7-8-40 - EARLY PAPERS CONCERNING
↓ US-UK AGREEMENTS
4-24-44

WRB

COPY OF ACSLDA BOOK #48.

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-08-2010 pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended. ST56834

LORD PHILIP KERR LOTHIAN

AMB - Aug 1939 - Dec 12, 1940 -
Died suddenly!

Succeeded By

British Foreign Secretary - Lord Halifax.
EDWARD Frederick Lindley Wood
Had been FOR SEC since Feb. 1938

BRITISH-U.S. COOPERATION

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Above papers (85) given to Gen. Clarke 4 Dec 43 by Col. Jacobs, Policy Staff

Returns to Crypto Div OACSI-DA

COPY

~~SECRET~~

Mr. President

Aide-memoire.

The British Government have informed me that they would greatly appreciate an immediate and general interchange of secret technical information with the United States, particularly in the ultra short wave radio field.

It is not the wish of His Majesty's Government to make this proposal the subject of a bargain of any description. Rather do they wish, in order to show their readiness for the fullest cooperation, to be perfectly open with you and to give you full details of any equipment or devices in which you are interested without in any way pressing you beforehand to give specific undertakings on your side, although of course they would hope you would reciprocate by discussing certain secret information of a technical nature which they are anxious to have urgently.

I presume that, if you approve in principle of this interchange of information, you would wish to discuss it further with the War and Navy Departments before giving a decision, and, should you so wish, I would be glad to place my Air Attache and the scientific assistant to the Air Attache at the disposal of the staff of the C. G. S. (General Marshall) and the C. N.O. (Admiral Stark) with a view to their discussing what technical matters might be of interest to these Services.

As to subsequent procedure, should you approve the exchange of information, it has been suggested by my Government that, in order to avoid any risk of the information reaching our enemy, a small secret British mission consisting of two or three service officers and civilian scientists should be despatched immediately to this country to enter into discussions with Army and Navy experts. This mission should, I suggest, bring with them full details of all new technical developments, especially in the radio field, which have been successfully used or experimented with during the last nine months. These might include our method of detecting the approach of enemy aircraft at considerable distances, which has proved so successful; the use of short waves to enable our own air-

Booklet 2 (D/MI-OSC)

1

craft to identify enemy aircraft, and the application of such short waves to anti-aircraft gunnery for firing at aircraft which are concealed by clouds or darkness. We for our part are probably more anxious to be permitted to employ the full resources of the radio industry in this country with a view to obtaining the greatest power possible for the emission of ultra short waves than anything else.

LOTHIAN

8th July, 1940.

COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
Eu

July 19, 1940

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of War and encloses a copy of an Aide-memorie dated July 8, 1940 from the British Embassy proposing a general interchange of secret technical information between the United States and British Governments, particularly in the ultra short wave radio field.

It is understood that the Secretary of War is prepared to consider such an interchange of information and the Department of State would appreciate receiving the views of the Secretary of War as to the reply which should be made to the British Aide-memoire.

Enclosure:
Aide-memoire,
July 8, 1940

2

COPY

660

WPD 4340

WAR DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

War Plans Division

Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

By authority A. C. of S., W.
Date 7/12/40 (Wilson)
Initials
WPD
GVS

July 19, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: General Interchange of Secret Technical Information between the United States and British Governments.

1. There is enclosed herewith, under date of July 19, a strictly confidential memorandum from the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War, transmitting a copy of an Aide-memoire, in which is proposed a general interchange of secret technical information between the United States and British Governments, particularly in the ultra short wave radio field, and asking the views of the Secretary of War as to the reply which should be made to the British Aide-memoire.

2. It is understood that this Aide-memoire was considered in the Cabinet Meeting of July 11 and was approved by the President and by the Secretaries of War and Navy (Mr. Dunn, State Department).

3. The Secretary of War has informed me that Mr. Dunn's statement is essentially correct. The Secretary of War stated that his policy, in which the President concurred, is as follows:

> "Give all information possible to the British to aid them in their present struggle, and furnish them such material assistance as will not interfere seriously with our own defense preparations."

4. The Secretary of War stated that in regard to the present memorandum, the furnishing of any technical or scientific information to the British must be accompanied with an explicit statement that procurement of any of the articles or devices concerned from sources of supply in this country must be subject to the approval by the War and Navy Departments, and such approval must be based upon noninterference with our own procurement program.

3

5. It is to be noted that Lord Lothian's Aide-memoire in effect asks us for all scientific or technical information that we have in regard to the utilization of instruments based upon the employment of ultra short wave radio. This, of course, is aimed at getting full information in regard to our airplane detector, which apparently is very much more efficient than anything the British have. The British in turn offer to reveal to us their detector and the details of their "pip squeak" identification system of aircraft, as well as the application of short waves to anti-aircraft gunnery control, which apparently is somewhat similar to our short range detector for antiaircraft regiments. Insofar as we are concerned, these matters are fully covered by the policy of the Secretary of War, as indicated in paragraph 3 above. The more serious matter in the British Aide-memoire, however, is the desire of the British to employ the "full resources" of our radio industry with a view to procuring the apparatus they desire. This matter, in principle, is covered by the policy of the Secretary of War, as indicated in paragraph 4 above, however, the actual application of this policy in regard to British procurement may offer considerable difficulty: first, in view of the limited production facilities in this country and, second, in view of the time factor involved.

6. Aside from the Chief Signal Officer and his opposite member in the Navy, the principal parties in interest are: G-2, from the military information standpoint; G-4, from the procurement standpoint; and WPD, from the planning standpoint along with the coordination of various activities to meet the requirements of our Color Plans. Another body, who may ultimately come into the picture, is the National Defense Research Committee which is about to take up certain projects, covered in the Aide-memoire of the British Ambassador, and on which the War Department representative is the A. C. of S., W. P. D.

7. Action recommended.

1. That the A. C. of S., G-2, be designated as the War Department representative for coordinating the details of the interchange of information covered in the Aide-memoire, and that specific questions in regard to plans, types of apparatus, tests, demonstrations, and procurement be handled in close collaboration with the Chief Signal Officer, G-4, and the War Plans Division.

2. That the letter herewith be signed by the Secretary of War and dispatched to the Acting Secretary of State.

DISPATCHED
by ACO 7-22-40. Cy. to G-2.
ACW/ehb.

16 A G O
JUL 22 1940
Received

/s/ Geo. V. Strong
GEO. V. STRONG,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

Concurrence:
A. C. of S., G-2 (S-M).
A. C. of S., G-4 (RCM).

Incls:
Memo. from SD 7-19-40)
s/Aide Memoire.
Ltr. for signature of S/W.

ml

JUL 22 1940
A P P R O V E D
By order of the Secretary of War
G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

/s/ O. N. Bradley.
by O. N. Bradley
Lt. Col., G.S.C. Asst. Sec. W.D.G.S.

FILE JUL 22 1940 MMD

General Strong showed this to SW who stated that the word all in quoted par. in Par 3 should be used advisedly.

OMB
Noted - Deputy Chief of Staff

OMB
Noted - Chief of Staff

Received A. G. O.
(Esq)
JUL 23 1940

OCS/15370-1205

COPY SECRET

WPD
GVS OCS
GCM

659

WD 400.3295 (7-19-40)
M-WPD

4

The Honorable,

JUL 22 1940

The Acting Secretary of State.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am in receipt of your strictly confidential memorandum of July 19 in which is enclosed a copy of an Aide-memoire, dated July 8, 1940, from the British Embassy proposing a general interchange of secret technical information between the United States and British Governments, particularly in the ultra short wave radio field. In view of the action taken on this memorandum in the Cabinet Meeting of July 11, the War Department is prepared to undertake conversations with a small secret British Mission, consisting of two or three service officers and civilian scientists, which will be dispatched to this country for the purpose indicated in the memorandum.

There are two basic questions which will arise from the contemplated conversations. The first is the full and free interchange of technical information which presents no particular difficulty in view of the Presidential approval of the Aide-memoire, and the second, which presents more possibilities of complication, involves the procurement of material by the British in this country. In regard to the latter, I believe that the furnishing of any technical or scientific information to the British should be based on the understanding that the procurement of related articles or devices from sources of supply in this country should be subject to approval by the War and Navy Departments, such approval being dependent upon noninterference with our own procurement program.

General Sherman Miles, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, has been designated as the War Department representative to coordinate the details for the interchange of information, covered in the Aide-memoire.

DISPATCHED
AGO 7-22-40.
. to G-2.
ACW/ehb.

