



A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

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Preface

Protecting our nation's security — our people, our territory and our way of life — is my Administration's foremost mission and constitutional duty. The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed America's security imperatives. The central security challenge of the past half century — the threat of communist expansion — is gone. The dangers we face today are more diverse. Ethnic conflict is spreading and rogue states pose a serious danger to regional stability in many corners of the globe. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents a major challenge to our security. Large scale environmental degradation, exacerbated by rapid population growth, threatens to undermine political stability in many countries and regions.

At the same time, we have unparalleled opportunities to make our nation safer and more prosperous. Our military might is unparalleled. We now have a truly global economy linked by an instantaneous communications network, which offers growing scope for American jobs and American investment. The community of democratic nations is growing, enhancing the prospects for political stability, peaceful conflict resolution and greater dignity and hope for the people of the world. The international community is beginning to act together to address pressing global environmental needs.

Never has American leadership been more essential — to navigate the shoals of the world's new dangers and to capitalize on its opportunities. American assets are unique: our military strength, our dynamic economy, our powerful ideals and, above all, our people. We can and must make the difference through our engagement; but our involve-

ment must be carefully tailored to serve our interests and priorities.

This report, submitted in accordance with Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986, elaborates a new national security strategy for this new era. Focussing on new threats and new opportunities, its central goals are:

- To credibly sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight.
- To bolster America's economic revitalization.
- To promote democracy abroad.

Over the past seventeen months, my Administration has worked to pursue these goals. This national security strategy report presents the strategy that has guided this effort. It is premised on a belief that the line between our domestic and foreign policies has increasingly disappeared — that we must revitalize our economy if we are to sustain our military forces, foreign initiatives and global influence, and that we must engage actively abroad if we are to open foreign markets and create jobs for our people.

We believe that our goals of enhancing our security, bolstering our economic prosperity, and promoting democracy are mutually supportive. Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic structures. Nations with growing economies and strong trade ties are more likely to feel secure and to work toward freedom. And democratic states are less likely to threaten

our interests and more likely to cooperate with the U.S. to meet security threats and promote sustainable development.

Since my Administration began, we have taken actions to meet these goals. To enhance global security, for example, we have pursued peace initiatives in the Middle East, established NATO's Partnership for Peace, reached a denuclearization agreement with Ukraine and Russia and implemented a firm strategy for a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. To bolster prosperity at home and around the world, we have passed the North American Free Trade Agreement, worked to open Asian-Pacific markets through the first-ever summit meeting of the Organization for Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation, lowered export controls and — having successfully completed the seventh GATT round — will now work with Congress to pass it this year. Our actions to promote democracy include our support for South Africa's recent transformation, aid to a new democratic Russia and Central and Eastern European nations, and our work with our Western Hemisphere neighbors, which will culminate at December's Summit of the Americas.

Even with the Cold War over, our nation must maintain military forces that are sufficient to deter diverse threats and, when necessary, to fight and win against our adversaries. While many factors ultimately contribute to our nation's safety and well-being, no single component is more important than the men and women who wear America's uniform and stand sentry over our security. Their skill, service and dedication constitute the core of our defenses. Today our military is the best-equipped, best-trained and best-prepared fighting force in the world, and I am committed to ensure that it remains so.

Our national security strategy reflects both America's interests and our values. Our commitment to freedom, equality and human dignity continues to serve as a beacon of hope to peoples around the world. The vitality, creativity and diversity of American society are important sources of national strength in a global economy that is dynamic,

multi-cultural and increasingly driven by ideas and information.

Our prospects in this new era are promising. The specter of nuclear annihilation has dramatically receded. The historic events of the past year — including the handshake between Israel and the PLO and the breakthroughs by Nelson Mandela and F.W. DeKlerk that culminated in the election of a multi-racial parliament and a government headed by President Mandela — suggest this era's possibilities for progress toward security, prosperity and democracy.

Our nation can only address this era's dangers and opportunities if we remain actively engaged in global affairs. We are the world's greatest power, and we have global interests as well as responsibilities. As our nation learned after World War I, we can find no security for America in isolationism, nor prosperity in protectionism. For the American people to be safer and enjoy expanding opportunities, our nation must work to deter would-be aggressors, open foreign markets, promote the spread of democracy abroad, encourage sustainable development and pursue new opportunities for peace.

Our national security requires the patient application of American will and resources. We can only sustain that necessary investment with the broad, bi-partisan support of the American people and their representatives in Congress. The full participation of Congress is essential to the success of our new engagement, and I will consult with Congress at every step of the policy making and implementation process. The Cold War may be over, but the need for American leadership abroad remains as strong as ever. I am committed to building a new public consensus to sustain our active engagement abroad. This document is a part of that commitment.

William Clinton

I. Introduction

A new era is upon us. The Cold War is over. The dissolution of the Soviet empire has radically transformed the security environment facing the United States and our allies. The primary security imperative of the past half century — containing communist expansion while preventing nuclear war — is gone. We no longer face massive Soviet forces across an East-West divide nor Soviet missiles targeted on the United States and ready to fire. Yet there remains a complex array of new and old security challenges America must meet as we approach a new century.

This national security strategy assesses America's role in this new international context and describes the Administration's strategy to advance our interests at home and abroad.

This is a period of great promise but also great uncertainty. We stand as the world's preeminent power. America's core value of freedom, as embodied in democratic governance and market economics, has gained ground around the world. Hundreds of millions of people have thrown off communism, dictatorship or apartheid. Former adversaries now cooperate with us in diplomacy and global problem solving. The threat of a war among great powers and the specter of nuclear annihilation both have receded dramatically. The dynamism of the global economy is transforming commerce, culture and global politics, promising greater prosperity for America and greater cooperation among nations.

At the same time, troubling uncertainties and clear threats remain. The new, independent states that replaced the

Soviet Union are experiencing wrenching economic and political transitions, as are many new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. While our relations with the other great powers are as constructive as at any point in this century, Russia's future is uncertain, and China maintains a repressive regime even as that country assumes a more important economic and political role in global affairs. The spread of weapons of mass destruction poses serious threats. Violent extremists threaten fragile peace processes, from the Mideast to South Africa. Worldwide, there is a resurgence of militant nationalism as well as ethnic and religious conflict. This has been demonstrated by upheavals in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia, where the United States has participated in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.

Not all security risks are military in nature. Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, rapid population growth and refugee flows also have security implications for both present and long term American policy. In addition, an emerging class of transnational environmental issues are increasingly affecting international stability and consequently will present new challenges to U.S. strategy.

American leadership in the world has never been more important. If we exert our leadership abroad, we can make America safer and more prosperous — by deterring aggression, by fostering the peaceful resolution of dangerous conflicts, by opening foreign markets, by helping democratic regimes and by tackling global problems. Without our active leadership and engagement abroad, threats will fester and our opportunities will narrow.

We can only engage actively abroad if the American people and the Congress are willing to bear the costs of that leadership — in dollars, political energy and, at times, American lives. In a democracy, the foreign policy of the nation must serve the needs of the people. The preamble of the Constitution sets out the basic objectives:

to provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.

The end of the Cold War does not alter these fundamental purposes. Nor does it reduce the need for active American efforts, here and abroad, to pursue those goals. One purpose of this report is to help foster the broad, bipartisan understanding and support necessary to sustain our international engagement. Congressional participation is critical to this commitment.

Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests. The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.

To that broad end, the report explains the three central components of our strategy of engagement and enlargement: our efforts to enhance our security by maintaining a strong defense capability and promoting cooperative security measures; our work to open foreign markets and spur global economic growth; and our promotion of democracy abroad. It also explains how we are pursuing the three elements of our strategy in specific regions.

During this Administration's first seventeen months, this strategy already has begun to produce tangible results with respect to our security requirements:

- At the President's direction, the Pentagon completed the Bottom Up Review, a full-scale assessment of what defense forces and systems our nation needs for this new security era. The President has also set forth a five-year defense budget that funds the force structure recommended by the Review, and he repeatedly stressed that he will draw the line against further cuts that would undermine that force structure or erode U.S. military readiness.

- The President convened a NATO Summit in January 1994. The Summit approved the Partnership For Peace and other major new initiatives, to ensure that NATO is prepared to meet the European and trans-Atlantic security challenges of this era, and to provide the security relationships that will bind former communist states to the rest of Europe. Since then, 21 countries, including Russia, have joined the Partnership for Peace.
- The President launched a comprehensive policy to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them. The U.S. opened formal negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and secured landmark commitments to eliminate all nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
- On May 3, 1994, President Clinton signed a Presidential Decision Directive establishing "U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations." This policy represents the first, comprehensive framework for U.S. decision-making on issues of peace-keeping and peace enforcement suited to the realities of the post Cold War period.

On the economic front, Administration policies have reaped dramatic successes:

- The President worked with the Congress on effective measures to reduce the federal budget deficit and restore economic growth. These measures help increase our competitiveness and strengthen our position in negotiations with other nations.
- The President secured approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement which creates the world's largest free trade zone and will create hundreds of thousands of American jobs. The vote for NAFTA marked a decisive U.S. affirmation of its international engagement. Through its environmental and labor side agreements, we are working actively to protect the rights of workers and to reduce air and water pollution that crosses national boundaries.
- The Administration stood at the forefront of a multilateral effort to achieve history's most extensive market-opening agreements in the GATT Uruguay-round negotiations on world trade. The President is

committed to working with Congress to secure U.S. accession this year to this pathbreaking agreement and the resulting World Trade Organization.

- The President convened the first meeting of leaders of the Organization for Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) — and took steps to expand our ties with the economies of the Asia-Pacific region, the fastest growing area in the world..
- We have committed the United States to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000, and we have developed a National Climate Plan to achieve that goal. The United States has also taken a leading role at the international level towards phasing out the production of most ozone-depleting substances. Under the Montreal Protocol for the protection of the ozone layer, the U.S. is contributing to developing countries' efforts to reduce their emissions of ozone-depleting chemicals. In June 1993, the U.S. signed the Biodiversity Treaty.
- The Administration has asserted world leadership on population issues, focussing in the context of the upcoming Conference on Population and Development on a plan to promote family planning, primary health and related development strategies that allow families to choose the number and spacing of their children.

Finally, the President has demonstrated a firm commitment to expanding the global realm of democracy:

- The Administration substantially expanded U.S. support for democratic and market reform in Russia and the other newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.

- The United States launched a series of initiatives to bolster the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. We affirmed our concern for their security, recognizing that such assurances would play a key role in promoting democratic developments.
- The U.S., working with the Organization of American States, helped reverse an anti-democratic coup in Guatemala.
- The Administration led efforts to strengthen UN sanctions on the military rulers of Haiti towards the end of restoring democracy and Haiti's democratically-elected president.
- The President invited the democratic nations of the Hemisphere to an unprecedented summit to discuss cooperation in support of democracy in the hemisphere, as well as mutual prosperity and sustainable development.
- The U.S. has increased support for South Africa as it conducted elections and became a multiracial democracy.
- The Administration initiated policies aimed at crisis prevention, including a new peacekeeping policy and a proposed revision of the Foreign Assistance Act.

This report has two major sections. The first part of the report explains our strategy of engagement and enlargement. The second part describes briefly how the Administration is applying this strategy to the world's major regions.

II. Advancing our Interests Through Engagement and Enlargement

The dawn of the post-Cold War era presents the United States with many distinct dangers, but also with a generally improved security environment and a range of opportunities to improve it further. The unitary threat that dominated our engagement during the Cold War has been replaced by a complex set of challenges, and our nation's strategy for defining and addressing those challenges is still evolving. In this time of global change, it is clear we cannot police the world; but it is equally clear we must exercise global leadership. As the world's premier economic and military power, and its premier practitioner of democratic values, the U.S. is indispensable to the forging of stable political relations and open trade.

Our leadership must stress preventive diplomacy — through such means as support for democracy, economic assistance, overseas military presence, military-to-military contacts and involvement in multilateral negotiations in the Middle East and elsewhere — in order to help resolve problems, reduce tensions and defuse conflicts before they become crises. These measures are a wise investment in our national security because they offer the prospect of resolving problems with the least human and material cost.

Our engagement must be selective, focussing on the challenges that are most relevant to our own interests and focussing our resources where we can make the most difference. We must also use the right tools — being willing to act unilaterally when our direct national interests are most at stake; in alliance and partnership when our interests are shared by others; and multilaterally when our interests are more general and the problems are best addressed by the international community. In all cases, the nature of our response must depend on what best serves our own long-term national interests. Those interests are

ultimately defined by our security requirements. Such requirements start with our physical defense and economic well-being. They also include environmental security as well as the security of values achieved through expansion of the community of democratic nations.

Our national security strategy draws upon a range of political, military and economic instruments, and focuses on the primary objectives that President Clinton has stressed throughout his campaign and his Administration:

- **Enhancing Our Security.** Taking account of the realities of the post-Cold War era and the new threats, a military capability appropriately sized and postured to meet the diverse needs of our strategy, including the ability, in concert with regional allies, to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. We will continue to pursue arms control agreements to reduce the danger of nuclear conflict and promote stability.
- **Promoting Prosperity at Home.** A vigorous and integrated economic policy designed to stimulate global environmentally sound economic growth and free trade and to press for open and equal U.S. access to foreign markets.
- **Promoting Democracy.** A framework of democratic enlargement that increases our security by protecting, consolidating and enlarging the community of free market democracies. Our efforts focus on preserving democratic processes in key emerging democratic states including Russia, Ukraine and other new states of the former Soviet Union.

These basic objectives of our national security strategy will guide the allocation of our scarce national security resources. Because deficit reduction is also central to the long-term health and competitiveness of the American economy, we are striving for the most efficient and environmentally sound use of our resources. We have already begun the difficult process of making these adjustments by undertaking a fundamental review of our national defense requirements and of the means for promoting democracy. We have also submitted to the Congress major reform legislation to update and streamline our international programs.

Enhancing our Security

The U.S. government is responsible for protecting the lives and personal safety of Americans, maintaining our political freedom and independence as a nation and providing for the well-being and prosperity of our nation. No matter how powerful we are as a nation, we cannot secure these basic goals unilaterally. Whether the problem is nuclear proliferation, regional instability, the reversal of reform in the former Soviet empire, or unfair trade practices, the threats and challenges we face demand cooperative, multi-national solutions. Therefore, the only responsible U.S. strategy is one that seeks to ensure U.S. influence over and participation in collective decisionmaking in a wide and growing range of circumstances.

An important element of our security preparedness depends on durable relationships with allies and other friendly nations. Accordingly, a central thrust of our strategy of engagement is to sustain and adapt the security relationships we have with key nations around the world. These ties constitute an important part of an international framework that will be essential to ensuring cooperation across a broad range of issues. Within the realm of security issues, our cooperation with allies includes such activities as: conducting combined training and exercises, coordinating military plans and preparations, sharing intelligence, jointly developing new systems, and controlling exports of sensitive technologies according to common standards.

