a case that the judge tried. In 1911, the precursor to § 455 was further amended to require disqualification when the judge was a material witness in the case. That same year, Congress enacted new legislation (later codified as 28 U.S.C. § 144) entitling a party to secure the disqualification of a judge by submitting an affidavit that the judge has “a personal bias or prejudice” against the affiant or for the opposing party. A decade later, in 

In 1927, the Supreme Court added a constitutional dimension to the law of disqualification. In 

By the mid-twentieth century, common-law aversion to judicial bias as grounds for disqualification continued to exert considerable

influence. Section 455 remained silent as to bias. Section 144, while ostensibly enabling a party to disqualify a district judge simply by submitting an affidavit alleging personal bias, had been construed exactly by the courts of appeals, as Professor John Frank explained at the time:

Frequent escape from the statute has been effected through narrow construction of the phrase “bias and prejudice.” Affidavits are found not “legally sufficient” on the ground that the specific acts mentioned do not in fact indicate “bias and prejudice,” a reasoning which emasculates the Berger decision by transferring the point of conflict.16

Frank warned that “[u]nless and until the Supreme Court gives new force and effect to the Berger decision, the disqualification practice of the federal district courts will remain sharply limited.”17

In 1948, § 455 was further amended to disqualify judges who were related to a party’s lawyer (not just the party, as had been the case since 1821). As amended, the statute then provided:

Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has, been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with a party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.18

In 1964, the Fifth Circuit articulated a so-called “duty to sit.”19 “It is a judge’s duty to refuse to sit when he is disqualified, but it is equally his duty to sit when there is no valid reason for recusation.”20 By 1972, Justice William Rehnquist reported, in Laird v. Tatum,21 that the duty to sit had been accepted by all circuit courts.

In 1972, the American Bar Association published a Model Code of Judicial Conduct to replace the Canons of Judicial Ethics it had promulgated fifty years earlier. The Model Code sought to encapsulate the

17. Id. at 630.
20. Id. at 362.
ethics of disqualification into a unified rule. Under the new rule, a judge was subject to disqualification “in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to” cases in which the judge had an actual bias concerning a party, had served as a lawyer in the matter (or was still with his former firm when the matter was being handled by another lawyer in that firm), had an interest in the case, or was related to the parties or their lawyers.

In 1973, the Judicial Conference of the United States adopted the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, based on the 1972 Model Code. The Code of Conduct applies to United States circuit judges, district judges, Court of International Trade judges, Court of Federal Claims judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges. The Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct is authorized to render advisory opinions about the Code when requested by a judge to whom the Code applies.

In 1974, Congress adopted, with some variations, the 1972 Model Code’s disqualification rule in an amendment to § 455, which, by virtue of its requirement that judges disqualify themselves whenever their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, was generally seen as qualifying, if not ending, the “duty to sit.”

II. Disqualification Under
28 U.S.C. § 455

A. Overview

1. The text of § 455

The primary source of disqualification law in the federal judicial system is 28 U.S.C. § 455. It provides, in its entirety, as follows:

§ 455. Disqualification of justice, judge or magistrate judge

(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:

(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;

(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;

(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;

(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:

(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;

(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;

(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.

(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household.
(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases shall have the meaning indicated:

1. “proceeding” includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other stages of litigation;

2. the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law system;

3. “fiduciary” includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, and guardian;

4. “financial interest” means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:

   i. Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is not a “financial interest” in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund;

   ii. An office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not a “financial interest” in securities held by the organization;

   iii. The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary interest, is a “financial interest” in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest;

   iv. Ownership of government securities is a “financial interest” in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the securities.

(e) No justice, judge, or magistrate judge shall accept from the parties to the proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsection (b). Where the ground for disqualification arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification.

(f) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any justice, judge, magistrate judge, or bankruptcy judge to whom a matter has been assigned would be disqualified, after substantial judicial time has been devoted to the matter, because of the appearance or discovery, after the matter was assigned to him or her, that he or she individually or as a fiduciary, or his or her spouse or minor child residing in his or her household, has a financial interest in a party (other than an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome), disqualification is not required if the justice, judge, magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, spouse or minor child, as the case may be, divests himself or herself of the interest that provides the grounds for the disqualification.

Sections (a) and (b) occupy the core of § 455 and should be read together. The two sections divide the universe of disqualification into two halves: the general, catch-all category of § 455(a), which requires
disqualification from any proceeding in which a judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned”; and a list of more specific grounds for disqualification in § (b).

The remainder of § 455 is directed at implementing §§ (a) and (b):

• Section (c) admonishes judges to keep abreast of their financial interests to ensure that they know when to disqualify themselves under § 455(b)(4).
• Section (d) defines terms employed in §§ (a) and (b).
• Section (e) provides parties with a limited opportunity to waive disqualification otherwise required by the catch-all § (a)—typically where the judge is poised to disqualify himself or herself sua sponte—but does not permit the parties to waive disqualification required by the more specific provisions of § (b).
• Section (f) provides a limited opportunity for judges to avoid the need to disqualify themselves for financial interest under § (b)(4) through divestiture.

2. Interpretive ground rules

a. Interpreting § 455(a) in relation to § 455(b)

As embodied in § 455, §§ (a) and (b) are conceptually separate. Section (a) compels disqualification for the appearance of partiality, while § (b) “also” compels disqualification for bias, financial interest, and other specific grounds. In contrast, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct—after which § 455 was originally modeled—and the current Code of Conduct for United States Judges unify the two halves conceptually by characterizing the specific grounds for disqualification as a nonexclusive subset of circumstances in which a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. For the most part, this may be a distinction without a difference—disqualification is required if the specific or general provisions are triggered, regardless of whether the specific provisions are characterized as a subset of or separate from the general. On the other hand, by conceptualizing them separately, § 455 can require disqualification under specific circumstances enumerated in § (b) that might not reasonably be characterized as calling a judge’s impartiality into question under § (a). For example, § (b)(4) requires

judges to disqualify themselves for financial interest “however small,”
which necessarily includes an interest so small that it could not rea-
onably call the judge’s impartiality into question.25

Any circumstance in which a judge’s impartiality might reasonably
be questioned under § (a) requires disqualification, even if the circum-
stance is not enumerated in § 455(b).27 At the same time, when § 455(b)
identifies a particular situation requiring disqualification, it will tend to
control any § 455(a) analysis with respect to that specific situation. For
example, § 455(b)(5) requires disqualification when one of the parties
is within the third degree of relationship to the judge. Consequently, a
fourth-degree relationship to a party does not by itself create an ap-
pearance of partiality requiring disqualification under § 455(a)—
although disqualification under § 455(a) might still be appropriate if,
for example, the judge’s personal relationship with the fourth-degree
relative was so close as to call the judge’s impartiality into question. As
the Supreme Court explained, “[s]ection 455(b)(5), which addresses
the matter of relationship specifically, ends the disability at the third
degree of relationship, and that should obviously govern for purposes
of § 455(a) as well.”28

b. Balancing the duty to decide and the duty to disqualify

Prior to 1974, the courts of appeals applied a judicial “gloss” to § 455
that created a “duty to sit,” whereby judges resolved close questions
against disqualification.29 The 1974 amendments to § 455, however,
shifted the balance by requiring disqualification whenever a judge’s
impartiality “might” reasonably be questioned, and the legislative
history made clear that in revising the statute, Congress sought to end the
“duty to sit.”30 The First, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
since said that close questions should be decided in favor of disquali-
fication,31 while the Seventh Circuit has remarked that “[a] judge may

25. Section 455(b)(4) requires disqualification for financial interest, while
§ 455(d) defines “financial interest” as “however small.”
27. Id.
citing In re Chevron, 121 F.3d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1997)); In re United States, 158 F.3d
II. Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455
decide close calls in favor of recusal.” Justice Scalia, in turn, in declining a request for his own disqualification, cited the proposition that judges should err on the side of disqualification with apparent approval as applied to the lower courts, but opined that the absence of a mechanism to replace a disqualified justice on the Supreme Court renders it inapplicable there.

Even though the “duty to sit” ended with the adoption of § 455, Canon 3A(2) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges nonetheless declares that “a judge should hear and decide matters assigned, unless disqualified.” The point is simply to underscore that judges have a duty to decide the cases that come before them, and that disqualification should not be used as an excuse to shirk that duty by dodging difficult or unpleasant cases. As a result, most circuits have said “there is as much obligation for a judge not to recuse when there is no occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do so when there is.”

c. The rule of necessity
In United States v. Will, the Supreme Court held that the adoption of § 455 was not intended to abridge the rule of necessity. This rule, which has roots in the common law dating back to the fifteenth century, states that “where all are disqualified, none are disqualified.”

26, 30 (1st Cir. 1998); Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 352 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1349 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 744 (11th Cir. 1989).


36. Id. at 217.

Will involved a class action brought by thirteen federal district judges challenging an act of Congress that stopped or reduced previously authorized cost-of-living increases for certain federal employees, including judges. The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, and, on appeal, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Court itself was disqualified from hearing the case since all of its members had a direct financial interest in the outcome. Invoking the rule of necessity, the Court held that disqualification could not be required because then no federal judge would be able to entertain this federal constitutional challenge.

Courts have used the rule of necessity to reject disqualification in a variety of situations. In In re Wireless Telephone Radio Frequency Emissions Products Liability Litigation, for example, four of seven members of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation assigned to hear the matter held stock interests in one or more of the parties. The panel determined that the rule of necessity precluded disqualification under § 455(a) because there was no statutory provision for substituting panel members, and disqualification would result in fewer than the statutorily required four judges being available to render a decision. In Ignacio v. Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiff sought to disqualify the entire circuit from hearing his case, on the grounds that all the Ninth Circuit judges had conspired to dismiss his previous suits. In denying the motion, the court explained that “a judge is not disqualified to try a case because of a personal interest in the matter at issue if ‘the case cannot be heard otherwise.’” Quoting the axiom that “where all are disqualified, none are disqualified,” the Ninth Circuit explained that the rule of necessity was designed to prevent a party from obstructing justice, forcing the

38. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019, 1025–26 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1999); Bartley v. United States, 123 F.3d 466, 467 n.1 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 723 (1998); Jefferson County v. Acker, 92 F.3d 1561, 1583 (11th Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1262 (1997), aff’d, 137 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 2069 (1999); Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654, 662 (5th Cir. 1979).
40. 453 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2006).
41. Id. at 1163 (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213 (1980)).
42. Pilla, 542 F.2d at 59.
removal of his or her case, and preventing the relevant court from deciding the matter.

d. Special concerns in bench trials

The question has sometimes arisen as to whether the standard for disqualification differs in a bench trial where the judge’s role is even more pivotal than in a jury trial. In Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., the court of appeals said: “We cannot overlook the fact that this is a non-jury case, and that [the judge] will be deciding each and every substantive issue at trial . . . . When the judge is the actual trier of fact, the need to preserve the appearance of impartiality is especially pronounced.”

Price Brothers v. Philadelphia Gear Corp. involved an alleged ex parte communication. The Sixth Circuit held that “where a suit is to be tried without a jury, sending a law clerk to gather evidence is so destructive of the appearance of impartiality required of a presiding judge” that a remand was necessary to determine the truth of the allegation. In a like vein, the D.C. Circuit has stated that “recusal might well be prudent when a perjury bench trial involves testimony from a proceeding over which the same judge presided,” but added that “section 455(a) does not require it.”

While disqualification issues may be of special concern in bench trials, it does not follow that disqualification is unnecessary in jury trials. As the Third Circuit has stated: “[S]ection 455 properly makes no distinction between jury and nonjury trials. The district judge in a jury trial must still make numerous pretrial rulings, including crucial summary judgment rulings, and will doubtless be called on to make numerous rulings on the qualification of witnesses and on evidentiary matters, not to mention post-trial motions.”

43. 10 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 1993).
44. Id. at 163, 166.
45. 629 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1980).
46. Id. at 446 (emphasis added). On remand, the Sixth Circuit found harmless error. Price Bros. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1981).
e. Standing

Parties who file disqualification motions claim, in effect, that they will be aggrieved if their cases are decided by judges who are partial or appear to be so. In the usual case, a movant alleges that the judge has a real or perceived bias or interest against the movant or in favor of the movant’s opponent. Thus, for example, a plaintiff may seek to disqualify a judge on the grounds that the defendant is the judge’s close friend. In that scenario, however, may the judge’s friend likewise move for disqualification? Although it might seem that the friend lacks standing, insofar as the friend stands to be aided rather than injured by the allegedly disqualifying bias, the friend may harbor an understandable concern that the judge might err in favor of his friend’s opponent to appear fair.

The issue of whether a party has standing to challenge a refusal to disqualify when the judge’s alleged partiality would be in that party’s favor arose in *Pashaian v. Eccelston Properties.* In that case, even though any alleged bias would have been in their favor, certain defendants moved for disqualification because their attorney’s law partner was married to the judge’s sister-in-law. The judge ordered a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiff before disqualifying himself, and the defendant challenged the judge’s failure to disqualify earlier. The Second Circuit raised the standing issue sua sponte:

> [A party] has standing to challenge the judge’s refusal to recuse even if the alleged bias would be in the moving party’s favor. Such a party might legitimately be concerned that the judge will “bend over backwards” to avoid any appearance of partiality, thereby inadvertently favoring the opposing party. The possibility of this compensatory bias by an interested judge is sufficiently immediate to constitute the “personal injury” necessary to confer standing under Article III.

A different standing issue has arisen in the context of deposing nonparty witnesses during governmental investigations. In *United States v. Sciarra,* the United States government filed a civil complaint against Local 560 union and twelve individuals, including the two petitioners who were members of Local 560’s executive board. After a bench trial,

49. 88 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1996).
50. *Id.* at 83.
51. 851 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1988).
the district judge found the executive board of Local 560 culpable of aiding and abetting corruption. After the trial court’s judgment was affirmed on appeal, the government moved to depose the petitioners concerning Local 560’s operations during the intervening period.52 The petitioners, who had been removed from their executive board positions as part of the trial court’s final judgment, filed a cross-motion seeking to disqualify the presiding judge. The judge declined to disqualify himself, and in reviewing that decision, the Third Circuit construed § 455(a)’s “proceeding” requirement to mean any stage of litigation in which a judge’s decision affects the “substantive rights of litigants to an actual case or controversy.”53 Because there was no pending action in which the rights of the litigants were at issue, the petitioners had no standing, as nonparty witnesses, to invoke § 455 to disqualify the judge. The court in Sciarra reserved judgment on the question whether, in the context of a case or controversy, a nonparty witness can move for the disqualification of a judge.54

B. Grounds for disqualification

1. General standard: when impartiality might reasonably be questioned—§ 455(a)

a. Framework for analysis

Section 455(a) requires disqualification for the appearance of partiality (i.e., when a judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned”) as compared to § 455(b)(1), which requires disqualification for actual partiality (i.e., when a judge “has a personal bias or prejudice toward a party”). Whether the judge is, in fact, impartial is determinative of disqualification under § (b)(1); but it is not dispositive of disqualification under § (a). The justification for making perceived partiality a grounds for disqualification is at least twofold. First, regardless of whether judges are partial in fact, public perceptions of partiality can undermine confidence in the courts. Second, disqualifying judges for outward manifestations of what could reasonably be construed as bias ob-

52. Id. at 624.
53. Id. at 635.
54. Id. at 636.
viates making subjective judgment calls about what is actually going on inside a judge’s heart and mind.

When Congress amended § 455(a), it made clear that judges should apply an objective standard in determining whether to disqualify. A judge contemplating disqualification under § 455(a), then, should not ask whether he or she believes he or she is capable of impartially presiding over the case. Rather, the question is whether a judge’s impartiality might be questioned from the perspective of a reasonable person, and every circuit has adopted some version of the “reasonable person” standard to answer this question.55 In the context of denying a motion for his disqualification from *Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia*, 56 Justice Scalia noted that this reasonable person is aware “of all the surrounding facts and circumstances.”57 The Second Circuit has characterized the reasonable person as an “objective, disinterested observer” who is privy to full knowledge of the surrounding circumstances.58

The Fourth Circuit has clarified that the hypothetical reasonable observer is not a judge because judges, keenly aware of the obligation to decide matters impartially, “may regard asserted conflicts to be more innocuous than an outsider would.”59 The Seventh Circuit has likewise noted that an outside observer is “less inclined to credit judges’ impartiality and mental discipline than the judiciary . . . .”60

55. See, e.g., United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 286 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1793 (1999); *In re Hatcher*, 150 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 1998); Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. Franksu Enter. Corp., 78 F.3d 550, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Ben-salem Twp., 57 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1992); Vieux Carre Prop. Owners v. Brown, 948 F.2d 1436, 1448 (5th Cir. 1991); *In re Barry*, 946 F.2d 913, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Nelson, 922 F.2d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 1990); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 902 F.2d 1289, 1290 (8th Cir. 1990); Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988); Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986); *In re United States*, 666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1981).


57. Id. at 924 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000)).


59. *DeTemple*, 162 F.3d at 287.

60. *In re Mason*, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990). See also O’Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 988 (7th Cir. 2001).
And relying on the Supreme Court’s observation in *Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.*, the Fifth Circuit commented that “[p]eople who have not served on the bench are often all too willing to indulge suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity of judges.”

At the same time, the hypothetical observer “is not a person unduly suspicious or concerned about a trivial risk that a judge may be biased.” This reasonable observer must be “thoughtful” and “well-informed.” The First Circuit has emphasized that a reasonable person does not draw conclusions on the basis of groundless suspicion:

> [When considering disqualification, the district court is not to use the standard of “Caesar’s wife,” the standard of mere suspicion. That is because the disqualification decision must reflect not only the need to secure public confidence through proceedings that appear impartial, but also the need to prevent parties from too easily obtaining the disqualification of a judge, thereby potentially manipulating the system for strategic reasons, perhaps to obtain a judge more to their liking.]

Numerous cases have rejected disqualification under circumstances in which calling a judge’s impartiality into question would require suspicion or speculation beyond what a reasonable person would indulge. The Second Circuit upheld a refusal to disqualify where the defendant alleged that the judge, a personal acquaintance, had grown unfriendly to him because of the defendant’s public opposition to the Gulf War. The court reasoned that “a disinterested observer could not reasonably question [the judge’s] impartiality based upon his alleged failure to return the plaintiff’s greetings.”

Likewise, where a defendant moved for an Asian judge to disqualify himself because the defendant had been publicly critical of a prominent Asian, the Second Circuit opined that “it is intolerable for a liti-

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63. *DeTemple*, 162 F.3d at 287.
64. *Mason*, 916 F.2d at 386. *See also* Jordan, 49 F.3d at 156; O’Regan, 246 F.3d at 988.
65. *In re Allied- Signal Inc.*, 891 F.2d 967, 970 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J.) (citation omitted).
gant, without any factual basis, to suggest that a judge cannot be impartial because of his or her race and political background.”

Uninformed speculation and criticism—even if widely reported in the media—do not trigger disqualification under § 455(a). In United States v. Bayless, a district judge was criticized in the media for granting a motion to suppress in a drug case, culminating in members of Congress calling for the judge’s impeachment. The judge subsequently reversed his earlier ruling, and the defendant argued that the judge should have disqualified himself. Although it was widely speculated that the judge had reversed his earlier ruling in response to the threats and criticism, the Second Circuit concluded that disqualification was unnecessary. The need for disqualification “is to be determined ‘not by considering what a straw poll of the only partly informed man-in-the-street would show[,] but by examining the record facts and the law, and then deciding whether a reasonable person knowing and understanding all the relevant facts would recuse the judge.’”

Similarly, in Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Justice Scalia, in explaining his decision not to disqualify himself, rejected the assertion that newspaper editorials calling his impartiality into question were dispositive. The reasonable observer must be “informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances,” and, in Scalia’s view, the editorials in question were not only factually inaccurate, they lacked recognition and understanding of relevant precedent.

Section 455 also requires disqualification if a reasonable person might believe that the judge was aware of circumstances creating an appearance of partiality, even if the judge was in fact unaware. In Liljeborg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., the trial judge was a member of the board of trustees of a university that had a financial interest in

68. 201 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000).
69. Id. at 127 (citing In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1313 (2d Cir. 1988)).
71. Id. at 924 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000)).
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litigation before the judge, but he stated that he was unaware of the financial interest when he conducted a bench trial and ruled in the case. The court of appeals, nevertheless, vacated the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) because the judge failed to disqualify himself pursuant to § 455(a), and the Supreme Court agreed. Noting that the purpose of § 455(a) is to promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process, the Court observed that such confidence “does not depend upon whether or not the judge actually knew of facts creating an appearance of impropriety, so long as the public might reasonably believe that he or she knew.”

The Supreme Court addressed a related issue in *Sao Paulo State of Federative Republic of Brazil v. American Tobacco Co., Inc.* There, the respondents sought the disqualification of the judge because his name had been associated with an earlier, similar suit prior to his appointment to the bench. In the earlier case, the judge was erroneously named in an amicus curiae brief as the president of the association that submitted the brief, although he had retired from that position six months prior to filing. The respondents argued that the inclusion of the judge’s name created an appearance of partiality on the part of the judge in the later case, even though the judge was unaware that his name was on the earlier brief; he played no part in preparing the brief; and he was only “vaguely aware” of the case. The district judge declined to disqualify himself, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court, in turn, reversed, concluding that the circuit court had misapplied the “reasonable person” standard and overlooked the requirement that the reasonable person be aware of all relevant facts when determining the need for disqualification. In the Court’s view, the fully informed, reasonable person would not believe that the erroneous use of the judge’s name could call the judge’s impartiality into question.

Courts of appeals have likewise required disqualification when a reasonable observer might think that judges were aware of events or information that could impair their impartiality—even if they were not so-aware. The Seventh Circuit, for example, remanded a habeas case directing the judge to whom the case had been reassigned to provide

73. Id. at 860.
75. Id. at 233.
the petitioner the opportunity to challenge the dismissal of four claims by the previously assigned district judge. That judge had ruled on the habeas petition without realizing that he, as a state court judge years earlier, had been on the panel whose decision was now challenged.

In In re Continental Airlines Corp., the Fifth Circuit found a violation of § 455(a) where a law firm for one of the parties appearing before the judge was considering the judge for employment, even though the judge was unaware of it. Quoting from Liljeberg, the Fifth Circuit explained that § 455(a) “does not call upon judges to perform the impossible.”