Sincerely yours,

JUL 22 1940
CUT 4:08 OUT
Office of
Chief of Staff

16 A G O
JUL 22 1940
Received

HENRY L. STIMSON
Secretary of War.

ml

ame

REGISTER NO. 900438
7-22-40

OCS/15270-1205

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~~SECRET~~ COPY

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WAR DEPARTMENT
War Department General Staff
Military Intelligence Division, G-2
Washington

September 4, 1940

5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE:

Subject: Exchange of Information with Representatives of British Government.

1. Reference is made to paragraph 1 of your memorandum of August 2, 1940, on above subject (350.05/7).

2. The present policy of the Secretary of War is to broaden the field of exchange of secret technical information and particularly not to bar the disclosure of information on items still under development on the sole ground that they are under development.

3. It is desired that the list of items recommended by you to be excluded from any exchange of information be reconsidered in the light of this broader policy and resubmitted. In case of devices, instruments, or systems under development, it is desired that those whose exclusion is still recommended be listed specifically, with reasons noted.

(sgd) SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

ess/lcw

FILE SEP 20 1940

~~SECRET~~

5.

9 AM Tues
Capt Bode.

SEPT. 5, 1940 85

THE SECRETARY OF WAR DIRECTS ANSWERS TO THIS RADIO AS FOLLOWS:

ADVISE WITHIN 12 HOURS IF ANSWER IS UNNECESSARY.

IF ANSWER IS NOT SENT WITHIN 7 DAYS REASON MUST BE STATED.

L. R. CONLEY,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Copies furnished as noted:

RADIOGRAM

(JTP)

WA47

Received at the War Department

September 5, 1940.

8:25 A.M.

From London, Filed 1:30 P. M.

To Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

London No. 401, September 5, 1940.

Are you prepared to exchange full information on German, Italian and Japanese code and cryptographic information therewith? Are you prepared to agree to a continuous exchange of important intercept in connection with the above? Please expedite reply.

This message for Chief of Staff from Strong.

Lee.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
SEP 5 1940
WAR DEPARTMENT

(War 85)
SEPT. 5, 1940.

Rec'd War Dept. Message Center, 10:44 A. M., September 7, 1940.
(JTP)

23WVP --- Fort Monmouth, N. J., September 7, 1940.

Signals,

Washington, D. C.

As matter of utmost importance to National Defense strongly urge concurrence Chief Staff in proposal General Strong that this government exchange complete technical information re Japanese German and Italian codes and cipher systems. Do believe constant exchange intercepted traffic unnecessary. Each government should rely upon own intercept services for collection material and translation. Unnecessary to discuss Paragraphs A, C, D and E of Akins' memorandum because not believed pertinent Strong's radio.

Marshall.

(WCR 85)
SEPT. 7, 1940

~~SECRET~~

C Y

657

WAR DEPARTMENT

War Department General Staff

Military Intelligence Division G-2

WASHINGTON

September 9, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Directive to G-2 Covering Interchange of Secret Technical Information with Representatives of British Government.

I. 1. In accordance with the agreement provided by the Aide-Memoire of the British Ambassador of July 8 and the reply of the Secretary of State thereto, War Department representatives have been engaged since August 28 in the interchange of secret technical information with members of the British Technical Mission headed by Sir Henry Tizard.

2. Letter of the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State, dated July 22, 1940, (Tab A), states the conditions governing the War Department's participation in this interchange and designates the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to coordinate the details. This letter constitutes the sole directive from higher authority under which the interchanges of information have been conducted.

The Secretary of War has stated verbally to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, that his policy is to furnish full and complete information to the British on all subjects, withholding only information whose exclusion is specifically recommended by Chiefs of Branch or by the Navy Department. In the former cases, the Secretary of War will reserve final decision to himself. Pursuant to this policy, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, has sent appropriate instructions in writing to Chiefs of Branch concerned.

3. As the conferences proceed and the growing importance and extent of the information exchanged become apparent, it is believed desirable that the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, be furnished a written directive from the Secretary of War confirming the verbal instruction heretofore received and defining the information to be given and withheld. Because of the secrecy attached to this subject and of the necessity for prompt and frequent contact between this Division and Chiefs of Branch, it is also believed desirable to authorize direct written communication among those concerned without going through the Adjutant General.

~~SECRET~~

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4. The action recommended below has been gone over and approved by representatives of the Chiefs of Branches concerned and the Judge Advocate General's office (Patent Branch).

II. Action Recommended:

The Secretary of War directs as follows:

1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, is hereby designated as the War Department representative to coordinate details for the interchange of information with members of the British Technical Mission or other authorized representatives of the armed forces of the British Empire.

2. The policy of the Secretary of War in this respect is to furnish full and complete information to authorities of the British Empire, subject to patent rights not owned by the United States Government and to the concurrent interest of the Navy Department where that interest exists. Information recommended specifically for exclusion by Chiefs of Branch will be referred by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to the Secretary of War for his final decision.

3. Information to be given to authorities of the British Empire will include the following catagories:

(a) Technical information on munitions, devices, or processes of manufacture owned by the United States Government.

(b) Cryptanalytic information. (No information which concerns our own codes, cyphers, and methods of cryptography will be divulged.)

(c) Information received from abroad concerning foreign armies, their organization, equipment, morale, and operations; munitions under development; political, economic and psychological information on foreign countries: provided in all cases that the information has not been obtained from other Departments of the United States Government.

4. Information on devices or processes of manufacture which are not owned by the United States Government will be handled as follows:

(a) Information furnished by representatives of

the War Department will be of such general nature as not to jeopardize patent rights or trade secrets.

(b) Should authorities of the British Empire desire to manufacture, or have manufactured, separately or jointly with the United States Government, by other than the patentees or the original manufacturers thereof, any such given devices, or to incorporate features of such given devices in other instruments or systems they may devise, the authorities of the British Empire must make such arrangements as may be necessary with the patentees or the original manufacturers of the given devices for the reproduction or use of any features thereof, and must guarantee to said patentees, their assignees, or manufacturers, the right to establish a claim against the responsible Government concerned for entire and reasonable compensation for such reproduction or use of the given devices or any of their features where such arrangements have not been satisfactorily concluded prior to such reproduction or use. Furthermore, the responsible Government concerned must agree to protect the rights of such United States patentees or manufacturers or their assignees against the filing of applications for Letters Patent by others in Great Britain, its Dominions and Colonies, on any such given devices or any features thereof.

5. Communications between Chiefs of Branch and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on matters touching these negotiations will be direct and will not pass through the office of the Adjutant General.

Sep 11 1940
APPROVED
By order of the Secretary of War
G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

/s/Orlando Ward
by Orlando Ward
Lt. Col., G. S. C. Sec.W.D.G.S.

/s/ Sherman Miles
Sherman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Noted E RH.

16 A GO
SEP 11 1940
Received

NOTED BY G.S.
SEP 10 1940

1 Incl - Tab A.

Received A.G.O.
SEP 11 1940

File: JWD 12 Sep 40

oss

Noted by SW

G-2
S M

~~SECRET~~

October 4, 1940.

MEMORANDUM for Lieut-Colonel E. A. Regnier, Aide to Secretary of War:

Subject: Codes and Ciphers.

1. It is strongly recommended as absolutely essential to National Defense and particularly to the Army that there be arranged between the Governments of the United States and Great Britain an immediate exchange of information concerning military, military attache and diplomatic codes, ciphers, cipher devices and apparatus and code and cipher systems employed by Germany, Italy and Japan, together with all information concerning the methods employed to solve messages in codes or ciphers of the classes mentioned.

2. Information which can be furnished by the United States will include among other things the details of the solution of the most difficult Japanese machine cipher system used for "utmost secret" diplomatic correspondence, which has just been completed by Army cryptanalysts after eighteen months of intensive work.

3. This exchange is recommended for the following reasons:

First, it would afford us technical information on the solution of the code and cipher systems employed by the Armies and Air Forces of the powers in question. Intercepted material pertaining thereto is not now available. Even if the intercepted material were obtainable, a long period of intensive study would be necessary before solutions could be achieved. In the present emergency, the saving of time is of the greatest importance. The experiences gained by the British in operations against the forces of the powers in question should provide invaluable information, including captured codes, cipher devices, ciphers and related documents.