The post-Cold War era presents a different set of threats to our security. In this new period, enhancing American security requires, first and foremost, developing and main-

taining a strong defense capability of forces ready to fight. We are developing integrated approaches for dealing with threats arising from the development of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by other nations. Our security requires a vigorous arms control effort and a strong intelligence capability. We have implemented a strategy for multilateral peace operations. We need to rigorously apply clear guidelines for when to use military force in this era.

We also face security risks that are not military in nature. Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and refugee flows also have security implications both for present and long term American policy. An emerging class of transnational environmental issues are increasingly affecting international stability and consequently will present new challenges to U.S. strategy.

Maintaining a Strong Defense Capability

U.S. military capabilities are critical to the success of our strategy. This nation has unparalleled military capabilities: the United States is the only nation capable of conducting large-scale and effective military operations far beyond its borders. This fact, coupled with our unique position as the security partner of choice in many regions, provides a foundation for regional stability through mutually beneficial security partnerships. Our willingness and ability to play a leading role in defending common interests also help ensure that the United States will remain an influential voice in international affairs — political, military and economic — that affect our well-being, so long as we retain the military wherewithal to underwrite our commitments credibly.

To protect and advance U.S. interests in the face of the dangers and opportunities outlined earlier, the United States must deploy robust and flexible military forces that can accomplish a variety of tasks:

- **Dealing with Major Regional Contingencies.** Our forces must be able to help offset the military power of regional states with interests opposed to those of the United States and its allies. To do this, we must be able to credibly deter and defeat aggression, by projecting and sustaining U.S. power in more than one region if necessary.

- **Providing a Credible Overseas Presence.** U.S. forces must also be forward deployed or stationed in key overseas regions in peacetime to deter aggression. Such overseas presence demonstrates our commitment to allies and friends, underwrites regional stability, gains us familiarity with overseas operating environments, promotes combined training among the forces of friendly countries, and provides timely initial response capabilities.
- **Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.** We are devoting greater efforts to stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, but at the same time we must improve our capabilities to deter and prevent the use of such weapons and protect ourselves against their effects. (Our integrated program to deal with threats to our security from weapons of mass destruction is discussed below.)
- **Contributing to Multilateral Peace Operations.** When our interests call for it, the United States must also be prepared to participate in multilateral efforts to broker settlements of internal conflicts and bolster new democratic governments. Thus, our forces must prepare to participate in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and other operations in support of these objectives. (Our strategy for peace operations and the contribution of U.S. forces is discussed below.)
- **Supporting Counterterrorism Efforts and Other National Security Objectives.** A number of other tasks remain that U.S. forces have typically carried out with both general purpose and specialized units. These missions include: counterterrorism and punitive attacks, noncombatant evacuation, counter-narcotics operations, nation assistance, and humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

To meet all of these requirements successfully, our forces must be capable of responding quickly and operating effectively. That is, they must be ready to fight and win. This imperative demands highly qualified and motivated people; modern, well-maintained equipment; realistic training; strategic mobility; and sufficient support and sustainment capabilities.

Major Regional Contingencies

The focus of our planning for major theater conflict is on deterring and, if necessary, fighting and defeating aggression by potentially hostile regional powers, such as North Korea, Iran or Iraq. Such states are capable of fielding sizable military forces that can cause serious imbalances in military power within regions important to the United States, with allied or friendly states often finding it difficult to match the power of a potentially aggressive neighbor. To deter aggression, prevent coercion of allied or friendly governments and, ultimately, defeat aggression should it occur, we must prepare our forces to confront this scale of threat, preferably in concert with our allies and friends, but unilaterally if necessary. To do this, we must have forces that can deploy quickly and supplement U.S. forward based and forward deployed forces, along with regional allies, in halting an invasion and defeating the aggressor.

With programmed enhancements, the forces the Administration is fielding will be sufficient to help defeat aggression in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. As a nation with global interests, it is important that the United States maintain forces with aggregate capabilities on this scale. Obviously, we seek to avoid a situation in which an aggressor in one region might be tempted to take advantage when U.S. forces are heavily committed elsewhere. More basically, maintaining a "two war" force helps ensure that the United States will have sufficient military capabilities to deter or defeat aggression by a coalition of hostile powers or by a larger, more capable adversary than we foresee today.

We will never know with certainty how an enemy might fight or precisely what demands might be placed on our own forces in the future. The contributions of allies or coalition partners will vary from place to place and over time. Thus, balanced U.S. forces are needed in order to provide a wide range of complementary capabilities and to cope with the unpredictable and unexpected.

Overseas Presence

The need to deploy U.S. military forces abroad in peacetime is also an important factor in determining our overall force structure. We will maintain robust overseas presence in several forms, such as permanently stationed forces,

deployments and combined exercises, port calls and other force visits, as well as military-to-military contacts. These activities provide several benefits. Specifically they:

- Give form and substance to our bilateral and multilateral security commitments.
- Demonstrate our determination to defend U.S. and allied interests in critical regions, deterring hostile nations from acting contrary to those interests.
- Provide forward elements for rapid response in crises as well as the bases, ports and other infrastructure essential for deployment of U.S.-based forces by air, sea and land.
- Enhance the effectiveness of coalition operations, including peace operations, by improving our ability to operate with other nations.
- Allow the United States to use its position of trust to prevent the development of power vacuums and dangerous arms races, thereby underwriting regional stability by precluding threats to regional security.
- Facilitate regional integration, since nations that may not be willing to work together in our absence may be willing to coalesce around us in a crisis.
- Promote an international security environment of trust, cooperation, peace and stability, which is fundamental to the vitality of developing democracies and free market economies for America's own economic well-being and security.

Through training programs, combined exercises, military contacts, interoperability and shared defense with potential coalition partners, as well as security assistance programs that include judicious foreign military sales, we can strengthen the local self-defense capabilities of our friends and allies. Through active participation in regional security dialogues, we can reduce regional tensions, increase transparency in armaments and improve our bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

By improving the defense capabilities of our friends and demonstrating our commitment to defend common interests, these activities enhance deterrence, encourage responsibility-sharing on the part of friends and allies, decrease the likelihood that U.S. forces will be necessary if

conflict arises and raise the odds that U.S. forces will find a relatively favorable situation should a U.S. response be required.

Counterterrorism, Fighting Drug Trafficking and Other Missions

While the missions outlined above will remain the primary determinants of our general purpose and nuclear force structure, U.S. military forces and assets will also be called upon to perform a wide range of other important missions as well. Some of these can be accomplished by conventional forces fielded primarily for theater operations. Often, however, these missions call for specialized units and capabilities.

Combating Terrorism

As long as terrorist groups continue to target American citizens and interests, the United States will need to have specialized units available to defeat such groups. From time to time, we might also find it necessary to strike terrorists at their bases abroad or to attack assets valued by the governments that support them.

Our policy in countering international terrorists is to make no concessions to terrorists, continue to pressure state sponsors of terrorism, fully exploit all available legal mechanisms to punish international terrorists and help other governments improve their capabilities to combat terrorism.

Countering terrorism effectively requires close day-to-day coordination among Executive Branch agencies. The Departments of State, Justice and Defense, the FBI and CIA continue to cooperate closely in an ongoing effort against international terrorists. Positive results will come from integration of intelligence, diplomatic and rule-of-law activities, and through close cooperation with other governments and international counterterrorist organizations.

Improving U.S. intelligence capacities is a significant part of the U.S. response. Terrorists, whether from well-organized groups or the kind of more loosely organized group responsible for the World Trade Center bombing, have the advantage of being able to take the initiative in the timing and choice of targets. Terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction represents a particularly dangerous potential threat that must be countered.

The United States has made concerted efforts this past year to punish and deter terrorists. On June 26, 1993, following a determination that Iraq had plotted an assassination attempt against former President Bush, President Clinton ordered a cruise missile attack against the headquarters of Iraq's intelligence service in order to send a firm response and deter further threats. Similarly, on March 4, 1994, the United States obtained convictions against the four defendants in the bombing of the World Trade Center.

U.S. leadership and close coordination with other governments and international bodies will continue, as demonstrated by the UN Security Council sanctions against Libya for the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings, a new international convention dealing with detecting and controlling plastic explosives, and two important counterterrorism treaties — the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Aviation and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Attacks Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.

Fighting Drug Trafficking

The Administration has undertaken a new approach to the global scourge of drug abuse and trafficking that will better integrate domestic and international activities to reduce both the demand and the supply of drugs. Ultimate success will depend on concerted efforts and partnerships by the public, all levels of government and the American private sector with other governments, private groups and international bodies.

The U.S. will shift its strategy from the past emphasis on transit interdiction to a more evenly balanced effort with source countries to build institutions, destroy trafficking organizations and stop supplies. We will support and strengthen democratic institutions abroad, denying narcotics traffickers a fragile political infrastructure in which to operate. We will also cooperate with governments that demonstrate the political will to confront the narcotics threat.

A new comprehensive strategy has been developed to deal with the problem of cocaine and another is being developed to address the growing threat from high-purity heroin entering this country. We will engage more aggressively with international organizations, financial institutions and nongovernmental organizations in counternarcotics cooperation.

At home and in the international arena, prevention, treatment and economic alternatives must work hand-in-hand with law enforcement and interdiction activities. Long-term efforts will be maintained to help nations develop healthy economies with fewer market incentives for producing narcotics. U.S. efforts will increase efforts abroad to foster public awareness and support for governmental cooperation on a broad range of activities to reduce the incidence of drug abuse. Public awareness of a demand problem in producing or trafficking countries can be converted into public support and increased governmental law enforcement to reduce trafficking and production. There has been a significant attitudinal change and awareness in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly as producer and transit nations themselves become plagued with the ill effects of consumption.

Other Missions

The United States government is also responsible for protecting the lives and safety of Americans abroad. In order to carry out this responsibility, selected U.S. military forces are trained and equipped to evacuate Americans from such situations as the outbreak of civil or international conflict and natural or man-made disasters. For example, U.S. Marines evacuated Americans from Monrovia, Liberia in August of 1990, and from Mogadishu, Somalia, in December of that year. In 1991, U.S. forces evacuated nearly 20,000 Americans from the Philippines over a three-week period following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo. This year, U.S. Marines coupled with U.S. airlift, helped ensure the safe evacuation of U.S. citizens from ethnic fighting in Rwanda.

U.S. forces also provide invaluable training and advice to friendly governments threatened by subversion, lawlessness or insurgency. At any given time, we have small teams of military experts deployed in roughly 25 countries helping host governments cope with such challenges.

U.S. military forces and assets are frequently called upon to provide assistance to victims of floods, storms, drought and other disasters. Both at home and abroad, U.S. forces provide emergency food, shelter, medical care and security to those in need.

Finally, the U.S. will continue as a world leader in space through its technical expertise and innovation. Over the past 30 years, as more and more nations have ventured

into space, the U.S. has steadfastly recognized space as an international region. Since all nations are immediately accessible from space, the maintenance of an international legal regime for space, similar to the concept of freedom of the high seas, is especially important. Numerous attempts have been made in the past to legally limit access to space by countries that are unable, either technologically or economically, to join space-faring nations. As the commercial importance of space is developed, the U.S. can expect further pressure from non-participants to redefine the status of space, similar to what has been attempted with exclusive economic zones constraining the high seas.

Retaining the current international character of space will remain critical to achieving U.S. national security goals. Our main objectives in this area include:

- Continued freedom of access to and use of space;
- Maintaining the U.S. position as the major economic, political, military and technological power in space;
- Deterring threats to U.S. interests in space and defeating aggression if deterrence fails;
- Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction to space;
- Enhancing global partnerships with other space-faring nations across the spectrum of economic, political and security issues.

Deciding When and How to Employ U.S. Forces

Our strategy calls for the development and deployment of American military forces in the United States and abroad to respond to key dangers — those posed by weapons of mass destruction, regional aggression and threats to the stability of states.

Although there may be many demands for U.S. involvement, the need to husband scarce resources suggests that we must carefully select the means and level of our participation in particular military operations. It is unwise to specify in advance all the limitations we will place on our

use of force, but it is appropriate to identify several basic principles that will guide our decisions on when to use force.

First, and foremost, our national interests will dictate the pace and extent of our engagement. In all cases, the costs and risks of U.S. military involvement must be judged to be commensurate with the stakes involved. In those specific areas where our vital or survival interests — those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security and vitality of our national entity — are at stake, our use of force will be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral. In other situations posing a less immediate threat, our military engagement must be targeted selectively on those areas that most affect our national interests — for instance, areas where we have a sizable economic stake or commitments to allies, and areas where there is a potential to generate substantial refugee flows into our nation or our allies.

Second, as much as possible, we will seek the help of our allies or of relevant multilateral institutions. If our most important national interests are at stake, we are prepared to act alone. But especially on those matters touching directly the interests of our allies, there should be a proportional commitment from them.

Third, in every case, we will consider several critical questions before committing military force. Have we considered nonmilitary means that offer a reasonable chance of success? What types of U.S. military capabilities should be brought to bear, and is the use of military force carefully matched to our political objectives? Do we have reasonable assurance of support from the American people and their elected representatives? Do we have timelines and milestones that will reveal the extent of success or failure, and, in either case, do we have an exit strategy?

Fourth, our engagement must meet reasonable cost and feasibility thresholds. We will be more inclined to act where there is reason to believe that our action will bring lasting improvement. On the other hand, our involvement will be more circumscribed when other regional or multilateral actors are better positioned to act than we are. Even in these cases, however, the United States will be actively engaged at the diplomatic level.

Combatting the Spread and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles

Weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, biological, and chemical — along with the missiles that deliver them, pose a major threat to our security and that of our allies and other friendly nations. Thus, a key part of our strategy is to seek to stem the proliferation of such weapons and to develop an effective capability to deal with these threats. We also need to maintain robust strategic nuclear forces while seeking to implement existing strategic arms agreements.

Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation

A critical priority for the United States is to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems. Countries' weapons programs, and their levels of cooperation with our nonproliferation efforts, will be among our most important criteria in judging the nature of our bilateral relations.

As a key part of our effort to control nuclear proliferation, we seek the indefinite extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) beyond 1995 and its universal application. Achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as soon as possible, ending the unsafeguarded production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes and strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are important goals. They complement our comprehensive efforts to discourage the accumulation of fissile materials, to seek to strengthen controls and constraints on those materials, and over time, to reduce world-wide stocks.

To combat missile proliferation, the United States seeks prudently to broaden membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The Administration supports the prompt ratification and earliest possible entry in force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as well as new measures to deter violations of and enhance compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). We also support improved export controls for nonproliferation purposes both domestically and multilaterally.

The proliferation problem is global, but we must tailor our approaches to specific regional contexts. We are leading international efforts to bring North Korea into compliance with its nonproliferation obligations, including the NPT, IAEA safeguards, and the North-South denuclearization accord. We will continue efforts to prevent Iran from advancing its weapons of mass destruction objectives and to thwart Iraq from reconstituting its previous programs. The United States seeks to cap, reduce and, ultimately, eliminate the nuclear and missile capabilities of India and Pakistan. In the Middle East and elsewhere, we encourage regional arms control agreements that address the legitimate security concerns of all parties. These tasks are being pursued with other states that share our concern for the enormous challenge of stemming the proliferation of such weapons.