[T]o hold that § 455(a) was violated . . . does not mean that [the judge] was required to stand recused before discovering that he was being considered for employment. Rather, when an offer of employment was received the day after his approval of $700,000 in legal fees to the firm making the offer, [the judge] was “required to take the steps necessary to maintain public confidence in the judiciary.”

In this case that meant “either . . . reject[ing] the offer outright, or, if he seriously desired to consider accepting the offer, st[anding] recused and vac[ating] the rulings made shortly before the offer was made.”

**b. Recurring scenarios**

i. Judge’s prior relationship with parties, witnesses, or lawyers

(A) **Prior relationship with a party.** The First Circuit has observed that former affiliations with a party may persuade a judge not to sit; but former affiliations are rarely a basis for compelled disqualification. Judges often cannot avoid some acquaintance with the underlying parties or events that give rise to litigation, particularly in smaller communities. Such acquaintance, by itself, will not require disqualification.

76. Russell v. Lane, 890 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1989). *See also* E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1295 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating district judge’s lack of actual knowledge of his former firm’s involvement in the litigation is irrelevant).

77. 901 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1990).

78. *Id.* at 1262 (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 861 (1988)).

79. *Id.*

80. *Id.* at 1262–63. The Fifth Circuit held, however, that the violation of § 455(a) constituted harmless error.

81. In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 221 (1st Cir. 1997).
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The Second Circuit upheld a refusal to disqualify where the judge had a social relationship with a shareholder in a company victimized by the defendants. The judge’s relationship with the shareholder “ended seven or eight years prior to sentencing[;] . . . he had no specific knowledge of the contested facts[;] and . . . the . . . allegations [regarding the judge’s friend’s restaurant] were not outcome-determinative in these proceedings.”

The Second Circuit also upheld a refusal to disqualify where the defendant had a remote (but adversarial) business relationship with the judge’s husband. “[I]t requires too much speculation to convert [the husband’s] alleged past frustrated dealings with [defendant] into any interest, financial or otherwise, in the outcome of [defendant’s] unrelated criminal trial.”

Some personal relationships, however, are so friendly or antagonistic as to require disqualification. The Sixth Circuit reversed a failure to disqualify in a sex discrimination suit where, in pretrial proceedings, the judge stated that he personally knew one of the people accused of discrimination and that “he is an honorable man and I know he would never intentionally discriminate against anybody.” “Once the district court expressed his ardent sentiments . . . the objective appearance of impartiality vanished.” Similarly, the Second Circuit found disqualification necessary when the judge admitted to a prior relationship with the defendant that influenced his decision making.

In In re Faulkner, the Fifth Circuit concluded that although there was no actual bias, the judge’s close, familial relationship with his cousin, who was integral to a number of transactions giving rise to the indictment, was sufficient to establish an appearance of bias. Both the judge and his cousin “describe[d] their relationship as more like that of ‘brother and sister’; she is the godmother to one of his children.”

In another Fifth Circuit case, the court reversed a failure to disqualify where there was a publicized history of “bad blood” between

82. United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 817 (2d Cir. 1992).
83. United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 47–49 (2d Cir. 1998).
84. Roberts v. Baer, 625 F.2d 125, 127 (6th Cir. 1980).
85. Id. at 129.
86. United States v. Toohey, 448 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2006).
87. 856 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1998).
88. Id. at 718.
the defendant and a close personal friend of the judge.89 While noting that friendship between the judge and a person with an interest in the case need not be disqualifying, here the judge’s friend and the defendant “were embroiled in a series of vindictive legal actions resulting in a great deal of publicity,” some of which involved the judge’s spouse.90

Courts distinguish, however, between personal relationships with parties, which sometimes give rise to a need for disqualification, and shared political, religious, or other affiliations with parties, which, by themselves, are insufficient to warrant disqualification. In *Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado*,91 the Tenth Circuit rejected the assertion that disqualification was necessary simply because the judge was a member of the same religion as the defendants. The court found that the plaintiff’s argument that the judge’s subscription to the same belief system as the defendant was tenuous and mere “associational bias,” rendering it insufficient to necessitate disqualification.

Similarly, in *Higginbotham v. Oklahoma*,92 the Tenth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that disqualification was necessary because the judge and a litigant shared a partisan affiliation in a politically charged case. The court explained, “an inescapable part of our system of government [is] that judges are drawn primarily from lawyers who have participated in public and political affairs.”93

There is authority for declining to disqualify when the judge’s friend is a public official who is sued in an official (as opposed to a personal) capacity. In *Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia*,94 Justice Scalia declined to disqualify himself from hearing a case in which Vice President Dick Cheney was a named party after Justice Scalia went on a hunting trip with the Vice President while the case was pending before the Supreme Court. Justice Scalia emphasized that the suit in question was filed against the Vice President in his official, as distinguished from his personal, capacity, and explained the importance of that distinction:

89. United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1995).
90. Id. at 157.
91. 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002).
92. 328 F.3d 638 (10th Cir. 2003).
93. Id. at 645.
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[W]hile friendship is a ground for recusal of a Justice where the personal fortune or the personal freedom of the friend is at issue, it has traditionally not been a ground for recusal where official action is at issue, no matter how important the official action was to the ambitions or the reputation of the Government officer.\(^\text{95}\)

On the other hand, there may be circumstances in which the ties between the judge and the public official are so close, and the consequences of a ruling adverse to the official are so dire, that disqualification is appropriate regardless of the capacity (if any) in which the official is sued. In *United States v. Bobo*,\(^\text{96}\) an Alabama district judge disqualified himself from hearing a case of interest to the governor because the judge had previously attended private functions endorsing the governor’s candidacy. Although the governor was not a party in the case, the outcome of the case could have affected the governor’s re-election. To avoid an appearance of bias, the district court concluded that disqualification was appropriate.

(B) *Prior relationship with a witness.* As with parties, a judge’s mere acquaintance or familiarity with a witness does not require disqualification. In *Fletcher v. Conoco Pipe Line Co.*,\(^\text{97}\) the Eighth Circuit found disqualification unnecessary even though the judge maintained a friendship of thirty-six years with a fact witness for the plaintiff and remained a client of the witness’s law firm in an unrelated, ongoing matter. The court found this relationship insufficient to overcome a presumption of impartiality because the judge had previously ruled against the plaintiff.

On the other hand, in some cases disqualification may be necessary. In *United States v. Kelly*,\(^\text{98}\) the Eleventh Circuit held that a trial judge improperly failed to disqualify himself when, among other things, a close personal friend was a key defense witness. The judge had expressed concern on the record that he might “bend over backwards to prove he lacked favoritism” toward the witness, and that a guilty verdict might “jeopardize his wife’s friendship” with the witness’s

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95. *Id.* at 916.
97. 323 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2003).
98. 888 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1989).
wife.99 “The judge expressed profound doubts about the propriety of
continuing . . . on the case; . . . Such doubts should have been re-
solved in favor of disqualification.”100

(C) Prior relationship with an attorney. While a judge’s acquaintance
with one of the attorneys does not ordinarily require disqualification,
there are cases where the extent of intimacy, or other circumstances,
renders disqualification necessary. In United States v. Murphy,101 the
Seventh Circuit concluded that a judge should have disqualified him-
self where he and the prosecuting attorney were close friends and
planned to vacation together immediately after the trial. The court
noted that “friendships among judges and lawyers are common” and
“a judge need not disqualify himself just because a friend—even a
close friend—appears as a lawyer.”102 However, here the extent of inti-
macy was “unusual” and an objective observer might reasonably doubt
the judge’s impartiality when “he was such a close friend of the prose-
cutor that the families of both were just about to take a joint vaca-
tion.”103

The Eleventh Circuit held that a trial judge should have disquali-
fied himself where his law clerk’s father—who himself had been the
drive’s law clerk—was a partner in the law firm representing one of the
parties.104 The court nevertheless found the failure to disqualify harm-
less error in this case.105

Similarly, the First Circuit held that refusal to disqualify was
“probably” improper where, during pendency of the action, the judge
was represented in an unrelated matter by a partner in a firm that was
involved in the case before the judge.106 Because of the procedural pos-

99. Id. at 738.
100. Id. at 745.
101. 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985).
102. Id. at 1537.
103. Id. at 1538. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit chose not to reverse
because the defendant’s disqualification motion was inexcusably untimely.
104. Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1988). See also First
Interstate Bank of Ariz. v. Murphy, Weir & Butler, 210 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that when firm representing a party hires law clerk of presiding judge, judge
must make sure law clerk ceases further involvement in case).
105. Parker, 855 F.2d at 1527.
106. In re Cargill, 66 F.3d 1256 (1st Cir. 1995).
ture of the case, the court did not resolve the question on the merits, but remarked:

Most observers would agree that a judge should not hear a case argued by an attorney who, at the same time, is representing the judge in a personal matter. Although the appearance of partiality is attenuated when the lawyer appearing before the judge is a member of the same law firm as the judge’s personal counsel, but not the same individual, many of the same cautionary factors are still in play. . . . This principle would seem to have particular force where, as here, the law firm is small and the judge’s lawyer is a name partner.107

Problems concerning a judge’s relationship with counsel become acute when personal and financial relationships are entangled. As a state judge, G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., often solicited friends and former colleagues in the Louisiana Bar for money to pay personal gambling and other debts, and received monies from two of those same lawyers in exchange for court-appointed “curatorships.”108 After becoming a federal judge, Porteous declined to disqualify himself from a case in which a party was represented by one of those same two lawyers from whom he had received thousands of dollars over the years. While that case was under advisement, Porteous solicited that lawyer for additional money. While there is no indication that Judge Porteous was soliciting a bribe, his refusal to disqualify himself from hearing the case under these circumstances gave rise to the first of four articles of impeachment voted against him by a unanimous House of Representatives, and the Senate convicted him on this same article.109

Likewise, problems arise when judges explore postjudicial employment with lawyers or law firms that enter an appearance before the judge. In Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillan,110 a federal judge who was contemplating resigning from the bench and returning to private practice spoke to a recruiter who agreed to contact law firms on the judge’s behalf. Although the recruiter did not use the judge’s name, it was gener-

107. Id. at 1261 n.4 (citation omitted).
109. Article I—engaging in a pattern of conduct that is incompatible with the trust and confidence placed in him as a federal judge.
110. 764 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1985).
ally known in the legal community that this was the only judge who was contemplating resignation. Two of the firms contacted represented opposing parties in an action pending before the judge, but the district judge denied a motion to disqualify. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the judge had acted improperly in denying the motion for disqualification. According to the court, although there was no indication of actual bias or favoritism toward either of the law firms, there was, to an objective observer, an appearance of partiality that was disqualifying. The court explained that disqualification is necessary whenever a judge is in negotiations, even preliminary and tentative negotiations, for employment with a lawyer or law firm appearing before the judge. The Judicial Conference subsequently issued an advisory opinion admonishing judges to refrain from negotiations if the firm’s cases before the court are “so frequent and so numerous that the judge’s recusal in those cases (which would be required) would adversely affect the litigants or would have an impact on the court’s ability to handle its dockets.”

Disqualification questions sometimes arise when a party is represented by a lawyer from the judge’s former firm. Disqualification is automatic under § 455(b)(2) only if the judge was affiliated with the firm at the time the firm was handling the matter now before the court. But relationships between judges and lawyers at judges’ former firms can remain close long after matters pending during the judge’s tenure at the firm have been resolved. For that reason, some judges choose to disqualify themselves from hearing matters argued by lawyers at their former firms for a period of years. With the exception of isolated, unusually close friendships discussed above, however, relationships

111. Id. at 461.
112. Id. Compare Anderson v. United States, 754 A.2d 920 (D.C. Ct. App. 2000) (disqualification unnecessary when news article mentioned that judge was potential candidate for federal prosecutor’s position; no showing that judge had sought position).
113. Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Opinion No. 84 (June 2009).
114. See Financial Settlement and Disqualification on Resignation from Law Firm, Advisory Op. No. 24 (Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct June 2009) (recommending that judges consider a recusal period of at least two years, recognizing that there will be circumstances where a longer period is more appropriate).
between judges and lawyers at their former firms naturally dissipate over time. In Patterson v. Mobile Oil Corp., the plaintiffs moved for disqualification because the judge had previously been employed by the law firm that represented the defendants. The Fifth Circuit concluded that disqualification was unnecessary because the judge had terminated his relationship with the firm thirty years earlier.

When relatives rather than friends appear as counsel, the issue is ordinarily resolved by § 455(b)(5). However, § 455(a) is sometimes used to fill gaps. In In re Hatcher, the Seventh Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify where the judge’s son, a third-year law student, had assisted the government in the prosecution of a defendant in a case arising from the same circumstances as that of the present defendant. Although the cases were formally separate proceedings, “they are both component parts of one large prosecution of the continuing criminal enterprise. . . . Outside observers have no way of knowing how much information the judge’s son acquired about that broader prosecution while working on the . . . case.” The court emphasized that a judge whose son is an assistant U.S. attorney need not disqualify himself from all cases in which the United States is a party, or even those cases where the son prosecuted a case bearing some relationship to the case before the judge. “This is instead the rare case where the earlier proceedings were so close to the case now before the judge that disqualification under § 455(a) was the only permissible option.”

Former clerks appearing as counsel before judges for whom they worked presents a recurring issue. The First Circuit has noted that this issue is often addressed by the imposition of moratoriums:

It is common knowledge in the profession that former law clerks practice regularly before judges for whom they once clerked. Courts often have prophylactic rules that forbid a former law clerk from appearing in that court for a year or more after the clerkship . . .

When the judge’s current law clerk has a possible conflict of interest, the Eleventh Circuit notes that “it is the clerk, not the judge who must

115. 335 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2003).
116. 150 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 1998).
117. Id. at 638.
118. Id.
119. In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 221 (1st Cir. 1997).
be disqualified.”  In a case involving medical malpractice, the plaintiff had moved to disqualify the judge because the judge’s law clerk used to work for the law firm representing some of the defendants. The Eleventh Circuit held that disqualification was not required under § 455(a) since the judge had screened the law clerk from the case and assigned the matter to another law clerk. The court reasoned that since “precedent approves the isolation of a law clerk who has accepted future employment with counsel appearing before the court, it follows that isolating a law clerk should also be acceptable when the clerk’s former employer appears before the court.”

ii. Judge’s conduct in judicial proceedings

(A) “Extrajudicial source” doctrine and its limits. In United States v. Grinnell Corp., a case predating the 1974 amendments to § 455, the Supreme Court opined, “[t]he alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source . . . other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.” In Grinnell, the Court ruled that disqualification was unnecessary because “[a]ny adverse attitudes that [the judge] evinced toward the defendants were based on his study of the depositions and briefs which the parties had requested him to make.” This so-called “extrajudicial source” doctrine is born of the common-sense view that ordinarily the circumstances suggesting or creating the appearance of partiality cannot reasonably be derived from information revealed in the normal course of litigation because it is natural for judges to form attitudes about litigants and issues before the court as the facts unfold, and no reasonable person would question the impartiality of judges who do. As the Supreme Court explained in Liteky v. United States:

The judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion of the evidence, be exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant, who has been shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible person. But the judge is not thereby

120. Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1101–02 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hunt v. Am. Bank & Trust Co., 783 F.2d 1011, 1016 (11th Cir. 1986)).
121. Id. at 1100.
122. Id. at 1102 (internal citation omitted).
124. Id. at 583.
125. Id.
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reusable for bias or prejudice, since his knowledge and the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings, and are indeed sometimes (as in a bench trial) necessary to completion of the judge’s task. \textsuperscript{126}

The \textit{Liteky} Court added, however, that “[i]t is wrong in theory, though it may not be too far off the mark as a practical matter,” to say that disqualification for bias requires an extrajudicial source. Rather, an extrajudicial source “is the only \textit{common} basis [for disqualification] but not the \textit{exclusive} one.”\textsuperscript{127} The Court referred to two different scenarios when disqualification follows from remarks made during judicial proceedings: when the remarks reveal an extrajudicial bias, and when the remarks reveal an excessive bias arising from information acquired during judicial proceedings. As the Court explained:

Judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. They \textit{may} do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they \textit{will} do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.\textsuperscript{128}

The Court took pains to emphasize that the latter form of bias—one that arises from what the judge learns in the courtroom—must be truly excessive to warrant disqualification:

A favorable or unfavorable predisposition can also deserve to be characterized as “bias” or “prejudice” because, even though it springs from the facts adduced or the events occurring at trial, it is so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment.\textsuperscript{129}

(B) Comments on parties or issues in the pending case. Consistent with \textit{Liteky} and its construction of the extrajudicial source doctrine, the general rule is that remarks a judge makes in the course of ongoing judicial proceedings, remarks that are in the nature of reactions to what the judge has observed, do not warrant disqualification.

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Id} at 551.
\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Id} at 555.
\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Id}. 
In *In re Huntington Commons Associates*, the district court had referred to its “predisposition” in the context of stating that “any predisposition this court has in this matter is a result of things that have taken place in this very courtroom.” The Seventh Circuit ruled that this acknowledgment of a “predisposition” was not “remotely sufficient evidence of the required ‘deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible.’”

Similarly in *In re Marshall*, a California bankruptcy court ruled that the media’s characterization of the court’s remarks from the bench as hostile to the creditor’s claims was insufficient to require disqualification. The court noted that in litigation, courts are likely to form opinions about parties and that an adverse ruling in a prior, related case is insufficient to require disqualification. While the court made some negative comments about the creditor, the comments “do not approach the high degree of antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”

In *In re Mann*, disqualification was again unwarranted where, during a status hearing with the petitioner, the judge “expressed skepticism about the likelihood that a Rule 60(b) motion, filed fourteen years after entry of an order, would be granted.” The Seventh Circuit held, “[t]hat comment, standing alone, is not enough to prove an improper motive.” The judge had also told the petitioner “he harbored no animosity towards her and would therefore consider the merits of her claim.”

*In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc.* was a more difficult case, in which the district judge made race-related remarks in the courtroom, including a statement rejecting a study as illegitimate because it was conducted by Caucasians. The Fifth Circuit characterized the remarks as “unfortu-

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130. 21 F.3d 157 (7th Cir. 1994).
131. *Id.* at 158.
132. *Id.* at 159 (quoting *Liteky*).
134. *Id.* at 860.
135. 229 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2000).
136. *Id.* at 658.
137. *Id.* at 659.
138. *Id.* at 658.
139. 121 F.3d 163 (5th Cir. 1997).
nate, grossly inappropriate, and deserving of close and careful scrutiny. While the court found that the district judge’s comments created “a reasonable perception of bias or prejudice,” it also found that they did not “reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible,” which, in its view, was required by the Supreme Court’s decision in Liteky before in-court statements would require disqualification. Observing that the litigation was near completion, the court declined to issue a writ of mandamus. In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit did not appear to distinguish between in-court statements in which a judge arguably acquired an excessive bias from information received during judicial proceedings (to which the quoted passage from Liteky pertained) and in-court statements that revealed extrajudicial bias, arguably at issue here.

It is not uncommon for a judge, at sentencing, to express outrage at the defendant’s conduct or at the defendant himself, and/or an urge to see the defendant severely punished. Ordinarily, none of this is ground for disqualification. Although decided before Liteky, United States v. Barry illustrates the relevant principle. At sentencing, the trial judge claimed that jurors who voted to acquit the defendant on several charges “will have to answer to themselves and to their fellow citizens.” The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that “this statement may indicate that the court thought appellant was guilty of more counts than he was convicted of” but “there is no indication that the court reached this conclusion based on anything other than its participation in the case.”

The Tenth Circuit upheld a refusal to disqualify even though the trial judge opined pretrial that “the obvious thing that’s going to happen . . . is that [the defendant is] going to get convicted . . .” The
court believed the judge merely expressed a view of what was likely to happen from what he had observed in the case: “Nothing in the remark indicates that the judge was unable or unwilling to carry out his responsibilities impartially.”

In a Ninth Circuit case, the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a motion to disqualify based on his criticism of the government’s initial failure to charge the defendant with carrying a weapon during the commission of a robbery. At a status conference, the judge had commented that the government’s omission of the gun count was “absurd” and “asinine,” and told counsel to “[s]hare that with your head of [the] criminal [division].” The Ninth Circuit found that the judge’s comments did not rise to the level required for disqualification under § 455(a), stating that “[a] judge’s views on legal issues may not serve as the basis for motions to disqualify.”

There are exceptions to the rule that the comments a judge makes in court do not trigger disqualification. In United States v. Whitman, the Sixth Circuit remanded the sentencing of a criminal defendant to a different trial judge after the original judge engaged in a “lengthy harangue” of the defense attorney that “had the unfortunate effect of creating the impression that the impartial administration of the law was not his primary concern.” The court added, however, that there was no evidence that the judge was actually biased in this case.

In United States v. Antar, the trial judge commented during a sentencing hearing on the amount of restitution he might award: “My object in this case from day one has always been to get back to the public that which was taken from it as a result of the fraudulent activities of this defendant and others.” The Third Circuit held that the remark reflected a mindset requiring disqualification:

147. Id. at 1416. See also United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 1005 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding district court didn’t abuse discretion in denying motion to disqualify where, during sentencing hearing, judge became frustrated with defendant and counsel, and made remarks concerning defendant’s credibility; “The . . . comments . . . may have been testy, but they do not justify a recusal . . . .”).
148. United States v. Wilkerson, 208 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2000).
149. Id. (quoting United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 882 (9th Cir. 1980)).
150. 209 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2000).
151. Id. at 626–27.
152. 53 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 1995).
153. Id. at 573.
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[T]his is a case where the district judge, in stark, plain and unambiguous language, told the parties that his goal in the criminal case, from the beginning, was something other than what it should have been and, indeed, was improper... It is difficult to imagine a starker example of when opinions formed during the course of judicial proceedings display a high degree of antagonism against a criminal defendant. After all, the best way to effectuate the district judge’s goal would have been to ensure that the government got as free a road as possible towards a conviction, which then would give the judge the requisite leverage to order a large amount of restitution.154

The court noted the trial judge’s reputation for fairness, and acknowledged the perils of focusing on one sentence out of volumes of transcripts. However, “in determining whether a judge had the duty to disqualify him or herself, our focus must be on the reaction of the reasonable observer. If there is an appearance of partiality, that ends the matter.”155

In United States v. Franco-Guillen,156 the district judge withdrew the defendant’s guilty plea and set the matter over for trial after the defendant objected to certain information in the presentence report. In the course of the hearing, the judge said, “I will not put up with this from these Hispanics or anybody else, any other defendants”;157 and again, “I’m not putting up with this. I’ve got another case involving a Hispanic defendant who came in here and told me that he understood what was going on and that everything was fine and now I’ve got a 2255 from him saying he can’t speak English. And he is lying because he told me he could.”158 The Tenth Circuit reversed the conviction and remanded the case for reassignment to a different judge, with the explanation, “The judge’s statements on the record would cause a reasonable person to harbor doubts about his impartiality, without regard to whether the judge actually harbored bias against Franco-Guillen on account of his Hispanic heritage.”159

154. Id. at 576.
155. Id.
156. 196 F. App’x 716 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished decision).
157. Id. at 717.
158. Id. at 718.
159. Id. at 719.
The general rule against disqualification for in-court comments on pending cases does not apply to out-of-court comments on pending cases. In *United States v. Microsoft Corp.*, an antitrust case, the D.C. Circuit required disqualification of the trial judge on remand because of the cumulative effect of his comments on the merits of the case in a series of secret interviews with reporters throughout the course of the trial. The court emphasized the distinction between comments from the bench—which generally do not require disqualification—and those same comments made off the bench, while the matter is pending.