Second, it would afford us technical information on the solution of the systems, pertaining to codes and ciphers, employed by the military attaches, foreign offices, and diplomatic and consular representatives of Germany and Italy. This information is of the highest importance at this time, especially for the disclosures it might yield in connection with Axis intentions, plans and operations in the Canal Zone, Caribbean area and Central and South America. It may also disclose espionage, sabotage plans and fifth column activities in this country and its possessions. Additional items that might be disclosed are the plans and intentions of Germany and Italy with respect to the Far East, Russia and the

(WAS-85)
OCT. 4. 1940

French possessions in the Western Hemisphere. Although it might be possible for this Government to solve the systems used without the aid of information expected to be gained by this exchange, the time necessary to obtain such results might extend from half a year to two years. The exigencies of the present emergency forbid such delay.

Third, Our information on the above subjects would, we are confident, be of material aid to Great Britain.

4. The Navy Department is opposed to any exchange of information on cryptanalysis of foreign codes and ciphers. I understand that this opposition is based on a fear that any information we give on our methods of cryptanalysis may aid the British in breaking down our codes and ciphers.

Sherman Miles.
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

hcm

MAILED EXECUTIVE OFFICE G-2 G.S. OCT 4 1940

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WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington

AG 400.3295 (10-18-40)M-WPD-M November 4, 1940.

SUBJECT: Interchange of Technical Information with British Representatives.

SECRET
AUTH: T. A. G.
Initials [illegible]
Date: 11-4-40.

TO: Chiefs of Arms and Services. (See Distribution Sheet Attached).

BASED ON: WID 4340-1 NOVEMBER 2, 1940.
COMPARED: ehb/jh

The following extract from a joint letter from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy to the National Defense Research Committee, represents the War Department policy reference interchange of technical information with British representatives, and is published for the information and guidance of all agencies of the War Department.

"It is agreed that all devices, instruments, or systems in use, developed for use or under development by the War and Navy Departments will be offered for release to the representatives of the British Government except the following:

"Pertaining to the Army: Bomb ballistic tables.

"Pertaining to the Navy: The bombsight and the antenna mine with two-way firing device.

"Should the British Government request drawings, specifications, performance data and any other detailed information relating to items available for release, such information will be furnished by the Department concerned.

"In all cases of exchange, it must be understood that the information to be furnished relates to the existence and the operation of specific given devices; and that should the British Government desire to manufacture or have manufactured by other than the patentees or the original manufacturers thereof any such given devices, or to incorporate features of such given devices in other instruments or systems they may devise, the British Government must make such arrangements as may be necessary with the patentees or the original manufacturers of the given devices for the reproduction or use of any features of such given devices, guaranteeing to said manufacturers or patentees a right to establish a claim against the British Government for entire and reasonable compensation for such reproduction and/or use of the given devices or any of their features where such arrangements have not been satisfactorily concluded prior to such reproduction and/or use; and further, the British Govern-

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ment must agree to protect the rights of such manufacturers or United States patentees against the filing of applications for Letters Patent in Great Britain, its Dominions or Colonies, on any such given devices or any features thereof."

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/E. S. Adams
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

COPY

~~SECRET~~

May 13, 1942

R-110

From Travis STOP Captain Hastings, R. Navy is returning to Washington shortly STOP We propose and hope you will agree that he may represent G.C. and C.S. on matters of policy STOP Also Propose attach to him Major Stevens, Essex, Fighting Area who will assist him and represent G.C.C.S. in the technical aspects of the work, Naval, military, and air.

COPY

~~[illegible]~~

May 19, 1942

The representation of G. C. & C. S. by Captain Hastings and Major Stevens in the capacity indicated in your 110 is considered highly satisfactory.

~~RI-SECRET-RI~~

8 June 1942

MEMORANDUM for 20-G.

Subject: Cryptanalysis; F.B.I. activities and liaison with the British.

1. On Saturday afternoon, 6 June 1942, I was instructed by Comdr. Wenger to prepare "ammunition" for you for a talk with Admiral Horne today in connection with the British (Captain Hasting's) move to deal only with the F.B.I. on matters relating to certain classes of our cryptanalytical efforts. After consideration I felt that the subject would be adequately treated only by frankly setting forth my opinions in an informal review of our relations with the British, as well as the F.B.I. This approach was felt necessary for several reasons; (1) the differences between the U.S. and British over-all set-up are so fundamentally different that we (the Navy or the U.S.) can approach the subject intelligently only if these differences are well understood, (2) since the ramifications of the subject reach into the highest places in both governments, and since a [illegible] in the [illegible] will likely go correspondingly [illegible] [illegible] (and the Navy) is at a disadvantage as compared [illegible] [illegible] set-up is centralized under an all-powerful Foreign Office with many senior officers technically familiar with the subject, while the U.S. set-up is divided sufficiently for the British to take advantage [illegible] also of the fact that there are extremely few of our senior policy makers technically familiar with the matter, (3) the explosive nature of some of my opinions are unprovable or may even be inaccurate in certain developments of the last several months with which I might not be familiar, but are nevertheless strongly enough felt to list for the very good reason that actual motives in the politico-diplomatic features of this game may easily be deeply buried under legitimate or ostensibly disinterested [illegible]. Enclosure (A) is added, giving the highlights in a brief form.

2. Relations with the British.

Early in 1940 our N.A. in London forwarded a guarded proposal from the British to exchange Orange-[illegible] analytical methods. The proposal was ignored for some weeks, [illegible] because we felt it would be a one way deal since various indications pointed to the fact that our solid reading of Orange Dip was much more complete than the British, while in Navy [illegible] were also better off. (This later turned out to be the case.) Again in early June the N.A. London was approached [illegible] on a proposal more general in scope. This time the same [illegible] prevailed although there was some opinion inclined to favor [illegible] exchange in

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the expectation of getting German Navy systems. For that reason it was felt that before accepting the offer one of our men should visit England to find out something of what they had to offer. Accordingly the proposal was again refused.

Early in the fall of 1940 the whole issue was blasted wide open without either U.S. authority so far as I am aware, or consultation with the Navy, by General Strong when he visited England as head of Army War Plans Division. Admiral Kirk, then Captain and N.A., describes the scene as a staff talk of high British Naval-Military officials with various secretaries, etc. present. General Strong came out before the whole assemblage with an offer to give them all the Orange Dip systems. There was a dead silence at the indiscretion, particularly on the part of those senior British officers who knew of the activity. When they recovered they at once accepted the offer. Washington was then informed. The heads of MID, ONI, Op-20, and Signal Corps were without exception opposed, but felt that the matter was now out of their hands and a matter for decision by higher authority. The question was put before a meeting of the CNO, Chief of Staff, and their two Secretaries, but they in turn, while opposed, felt the decision must be made by the White House. The President, as part of his policy of "all out aid to Britain" decided to carry it out.

The details of the exchange are fairly well known so I will not go into them now, except to remark that while we gave them everything we had in February 1941, they refused to reciprocate in several categories, and only incompletely in others until nearly a year later after frequent representations on our part. Our relations with the British activity in England are now cordial, and technical exchange is believed to be complete.

Last summer the British embarked on an extensive program of expanding their Secret Service organization in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in the United States. Captain Hasting, R.N., a former Canadian D.N.I., was one of the early arrivals. In view of his status in this organization, a brief review of the British Secret Service is warranted before taking up Captain Hasting's activities.

3. <u>The British Foreign Office, including Secret Service [illegible] (Government Code and Cipher School).</u>

After World War I the British organization in cryptanalytical activity was similar to the present U.S. set-up in that the Army, the Navy, the R.A.F., and also the Foreign Office, and to a minor degree Scotland Yard had their own Black Chambers. By 1925 various difficulties of the kind we are now going through in attempting to coordinate and avoid duplication and dispersion

of effort were not by placing all activities of this kind under the Foreign Office. There were several good reasons for this; the Ministry with the greatest prestige, closest to the King and Prime Minister, who at times held this portfolio also, was the Foreign Office; the F.O. had a capable group of cryptanalysts; its work was on the increase in that era of conferences by contrast to the minor immediate character or importance of the Army-Navy effort in peace time; and the Foreign Office controlled the secret service which can aid such efforts to a great degree.

Foreign Office control extends not alone to the diplomats and their technical attache's such as naval, military, commercial, agricultural, financial, and cultural; it includes foreign office spies, undercover agents, civilian intelligence individuals and organizations, the undercover secret service agent organization, and naval-military agents; it also includes control of the character and security of all cryptographic aides used by the above to insure the inherent safety of their own communications. This last mentioned control, which extends to all Army-Navy-F.O. systems, is handled by the Government Code and Cipher School, a name which is used also as a cover-up for the pooled British Black Chamber under the Foreign Office. Thus all activities of the British Government in the foreign field are under Foreign Office centralized control.