The United States has signed bilateral agreements with Russia and Ukraine, which commit both these countries to adhere to the guidelines of the MTCR. Russia has agreed not to transfer space-launch vehicle technology with potential military applications to India. South Africa has joined the NPT and accepted full-scope safeguards. Argentina has joined the MTCR and Brazil has committed itself publicly to adhere to the MTCR guidelines. Argentina, Brazil and Chile have brought the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force. We continue to push for the dismantlement of intercontinental ballistic missiles located in Ukraine and Kazakhstan and to press China to formalize its earlier MTCR undertakings. With the United States and Russia, Ukraine is pressing forward on implementation of the Trilateral Accord, which provides for the transfer of warheads from Ukraine to Russia in return for fair compensation for their value.

Thus, the United States seeks to prevent additional countries from acquiring chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. However, should such efforts fail, U.S. forces must be prepared to deter, prevent and defend against their use.

The United States will retain the capacity to retaliate against those who might contemplate the use of weapons of mass destruction, so that the costs of such use will be seen as outweighing the gains. However, to minimize the impact of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on our interests, we will need the capability not only to deter their use against either ourselves or our allies and friends, but also, where necessary and feasible, to prevent it.

This will require improved defensive capabilities. To minimize the vulnerability of our forces abroad to weapons of mass destruction, we are placing a high priority on improving our ability to locate, identify, and disable arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, production and storage facilities for such weapons, and their delivery systems.

Strategic Nuclear Forces.

We will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. Therefore we will continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by such political and military leaders. We are engaged in a review to determine what nuclear posture is required in the current world situation.

The strategic arms control process, with its prescribed reductions in strategic offensive arms and steady shift toward less destabilizing systems, remains indispensable. The U.S. is committed to the ratification and entry into force of the START I and II Treaties. Although Ukraine has yet to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Rada's action on 3 February 1994 to ratify the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol without reservations places Ukraine back on track toward becoming a Non-Nuclear Weapons State. The U.S. is also reviewing whether future reductions in strategic forces below START II levels are advisable. We will also explore strategic confidence-building measures and mutual understandings that reduce the risk of accidental war.

Arms Control

Arms control is an integral part of our national security strategy. Arms control can help reduce incentives to initiate attack; enhance predictability regarding the size and structure of forces, thus reducing fear of aggressive intent; reduce the size of national defense industry establishments and thus permit the growth of more vital, nonmilitary industries; ensure confidence in compliance through effective monitoring and verification; and, ultimately, contribute to a more stable and calculable balance of power.

As noted above, arms control is an integral part of our strategy to limit the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and to limit the strategic nuclear forces which could still pose a direct threat to the United States.

The full and faithful implementation of existing arms control agreements, including the ABM Treaty, BWC, INF, CFE, several nuclear testing agreements, the 1992 Vienna Document on CSBMs, Open Skies, the Environmental Modification Convention (EnMod), Incidents at Sea and many others will remain an important element of national security policy. The on-going negotiation initiated by the United States to clarify the ABM Treaty by establishing an agreed demarcation between strategic and theater ballistic missiles and update the Treaty to reflect the break-up of the Soviet Union reflects the Administration's commitment to maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of crucial arms control agreements.

Future arms control efforts may become more regional and multilateral. Regional arrangements can add predictability and openness to security relations, advance the rule of international law and promote cooperation among participants. They help maintain deterrence and a stable military balance at regional levels. The U.S. is prepared to promote, help negotiate, monitor and participate in regional arms control undertakings compatible with American national security interests. We will generally support such undertakings but will not seek to impose regional arms control accords against the wishes of affected states.

As arms control, whether regional or global, becomes increasingly multilateral, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva will play an even more important role. The U.S. will support measures to increase the effectiveness and relevance of the CD. Arms control agreements can head off potential arms races in certain weapons categories or in some environments. We will continue to seek greater transparency, responsibility and, where appropriate, restraint in the transfer of conventional weapons and global military spending must increase. The UN register of conventional arms transfers is a start in promoting greater transparency of weapons transfers and buildups, but more needs to be done. The U.S. has proposed that the new regime to succeed the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) focus on conventional arms sales and dual-use technologies. Where appropriate, the United

States will continue to pursue such efforts vigorously. Measures to reduce over-sized defense industrial establishments, especially those parts involved with weapons of mass destruction, will also contribute to stability in the post-Cold War world. The Administration also will pursue defense conversion agreements with FSU states, and possibly China.

Peace Operations

In addition to preparing for major regional contingencies, we must prepare our forces for peace operations to support democracy or conflict resolution. The United States, along with others in the international community, will seek to prevent and contain localized conflicts before they require a military response. U.S. support capabilities such as airlift, intelligence, and global communications, have often contributed to the success of multilateral peace operations, and they will continue to do so. U.S. combat units are less likely to be used for most peace operations, but in some cases their use will be necessary or desirable and justified by U.S. national interests as guided by the Presidential Decision Directive, "U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," and outlined below.

Multilateral peace operations are an important component of our strategy. From traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement, multilateral peace operations are sometimes the best way to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly and deadly.

Peace operations often have served, and continue to serve, important U.S. national interests. In some cases, they have helped preserve peace between nations, as in Cyprus and the Golan Heights. In others, peacekeepers have provided breathing room for fledgling democracies, as in Cambodia, El Salvador and Namibia.

At the same time, however, we must recognize that peace operations make demands on the UN that exceed the organization's current capabilities. The United States is working with the UN headquarters and other member states to ensure that the UN embarks only on peace operations that make political and military sense and that the UN is able to manage effectively those peace operations it does undertake. We support the creation of a professional UN peace operations headquarters with a planning staff, access to timely intelligence, a logistics unit that can be rapidly deployed and a modern operations center with

global communications. The United States is committed to working with the United Nations to see that we pay our bills in full, while reducing our nation's proportional assessment for these missions.

When deciding whether to support a particular UN peace operation, the United States will insist that fundamental questions be asked before new obligations are undertaken. These include an assessment of the threat to international peace and security, a determination that the peace operation serves U.S. interests as well as assurance of an international community of interests for dealing with that threat on a multilateral basis, identification of clear objectives, availability of the necessary resources, and identification of an operation's endpoint or criteria for completion.

Most UN peacekeeping operations do not involve U.S. forces. On those occasions when we consider contributing U.S. forces to a UN peace operation, we will employ rigorous criteria, including the same principles that would guide any decision to employ U.S. forces. In addition, we will ensure that the risks to U.S. personnel and the command and control arrangements governing the participation of American and foreign forces are acceptable to the United States.

The question of command and control is particularly critical. There may be times when it is in our interest to place U.S. troops under the temporary operational control of a competent UN or allied commander. The United States has done so many times in the past — from the siege of Yorktown in the Revolutionary War to the battles of Desert Storm. However, under no circumstances will the President ever relinquish his command authority over U.S. forces.

Improving the ways the United States and the UN decide upon and conduct peace operations will not make the decision to engage any easier. The lesson we must take away from our first ventures in peace operations is not that we should forswear such operations but that we should employ this tool selectively and more effectively. In short, the United States views peace operations as a means to support our national security strategy, not as a strategy unto itself.

The President is firmly committed to securing the active support of Congress for U.S. participation in peace operations. The Administration has set forth a detailed blueprint

to guide consultations with Congress. With respect to particular operations, the Administration will undertake such consultations on questions regarding command and control of U.S. forces, the nature of expected U.S. military participation, the mission parameters of the operation, the expected duration, and budgetary implications. In addition to such operation-specific consultations, the Administration has also conducted regular monthly briefings for congressional staff, and will deliver an Annual Comprehensive Report to Congress on Peace Operations. Congress is critical to the institutional development of a successful U.S. policy on peace operations.

Two other points deserve emphasis. First, the primary mission of our Armed Forces is not peace operations; it is to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our most important interests are threatened. Second, while the international community can create conditions for peace, the responsibility for peace ultimately rests with the people of the country in question.

Strong Intelligence Capabilities

Only a strong intelligence effort can provide adequate warning of threats to U.S. national security and identify opportunities for advancing our interests. Policy analysts, decision makers and military commanders at all levels will continue to rely on our intelligence community to collect and analyze information unavailable from other sources and which provides an essential complement to foreign service reporting, media reports and private analysts who rely entirely on open sources.

Because national security has taken on a much broader definition in this post-Cold War era, intelligence must address a much wider range of threats and dangers. We will continue to monitor military and technical threats, to guide long-term force development and weapons acquisition, and to directly support military operations. Intelligence will also be critical for directing new efforts against regional conflicts, proliferation of WMD, counterintelligence, terrorism and narcotics trafficking. In order to adequately forecast dangers to democracy and to U.S. economic well-being, the intelligence community must track political, economic, social and military developments in those parts of the world where U.S. interests are most heavily engaged and where overt collection of information from open sources is inadequate. Finally, to enhance the study and support of worldwide environ-

mental, humanitarian and disaster relief activities, technical intelligence assets (principally imagery) must be directed to a greater degree towards collection of data on these subjects.

Economic intelligence will play an increasingly important role in helping policy makers understand economic trends. Economic intelligence can support U.S. trade negotiators and help level the economic playing field by identifying threats to U.S. companies from foreign intelligence services and unfair trading practices.

This strategy requires that we take steps to reinforce current intelligence capabilities and overt foreign service reporting, within the limits of our resources, and similar steps to enhance coordination of clandestine and overt collection. Key goals include to:

- Provide timely warning of strategic threats, whether from the remaining arsenal of weapons in the former Soviet Union or from other nations with weapons of mass destruction;
- Ensure timely intelligence support to military operations;
- Provide early warning of potential crises and facilitate preventive diplomacy;
- Develop new strategies for collection, production and dissemination (including closer relationships between intelligence producers and consumers) to make intelligence products more responsive to current consumer needs;
- Improve worldwide technical capabilities to detect, identify and determine the efforts of foreign nations to develop weapons of mass destruction;
- Improve counterintelligence efforts;
- Provide focussed support for law enforcement agencies in areas like counternarcotics, counterterrorism and illegal technology trade;
- Streamline intelligence operations and organizations to gain efficiency and integration;

- Revise long-standing security restrictions where possible to make intelligence data more useful to intelligence consumers.
- Strengthen intelligence relationships and sharing with friendly foreign intelligence services, especially in areas where U.S. intelligence capabilities are limited.

The Environment

The more clearly we understand the complex interrelationships between the different parts of our world's environment, the better we can understand the regional and even global effects of local changes to the environment. Increasing competition for the dwindling reserves of uncontaminated air, arable land, fisheries and other food sources, and water, once considered "free" goods, is already a very real risk to regional stability around the world. The range of environmental risks serious enough to jeopardize international stability extends to massive population flight from man-made or natural catastrophes, such as Chernobyl or the East African drought, and to large-scale ecosystem damage caused by industrial pollution, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, ozone depletion, and ultimately climate change. Strategies dealing with environmental issues of this magnitude will require partnerships between governments and nongovernmental organizations, cooperation between nations and regions, and a commitment to a strategically focused, long-term policy for emerging environmental risks.

The decisions we make today regarding military force structures typically influence our ability to respond to threats 20 to 30 years in the future. Similarly, our current decisions regarding the environment will affect the magnitude of its security risks over at least a comparable period of time, if not longer. The measure of our difficulties in the future will be settled by the steps we take in the present.

As a priority initiative, the U.S. will press the global community at the September Cairo Conference and in other fora, to address the continuous climb in global population. Rapid population growth in the developing world and unsustainable consumption patterns in industrialized nations are the root of both present and potentially even greater forms of environmental degradation and resource depletion. A conservative estimate of the globe's population projects 8.5 billion people on the planet by the year

2025. Even when making the most generous allowances for advances in science and technology, one cannot help but conclude that population growth and environmental pressures will feed into immense social unrest and make the world substantially more vulnerable to serious international frictions.

Promoting Prosperity at Home

A central goal of our national security strategy is to promote America's prosperity through efforts both at home and abroad. Our economic and security interests are increasingly inseparable. Our prosperity at home depends on engaging actively abroad. The strength of our diplomacy, our ability to maintain an unrivaled military, the attractiveness of our values abroad — all these depend in part on the strength of our economy.

Enhancing American Competitiveness

Our primary economic goal is to strengthen the American economy and reverse the decline in American competitiveness that plagued our international economic performance for over a decade. The first step toward that goal was reducing the federal deficit and the burden it imposes on the economy and future generations. The economic program passed in 1993 will reduce the deficit by over \$500 million, restored investor confidence in the U.S. and strengthened our position in international economic negotiations. We are building on this deficit reduction effort with other steps to improve American competitiveness: investing in technology; assisting defense conversion; improving information networks and other vital infrastructure; and improving education and training programs for America's workforce. We are structuring our defense R&D effort to place greater emphasis on dual-use technologies that can enhance competitiveness and meet pressing military needs. We are also reforming the defense acquisition system so that we can develop and procure weapons and materiel more efficiently.

Partnership with Business and Labor

Our economic strategy views the private sector as the engine of economic growth. It sees government's role as a partner to the private sector — acting as an advocate of U.S. business interests; leveling the playing field in interna-

tional markets; helping to boost American exports; and finding ways to remove domestic and foreign barriers to the creativity, initiative and productivity of American business.

To this end, on September 29, 1993, the Administration published its report creating America's first national export strategy and making 65 specific recommendations for reforming the way government works with the private sector to expand exports. Among the recommendations were significant improvements in advocacy, export financing, market information systems and product standards education. The results of these reforms could enable U.S. exports to reach the trillion dollar mark by the turn of the century, which would help create at least six million new American jobs.

Another critical element in boosting U.S. exports is reforming the outdated export licensing system. Last year, that reform began with significant liberalization of export licensing controls for computers, supercomputers and telecommunications equipment. This year the Administration is seeking comprehensive reform of the Export Administration Act, which governs the process of export licensing. The goal of this reform is to strengthen our ability to prevent proliferation and protect other national interests, while removing unnecessarily burdensome licensing requirements left over from the Cold War.

Enhancing Access to Foreign Markets

The success of American business is more than ever dependent upon success in international markets. The ability to compete internationally also assures that our companies will continue to innovate and increase productivity, which will in turn lead to improvements in our own living standards. But to compete abroad, our firms need access to foreign markets, just as foreign industries have access to our open market. We vigorously pursue measures to increase access for our companies — through bilateral, regional and multilateral arrangements.

The North American Free Trade Agreement

On December 3, 1993, President Clinton signed the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA), which creates a free trade zone among the United States, Canada and Mexico.

NAFTA will create more than 200,000 American jobs and it increases Mexico's capacity to cooperate with our nation on a wide range of issues that cross our 2000 mile border — including the environment, narcotics trafficking and illegal immigration.

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

Our economic relations depend vitally on our ties with the Asia Pacific region, which is the world's fastest-growing economic region. In November 1993, President Clinton convened the first-ever summit of the leaders of the economies that constitute the Organization for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). U.S. initiatives in the APEC forum will open new opportunities for economic cooperation and permit U.S. companies to become involved in substantial infrastructure planning and construction throughout the region. The trade and investment framework agreed to in 1993 provides the basis for enhancing the "open regionalism" that defines APEC.