[A]ll of these remarks and others might not have given rise to a violation of the Canons or of § 455(a) had he uttered them from the bench . . . . It is an altogether different matter when the statements are made outside the courtroom, in private meetings unknown to the parties, in anticipation that ultimately the Judge's remarks would be reported.

(C) Comments on parties or issues in prior judicial proceedings. The general rule that bias or prejudice must be derived from an extrajudicial source and that comments based on a judge’s observations in pending proceedings will not ordinarily form the basis for disqualification applies equally to comments a judge makes in earlier proceedings. In *Liteky v. United States*, the Supreme Court made two relevant observations. First, it stated that in *United States v. Grinnell Corp.* the Court “clearly meant by ‘extrajudicial source’ a source outside the judicial proceeding at hand—which would include as extrajudicial sources earlier judicial proceedings conducted by the same judge.” This observation, however, must be understood in the larger context of the opinion as a whole, in which the Court rejected rigid adherence to an extrajudicial source doctrine (which it characterized not as a “doctrine” but as a “factor”). Regardless of whether prior proceedings are characterized as an “extrajudicial source,” the Court’s second, and ultimately more important, observation is that for purposes of disqualification

160. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
161. *Id.* at 115.
165. *Id.* at 555.
analysis, a judge’s comments in pending and past proceedings are on equal footing:

[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.166

In Liteky, the defendant moved to disqualify the judge on the ground that, during an earlier criminal trial, the judge displayed “impatience, disregard for the defense and animosity”167 toward the defendant. He cited various comments by the judge, including admonitions of defense witnesses and counsel as well as certain trial rulings. The Court rejected the contention that disqualification was in order: “All occurred in the course of judicial proceedings, and neither (1) relied upon knowledge acquired outside such proceedings nor (2) displayed deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible.”168

In Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,169 a district judge had overseen compliance with a city plan to clean up the Boston Harbor. In a subsequent case about locating a landfill pursuant to the Clean Water Act, a party moved for the judge’s disqualification, and the judge refused. The First Circuit upheld the refusal, noting that “a judge is sometimes required to act against the backdrop of official positions he took in other related cases. A judge cannot be replaced every time a case presents an issue with which the judge’s prior official decisions and positions may have a connection.”170

(D) Ex parte communications. Trial courts should be wary of ex parte contacts, which can result in reversals. Ex parte contacts contributed to the D.C. Circuit’s decision to remand a case to a different trial judge in United States v. Microsoft.171 The court was “concerned by the district

166. Id. (citation omitted).
167. Id. at 542.
168. Id. at 556.
169. 968 F.2d 1438 (1st Cir. 1992).
170. Id. at 1462.
171. 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Microsoft I) (contacts included argumentative letters and a redacted exhibit). See also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d
judge’s acceptance of *ex parte* submissions,” and indicated that “the appropriate course would have been simply to refuse to accept any *ex parte* communications.”

In a Sixth Circuit case, the appellant alleged that the trial judge had sent his law clerk to gather evidence and therefore the judge should have disqualified himself. The court observed that while “not every *ex parte* communication to the trial court requires reversal,” the allegation here was sufficiently serious as to require a remand to determine its truth.

Where the trial judge met *ex parte* with a panel of experts and prohibited counsel from discovering the contents of the meeting, the Seventh Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify. However, the Sixth Circuit upheld a refusal to disqualify in a similar situation involving various *ex parte* communications because the judge “explained to Plaintiffs’ counsel the ministerial nature of these *ex parte* discussions before they took place” and “personally extended to Plaintiffs’ counsel an invitation to attend all of these meetings.” Counsel chose not to attend and “failed to register any objection to the meetings at that time.”

(E) Conduct in relation to guilty pleas. In *Halliday v. United States*, the First Circuit implied that disqualification is sometimes appropriate when a judge faces a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate a conviction with respect to which he or she imposed the sentence. In a post-conviction motion, the defendant argued that a different judge should have conducted the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 plea-agreement hearing. Since the § 2255 challenge would have forced the same judge to evaluate his own actions, the First Circuit found it pref-

34, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding judge’s secret interviews with reporters during course of trial violated Code of Conduct Canon 3A(4), which prohibits “*ex parte* communications on the merits, or procedures affecting the merits, of a pending . . . proceeding”).

172. *Microsoft I*, 56 F.3d at 1464.


176. *Id.*

177. 380 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1967).
erable (but not required) for a different judge to conduct the § 2255 evidentiary hearing. In subsequent cases, the First Circuit clarified that Halliday is limited to cases in which the § 2255 motion accuses the sentencing judge of violating Rule 11.178

Where a judge’s conduct during plea negotiations violated Rule 11, and a defendant subsequently pled not guilty and was convicted, the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial, but was entitled to resentencing before a new judge.179 The Eighth Circuit concurred that when a case is remanded after a court of appeals finds a Rule 11 violation, the judge need not disqualify himself or herself from the subsequent trial, though disqualification might be in order for sentencing if the defendant is convicted.180

Similarly, the Third Circuit required resentencing before a new judge where the trial judge had communicated his preference to defense counsel that the defendant plead guilty and indicated that the defendant would receive a lighter sentence if he did.181 After the defendant went to trial and was convicted, the Third Circuit vacated the sentence because a reasonable person might conclude that “the judge’s attitude as to sentence was based at least to some degree on the fact that the case had to be tried, an exercise which the judge seemed anxious to avoid.”182

(F) Conduct reflecting that the judge took personal offense. In assorted cases, disqualification has been deemed necessary where trial judges took unusual actions, or made comments, that indicated they took personal offense. In In re Johnson,183 a bankruptcy trustee had been held in contempt because the trial judge thought the trustee had misrepresented the judge’s conduct to another judge in order to obtain a favorable court order. At the contempt proceedings, the judge declared that he was “prejudiced in this matter,” had “all but made up his mind,” was “not in the least inclined to be neutral,” and would serve as “complaining witness, prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner.”184 The Fifth

178. See, e.g., Panzardi-Alvarez v. United States, 879 F.2d 975, 985 (1st Cir. 1989).
180. In re Larson, 43 F.2d 410, 416 (8th Cir. 1994).
182. Id. at 583.
183. 921 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1991).
184. Id. at 587.
Circuit held that the judge clearly “considered [the party’s] actions to be a personal affront to his authority” such that a reasonable person would doubt his impartiality.185

Trial judges occasionally appear insulted when their rulings are challenged by a litigant. The Third Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify where the judge had responded to the petitioners’ mandamus motion for disqualification by writing a lengthy letter. The judge, “in responding to the mandamus petition . . . has exhibited a personal interest in the litigation.”186 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit reversed a conviction where the judge remarked in court that the defendant had “broken faith” with him by raising a certain issue on appeal following his earlier trial.187

On the other hand, in Hook v. McDade,188 the Seventh Circuit found disqualification unnecessary where the judge called the motion for his disqualification by a lawyer–litigant “offensive,” claimed it “impugned” his integrity, and directed the party to testify under oath about the judge’s alleged bias because, the judge claimed, the motion reflected unethical behavior. The judge was reacting, “albeit strongly,” to a motion brought on the eve of trial, and the Seventh Circuit believed that his comments did not “reflect a bias or prejudice gained from outside the courtroom.”189

iii. Judge’s extrajudicial conduct

As explained in the preceding section about the extrajudicial source doctrine, a judge is subject to disqualification for apparent partiality evidenced by extrajudicial conduct. The focus here, however, is on extrajudicial conduct that impugns impartiality or perceived impartiality. “Impartiality” subsumes a lack of bias toward a party, and perhaps open-mindedness toward the issues before the court, but does not require the absence of preexisting views on the legal questions that the judge must decide.190 Thus, the fact that a judge comes to a case with preexisting views on the legal questions presented, based on prior, ex-

185. Id.
188. 89 F.3d 350 (7th Cir. 1996).
189. Id. at 356.
trajudicial learning, is no grounds for disqualification. As the Court observed in *Liteky v. United States*,

191 “*Some* opinions acquired outside the context of judicial proceedings (for example, the judge’s view of the law acquired in scholarly reading) will not suffice” to warrant disqualification.

192

What will require disqualification is conduct manifesting bias or pre judgment. Such conduct can arise in a variety of settings.

(A) *Extrajudicial comments on pending or impending cases.* In *United States v. Cooley*,

193 the Tenth Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify where the defendants were abortion protesters and the trial judge had appeared on national television and stated that “these people are breaking the law.”

194 “The court of appeals stated:

Two messages were conveyed by the judge’s appearance on national television in the midst of these events. One message consisted of the words actually spoken. . . . The other was the judge’s expressive conduct in deliberately making the choice to appear in such a forum at a sensitive time to deliver strong views on matters which were likely to be ongoing before him. Together, these messages unmistakably conveyed an uncommon interest and degree of personal involvement in the subject matter. It was an unusual thing for a judge to do, and it unavoidably created the appearance that the judge had become an active participant in bringing law and order to bear on the protesters, rather than remaining as a detached adjudicator.

195

In *In re Boston’s Children First*,

196 the First Circuit held that a judge’s comments to the media about a pending case challenging an elementary school student-assignment process on grounds of racial discrimination required disqualification. Seeking to correct misinterpretations in press accounts unfavorably comparing her action in the pending matter with a previous case, the judge had told a newspaper reporter in a phone interview, the content of which was later published, that the pending case was “more complex.”

197 The plaintiffs
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subsequently moved for disqualification, and the judge denied the motion. The First Circuit held that disqualification was necessary and granted the petitioners’ writ of mandamus pursuant to § 455(a). Although it found the media contact “less inflammatory than that in Cooley,” it saw “the same factors at work.”\(^{198}\) First, because the school-assignment program was a matter of significant local concern, the public attention and rarity of such public statements by a judge made it “more likely that a reasonable person [would] interpret such statements as evidence of bias.”\(^{199}\) Second, like Cooley, the “appearance of partiality” at issue here . . . stems from the real possibility that a judge’s statements may be misinterpreted because of the ambiguity of those statements.”\(^{200}\) Finally, a judge’s defense of her own orders, before the resolution of appeal, could also create the appearance of partiality.\(^{201}\) The court noted that its holding was “based on the particular events” of a “highly idiosyncratic case.”\(^{202}\)

Similarly, in Hathcock v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., the Fourth Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify where, while a jury trial was pending against an automobile company, the judge, while at an auto torts seminar, gave a speech that expressed hostility toward defendants and defense counsel in such cases.\(^{203}\) In contrast to Hathcock, disqualification has been deemed unnecessary if the judge’s extrajudicial comments are sufficiently balanced to belie claims that they manifest bias. In United States v. Pitera,\(^{204}\) the

\(^{198}\) Id. at 169.

\(^{199}\) Id. at 170.

\(^{200}\) Id.

\(^{201}\) Id. “Canon 3A(6) does not bar comment in final, completed cases, so long as judges refrain from revealing the deliberative processes and do not place in question their impartiality in similar future cases.” Compendium of Selected Opinions § 3.9-1(d) (2009).

\(^{202}\) Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d at 171. After receiving a petition for rehearing en banc from the district judge, the appeals panel sought the opinions of the other three nonpanelist active judges, who disagreed that the judge’s comment required mandatory disqualification under § 455(a). They agreed with the panel, though, that her comment on a pending case was “at the very least particularly unwise.” Id. This difference of view among the active judges indicated “the continuing need for a case-by-case determination of such issues,” the panel acknowledged. Id.

\(^{203}\) 53 F.3d 36, 41 (4th Cir. 1995).

\(^{204}\) 5 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 1993).
judge gave a videotaped lecture to a government drug enforcement task force seven months before a narcotics case was tried, but after the case had already been assigned to her. In the lecture, the judge urged the assembled agents and prosecutors to take certain steps to increase prospects for conviction in narcotics cases. The Second Circuit nevertheless upheld the refusal to disqualify because the judge’s lecture “included several emphatic criticisms of prosecutors that would lead a reasonable person not to question, but to have confidence in the [judge’s] impartiality.”205 In addition, the judge participated in various programs for criminal defense lawyers, and she “commendably lectures to a variety of trial practice seminars.”206

In United States v. Microsoft Corp.,207 the D.C. Circuit noted that other courts of appeals had found violations of § 455(a) “for judicial commentary on pending cases that seems mild in comparison to what we are confronting in this case.”208 The district judge had given “secret interviews to select reporters” throughout the course of the Microsoft trial, requiring “that the fact and content of the interviews remain secret until he issued the Final Judgment.”209 The interviews began to appear in press accounts immediately after the final judgment was entered. Some interviews were conducted after the final judgment was entered. Because the full extent of the judge’s actions did not become apparent until the case was on appeal, the D.C. Circuit decided to adjudicate Microsoft’s disqualification request even though the published interviews had not been admitted into evidence and no evidentiary hearing had been held on them. The D.C. Circuit held that the judge “breached his ethical duty under Canon 3A(6) each time he spoke to a reporter about the merits of the case.”210 The judge’s comments did not fall into one of “three narrowly drawn exceptions” under the canon because the judge did not discuss “purely procedural matters” but ac-

205. Id. at 626.
206. Id. at 627.
207. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
208. Id. at 114 (citing In re Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir. 2001) and United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993)).
209. Id. at 108.
210. Id. at 112. Canon 3A(6), which forbids federal judges from commenting publicly “on the merits of a matter pending or impending in any court,” applies to cases pending before any court—state or federal, trial or appellate.
tually “disclosed his views on the factual and legal matters at the heart of the case.” The fact that the judge “may have intended to ‘educate’ the public about the case or to rebut ‘public misperceptions’” was not an excuse for his actions, and his “insistence on secrecy . . . made matters worse” because it prevented the parties from raising objections or seeking disqualification before the judge issued a final judgment.

The D.C. Circuit has not “gone so far as to hold that every violation of Canon 3A(6) . . . inevitably destroys the appearance of impartiality and thus violates § 455(a).” “In this case, however, . . . the line has been crossed,” and the judge’s comments “would lead a reasonable, informed observer to question the District Judge’s impartiality.” Because Microsoft “neither alleged nor demonstrated that [the judge’s conduct] rose to the level of actual bias or prejudice,” the court found “no reason to presume that everything the District Judge did [was] suspect.” The court concluded that there was no reason to set aside the findings of fact and conclusions of law, and that the appropriate remedy was disqualification of the judge “retroactive only to the date he entered the order breaking up Microsoft.”

United States v. Barry presents a counterpoint to Microsoft, in which an extrajudicial comment on a pending case did not give rise to a perception of partiality sufficient to warrant disqualification. In Barry, the judge, after sentencing the defendant, addressed a forum at Harvard Law School in which he spoke of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. When the sentence was vacated on unrelated grounds and the case remanded for resentencing, the defendant moved for disqualification, claiming the judge’s remarks at Harvard created an appearance of partiality. The D.C. Circuit ruled, however, that because the judge’s remarks were “based on his own observations during the performance of his judicial duties,” disqualification was not required.

211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 114.
214. Id. at 115.
215. Id. at 116.
216. Id.
218. Id. at 263.
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(B) Attendance at party-sponsored educational seminars on issues in litigation. For years, educational institutions and other organizations have hosted expense-paid educational seminars for judges on a range of issues coming before the courts. When seminar sponsors later appear as parties before those judges in cases raising issues covered in the seminars, it brings up questions of ethics and disqualification. As to the ethics of participating in expense-paid seminars, the Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct has opined at length and in considerable detail.\(^\text{219}\) As to the need to disqualify, the answer is: it depends.

The Third Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify where the trial judge in a mass tort asbestos case attended a scientific conference on the dangers of asbestos.\(^\text{220}\) The conference was funded in part by $50,000 from the plaintiffs’ settlement fund. The request to use these funds for this purpose was approved by the judge.\(^\text{221}\) The Third Circuit, in reversing, offered the following explanation:

We are convinced that a reasonable person might question [the judge’s] ability to remain impartial. To put it succinctly, he attended a predominantly pro-plaintiff conference on a key merits issue; the conference was indirectly sponsored by the plaintiffs . . . and his expenses were largely defrayed by the conference sponsors . . . Moreover, he was, in his own words, exposed to a Hollywood-style “pre-screening” of the plaintiffs’ case.\(^\text{222}\)

The court declined to address whether any of these facts alone compelled disqualification, because “together they create an appearance of partiality that mandates disqualification.”\(^\text{223}\)

The Second Circuit, in contrast, upheld a refusal to disqualify in a case involving a trial judge’s attendance at an expense-paid environmental seminar funded indirectly by Texaco.\(^\text{224}\) After the judge attended the seminar, a lawsuit against Texaco that he had previously

\(^{219}\) See Participation in a Seminar of General Character, Advisory Op. No. 3 (Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct June 2009); Attendance at Independent Educational Seminars, Advisory Op. No. 67 (Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct June 2009).

\(^{220}\) In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992).

\(^{221}\) Id. at 779.

\(^{222}\) Id. at 781–82.

\(^{223}\) Id. at 782.

\(^{224}\) In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2001).
dismissed was remanded to him. The Second Circuit agreed with the district judge that his presence at the seminar did not warrant disqualification under § 455(a) because Texaco provided only a minor part of the funding to one of two nonprofit organizations that conducted the seminar, and because the organizations had no connection to the case. Also, there was no showing that any aspect of the seminar touched on issues material to any claims or defense in the litigation.

iv. Party’s conduct toward judge

Parties and their lawyers sometimes behave in ways that predictably engender a judge’s animus, but such behavior does not trigger the need for disqualification. To hold otherwise would be to create an opportunity for parties to exhibit hostile behavior strategically, as a means to force disqualification. Upholding a refusal to disqualify where the litigant had verbally attacked the judge in public, the First Circuit said, “[a] party cannot force disqualification by attacking the judge and then claiming that those attacks must have caused the judge to be biased against [her].”225 Indeed, where a party argued that the judge’s ongoing hostility toward him required disqualification, the Third Circuit held that the party’s own public hostility toward the judge (including writing a letter to a Supreme Court justice urging punishment of the judge) counseled against disqualification, “lest we encourage tactics designed to force recusal.”226 For the same reason, the filing of a collateral lawsuit or other adversarial legal action against the judge will generally not require disqualification.227

226. United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1414 (3d Cir. 1994). See also United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000). The Second Circuit held that the judge did not commit clear error in denying disqualification because of media and political attacks on him. To read § 455 to allow such disqualification “would create a moral hazard by encouraging litigants or other interested parties to maneuver to obtain a judge’s disqualification.” Bayless, 201 F.3d at 129.
227. See Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1355–56 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Whitesel, 543 F.2d 1176, 1181 (6th Cir. 1976).
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In upholding a refusal to disqualify where the plaintiff had sent a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee opposing the judge’s nomination to the bench, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that disqualification was necessary: “Such a letter is probative of [the plaintiff’s] dislike for [the judge], not the other way around.”

The courts have taken a similar approach to threats against the judge. In United States v. Mosby, the respondent moved for disqualification on the grounds that he had previously threatened the judge, that the judge was made aware of these threats through a motion filed with the court, and that the judge was thus incapable of approaching the case impartially. The Eighth Circuit found that the judge was previously unaware of these threats, and therefore that disqualification was unnecessary. In another Eighth Circuit case, a district judge did not disqualify himself after a letter threatening his life was sent to a local newspaper. Because the judge believed the threat was an attempt to have the case removed to a different court with a more favorable judge and the defendant was incapable of carrying out the threat, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the judge properly denied the motion for disqualification. And in LoCascio v. United States, the Second Circuit concluded that disqualification was unnecessary when the judge told the press that he was not intimidated by a party’s threats, observing that the judge’s statement evinced his capacity to separate his personal interests from the facts of the case.

It bears emphasis, however, that this line of cases seeks to thwart parties or their counsel from engaging in strategic behavior aimed at forcing disqualification. Cases in which a judge becomes aware of a party’s conduct through other means may stand on different footing. One exceptional case in which the court of appeals reversed a refusal to disqualify in the face of a threat to the judge is instructive. The Tenth Circuit held that a trial judge should have disqualified himself because he “learned of the alleged threat from the FBI, and there is nothing in the record to suggest the threat was a ruse by the defendant

229. 177 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 1999).
230. United States v. Dehghani, 550 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2008).
231. 473 F.3d 493, 496 (2d Cir. 2007).
in an effort to obtain a different judge.”232 Moreover, the trial court had expedited sentencing in order to “get [the defendant] into the federal penitentiary system immediately, where he [could] be monitored more closely.”233 Under the circumstances, the court’s impartiality could reasonably be questioned. However, in dicta, the Tenth Circuit clarified that threats against a judge will rarely be ground for disqualification:

[I]f a death threat is communicated directly to the judge by a defendant, it may normally be presumed that one of the defendant’s motivations is to obtain a recusal, particularly if he thereafter affirmatively seeks a recusal. . . . [I]f a judge concludes that recusal is at least one of the defendant’s objectives (whether or not the threat is taken seriously), then § 455 will not mandate recusal because that statute is not intended to be used as a forum shopping statute. . . . Similarly, if a defendant were to make multiple threats to successive judges or even to multiple judges on the same court, there might be some reason to suspect that the threats were intended as a recusal device.234

On the other hand, in United States v. Honken,235 security measures were put in place at the request of authorities to protect the judge from the defendant. The defendant argued that he was unaware of the security measures prior to trial, and that his ignorance prevented him from filing the necessary motion for disqualification. The district court rejected that argument, reasoning that disclosure of the security measures to the defendant would mitigate their effectiveness, and that any judge confronted with a case with a high security risk would have been afforded the same security measures.