4. <u>The contrasting U.S. picture.</u>

The State Department's control of its diplomats and their attache's is somewhat comparable to the Foreign Office. In other fields of activity it is quite different from Britain's.

(a) From long contact with the State Department, both official and unofficial, I know that undercover agents and spies have been practically non-existant in the tradition of our diplomatic service. The Navy employed some in certain areas, chiefly outside the Western Hemisphere, as did the Army. The effort was minor in extent and results. The mass of our intelligence came from our accredited attache's and observers, or else from ship visits and voluntary informants. To meet the need for intensification and greatly expanded effort in this line the C.O.I. was set up in late 1941. Most existing undercover agents and spies of Army-Navy were transferred to its jurisdiction extending world wide except for the Western Hemisphere which remains an Army-Navy field.

(b) The Western Hemisphere was placed under F.B.I. jurisdiction for counterespionage purposes, not for espionage work itself. It was a new type of work for them, with antecedents dating back only to 1939 when they were made primarily responsible for counter-espionage, espionage and sabotage within the United States.

As was to be expected, they progressed slowly in this difficult field, and were guided and trained principally by O.N.I. and M.I.D. which had joint responsibilities with them in this work. The F.B.I. was brought up in a tradition of criminal prosecution. They made their reputation on the thoroughness of their preparation of a case for court presentation. They obtained a percentage of convictions in the high nineties, with infamous "public enemy" or underworld figures furnishing the color for publicity and headlines. But counterespionage work differed in many cases from the usual criminal procedure because duly accredited officials of foreign governments were involved. The F.B.I. had to be taught to work on these cases without infringing diplomatic protocol and without expectation of court prosecution, but instead aiming toward handicapping or preventing effective work, or developing diplomatically admissable reasons for declaring them "persona non grata". Joint Army-Navy - F.B.I. efforts in this line culminated in closing of Axis consulates by the State Department last summer.

Independent F.B.I. effort continued to be the policeman approach, aimed at court conviction. They were successful in the case of many petty spies or agents particularly after the foreign agent registration act was passed to facilitate their work.

When the F.B.I. was given jurisdiction of counterespionage in the Latin Americas they took hold with gusto, sending many of their men down in an attempt to set up an effective organization. These men were, however, lacking the background and training for this work. They were scientifically trained policemen working within the legalistic limitations of their experience. They soon gave up any pretense of being undercover counter agents and re-oriented their whole effort to becoming so-called "technical advisors" to the police of the different Latin American nations. As such, they were on familiar ground and they have done good work in disseminating scientific police methods. But chiefly they have been useful in establishing personal contact with the police, and in providing a channel for exchange of information. Their status is known and approved by the governments concerned and in fact many of them are openly listed as civil attaché's of the U.S. diplomatic posts.

It is this liaison and cooperative status with the police of Latin America that the British Secret Service cannot hope to match and it is for this reason that the British Secret Service has established and fostered a close liaison with the F.B.I.

(c) Cryptographic aids, i.e. codes and ciphers, have always been prepared by each U.S. government agency for its own use independently. In recent years Army-Navy collaboration has

been increasing to the point that now mutually developed methods and systems are frequently used by both. The chief other user of codes and ciphers is the State Department. Their systems in the past have been the laughing stock of the world's Black Chambers. It is only in the past several years that, as a result of Army-Navy representations, they started using some obsolete Navy systems, and more recently, largely through the recommendations of the Defense Communication Board, they have adopted a few really secure systems. Other government agencies, such as Treasury, F.B.I., Commerce, etc. are on their own. This whole picture contrasts with the British centralized organ for development of cryptographic aids and for evaluating or approving the security of systems prior to use by any branch of the British government. This organ is the Government Code and Cipher School administered by the Foreign Office.

(d) Cryptanalysis in the United States is primarily a joint Army-Navy endeavor. Collaboration is close, particularly on foreign diplomatic systems. Military-naval systems are handled by the respective service. The organization thus consists of a distinct Army and a distinct Navy unit freely exchanging ideas, but developing independently under the Signal Corps and Naval Communications. Other than the above, in the Coast Guard there is a small unit which worked under the Treasury on narcotics, smuggling, specie, and clandestine traffic in peace time, but is now serviced by the Navy. The F.B.I. has engaged in cryptanalysis to a minor extent since 1934, purely on police or criminal types of traffic and recently, with Coast Guard aid, on a few German clandestine systems. The F.B.I. unit is part of their "Technical Laboratory" which does much of their scientific police work including secret ink study. Their unit is small and their capabilities are admitted by themselves to be limited, since they have confessed their inability to take over entirely even the simple German clandestine traffic from South America which is small in volume and of comparatively elementary difficulty from a cryptanalytical point of view. The State Department has no cryptanalysis unit. Other government organs have either dropped efforts in this field, or have a few amateurs (the F.C.C.), or are training a few men with fair success (Censorship).

(e) Following the decision on exchange with the British, Army-Navy representatives visited England in February last year. In Washington, at the request of London, liaison was established with the British Embassy Naval Attaché for the purpose of further courier exchange of matter and for the purpose of furnishing the British Ambassador with a limited amount of the more important Orange decrypted messages, pending the establishment of special channels between our services and the British C.C. & C.S. This channel or exchange was established in June and further sharing of decryptions to the British here was

stopped by mutual agreement. Courier service to London via bomber continued through the British N.A.

The above is an outline of the U.S. picture when Captain Hasting came on the scene in the late summer of 1941.

5. Captain Hasting's activities.

As an advance agent of the British Foreign Office Secret Service, Captain Hasting quickly and efficiently established close and friendly relations with O.N.I., M.I.D., Op-20, Op-37, the Signal Corps, the State Department, the Coast Guard, the F.B.I., Treasury, Commerce, the F.C.C., and many other groups and high officials of the U.S. government. His status was somewhat obscure at the time, but included among other things full authority to deal with the U.S. Army and Navy cryptanalytical units for the British C.C. & C.S. He took over the courier exchange work from the British N.A. He requested at times certain decryptions bearing on Axis financial and espionage activities in South America, and was usually supported in these requests by dispatches from the Foreign Office. As a Naval Officer he had ready access to O.N.I. and the Navy Department which was dealing with officers of many British missions in town. As a British intelligence representative he was on close and friendly terms with the F.B.I., Op-16-B, and M.I.D.'s counterespionage sections. As a C.C. & C.S. representative he got the Coast Guard to furnish him their decryptions of German Clandestine traffic. His true status developed somewhat later when there arrived in New York a Mr. Stevenson who was appointed head of the British Secret Service in the United States and the Western Hemisphere. This expanded activity was set up with full U.S. approval as a cooperative activity in counterespionage.

Within this group was established a small unit to study the German clandestine radio picture. They had contact with the Navy Department (Op-20-G) on this, and in November 1941 represented their work as being a desire to pool in one place all the British, Canadian, and U.S. results in order to get as complete a picture as possible. They further stated, "As soon as the United States is able to fully take over this German clandestine radio work we (the British) want to turn it completely over to the United States." In view of the fact that half a dozen U.S. organizations were intercepting or processing this traffic and collaboration by the Army-Navy organizations with the others was negligible for various reasons chiefly involving security, and further, because the British-Canadian effort had certain coverages we lacked, their suggestion was considered excellent and was approved.

Captain Hasting accordingly began to collect and

receive full information on this subject from all U.S. agencies involved. Since the Coast Guard had done most of the U.S. work on German clandestine, his relations with them were close and included full files of decrypted systems. In return the British Secret Service unit in New York furnished information to the Coast Guard.

In the ensuing months, under the stress of war and the serious shortage of capable cryptanalytical talent, the urgency of eliminating duplication of effort, or at least co-ordinating the effort, was more and more strongly felt. Personal contacts were established with the other units as a preliminary to this end. In March of this year the Coast Guard cryptanalysis unit was brought under direct On-20-G supervision. It was mutually decided that all Navy-Coast Guard intelligence and research on German clandestine would be centered in the Coast Guard and their output would be channeled through the established Navy XE dissemination system in O.N.I. This was a first step and a sound one.