Uruguay Round of GATT

The successful conclusion in December 1993 of the Uruguay Round of the negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) significantly strengthened the world trading system. The Uruguay Round accord is the largest, most comprehensive trade agreement in history. It will create hundreds of thousands of new U.S. jobs and expand opportunities for U.S. businesses. For the first time, international trade rules will apply to services, intellectual property and investments, and effective rules will apply to agriculture. The Uruguay Round also continued the cuts in tariff rates throughout the world that began just after the Second World War. The Administration is committed to working with Congress to passing GATT this year and ensuring that the promises made to American industries in the Uruguay Round are fulfilled.

U.S. - Japan Framework Agreement

While Japan is America's second-largest export market, foreign access to the Japanese market remains limited in many important sectors. Japan's persistent current account surpluses are a major imbalance in the global economy. In July 1993 President Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister

Miyazawa established the U.S.-Japan Framework for Economic Partnership to redress the imbalances in our economic relationship. By the February 1994 Summit between President Clinton and Prime Minister Hosokawa, Japan had not yet fulfilled key commitments under the Framework agreement. The Administration is continuing efforts to ensure that competitive American goods and services have fair access to the Japanese market. We believe Japan must take measures to open its markets and stimulate its economy, both to benefit its own people and to fulfill its international responsibilities

Expanding the Realm of Free Trade

The conclusion of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round represents unprecedented progress toward more open markets both at the regional and global levels. The Administration intends to continue its efforts in further enhancing U.S. access to foreign markets. The World Trade Organization will provide a powerful new institutional lever for securing such access. Emerging markets, particularly along the Pacific Rim, present vast opportunities for American enterprise, and APEC now provides a suitable vehicle for the exploration of such opportunities. The U.S. may also be amenable to the possible establishment of free trade regimes with other nations. All such steps in the direction of expanded trading relationships will be undertaken in a way consistent with protection of the international environment and to the end of sustainable development here and abroad.

Strengthening Macroeconomic Coordination

As national economies become more integrated internationally, the U.S. cannot drive global growth on its own. International economic expansion will benefit from coordinating the macroeconomic policies of the G-7 economies, and especially the three major economies of the world — the United States, Germany and Japan. To improve global macroeconomic performance, we will continue to work through the G-7 "heads of state" and financial leader meetings to seek growth-oriented policies to complement our own budget deficit reduction efforts. Together we can promulgate a growth strategy that combines reducing budget deficits in the U.S., lowering interest rates in Germany and reducing current account surpluses in Japan.

Providing for Energy Security

The United States depends on oil for more than 40% of its primary energy needs. Roughly 45% of our oil needs are met with imports, and a large share of these imports come from the Persian Gulf area. The experiences of the two oil shocks and the Gulf War show that an interruption of oil supplies can have a significant impact on the U.S. economy. Appropriate economic responses can substantially mitigate the balance of payments and inflationary impacts of an oil shock; appropriate foreign policy responses to events such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait can limit the magnitude of the crisis.

Over the longer term, the United States' dependence on access to foreign oil sources will be increasingly important as our resources are depleted. The U.S. economy has grown roughly 75% since the first oil shock; yet during that time our oil consumption has remained virtually stable and oil production has declined. High oil prices did not generate enough new oil exploration and discovery to sustain production levels from our depleted resource base. These facts show the need for continued and extended reliance on energy efficiency and conservation and development of alternative energy sources. Conservation measures notwithstanding, the U.S. has a vital interest in unrestricted access to this critical resource.

Promoting Sustainable Development Abroad

Broad-based economic development not only improves the prospects for democratic development in developing countries, but also expands the demands for U.S. exports. Economic growth abroad can alleviate pressure on the global environment, reduce the attraction of illegal narcotics trade and improve the health and economic productivity of global populations.

The environmental aspects of ill-designed economic growth are clear. Environmental damage will ultimately block economic growth. Rapid urbanization is outstripping the ability of nations to provide jobs, education, and other services to new citizens. The continuing poverty of a quarter of the world's people leads to hunger, malnutrition, economic migration, and political unrest. Widespread illiteracy and lack of technical skills hinder employment

opportunities and drive entire populations to support themselves on increasingly fragile and damaged resource bases. New diseases and epidemics, often spread through environmental degradation, threaten to overwhelm the health facilities of developing countries, disrupt societies, and stop economic growth. These realities must be addressed by sustainable development programs which offer viable alternatives. U.S. leadership is of the essence. If such alternatives are not developed, the consequences for the planet's future will be grave indeed.

Domestically, the U.S. must work hard to halt local and cross-border environmental degradation. In addition, the U.S. should foster environmental technology targeting pollution prevention, control, and cleanup. Companies that invest in energy efficiency, clean manufacturing, and environmental services today will create the high-quality, high-wage jobs of tomorrow. By providing access to these types of technologies, our exports can also provide the means for other nations to achieve environmentally sustainable economic growth. At the same time, we are taking ambitious steps at home to better manage our natural resources and reduce energy and other consumption, decrease waste generation, and increase our recycling efforts.

Internationally, the Administration's foreign assistance program focuses on four key elements of sustainable development: broad-based economic growth; the environment; population and health; and democracy. We will continue to advocate environmentally sound private investment and responsible approaches by international lenders. At our urging, the Multilateral Development Banks (MDB's) are now placing increased emphasis upon sustainable development in their funding decisions, to include a commitment to perform environmental assessments on projects for both internal and public scrutiny. In particular, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), established this year, will provide a source of financial assistance to the developing world for climate change, biodiversity, and oceans initiatives.

The U.S. is taking specific steps now in all of these areas:

- In June 1993, the United States signed the Convention on Biological Diversity, which aims to protect and utilize the world's genetic inheritance. The Interior Department has been directed to create

a national biological survey to help protect species and to help the agricultural and biotechnical industries identify new sources of food, fiber and medications.

- New policies are being implemented to ensure the sustainable management of U.S. forests by the year 2000, as pledged internationally. In addition, U.S. bilateral forest assistance programs are being expanded, and the United States is promoting sustainable management of tropical forests.
- In the wake of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the United States has sought to reduce land-based sources of marine pollution, maintain populations of marine species at healthy and productive levels and protect endangered marine mammals.
- The United States has focussed technical assistance and encouraged nongovernmental environmental groups to provide expertise to the republics of the Former Soviet Union and East European nations that have suffered the most acute environmental crises. The Agency for International Development, the Environmental Protection Agency and other U.S. agencies are engaged in technical cooperation with many countries around the world to advance these goals.
- The Administration is leading a renewed global effort to address population problems and promote international consensus for stabilizing world population growth. Our comprehensive approach will stress family planning and reproductive health care, maternal and child health, education, and improving the status of women. The International Conference on Population Development, to be held in September in Cairo, will endorse these approaches as important strategies in achieving our global population goals.

Promoting Democracy

All of America's strategic interests — from promoting prosperity at home to checking global threats abroad before they threaten our territory — are served by enlarging the

community of democratic and free market nations. Thus, working with new democratic states to help preserve them as democracies committed to free markets and respect for human rights, is a key part of our national security strategy.

One of the most gratifying and encouraging developments of the past 15 years is the explosion in the number of states moving away from repressive governance and toward democracy. Since the success of many of those experiments is by no means assured, our strategy of enlargement must focus on the consolidation of those regimes and the broadening of their commitment to democracy. At the same time, we seek to increase respect for fundamental human rights in all states and encourage an evolution to democracy where that is possible.

The enlargement of the community of market democracies respecting human rights and the environment is manifest in a number of ways:

- More than 20 nations in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Latin America, and East Asia have, over the past 10 years, adopted the structures of a constitutional democracy and held free elections;
- The nations of the Western Hemisphere have proclaimed their commitment to democratic regimes and to the collective responsibility of the nations of the OAS to respond to threats to democracy.
- In the Western Hemisphere, only Cuba and Haiti are not democratic states;
- Nations as diverse as South Africa, Cambodia and El Salvador have resolved bitter internal disputes with agreement on the creation of constitutional democracies.

The first element of our democracy strategy is to work with the other democracies of the world and to improve our cooperation with them on security and economic issues. We also seek their support in enlarging the realm of democratic nations.

The core of our strategy is to help democracy and markets expand and survive in other places where we have the strongest security concerns and where we can make the greatest difference. This is not a democratic crusade; it is a

pragmatic commitment to see freedom take hold where that will help us most. Thus, we must target our effort to assist states that affect our strategic interests, such as those with large economies, critical locations, nuclear weapons, or the potential to generate refugee flows into our own nation or into key friends and allies. We must focus our efforts where we have the most leverage. And our efforts must be demand-driven — they must focus on nations whose people are pushing for reform or have already secured it.

Russia is a key state in this regard. If we can support and help consolidate democratic and market reforms in Russia (and the other newly independent states), we can help turn a former threat into a region of valued diplomatic and economic partners. In addition, our efforts in Russia, Ukraine and the other states raise the likelihood of continued reductions in nuclear arms and compliance with international nonproliferation accords.

The new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe are another clear example, given their proximity to the great democratic powers of Western Europe, their importance to our security, and their potential markets.

Since our ties across the Pacific are no less important than those across the Atlantic, pursuing enlargement in the Asian Pacific is a third example. We will work to support the emerging democracies of the region and to encourage other states along the same path.

Continuing the great strides toward democracy and markets in our emerging hemisphere is also a key concern and lies behind the President's decision to host the Summit of the Americas this December. As we continue such efforts, we should be on the lookout for states whose entry into the camp of market democracies may influence the future direction of an entire region; South Africa and Nigeria now hold that potential with regard to sub-Saharan Africa.

How should the United States help consolidate and enlarge democracy and markets in these states? The answers are as varied as the nations involved, but there are common elements. We must continue to help lead the effort to mobilize international resources, as we have with Russia and the other new states. We must be willing to take immediate public positions to help staunch democ-

ratic reversals, as we have in Haiti, Guatemala and Nigeria. We must give democratic nations the fullest benefits of integration into foreign markets, which is part of why NAFTA and the GATT rank so high on our agenda. And we must help these nations strengthen the pillars of civil society, improve their market institutions, and fight corruption and political discontent through practices of good governance.

At the same time as we work to ensure the success of emerging democracies, we must also redouble our efforts to guarantee basic human rights on a global basis. At the 1993 United Nations Conference on Human Rights, the U.S. forcefully and successfully argued for a reaffirmation of the universality of such rights and improved international mechanisms for their promotion. In the wake of this gathering, the UN has named a High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the rights of women have been afforded a new international precedence. The U.S. also continues to work for the protection of human rights on a bilateral basis. To demonstrate our own willingness to adhere to international human rights standards, the Administration will seek Senate consent to U.S. ratification of international conventions prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race and against women.

In all these efforts, a policy of engagement and enlargement should take on a second meaning: we should pursue our goals through an enlarged circle not only of government officials but also of private and non-governmental groups. Private firms are natural allies in our efforts to strengthen market economies. Similarly, our goal of strengthening democracy and civil society has a natural ally in labor unions, human rights groups, environmental advocates, chambers of commerce, and election monitors. Just as we rely on force multipliers in defense, we should welcome these "diplomacy multipliers," such as the National Endowment for Democracy.

Supporting the global movement toward democracy requires a pragmatic and long-term effort focussed on both values and institutions. The United States must build on the opportunities achieved through the successful conclu-

sion of the Cold War. Our long-term goal is a world in which each of the major powers is democratic, with many other nations joining the community of market democracies as well.

Our efforts to promote democracy and human rights are complemented by our humanitarian assistance programs which are designed to alleviate human suffering and to pave the way for progress towards establishing democratic regimes with a commitment to respect for human rights and appropriate strategies for economic development.

Through humanitarian assistance and policy initiatives aimed at the sources of disruption, we seek to mitigate the contemporary migration and refugee crises, foster long-term global cooperation and strengthen involved international institutions. The U.S. will provide appropriate financial support and will work with other nations and international bodies, such as the International Red Cross and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in seeking voluntary repatriation of refugees — taking into full consideration human rights concerns as well as the economic conditions that may have driven them out in the first place. Helping refugees return to their homes in Mozambique, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia and Guatemala, for example, is a high priority.

Relief efforts will continue for people displaced by the conflict in Bosnia and other republics of the former Yugoslavia. We will act in concert with other nations and the UN against the illegal smuggling of Chinese into this country. Efforts will continue to induce the military forces in Haiti to accept the installation of its democratically elected government, in part to help stem the flow of Haitians attempting entry into the United States.

III. Integrated Regional Approaches

The United States is a genuinely global power. Our policy toward each of the world's regions reflects our overall strategy tailored to their unique challenges and opportunities. This section highlights the application of our strategy to each of the world's regions; our broad objectives and thrust, rather than an exhaustive list of all our policies and interests. It illustrates how we integrate our commitment to the promotion of democracy and the enhancement of American prosperity with our security requirements to produce a mutually reinforcing policy.

Europe and Eurasia

Our strategy of enlargement and engagement is central to U.S. policy towards post-Cold War Europe. European stability is vital to our own security, a lesson we have learned twice at great cost this century. Vibrant European economies mean more jobs for Americans at home and investment opportunities abroad. With the collapse of the Soviet empire and the emergence of new democracies in its wake, the United States has an unparalleled opportunity to contribute toward a free and undivided Europe. Our goal is an integrated democratic Europe cooperating with the United States to keep the peace and promote prosperity.

The first and most important element of our strategy in Europe must be security through military strength and cooperation. The Cold War is over, but war itself is not over.

As we know, it rages in the former Yugoslavia. While that war does not pose an immediate threat to our security or warrant unilateral U.S. involvement, U.S. policy is

focussed on four goals: preventing the spread of the fighting into a broader European war that could threaten both allies and the stability of new democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe; stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees from the conflict; halting the slaughter of innocents; and helping to confirm NATO's central role in post-Cold War Europe.

Our leadership paved the way to NATO's February ultimatum that ended the Serb shelling of Sarajevo and restored calm to Bosnia's capital. Our diplomatic leadership brought an end to the fighting between the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia and helped establish a bicomunal Bosnian-Croat Federation. We have played a leading role in the Contact Group, in tandem with the European Union and the Russian Federation, in forging a plan for a comprehensive settlement to the Bosnian conflict. In addition, the U.S., through the Sarajevo airlift and airdrops throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, has provided the largest quantity of humanitarian aid of any nation. We have led the way in NATO's decisions to enforce the no-fly zone, to protect UN troops if they are attacked, to enforce the economic sanctions against Serbia on the Adriatic and, most recently, to end the Serb's assault on Gorazde. And we have deployed peacekeeping troops to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to prevent the spillover of the conflict, as well as laying down a firm warning to Serbia against escalation of violence in Kosovo.

The murderous conflict in Yugoslavia reminds us that military forces remain relevant in a post-Cold War world. It also reveals the difficulties of applying military force to conflicts within as well as among states. And it teaches us that it is best to act early to prevent conflicts that we may later not be able to control.