Judges have likewise been loath to disqualify themselves in cases where a party or that party’s lawyer has been complimentary of the judge. In Sullivan v. Conway,236 the defendant (a lawyer) wrote a letter to his client praising the judge. Sullivan, a lawyer representing himself as plaintiff, inadvertently received a copy of the letter, submitted it to the court, then moved for disqualification on the ground that the praise could influence the judge. “[T]he praise would not have come

232. United States v. Greenspan, 26 F.3d 1001, 1006 (10th Cir. 1994).
233. Id. at 1003 (Appellant’s Appendix 358–59).
234. Id. at 1006.
236. 157 F.3d 1092 (7th Cir. 1998).
II. Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455

2. Specific grounds: § 455(b)
a. Personal bias, prejudice, or knowledge: § 455(b)(1)

Disqualification under § 455(b)(1) requires a judge to disqualify himself or herself where he or she "has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding."

i. Bias and prejudice

As a practical matter, parties rarely seek disqualification under § 455(b)(1) alone for two reasons. First, relief for actual bias may be easier to obtain under § 144 than § 455(b)(1). Section 144 requires disqualification whenever a timely and facially sufficient affidavit alleging bias is filed, whereas § 455(b)(1) requires disqualification only if "actual bias or prejudice is 'proved by compelling evidence.'" If courts analyze a claim under § 144 and it fails, there will not be sufficient evidence to meet the higher burden of proof under § 455(b)(1); if the claim is valid, disqualification is required under § 144, and an analysis of § 455(b)(1) becomes unnecessary. As a consequence, litigants often

237. Id. at 1096.
238. Id. Accord United States v. Owens, 902 F.2d 1154, 1156 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Parties cannot be allowed to create the basis for disqualification by their own deliberate actions. To hold otherwise would encourage inappropriate ‘judge shopping.’"). See also In re Mann, 229 F.3d 657, 658 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[Judge-shopping] is not a practice that should be encouraged.").
239. The corollary to § 455(b)(1) in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is Canon 3C(1)(c). See Appendix, infra.
240. Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 355 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1202 (7th Cir. 1985) (concluding that a judge's statement that a motion for disqualification was "offensive" and "impugned his integrity" was not sufficiently compelling evidence of an extrajudicial source for actual bias against defendant)).
argue for disqualification under both statutes when alleging actual bias. Courts often conflate the analysis of bias under the two statutes, deciding to “view judicial interpretations of ‘personal bias or prejudice’ under § 144 as equally applicable to § 455(b)(1).”

Second, most litigants who file motions for disqualification for actual bias or partiality under § 455(b)(1) also argue that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned under § 455(a). Because demonstrating an appearance of partiality under § 455(a) is easier (and implicitly less critical of the subject judge) than demonstrating actual bias or prejudice, courts again often decide the issue on § 455(a) grounds without ever reaching § 455(b)(1).

The issue of disqualification for bias, while not a common occurrence, still arises occasionally. Disqualification under § 455(b)(1) requires that a litigant present evidence of a “negative bias or prejudice [which] must be grounded in some personal animus or malice that the judge harbors against him.” The standard for determining if such bias exists is “whether a reasonable person would be convinced the judge was biased.” The Fifth Circuit noted that the standard for finding actual bias is objective, and that “it is with reference to the ‘well-informed, thoughtful and objective observer, rather than the hypersensitive, cynical and suspicious person’ that the objective standard is currently established.”

In Mann v. Thalacker, the Eighth Circuit was unwilling to imply actual bias or prejudice from the judge’s own personal history. After his conviction for sexual abuse of a child, the defendant argued, in the context of his habeas petition, that the trial judge’s own history of sexual abuse at the hands of his father should have caused him to disqualify himself on the grounds of personal bias. Although § 455(b)(1) does not apply to the actions of a state trial judge, the court used it as a standard in this case. The court held that reference to the judge’s personal history was insufficient to establish actual bias, although it stated

242. Id. at 1201.
243. Hook, 89 F.3d at 355. See also Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2009); Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1025 (7th Cir. 2000).
244. Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448, 462 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1995)).
245. 246 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 2001).
that the defendant’s argument would have been stronger “if the abuse the judge suffered as a child bore a closer resemblance to the conduct with which [the defendant] was charged.”

ii. Extrajudicial source of bias

Most circuits have adopted the requirement, based on the Supreme Court’s use of the extrajudicial source doctrine for § 455(a), that “[b]ias against a litigant must . . . arise from an extrajudicial source” for disqualification under § 455(b)(1). Adverse contempt orders and other judicial rulings in the same case, for example, are thus not, by themselves, sufficient for establishing bias for disqualification under § 455(b)(1). Explaining the application of the extrajudicial source doctrine to § 455(b)(1), one district court noted: “In every lawsuit, judges make rulings adverse to one or the other party. That these rulings may be unwelcome is simply too commonplace a circumstance to support an allegation of bias.”

The Fifth Circuit held, in *Andrade v. Chojnacki*, that opinions formed in the course of the current proceedings, as well as those based on prior judicial proceedings, are “nearly exempt from causing recusal,” and can only do so if they “reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” The judge’s off-the-record insults and expressions of distaste for several of the parties were not enough to meet this high standard because “expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, and even anger” will not establish the bias or prejudice required by § 455(b)(1).

246. *Id.* at 1097.


248. *Hook*, 89 F.3d at 355. See also *United States v. Griffin*, 84 F.3d 820, 831 (7th Cir. 1996).

249. See, e.g., *Brokaw v. Mercer County*, 235 F.3d 1000, 1025 (7th Cir. 2000).

250. *Marion v. Radtke*, No. 07-cv-243-bbc, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41031 at *14–15 (W.D. Wis. May 14, 2009) (holding defendant’s motion to disqualify, which was based wholly on motions the judge made that were not in defendant’s favor, lacked sufficient evidence of actual bias for disqualification under § 455(b)(1)).

251. 338 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2003).

252. *Id.* at 462 (citing *Liteky*, 510 U.S. at 555–56).

253. *Id.*
In *Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd.*, the Seventh Circuit rejected the disqualification arguments of an attorney whom the trial judge had found in contempt several times. The attorney had repeatedly violated court orders, including a confidentiality agreement, and had misrepresented himself as a party’s counsel after that party had dismissed him. The Seventh Circuit found his argument for disqualification without merit because the attorney made “no attempt to establish any bias stemming from a personal relationship or prior litigation,” instead relying exclusively on “rulings during the litigation, which absent extraordinary circumstances, are not grounds for recusal.” No such extraordinary circumstances were enumerated, and the court made clear that “efforts at courtroom administration and enforcing compliance with a court order do not amount to an inability to render fair judgments.”

In *Williams v. Anderson*, a habeas case, the Sixth Circuit held that information about the petitioner received by the trial judge during private FBI briefings in his previous role as U.S. attorney was not enough to establish bias or prejudice under § 455(b)(1). In the 1970s, the judge was part of an investigation into a group of which the petitioner had been a member. The court rejected the argument that the judge’s potential knowledge of the petitioner would cause him to rule improperly. As the court explained, “opinions held by judges as a result of what they learned in earlier proceedings do not qualify as bias or prejudice,” and that information gained in the course of the FBI briefings was “akin to information learned in earlier proceedings.” The petitioner tried to distinguish the briefings from other “earlier proceedings” on the grounds that the briefings were classified whereas court proceedings are matters of public record, but the court again rejected this distinction, explaining that “[j]udges often obtain confidential information about defendants at trials that is never shared with the public,” and that the mere private nature of this information does not establish bias or prejudice.

254. 299 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2002).
255. *Id.* at 640.
256. *Id.*
257. 460 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2006).
258. *Id.* at 815.
259. *Id.*
iii. Bias against nonparties

Actual bias for or against an attorney, witness, or other participant is not ordinarily enough to warrant disqualification under § 455(b)(1), unless so extreme as to engender bias for or against a party. In Dembowski v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., a part-time magistrate judge was allowed to continue his representation of a party involved in a suit in the same district in which the magistrate judge served his judicial function. The party seeking disqualification of the magistrate judge from his role as advocate alleged that the judge and jury would be inclined to favor the arguments of the magistrate judge because of his status as a member of the judiciary. In reaching its decision denying the motion to disqualify, the district court held that, in the context of § 455(b)(1), "potential ‘bias for or against an attorney, who is not a party, is not enough to require disqualification unless it can also be shown that such a controversy would demonstrate bias for or against the party itself.’" The court further held that “a judge’s acquaintance with a party, an attorney, or a witness without some factual allegation of bias or prejudice, is not sufficient to warrant recusal.”

The Second Circuit held that a judge’s comment on the possibility of disbarment proceedings against a party’s attorney does not establish the personal bias required by § 455(b)(1). In LoCascio v. United States, the trial judge, in a hearing not attended by the attorney threatened with disbarment, mentioned the possibility of disbarment proceedings should the attorney testify as planned. The Second Circuit found that, when read in context, the judge’s comment could not “reasonably be construed as exhibiting personal animosity towards [the attorney or the defendant],” nor could it be seen as “displaying hostility towards [the defendant’s] claim.” The court went on to hold that personal bias was not established because the judge’s comment did not

261. Id. at 511 (quoting United States v. Edwards, 39 F. Supp. 2d 692, 699 (M.D. La. 1999)).
263. 473 F.3d 493 (2d Cir. 2007).
264. Id. at 496–97.
derive from an extrajudicial source or reveal the requisite favoritism or antagonism, making disqualification unnecessary.

iv. Knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts

Section 455(b)(1) requires disqualification where judges have prior knowledge of disputed facts. The Fifth Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify where a relative of the judge was a major participant in transactions relating to the defendant's indictment and “that relative had communicated to the judge . . . material facts and her opinions and attitudes regarding those facts.”

In United States v. Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial judge should have disqualified himself from a lawsuit against Alabama and its state universities where the judge had been a state legislator involved in legislative battles germane to the litigation. The judge was “forced to make factual findings about events in which he was an active participant.”

Alabama can be reconciled with Easley v. University of Michigan Board of Regents, where the Sixth Circuit rejected the contention that knowledge gained by the judge while serving on a law school’s “committee of visitors” required him to disqualified himself from a discrimination suit against the law school. In Easley, the judge’s position did not give him knowledge of the events at issue in the litigation.

In United States v. Microsoft Corp., the D.C. Circuit remanded a case to a different trial judge where, among other things, the original judge appeared to be influenced in his handling of a case by his private reading of a book related to the case. While the court did not explicitly cite § 455(b)(1), the facts and holding of the case suggest the relevance of this subsection. The court noted that “[t]he book’s allegations are, of course, not evidence on which a judge is entitled to rely.”

The Ninth Circuit held that the trial judge’s decision to revoke the bail bonds of bank robbery defendants after the U.S. attorney informed the judge about threats to the witnesses’ safety could not constitute a

265. In re Faulkner, 856 F.2d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1988).
266. 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987).
267. Id. at 1545.
268. 906 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1990).
269. 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Microsoft I).
270. Id. at 1463.
disqualifying fact with regard to the subsequent trial.\textsuperscript{271} The fact that the judge was made aware of the information in private rather than in open court is irrelevant, considering the defense counsel’s refusal of an offer to review the information in camera.

In \textit{Edgar v. K.L.},\textsuperscript{272} the Seventh Circuit extended § 455(b)(1) to information acquired in off-the-record briefings and held that § 455(b)(1) required disqualification where a judge who was briefed privately by a panel of experts declined to inform the parties about the briefing’s contents. The court acknowledged that § 455 is primarily concerned with knowledge gained “outside a courthouse”; however, knowledge acquired in a judicial capacity typically “enters the record and may be controverted or tested by the tools of the adversary process . . . . Off-the-record briefings in chambers, by contrast, leave no trace in the record—and in this case the judge has forbidden any attempt at reconstruction . . . . This is ‘personal’ knowledge . . . .”\textsuperscript{273}

When the judge simply possesses information generally available to the public, however, disqualification is unnecessary. In \textit{In re Hatcher},\textsuperscript{274} the judge’s son had assisted in the prosecution of a defendant in a case related to the case before the judge, and the judge had sat in on the trial to observe his son’s performance. The judge “was present only as a spectator in the courtroom. He therefore learned nothing . . . that any member of the public could not also have learned by attending the trial or reading a good newspaper account of its progress. This limited exposure is simply not the kind of personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts with which § 455(b)(1) is concerned.”\textsuperscript{275} The Seventh Circuit held that disqualification was required under § 455(a), however, because the cases were so closely related.

\textit{b. Prior association with matter as private practitioner or witness: § 455(b)(2)}

Subsection 455(b)(2) requires disqualification “[w]here in private practice [the judge] served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such as-

\textsuperscript{271} United States v. Jackson, 430 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1970).
\textsuperscript{272} 93 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996).
\textsuperscript{273} \textit{Id} at 259.
\textsuperscript{274} 150 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 1998).
\textsuperscript{275} \textit{Id} at 635.
sociation as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it.\textsuperscript{276}

In \textit{In re Rogers},\textsuperscript{277} the Fourth Circuit defined the “matter in controversy” quite broadly. There, defendants were charged with using unlawful means to secure passage of a bill in the state legislature. A former law partner of the trial judge had represented a company in its own efforts to get the bill passed. The defendants planned to argue that their conduct was no more culpable than that of the company represented by the judge’s former partner, whom they planned to call as a witness. Holding that disqualification was required under § 455(b)(2), the Fourth Circuit observed that “the actual case before the court consists of more than the charges brought by the government. It also includes the defense asserted by the accused. Here, this defense, in part at least, will consist of matters in which the judge’s former partner served as lawyer.”\textsuperscript{278}

In \textit{United States v. DeTemple},\textsuperscript{279} the Fourth Circuit distinguished \textit{Rogers} and held disqualification unnecessary where the judge had represented a creditor of the defendant several years before the current charges of bankruptcy fraud. The creditor “played no role in either the defense or the prosecution of the case. . . . The connection between the judge’s prior professional associations and the case before him is far more tenuous here than in \textit{Rogers}.”\textsuperscript{280}

In \textit{Blue Cross \\& Blue Shield of Rhode Island v. Delta Dental of Rhode Island},\textsuperscript{281} the Rhode Island district court employed a more restrictive reading of “matter in controversy.” Although lawyers previously associated with the trial judge had been marginally involved with the current litigation and might conceivably be called to testify, the district court ruled that disqualification was not required under § 455(b)(2). In so ruling, the court reasoned that “the matter in controversy” referred only to “the case that is before the Court as defined by the docket

\textsuperscript{276} The corollary to § 455(b)(2) in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is Canon 3C(1)(b). See Appendix, \textit{infra}.
\textsuperscript{277} 537 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1976).
\textsuperscript{278} \textit{Id.} at 1198.
\textsuperscript{279} 162 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 1998).
\textsuperscript{280} \textit{Id.} at 284.
number attached to that case and the pleadings contained therein.”

In addition, the court found that the limited context of the testimony potentially required of the lawyers in question was such that it precluded them from being considered material witnesses under the meaning of the statute, and that the lawyers’ “limited activities do not constitute ‘serving as a lawyer’ in the ‘matter in controversy’” under § 455(b)(2).

The Ninth Circuit held that disqualification was required where the judge’s former law firm represented a nonparty company that faced a potential claim for indemnification if the government were found liable. The firm also represented that client in a state court action brought by the same plaintiff concerning the same events as before the trial court.

c. Prior association with matter as governmental employee:

§ 455(b)(3)

Subsection 455(b)(3) requires disqualification where the judge has “served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy.”

The Eighth Circuit held that “[i]f an indictment or investigation leading directly to the indictment began after a former prosecutor took office as a judge, he or she is not considered to have been ‘of counsel’ and is not required by § 455 to disqualify himself or herself.

In United States v. Arnpreister, the Ninth Circuit held that a judge who was formerly a U.S. attorney when the case at hand was under investigation should have disqualified himself from ruling on the appellant’s motion for a new trial. The court noted that its analysis “imputes

282. Id. at 46.
283. Id. at 47.
284. Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 734–35 (9th Cir. 1991). Cf. In re FCC, 208 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding sua sponte that law firm hired to represent debtor on appeal must withdraw from case because it would compromise appellate judge, a member of the panel, who used to be partner at firm).
285. The corollary to § 455(b)(3) in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is Canon 3C(1)(e). See Appendix, infra.
287. 37 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 1994).
to the United States Attorney the knowledge and acts of his assistants.”

In *United States v. Silver*, the Ninth Circuit held that a trial judge who had served as U.S. attorney for the preliminary investigation of the defendant’s prior offense need not disqualify himself under § 455(b)(3). The judge had served as U.S. attorney during the first two years of a five-year mail fraud investigation of the defendant, conducted more than ten years before the indictment that lead to the current case. In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit said “[t]here is no factual connection or relationship between the current case and the 1982 mail fraud case.” It further noted that the previous case was referenced only “for purposes of sentencing,” and that the judge “was not asked to make any determinations or to render an opinion on the mail fraud conviction.”

The Ninth Circuit distinguished the facts in *Arnpreister*, explaining that in *Silver* the trial judge had not initiated the current case, but had merely been U.S. attorney at the beginning of an investigation of a factually unrelated case involving the same defendant.

The Eleventh Circuit held that a trial judge who served as the attorney of record for one of the parties in prior litigation should have disqualified himself under §§ 455(b)(1) and (b)(3). While serving as U.S. attorney, the trial judge acted as the attorney of record for the defendant association, the status of which was the subject of the current litigation. During his prior representation, the judge filed a brief that the party seeking disqualification claimed would likely be used as evidence in the current proceeding. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that, “[b]ecause of [the judge’s] involvement in the earlier . . . litigation, Plaintiff has shown that [the judge] may have knowledge of facts in dispute in the present case.” Disqualification was therefore required because “the record is strong enough to presume personal knowledge of facts by virtue of [the judge] having participated as coun-

288. *Id.* at 467. The court held that both § 455(a) and § (b) required disqualification in this case.
289. 245 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2001).
290. *Id.* at 1079.
291. *Id.* at 1080.
293. *Id.* at 1313.
sel of record in [prior] litigation that . . . concerns (that is, might affect) this proceeding.\textsuperscript{294}

The Seventh Circuit held disqualification was not required where the judge presiding over a tax evasion case had previously served as an assistant U.S. attorney (AUSA) at the same time, and in the same district, where the defendant had been indicted.\textsuperscript{295} The court stated: “As applied to judges who were formerly AUSAs, § 455(b)(3) requires some level of actual participation in a case to trigger disqualification.”\textsuperscript{296} Because no evidence of actual participation was presented, the court found the judge did not commit plain error in not disqualifying himself.\textsuperscript{297}

In \textit{Clemmons v. Wolfe},\textsuperscript{298} the district judge denied a habeas petition filed by a petitioner over whose trial that same judge had presided in state court, prior to his appointment to the federal bench. The Third Circuit concluded that the district judge erred in declining to disqualify himself, on the grounds that his impartiality might reasonably be questioned under § 455(a). The court went further, however, and took the unusual step of exercising its broad supervisory authority over federal proceedings to require that all federal district judges disqualify themselves from habeas corpus proceedings raising issues concerning trials or convictions over which the judges presided in their former capacities as state judges. \textit{Clemmons} was decided under § 455(a), not § 455(b)(3). The corollary to § 455(b)(3) in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges—Canon 3C(1)(e)—was amended in 2009 to make its applicability to former judicial service explicit, by requiring disqualification when “the judge has served in governmental employment and in that capacity participated as a judge (in a previous judicial position), counsel, advisor, or material witness concerning the proceeding

\textsuperscript{294} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{295} United States v. Ruzzano, 247 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2001).
\textsuperscript{296} \textit{Id.} at 695 (citing United States v. Boyd, 208 F.3d 638, 647 (7th Cir. 2000); Mangum v. Hargett, 67 F.3d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1995); Kendrick v. Carlson, 995 F.2d 1440, 1444 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Di Pasquale, 864 F.2d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 1988); \textit{cf.} United States v. Pepper & Potter, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 123, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)).
\textsuperscript{297} \textit{Ruzzano}, 247 F.3d at 696. Because the defendant didn’t request disqualification at trial and raised the issue for the first time on appeal, the Seventh Circuit could only review for plain error. \textit{Id.} at 695.
\textsuperscript{298} 377 F.3d 322 (3d Cir. 2004).
or has expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy.”

d. Financial interest in matter: § 455(b)(4) and § 455(f)

i. Disqualification for financial interest

Subsection 455(b)(4) requires disqualification where a judge “knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.”

Section 455(d)(4) defines “financial interest” for the purposes of § 455(b) and provides specific exemptions, such as investment in a mutual fund or ownership of government securities. Note that, apart from such exemptions, even the smallest financial interest (e.g., ownership of a single share of stock) requires disqualification. Under § 455(c), it is a judge’s duty to keep abreast of all of his or her financial interests.

Courts of appeals have interpreted “financial interest” to refer to a direct interest, not a “remote or contingent” interest. In a case involving the constitutionality of a “privilege” tax as applied to federal judges working within Jefferson County, Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit raised the issue of disqualification sua sponte where “nine of the en banc panel’s twelve judges [had] sat in Jefferson county at least one day—and some a few days more.” Because the city had never tried to collect the privilege tax from a federal judge who did not have chambers in the county, and none of the Eleventh Circuit judges had cham-

299. See Appendix, infra (emphasis added).

300. The corollary to § 455(b)(4) in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is Canon 3C(1)(c). See Appendix, infra.

301. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1, Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.4, and Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 require a nongovernmental corporate party to a proceeding to file a statement identifying any parent corporation or publicly held corporation that owns 10% or more of its stock. This disclosure is meant to aid judges in decisions about disqualification under Canon 3C(1)(c) and § 455(b)(4). Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.4, the government must also file a statement identifying an organizational victim of a crime and providing the same information on a corporate victim that a nongovernmental corporate party must file.


