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JOINT MEETING OF
STATE-ARMY-NAVY COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE BOARD
AND

STATE-ARMY-NAVY COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING COMMITTEE

15 February 1946

SUMMARY

Action To Be Taken By Committee Members

<u>Action to be Taken</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>
1. Advise General Vandenberg and Admiral Inglis regarding details of FBI request for [redacted] translations (page 3).	ASA Op-20-G
2. Discuss request for [redacted] translations with Mr. Hoover (page 3)	G-2 Op-23
3. Prepare details for implementation of State-Army-Navy C I coordination program and forward report thereon to STANCIB (page 3)	ASA Op-20-G
4. Advise Admiral Inglis of opinion of the Board regarding participation of ASA, Europe in [redacted] and advise Secretariat of his approval or comments (page 11).	Op-32
5. Forward replies to Colonel Marr-Johnson regarding nonavailability of ULTRA histories of the Japanese war (page 11)	G-2 Op-32 ASA Op-20-G

Action to be Taken by Secretariat

1. Prepare and circulate tentative letter from STANCIB to the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations regarding program for State-Army-Navy coordination in C. I. activities (page 6).

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E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6)

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E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6)

2. Subsequent to signing of the Agreement, advise [redacted] regarding U. S. delegation and agenda for the Technical Conference (page 7).
3. Upon notification from Op-20 that personnel question is settled, prepare tentative letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Treasury regarding termination of Coast Guard C. I. activities (page 8).
4. Forward reply to [redacted] regarding replacement of ULTRA (page 9).

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FINAL COPYJOINT MEETING OFSTATE-ARMY-NAVY COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE BOARDANDSTATE-ARMY-NAVY COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING COMMITTEE15 February 1946

Present:

STANCIBArmy Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Brigadier General W. Preston Corderman*
Captain Robert F. Packard*Navy Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis
Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone
Lieutenant (j.g.) John F. Callahan*State Mr. Alfred McCormack*STANCICCArmy Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke
Brigadier General W. Preston Corderman*
Colonel Harold G. Hayes
Captain Robert F. Packard*Navy Captain J. N. Wenger
Captain J. S. Harper
Captain W. R. Smedberg III
Lieutenant (j.g.) John F. Callahan*State Mr. Alfred McCormack*

Also present

Navy Captain C. F. Espe

*Dual Membership.

A joint meeting of STANCIB-STANCICC was held at 1330 on 15 February 1946 in the office of Lieutenant General Vandenberg.

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General Vandenberg led the discussion of the agenda which had been prepared for the meeting.

Approval and Activation of British-U. S. Communication Intelligence Agreement (Item 1)

General Vandenberg reported that, since the last meeting of STANCIB, he and Admiral Inglis had conferred with Mr. Hoover concerning the relationship between STANCIB and the FBI. He stated that, upon explanation of the extent of the proposed British-U. S. Communication Intelligence Agreement and STANCIB's requirements as regards security for the handling of communication intelligence, Mr. Hoover had indicated his general willingness to accept STANCIB's authority and procedures in the field of communication intelligence. A copy of the proposed Agreement was left with Mr. Hoover for his study. Although no answer regarding specific arrangements for future STANCIB-FBI relations has been received from Mr. Hoover as yet, it appears that these relations are now on a good basis. Indicating his feeling that the FBI will provide adequate security for the handling of communication intelligence, Admiral Inglis assured the Board that the major difficulties have been solved. The remaining problem is one of definition of terms. He noted that the confidence which exists between STANCIB and the FBI is still tenuous and that considerable care must be exercised to maintain it.

As regards specific steps to implement the new STANCIB-FBI relationship, General Clarke reported that Mr. Reynolds of the FBI has indicated that the Bureau will not require actual translations of messages affecting their operations. The FBI will request the appointment of an MIS officer responsible to represent the interests of the FBI. On the basis of a "want list" to be supplied him, this officer will effect the selection and forwarding of that communication intelligence which is needed by the FBI. General Vandenberg indicated his feeling that, at most, Mr. Hoover will require no more than a room for FBI use within MIS. Until a definite reply is received from Mr. Hoover no further action can be taken regarding final approval and activation of the British-U S Agreement. Admiral Inglis urged that all reasonable action be taken to expedite Mr. Hoover's reply.