In the intervening week before this was put into effect, the subordinates of Captain Hasting, you will recall, paid you a visit. They had learned of the plan and wanted to be sure that full information and decrypticns from the Coast Guard continued to flow to them. You called me in on this talk in which you recall that I suggested that the proper prerogatives to an exchange between the U.S. and British governments was a problem of at least co-ordination, of the U.S. full effort on this particular category. Parts of our picture on German Clandestine were still scattered between Army, Navy, Coast Guard, the F.B.I., the F.C.C., the State Department, Censorship, and the C.O.I. I suggested that the State Department was the logical agency for initiating such a get-together and believed that the O.N.I. would propose such a meeting. The British expressed tentative satisfaction with the idea. Apparently in a following talk with which I was unfamiliar, they expressed a desire to have the then current arrangement with the Coast Guard continue for a while. This was not only agreed to, but soon strengthened at our suggestion by weekly meetings at the Coast Guard for exchange of technical data. These meetings continued between representatives of Captain Hasting, the Coast Guard and the Navy until last week and proved mutually valuable and about equally beneficial to both sides.

Some days after the above talk the O.N.I. wrote such a proposal and the letter, after minor alterations suggested by us, was sent to Mr. Berle. Shortly thereafter the first meeting was held in Mr. Berle's office between representatives of all the above agencies, except Censorship and the C.O.I. which were only indirectly interested or had agreed to drop out of the picture. There will be of this and other meetings to co-ordinate and eliminate duplication in U.S. efforts will be mentioned later since they

should be considered in the light of other activities of Captain Hasting and the Secret Service.

My personal relations with Captain Hasting have been quite friendly if not cordial. For several months after his arrival we had frequent business contacts and a number of long conversations. In the peculiar position of being attached to O.N.I., but working in 20-G, I was consulted by Admiral Wilkinson on matters brought to him by Captain Hasting which might bear on Communication Intelligence, while in Op-20 I was usually among the conferees present when Captain Hasting had G.C. & C.B. matters to bring up. At times the Op-20 business was entirely with me in connection either with desires of London on decrypted intelligence, or with his own requests for decryptions for Secret Service use or to show the Ambassador. Since the latter procedure was a violation of the understanding with London of the previous June these cases were each referred to the D.N.I., but since they usually were backed by a despatch from the Foreign Office they were always granted.

Throughout this liaison of ten months, particularly in some of my early long talks with him, Captain Hasting has been advocating and strongly pushing the idea of a combined U.S. Black Chamber. There is much to be said for such an arrangement from a theoretical point of view and from the British experience. There are far outweighing reasons why this should not be the case in the U.S. scene. A few of them are touched on in this memo and the others I believe are well known to you. At the end of one of these talks I made the remark to Captain Hasting that I believed I could reverse my stand and work up as strong an argument for such a central unit as I had maintained against it. Admiral Noyes was kept fully appraised of the details of these talks and Admiral Wilkinson of their tenor.

Captain Hasting's proselyting efforts were carried on with many others cognizant of the cryptanalytical activity throughout our government. They were received with a deaf ear for the most part, but the F.B.I. and the F.C.C. liked it. This preaching was almost invariably carried on with individuals in the highly confidential manner proper to the subject though improper for manner in which the necessary secrecy also cloaked these behind the scenes activities, but the fact of their taking place was nevertheless learned in one way or another. In the case of the Navy's reactions, with which I am most familiar, his efforts in time became obnoxious. So far as I am aware they have practically stopped as regards the Navy since you told him quite frankly a couple of months ago just what the Navy thought of his activity in this regard.

The extent of this proselyting by Captain Hasting

outside the Navy during the late spring period while conferences were in progress aimed at coordinating the U.S. effort, is not definitely known, but the conferences themselves as well as recent development may give a clue.

6. U.S. "Coordination" conferences.

The first step toward coordinating U.S. effort is covered above in connection with the Coast Guard. The circumstances leading up to the State Department conference are also outlined. As a result of this conference certain principles were agreed upon chiefly concerned with final action to be taken on decrypted intelligence. Questions of procurement, processing and dissemination were referred to the Intelligence Committee whose members are the head of G-2, MID and the ONI. This committee decided that since wide procurement was desirable, and since the principles of final action had been decided, a sub-committee which they appointed should study and report on the two questions of "processing" and "dissemination" of decrypted intelligence.

The conferences were held between Op-20-G, the Signal Corps, MID, G-2, and the ONI. The final report outlined the history, aims, activities and, by inference, the capabilities of the Military U.S. Black Chambers, recommended limitation to Army, Navy (plus Coast Guard), and the ONI, and recommended limitations on dissemination. The report is now in the hands of the Intelligence Committee awaiting approval before further action can be taken to put the recommendations into effect.

In addition to the above, another forward step was taken at the end of May when Army agreed to transfer all their German clandestine work to the Coast Guard pool which thus had about 90% of the overall U.S. activity on German clandestine under its charge. This set-up thus practically eliminated U.S. duplication of effort and dispersion of activity in this category and with weekly conferences with British continuing, furnished nearly an ideal arrangement for British-U.S. exchange on German clandestine. But there were certain flaws in the picture.

At the initial State Department conference suggested by the D.N.I., Mr. Fly of the FCC strongly advocated a central single U.S. Black Chamber. This may have been simply his own idea, uninfluenced by others. At the conferences with the ONI they strongly upheld their cognizance of diplomatic traffic, but after some straightforward talk they finally agreed to a mutual recommendation that they be included in dissemination of only German Hemisphere clandestine traffic. Throughout the period of these conferences aimed at coordinating U.S. efforts the secret activities of Captain Hasting in this particular field were obscure, and it is known that Mr. Hoover and Mr. Stevenson, with

advantage to both organizations, fostered and increased their collaboration in "counterespionage" work in Latin America. It was desirable that the FBI 10% of German clandestine effort, founded on about 30% traffic coverage furnished them by the FCC, be added to the pool for several reasons. The FBI, as mentioned earlier, admittedly could not undertake the whole effort when offered to them, despite the fact the cryptanalytical organization was ten times the size of the Coast Guard.

We made the offer because we wanted to use the Coast Guard for other projects. Full FCC traffic and FBI collateral intelligence would fill out the U.S. pool in the Coast Guard. The FBI itself had more than it could apparently handle with the criminal types of cryptograms, their legitimate field. This inference is to be drawn from the fact they have often called on the Coast Guard particularly, as well as Army-Navy, for aid. Finally, almost the entire finished product of the FBI in the German clandestine effort was duplication of that being done by the armed services whose finished results preceded the FBI's by periods varying from a week to several months.

In the general atmosphere and conditions outlined to this point in the [illegible], the British Secret Service in the person of Captain [illegible], announced at last Friday's meeting with the Coast Guard that all further exchange and collaboration with them would cease, and would be hereafter only through the FBI. Aside from the inferences to be drawn from this blossoming forth of exclusively FBI-British collaboration in this particular Latin American clandestine field, there are questions of FBI security, and matters of high policy which have been hinted at above, but will be dealt with further on. In the meantime, another episode of some interest has recently taken place in New York which should be understood.

7. <u>The New York Episode.</u>

The New York set-up of Op-16-[illegible]-3 has during the past few weeks been proceeding to acquire by various undercover [illegible] a number of foreign diplomatic and a few minor naval [illegible] related cryptographic material. These methods were developed over a period of years under the cognizance of ONI ([illegible]-2 and 16-[illegible]) in close touch with Op-20-G. There were [illegible] organizations to carry these out in a number of cities, including Chicago and Los Angeles, but, earliest and primarily, in New York the organization had been fully developed under the [illegible] of several former MIC-3's, including Captain [illegible], and had been highly successful.

Lt-Comdr. Haffenden, USNR., currently in direct [illegible] of the work, took over the set-up already developed and

in developing it further he has produced commendable results. But, because it was done without the guidance of Op-20-G (via OMI), everything produced this spring to date is in the hands of the FBI, including all the original films. This is because Haffenden had obtained no camera of his own and had to call in the FBI, which has plenty of money for cameras, in order to do the jobs. The FBI (Technical Laboratory) is very likely to attempt to exchange this material with the British for material now to themselves in order to cement their relations further with the British Secret Service as well as to increase their own decrypting coverage. The FBI may already have done so since they have the films and this may be another reason for the British wanting to deal primarily with the FBI.

A point in this connection, slightly disquieting two weeks ago, was Haffenden's remark about "tips from the British", concerning which he was very reticent. This point becomes disturbing in view of last Friday's developments, and, until clarified, engenders more than a suspicion that the British Secret Service headquarters in New York are making use of the [illegible] U.S. Navy set-up, by direct contact (the "tips"), or more likely through the FBI which necessarily is closely associated with Naval Intelligence there.