303. Jefferson County v. Acker, 92 F.3d 1561, 1581 (11th Cir. 1996). The issue of disqualification was discussed in an appendix to the opinion.
bers in Jefferson County, the court held that any possible interest the judges may have was too remote and contingent to constitute a financial interest.

Similarly, in an antitrust case alleging price-fixing by oil companies, all of the trial judges in the district were residents of New Mexico whose future utility bills could have been affected by the outcome of the litigation. The Tenth Circuit held that this was too remote and contingent to qualify as a “financial interest” under § 455(b)(4). In each case, the courts considered the potential benefit an “other interest” under the statute, which meant, under § 455(b)(4), that disqualification was required only if this “other interest” would be “substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.”

In a Second Circuit case involving an attack on an abortion clinic, the defendant moved for disqualification on the grounds that the judge’s wife had made financial contributions to the victim clinic and so had created a financial interest under § 455(b)(4). The court noted that “[r]ecusal is not required . . . when the alleged interest or bias on the part of the judge or his spouse is ‘not direct, but remote, contingent, or speculative.’” In affirming the trial judge’s denial of the disqualification motion, the court explained that the clinic in question, although named as the victim, was not a party to the litigation, and that “contributions made by [the judge’s] wife to [the clinic] did not constitute a financial interest in the organization.”

In Draper v. Reynolds, the plaintiff in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil suit sought to disqualify the trial judge on the grounds that the judge owned property in the same county that the defendant was deputy sheriff. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the

304. Id. at 1582. The court also held that disqualification would be contrary to the rule of necessity. Id. at 1583, 1584.
305. In re New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 620 F.2d 794, 796 (10th Cir. 1980).
307. Id. at 398 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 48 (2d Cir. 1998)). See also Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591, 600 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding trial judge not disqualified even though his wife’s position at district attorney’s office might conceivably be indirectly affected by outcome of case, because such an interest was “remote, contingent or speculative”).
308. Id.
309. 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2004).
judge, who previously filed a zoning application in the county, would likely side with his own financial interests and hence the county in violation of § 455(b)(4). The court held that a property interest in a given county is grounds for disqualification only if “[that county and its commissioners] are parties to the case and [the judge’s] zoning application is currently pending before [that county and its commissioners].”

The Fifth Circuit held that where the judge or someone in his family is a member of a class seeking monetary relief, § 455(b)(4) imposes a “per se rule” requiring disqualification. The Fourth Circuit, in contrast, held that a trial judge who, as a rate-paying customer of a utility company involved in the case before him, had the possibility of recovering a $100 refund as a putative member of the class of plaintiffs, should not have disqualified himself under § 455(b)(4). The court classified the potential refund as an expectancy interest, and as such it was not a “financial interest,” but rather “some other interest” under the language of § 455(b)(5). It further explained that the words “however small” apply only to financial interests under § (b)(4), and that in addressing other interests, a judge “must necessarily consider the remoteness of the interest and its extent or degree.” The Fourth Circuit held that the possible refund was “de minimis” and therefore not grounds for disqualification.

In a class action lawsuit arising from the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina, a New Orleans district judge refused to disqualify himself on the grounds that possible inconvenience experienced by the judge and his family gave him a potential financial interest in the outcome of the proceedings under § 455(b)(4). In its disqualification analysis, the district court referred to the Fifth Circuit’s statement that “[a] re-

310. Id. at 1280.
313. Id. at 368.
314. Id. But see Gordon v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1043–44 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (holding disqualification required of a judge who, as wholesale customer of defendant electrical company, had “legal claims identical to those raised by plaintiffs,” which qualified both as financial and other claims under language of § 455(b)(4)).
mote, contingent, or speculative interest is not a disqualifying financial interest under the statute.”

Because the judge and his family had suffered no financial loss or property damage as a result of Katrina, any interest or potential class membership based on possible inconvenience was, at best, “ephemeral, inchoate, and bordering on the metaphysical,” and so could not justify disqualification.

In United States v. Rogers, a mail fraud case, the trial judge was “one of millions of stockholders” in a defrauded bank. Holding that disqualification was not required under § 455(b)(4), the Ninth Circuit explained that the bank, which was the victim of the crime, is not a party to the proceeding under § 455(b)(4). Moreover, “stock ownership in the corporate victim of a crime cannot be deemed a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy” under § 455(b)(4).

ii. Divestiture as a cure for financial interest disqualification
The conflicts enumerated in § 455(b) require automatic disqualification—even if the judge believes he or she is capable of impartial judgment; even if he or she believes that a reasonable person would not question his or her impartiality; and even if the parties are willing to waive any objections. Section 455(f), however, provides an opportunity for the judge to “cure” certain § 455(b) conflicts.

Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any justice, judge, magistrate, or bankruptcy judge to whom a matter has been assigned would be disqualified, after substantial judicial time has been devoted to the matter, because of the appearance or discovery, after the matter was assigned to him or her, that he or she individually or as a fiduciary, or his or her spouse or minor child residing in his or her household, has a financial interest in a party (other than an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome), disqualification is not required if the justice, judge, magistrate, bankruptcy judge, spouse or

316. Id. at 648 (citing In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 786–87 (5th Cir. 1986)).
317. Id. at 649–50.
318. 119 F.3d 1377 (9th Cir. 1997).
319. Id. at 1384. See also United States v. Aragon, No. 99-50341, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 15423 at *5 (9th Cir. June 29, 2000).
320. Rogers, 119 F.3d at 1384. Disqualification was not required under § 455(a) either, the court ruled.
minor child, as the case may be, divests himself or herself of the interest that provides the grounds for disqualification.\footnote{28 U.S.C. § 455(f) (1988).}

A number of courts of appeals have upheld and applauded the use of this subsection to prevent disqualification.\footnote{See, e.g., \textit{In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig.}, 174 F. Supp. 2d 70, 80–81 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying defendants’ motion for disqualification and holding that, under § 455, “a judge . . . assigned a case in which she has a financial or other curable conflict . . . may continue to preside if she promptly eliminates it”) (citing \textit{Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp.}, 136 F.3d 1025 (5th Cir. 1998)); \textit{Key Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc.}, 24 F. Supp. 2d 480 (W.D. Pa. 1998) (judge divested stock in parent corporation and declined to disqualify himself, noting that disqualification would be mandatory except for the provisions of § 455(f)). \textit{But see \textit{Gordon v. Reliant Energy, Inc.}, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (relying on \textit{Tramonte}) (both cases holding disqualifying interests incurable even if discovered and removed at beginning of case).} In \textit{United States v. Lauersen},\footnote{925 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1991).} the trial judge in an insurance fraud case disclosed his ownership of a small number of shares in one of the victim insurance companies eligible to receive monetary restitution as a result of the judge’s ruling in the case. Because the recovery of restitution would affect the price of the shares in question, the company agreed to waive its right to monetary recovery so as to allow the judge to continue on the case with no financial conflict. The Second Circuit held that what would otherwise have provided a basis for disqualification under § 455(b)(4) was not a financial interest in this case because the decision by the company in question to “forgo its restitution claim” served to “eliminate such a basis” under § 455(f).\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 561.}
In *In re Certain Underwriter*, the district judge discovered—that she owned shares in two of the defendant corporations, making her a putative class member. The judge immediately informed the parties of the conflict, divested herself of the shares, and opted out of the class. She denied the subsequent § 455(b)(4) disqualification motion, and the Second Circuit affirmed, stating that § 455(f) was created to allow the continued participation of a “district judge with a minor interest in a class action lawsuit discovered after assignment, who quickly divested herself of the conflicting interest.”

In a class action copyright case, two of the reviewing Second Circuit judges declined to disqualify themselves despite their membership in the relevant class for five months during their work on the case. The class included anyone with copyrighted material posted on the electronic databases LexisNexis and Westlaw, among others. Having promptly divested themselves of any legal or financial claim as soon as they realized that they were members in the class, the judges relied on § 455(f) to justify their decision not to disqualify themselves. As they explained, “a reasonable person would not have known that we were class members” before the date on which they discovered—and promptly divested themselves of—the interest.

Also relevant to their refusal to disqualify was the fact that “many—if not most—other judges are similarly situated,” including all but one of the other members of the Second Circuit, as well as (presumably) all the members of the Supreme Court.

Some courts, however, have construed the “divestiture cure” strictly. The Sixth Circuit held that disqualification was required in a case where the trial judge’s daughter was employed by the law firm representing a party before the judge, even though the daughter resigned from the law firm. It observed that § 455(f) refers to the judge himself or herself, his or her spouse, or a minor child residing with the

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327. 294 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2002).
328. Id. at 304.
329. *In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig.*, 509 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007).
330. Id. at 142.
331. Id. at 142–43.
judge. This “suggests that Congress intended to exclude the types of cure not permitted by this provision, for Congress had the opportunity to enact a broader amendment than it devised with section 455(f)".333

The Second Circuit held that a district judge who had unknowingly possessed a substantial financial stake in one of the plaintiffs during a bench trial could not cure this conflict by divesting himself of the interest on remand.334 Although the court based its decision on the creation of an appearance problem under § 455(a), its analysis is relevant to the divestment cure of a § 455(b)(4) conflict as well. The court held that “where an earlier ‘appearance’ of a potentially disqualifying interest mandated recusal under Section 455(a), a divestiture years later cannot cure a judge’s presiding over significant proceedings in a case—here rendering a decision after a bench trial—in the intervening years.”335

e. Other interests of judge and judge’s family: § 455(b)(5)

Section 455(b)(5) requires a judge’s disqualification when:

- He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
  - (i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
  - (ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
  - (iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
  - (iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.336

i. Where judge or relatives are parties or associated with parties

Under § 455(b)(5)(i), a judge shall disqualify himself where “[h]e or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person . . . [i]s a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party.” Based on this subsection, the Tenth Circuit held that a trial judge should have disqualified

333. Id. at 1147 (Kennedy, J., concurring).


335. Id. at 131.

336. The corollary to § 455(b)(5) in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is Canon 3C(1)(d). See Appendix, infra.
himself from hearing habeas claims challenging state court cases in which his uncle had participated as a criminal appeals judge. His uncle, who had since died, was nonetheless a named defendant in the claims, thus requiring disqualification pursuant to § 455(b). \(^{337}\)

The District Court of Puerto Rico held that § 455(b)(5) did not reach the father of the judge’s son-in-law, who was on the board of directors of one of the named parties. \(^{338}\) The Checklist for Financial and Other Conflicts contained within the Code of Conduct for United States Judges identified “the following blood relatives as falling within the third degree relationship: parent, child, grandchild, great grandparent, great grandchild, sister, brother, aunt, uncle, niece, and nephew.” \(^{339}\) Regarding this as an exclusive list of possible third-degree relationships, the court concluded that a judge could not disqualify himself under § 455(b)(5) without establishing the existence of such a relationship. \(^{340}\)

ii. Where judge or relatives acting as lawyer

Subsection 455(b)(5)(ii) requires disqualification where the judge “or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person . . . is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding.” The Seventh Circuit held that a judge’s attendance at a related trial, to watch his son act as assistant counsel, did not require disqualification under § 455(b)(1). \(^{341}\) The defendant also sought disqualification under § 455(b)(5)(ii). Although the son, who was a third-year law student, “acted as a lawyer,” the court held that disqualification was not required under this subsection because the proceeding was not the same as that involving the defendant. It involved a defendant charged with conduct arising from the same conduct as the defendant in the case at bar, but the two men were not codefendants. “No

\(^{337}\) Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1571 (10th Cir. 1994).


\(^{339}\) Id. at 179.

\(^{340}\) Id.

\(^{341}\) In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 1998), discussed supra text accompanying notes 116–18 and 274–75.
matter how closely related the two cases were factually or legally . . . the fact remains that they were separate ‘proceedings.’” 342

In similar circumstances, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, required disqualification. In In re Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 343 seven claims against an insurance company were consolidated for trial, and the trial judge initially disqualified himself because his daughter’s law firm represented four of the claimants. The judge later separated the cases and planned to try the three claims in which his daughter’s firm was not involved. On mandamus petition, the court reversed because the cases remained intimately connected: “A decision on the merits of any important issue in any of the seven cases . . . could . . . constitute the law of the case in all of them, or involve collateral estoppel, or might be highly persuasive as a precedent.” 344 The court did not specify whether it based its decision on § 455(a) or § 455(b)(5)(ii), but a concurring opinion, joined by seven judges, emphasized that there was an actual conflict of interest pursuant to § 455(b)(5) as well as an appearance of partiality. 345

A proposed substitution or addition of counsel by one of the parties may create a conflict of interest requiring disqualification of the judge under § 455(b). The Eleventh Circuit held that, in such a case, the court may deny the request for new counsel, even apart from evidence or suspicion that it is made to spark disqualification, if it would cause undue delay. However, a showing of “overriding need” for the new counsel “would trump both time delay and the loss of prior judicial activity.” 346 Where the defendants retained the judge’s brother-in-law six years after the complaint was filed, the Fifth Circuit remanded for a determination of whether the primary motive in his hiring had been to disqualify the judge. The court held that “a lawyer may not enter a case for the primary purpose of forcing the presiding judge’s recusal.” 347 Otherwise, it observed, “a litigant could in effect veto the allotment and

342. Id. at 637. The court found that disqualification was required under § 455(a), which illustrates that the appearance of impropriety may require disqualification even absent ground for disqualification specifically enumerated in § 455(b).
343. 919 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1990).
344. Id. at 1143.
345. Id. at 1147.
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obtain a new judge by the simple expedient of finding one of the judge’s relatives who is willing to act as counsel . . .”

iii. Where judge or relatives have an interest that could be substantially affected

Subsection 455(b)(5)(iii) states that a judge must disqualified himself “where he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them or the spouse of such a person . . . is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.” A recurring problem implicating this section has arisen when relatives of the judge are employed by a law firm representing a party in litigation before the judge. In 1993, seven members of the Supreme Court, each with relatives employed by law firms, issued a letter responding to this concern. The justices noted that in cases where a relative appears before the judge as counsel, § 455(b)(5)(ii) requires disqualification. Since Congress could have, but did not, broaden this subsection to require disqualification whenever a relative is affiliated with a law firm that appears before a judge, the justices opined that Congress must not have regarded so broad a disqualification as necessary. That, in turn, refuted categorical assertions under § 455(a) that a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned whenever a firm that employs one of the judge’s relatives appears before him or her. And in the minds of the justices, it likewise refuted categorical claims that any lawyer-relative at the firm possessed an interest in the case under § 455(b)(5)(iii) sufficient to require disqualification. The signatories to the letter nonetheless indicated that they would disqualify themselves from any case in which a relative held a partnership interest in a firm appearing before the Court, unless the Court received assurances from the firm that the relative would not share in profits derived from the case. Salaried employees, in contrast, did not share in the profits of the firm and so had no significant interest in the outcome of cases heard by the Court.

The courts of appeals appear to concur that disqualification is unnecessary when a relative is simply a salaried employee of the firm that

348. Id. at 1264.
349. Supreme Court Statement of Recusal Policy, 114 S. Ct. (Orders Section, p. 52) (Nov. 1, 1993).
350. Id. at 53.
appears before the court. For example, the Eighth Circuit found disqualification unnecessary in a case in which a law firm representing a party before the judge had hired the judge’s daughter, who worked for the firm as a law clerk and later accepted a permanent job offer as associate starting in the fall. The court said, “an employment relationship between a party and a judge’s son or daughter does not per se necessitate a judge’s disqualification.”\textsuperscript{351} The issue is fact-dependent, and the facts in this case didn’t show an actual conflict under § 455(b)(iii).\textsuperscript{352} The daughter was not and would not, as a future employee of the law firm, be involved in the present litigation. She “was to be a salaried employee . . . not a partner whose income is directly related to the profit margin of the firm and could be substantially affected by the outcome of this case.”\textsuperscript{353} Finally, the firm was only one of many firms representing the parties, and its share of any damages almost certainly wouldn’t affect the salary or benefits of a first-year associate. Similarly, in \textit{Southwestern Bell Co. v. FCC},\textsuperscript{354} a court of appeals judge found that his son’s employment as a nonmanagement entry-level computer programmer for an intervenor in the case on appeal did not require the judge’s disqualification from the panel hearing the appeal.

The circuits are divided, however, on whether a relative of the judge who is a partner at a firm in litigation before the judge has an interest in the outcome that is sufficient to trigger the need for disqualification. In \textit{Potashnick v. Port City Construction Co.},\textsuperscript{355} the Fifth Circuit adopted a per se rule requiring disqualification where a relative of the judge is a partner in a law firm representing a party in the case: “[W]hen a partner in a law firm is related to a judge within the third degree, that partner will always be ‘known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome’ of a proceeding involving the partner’s law firm.”\textsuperscript{356}

\textsuperscript{351} \textit{In re} Kan. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 85 F.3d 1353, 1364 (8th Cir. 1996).
\textsuperscript{352} \textit{Id.} The court also held that there was no appearance of a conflict of interest in violation of § 455(a). \textit{Id.} at 1365.
\textsuperscript{353} \textit{Id.} at 1364.
\textsuperscript{354} 153 F.3d 520 (8th Cir. 1998).
\textsuperscript{355} 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980).
\textsuperscript{356} \textit{Id.} at 1113 (quoting § 455(b)(5)(iii)).
However, the Second Circuit explicitly rejected this per se approach in *Pashaian v. Eccelston Properties, Ltd.*\(^ {357} \) It found disqualification unnecessary where a partner in the law firm representing the defendant was married to the sister of the judge’s wife. “It would simply be unrealistic to assume . . . that partners in today’s law firms invariably ‘have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of’ any case in which any other partner is involved.”\(^ {358} \) The trial court had noted that the law firm in question had sixty partners and gross revenue in excess of $100 million. Moreover, the case was not likely to affect the firm’s reputation. The judge had concluded that his sister-in-law’s interest would not be “substantially affected” by the outcome of the case, and the court of appeals agreed.

In a Fifth Circuit false advertising case,\(^ {359} \) the district judge was not disqualified even though her father-in-law was a retired partner in the firm representing the defendants. The judge’s alleged interest in the proceeding under § 455(b)(5)(iii) was connected to the fact that since her father-in-law’s death, the firm had been paying her husband death benefits that were adjustable based on the salaries of partners within the firm. The Fifth Circuit held that this interest was too remote to constitute a disqualifying financial interest because “the Consumer Price Index always served as a ceiling on the adjustment to which [the judge’s father-in-law] was entitled,” making any interest the judge had in the outcome of the case so small as to be insignificant.\(^ {360} \)

In *Sensley v. Albritton,*\(^ {361} \) the plaintiffs moved to disqualify the trial judge, whose wife was employed as an assistant district attorney in the office representing the defendants, though she herself was in no way involved in the case. The plaintiffs, relying on § 455(b)(5)(iii), alleged that the outcome of the case might have an indirect effect on the judge’s wife’s ongoing employment in the office, in the event that the district attorney were to lose political popularity by losing the case. The Fifth Circuit found the plaintiffs’ allegations unconvincing because “they are only able to make this argument by layering several specula-

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357. 88 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1996).
358. *Id.* at 83 (quoting § 455(b)(5)(iii)).
360. *Id.* at 378.
361. 385 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 2004).
tive premises on top of one another to reach a speculative conclusion.\textsuperscript{362}

In a case concerning the constitutionality of state taxation practices,\textsuperscript{363} the Tenth Circuit concluded that § 455(b)(5) did not require disqualification even though the trial judge’s son’s father-in-law was state governor. It found that the governor was not within the third degree of relationship required by § 455(b)(5). In addition, the court rejected the idea that the governor had an interest in the outcome of the suit because it was not “alleged that [the governor] has a personal or financial interest in the outcome of this litigation,” and “[a] ny political interest that [the governor] may have in the outcome of this case is filtered through the State.”\textsuperscript{364}

iv. Where judge or relatives likely to be material witnesses

Subsection 455(b)(5)(iv) states that a judge must disqualify himself where “he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them or the spouse of such a person . . . is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.”

In \textit{United States v. Robinson},\textsuperscript{365} the Eighth Circuit ruled that the trial judge’s failure to disqualify himself under § 455(b)(5)(iv) when his nephew was one of thirty-four witnesses testifying on the same subject was harmless error. The court declined to reach the issue of whether the nephew was a material witness, holding that even if he was, the judge’s failure to disqualify was harmless. The court explained that, “[a] s in other areas of the law, there is surely room for harmless error committed by busy judges who inadvertently overlook disqualifying circumstances.”\textsuperscript{366}

\textbf{C. Disqualification procedure}

By its terms, § 455 simply states that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself” under the circumstances specified. In so stating, it obligates disqualifi-
carnation regardless of whether a motion to disqualify has been filed. Accordingly, the disqualification process may be triggered by a judge on his or her own initiative, or by a party, on motion.

1. Investigating disqualification claims

*United States v. Morrison*[^367] addressed the question whether a trial judge, asked to disqualify herself based on conflict of interest, may investigate the matter. When the defendant sought disqualification based on an alleged adverse business relationship between himself, the judge’s husband, and a friend of the judge, the judge asked her husband and friend to review the materials submitted in the defendant’s motion. Both the judge’s husband and friend stated that the allegations were false, and denied any relationship with the defendant. Accordingly, the judge declined to disqualify herself. The Second Circuit noted that “it was not irregular for [the judge] to ascertain her husband’s and friend’s possible involvement with the defendant simply by asking them, in a reasonable effort to confirm that [defendant’s] incredible claims were indeed not factual.”[^368]

Contrarily, when the trial judge does not adequately investigate and disclose potential grounds for disqualification, the judge’s ignorance of those grounds does not eliminate the potential conflict. In *Chase Manhattan v. Affiliated FM Insurance*,[^369] Chemical Bank merged with The Chase Manhattan Bank just prior to the case being assigned to the district judge. The newly merged entity used the Chase name, while counsel and the court used the Chemical Bank name to refer to the plaintiff. As a consequence, the district judge was unaware that his stock in Chase actually meant he had a financial interest in the plaintiff. Three years later and on remand, the judge became aware of the interest and immediately divested himself of his stock.[^370] Although it could not be established that the judge was in fact aware of his financial interest, the Second Circuit concluded that “a reasonable person knowing the pertinent facts” would conclude the judge was aware,  

[^367]: 153 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1998).
[^368]: *Id.* at 48 n.4.
[^369]: 343 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2003).
[^370]: *Id.* at 123.
which created the appearance of partiality under § 455(a). The appropriate remedy was the vacatur of the district court’s judgment awarding damages to Chemical Bank.