As we work to resolve that tragedy and ease the suffering of its victims we also need to change our security institutions so they can better address such conflicts and advance Europe's integration. Many institutions will play a role, including the European Union, the Western European Union, the Council of Europe, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations. But NATO, history's greatest political-military alliance, must be central to that process.

Only NATO has the military forces, the integrated command structure, the broad legitimacy and the habits of cooperation that are essential to draw in new participants and respond to new challenges. One of the deepest transformations within the transatlantic community over the past half-century occurred because the armed forces of our respective nations trained, studied and marched through their careers together. It is not only the compatibility of our weapons, but the camaraderie of our warriors that provide the sinews behind our mutual security guarantees and our best hope for peace.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has significantly reduced the level of U.S. military forces stationed in Europe. We have determined that a force of roughly 100,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to U.S. European command will preserve U.S. influence and leadership in NATO and provide a deterrent posture that is visible to both Western and Eastern Europeans. While we continue to examine the proper mix of forces, this level of permanent presence, augmented by forward deployed naval forces and reinforcements available from the U.S., is sufficient to respond to plausible crises and contributes to stability in the region. Such a force level also provides a sound basis for U.S. participation in multinational training and preserves the capability to deter or respond to larger threats in Europe and to support limited NATO operations "out of area."

With the end of the Cold War, NATO's mission is evolving; today NATO plays a crucial role helping to manage ethnic and national conflict in Europe. With U.S. leadership, NATO has provided the muscle that is helping to bring about a peaceful settlement in the former Yugoslavia. NATO air power enforces the UN-mandated no-fly zone and provides support to UN peacekeepers. Our firm ultimatum in February 1994 finally brought an end to the shelling of Sarajevo, and NATO's April decision

ended the siege of Gorazde. NATO stands ready to help support the peace once the parties reach an agreement.

With the adoption of the U.S. initiative, Partnership for Peace, at the January 1994 summit, NATO is playing an increasingly important role in our strategy of European integration, extending the scope of our security cooperation to the new democracies of Europe. Twenty-one nations, including Russia, have already joined the partnership, which will pave the way for a growing program of military cooperation and political consultation. Partner countries are sending representatives to NATO headquarters near Brussels and to a military coordination cell at Mons — the site of SHAPE. Joint exercises will take place later this year in Poland and the Netherlands.

In keeping with our strategy of enlargement, PFP is open to all former members of the Warsaw Pact as well as other European states. Each partner will set the scope and pace of its cooperation with NATO. During his trip to Europe in July, the President reaffirmed his commitment to NATO's future expansion, with PFP the best path toward NATO membership. The aim of NATO's future expansion, however, will not be to draw a new line in Europe further east, but to expand stability, democracy, prosperity and security cooperation to an ever-broader Europe.

The second element of the new strategy for Europe is economic. The United States seeks to build on vibrant and open market economies, the engines that have given us the greatest prosperity in human history over the last several decades in Europe and in the United States. To this end, we strongly support the process of European integration embodied in the European Union, seek to deepen our partnership with the EU in support of our economic goals but also commit ourselves to the encouragement of bilateral trade and investment in countries not part of the EU.

The nations of the European Union face particularly severe economic challenges with nearly 20 million people unemployed and, in Germany's case, the extraordinarily high costs of unification. Among the Atlantic nations, economic stagnation has clearly eroded public support in finances for outward-looking foreign policies and for greater integration. We are working closely with our West European partners to expand employment and promote longterm growth, building on the results of the Detroit Jobs Conference and the Naples G-7 Summit.

As we work to strengthen our own economies, we must know that we serve our own prosperity and our security by helping the new market reforms in the new democracies in Europe's East that will help to deflate the region's demagogues. It will help ease ethnic tensions. It will help new democracies take root.

In Russia, the economic transformation undertaken will go down as one of the great historical events of this century. The Russian Government has made remarkable progress toward privatizing the economy and reducing inflation. But much remains to be done to build on the reform momentum to assure durable economic recovery and social protection. President Clinton has given strong and consistent support to this unprecedented reform effort, and has mobilized the international community to provide structural economic assistance.

The short-term difficulties of taking Central and Eastern Europe into Western economic institutions will be more than rewarded if they succeed and if they are customers for America's and Western Europe's goods and services tomorrow. That is why this Administration has been committed to increase support substantially for market reforms in the new states of the former Soviet Union, and why we have continued our support for economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe, while also paying attention to measures that can overcome the social dislocations which have resulted largely from the collapse of the Soviet-dominated regional trading system.

Ultimately, the success of market reforms to the East will depend more on trade than aid. No one nation has enough money to markedly change the future of those countries as they move to free market systems. One of our priorities, therefore, is to reduce trade barriers with the former communist states.

The third and final imperative of this new strategy is to support the growth of democracy and individual freedoms that has begun in Russia, the nations of the former Soviet Union and Europe's former communist states. The success of these democratic reforms makes us all more secure; they are the best answer to the aggressive nationalism and ethnic hatreds unleashed by the end of the Cold War. Nowhere is democracy's success more important to us all than in these countries.

This will be the work of generations. There will be wrong turns and even reversals, as there have been in all countries throughout history. But as long as these states continue their progress toward democracy and respect the rights of their own and other people, that they understand the rights of their minorities and their neighbors, we will support their progress with a steady patience.

East Asia and the Pacific

East Asia is a region of growing importance for U.S. security and prosperity; nowhere are the strands of our three-pronged strategy more intertwined, nor is the need for continued U.S. engagement more evident. Now more than ever, security, open markets and democracy go hand in hand in our approach to this dynamic region. President Clinton envisions an integrated strategy — a New Pacific Community — which links security requirements with economic realities and our concern for democracy and human rights.

In thinking about Asia, we must remember that security comes first. The United States intends to remain active in that region. We are a Pacific nation. We have fought three wars there in this century. To deter regional aggression and secure our own interests, we will maintain an active presence and we will continue to lead. Our deep bilateral ties with allies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, and a continued, committed American military presence will serve as a bedrock for America's security role in the Asia-Pacific region. Currently, our forces number nearly 100,000 personnel in this critical region. In addition to performing the general forward deployment functions outlined above, they contribute to deterring aggression and adventurism by the North Korean regime.

As the first pillar of our New Pacific Community, we are pursuing stronger efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the Korean peninsula and in South Asia. We have instituted new regional dialogues on the full range of common security challenges. Our goal is to integrate, not isolate the region's powers and to find solutions, short of conflict, to the area's continuing security challenges.

The second pillar of our new Pacific Community and the challenge for the Asian Pacific region in this decade is to develop multiple new arrangements to meet multiple threats and opportunities. These arrangements can function like overlapping plates of armor, individually providing protection and together covering the full body of our common security concerns.

Our strong commitment to the region, and our active engagement are the foundation of our efforts to secure peace and stability on a nonnuclear Korean peninsula. We are prepared to engage in broad and thorough discussions with North Korea to resolve a variety of issues, provided that the North acts in good faith and while it keeps major elements of its nuclear program "frozen." But if North Korea pursues nuclear weapons development, we will do what it takes, in concert with allies and friends, to assure South Korea's security and maintain international pressure on the Pyongyang regime. Our long run objective continues to be a non-nuclear, peacefully reunified Korean Peninsula.

If security problems persist in Asia, so do new opportunities for economic progress. Just three decades ago, Asia had only 8% of the world's GDP. Today, it exceeds 25%. Asian economies are growing at three times the rate of the more established industrial nations.

The growth of Asia can and will benefit our nation. Over the past five years, our exports to many Asian nations have increased by 50% or more. Much of what Asia needs to continue its growth are goods and services in which we are strong. Already, Asia is our largest trading partner. Exports to Asia account for 2.5 million jobs.

We are working with Japan to bring about the implementation of the 1993 Framework Agreement, to ensure that the economic leg of that relationship is as healthy and vibrant as our political and security links.

We are developing a broader engagement with the People's Republic of China that will encompass both our economic and strategic interests. That policy is best reflected in our decision to delink China's Most Favored Nation status from its record on human rights. We are also working to facilitate China's development of a more open, market economy that accepts international trade practices. Given its growing economic potential and already sizable

military force, it is essential that China not become a security threat to the region. To that end, we are strongly promoting China's participation in regional security mechanisms to reassure its neighbors and assuage its own security concerns. And we are seeking to gain further cooperation from China in controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

We are also moving to take advantage of evolving multilateral mechanisms. The APEC summit, hosted by President Clinton last year, is vivid testimony to the possibilities of stimulating regional economic cooperation.

The third pillar of our policy in building a new Pacific community is to support the wave of democratic reform sweeping the region. The new democratic states of Asia will have our strong support as they move forward to consolidate and expand democratic reforms.

Some have argued that democracy is somehow unsuited for Asia or at least for some Asian nations — that human rights are relative and that they simply mask Western culturalism and imperialism. These voices are wrong. It is not Western imperialism, but the aspirations of Asian peoples themselves that explain the growing number of democracies and the growing strength of democracy movements everywhere in Asia. It is an insult to the spirit, the hopes, and the dreams of the people who live and struggle in those countries to assert otherwise.

Each nation must find its own form of democracy. But there is no cultural justification for torture or tyranny. We refuse to let repression cloak itself in moral relativism, for democracy and human rights are not occidental yearnings; they are universal yearnings and universal norms. We will continue to press for respect for human rights in countries as diverse as China and Burma.

The Western Hemisphere

The Western hemisphere, too, is a fertile field for a strategy of engagement and enlargement. Sustained improvements in the security situation there, including the resolution of border tensions, control of insurgencies and containment of pressures for arms proliferation, will be an essential underpinning of political and economic progress in the hemisphere.

The unprecedented triumph of democracy and market economies throughout the region offers an unparalleled opportunity to secure the benefits of peace and stability, and to promote economic growth and trade. Ratification of NAFTA is one of our most important foreign policy achievements, because it advances all three of our central objectives: not only does it mean new jobs and new opportunities for American workers and business, but it also represents an important step in solidifying the hemispheric community of democracies. Vice President Gore has called NAFTA "a starting point for dealing with the common challenges of the Americas."

At the Summit of the Americas this December, President Clinton will bring together the region's leaders to explore new ways to further this process of integration. The Summit will address three broad themes: promoting democracy, increasing prosperity and trade ties, and achieving sustainable development.

At the same time, we remain committed to extending democracy to the handful of remaining outposts where the region's people are not free. Our overarching objective is to preserve the dominance of civilian elected governments and promote their evolution into functioning democratic societies respectful of human rights. In Haiti we are working with the international community to reverse the military coup and restore democracy. The Cuban Democracy Act remains the framework for our policy toward Cuba; our goal is the peaceful establishment of democratic governance for the people of Cuba.

We are working with our neighbors through the OAS to invigorate regional cooperation. Both bilaterally and regionally, we seek to eliminate the scourge of drug trafficking, which poses a serious threat to democracy and security. We also seek to strengthen norms for defense establishments that are supportive of democracy, respect for human rights, and civilian control in defense matters. Finally, protecting the region's precious environmental resources is an important priority.

The Middle East, Southwest and South Asia

The United States has enduring interests in the Middle East, especially pursuing a comprehensive breakthrough to Middle East peace, assuring the security of Israel and our

Arab friends, and maintaining the free flow of oil at reasonable prices. Our strategy is harnessed to the unique characteristics of the region and our vital interests there, as we work to extend the range of peace and stability, while implementing a strategy of dual containment of Iraq and Iran as long as those states pose a threat to U.S. interests, to other states in the region, and to their own citizens.

We have made solid progress in the past year. The President's efforts helped bring about an historic first — the handshake of peace between Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat on the White House lawn. The President will bring Prime Minister Rabin and King Hussein to Washington for an historic meeting to advance the peace process further. But our efforts have not stopped there; on other bilateral tracks and through regional dialogue we are working to foster a durable peace and a comprehensive settlement, while our support for economic development can bring hope to all the peoples of the region.

In Southwest Asia, the United States will maintain its long-standing presence, which has been centered on naval vessels in and near the Persian Gulf and prepositioned combat equipment. Since Operation Desert Storm, temporary deployments of land-based aviation forces, ground forces and amphibious units have supplemented our posture in the Gulf region.

While we hold out the hand of cooperation and assistance to the nations of the region that choose peace, we are firm in our determination to contain and resist those who foster conflict. We have instituted a new dual containment strategy aimed at both Iraq and Iran.

We have made clear to Iraq it must comply with all the relevant Security Council resolutions, and we continue to support oppressed minorities in Iraq through Operations Provide Comfort and Southern Watch. Our policy is directed not against the people of Iraq, but against its oppressive and dangerous leaders.

Our policy toward Iran is aimed at changing the behavior of the Iranian government in several key areas, including Iran's efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction and missiles, its support for terrorism and groups that oppose the peace process, its attempts to undermine friendly governments in the region and its dismal human rights record. We remain willing to enter into an authoritative dialogue with Iran to discuss the differences between us.

South Asia has seen the spread of democracy, and our strategy is designed to help the peoples of that region enjoy the fruits of democracy and greater stability through efforts aimed at resolving long-standing conflict and implementing confidence building measures. This advances U.S. interests in halting nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation. The United States has engaged India and Pakistan in seeking agreement on steps to cap, reduce, and ultimately eliminate their weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile capabilities. Regional stability and improved bilateral ties are also important for America's economic interest in a region that contains a quarter of the world's population and one of its most important emerging markets.

A key objective of our policy in the Gulf is to reduce the chances that another aggressor will emerge who would threaten the independence of existing states. Therefore, we will continue to encourage members of the Gulf Cooperation Council to work closely on collective defense and security arrangements, help individual GCC states meet their appropriate defense requirements and maintain our bilateral defense agreements.

In both the Middle East and South Asia, the pressure of expanding populations on natural resources is enormous. Growing desertification in the Middle East has strained relations over arable land. Pollution of the coastal areas in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aqaba has degraded fish catches and hindered development. Water shortages stemming from overuse, contaminated water aquifers, and riparian disputes threaten regional relations.

In South Asia, high population densities and rampant pollution have exacted a tremendous toll on forests, biodiversity, and the local environment.

Africa

Africa is one of our greatest challenges for a strategy of engagement and enlargement. Throughout Africa, the U.S. policy seeks to help support democracy, sustainable economic development and resolution of conflicts through negotiation, diplomacy and peacekeeping. New policies will focus on efforts to strengthen civil societies and mechanisms for conflict resolution, particularly where ethnic, religious, and political tensions are acute. In particular, we

intend to focus on identifying and addressing the root causes of conflicts and disasters before they erupt.

The nexus of economic, political, social, ethnic and environmental challenges facing Africa can lead to a sense of "Afro-pessimism." We will instead seek to simultaneously address these challenges and create a synergy that can stimulate development, resurrect societies and build hope. Throughout the continent — in Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, Sudan and elsewhere — we encourage peaceful resolution of internal disputes to promote long-term stability and development of the region. We also encourage democratic reform in nations like Nigeria and Zaire to allow the people of these countries to enjoy responsive government.