Certain aspects, however, bordered on the alarming. Our New York organization finished three jobs and delivered the product on three different courier trips spaced a week or two apart before the officer in charge of the work (who was the courier) gave us any intimation that persons outside of his organization were involved. On the earlier trips our talks with him here concerned chiefly his methods, results, and plans. He said he "preferred not to mention" certain features of the case. Reticence and discretion being an essential of this work the point was not pressed. On the trip last Wednesday, however, the conversations were more extended and in turning it toward reminiscences of previous cases with which I had first hand experience I mentioned the subject of seals. This had been an only partially solved problem in previous years, but we knew from certain statements of his and from one of the items obtained that he had solved the problem. The direct question elicited the amazing information that a British agent, a woman, had been used for the seal work.

There is no question that Haffenden has been thoroughly indoctrinated in discretion. It now appears that in this he was over zealous and misguided in not keeping us informed. There is a strong suspicion that this was the result of British insistence. If the British had either desires or "tips" on foreign code acquisition in the U.S. they should have come to the RI people in Washington. Instead they appear to know so much of all aspects of our intelligence set-up that they can by-pass the proper con-

trolling agency through which the initial exchange took place and work direct with units of it without our knowledge. Credit for this would be due Captain Hasting's spade work for the British Secret Service headquarters in New York.

If the British Secret Service is not a model of ethics for the "Special Missions" section of our proposed "Communication Raiders" it is certainly a model of organization for acquisition of foreign encrypted systems we may want. Perhaps ethics do not belong in this field.

At any rate, further leaks of this kind were summarily stopped as soon as Commander Wenger and myself first learned the facts last Wednesday. Pending pushing through of a DIO-3 camera requisition Haffenden will return to the procedure used several dozen times in the past, of calling on us for help for such work.

This episode should be closed with a word of caution on the surmises involved, although there is much to substantiate the picture, and in this hush-hush field it is usually impossible to do more than fill in with logical surmises the outlining facts. Positive information on this episode should be known in a few days because another job is being set up with a representative of this office, but not of the FBI or British, present.

8. Security.

This subject is the very heart and soul of the use of all codes and ciphers, and, of course, of attempts to break them by cryptanalysis. Failure in security of one's own communication systems obviously result in lost ships, battles, if not lost wars, and loses diplomatic conferences as surely as a stud poker player loses to opponents who read his hole cards.

But while possible compromise of our own systems can usually be remedied before irreparable loss by changing often to secure uncompromised systems, cryptanalysis is a flower of considerably greater delicacy. Years of effort of a large organization can fold up like a pricked balloon at one indiscretion, since compromise of the fact that we are reading even a low security system invariably leads to its cancellation and replacement by a more difficult system, or also to replacement by systems of approximately equal security at more frequent intervals. The tendency of every nation is toward more secure systems. In the case of Orange, inherent security has increased in the past few years in about a geometric ratio. Despite the advance of the cryptanalytical art, it is slowly but surely losing ground to increased complexity and security, while the number of systems

that become blanks to the cryptanalysts is increasing.

Parallel with this development has grown the tendency in recent years to make greater use of espionage to obtain foreign systems. This tendency will increase as the art of cryptanalysis withers. And that brings us back to the British and the F.B.I. As indicated earlier in this memorandum, the British have a full appreciation of the needs. The Secret Service under the Foreign Office is in an ideal position to work for the G.C. & C.S. also under that office, and the weight and support of British Foreign Office Diplomacy can aid by a delicate assist or discrete prod when considered feasible and desirable. The U.S. has no comparable organization for this work except such as the U.S. Navy has developed within our borders.

The FBI appreciates the security features essential to cryptanalytical effort only to the degree that is to be expected of their elementary cryptanalytical abilities and experience. They customarily handle and disseminate cryptanalytical results in the same manner as other routine confidential intelligence. Fortunately, the systems they have been reading are only the minor German clandestine ones. They have consequently not been in a position to do much damage.

On the other hand the FBI's potentialities of irreparable damage in this Black Chamber work are inherent in their organization, tradition and purpose. High FBI officials have informed us that if the District Attorney, or the Attorney General calls for completed decryptions to use in prosecuting a case or as evidence in court, the FBI must comply. Their frank admission of their helplessness to guard the security of cryptanalytical results is matched only by their complacent acceptance of the situation, an acceptance which gives a further clue to their lack of appreciation of cryptanalytical security.

Inadequate understanding of the necessary security and safeguards has been responsible for harmfully misdirected effort or for leakages and compromises of our work in the past. Last year in April the State Department came close to compromising our whole Orange Dip effort by mishandling of material so that a leak to the German Secret Service was passed on to the Japanese. In 1940 the FBI photographed all the documents of a German diplomatic courier who was forcibly detained in Panama for this purpose among others. The effort was almost useless for Black Chamber purposes and might have been very harmful if we had been reading the systems. Again, last year in May, the narcotics people this time, seized, photographed and thus openly compromised a Japanese Naval system used chiefly to control the Japanese merchant fleet, but used for ship movement purposes by some of the Japanese Navy. In the case of this particular system and its amateurish compromise I can speak with special feeling since

in order to obtain it, I twice risked my neck by entering a darkened room in which there was a foreign armed guard who was known to be resting, though on duty, and was believed to be asleep. This system we had been reading for a year before it was openly compromised and was definitely scheduled for use through the end of 1942, perhaps later. The system which replaced it is still a blank, with few prospects of cracking in view of other work of higher priority and importance for winning the war.

Many other instances need not be listed here other than to remark that both the White House and the State Department have been involved. In view of the fact that in general the only people qualified to lay down the degree of security necessary to insure continuance of cryptanalytic effort are the people familiar with the intricacies of the problems and those charged with exercising or instituting the safeguards necessary to continued success, and furthermore, since in the United States the Army and Navy are the government organs thus qualified and responsible, we come to the question of desiderata in this effort.

9. Policy.

When the exchange with the British was decided in the fall of 1940 and carried through in February and March of 1941, the U.S. organs familiar with the fact of the exchange were the Army, the Navy, and the White House. For some reason not known to myself, the State Department was not consulted on the initial decision, nor informed of the subsequent action until much later. In February 1941, Admiral Nomura, the new Japanese Ambassador to the United States arrived in Washington. Shortly thereafter informal conversations between him and Mr. Hull looking toward finding some common grounds for ameliorating differences between our governments were inaugurated and in time developed into official negotiations.

It is beside the point we are discussing that they eventually failed. What is to the point is that for a period of several months the British government was familiar with all details of our negotiations with the Japanese, but it is an amazing fact that this was not known to Mr. Hull until late in May of 1941. Despite intimate relations between the British government and ourselves, their diplomats discretely did not mention it to our State Department. It is of course likely that they assumed our State Department was aware of our having turned over all the Orange Diplomatic systems to the British and that their discretion was an instinctive result of their long experience and background with this type of intelligence.

Lack of U.S. coordination and sufficient control was primarily responsible for our initial relations with the British

in the cryptanalytical field, as pointed out above in the General Strong episode. Whether this is for good or bad remains to be seen. But certainly a feature which is bad is the way we could be forced into an undertaking without control of the approach or the decision. It must be borne in mind that I am talking about the systems, not the derived intelligence. Unquestionably it is good for the democratic cause to furnish important intelligence derived from cryptanalysis to the British.

The RESULTS, i.e. intelligence, is a different matter. The exchange can continue as long as we are allies, and will be much easier to ease out of if we want to do so afterwards. Exchange of D/F and traffic analysis would have been made in any case. Also there would undoubtedly have been a full and complete exchange of all types of military-naval operational and technical material information as well as intelligence in the pooled effort to win the war.

To come back again to the British Foreign Office Secret Service organization, officers in ONI have been dissatisfied with the British Secret Service passing naval information to FBI through which it then filters before being passed on to Navy. They have felt that the proper channels should be via either -

(a) Our N.A. in London or Ottawa,
(b) The British N.A. in Washington, direct to ONI,
(c) If Captain Hasting of the Secret Service had it, the information should be passed direct to Navy, NOT via the FBI.

Besides the often inadmissable delays involved by information passing through another organ, it would appear improper for the FBI to be in a position to exercise discretion on what is or is not of interest to the Navy.

I do not presume to represent the above as the policy of the D.N.I., but as a facet of the all embracing British organization with which 20-G deals, and in view of the FBI angle, I feel it should be mentioned. If this Secret Service retains cognizance of our exchange with the British, and also of naval matters, negotiations and actual exchange thereon must be with the Navy Department direct, not via a third agency.

Harry Hopkins last fall told me as a British joke, his experience on one of his recent visits to Churchill, when after dinner they played for him a full record of his trans-Atlantic phone conversations of the previous night with Roosevelt.