In a variation on this theme, the Sixth Circuit clarified that a litigant has no obligation to investigate possible bases for disqualification. After a trial judge learned of a conflict, he transferred the case to another judge. Faced with deciding whether a prior dispositive ruling by the first judge should be allowed to stand, the second judge noted that the disqualification motion had been filed after the judge’s adverse ruling, and stated that “the Court refuses to reward [the movant] or encourage this trend.” She further observed that “litigants have a duty to investigate and inform the court of any perceived biases before the court and the parties invest time and expense in a case.”

The Sixth Circuit rejected this analysis, stating:

We believe instead that litigants (and, of course, their attorneys) should assume the impartiality of the presiding judge, rather than pore through the judge's private affairs and financial matters. Further, judges have an ethical duty to “disclose on the record information which the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification.” Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1489 (11th Cir. 1995). . . . [The judge] possibly did not consider the matter sufficiently relevant to merit disclosure, but his non-disclosure did not vest in [the parties] a duty to investigate him.

2. Waiver of disqualification: § 455(e)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(e), waiver of a ground for disqualification based on § 455(a) “may be accepted provided it is preceded by a full

372. Id. at 130.
373. Id. at 132–33.
375. Id. at 742.
376. Id.
377. Id. See also In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 174 F. Supp. 2d 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). In an ongoing class action suit alleging widespread securities violations, the plaintiffs sought to present expert testimony by law professors explaining why the judge should disqualify himself. The court held that where the facts are undisputed, expert opinion on a disqualification motion is not acceptable. Id. at 66–67. See also United States v. Eyerman, 660 F. Supp. 775, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same).
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Disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification”; waiver of disqualification under § 455(b) is not permissible.378

Some courts of appeals have recognized waivers pursuant to § 455(e).379 In Perkins v. Spivey,380 the trial judge fully disclosed the potential conflict arising from his law clerk accepting an employment offer from a firm that occasionally represented one of the parties to the lawsuit. Counsel for both parties elected to proceed, and expressed no concern for the continued participation of the law clerk.381 The Eighth Circuit found that where counsel expressly assented to the clerk’s participation and failed to seek the judge’s disqualification in a timely manner after disclosure, the parties effectively waived the grounds for the judge’s disqualification.382

The Eleventh Circuit noted, however, that “[w]hile it is . . . permissible for a judge to accept a waiver of recusal, we believe this option should be limited to marginal cases and should be exercised with the utmost restraint.”383 Finding that the defendant did not validly waive his disqualification claim even though he was apprised of the potential disqualifying circumstance and did not seek disqualification, the Eleventh Circuit held that, as a general rule, “a federal judge should reach his own determination [on disqualification], without calling upon counsel to express their views. . . . The too frequent practice of advising counsel of a possible conflict, and asking counsel to indicate their approval of a judge’s remaining in a particular case is fraught with potential coercive elements which make this practice undesirable.”384

379. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 119 F.3d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Cargill, 66 F.3d 1256, 1261 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231, 236–37 (3d Cir. 1982).
380. 911 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1990).
381. Id. at 33.
382. Id.
384. Id. at 745–46 (quoting In re Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1226, 1231 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting Resolution L, Judicial Conference of the United States, Oct. 1971)).
Failure to comply with the procedural requirements for disclosure under § 455(e) for waiver of disqualification can result in reversal. 385 In Barksdale v. Emerick, 386 the trial court rejected a “belated” disqualification motion, explaining in its order that the court “order disclosed to counsel that one of its law clerks was related to a Defendant party herein at the July 8, 1986 status conference and counsel voiced no objections.” 387 Quoting § 455(e), the Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that “[t]here is no disclosure ‘on the record’ and therefore no properly obtained ‘waiver.’” 388 The court went on to say that § 455(e)’s disclosure and waiver requirements “must be strictly construed.” 389

3. Timeliness of disqualification motion

Unlike § 144, § 455 has no explicit requirement for a “timely” affidavit. Most circuits, however, require that a motion for disqualification be brought “at the earliest moment after knowledge of the facts demonstrating the basis for such disqualification.” 390 And all the circuits that have considered the issue agree that a party may not withhold “a recusal application as a fall-back position in the event of adverse rulings on pending matters.” 391 These circuits have held that the timeli-

385. See, e.g., Hall v. Small Bus. Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding § 455(e) waiver not valid where magistrate judge “failed fully to disclose the basis on which a reasonable person might ‘harbor doubts about the magistrate’s impartiality’”; vacating lower court’s judgment) (quoting Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980)).
386. 853 F.2d 1359 (6th Cir. 1988).
387. Id. at 1361.
388. Id. (Contie, J., dissenting).
389. Id. Accord United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1538–39 (7th Cir. 1985) (disclosure must be on record).
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ness requirement applies to § 455(b) as well, even though disqualification under that section cannot be waived.392 “[A] party having information that raises a possible ground for disqualification cannot wait until after an unfavorable judgment before bringing the information to the court’s attention.”393 The Fifth Circuit has said that “[t]he most egregious delay—the closest thing to per se untimeliness—occurs when a party already knows the facts purportedly showing an appearance of impropriety but waits until after an adverse decision has been made by the judge before raising the issue of recusal.”394

The Ninth Circuit requires “reasonable promptness after the ground for such a motion is ascertained.” The Second Circuit uses a four-factor analysis for determining the timeliness of a motion: (1) whether the movant has participated in a substantial manner in trial or pretrial proceedings; (2) whether granting the motion would waste judicial resources; (3) whether the motion was made after entry of judgment; and (4) whether the movant can show good cause for delay.395

At the same time, the Third Circuit has held that where a judge has knowledge of facts that lend themselves to an appearance of impropriety but fails to disclose this information, a party will not be charged

392. See Summers v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 917, 921 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The policy considerations supporting a timeliness requirement are the same in each section: to conserve judicial resources and prevent a litigant from waiting until an adverse decision has been handed down before moving to disqualify the judge.”); In re Kan. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 85 F.3d 1353, 1363 (8th Cir. 1996) (“While it is true that a § 455(b)(1) objection cannot be waived, it is still subject to the timeliness requirement of our cases.”).

393. Nordbrock v. United States, 2 F. App’x 779 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Rogers, 119 F.3d 1377, 1380 (9th Cir. 1997)).


395. Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 733 (9th Cir. 1991).

396. Apple, 829 F.2d at 334. See also United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 2007) (where motion seeking disqualification made prior to entry of judgment, and movant demonstrated good cause for delay, motion not untimely when raised two years after judge’s impartiality was first questioned).
with constructive or imputed knowledge of those facts when determining whether the motion was made in a timely manner. 397

However, in a case in which a city board of education was charged with constructive knowledge of the facts it used as grounds for its disqualification motion, the district court held that by failing to file the motion in a timely manner “in the vain and remote hope that a jury would somehow rule in favor of the Board and against the Plaintiff,” the board waived its right to raise the disqualification issue. 398

The Second Circuit has said that untimeliness can “constitute the basis for finding an implied waiver. But the distinction is a critical one, because while waiver—whether express or implied—will preclude appellate [review], untimeliness need not do so.” 399 Assuming the defendant’s failure to move for disqualification until after the trial judge had ruled against her was a forfeiture and not an implied waiver, the Second Circuit could review the claim only for plain error, and it held that the judge’s decision not to disqualify himself sua sponte was not plain error.

4. Evaluation of motion by merits judge

In a statutory scheme so committed to the appearance of impartial justice that it requires disqualification whenever a judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned,” it is curious that the task of deciding whether a judge is (or appears to be) too biased or conflicted to decide a matter fairly is left to the judge who is allegedly too biased or conflicted to decide the matter fairly. But given the presumption of impartiality to which a judge is entitled, and the inefficiency of calling upon a second judge to resolve a preliminary motion, the conventional practice in federal courts has been for disqualification motions to be decided by the judge whose disqualification is sought.

The First Circuit observed that “[a]lthough a trial judge faced with a § 455(a) disqualification motion may, in her discretion, leave the motion to a different judge, no reported case or accepted principle of law

compels her to do so . . . ." The weight of authority indicates that it is proper, indeed the norm, for the challenged judge to rule on a disqualification motion pursuant to § 455. Because § 455 contains no provision concerning the transfer of disqualification motions to another judge, a district judge in the Southern District of Illinois ruled that the motion to disqualify "must be decided by the judge whose disqualification is sought."

5. Judge’s postdisqualification authority

Many courts of appeals have held that, after disqualification, a judge may take no nonministerial actions with respect to the case. For example, in El Fenix de Puerto Rico v. The M/Y Johanny, on motion from one party the trial judge disqualified himself under § 455(a). However, when the other party moved for reconsideration, the court listened to arguments and entered a reconsideration order vacating the disqualification order. The First Circuit found this action improper: "[A] trial judge who has recused himself ‘should take no other action in the case except the necessary ministerial acts to have the case transferred to another judge.”


403. The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits concur with the First and Ninth Circuits that a judge can take no nonministerial actions after announcing his or her intentions to disqualify. See Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448, 457 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that district judge erred in vacating her disqualification order after disqualifying herself); Moody v. Simmons, 858 F.2d 137, 143–44 (3d Cir. 1988) (after disqualification, judge is limited to "the ‘housekeeping’ duties necessary to transfer a case to another judge"); Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines Inc., 712 F.2d 899, 904 (4th Cir. 1983) ("Patently a judge who is disqualified from acting must not be able to affect the determination of any cause from which he is barred.").

404. 36 F.3d 136 (1st Cir. 1994).

405. Id. at 141 (quoting 13A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3550 (2d ed. 1984)).
Similarly, in United States v. Feldman, during the pendency of a criminal defendant’s appeal, a merger was effected that made the judge a stockholder in an institution to which the defendant had been ordered to pay restitution. On remand, the trial judge wished to sentence the defendant while reassigning to a different judge only the restitution aspect of the sentence. The Ninth Circuit rejected that effort. In United States v. O’Keefe, the judge granted a party’s motion for a new trial, then disqualified himself from further involvement. After the case was transferred to a new judge, the government moved for reconsideration of the order granting a new trial. The new judge transferred the case back to the original judge to rule on the motion for reconsideration, which the judge did. The Fifth Circuit ruled that this was improper, rejecting the contention “that an exception from the bright-line rule for recusals . . . should be created for motions for reconsideration because a [new] judge cannot reconsider what that judge has not considered previously.” New judges often must act on motions for reconsideration first heard by other judges who later died or became ill. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that its “ruling today may put one district court judge in the somewhat uncomfortable position of having to pass judgment on the discretionary rulings of another judge,” but found this circumstance was outweighed by “the values underlying 28 U.S.C. § 455,” which require that a judge who has disqualified himself or herself take no further action.

The Second Circuit, however, has refused to apply a pure bright-line approach. In Pashaian v. Eccelston Properties, Ltd., the trial judge concluded that disqualification in the face of an alleged conflict of interest was not legally required, but disqualified himself as a matter of

406. 983 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1992).
407. Id. at 145. Accord Stringer v. United States, 233 F.2d 947, 948 (9th Cir. 1956) (“once having disqualified himself for cause . . . it was incurable error for the district judge to resume full control and try the case”).
408. 128 F.3d 885 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1078 (1998).
409. Id. at 891.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 891–92 n.6. See also United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 212 (1980) (“In federal courts generally, when an individual judge is disqualified . . . by reason of § 455, the disqualified judge simply steps aside and allows the normal administrative processes of the court to assign the case to another judge not disqualified.”).
412. 88 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1996).
prudence to avoid any possibility of appellate reversal after prolonged proceedings. He chose, however, to make disqualification effective only after he ruled on a pending motion for preliminary injunction. On appeal, the Second Circuit found that disqualification was indeed unnecessary and then addressed the contention that, nevertheless, “once he decided to recuse himself as a matter of discretion, such recusal had to be total and immediate.”413 If so, ruling on the motion for preliminary injunction would have been clearly improper. The Second Circuit held that the trial court’s willingness to rule on the preliminary injunction motion prior to disqualification was

a practical and appropriate resolution of the situation . . . . We note also the potential for mischief in imposing an inflexible rule . . . and are accordingly loath to articulate a rule that would frustrate or obviate the careful exercise of judicial discretion by district judges in responding to disqualification motions in unusual circumstances.414

The unusual circumstances included the fact that the plaintiffs sought enforcement of a judgment ensuing from litigation that had occurred years earlier, with the motion for disqualification surfacing just prior to the scheduled ruling on the proposed injunction.

Pashaian may be reconciled with the other cases on the ground that the delayed disqualification was entirely prudential, not legally obligatory.415 Although it is beyond the scope of this monograph, “prudential” disqualification presents ethical problems of its own, given the judge’s obligation under Canon 3A(2) of the Code of Conduct to “hear and decide matters assigned, unless disqualified.” The best course for a trial judge is to disqualify himself or herself only when disqualification is necessary, and to take no nonministerial action after disqualification.

413. Id. at 84.
414. Id. at 84–85.
415. See also United States v. Lauersen, 348 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2003). The trial judge owned an insubstantial amount of stock in a company entitled to a negligible restitution claim against the criminal defendant. Disqualification was unnecessary, and the judge was allowed to reverse his decision because the case had not yet been transferred to another judge, and no final judgment had been entered.
A few litigants have objected to a disqualified judge transferring the case to another judge. This claim is generally rejected. The Fifth Circuit, however, drew a different conclusion in *McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co.* It stated that permitting a disqualified judge to assign the case “would violate the congressional command that the disqualified judge be removed from all participation in the case” and might also “create suspicion that the disqualified judge will select a successor whose views are consonant with his.”

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416. See United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Judge Tjoflat’s assignment of Judge Alaimo was a purely ministerial act, without any implications concerning the merits of the case.”); *In re Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.*, 919 F.2d 1136, 1145 (6th Cir. 1990) (“even a judge who has recused himself ought to be permitted to perform the duties necessary to transfer the case to another judge”); *In re Cement Antitrust Litig.*, 673 F.2d 1020, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[W]e refuse to construe the word ‘proceeding’ to include the performance of ministerial duties such as assigning a case to another judge.”).

417. 714 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1983).

418. *Id.* at 1261.
III. Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 144

A. Overview

Section 144 of Title 28 states in its entirety:

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.

The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith. 419

By its terms, § 144 applies only to district judges, as compared to § 455, which applies to any “justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States.” A literal reading of § 144 suggests that a party can force disqualification automatically, simply by filing an affidavit alleging that the judge is biased against the affiant or in favor of the affiant’s opponent. Such an interpretation would render § 144 akin to peremptory disqualification procedures adopted by judicial systems in a number of western states—and the legislative history of § 144 lends some support for this interpretation. 420

The federal courts have indeed held that under § 144 a judge must step aside upon the filing of a facially sufficient affidavit; but they have been exacting in their interpretations of what a facially sufficient affidavit requires and of the procedural prerequisites to application of the statute. Thus, motions have been dismissed for untimeliness; because the movant failed to submit an affidavit or submitted more than one affidavit; because the attorney rather than a party submitted the affida-

419. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1949). Originally enacted as § 21 of the Judicial Code of 1911, the statute was recodified as § 144 in 1948 without significant change.

420. 46 Cong. Rec. 2627 (1911) (remarks of Representative Cullop).
vit; because the movant’s affidavit was unaccompanied by a certificate of counsel or failed to make allegations with particularity; and because the certificate of counsel certified only to the affiant’s—not counsel’s—good faith.421

As a consequence, § 144 has been rendered a much more cumbersome tool to obtain disqualification than § 455, even though § 455 calls upon judges to evaluate the merits of a movant’s allegations and not simply the facial sufficiency of those allegations. Some have criticized the federal courts for what they regard as an unduly stingy construction of § 144, but it bears note that over the years, several members of Congress have introduced bills to override federal court interpretation of § 144, and none have passed.422

An additional reason that § 144 has fallen into relative disuse is that it requires the more difficult showing of actual bias, whereas § 455(a) requires a mere appearance of bias. Section 455 thus subsumes § 144: As the Supreme Court has observed of § 144, it “seems to be properly invocable only when § 455(a) can be invoked anyway.”423 Moreover, many of the circumstances that might qualify as actual bias under § 144 are specifically enumerated in § 455(b), which explicitly addresses various conflicts of interest, in addition to actual bias.424 In short, while parties still file motions under § 144, they usually do so in tandem with

421. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1072 (7th Cir. 1990) (counsel did not present certificate of good faith, “another requirement of section 144 with which Barnes failed to comply”); In re Cooper & Lynn, 821 F.2d 833, 838 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[N]o party filed an affidavit . . . Rather the affidavit was filed by an attorney.”); United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 961 (5th Cir. 1986) (“Elder’s affidavit violates the one-affidavit rule . . . and need not be considered.”); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Because of the statutory limitation that a party may file only one affidavit in a case, we need consider only the affidavit filed with Balistrieri’s first motion.”); Roberts v. Bailer, 625 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1980) (motion rejected because counsel, not plaintiff, signed and filed affidavit); United States ex rel. Wilson v. Coughlin, 472 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1973) (same); Morrison v. United States, 432 F.2d 1227, 1229 (5th Cir. 1970) (motion rejected because there was no certificate of good faith by counsel); United States v. Hoffa, 382 F.2d 856, 860 (6th Cir. 1967) (same).

422. For a discussion of failed amendments, see Comment, Disqualifying Federal District Judges Without Cause, 50 Wash. L. Rev. 109 (1974).


424. See id. (“section 455 is the more modern and complete recusal statute”).


§ 455, with the latter section typically monopolizing the court’s attention.

B. Grounds for disqualification

1. Bias or prejudice

As noted in the overview, under § 144 disqualification is triggered by an affidavit that alleges “the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against [the affiant] or in favor of any adverse party.” The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have explained that “[t]o warrant recusal under § 144, the moving party must allege facts that would convince a reasonable person that bias actually exists.” In *Liteky v. United States*, the Supreme Court noted that the standard for bias or prejudice under § 144 is identical to disqualification for bias and prejudice under § 455(b)(1). In so stating, it distinguished § 455(a), which requires allegations of bias “to be evaluated on an objective basis, so that what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.” The Ninth Circuit, however, has imported § 455(a)’s objective standard into its § 144 analysis (before and after *Liteky*), declaring that “[u]nder both recusal statutes, the substantive standard is ‘[W]hether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’”

2. Extrajudicial source doctrine revisited

The “extrajudicial source” doctrine, previously discussed in Part II in connection with § 455, likewise applies to § 144—indeed the doctrine was initially developed under § 144. Thus, ordinarily, disqualifying bias will have an extrajudicial origin—judges often acquire an unfavorable

425. Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm. on Performance & Expenditure Review, 637 F.2d 1014, 1019 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981); Christo v. Padgett, 325 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
427. Id. at 548 (“paragraph (b)(1) entirely duplicated the grounds of recusal set forth in § 144”).
428. Id.
429. Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1997)).
opinion of a party in light of what they learn in the course of judicial proceedings, but that will rarely warrant disqualification. It bears re-emphasis, however, that in Liteky—the Supreme Court’s latest word on the extrajudicial source doctrine—the Court took pains to emphasize that “there is not much doctrine to the doctrine,” and that sometimes a judge is subject to disqualification under §§ 144 and 455 for bias manifested in judicial proceedings:

[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.431

To illustrate the disqualifying bias that can manifest itself in judicial proceedings, the Liteky Court pointed to a comment of the district judge in the 1921 case of Berger v. United States:432 “One must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not [to be] prejudiced against the German Americans’ because their ‘hearts are reeking with disloyalty.’”

Liteky rejected an additional argument in support of a rigid extrajudicial source rule under § 144. Section 144 requires disqualification for “personal bias or prejudice.” Limiting § 144 to “personal” bias arguably justifies the exclusion of official or “judicial” bias from its scope, and so confines its application to allegations of extrajudicial or personal bias. In Liteky, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “a number of Courts of Appeals have relied upon the word ‘personal’ in restricting § 144 to extrajudicial sources,” but concluded “that that mistakes the basis for the ‘extrajudicial source’ doctrine.”434

430. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554.
431. Id. at 555.
432. 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
433. Id. at 28 (quoted in Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555).
434. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548–49.
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Bias and prejudice seem to us not divided into the “personal” kind, which is offensive, and the official kind, which is perfectly all right. As generally used, these are pejorative terms, describing dispositions that are never appropriate. . . . Secondly, interpreting the term “personal” to create a complete dichotomy between court-acquired and extrinsically acquired bias produces results so intolerable as to be absurd. Imagine, for example, a lengthy trial in which the presiding judge for the first time learns of an obscure religious sect, and acquires a passionate hatred for all its adherents. This would be “official” rather than “personal” bias, and would provide no basis for the judge’s recusing himself.435

Some federal courts have since adopted Liteky’s more nuanced approach to § 144 and analyze allegations of in-court bias to see if they meet the “high degree of favoritism or antagonism” standard.436 Others, however, continue to use the pre-Liteky analysis by rejecting § 144 motions if the accompanying affidavit does not allege an “extrajudicial source” for the judge’s purported bias, or fails to show that the bias was “personal,” as opposed to “judicial.”437

3. Bias toward counsel

Of the cases dealing primarily with § 144, a sizable percentage involves a judge’s alleged antipathy toward counsel. On its terms, § 144 requires bias against the party. Accordingly, a judge’s hostility toward counsel is

435. Id. at 549–50.
436. See, e.g., Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Liteky at length, noting allegations of bias were based on conduct in judicial proceedings, and upholding district court’s assessment that “Pesnell failed to ‘demonstrate any such “deep-seated favoritism that would make fair judgment impossible”’”); Christo v. Padgett, 323 F.3d 1324, 1333–34 (2000) (quoting Liteky and concluding that affiant’s allegations did not show extrajudicial source of bias or reflect improper hostility or partiality).
437. United States v. Miller, 355 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Defendant’s allegations concern judicial, non-personal matters and cannot properly be the basis of a motion for disqualification.”); Young v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409, 422–23 (6th Cir. 2003) (relying on pre-Liteky cases for the propositions that the “alleged bias ‘must stem from an extrajudicial source’” and that “extrajudicial conduct encompasses only ‘personal bias as distinguished from a judicial one,’” and concluding that “recusal is also unwarranted because Plaintiffs do not allege bias from extrajudicial sources”).
generally an insufficient ground for disqualification.\textsuperscript{438} However, courts have held that "under specific circumstances bias against an attorney can reasonably be imputed to a party."\textsuperscript{439} As the Seventh Circuit explained, "the party seeking recusal on that theory must allege facts suggesting that the alleged bias against counsel might extend to the party."\textsuperscript{440} The allegations to that effect cannot be "merely conclusory."\textsuperscript{441}

Conversely, the Seventh Circuit rejected the contention that a lawyer’s praise of the judge required disqualification. In \textit{Sullivan v. Conway},\textsuperscript{442} the lawyer had written a letter to his client maintaining that, as a result of removal of the case to federal court, "we have a much better judge."\textsuperscript{443} By mistake, the letter ended up in the hands of opposing counsel, who showed it to the judge and petitioned for disqualification. The Seventh Circuit rejected the contention that the affidavit evinced alleged bias sufficient to require referral of the matter to another judge:

We can imagine, though only with great difficulty, a case in which public praise of a judge by a lawyer was so fulsome as to call into question the judge’s psychological fortitude to rule against his encomiast. But here there was no public praise . . . and the praise would not have come to [the judge’s] attention, and so would never have threatened to turn his head, had not the lawyer wishing to disqualify him brought it to his attention.\textsuperscript{444}

\textsuperscript{438} See, e.g., United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1993); Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991); Souder v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 939 F.2d 647, 653 (8th Cir. 1991); \textit{In re Cooper & Lynn}, 821 F.2d 833, 838 (1st Cir. 1987).