This year, South Africa took key steps towards democratic reform with the holding of non-racial elections and creation of a Government of National Unity. We will remain committed to ensuring that democracy takes root in South Africa in order to foster a new era of prosperity and stability for all the peoples of the region. We must support the revolution of democracy sweeping the continent — on center stage in South Africa, and in quieter but no less dramatic ways in countries like Malawi, Benin, Niger and Mali. We need to encourage the creation of cultures of tolerance, flowering of civil society and the protection of human rights and human dignity.

Our humanitarian interventions, along with the international community, will require continued active participation to address the grave circumstances on the continent. This has been particularly true in Somalia. The global reach of U.S. forces in Somalia allowed us to break through the chaos that had prevented the introduction of relief supplies and UN peacekeepers. U.S. forces prevented the death of hundreds of thousands of Somalis, established a logistics system and then turned over the mission to more than 25,000 UN peacekeepers from over a score of nations.

In the end, however, such efforts by the U.S. and the international community must be limited in duration and designed to give the peoples of a nation the means and opportunity to put their own house in order. In Somalia and elsewhere, the responsibility for the fate of a nation rests finally with its own people. In Rwanda, the United States has also taken an active role in providing relief to those displaced by ethnic violence. And U.S. AID is

leading international efforts to get ahead of the curve on potential famines that threaten up to 20 million people on the continent.

The United States is also working with regional organizations, non-governmental organizations and governments throughout Africa to address the urgent issues of population growth, spreading disease (including AIDS), environmental decline, enhancing the role of women in development, eliminating support for terrorism, demobilization of bloated militaries, relieving burdensome debt, and expanding trade and investment ties to the countries of Africa.

Central to all these efforts will be strengthening the American constituency for Africa, drawing on the knowledge, experience and commitment of millions of

Americans to enhance our nation's support for positive change in Africa. The White House Conference on Africa, the first such gathering of regional experts ever sponsored by the White House, drew together more than 200 Americans from the Administration, Congress, business, labor, academia, religious groups, relief and development agencies, human rights groups and others to discuss Africa's future and the role that the United States can play in it. The President, Vice President, Secretary of State and National Security Advisor all participated in the conference, which produced a wealth of new ideas and new commitment to Africa.

IV. Conclusions

The clear and present dangers of the Cold War made the need for national security commitments and expenditures obvious to the American people. Today the task of mobilizing public support for national security priorities has become more complicated. The complex array of new dangers, opportunities and responsibilities outlined in this strategy come at a moment in our history when Americans are preoccupied with domestic concerns and when budgetary constraints are tighter than at any point in the last half century. Yet, in an integrating and interdependent world, we simply cannot be successful in advancing our interests — political, military and economic — without active engagement in world affairs.

While Cold War threats have diminished, our nation can never again isolate itself from global developments. Domestic renewal will not succeed if we fail to engage abroad in open foreign markets, to promote democracy in key countries, and to counter and contain emerging threats.

We are committed to enhancing U.S. national security in the most efficient and effective ways possible. We recognize that maintaining peace and ensuring our national security in a volatile world are expensive. The cost of any other course of action, however, would be immeasurably higher.

Our engagement abroad requires the active, sustained bipartisan support of the American people and the U.S. Congress. Of all the elements contained in this strategy, none is more important than this: our Administration is committed to explaining our security interests and objectives to the nation; to seeking the broadest possible public and congressional support for our security programs and investments; and to exerting our leadership in the world in a manner that reflects our best national values and protects the security of this great and good nation.

Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage: 1995



This report was prepared by the National Counterintelligence Center.

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Introduction

Section 809 of the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995* required that the President report to the Congress on foreign industrial espionage targeted against US industry. The Act defined foreign industrial espionage as "industrial espionage conducted by a foreign government or by a foreign company with direct assistance of a foreign government against a private United States company and aimed at obtaining commercial secrets." The Act required that the report address four issues:

- The respective policy functions and operational roles of the agencies of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government in identifying and countering threats to US industry of foreign industrial espionage, including the manner in which such functions and roles are coordinated.
- The means by which the Federal Government communicates information on such threats, and on methods to protect against such threats, to US industry in general and to US companies known to be targets of foreign espionage.
- The specific measures that are being or could be undertaken in order to improve the activities referred to in the above paragraphs, including proposals for any modifications of law necessary to facilitate the undertaking of such activities.
- The threat to US industry of foreign industrial espionage and any trends in that threat, including:
 - The number and identity of the foreign governments conducting foreign industrial espionage.
 - The industrial sectors and types of information and technology targeted by such espionage.
 - The methods used to conduct such espionage. The National Counterintelligence Policy Board (NACIPB), on behalf of the National Security Council, tasked the National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC) to draft a community-based response to this Congressional requirement. The NACIC solicited input from the relevant Executive Branch agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Security Division; the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Counterintelligence Center; the Department of State, Bureaus of Intelligence and Research and Diplomatic Security; the Director of Counterintelligence and Security Programs in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence; the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the US Army Intelligence and Security Command; the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS); the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI); the Defense Investigative Service (DIS); the Personnel Security Research Institute; the National Security Agency (NSA); the Department of Energy (DOE), Counterintelligence Division; the Department of Commerce, Office of Export Enforcement; the Department of Treasury, Office of

Intelligence Support; and the US Customs Service, Office of Intelligence. Input from each of these agencies has been incorporated into this report.

This study describes the "defensive" measures that the US Government applies to counter foreign collection of US economic-related intelligence and information. It also lists the US targets of foreign economic collection and the methods foreign governments and corporations use to obtain US economic and technological information, including at times US Government information that directly affects US industry. This study does not address the concept of the US Government "offensively" collecting foreign proprietary information and providing it to US firms, which is against US policy.

To provide a full scope of foreign economic collection efforts targeted at US firms, this report examines "foreign industrial espionage" as specifically requested by Congress as well as other types of collection efforts that potentially could be damaging to US national and corporate interests. This report includes collection efforts by foreign intelligence services, other government agencies, and private firms, in two broad classes of economic collection activities--espionage and illicit acquisition of proprietary information, and other economic collection efforts. In distinguishing between different types of collection activity, this report is not designed to establish legal parameters for the activities described, nor to characterize the actions and decisions of US law enforcement and intelligence agencies with regard to counterintelligence (CI) operations and investigations.

Espionage and Illicit Acquisition of Proprietary Information.

Espionage and illicit collection activities represent attempts by foreign governments and/or industry to acquire classified or nonpublic information from US firms. Government-sponsored activities are conducted by entities such as intelligence services, other government agencies--such as foreign trade offices and S&T attaches--and private corporations.

Other Economic Collection Efforts.

Foreign governments and industry also collect economic information from US firms through standard business practices--such as mergers and acquisitions, ⁽¹⁾ strategic alliances, and licensing agreements--as well as gathering publicly available information. Although these activities are an accepted element of the business world and are largely peripheral to the scope of this report, a large body of reporting indicates that these activities generate a considerable portion of the technology and economic information obtained by our competitors. They clearly do not constitute illegal behavior, however. Open-source collection activities include, but are not limited to, review of trade journals or corporate annual reports, market surveys, and attending conferences and symposia. In some instances, however, these types of collection efforts could be precursors to illicit collection activities or indicate the intelligence interest of foreign powers. For example, attempts by a foreign government's intelligence service to persuade an employee of a US firm to gather information from the firm's library could be the first step in setting up a source that would eventually collect proprietary documents. Similarly, joint ventures and

licensing agreements provide ideal opportunities to gather nonpublic information from US firms.

This report is divided into four sections, corresponding with the four parts of the Congressional requirement. A classified version of this report accompanies this document.

Policy Functions and Operational Roles

Report the respective policy functions and operational roles of the agencies of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government in identifying and countering threats to US industry of foreign industrial espionage, including the manner in which such functions and roles are coordinated.

The US Government's primary methods for identifying and countering foreign economic espionage and illicit acquisition of proprietary information are CI operations and law enforcement investigations. CI and law enforcement agencies monitor foreign intelligence collection, ascertain how and against whom it is directed, and determine the optimum remedy to counter the threat, either through CI methods or criminal prosecution. CI efforts are directed at monitoring, penetrating, and neutralizing foreign intelligence activities targeted against US national interests, including economic and industrial interests. Law enforcement agencies take advantage of CI information as well as develop their own information through investigations. At times, these two communities have proceeded separately without effectively coordinating their efforts. Section III of this study contains several Executive Branch options to ensure better coordination and cooperation.

The FBI is the central US Government agency for collecting, analyzing, and investigating foreign threats to US industry. Because of its mission as both the US Government's primary CI agency with regard to foreign intelligence activities within the United States and in its role as the lead criminal investigative agency, the FBI is able to use both types of remedies against economic and industrial espionage. The FBI recently created two new investigative classifications--one for cases in which there is alleged or confirmed foreign power involvement and one for purely criminal cases--to better counter the problem. Current internal FBI administrative reform is designed to optimize the use of CI and law enforcement remedies.

The US Customs Service is the US Government's primary border enforcement agency with responsibility for enforcing several categories of laws that relate to illegal economic activities. For example, Customs is responsible for enforcing the Arms Export Control Act and the Export of War Materials Act, which involve munitions control and trafficking activities. It is also responsible for the enforcement of export controls of high-technology material and information under the Export Administrations Act. Economic and industrial espionage are often connected to trade sanctions and embargoes against

designated countries, strategic trade issues, and protection of intellectual property rights, and thus fall under Customs responsibilities.

Each Department of Defense (DOD) military service has CI and criminal investigative components that conduct CI operations and investigate foreign economic and industrial intelligence activities as they relate to DOD programs and systems. Military services work closely with the FBI when the activity involves violations of Federal laws or intelligence activity targeted against US persons. The information developed through this support is disseminated and coordinated throughout the CI and security programs communities.

CI and law enforcement investigative agencies rely on several sources within the US Government for CI information and criminal leads that they further develop through investigations and operations, including the following:

- The FBI's Development of Espionage, Counterintelligence, and Counterterrorism Awareness (DECA) Program provides an interface with the US corporate community through which the FBI not only conveys information but also obtains investigative leads from corporations concerning foreign government and corporate attempts to illicitly collect US economic and technological information.
- The CIA informs the FBI and other appropriate US Government agencies when it learns, in the course of its broader foreign CI and economic intelligence-gathering activities, about a foreign government or company targeting US industry. For example, the CIA informs the FBI and/or the Department of Justice of economic espionage information acquired from foreign government sources. In addition, the CIA informs the State Department and other appropriate government agencies of instances of economic espionage or state-supported unfair trading practices, such as bribery of contracting officials. The CIA also prepares analysis on countries engaging in economic espionage and questionable trading practices for dissemination to US Government policymakers and throughout the Intelligence Community.
- DOE's Counterintelligence Division manages a defensive CI program to identify and counter threats of foreign economic and industrial intelligence collection activities against DOE personnel and facilities. DOE collects information through reports on foreigners visiting DOE facilities and through debriefings of DOE employees and contractors who may have been targeted by foreign governments or corporations. It furnishes this information as CI leads to the FBI when there is evidence of foreign intelligence targeting.
- DIS systematically collects CI information developed through personnel security interviews and industrial security inspections. The Counterintelligence Office analyzes this information and, when appropriate, provides it as CI and criminal investigative leads to agencies such as the FBI, US Customs Service, and the military services.

US Government Support to Private Industry

Report the means by which the Federal Government communicates information on [industrial espionage] threats, and on methods to protect against such threats, to US industry in general and to US companies known to be targets of foreign espionage.

US Government agencies identify and counter foreign economic espionage and illicit efforts to acquire proprietary information from two distinct but integrated approaches: CI and law enforcement. As a subset of those approaches, and taking advantage of the information that the respective communities develop, the US Government also counters those activities through awareness training.

Awareness programs are designed to provide government and private audiences with the foreign threat information they need to better protect classified and proprietary economic information from illicit collection. US Government contractors receive the vast majority of threat information that flows from government to industry. Recipients include contractors for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), CIA, and the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State.

The primary US Government programs that pass threat information to non-government affiliated corporations are the FBI's DECA Program; the State Department's Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC); and, on occasion, the CIA's National Resources Division. NACIC, which recently completed a survey of the CI needs of US industry, also has implemented initiatives to work with these various programs to provide more timely or relevant threat information to the private sector.

After obtaining information indicating that a specific US company is being targeted by a foreign intelligence service or government, the US Intelligence Community (USIC) shares it with the FBI which may inform the US company about the threat. The FBI may brief appropriate personnel in the company about the threat and work with them to counteract that threat. Information of a more general nature also is shared with the State Department's OSAC representatives for passage to the private sector. The NACIC will join forces with OSAC to share threat information, particularly on the US technology targeted and collection techniques used by foreign governments.

The following tabulation lists the awareness and briefing programs within each US Government agency that provides threat information to private-sector companies:

USG Agency	Recipient of CI and Threat Information
CIA	Selected US persons and companies
DIA	DOD contractors
DIS	DOD contractors

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DOD/ASPP	DOD contractors and defense acquisition community
DODSI	Briefings and <i>Security Awareness Bulletin</i> to numerous industry customers
Military Services	Contractors working on service R&D programs, special access programs, and military systems acquisition programs
DOE	DOE contractors, CRADA participants
FBI	All US industry
NACIC	Selected US industry
NASA	NASA contractors
NSA	NSA contractors
USDS/DS/OSAC	Member companies

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The DECA Program is the FBI's public voice and educational medium for communicating foreign threat information, especially the economic espionage threat, to the private sector. The DECA Program has been in place for over 20 years and has been an integral part of the FBI's foreign CI program. DECA coordinators in each of the FBI's 56 field offices have regular liaison with companies located in the field offices' territories. The DECA coordinators furnish briefings, videotapes, pamphlets, and other materials to help the private sector understand and recognize foreign economic espionage threats directed at them. The content of briefings and material provided is tailored to the specific needs and concerns of each company. The DECA coordinators also discuss the various methods employed by foreign governments to accomplish their intelligence collection goals. During fiscal years 1993 and 1994, the FBI briefed almost 20,000 companies totaling nearly a quarter of a million personnel, in addition to briefings at academic institutions, laboratories, and state and local governments.

The DECA Program is a national effort with management, direction, and analytical support from FBI Headquarters. As needed, FBIHQ provides field offices with information, materials, and speaker support to facilitate a specific request or need. It relies on dynamic and direct communication between the DECA coordinator and executives, security directors, and personnel in US corporations. In addition, the program periodically publishes a foreign intelligence threat information journal titled *DECA*

Notes. Both classified and unclassified versions of *DECA Notes* and DECA briefings have been given to US corporations throughout the United States.

Department of State

State Department's OSAC is a joint venture by the Department and US businesses to interact on overseas security problems of mutual concern, including foreign economic threats. OSAC is administered under the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). Over 1,400 private-sector organizations participate in its activities and receive information and guidance. As part of the growing emphasis on the threat to US business, OSAC established a Committee for Protection of Information and Technology that seeks to improve the government-industry partnership.

OSAC also oversees "Country Councils" in selected foreign cities that consist of US embassy security officers and other post officials working with security managers of US private-sector enterprises to exchange unclassified security information in a timely fashion. There are Country Councils in 25 foreign cities, with five more planned for 1995. Country Councils enable OSAC to pass threat information to industry and to gather information from US corporations concerning threats to US economic security.