In the light of our new relationship with the FBI, Admiral Inglis questioned the adequacy of the Army and Navy answers to Mr. Hoover's recent request for [redacted] translations. It was

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his feeling that both answers should have provided further information and explanation as regards our refusal to make them available. He suggested that the original answers to, supplemented accordingly. General Corderman noted that the basic reason for refusing to make such material available is the need of maintaining a continuous and broad safeguard against unnecessary dissemination of exact translations. It was General Clarke's feeling that Mr Hoover does not need further technical explanation as regards the nonavailability of translations inasmuch as he is adequately informed in these matters by his own cryptanalytic personnel. General Vandenberg indicated his agreement with Admiral Inglis' suggestion. He felt that the primary consideration in such cases is to determine that course of action which is in the best interests of the government as a whole. To adequately balance the need for security safeguards against the advantages of any particular governmental action which might endanger these safeguards, it is necessary that the question be discussed thoroughly by all concerned. To this end he directed that General Corderman and Captain Wenger should provide details regarding the background of the FBI's recent request for [REDACTED] translations. He and Admiral Inglis will then discuss the matter fully with Mr. Hoover.

Reallocation of Cryptanalytic Work (Item 3).

Making reference to the memorandum and attached organization chart concerning coordination of the Army and Navy communication intelligence activities (see Inclosure A), which had been prepared on the basis of an Op-20-G proposal as amended to include the comments of ASA, General Corderman outlined their background. He recommended that they be accepted by STANCIB. Admiral Stone noted that the technical operations of Op-20-G and ASA may be divided into three categories, i.e., (1) work on purely naval communications by Op-20-G, (2) work on purely military communications by ASA, and (3) work on diplomatic and other communications jointly by Op-20-G and ASA. It is the intent of the proposed plan to retain complete Navy and Army responsibility for work on naval and military systems respectively. Diplomatic and other communication activities will be considered a joint project and will come under the direction of the proposed Coordinator. He recommended that the basic proposal be accepted in principle by STANCIB and that General Corderman and Captain Wenger be directed to prepare the necessary details for its implementation and to make specific recommendations regarding the selection of a Coordinator. Their recommendations should then be presented to the Board for approval.

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Section 3.3(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6)

General Vandenberg indicated his feeling that, inasmuch as the Army has been conducting wartime activity in the diplomatic and [redacted] field, the first Coordinator should be selected from the Army. Admiral Inglis stated his preference that the Coordinator be made directly responsible to STANCIB rather than to STANCICC as indicated on the chart. General Corderman noted that, in preparing the proposal, STANCIB and STANCICC had been considered as two elements of one governing body. As regards General Clark's suggestion that the Coordinator and his staff might replace STANCICC, Admiral Stone indicated that, although the Coordinator should receive direction from STANCIB, it will be advisable to retain STANCICC as an advisory and coordinating body. Captain Wenger recommended that STANCICC be retained as presently constituted until the proposed plan has been in operation long enough to indicate whether a need for STANCICC will continue to exist. General Vandenberg indicated his agreement with this proposition and suggested that STANCICC be retained and be considered as the subordinate element of a governing body to include both STANCIB and STANCICC. Admiral Inglis further suggested that the position of the Coordinator be changed to place him in direct authority over the working subcommittees of STANCICC. As such he might serve as permanent chairman of STANCICC. Captain Wenger noted that the original intention of the proposal had been to retain the direct relationship between STANCICC and its subcommittees in order that they may continue to serve in an advisory capacity to the Coordinating Committee. They will serve a similar function for the Coordinator. General Vandenberg suggested that, in view of the above discussion, the proposed relationship between STANCICC, its subcommittees, and the Coordinator be left unchanged, but that the chart be redrafted to indicate that the Coordinator will be directly responsible to the Board. This could be accomplished by (1) placing STANCIB and STANCICC in the same box, or (2) adding a line of direct authority between STANCIB and the Coordinator. It was agreed that the latter should be effected. On the basis of this change, General Vandenberg recommended that the Board approve the proposal in principle and direct STANCICC to work out the implementing details. Admiral Stone emphasized the immediate need for reallocation of joint problems. Both he and Admiral Inglis indicated their acceptance of the proposal with the understanding that it may be subject to future change.