\textsuperscript{439} \textit{Souder}, 939 F.2d at 653. \textit{Accord Sykes}, 7 F.3d at 1339; United States v. Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652, 656 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988); \textit{In re Beard}, 811 F.2d 818, 830 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459, 462 (10th Cir. 1976); Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1050–51 (5th Cir. 1975).

\textsuperscript{440} \textit{Sykes}, 7 F.3d at 1339.

\textsuperscript{441} \textit{Id.} at 1340. \textit{Accord Souder}, 939 F.2d at 653 n.6.

\textsuperscript{442} 157 F.3d 1092 (7th Cir. 1998).

\textsuperscript{443} \textit{Id.} at 1095.

\textsuperscript{444} \textit{Id.} at 1096.
C. Disqualification procedure

Unlike § 455(a), which can be brought by motion but also requires judges to disqualify sua sponte where appropriate, § 144 is triggered only by the submission of an affidavit and motion for disqualification. Absent this trigger, there is no basis for disqualification under § 144, and no appeal based on § 144 will be heard. Apart from meeting the substantive standard, § 144 sets forth several procedural requirements, and courts demand “strict compliance.”

1. Timeliness

Section 144 raises issues of timing twice—in the first paragraph, when it calls for the filing of a “timely” affidavit, and again in the second paragraph, when it states that a motion for disqualification “shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term [session] at which the proceeding is to be heard.” With the abolition of terms of court in 1963, this latter provision no longer applies directly. Some federal courts, however, have nonetheless required that the affidavit be filed within ten days of the beginning of the proceeding. Other courts have determined timeliness on the basis of whether the affidavit was filed as soon as practicable or promptly “after the facts forming the basis of the disqualification became known.” Either way, numerous cases have involved rejection of § 144 motions because of untimely affidavits.

445. See, e.g., United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1999).
446. In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997).
450. See, e.g., Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 919 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Young, 907 F.2d 867, 868 (8th Cir. 1990); Easley v. University of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351, 1357 (6th Cir. 1988).
2. Facial sufficiency affidavit

Section 144 conditions disqualification on the moving party filing a sufficient affidavit. If no affidavit is filed, disqualification will be denied. In the landmark case, Berger v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted the statutory predecessor to § 144 to require that the challenged judge accept all facts alleged in the affidavit as true, and not pass on the truth of the alleged facts. Rather, the judge’s role was limited to evaluating the facial sufficiency of the affidavit for the purpose of determining whether a reasonable person could find “fair support” for the charge that the judge was biased against the movant or in favor of another party. Many circuits have since reiterated this principle.

In Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, the Ninth Circuit departed from the prevailing view. While acknowledging that “a judge is generally required to accept the truth of the factual assertions in an Affidavit

452. Id.
453. Id. at 33–34.
454. See In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Section 144 is unusual because it requires that the district judge accept the affidavit as true even though it may contain averments that are false and may be known to be so to the judge.”); United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In passing on the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, the court must assume the truth of its factual assertions even if it knows them to be false.”) (quoting United States v. Balistieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1985)); Souder v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 939 F.2d 647, 653 (8th Cir. 1991) (“In reviewing [§ 144] affidavits the court must not pass on the factual merit of any allegation but must restrict its analysis to the legal sufficiency of the affidavit.”); Weatherhead v. Globe Int’l, Inc., 832 F.2d 1226, 1227 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Under § 144, the judge cannot assess the truth of the facts alleged.”); and Albert v. United States Dist. Ct., 283 F.2d 61, 62 (6th Cir. 1960) (in assessing § 144 motion, judge “must accept the facts alleged in the affidavit as true, as they may not be controverted”). See also United States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 109, 110 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting trial court felt “bound by statute and Supreme Court precedent to accept Rankin’s factual allegations as true”). But see Henderson v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corrs., 901 F.2d 1288, 1296 (5th Cir. 1990) (“the judge must pass on the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, but may not pass on the truth of the matter alleged”) (quoting Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs of Mobile County, 517 F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th Cir. 1975)).

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of Bias filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144, the court made an exception because the allegation of bias “relates to facts that were peculiarly within the judge’s knowledge.” The party had accused the judge of various improper ex parte communications, but the Ninth Circuit held that disqualification was unnecessary, in part, because the judge knew the allegations were false.

The prevailing view that judges accept all allegations in a § 144 affidavit as true has prompted the concern that judges are left helpless to stop parties from disqualifying judges by filing false affidavits. There are isolated cases in which disqualification on the basis of sham affidavits may have occurred. For example, in United States v. Rankin, the defendant alleged that in a previous trial the judge had chased the defendant around the courtroom and assaulted him. While denying the bizarre accusation, the trial judge nevertheless disqualified himself from the second trial on the ground that § 144 bound him to accept the allegations as true. In an earlier unrelated case, the Third Circuit had held a refusal to disqualify improper, even though “[p]robably the district court is right that there is no basis for the allegations” that the judge made improper statements (e.g., “If I had anything to do with it you would have gone to the electric chair.”). The court of appeals expressed “sympathy with district judges confronted with what they know to be groundless charges of personal bias” but held that § 144 requires acceptance of factual allegations as true.

Courts have, however, countered this potential problem by scrutinizing the facial sufficiency of § 144 affidavits. As the First Circuit explained, “courts have responded to the draconian procedure—automatic transfer based solely on one side’s affidavit—by insisting on

456. Id. at 701.
457. Id.
458. 870 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1989).
459. The second trial was reassigned. Thereafter, the government indicted the defendant for perjury arising out of the statements in his affidavit seeking the first judge’s disqualification. The Rankin opinion concerned issues relating to this indictment.
461. Id.
a firm showing in the affidavit that the judge does have a personal bias or prejudice to a party.  

Virtually every circuit has therefore imposed some variation of the requirement that movants’ affidavits be sufficient to “convince a reasonable person” that their judge is biased.  

For example, the Seventh Circuit stated:

[T]he facts averred must be sufficiently definite and particular to convince a reasonable person that bias exists; simple conclusions, opinions, or rumors are insufficient. . . . Because the statute “is heavily weighed in favor of recusal,” its requirements are to be strictly construed to prevent abuse.

In a similar vein, the Tenth Circuit observed that § 144 creates the rebuttable presumption that the challenged judge is impartial, which imposes a burden on the affiant to demonstrate the judge’s partiality. 

Several circuits have thus ruled that the movant’s affidavit must state with particularity material facts supporting allegations of the judge’s bias. According to the D.C. Circuit, “stating the facts with particularity” means the affidavit “must be strictly construed [against the affiant]; it must be definite as to time, place, persons and circumstances.”

The Tenth Circuit has reached a similar conclusion. By requiring that the challenging party state facts material to the allegations of the judge’s bias with particularity, the courts have excluded conclusory

462. In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997).
464. United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
465. In re McCarthy, 368 F.3d 1266, 1269 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1992)).
assertions, as well as opinions and rumors, from the realm of allegations that may support a judge’s disqualification. \(^{469}\) Even if the affidavit is deemed facially sufficient and the case is transferred, the First Circuit has observed that “the possibility remains, although not developed in the statute, that the transferee judge might hold a hearing, conclude that the affidavit was false and transfer the action back to the original judge.” \(^{470}\)

3. Counsel’s certificate of good faith

Section 144 states: “A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.” \(^{471}\) The question has arisen whether counsel’s certificate of good faith must assert that counsel believes the allegations to be true or whether counsel merely believes that his or her client is acting in good faith. The word “it” in the phrase quoted above seems to refer back to the party’s affidavit, and thus to require that counsel vouch for the good faith of the party’s belief—not counsel’s own belief—that the facts are true. However, the two circuits that have addressed the question directly have held otherwise. The First Circuit held a § 144 motion inadequate in part because counsel’s certificate of good faith asserted only that the party acted in good faith. \(^{472}\) The court noted that

[One] may well question the value of counsel’s opinion of what is in his client’s mind, and we certainly must disagree . . . that it is a client’s “right” to have counsel’s certification when counsel believes the affidavit’s recitation to be false. If a certificate is to serve the purpose of shielding a court which cannot test the truth of claimed facts, it should at least carry the assertion that counsel believes the facts alleged to be accurate and correct. \(^{473}\)

The D.C. Circuit reached a similar conclusion. \(^{474}\)

\(^{469}\) See, e.g., Burger, 964 F.2d 1065; Weatherhead, 832 F.2d 1226.
\(^{470}\) In re Martínez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997).
\(^{472}\) In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1961).
\(^{473}\) Id. at 385.
Failure to comply with other procedural requirements of § 144 has likewise resulted in rejection of motions under the statute. 475

v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1993) (certificate must “stat[e] that the affidavit is made in good faith”).

475. See supra text accompanying and cases cited in note 421.
IV. Disqualification Under
28 U.S.C. § 47

A little-used disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 47, provides that “no judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him.”476 One reason the statute has barely surfaced in the case law is that its applicability is limited to cases in which a trial judge subsequently serves as an appellate judge in the same matter, which may occur when a district judge is appointed to the circuit court or sits on the circuit court by designation. A second reason it is so rarely employed is that on those occasions where it suggests a basis of disqualification, the same result would also be reached by reference to § 455(a).

As an historical aside, however, it may be noted that this was not always so. When members of the Supreme Court “rode circuit” in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it was not uncommon for them to hear appeals as Supreme Court justices from cases they decided as circuit court judges.

In Russell v. Lane,477 the trial judge in a habeas case reviewed a decision of a state appellate court in which the judge had been a member of the panel. The Seventh Circuit found that this created an appearance of impropriety in violation of § 455(a). In reaching that decision, however, the court cited the relevance of § 47, noting that it “is an express ground for recusal . . . in modern American law for a judge to sit on the appeal from his own case.”478

A somewhat more extended discussion of § 47 is found in an opinion by Judge James Craven, Jr., of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, explaining his disqualification from a school desegregation case.479 As a district judge years earlier, he heard and decided a case involving the same parties. Although the instant case was a separate lawsuit, it raised the identical “ultimate question.” Citing the Supreme Court’s treatment of the predecessor statute to § 47, Judge Craven held that the statute must be “strictly construed” to prevent judges

477. 890 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1989).
478. Id. at 948.
from, in effect, sitting in appellate judgment of their own earlier decisions.\textsuperscript{480}

In \textit{Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.},\textsuperscript{481} the Supreme Court observed that it makes no difference whether “the question may be easy of solution or that the parties may consent to the judge’s participation” because “the sole [statutory] criterion” is whether the case on appeal “involve[s] a question which the judge has tried or heard” in the proceedings below.\textsuperscript{482} In \textit{Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Co. v. International Curtiss Marine Turbine Co.},\textsuperscript{483} the Supreme Court vacated an appellate decision notwithstanding the parties’ consent to the trial judge sitting on the appeal, holding that the appellate panel was “not organized in conformity to law.”\textsuperscript{484}

The Third Circuit, however, rejected without explanation the contention that a district judge, sitting by designation on the Third Circuit panel (and the author of the court opinion), should be disqualified pursuant to § 47.\textsuperscript{485} In his capacity as trial judge, he had accepted the defendant’s conditional plea of guilt. On appeal, the defendant argued that his guilty plea should be vacated because the indictment against him resulted from prosecutorial vindictiveness. At oral argument, the judge informed counsel of his involvement in the case. Counsel did not object, and disqualification was waived. In a footnote, the Third Circuit, after “[h]aving independently considered this matter, . . . conclude[d] that there is no basis for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 47.”\textsuperscript{486} The court’s reasoning may have been based on the nature of the defendant’s appeal, which did not claim any impropriety in the plea agreement or challenge any action taken by the judge. Rather, the defendant objected to the bringing of the indictment in the first place.

\textsuperscript{480} \textit{Id.} at 136. \textit{See also} \textit{Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.}, 228 U.S. 339 (1913); \textit{Moran v. Dillingham}, 174 U.S. 153 (1899).
\textsuperscript{481} 228 U.S. 339 (1913).
\textsuperscript{482} \textit{Id.} at 344.
\textsuperscript{483} 228 U.S. 645 (1913).
\textsuperscript{484} \textit{Id.} at 652.
\textsuperscript{485} United States \textit{v. Morrow}, 717 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1983).
\textsuperscript{486} \textit{Id.} at 801 n.1.
V. Disqualification on Appeal

A. Routes of appellate review

Aggrieved parties often challenge a judge’s refusal to disqualify. All courts of appeals permit a party to seek interlocutory review via mandamus, reasoning that, at least in some cases, the damage to public confidence in the justice system (or perhaps to the litigants) would not be undone by postjudgment appeal.

The Third and Seventh Circuits have said that while petitioning for a writ of mandamus is a proper means for appellate review of a district court’s refusal to disqualify pursuant to § 455(a), it is unavailable for a challenge under § 144. The reasoning is that § 144, which addresses actual bias, protects litigants, but § 455, which concerns whether a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, also protects public confidence in the judiciary. “While review after final judgment can (at a cost) cure the harm to a litigant, it cannot cure the additional, separable harm to public confidence that § 455 is designed to prevent.”

487. See, e.g., In re Va. Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1976). A motion for mandamus was brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The motion involved a “controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion” as to how the recently amended § 455 should be applied to the facts. Id. at 363 (quoting § 1292(b)), 364. While the decision against disqualification was not ordinarily appealable under this statute, this case presented an exception because the trial judge’s decision effectively meant that no judge residing in the state of Virginia could preside over the case, even though the lawsuit was filed in the Eastern District of Virginia.

488. See, e.g., In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir. 1981); In re IBM Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 926–27 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 774–78 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Rogers, 537 F.2d 1196, 1197 n.1 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 614 F.2d 958, 961 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 919 F.2d 1136, 1139–43 (6th Cir. 1990); SCA Servs. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 117 (7th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 677 F.2d 626, 643 (8th Cir. 1982); In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1982); Bell v. Chandler, 569 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1978).

489. See Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 774–78; SCA Servs., 557 F.2d at 117.

490. Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 776.
Most circuits apply their usual standard for mandamus—often placing a heavy burden on the movant.\textsuperscript{491} Allocating the burden to the movant serves a “strong judicial policy” that disfavors piecemeal appeals.\textsuperscript{492} After all, the movant has the opportunity to appeal the disqualification decision after the case has been decided on the merits,\textsuperscript{493} and a full “contextual assessment” can be done for allegations of impartiality.\textsuperscript{494}

The First Circuit, however, has adopted a separate standard for entertaining a mandamus action seeking disqualification: “[w]hen the issue of partiality has been broadly publicized, and the claim of bias cannot be labeled as frivolous.”\textsuperscript{495} It has also stated that the standard for granting mandamus should be relaxed “in a criminal case in which the government seeks the judge’s recusal, for a defendant’s verdict will terminate the case, thereby rendering the usual remedy, end-of-case appeal, illusory.”\textsuperscript{496} Where the government seeks disqualification in a criminal case, “the ordinary abuse-of-discretion standard rather than

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{491} See, e.g., \textit{In re Larson}, 43 F.3d 410, 412 (8th Cir. 1994) (petitioner must establish “clear and indisputable right” to disqualification); \textit{In re McCarthy}, 368 F.3d 1266, 1269 (10th Cir. 2004) (where a party “lacks an adequate factual basis for disqualification,” the court of appeals will not issue a mandamus).
\item \textsuperscript{492} Alexander v. Chi. Park Dist., 709 F.2d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1983).
\item \textsuperscript{493} See, e.g., \textit{In re Vazquez-Botet}, 464 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 2006) (where motion for mandamus denied because of lack of “clear and indisputable” entitlement to relief, court did not have to address whether judge should have disqualified; so defendant was still free to raise denial of motion for disqualification on appeal after final judgment).
\item \textsuperscript{494} Alexander, 709 F.2d at 471. See also Scenic Holding, LLC v. The New Bd. of Tr. of the Tabernacle Missionary Baptist Church, Inc., 506 F.3d 656, 665 (8th Cir. 2007) (although the judge improperly injected his religious beliefs into the proceedings, looking at the \textit{totality of the circumstances}, a reasonable person would not conclude religious favoritism on the part of the judge; thus the judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to disqualify).
\item \textsuperscript{495} \textit{In re United States}, 158 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also \textit{In re Boston’s Children First}, 244 F.3d 164, 167 (1st Cir. 2001) (where question of judge’s partiality was highly publicized, writ of disqualification issued where it may not have under normal circumstances) (citing \textit{In re Martinez-Catala}, 129 F.3d 213, 217 (1st Cir. 1997)).
\item \textsuperscript{496} \textit{In re United States}, 158 F.3d at 30.
\end{itemize}
the more exacting standard usually applicable to petitions for mandamus” should be used.\footnote{Id. at 31.}

In the Seventh Circuit, mandamus is the only means to challenge a refusal to disqualify pursuant to § 455(a), although post-final-judgment appeal is available to challenge refusals to disqualify under § 144 and § 455(b).\footnote{See, e.g., United States v. Farrington, 27 F. App’x 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ruzzano, 247 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2001); In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Horton, 98 F.3d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1205 (7th Cir. 1985). Cf. United States v. Boyd, 208 F.3d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 2000) (Ripple, J., dissenting) (urging Seventh Circuit to join rest of courts of appeals in permitting appellate review of failure to disqualify under § 455(a)).} The Seventh Circuit’s rationale in requiring a party to petition for writ of mandamus to preserve a disqualification challenge is that the injury the court seeks to prevent “is not an injury to an individual party, but rather to the judicial system as a whole.”\footnote{Ruzzano, 247 F.3d at 695.}

\section*{B. Standards of review}

Every court of appeals except the Seventh Circuit generally uses an “abuse of discretion” standard for reviewing a trial court’s decision about disqualification.\footnote{See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 26 (1st Cir. 2005); Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Omega, S.A., 432 F.3d 437, 447 (2d Cir. 2005); Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 166 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 665 (4th Cir. 2003); In re Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 121 F.3d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Triple S Rests., Inc., 422 F.3d 405, 417 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Larsen, 427 F.3d 1091, 1095 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Wilkerson, 208 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2000); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 659 (10th Cir. 2002); Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Roach, 108 F.3d 1477, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1997).} The Seventh Circuit sometimes applies a de novo standard of review.\footnote{See United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1203 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying de novo standard of review to motions brought pursuant to both §§ 144 and 455). See also Sac & Fox Nation v. Cuomo, 193 F.3d 1162, 1168 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying de novo standard where district judge “did not create a record or document her decision not to recuse”). But see Tezak v. United States, 256 F.3d 702, 716 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying abuse of discretion standard).

\footnote{Id. at 31.}
In *Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. AT&T,* the D.C. Circuit used a stricter standard in reviewing a judge’s factual findings that gave rise to Southern Pacific’s claim that it was denied a fair trial because of the judge’s legal and policy bias. Southern Pacific asked the court to remand the case for a new trial or, in the alternative, to abandon the “clearly erroneous” standard when reviewing the district court’s factual findings. Although the court declined to abandon the standard, it “reviewed the District Court’s findings against the record with particular, even painstaking, care” in view of the judicial misconduct allegations.

In *SEC v. Loving Spirit Foundation Inc.*, although the D.C. Circuit adopted the “abuse of discretion” standard for disqualification under § 455, it did not articulate a binding standard of review for § 144, finding that it “need not decide which standard to adopt, for even reviewing de novo we can easily sustain [the trial judge’s] decision.” In *United States v. Microsoft Corp.*, however, the D.C. Circuit rejected greater scrutiny of the judge’s fact-findings because, absent evidence of actual bias, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure § 2(a) “mandates clearly erroneous review of all district court factfindings.”

When applying the “abuse of discretion” standard, the appellate courts recognize that there “will be occasions in which [it] affirm[s] the district court even though [it] would have gone the other way” had the standard been de novo review. Factors that may be used to assess whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion include whether the trial judge “engaged in measured and considered deliberations” before handing down a ruling; whether the ruling was “well-reasoned”; whether, after declining to disqualify, the judge’s rulings

503. *Id.* at 984.
504. 392 F.3d 486, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
505. 253 F.3d 34, 117 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
506. *Alloco v. City of Coral Gables*, 159 F. App’x 921, 923 (11th Cir. 2005).
507. *Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc.*, 368 F.3d 709, 719 (7th Cir. 2004). See also *Dixon v. Clem*, 492 F.3d 665, 679 (5th Cir. 2007) (judge didn’t abuse discretion by writing “lengthy and meticulous legal analysis” as to why he refused to disqualify himself, and imposing sanctions against plaintiff’s attorney).
508. *Alloco*, 159 F. App’x at 923.
and conduct called the judge’s impartiality into question; whether the judge provided the appellant an opportunity to argue and brief his positions, and whether the judge fully considered the appellant’s motions.