Government and business representatives have joined with OSAC to produce a series of publications providing guidance, suggestions, and planning techniques on a variety of security-related issues, including a booklet titled *Guidelines for Protecting US Business Information Overseas*, the latest version of which was published in November 1994. To exchange threat information as expeditiously as possible, the State Department created the OSAC Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB). The EBB is an unclassified on-line system available to OSAC member companies that serves as the focal point for the exchange of information between the Department of State and the US private sector. More specifically, DS's Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis (ITA) uses the EBB to provide US corporations doing business abroad with timely, unclassified security-related information. US firms supplement ITA's information by voluntarily submitting accounts of security or crime incidents affecting their own or other US overseas operations. The EBB currently contains over 42,000 individual reports of various types of threats overseas.

Central Intelligence Agency

The CIA provides information to the FBI for use, as appropriate and in accordance with memoranda of understanding and executive orders, in the DECA Program. On occasion, the CIA briefs US corporate officials directly concerning the foreign intelligence threats facing US companies. The CIA has presented these briefings, which describe the ways various countries conduct economic intelligence collection against the United States, to individual corporations and at industry-wide conferences, often with FBI participation.

The briefings cover foreign economic activities worldwide, focusing on intelligence-gathering techniques used by specific countries. The CIA plans to offer another briefing on commercially available technical gear used by foreign services to conduct economic espionage against US companies.

As appropriate, CIA coordinates with other US Government agencies, specifically the FBI, before notifying a US company that it is the specific target. CIA also is participating extensively in planning and implementing an array of activities under the auspices of the NACIC's new interagency Awareness Working Group (see below). These programs are designed to inform and assist US companies that are actual or potential targets.

Department of Defense

The ***Defense Intelligence Agency***, under its Defense Information Counter Espionage (DICE) program, conducts briefings at conferences attended by government-affiliated contractors and provides current threat information for training courses for DOD contractor personnel. The subjects of these briefings include economic intelligence collection activities by friendly countries and threats of illicit technology transfer. DIA also prepares CI risk assessments on foreign ownership of DOD-affiliated US corporations and studies on the foreign intelligence threat to DOD programs and operations, including contractor programs.

The ***Defense Investigative Service*** shares information with industry about targeting of specific technologies or specific contractors based on its analysis of information from data bases such as the Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence (FOCI) data base and various elements of the Foreign Disclosure and Technical Information System. The focus of the DIS program is to safeguard classified information, but its efforts also help to protect proprietary information. As DIS becomes aware of the targeting of specific technologies or specific contractors, that information is shared with industry and other US Government agencies as appropriate.

Foreign threat information also is developed by DIS Special Agents during personal security interviews (PSIs), by Industrial Security representatives under the auspices of the National Industrial Security Program, and through liaison with other US agencies. Reports are disseminated throughout DOD, throughout the USIC, and to cleared defense contractors during industrial security actions.

DIS is developing a program to identify cleared facilities that are involved in critical technologies and have interface with foreign interests. They will spearhead a briefing/debriefing program for contractor personnel who host foreign national visitors, conduct foreign travel/visits, interface with on-site foreign national visitor groups, and are assigned overseas. The focus of this program will be to identify attempts by foreign nationals to circumvent or undermine disclosure decisions.

DOD Service CI Components each have comprehensive programs to brief the defense

industry and the acquisition community on the political, military, and economic threat to sensitive technologies and programs and the multidisciplinary threat posed by foreign countries, visitors, and economic entities. Military CI components provide a full range of CI support to the military research, development, test, and evaluations community; acquisition program offices; and contractors they serve. Their overall goal is to detect, deter, neutralize, and exploit attempts by foreign entities to acquire restricted DOD systems and technologies.

The ***DOD Acquisition Systems Protection Program (ASPP)*** attempts to unify the acquisition, CI, and security communities to prevent losses of information. Under ASPP, the acquisition community identifies the most essential elements of DOD acquisition programs, known as EPITS (essential program information, technology, and systems), as well as other pertinent information about DOD technologies. The CI community identifies threats to the technologies in general and to specific EPITS by location as far as possible. The security community then tailors countermeasures to offset the threat and vulnerabilities of the program.

The ***Department of Defense Security Institute (DODSI)*** develops and presents courses of instruction in DOD Security Countermeasures programs, including industrial, personnel, information, and security awareness and management programs. Discussions of the threat are inherent in these programs. DODSI also publishes unclassified security awareness information. The most well-known DODSI publication is the *Security Awareness Bulletin*, which is distributed to over 25,000 customers in government and industry and provides an easy vehicle for disseminating CI information. Articles often highlight foreign economic and industrial intelligence activities and ways to protect against them. DODSI is in the process of producing a series of security awareness videos titled *Countering Espionage*.

National Reconnaissance Office

NRO's Counterintelligence Staff runs a CI threat and awareness program to brief its contractor-based personnel on the intelligence threat targeting their systems and programs.

National Security Agency

The NSA conducts briefings and develops and organizes courses, seminars, and conferences to sensitize its contractors cleared for special compartmented information to the foreign intelligence threat domestically and overseas. NSA provides general and country-specific threat information in all indoctrination and orientation briefings, debriefings, and special briefings (for example, defensive travel briefings, courier briefings, special access briefings, and so forth).

NSA products are not provided directly to the private sector, and there are currently no plans to do so. On rare occasions when specific threat information of import to a US company is developed by NSA, the information may be provided to the FBI. Subject to NSA approval, a "sanitized" FBI threat notification may be made to the firm.

National Counterintelligence Center

The NACIC was established in 1994 in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-24, titled "US Counterintelligence Effectiveness." It is the NACIPB's primary mechanism to guide all national-level CI activities, including countering foreign economic and industrial intelligence collection activities.

The NACIC Threat Assessment Office has begun to compile intelligence and open-source reporting on the clandestine targeting of US industry and technologies by foreign powers or their intelligence services. It fulfills this in cooperation with other US Government agencies in three ways:

1. By providing analyses on threats to emerging or existing technologies and on threats to critical facilities in the United States or overseas.
2. By identifying and broadly disseminating information on human and technical collection methods used by foreign powers against the United States, including threats encountered by US businessmen at home or overseas.
3. By assessing the CI aspects of foreign disclosures, foreign ownership, technology transfers, and joint ventures.

In cooperation with other US Government agencies, the NACIC has begun to provide certain reports, as appropriate based upon classification and dissemination caveats, to US private firms with and without classified government contracts. The NACIC has responded to limited taskings from US corporations for threat information and will seek to make this service more available to private-sector customers.

The NACIC Program Integration Office, through the NACIC Awareness Working Group, also serves as a community coordinating body for CI training and awareness programs. As such, it facilitates the development and monitors the effectiveness of US Government awareness programs for both the public and private sectors. CI information describing the threat to US industry is incorporated into these awareness presentations.

The NACIC is currently participating in two surveys of private industry. The first was conducted in coordination with OSAC, under the direction of the National Security Council. It was distributed in December 1994 and January 1995 to OSAC member companies. This survey was designed to identify ways to enhance the relationship between the CI community and US private industry. It sought the opinion of industry on how the US Government could better provide private corporations with information on the threat from foreign intelligence and security services overseas and in the United States. Results of this survey are now being tabulated and will be used to help formulate

US Government policy on how to best fill the CI needs of US industry. The NACIC is also participating in a spring 1995 survey, in conjunction with the American Society of Information Security (ASIS) and Michigan State University, to gauge the severity of the theft of proprietary information in the private sector. This survey is designed to update and validate a 1992 ASIS survey on the same subject. The survey will be distributed to approximately 6,000 US corporations, and results are planned to be published by summer 1995.

Department of Energy

DOE's CI Program mission is to deter and neutralize foreign intelligence activities in the United States directed at or involving DOE programs, facilities, technology, personnel, and sensitive unclassified and classified information. The DOE Counterintelligence Division communicates the foreign threat through its awareness training program, analysis program, foreign travel briefing and debriefing programs, and the dissemination of foreign intelligence threat information to employees, scientists, managers, and security personnel. The Counterintelligence Division regularly publishes classified and unclassified analytical studies, bulletins, newsletters, and other information about foreign intelligence threats to DOE facilities and personnel. This threat information is also shared with other US Government agencies and US corporations who have entered into cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs) with DOE.

Department of Commerce

Although the Department of Commerce does not have a formal program to provide CI support to US business, it provides informal assistance through security awareness briefings to contractors and consultants with access to classified information. Its Office of Export Enforcement conducts an industry outreach program that provides information to numerous industry officials each year on CI as it relates to illegal technology transfer. Various Department of Commerce components also publish newsletters and magazines that contain highlights of security incidents and illicit export practices.

US Customs Service

In support of its multifaceted mission, Customs has for years operated several education and outreach programs designed to familiarize private industry with the export laws and regulations and with the Customs Service roles in enforcing them. These programs have included threat information when it applies to export issues.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NASA provides specific threat information to NASA employees and contractors involved in Special Access Programs through approximately 1,500 security awareness briefings annually. Although there are no NASA resources solely dedicated to conducting awareness briefings, security specialists are usually assigned the task.

Options for Consideration

Report the specific measures that are being or could be undertaken in order to improve the activities referred to in the above paragraphs, including proposals for any modifications of law necessary to facilitate the undertaking of such activities.

CI efforts are governed by presidential directives, executive orders, and statutes, many of which were established during the Cold War and were designed to counter a corresponding threat: that is, foreign intelligence activities directed against US military and political information. Over the past three years, some of these guidelines have been adapted to better confront the post--Cold War reality that economic and technological information are as much a target of foreign intelligence collection as military and political information.

Law enforcement efforts are similarly limited because economic and technological information is often not specifically protected by Federal laws, making it difficult to prosecute thefts of proprietary technology or intellectual property. Law enforcement efforts instead must rely on less specific criminal laws--such as espionage, fraud and stolen property, and export statutes--to build prosecutable cases against foreign economic and industrial intelligence collectors and to deter such activity. The Administration is considering legislative options to strengthen current Federal statutes, and possibly to establish new laws that would specifically forbid theft of intellectual property and proprietary information.

While other options are under various stages of consideration, the following are included as examples:

Executive Branch Policy Options

Increase resources available to US CI and law enforcement organizations to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute entities involved in industrial and economic intelligence collection activities targeting US information.

As attested by the Aldrich Ames espionage case, the end of the Cold War has not stopped

traditionally hostile foreign intelligence services from collecting information via espionage. US CI agencies continue to allocate resources against traditional intelligence threats. However, while such threats have continued, an increasing portion of US CI and law enforcement resources is also being drawn to thwart economic and industrial intelligence collection activities. Some of these more recently identified activities are conducted by traditional threat countries and can be investigated with existing resources directed against those countries.

Countries that heretofore have not been considered intelligence threats account for much of the economic collection currently being investigated by the US CI and law enforcement communities. Since the CI community does not have the benefit of years of accumulated experience investigating such efforts, these investigations are often labor intensive. Resources in these areas will likely have to be increased, especially if the theft of proprietary information is made a Federal violation, since the result would be an increased number of cases requiring more trained investigators and analysts.

Institutionalize the concept that economic security is an integral part of national security.

The goal of US CI is to identify, penetrate, and neutralize foreign intelligence activities that threaten US national security. CI has traditionally been directed at military, ideological, or subversive threats to national security. Until the past several years, countering activities that threaten economic security had not usually been included.

In today's world in which a country's power and stature are often measured by its economic/industrial capability, foreign government ministries--such as those dealing with finance and trade--and major industrial sectors are increasingly looked upon to play a more prominent role in their respective country's collection efforts. While a military rival steals documents for a state-of-the-art weapon or defense system, an economic competitor steals a US company's proprietary business information or government trade strategies. Just as a foreign country's defense establishment is the main recipient of US defense-related information, foreign companies and commercially oriented government ministries are the main beneficiaries of US economic information. The aggregate losses that can mount as a result of such efforts can reach billions of dollars per year, constituting a serious national security concern.

The March 1990 and February 1995 national security strategies published by the White House focus on economic security as an integral part not only of US national interest but also of national security.

In February 1995, President William J. Clinton published *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* in accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986. It identified the US central goals as:

- To sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight.

- To bolster America's economic revitalization.
- To promote democracy abroad.

The report identifies US intelligence capabilities as critical instruments of national power and notes:

- *The collection and analysis of intelligence related to economic development will play an increasingly important role in helping policy makers understand economic trends. That collection and analysis can help level the economic playing field by identifying threats to US companies from foreign intelligence services and unfair trading practices. (p.17)*

The report describes the US Government partnership with business and labor, noting:

- *Our economic strategy views the private sector as the engine of economic growth. It sees government's role as a partner to the private sector--acting as an advocate of US business interests; leveling the playing field in international markets; helping to boost American exports; and finding ways to remove domestic and foreign barriers to the creativity, initiative and productivity of American business. (p.19)*

Guidance issued from 1990 to the present directs the Intelligence Community and CI community specifically to detect and deter foreign intelligence targeting of US economic and technological interests, including efforts to obtain US proprietary information from companies and research institutions that form our strategic industrial base.

Consistent with US national security policy since 1990, then, the CI community should emphasize economic security in operations, reports, and briefings designed to fulfill the guidance outlined above.

Develop a coordinated CI and law enforcement approach and appropriate collection and analytic requirements to address foreign economic and industrial intelligence collection activities.

Previous reports sponsored by the Executive and Legislative Branches have found that efforts across the government to investigate and counter economic and industrial intelligence collection activities were often fragmented and uncoordinated. The CI and law enforcement communities have usually not effectively harmonized their efforts. Numerous interagency working groups and committees had been formed to discuss the problem, while at the same time a number of individual agencies were exerting their own efforts. This lack of coordination resulted in many partially informed decisions and diverging collection and analytical efforts. The Executive Branch is developing a coordinated CI and law enforcement approach and appropriate collection and analytic requirements.

Since its inception, the NACIC has made efforts to determine the CI needs of various traditional and nontraditional intelligence consumers. In the process of surveying agency customers, the NACIC discovered that many needs have not fully been met in the past, either because no mechanism was in place to fulfill the needs or because the existing mechanism was malfunctioning. As part of the NACIC's program of determining CI needs, it will assist in forming appropriate and manageable requirements to ensure that 1) necessary information is being collected and 2) once the information is collected, it reaches those that need it.

Systematically collect and analyze information about the efforts of foreign countries not traditionally considered intelligence threats, along with corporations from those countries, to collect protected US Government and corporate information.

Over the past several months, the NACIC has interviewed over 170 officials from 62 US Government agencies--both those that are customarily involved in CI and those who have not usually been included in such efforts--to determine the CI needs of the US Government. Several policymakers interviewed cited a lack of information on the activities of countries that have not traditionally been considered intelligence threats but that may be mounting aggressive intelligence targeting efforts against our leading-edge technologies, economic infrastructure, and personnel. They desire better information about whether information and technology shared with allies through legitimate projects are being siphoned off and provided to foreign competitors, and how much information is being acquired by foreign students studying at US universities and research centers. They are also interested in what intelligence capabilities the US Government is providing to friendly foreign countries through liaison relationships that could be used to collect US information. More proactive and aggressive collection against intelligence services and corporate information collection personnel from countries traditionally allied with the United States is needed to fill these intelligence gaps.