General Corderman pointed out that, prior to further consideration of details, STANCIB should indicate the extent to

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which the Coordinator will be authorized to act as a "director" in behalf of the Board. He felt that the proposed plan will operate satisfactorily if the Coordinator is free to take prompt and decisive action. Admiral Inglis noted that the Coordinator must be subject to the direction of STANCIB in all matters. Admiral Stone pointed out that the authority of the Coordinator will be limited to joint problems. It was the feeling of General Vandenberg that, if all the participating agencies are in agreement as to the function and purpose of the plan, specific delineation of the extent of the Coordinator's authority is not of primary importance.

As regards the appointment of a Coordinator, Admiral Inglis raised the question whether it would be advisable to select the head of one of the participating agencies. It was his feeling that it would be unwise to expect the Coordinator to perform those responsibilities in addition to his regular duties. The Coordinator should be entirely free of bias and should have sufficient time to devote to the job. General Corderman noted that there are a limited number of candidates with sufficient experience for the assignment. Inasmuch as the Coordinator will require a considerable staff, he stated that the use of staff personnel already available at Op-20-G and ASA will obviate the necessity of establishing a duplicate staff. This will be possible if the Coordinator is selected from either of these agencies. Captain Wenger pointed out that the proposal provides for the assignment of Army and Navy personnel to each of the staff functions in such manner as to avoid bias. General Vandenberg noted that the Coordinator will require a deputy who should be appointed from the other service. All present were in agreement with Colonel Hayes that the position of deputy will be a full-time job. In view of these considerations Admiral Inglis indicated his acceptance of the proposals regarding the selection of a Coordinator and his staff. General Vandenberg reemphasized the fact that implementation of these plans will be successful to the extent that all concerned accept the principle of mutual cooperation.

Noting that the present plan provides for coordination in the technical field only, Captain Smedberg stated that this action represents the first in a series of three steps which will be necessary to establish complete coordination in the entire field of communication intelligence. It will be necessary to extend this plan to provide for (1) coordination of the production and dissemination of ULTRA and (2) coordinated direction

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of working priorities. Inasmuch as the establishment of procedures to increase coordination in the intelligence field will be gradual and may entail the exchange of personnel, Admiral Stone indicated that, as planned at present, the Coordinator will be responsible for technical operations to the point of making translations available to the intelligence activities. He emphasized that, in accordance with the spirit of the Eisenhower-Nimitz correspondence, there must be complete cooperation in the development of this program.

Captain Wenger inquired as to what steps will be taken by the Board to advise General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz of those plans. Admiral Inglis pointed out that any report made to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations should indicate that further coordination of intelligence functions is planned. It was agreed by all present that STANCIB should forward one report signed by its senior members from the State Department, the Army and the Navy.

Plans for the British-U. S. Technical Conference (Item 2).

General Vandenberg indicated his understanding that the U. S. delegation will be composed of eight representatives--four from the Army and four from the Navy. General Corderman reported that Army representation will include himself, Colonel McKee, Colonel Rowlett, and Captain Patton. Captain Wenger stated that he and Captains Smedberg, Goodwin and Howeth will constitute the Navy members of the delegation. It was noted that the delegates from both services have been selected so as to provide authoritative representation on each of the problems to be discussed. General Corderman recommended that the proposed representatives be approved by STANCIB and that they be given authority to speak on behalf of STANCIB during the negotiations. He reported that a set of proposed agenda has been received from the British and stressed the need for complete preparation by the U. S. delegation in advance of the conference. He felt that a definite decision must be reached as regards the adjustment of Army and Navy viewpoints on all matters for discussion, to the end that the U. S. delegation may represent a consolidated U. S. point of view. There ensued a discussion as to the necessity for State Department representation as a result of which it was agreed that, if possible, the delegation should include a member of the State Department. Mr. McCormack indicated that he would try to make Mr. Huddleson available for this purpose. The proposed representation was approved by the Board, and it was further

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directed that the delegates undertake immediate preparation for the conference. Subsequent to the signing of the Agreement the Secretariat will advise ██████████ regarding the U S delegation and STANCIB's counterproposals to the British agenda.