In Moran v. Clarke, the plaintiff moved to disqualify the judge after a defendant revealed at her deposition that she had known the judge socially for over twenty years. The district judge declined to disqualify himself without comment, and the Eighth Circuit, faced with a record insufficient to apply the “abuse of discretion” standard to the case before it, remanded to the same judge for further proceedings, with the following explanation and instructions:

The district judge’s appearances at the same social events as Clarke and Smith brooks little mention. Judges, attorneys and public officials will often share public appearances. This does little to create the appearance of impropriety. The social relationship, however, invites more scrutiny. The image of one sitting in judgment over a friend’s affairs would likely cause the average person in the street to pause. That the judge and Clarke enjoyed a friendship of sufficient depth and duration as to warrant several reciprocal visits to one another’s homes only exacerbates the problem. We find particularly worrisome the district court’s failure to disclose this conflict himself, as permitted by section 455(e). Moreover, the record suggests a fractious relationship between the district court and Moran’s attorneys. We do, however, have the utmost faith in the district court’s ability to rule impartially, and have imposed on ourselves an obligation to reverse a district court only where we can say with certainty that it has abused its discretion. Accordingly, rather than remand to a different judge, we remand this question to the district court with the suggestion that it revisit and more thoroughly consider and respond to Moran’s recusal request.

509. In re Basciano, 542 F.3d 950, 956 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 775 (2d Cir. 2007)).
511. Id.
512. 296 F.3d 638 (8th Cir. 2002).
513. Id. at 649.
A party’s motion must be timely. A few appellate courts are willing to entertain an argument about disqualification that was not raised in a timely manner, but apply a “plain error” standard.  

C. Issues on appeal

1. Harmless error

Section 455 tells judges when disqualification is required, but does not spell out the appropriate remedy for a failure to disqualify. In *Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.*, the Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), authorizing relief from a final judgment, is an appropriate remedy for a trial court’s improper failure to disqualify. The Court cautioned that Rule 60(b)(6) relief is “neither categorically available nor categorically unavailable for all § 455(a) violations.” Rather, “there is surely room for harmless error committed by busy judges who inadvertently overlook a disqualifying circumstance.”

In spelling out the factors to be considered in determining whether a new trial is the appropriate remedy, the Court cautioned against too casual a finding of harmless error:

> [1] It is appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process. We must continuously bear in mind that “to perform its high function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’”


516. Id. at 864.

517. Id. at 862. Courts have also applied the harmless error standard to § 455(b) violations. See Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1571 (10th Cir. 1994); Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 867 F.2d 1415, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1527 (11th Cir. 1988).

V. Disqualification on Appeal

Heeding the Court’s warning, courts of appeals have been slow to deem a failure to disqualify harmless error. A few exceptions are instructive.

In *Harris v. Champion,* 519 a judge in a habeas case failed to disqualify himself even though his uncle had been a judge in some of the state cases challenged on appeal. The Tenth Circuit found that disqualification was required under both § 455(a) and § 455(b)(5)(i). However, “this case presents the very unusual situation that [the judge] did not act alone, but rather as one member of a three-judge panel that ruled unanimously . . . .” 520 In part for that reason, the court opted not to vacate the rulings.

In *Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc.*, 521 the judge disqualified herself based on inaccurate information, then vacated her disqualification order when she realized the mistake. The Fifth Circuit held that it was error to vacate the disqualification order. However, the error was harmless because:

[R]ecusal was sua sponte, and based on incomplete and incorrect information. . . . [N]one of the parties ever moved to have the judge step aside, and none has suggested any actual bias or prejudice. . . . The risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process. Indeed, overturning the many decisions [the judge] made after vacating her recusal order—simply because she recused herself too hastily and in error—would be wasteful and unnecessary. 522

The Fifth Circuit also found harmless error in an improper failure to disqualify in *United States v. Jordan.* 523 It found that the defendant’s well-known, extremely antagonistic relationship with a close personal friend of the judge created an appearance of impropriety under § 455(a). The court upheld the defendant’s conviction, but vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing by a different judge. The “[a]ppellant never contends that she suffered any harm during trial because of any alleged bias or prejudice.” 524 Under the circumstances, the court found that upholding the conviction would not be

519. 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1994).
520. Id. at 1572.
521. 101 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 1996).
522. Id. at 459.
523. 49 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1995).
524. Id. at 158.
unjust to the appellant and would not undermine the public’s confidence in the judicial process.

Faced with a mandamus action seeking mistrial in the midst of complex mass tort litigation, the First Circuit noted that while the Liljeberg analysis was in the context of a Rule 60(b) motion, “we believe it should apply as well to present circumstances, where ‘mistrial’ . . . would threaten to undo matters of considerable importance previously decided.”\(^{525}\) Thus, even assuming arguendo that disqualification was improperly denied, the court nevertheless denied the requested relief because it would mean retrying complex and costly litigation and re-opening settlement agreements.\(^{526}\) Moreover, no future injustice would result because there were no allegations of actual bias infecting any findings or rulings, and no rulings had been made that “are incurable or could have preclusive effect in some other action.”\(^{527}\) Finally, because the alleged appearance of impropriety (brothers of the judge’s law clerks were among the attorneys in the case) was not egregious, the court did “not believe . . . that the relevant public’s confidence in the judiciary would be seriously undermined were no mistrial declared.”\(^{528}\)

2. Reviewability of lower court decisions to disqualify

The vast majority of disqualification appeals concern a judge’s refusal to disqualify. The courts of appeals are split as to whether a judge’s decision to disqualify is reviewable.

Holding that a decision to disqualify is unreviewable, the Seventh Circuit explained its rationale:

> [W]e fail to conceive of any interest which the plaintiffs have as litigants for review of [the judge’s] recusal order. The effect of his decision to step aside is merely to have the case reassigned to another judge of the district court. The order does not strip plaintiffs of a fair forum in which they can pursue their claim. . . . [T]hey have no protectable interest in the continued exercise of jurisdiction by a particular judge.\(^{529}\)

525. In re Allied-Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 973 (1st Cir. 1989).
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. Hampton v. City of Chi., 643 F.2d 478, 479 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
The court held that the order to disqualify is not a final order and, because a party lacks a claim of right to the original judge, the collateral order doctrine does not apply. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have taken the same position.

The Ninth Circuit, as noted above, concurs that a decision to disqualify is not reviewable on appeal, but has allowed a party to seek a writ of mandamus to review a decision to disqualify in “exceptional situations in which the costs of familiarizing a new judge, in terms of delay, will prove to be very great” and the litigation is “greatly disrupted.” The First Circuit addressed the reviewability of sua sponte disqualifications in United States v. Snyder. The district court judge expressed pervasive hostility toward a federal prosecutor for what the judge perceived to be a selective and “grossly disparate” sentencing request. The district judge disqualified himself sua sponte, and the defendant appealed the decision claiming the judge had a duty to sit. The First Circuit held that a sua sponte disqualification must be examined in light of both the duty to sit and the duty to disqualify:

We have recognized that the duty to recuse and the duty to sit do not exert equal pull; in close cases, “doubts ordinarily ought to be resolved in favor of recusal.” No one suggests that different principles of review apply here, where a judge has recused himself sua sponte. Hence, our review in this case, as in our prior cases, is both deferential and weighted: we inquire whether, in light of the policy favoring recusal in close cases, [the trial judge] abused his discretion in finding that he had a duty to recuse himself.

Both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have been willing to review orders by judges disqualifying themselves, at least in some circumstances.

530. Id. at 479–80.
531. See, e.g., Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 677 F.2d 626, 644 (8th Cir. 1982); In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1022–24 (9th Cir. 1982).
532. Cement Antitrust, 673 F.2d at 1025.
533. 235 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2000).
534. Id. at 47.
535. Id. at 46.
536. Id.
537. See In re Va. Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 363–65 (4th Cir. 1976) (decision to disqualify reviewable by mandamus, and as collateral order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), where it raises important legal issue that would otherwise escape
3. Mootness of underlying dispute

A claim for disqualification, like any other claim, cannot be adjudicated absent a live dispute between the parties. Courts have implicitly or explicitly rejected disqualification requests as moot in a variety of circumstances. In Pontarelli v. Stone, after all the parties had settled the merits of the underlying disputes, one of the attorneys appealed the denial of attorneys’ fees. The focus of the attorney’s claim, however, was that the judge should have disqualified himself pursuant to § 455(a). The First Circuit found the issue moot:

[B]efore an appellate court can make a ruling on the appropriateness of disqualification by a district judge . . . the underlying dispute as to which the district court ruling is relevant must still remain a live controversy . . . If a trial judge has wrongly failed to disqualify him or herself, the remedy to correct this situation is for the appellate court to reverse the decision of the case on the merits and to order a new trial before a different judge.

Where, as here, the underlying case had settled, and no party challenged the settlement, the issue of disqualification was moot. The court noted that counsel’s recourse was to file a disciplinary complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 351. review); Kelley v. Metro. County Bd., 479 F.2d 810, 811 n.1 (6th Cir. 1973) (decision to disqualify reviewable, apparently immediately, though court did not clarify).

538. See, e.g., In re Starr, 152 F.3d 741, 751 n.23 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding party moving for disqualification lacked standing to bring underlying action); United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 1998) (violation of Rule 11 required remand to a different judge anyway); Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1121 (6th Cir. 1994) (trial court’s judgment reversed on substantive grounds unrelated to disqualification); United States v. Ahmed, 980 F.2d 161, 163 (2d Cir. 1992) (trial judge had already directed clerk of court to reassign case to a different judge); Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1282 (6th Cir. 1991) (trial judge had already withdrawn from case).

539. 978 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1992).
540. Id. at 775.
541. Id. at 776.
4. Impact of guilty plea on reviewability of nondisqualification

The courts of appeals differ as to whether a defendant who pleads guilty waives her challenge to the trial judge’s denial of a motion to disqualify. In United States v. Chantal,542 a defendant was charged with, and pled guilty to, various drug-related offenses. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge made critical comments about the defendant. It was later discovered that the defendant engaged in further drug-related activity while free on bond pending sentencing that resulted in a second indictment. The new case was assigned to the same judge, and the defendant moved to disqualify, but the judge refused. Subsequently the defendant pled guilty to that charge as well. On appeal, when the defendant challenged the judge’s refusal to disqualify himself with respect to the second indictment, the government argued that a guilty plea waives all but jurisdictional defenses and therefore waived the defendant’s § 455(a) challenge. The First Circuit disagreed:

Considering the laudable congressional aim that § 455(a) would assure not only an impartial court but the appearance of one, the idea that a plea of guilty would wipe out the attainment of adjudication by that kind of court is simply contrary to fundamental fairness. . . . [I]t is plain that Congress would never have thought its purpose to assure actions by judges who are not only impartial but appear to be, could be . . . eradicated by a plea engendered by the immediate prospect of a trial/decision by a biased judge.543

The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have taken the opposite approach, holding that an unconditional guilty plea waives appeal of a § 455(a) disqualification motion.544 They reason that since § 455(e) permits waiver of disqualification when a judge is faced with an appearance of impropriety under § 455(a) but makes full disclosure, waiver may also be found when a party enters a guilty plea without specifically preserving the issue for appeal.545

542. 902 F.2d 1018 (1st Cir. 1990).
544. United States v. Hotel, 154 F.3d 506, 507 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1324 (10th Cir. 1988).
545. Hotel, 154 F.3d at 508 (citing Gipson, 835 F.2d at 1325).
Because in the Seventh Circuit the sole route to review a refusal to disqualify pursuant to § 455(a) is an immediate application for writ of mandamus, a party who fails to seek mandamus waives its right to raise the issue in a postjudgment appeal.546 However, the Seventh Circuit has also held that “denial of a motion for mandatory disqualification under § 144 need not be appealed immediately, and is not waived when the defendant pleads guilty.”547

5. Jurisdiction

Courts of appeals have sometimes found that they have jurisdiction to review a refusal to disqualify—for example, on a habeas petition—even though they lack jurisdiction to review the underlying merits of the trial court’s decision on the issue in the case.548

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), “an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” Yet the Fifth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in denying a motion to disqualify. It reasoned that because a trial judge who has disqualified himself from a case may take no further action (except transferring the case to another federal judge), if the judge should have disqualified himself then any orders entered after denying the motion to disqualify were improper.549 Therefore, reviewing the refusal to disqualify would not really be reviewing the order of remand, even though a finding that disqualification was required would lead to vacating the remand order. “[W]e would be performing an essentially ministerial task of vacating an order that the district court had no authority to enter into for reasons unrelated to the order of remand itself.”550

546. See, e.g., United States v. Horton, 98 F.3d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1996); see also supra notes 498–99 and accompanying text.
547. Id. (citing United States v. Troxell, 887 F.2d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 1989)).
548. See Trevino v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999); Russell v. Lane, 890 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1989); Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114 (4th Cir. 1978).
550. Id. at 1028.
D. Disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 2106

In addition to the explicitly iterated disqualification statutes, appellate courts have employed 28 U.S.C. § 2106 to disqualify judges on appeal. In *Liteky v. United States*, the Supreme Court recognized this practice and acknowledged that “Federal appellate courts’ ability to assign a case to a different judge on remand rests not on the recusal statutes alone, but on the appellate courts’ statutory power . . . 28 U.S.C. § 2106."552

Section 2106 provides:

The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.553

Appellate courts have interpreted this statute to require reassignment to a different judge on remand when “removal is essential to ‘preserve[ ] both the appearance and reality of fairness.’” Generally, this power of reassignment should only be used in “rare and extraordinary circumstances,” including but not necessarily limited to circumstances manifesting personal bias.556

The presence of personal bias will merit reassignment to a different judge on remand. In determining whether personal bias is evident, courts often base their determinations on the framework set forth in § 455 and interpreted by *Liteky*.557 For example, the First Circuit has

552. *Id.* at 554.
553. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (emphasis added).
555. Mustang Mktg., Inc. v. Chevron Prods. Co., 406 F.3d 600, 610 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1333 (5th Cir. 1997).
556. See Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1987).
557. See, e.g., *Smith*, 827 F.2d at 562 (determining that “[r]eassignment to a different trial judge is appropriate under a demonstration of personal bias”). See also Arthur D. Hellman, *The Regulation of Judicial Ethics in the Federal System: A Peek Behind Closed Doors*, 69 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 189, 204 (2007) (highlighting appellate courts’ use of § 2106 as “a device for enforcing an ethical standard almost identical to that of § 455(a)”).
held that when the district judge’s views—even if arguably incendiary—were grounded entirely on information acquired at trial, there was no evidence of personal bias sufficient to require reassignment.\footnote{558} Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that even though adopting a party’s findings in their entirety is a “disfavored practice,” this action does not meet the standard for personal bias necessary to require reassignment.\footnote{559}

Absent personal bias, appellate courts require a showing of “unusual circumstances” in order to determine that reassignment on remand is required.\footnote{560} Appeals courts use two different tests to determine whether unusual circumstances exist such that reassignment on remand is warranted: a three-factor test and an “objective observer” test.

The Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits apply a three-factor test to determine whether unusual circumstances exist that would merit reassignment: (1) “whether on remand the district judge can be expected to follow [the appellate] court’s dictates”; (2) “whether reassignment is advisable to maintain the appearance of justice”; and (3) “whether reassignment risks undue waste and duplication.”\footnote{561} In weighing these factors, “[t]he first two factors are considered to be of equal importance and a finding of either one will support a remand to a different judge.”\footnote{562}

\footnote{558} Hull v. Municipality of San Juan, 356 F.3d 98, 104 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding, as in Liteky, that “views formed by a judge in considering a case are normally not a sound basis either for required recusal or for directing that a different judge be assigned on remand” (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994)));
\footnote{559} See Vuitton et Fils v. J. Young, 644 F.2d 769, 778 (9th Cir. 1980).
\footnote{560} See, e.g., Mustang Mktg., 406 F.3d at 610 (discussing the two inquiries that must be made in applying 28 U.S.C. § 2106: (1) “whether the district court has exhibited personal bias requiring recusal from a case” and (2) “whether ‘unusual circumstances’ merit reassignment”) (quoting United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 785 F.2d 777, 779–80 (9th Cir. 1986));
\footnote{561} United States v. Lyons, 472 F.3d 1055, 1071 (9th Cir. 2007). See also Solomon v. United States, 467 F.3d 928, 935 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Robin, 533 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc).
This test has been applied most frequently by the Ninth Circuit in addressing situations where questionable judicial tactics have compromised the appearance of justice. For example, in Living Designs v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, the district court adopted a party’s summary judgment order wholesale with only minor changes; directed publication of the ghost-written order; and reversed a previously entered certification sub silento. The Ninth Circuit concluded that even though the district judge’s impartiality was arguably still intact, his actions constituted the unusual circumstances necessary to require reassignment on remand. Similarly, in Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Cincom Systems, Inc., when the district judge displayed blatant disregard for the circuit court’s mandates (as evidenced by the reaffirmation of his prior ruling without addressing or attempting to distinguish the appellate court’s determination), and overt animosity toward a party (as displayed by his denial of the party’s motions without review), the Ninth Circuit ordered reassignment on remand.

The Third, Eighth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have adopted a more lenient “objective observer” standard to determine whether unusual circumstances that would merit reassignment on remand are present. This test requires reassignment when “facts might reasonably cause an objective observer to question [the judge’s] impartiality.” In this way, the appellate courts can combat not only actual bias but also the appearance of bias by remanding to a different judge when “reasonable observers could believe that a judicial decision flowed from the judge’s animus toward a party rather than from the judge’s application of law to fact.”

563. 431 F.3d 353 (9th Cir. 2005).
564. Id. at 372.
566. Id. at *14.
567. See In re DaimlerChrysler Corp., 294 F.3d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 2002) (describing both “objective observer” and three-factor tests, but declining to specifically adopt either).
In applying the objective observer test, appellate courts have typically found reassignment necessary when judicial conduct exceeds the bounds of unquestioned impartiality. For example, in Cobell v. Kempthorne, the D.C. Circuit heard the ninth appeal in six years of a case involving a dispute between the beneficiaries of Indian land trusts and their trustee, the United States. Although the district judge’s conduct had not met the Liteky standard for personal bias, the harsh language in all eight of the judge’s prior opinions, coupled with a string of reversals by the D.C. Circuit, required reassignment. The court concluded that, taken together, these facts would leave “an objective observer . . . with the overall impression” that the district court’s professed hostility to [the defendant] has become ‘so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment.”

Similarly, in United States v. Tucker, the Office of Independent Counsel (OIC) sought disqualification of the district judge because of “reported connections among Judge Woods, the Clintons, and [defendant] Tucker,” connections it chronicled with various newspaper articles. Although none of the articles directly linked the judge to the defendant, the Eighth Circuit ordered remand of the case to a different judge under § 2106, noting that the judge had worked with and admired Hillary Clinton, and had spent a night in the White House. The court further noted that “President and Mrs. Clinton have been reported to have expressed continued support for Tucker since his indictment by the grand jury” and attended a fundraising luncheon for

570. 455 F.3d 317 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
571. Id. at 332 (noting that it is a “rare case that meets the Liteky standard” for disqualification, in which “the judge’s views have become ‘so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment’”) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994)).
572. Id. at 333–35.
573. Id. at 335 (quoting Microsoft I, 56 F.3d at 1463).
574. Id. (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551). See also Haines v. Liggett Group, 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992). Although not citing to 28 U.S.C. § 2106 explicitly, the Third Circuit found that the district judge’s use of inflammatory language threatened the “appearance of impartiality.” To preserve this impartiality, the court exercised its “supervisory powers” and remanded the case to a different judge. Haines, 975 F.2d at 98.
575. 78 F.3d 1313, 1325 (8th Cir. 1996).
576. Id. at 1323.
him. In the court’s view, reassignment was necessary because of the “risk of a perception of judicial bias or partiality” given the “high profile” of the OIC’s work and the widely reported connections.

The decision in Tucker also involved the use of an unusual procedure for requesting disqualification of the district judge. Instead of presenting the issue to the judge directly, the appellant presented the request for the first time on appeal. The Eighth Circuit held that it was empowered, pursuant to § 2106, to direct the entry of any order “as may be just under the circumstances,” including the reassignment of the case to a different district judge where, under § 455(a), the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”

The D.C. Circuit, in “a departure from [its] usual practice of declining to address issues raised for the first time on appeal,” considered the appellant’s request for disqualification of the trial judge where “the full extent of [the judge’s] actions [were] not [ ] revealed until this case was on appeal.”

577. Id. at 1324.
578. Id. at 1325.
579. Id. at 1324.
581. Id. at 108.
Appendix

Code of Conduct for United States Judges
(Effective July 1, 2009)

Canon 3: A Judge Should Perform the Duties of the Office Fairly, Impartially and Diligently

... 

C. Disqualification.
(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances in which:
   (a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
   (b) the judge served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or lawyer has been a material witness;
   (c) the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge’s spouse or minor child residing in the judge’s household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be affected substantially by the outcome of the proceeding;
   (d) the judge or the judge’s spouse, or a person related to either within the third degree of relationship, or the spouse of such a person is:
      (i) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
      (ii) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
      (iii) known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; or
      (iv) to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding;
(e) the judge has served in governmental employment and in that capacity participated as a judge (in a previous judicial position), counsel, advisor, or material witness concerning the proceeding or has expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy.

(2) A judge should keep informed about the judge’s personal and fiduciary financial interests and make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal financial interests of the judge’s spouse and minor children residing in the judge’s household.

(3) For the purposes of this section:

(a) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law system; the following relatives are within the third degree of relationship: parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, great grandparent, great grandchild, sister, brother, aunt, uncle, niece, and nephew; the listed relatives include whole and half blood relatives and most step relatives;

(b) “fiduciary” includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, and guardian;

(c) “financial interest” means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, advisor, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:

(i) ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is not a “financial interest” in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund;

(ii) an office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not a “financial interest” in securities held by the organization;

(iii) the proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company, or a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary interest, is a “financial interest” in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest;

(iv) ownership of government securities is a “financial interest” in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the securities;
(d) “proceeding” includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other stages of litigation.

(4) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this Canon, if a judge would be disqualified because of a financial interest in a party (other than an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome), disqualification is not required if the judge (or the judge’s spouse or minor child) divests the interest that provides the grounds for disqualification.

D. Remittal of Disqualification. Instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, a judge disqualified by Canon 3C(1) may, except in the circumstances specifically set out in subsections (a) through (e), disclose on the record the basis of disqualification. The judge may participate in the proceeding if, after that disclosure, the parties and their lawyers have an opportunity to confer outside the presence of the judge, all agree in writing or on the record that the judge should not be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate. The agreement should be incorporated in the record of the proceeding.
For Further Reference


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