Churchill quite frankly told Hopkins he did not want Hopkins to be unaware of the fact. This incident is mentioned to emphasize the point that British diplomacy misses few tricks

of this kind. So far as I am aware no British diplomat's phone conversations to England have ever been recorded by the United States. The Navy has done this in the case of the Japanese.

But, regardless of how fully open-handed and trusting Roosevelt and Churchill are with each other now, political leaders are only temporary. The permanent undersecretaries and the top "civil service" of Britain are the prime policy makers, whose will is bent only when an unusually forceful political leader is in power such as Churchill. With a return to peace and the intrigues of diplomacy we would be naive to expect that "Hill" not to flatten out again into impenetrable walls. Granting that the post war social order may be quite different regardless of victor, it is almost inconceivable to expect that for some centuries to come our two nations' interests will be so parallel and unconflicting that all negotiations with a third power will be completely entrusted to the knowledge of the other.

10. Recommendations.

(1) Centre U.S. Black Chamber effort in Army-Navy, except for domestic internal items which normally fall under the province of the FBI, or of the Treasury and its several intelligence services.

(2) Since Secretary Knox has several times in the past expressed hearty accord with any measures necessary to maintain security of this effort, and since other interested agencies agreed at a State Department conference that no action should be taken on decrypted intelligence without prior reference to Army-Navy, dissemination of decrypted intelligence of a diplomatic, military, naval, or international character should be made only under the safeguards set up by Army and Navy.

(3) All exchanges that may be made with foreign governments in matters concerning cryptanalysis must be only with the approval of those agencies fully cognizant of this activity and the consequences of such exchange, namely the Army and Navy.

(4) Other agencies of our government who may engage in intercept activities in connection with their normal functions, in particular the FCC and Censorship, should furnish the coded traffic they receive to the Army-Navy decryption unit. This is to a large extent now being done on a voluntary basis, but we must be prepared to insist on it, if for political or other reasons there is threat of stoppage.

(5) Stop gradually, starting at once, and as suitable occasions present, all further exchange of newly cryptanalyzed systems with the British. Initially this should apply only

to diplomatic systems, since it would appear desirable to continue full collaboration on foreign naval-military systems for the duration of the war. The British have often and with advantage to themselves, engaged in "limited" exchange, for we know of this in the case of Finland, the French, and ourselves initially.

(6) Continue exchange of Intelligence, including that derived from cryptanalysis, with the British as completely and for as long a period as considered desirable. The effects of this exchange we can much more readily control than the effects of exchange of basic systems and procedures and methods for attack thereon.

Note: If I have appeared to set myself up as a one man counter British espionage unit, such was not the intent which was aimed rather at making more effective our own national effort and our joint war effort with suggestions based on my observations, experience, and convictions.

A. D. FRAZIER,
Lt-Comdr., U. S. Navy.

ENCLOSURE (A)

Brief of Basic Memorandum

1. Because of the wide differences between the U.S. and British basic intelligence organization, with particular reference to cryptanalysis and the Foreign Service, and because full factual information in intelligence can never be complete, a frank outline of opinion supported by available fact is used as the approach for this memorandum.

2. Though the U.S. was more or less "pressured" into an exchange with the British in the first place, relations with the British G.C. & C.S. are now cordial and technical exchange complete.

3. The British Foreign Office controls not only its diplomats, but all activities in the foreign field including the Secret Service, agents whether civilian, naval, or military, and cryptanalysis of foreign encrypted communication systems.

4. By contrast, in the United States the State Department controls only [illegible]. Cryptanalysis is almost solely a joint Army-Navy effort. Such Secret Service as we have was solely Army-Navy, until the C.C.I. developed as a war time phenomena. The FBI, our national police, has just begun efforts in the counterintelligence field, first in the United States and lately in Latin America. The British Secret Service are interested in using the valuable contact the FBI has established with the police of Latin America, while the FBI is anxious to learn from the British and, if possible, extent their field to international cryptanalysis work of which the British Secret Service also have cognizance.

5. Captain Hasting, an agent of the British Secret Service, has contacts on friendly terms with all U.S. intelligence activities and many other high officers and related organs. He has been proselyting in various quarters to further the idea of a combined U.S. Black Chamber, despite its undesirability from the U.S. point of view. Our present organization is now carefully buried in the Army and Navy under other legitimate activities.

Taken out of its present background, the State Department does not have the technical skill or background to administer it, nor the tradition, temperament and training in secret diplomacy and undercover activities to adequately control or develop it. Furthermore the State Department to a small degree, the FBI to a large degree, and other organs which might control such a combined Black Chamber are, to varying degrees, subject to

political vicissitudes and whims which have endangered those efforts in the past. The Army and Navy, being for the most part non-political and objective in outlook, and having the experience and organization which has developed almost all of our success to date in the only proper place for this activity in the United States.

6. German clandestine transmissions from South America have in the last year or two created an undesirable Black Chamber picture in the U.S. The systems were of minor importance and difficulty, hence, in default of Army-Navy effort on them because of preoccupation with major naval and diplomatic systems, and only minor Army effort for the same reasons, the Coast Guard has successfully undertaken to break them. The FBI recently became interested, and, with Coast Guard aid, has had minor success. A few skilled amateurs in the FCC have also broken one or two. Because of this duplication and dispersion of effort and attendant lack of security, conferences aimed at coordination and controlling this work were held this spring.

Captain Hasting's announcement that he would deal only with the [illegible] clandestine seriously interferes with the purpose of these conferences and may be motivated by self-interest of both the British Secret Service and the FBI.

7. The FBI and the British Secret Service appear to have been making use of a U.S. Navy undercover organization in New York without our knowledge. This was summarily stopped when we learned of it. More facts will be known shortly.

8. The security essential to continued success in cryptanalysis can be fully appreciated only by those who are skilled therein. This is a constant concern, for security in practice depends on thorough indoctrination of the agencies to whom the intelligence is given. Again in practice, it is possible to indoctrinate only a few persons properly. For that reason any classification below "RI-SECRET", formerly "SECRET-Special Handling" is considered improper and inadequate. Lower classification can be tolerated only when there is no evident tie-up between the extracted intelligence and its source. The FBI habitually underclassifies this material because of lack of appreciation and because they are by lack of cryptanalytical experience and by basic organization incapable of maintaining the necessary security.

9. All dealings with the British in matters concerning cryptanalysis and related results should be with only the U.S. agencies fully qualified, namely Army-Navy, the agencies through which the initial exchange took place. We must prepare now for [illegible] intrigues of peace.

Enclosure (A)

10. Six recommendations are made outlining what I believe to be U.S. desiderata.

COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL:

Some time ago the Prime Minister stated that our cipher experts of the United States and British Navies were in close touch but that he was under the impression that there was not a similar intimate interchange between our two Armies. I wonder if you could take this up with General Dill and let me know.

F.D.R.

M.I.D. 350.051 Exch. of Info., Great Britain 7-9-42

COPY

July 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff

1. Reference is made to attached memorandum for General Marshall, dated July 9, 1942.

2. Intimate interchange of technical cryptanalytic information between the British and the American Armies has been in progress for over a year, and appears to be quite satisfactory to both sides. Studies and conferences pertaining to a similar exchange of technical cryptographic information to facilitate communication among the American Army on the one side and the RAF and the British Army on the other side in all echelons have been in progress for about three months, and will be completed very soon. If interchange of similar material appears to be more advanced between the British Navy and the American Navy, it is because actual intercommunication between these two services has been necessary for a much longer period of time.

3. Draft of Memorandum for the President herewith.

George V. Strong,
Major General
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Attached:
Memo. 7-9-42
Memo. for President,
7-10-42.

WDCSA 311.52 (7-7-42)
MID 350.051 Exch. of Info., Great Britain 7-9-42

12

COPY

WDGBI
GVS
72577

July 10, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Reference your Memorandum of July 9, on the intimate interchange of information between the cipher experts of the British and American Armies, such interchange of technical cryptanalytic information has been in progress for over a year and appears to be satisfactory to both services. A similar exchange of technical cryptographic information to facilitate communication between the American Army and the RAF and the British Army in all echelons is now being studied and will be put into effect in the near future.

Chief of Staff.

ml

[illegible] 350.051 Exch.of Info..G.B. (7-9-42)
[illegible] 311.[illegible] (7-[illegible]-42)

13

COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

CCS JRD
3542

WDCSA/311.52 (7-9-42)

X

July 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have taken up the question of interchange of information between cipher experts in the British and American Armies with Sir John Dill.