Captain Wenger inquired as to the policy of the Board regarding the British request that their liaison officers be allowed access to collateral information centers, particularly at Op-20-G. He noted that Op-20-G has consistently denied similar requests during the war. It was his feeling that since the British will undoubtedly reiterate this request during the conference STANCIB should indicate its policy in this matter. Admiral Inglis pointed out that the question hinges on the fact that such permission would make collateral information from the State Department available to the British. Such a situation could not be tolerated and would necessitate a restriction upon the amount of collateral material which Op-32 could make available for use at Op-20-G. Noting that during the war MIS neither received Foreign Office collateral from the British nor made State Department collateral available to them, Mr McCormack pointed out that the proposed Agreement precludes its exchange. Both he and Captain Smedberg have assured Admiral Leahy that no such exchange will exist within the terms of the Agreement, and that exchange will be limited to traffic and to technical materials and information.

As regards the responsibilities and functions of resident liaison officers, Admiral Inglis reported that Group Captain Jones had appeared willing to accept the condition that British liaison officers may be denied access to certain operations within our various agencies. Captain Wenger raised the question of procedures for the exchange of materials, noting that present provisions are such that we rely almost entirely upon British facilities. He recommended that STANCIB adopt a "cash-and-carry" policy. In view of possible difficulty in justifying our expenditures for the use of British facilities and in view of the danger that we may come to rely upon commercially controlled channels, he felt that we must assume direct responsibility for the forwarding of information procured at GCS for our use in Washington. The British would then be responsible to forward only that information which they obtain here for their use at GCS. General Clarko and General Corderman noted that the Army has no communications terminal in England at the present time, and that, although the present arrangement is working well, we are dependent upon the British. They indicated their agreement with Mr McCormack's statement that the

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problem hinges upon the acquisition of a U S -controlled radio circuit. There should be two channels for this exchange. Inasmuch as a British-controlled channel already exists, there should be an additional channel controlled by the U S. General Corderman noted that, if we provide our own facilities, we will be protected against the possibility of delay, and the British will be unable to justify delay on the basis of inadequate facilities. Admiral Stone stated that the Navy has requested that their existing radio link be maintained and extended, but has not received any approval from the British to date. The equipment for this channel would be loaned by the U S., but the British end of the link would be operated by British personnel. All present indicated their approval of the "cash-and-carry" principle. It was directed that the U S delegation at the Technical Conference should insist upon a U. S.-controlled channel.

Termination or Continuance of Coast Guard Communication Intelligence Activities (Item 4):

Captains Wenger and Smedberg reported the decisions made by STANCICC at its recent meeting that Coast Guard C. I. activities should be terminated with the understanding that certain Coast Guard personnel might be attached to Op-20-G and that STANCIB should indicate its willingness to undertake future communication intelligence tasks for the Treasury. At its last meeting STANCICC recommended that the Board authorize the preparation of a letter to this effect from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Treasury. Such a letter should express the appreciation of STANCIB for the assistance provided by the Coast Guard C. I. Unit during the war. Noting the possibility that Coast Guard officers might be detailed to continue communication intelligence work with the Navy, Admiral Stone stated that no further action has been taken in this matter since the last meeting of the Board. Admiral Inglis indicated that no final action should be taken until the Navy reaches a decision as regards the possibility of retaining Coast Guard personnel. General Corderman noted that, with the termination of Coast Guard C. I. activity, STANCIB may be required to assume responsibility for their [redacted] operations. All present were in agreement with General Vandenberg's recommendation that the proposals of STANCICC be accepted, and it was directed that the Secretariat prepare the proposed letter upon advice from Op-20 that the question of personnel has been settled.