Foreign Economic Threat

Report on the threat to US industry of foreign industrial espionage and any trends in that threat, including:

1. The number and identity of the foreign governments conducting any but foreign industrial espionage.

- a. Country Case Studies

A number of foreign countries pose various levels and types of threats to US economic and technological information. Some have been considered ideological and military adversaries for decades. Their targeting of US economic and technological information is not new but has continued as an extension of a concerted intelligence assault on the

United States conducted throughout the Cold War. Others are either longtime allies of the United States or have traditionally been neutral. These countries target US economic and technological information despite their friendly relations with the United States.

In some cases, they take advantage of their considerable legitimate access to US information and collect sensitive information more easily than our military adversaries. In addition, some of the countries traditionally considered allies have infrastructures that allow them to easily internalize high-tech information and utilize it in competition against US firms.

The evidence indicating which countries and corporations conduct economic and industrial espionage against the United States is derived from numerous classified and open sources. Because of the ramifications to US foreign policy as well as the sensitivity of source information, the specific identities of countries are included in the classified report only.

2. The industrial sectors and types of information and technology targeted by such espionage.

b. Targeted Information and Technology

The industries that have been the targets in most cases of economic espionage and other collection activities include biotechnology; aerospace; telecommunications, including the technology to build the "information superhighway"; computer software/hardware; advanced transportation and engine technology; advanced materials and coatings, including "stealth" technologies; energy research; defense and armaments technology; manufacturing processes; and semiconductors. Proprietary business information--that is, bid, contract, customer, and strategy--in these sectors is aggressively targeted. Foreign collectors have also shown great interest in government and corporate financial and trade data.

These industries are of strategic interest to the United States because they produce classified products for the government, produce dual use technology used in both the public and private sectors, and are responsible for leading-edge technologies critical to maintaining US economic security. Many other US high-tech industrial sectors have been targeted. Any company competing for a sale or a piece of market share, regardless of the market, could resort to intelligence activities as a "force multiplier" to improve its chances of success.

Currently, there is no formal mechanism for determining the full qualitative and quantitative scope and impact of the loss of this targeted information. Industry victims have reported the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars, lost jobs, and lost market share. However, these reports have been ad hoc and often only after public exposure of the loss. Understandably, US industry is reluctant to publicize occurrences of foreign economic and industrial espionage. Such publicity can adversely affect stock values, customers' confidence, and ultimately competitiveness and market share.

3. The methods used to conduct such espionage. ⁽²⁾

c. Collection Methods

Practitioners seldom use one method in isolation but combine them into concerted collection programs. Although countries or corporations have been known to turn legitimate transactions or business relationships into clandestine collection opportunities, some of the methods listed are most often used for legitimate purposes. While their inclusion here is not intended to imply illegal activity, they are listed as potential elements of a broader, coordinated intelligence effort.

Traditional Methods

Traditional espionage methods primarily reserved for collecting national defense information are now being applied to collect economic and proprietary information. Traditional awareness training is most suitable for countering these collection methods.

Classic Agent Recruitment.

An intelligence collector's best source is a trusted person inside a company or organization whom the collector can task to provide proprietary or classified information. A foreign collector's interest in employees is not necessarily commensurate with their rank in the company. Researchers, key business managers, and corporate executives can all be targets, but so can support employees such as secretaries, computer operators, technicians, and maintenance people. The latter frequently have good, if not the best, access to competitive information. In addition, their lower pay and rank may provide fertile ground for manipulation by an intelligence agency.

US Volunteers.

The individuals most likely to improperly acquire a company's information are the company's own employees. Employees who resort to stealing information exhibit the same motivations and human frailties as the average thief or spy: illegal or excessive use of drugs or alcohol, money problems, personal stress, and just plain greed.

Surveillance and Surreptitious Entry.

Economic and industrial espionage may involve simply breaking into an office containing desired information. Companies have reported break-ins in which laptop computers or disks were stolen, even when there were easily obtainable, more valuable items in the same vicinity. These instances are not always reported, or reported as merely break-ins, without considering the possibility that the target was information rather than equipment.

Some countries convince hotel operators to provide intelligence collectors with access to visitors' luggage or rooms. During these surreptitious break-ins, known colloquially as ``bag ops," unattended luggage is searched for sensitive information, and any useful documents are copied or simply stolen.

Specialized Technical Operations.

This includes computer intrusions, telecommunications targeting and intercept, and private-sector encryption weaknesses. These activities account for the largest portion of economic and industrial information lost by US corporations.

Because they are so easily accessed and intercepted, corporate telecommunications--particularly international telecommunications--provide a highly vulnerable and lucrative source for anyone interested in obtaining trade secrets or competitive information. Because of the increased usage of these links for bulk computer data transmission and electronic mail, intelligence collectors find telecommunications intercepts cost-effective. For example, foreign intelligence collectors intercept facsimile transmissions through government-owned telephone companies, and the stakes are large--approximately half of all overseas telecommunications are facsimile transmissions. Innovative ``hackers" connected to computers containing competitive information evade the controls and access companies' information. In addition, many American companies have begun using electronic data interchange, a system of transferring corporate bidding, invoice, and pricing data electronically overseas. Many foreign government and corporate intelligence collectors find this information invaluable.

Economic Disinformation.

Some governments also use disinformation campaigns to scare their domestic companies and potential clients away from dealing with US companies. Press and government agencies frequently discuss foreign economic and industrial intelligence activities, often in vague, nonspecific terms. The issue has been used to paint foreign competitors or countries as aggressive and untrustworthy, even if the accuser has no tangible evidence of any collection activity. Some countries have widely publicized their efforts to set up information security mechanisms to protect against their competitors' penetration attempts, and frequently the United States is mentioned as the primary threat.

Other Economic Collection Methods

Tasking Foreign Students Studying in the United States.

Some foreign governments task foreign students specifically to acquire information on a variety of economic and technical subjects. In some instances, countries recruit students before they come to the United States to study and task them to send any technological information they acquire back to their home country. Others are approached after arriving and are recruited or pressured based upon a sense of loyalty or fear for their home country's government or intelligence service.

In some instances, at a intelligence collector's behest, foreign graduate students serve as assistants at no cost to professors doing research in a targeted field.

The student then has access to the professor's research and learns the applications of the technology.

As an alternative to compulsory military service, one foreign government has an organized program to send interns abroad, often with the specific task of collecting foreign business and technological information.

Tasking Foreign Employees of US Firms and Agencies.

Foreign companies and governments sometimes recruit or task compatriot employees within a US firm to steal proprietary information. Although similar to clandestine recruitment used traditionally by intelligence services, often no intelligence service is involved, only a competing company or nonintelligence government agency. The collector then passes the information directly to a foreign firm or the government for use in its R&D activities.

Debriefing of Foreign Visitors to the United States.

Some countries actively debrief their citizens after foreign travel, asking for any information acquired during their trips abroad. Sometimes these debriefing sessions are heavyhanded, with some foreign scientists describing them as offensive. In other countries, they are simply an accepted part of traveling abroad.

Recruitment of Emigres, Ethnic Targeting.

Frequently, intelligence collectors find it effective to target persons of their own ethnic group. They particularly seek individuals working in US military and R&D facilities who have access to proprietary and classified US technology. Several countries have found repatriation of emigre and foreign ethnic scientists to be the most beneficial technology transfer methodology. One country, in particular, claims to have repatriated thousands of ethnic scientists back to their home country from the United States. Ethnic targeting includes attempts to recruit and task naturalized US citizens and permanent resident aliens to assist in acquiring US S&T information. Frequently, foreign intelligence collectors appeal to a person's patriotism and ethnic loyalty. Some countries' collectors resort to threatening family members that continue to reside in their home country.

Elicitation During International Conferences and Trade Fairs.

Events--such as international conferences on high-tech topics, trade fairs, and air shows--attract many foreign scientists and engineers, providing foreign intelligence collectors with a concentrated group of specialists on a certain topic. Collectors target these individuals while they are abroad to gather any information the scientists or engineers may possess. Sometimes, depending on the foreign country and the specific circumstances, these elicitation efforts are heavyhanded and threatening, while other times they are subtle.

Foreign intelligence collectors sometimes attempt to recruit scientists by inviting them on expense-paid trips abroad for conferences or sabbaticals. The individuals are treated royally, and their advice is sought on areas of interest. When they return to the United

States, collectors recontact them and ask them to provide information on their areas of research.

Commercial Data Bases, Trade and Scientific Journals, Computer Bulletin Boards, Openly Available US Government Data, Corporate Publications.

Many collectors take advantage of the vast amount of competitive information that is legally and openly available in the United States. Open-source information can provide personality profile data, data on new R&D and planned products, new manufacturing techniques, and competitors' strengths and weaknesses. Most collectors use this information for its own worth in their business competition. However, some use openly available information as leads to refine and focus their clandestine collection and to identify individuals and organizations that possess desired information.

Clandestine Collection of Open-Source Materials.

Because they believe that they are closely monitored by US CI, some traditional intelligence services resort to clandestine methods to collect even open-source materials. They have been known to use false names when accessing open-source data bases and at times ask that a legal and open relationship be kept confidential.

Foreign Government Use of Private-Sector Organizations, Front Companies, and Joint Ventures.

Some foreign governments exploit existing non-government affiliated organizations or create new ones--such as friendship societies, international exchange organizations, import-export companies, and other entities that have frequent contact with foreigners--to gather intelligence and to station intelligence collectors. They conceal government involvement in these organizations and present them as purely private entities in order to cover their intelligence operations. These organizations spot and assess potential foreign intelligence recruits with whom they have contact. Such organizations also lobby US Government officials to change policies the foreign government considers unfavorable.

Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions.

Several countries use corporate mergers and acquisitions to acquire technology. The vast majority of these transactions are made for completely legitimate purposes. However, sometimes they are made specifically to allow a foreign company to acquire US-origin technologies without spending their own resources on R&D.

According to a 1994 US Government report, entitled *Report on US Critical Technology Companies*, 984 foreign mergers and acquisitions of US critical technology companies occurred between 1 January 1985 and 1 October 1993. All but a handful of these mergers and acquisitions were friendly, and four countries accounted for 68 percent of them. Of the total, 60 percent involved US firms in advanced materials, computers--including software and peripherals--and biotechnology, areas of relative US technical strength. The remaining deals involved US firms in electronics and semiconductors, professional and scientific instrumentation, communications equipment, advanced manufacturing, and aircraft and spare parts.

Headhunting, Hiring Competitors' Employees.

Foreign companies typically hire knowledgeable employees of competing US firms to do corresponding work for the foreign firm. At times, they do this specifically to gain inside technical information from the employee and use it against the competing US firm.

Corporate Technology Agreements.

Some foreign companies use potential technology sharing agreements as conduits for receiving proprietary information. In such instances, foreign companies demand that, in order to negotiate an agreement, the US company must divulge large amounts of information about its processes and products, sometimes much more than is justified by the project being negotiated. Often, the information requested is highly sensitive. In some of these cases, the foreign company either terminates the deal after receipt of the information or refuses to negotiate further if denied the information.

Sponsorship of Research Activities in the United States.

Numerous foreign countries exploit a favorable research climate in the United States to sponsor research activities at US universities and research centers. Generally, both the US and the foreign country benefit from the finished research. At times, however, foreign governments or companies use the opportunity as a one-sided attempt only to collect research results and proprietary information at the US facility. Foreign intelligence services also use these efforts as platforms to insert intelligence officers who act solely as information collectors.

Hiring Information Brokers, Consultants.

Information brokers scour the world for valuable proprietary data. What they cannot obtain legally or by guile, some information brokers purchase. The broker then verifies the data, puts it into a usable and easily accessible format, and delivers it to interested clients. The following advertisement published in the *Asian Wall Street Journal* in 1991 illustrates this activity:

- Do you have advanced/privileged information on any type of project/contract that is going to be carried out in your country? We hold commission/agency agreements with many large European companies and could introduce them to ``your" project/contract. Any commission received would be shared with yourselves.

The ad was followed by a phone number in Western Europe.

Some countries frequently hire well-connected consultants to write reports on topics of interest and to lobby US Government officials on the country's behalf. Often, the consultants are former high-ranking US Government officials who maintain contacts with their former colleagues. They exploit these connections and contract relationships to acquire protected information and to gain access to other high-level officials who are currently holding positions of authority through whom they attempt to further acquire protected information.

Fulfillment of Classified US Government Contracts and Exploitation of DOD-Sponsored Technology Sharing Agreements.

At times, classified US Government contracts are awarded to companies that are partially or substantially controlled by a foreign government. Although US Government security agencies closely monitor these contracts, they can still provide foreign governments unauthorized access to information. Traditional allies of the United States are most likely to use this method, since non-allies seldom are included in such contracts.

Tasking Liaison Officers at Government-to-Government Projects.

During joint R&D activities, foreign governments routinely request to have an on-site liaison officer to monitor progress and provide guidance. Several allied countries have taken advantage of these positions as cover for intelligence officers assigned with collecting as much information about the facility as possible. Using their close access to their US counterparts conducting joint R&D, particularly in the defense arena, liaison officers have been caught removing documents that are clearly marked as restricted or classified.

Footnotes

⁽¹⁾ The US Government has procedures to review foreign purchases of US firms to determine if the acquisition is likely to have an adverse effect on US national security interests. Mergers and acquisitions with firms having classified US Government contracts are governed by the National Industrial Security Program, established by Executive Order 12829, which provides security safeguards for classified information at contractors under foreign ownership, control, or influence. In addition, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) reviews under statutory procedures various foreign mergers and acquisitions of US firms to determine the impact on US national security.

⁽²⁾ These descriptions are adapted from a 1993 interagency study on foreign intelligence threats to US economic interests.

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Overview

The [National Security Strategy Report](#) is published by the executive branch of the United States government. It is intended to be a comprehensive statement articulating the worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are important to its security. Among the reporting requirements are those actions needed to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy.

Under the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986 (amending [Title 50, Chapter 15, Section 404a](#) of the US Code), the President must submit a report on the national security strategy of the United States to Congress each year. However, especially in recent years, these reports have been made late or not at all.

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[National Defense Strategy](#) is produced by the Secretary of Defense to describe how the Department of Defense will contribute to the execution of the President's National Security Strategy.

[National Military Strategy \(2015\)](#) is produced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to describe how the military will contribute to the execution of the President's National Security Strategy and the Secretary of Defense's National Defense Strategy.

About NSSA

The National Security Strategy Archive (NSSA), a project of the Taylor Group, is devoted to the promotion of the national security of the United States of America through education and dissemination of research and information. NSSA provides access to public documents on national security strategy, including but not limited to the National Security Strategy Reports produced in compliance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, related official documents, third-party research, and public commentary.

Additionally, NSSA seeks to promote strategic thought and policy-making by providing examples of strategic plans, academic papers, and criticism.

 Posted by Admin at 1:09 AM