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Making reference to a memorandum from [REDACTED] dated 11 February 1946, in which the British indicate their acceptance of the word CREAM as a replacement for the word ULTRA and their willingness to postpone the date of the change-over until 15 March, the Secretariat circulated a proposed answer indicating acceptance by STANCIB. All were agreed that the British proposal should be accepted, and it was directed that the Secretariat should forward the proposed reply to [REDACTED]

Participation of ASA, Europe in [REDACTED] Activities (Item 6):

General Corderman requested that the Board approve the recommendations regarding participation of ASA, Europe, in [REDACTED] activities which were presented for the consideration of STANCIB by Major General Bissell in his memorandum dated 18 January 1946 (see Inclosure B). As regards paragraph 2a of this memorandum, General Corderman indicated two alternate routes for the handling of [REDACTED] traffic, i.e., (1) direct exchange between field units or (2) exchange between field units via Washington and London. Emphasizing his feeling that the number of field personnel having knowledge of U. S.-British collaboration on the [REDACTED] problem should be maintained at a minimum, Admiral Inglis proposed that the source of the traffic being passed be hidden by exchanging it through the STANCIB liaison group in London. All present indicated their willingness to accept this suggestion.

Making reference to paragraph 2b of General Bissell's memorandum, General Corderman requested the opinion of the Board as regards provisions for the exchange of traffic analysis reports. He pointed out that the exchange of these reports is vital to the operations of ASA, Europe, and that they are properly of interest to the Theatre G-2. Within limitations imposed by adequate security safeguards, promptness is of the essence in the exchange of these reports. Admiral Inglis indicated that the direct exchange of traffic analysis reports between field units of the British and American forces would not be acceptable to him. He felt that, in order to assure that personnel in Frankfurt are not apprised of the joint British-U S effort, the identity of reports received from the British must be obscured. All possible precautions must be taken to avoid weakening the unique security standards which are now applied to the [REDACTED] problem. He suggested that the exchange of traffic analysis reports might be effected through Washington and London to the end that the identity of their source be hidden. General Corderman and Captain Wenger

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Section 3.3(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6)

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pointed out that, if present [redacted] security standards for the handling of traffic analysis in the field are maintained as proposed by Admiral Inglis, they will preclude maximum efficiency in operation. Because of the limited facilities and personnel now available to both the U. S. and the British, it will be advisable to allocate traffic analysis problems. Unnecessary security restrictions will preclude successful allocation of work or sufficient speed in the preparation and dissemination of information derived from traffic analysis. Noting that free exchange of traffic and technical information exists between U. S. and British units as regards other sensitive problems, General Corderman recommended that [redacted] traffic analysis reports be passed with a minimum of delay and complication. Captain Wenger pointed out that, if [redacted] is to become the major technical problem undertaken by STANCIB in the future, its proper handling will require a considerable increase and extension of liaison, exchange, and personnel. It will be practically impossible to restrict knowledge of either [redacted] operations or British collaboration to merely a few individuals. Moreover, with rotation of personnel between Washington and field activities this knowledge will gradually extend to the latter. It was his feeling that the delineation of policy in this matter will be an important question for discussion at the Technical Conference and that STANCIB must be prepared to readjust its thinking as regards the unique security procedures being applied at present if operations are to be conducted on the scale that is obviously required for success in any way comparable to that achieved during the war. Mr. McCormack indicated his feeling that [redacted] activity is of sufficient importance to be worth the risk. Inasmuch as participation of ASA, Europe, is vital to the proper handling of the [redacted] problem, he indicated his willingness to accept the proposals of General Bissell's memorandum. Indicating his feeling that we must continue to maintain all reasonable security, General Vandenberg stated that the requirements of the Theatre Commander must be met. Inasmuch as an extension of [redacted] activities will be necessary for its successful handling, he was prepared to adjust security standards accordingly.

At this point Mr. McCormack and Admiral Inglis left the meeting

As regards Admiral Inglis' proposal for the handling of traffic analysis reports and the ensuing discussion concerning the need for an adjustment of security standards, Captain Harper pointed out the danger of possible false interpretations or conclusions which might be derived from analysis of incomplete

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traffic. Admiral Stone indicated his willingness to approve General Bissell's recommendations with the understanding that the materials to be exchanged will be kept to the necessary minimum and that maximum security is afforded. General Corderman stated that he would visit Frankfurt prior to the Technical Conference in order to check the extent of material needed and security measures which will be applied. He proposed that General Bissell's recommendation be adopted and that the problem be presented to the British for their concurrence at the Technical Conference. All present approved this suggestion. General Vandenberg directed that Captain Smodberg should advise Admiral Inglis regarding that part of the discussion which occurred subsequent to his departure and that the Secretariat should then be informed of any objections sustained by Admiral Inglis.

Replies to be Made by Member Agencies to the British Request for ULTRA Histories of the Japanese War (Item 7):

General Vandenberg indicated his willingness that the replies of the member agencies should be forwarded. All present agreed that these replies should be negative and should, in different language, indicate similar reasons for the negative reply.

Selection of the Term "Communication Intelligence" or "Signal Intelligence" (Item 8)

General Vandenberg proposed that, inasmuch as the term "Signal Intelligence" is commonly used by the British and the Army, STANCIB indicate its willingness to adopt this term. Indicating his preference for the term "Communication Intelligence" Admiral Stone stated that the selection of either term appeared to be a relatively unimportant matter. There ensued a discussion as to the practical effect of making any change at this time as a result of which all were agreed that no change is necessary and that the two terms be considered synonymous.

Proposed Schedule for the Preparation of Tentative and Final Minutes (Item 9):

The Secretariat reported that STANCIB had accepted a schedule for the preparation of minutes, whereby tentative minutes would be prepared and circulated within the week following a meeting, the comments of the members would be returned to the Secretariat within the following week, and the Secretariat would prepare and circulate final minutes prior to the close of the third week. All present indicated their acceptance of this procedure for STANCIB minutes.

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Publication of a Joint State-Army-Navy Summary

The Secretariat circulated six recommendations concerning the preparation and publication of a joint State-Army-Navy Summary (see Inclosure C). These recommendations had been prepared by the STANCICC Ad Hoc Subcommittee for Diplomatic Intelligence and had been approved in principle by STANCICC at their last meeting. Captain Smedberg reviewed the background of these proposals and stated that, prior to the preparation of details for their implementation, STANCICC requests that the Board approve them in principle. As regards recommendation (e), General Vandenberg indicated his feeling that the preparation of an adequate joint summary would require the unlimited use of all available collateral. If the Summary is to be valuable, it cannot be based on the use of limited collateral information. He was particularly concerned that collateral information received from the State Department be complete. It was his feeling that restrictions may be placed on dissemination but not on material used in preparation. Inasmuch as STANCIB must make some decision in this matter, he suggested that further discussion be deferred until Mr. McCormack and Admiral Inglis are present for the next meeting.

There being no further business to discuss, the meeting was adjourned.

Respectfully,

ROBERT F. PACKARD
JOHN F. CALLAHAN
Secretariat, STANCIB-STANCICC

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INCLOSURE A

15 February 1946

MEMORANDUM

Subj: Coordination of the Army and Navy Communication
Intelligence Activities

Encl (A) Chart of proposed C.I. Coordination Plan

1. In order to insure thorough integration of Army and Navy Communication Intelligence Activities for the performance of those tasks which by mutual agreement are a joint responsibility, it is proposed that the present STANCIB-STANCICC organization be modified as indicated in enclosure (A) to provide for a "Coordinator of Joint Operations". This plan pertains only to the collection, production and exchange of information derived from foreign or [REDACTED] communications and is not concerned with its evaluation or dissemination as intelligence.

2. The Coordinator of Joint Operations shall function, as shown in enclosure (A), under the control of STANCIB-STANCICC as executor of policies and directives formulated by STANCIB-STANCICC for the allocation of tasks for such intercept and processing capacities as may be made available for joint use by ASA and Op-20-G, and for coordination of all joint projects with other U.S. and foreign intelligence agencies. The operating heads of ASA and Op-20-G will be responsible to the Coordinator for accomplishment of the tasks allocated by him.

3. The Army will continue to be responsible for work on military and military attache systems and the Navy for work on naval and naval attache systems. Work on other systems will be a joint responsibility and shared accordingly. It is expected that a certain percentage of the intercept and processing capacities will be reserved and controlled entirely by ASA and Op-20-G respectively for the performance of the strictly military or naval tasks. The remaining capacities will be placed at the disposal of the Coordinator for accomplishing the other tasks as he may direct. In the utilization of the joint capacities thus made available to him to accomplish joint tasks directed by STANCIB-STANCICC, he shall be guided by the principle of (1) obtaining the maximum of

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
intelligence in the minimum of time, (2) maintaining technical continuity, and (3) providing continued training of the personnel of both Communication Intelligence organizations on all types of communications intelligence problems. It is not required that all capacities allocated to the coordinator necessarily be used on problems of joint interest. For example, it may become desirable for naval supplementary radio stations to intercept traffic of a purely military nature in which the Navy would have no interest other than furnishing assistance.

4. To assist the Coordinator in carrying out his duties, there will be a Joint Intercept Control Group, a Joint Processing Allocation Group, and a Joint Liaison Group. In addition, he shall have assigned to him the necessary clerical, administrative, and analytical assistance from each service, but in the interest of minimizing requirements he will endeavor to utilize existing facilities wherever practicable.

5. In order to insure the assignment of an officer of adequate rank and technical experience and to simplify control problems and minimize control personnel, the Chief of the Army Security Agency and the Assistant Chief of Naval Communications for Communication Intelligence will alternate as "Coordinator of Joint Operations" for a term of one year, or other period as agreed upon by STANCIB. The Coordinator's senior assistant shall be an officer of suitable rank and technical qualifications from the opposite Service who normally will head the Joint Processing Allocation Group. The officer in charge of the Liaison Group shall also be from the opposite Service. The officer in charge of the Intercept Control Group shall be from the same Service as the Coordinator.

6. Upon adoption of this plan in principle, the Chief of ASA and Op-20-G will jointly draw up for STANCIB approval an agreement as to general principles governing the duties and responsibilities of the Coordinator in allocating intercept and processing tasks.

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INCLOSURE B

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STANCIB SECRETARIAT.


SUBJECT: Participation of ASA, Europe in [redacted] Activities.

1. It is requested that the above subject be placed on the agenda for consideration at the next meeting of STANCIB and that the Army's proposals thereon, as set forth in this memorandum, be circulated among the members of STANCIB prior to such meeting.

2. The Army proposes the following on the [redacted] problem:

a ASA, Europe will pass [redacted] traffic intercepted by it direct to the nearest British unit designated by GC&CS, by secure wire or by safe hand courier, and receive from the British traffic intercepted by the British of particular interest to it.

b ASA, Europe will engage in traffic analysis on [redacted] systems but will do no cryptanalysis.



d. Intelligence of particular interest to USFET, resulting from the processing of [redacted] traffic, will be made available to the theater commander as evaluated intelligence only. This intelligence will be disseminated through War Department SSO channels, and will be limited to intelligence of a strictly military nature, e.g., order of battle.

e. G-2, War Department will maintain a liaison officer at GC&CS to extract and transmit to G-2, War Department, through SSO channels, intelligence resulting from the processing of [redacted] traffic by the British. This officer will be a member of the STANCIB group.

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3. It is recommended that STANCIB transmit the above information to the British by appropriate memorandum and obtain British concurrence in items a, c and e, above.

/s/
CLAYTON BISSELL
Major General, GSC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

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INCLOSURE C

RECOMMENDATIONS RE THE MAGIC SUMMARY

1. That the summary be prepared as a joint Army-Navy-State publication and the name changed to "STAN SUMMARY"

2. That participation be effected by Navy and State with personnel as agreed upon by Army, Navy and State under STANCIB direction.

3. That items be condensed as much as practicable but not beyond that point at which further condensation might result in misconstruing the information.

4. That dissemination be directed by STANCIB and that State, Army and Navy be responsible for dissemination to necessary authorities within their respective services.

5. That collateral information as requested by the editors be supplied to them by the departments concerned, in accordance with departmental policies.

6. That all departments furnish the editorial group statements as to subjects in which they are interested, together with any collateral information that may be pertinent. These statements to be revised and submitted once each month. Whenever a situation arises which is of particular interest special statements should be made.

~~TOP SECRET ULTRA~~