We find that an interchange of cryptanalytic information has been in progress for over a year and appears to be satisfactory to both services. A similar exchange of technical cryptographic information to facilitate communications between the American Army, the RAF, and the British Army in all echelons is now being studied and will be put into effect in the near future.

(Sgd) G.C. Marshall

Chief of Staff

mej

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Copy of rewrite for G-2 MIS 350.051 Exch. of Info., G.B. 7-11-42 (7-9-42)

14

(COPY)

~~SUPER SECRET~~ August 17, 1942

WDCSA 350.05 (8-17-42)

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL NORMAN E. FISKE:
Room 202, Public Health Building.

Reference to security measures, certain operations, the following lists are submitted:

(a) List of persons now having knowledge, Office Secretary of War:

Secretary of War
Colonel E. L. Harrison

Office Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff:

Chief of Staff
Deputy Chief of Staff
Colonel J. R. Deane
Colonel R. N. Young
Colonel W. T. Sexton
Colonel G. F. Schulgen
Colonel O. L. Nelson
Miss Mona Mason
Mrs. Virginia Cooksey
Miss Milrae Hansen
Mr. Frank Hurley
Mr. G. A. Speers

(b) Security officers designated:

Colonel R. N. Young and
Colonel W. T. Sexton alternate.

(Sgd) R.N. YOUNG
R. N. YOUNG,
Colonel, General Staff
Asst. Secretary, General Staff

AUG 18, 1942
STAMP

Office of Chief
of Staff

~~SUPER SECRET~~

15

COPY

(This letter not used)

My dear Sir John:

Reference your secret and personal note of 2nd December, in regard to Dr. Turing, it appears that Dr. Turing came over here as a representative of the Post Office Department in the capacity of a Cryptographer and Cryptanalyst. As far as I can determine, he did not contact any person in authority either in G-2, or the Signal Corps, or in Joint Security Control, nor was he vouched for by the British Joint Staff Mission to any of those authorities. I understand, however, that a relatively junior officer in the Signal Corps was asked by Captain Hastings for permission to have Dr. Turing visit the Bell Laboratories for the purpose of consultation on a highly secret device that is being there developed. In view of the procedure taken, I think you will agree with me that the denial of the request was proper and that the British authorities, under similar circumstances, would have taken similar action.

I have issued orders that this device, in its present stage, be held in the ultra secret class and there are very few officers, even in the American service, who have any inkling as to what is going on in this line. Under the circumstances, I see no useful purpose to be served at the present time in permitting Dr. Turing to visit the Bell Laboratories for purpose of consultation on this device. If, as and when development has reached the stage when it will serve a useful purpose to allow a duly accredited representative of the British Government to look into the matter, I shall be very glad to grant permission for him to do so. In the meantime, if you so desire I shall be very glad to direct that every courtesy be extended to Dr. Turing in the cryptanalytical field.

Faithfully yours,

Chief of Staff.

Field Marshal Sir John Dill,
Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
Washington, D.C.

C
C
P
Y

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION
OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

~~MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL~~

2d December, 1942.

Dear Marshall

This is not a big question but I have to write to you about it because I am told that people concerned are acting on your direct order.

A certain Dr. A. M. Turing, who is our leading authority on scrambling devices, has come over from England in the belief that he would be allowed to visit the Bell Laboratories for consultation on a highly secret telephone "scrambling" device which is being developed there. I understand now that the construction of your scrambling device is well advanced, but is considered too secret to allow Dr. Turing to look in on it.

General Olmstead knows all about the situation and all I will say is that Dr. Turing is absolutely reliable and is in on every secret we possess about cryptanalyst (I think that is the right word!) devices. I am told that we are working together on these questions in full co-operation.

Can you lift the ban on Dr. Turing?

Yours ever

J. E. Dill.

General G. C. Marshall
Chief of Staff,
Room 2080,
War Department,
Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

December 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL STRONG:

1. Reference the attached communication I have this date interviewed Colonel D. M. Crawford, Signal Corps, who as the representative of the Chief Signal Officer, is responsible for the formulation of their policy in connection with this highly secret scrambling device.

2. Colonel Crawford advises me that Doctor Turing has come over to this country posing as a Cryptographer and Cryptanalyst, but that in his opinion, his (Turing's) chief mission is to obtain information relative to the scrambling device. Colonel Crawford states that several days ago he was informed of Doctor Turing's presence here and that he called General Stoner and asked him to tip off both you and the Chief of Staff in advance concerning the real purpose of Turing's visit. Stoner told him that this had been done. Colonel Crawford also stated that he had been approached by Captain Hastings and Brig. Home with a view to having permission granted to Doctor Turing to visit the Bell Laboratories for the purpose of consultation on this device. Colonel Crawford told these people that this device had been deemed ultra secret by the Chief of Staff and that under no consideration could permission be granted to Doctor Turing. Crawford further stated that only a few days ago he received a phone call about 10:30 in the morning stating that Doctor Turing was leaving for New York on a 1:00 train and could arrangements be made for him to visit the Bell Laboratories.

3. It is Colonel Crawford's opinion, and also my own, that this is just one more "back door" atempt to gain information, not only on this scrambling device, but also on our secret code missions. In both of these cases, as you are well aware, permission to see these devices has always been denied representatives of foreign governments.

CARTER W. CLARKE,
Colonel, General Staff.

~~SECRET~~

COPY

Mona:

Gen. McNarney took this letter in to Gen. Marshall but I don't know if it has been sgd.

MJ

COPY

December 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Dr. A. M. Turing.

Dr. Turing came to this country as a representative of the British Post Office, supposedly as a Cryptographer and Cryptanalyst. He did not contact this office and, as far as I know was not vouched for by the British Staff Mission. However, Captain Hastings, who is accredited as a liaison officer between the British Admiralty and the Navy Department and who has no standing whatever with the War Department, did approach an officer in the Signal Corps who is charged with the responsibility for the execution of policy in connection with the highly secret telephone scrambling device, and asked that permission be granted to Dr. Turing to visit the Bell Laboratories for the purpose of consultation on this device. Colonel Crawford, in accordance with his orders, told Captain Hastings that the device was ultra secret and that under no consideration could permission be granted as requested. A few days later Colonel Crawford, S.C., received a call about 10:30 in the morning stating that Dr. Turing was leaving for New York on the afternoon train and requesting that arrangements be made for him, Dr. Turing, to visit the Bell Laboratories.

This incident constitutes just one more pain in the neck resulting from the consistent practice of British representatives to this country using back-door methods to gain information, not only in regard to this particular scrambling device but also on secret code missions and devices, permission to see which has always been denied representatives of foreign governments, including the British, who have exactly the same policy in regard to this type of material.

Instances of this kind will constantly occur until the British are educated to the degree of putting all the cards on the table and to dealing with responsible officers instead of going on their own and snooping with underlings. If the British cannot be

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frank and, on secret information, deal on the proper level after having been properly introduced and accredited, they can expect no other treatment than they have received.

I recommend that the enclosed letter be sent to Sir John Dill in reply to his of December 2.

GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A.C. of S., G-2

2 Incls:
Ltr. from Sir John Dill
to Gen. Marshall, 12-2-42.
Reply to Sir John Dill's
letter.

COPY

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

December 8, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR General McNarney:

When Dill spoke to me about this matter of Dr. Turing and the Bell Laboratories he mentioned the fact that Turing had access to all of the most secret developments in England. If that is the case would there continue to be objection to his being allowed to see what is going on?

G.C.M.

Incls.

COPY

WDCSA 095 Turing, Dr.
(12-5-42)

OCS
-RNY
3542

December 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL:

Dear Dill:

In answer to your note regarding Dr. Turing, I find that this project has been placed in the ultra secret class and information concerning it has been restricted to the fewest possible officers. I am told that this same policy is being followed by your Intelligence people and that there is not interchange of information regarding these ultra secret developments.

I regret that Dr. Turing should have been embarrassed by a last-minute refusal after he had made plans to go to New York. The misunderstanding in this matter was due to Dr. Turing's having conferred with subordinates in the War Department who do not have authority to decide these questions. Such difficulties will be eliminated if requests are made to our Military Intelligence Division, and I have instructed that division to extend him every possible courtesy.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd. G.C. Marshall

Chief of Staff.

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Original dispatched from
OCS 12/9/42

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C O P Y

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION
OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

To G-2?
GCM

653

~~SECRET~~

15th December, 1942

Dear Marshall

I am most grateful to you for your letter of the 9th December concerning Dr. Turing.

I was horrified when I learnt that we were not giving you all our ultra secret developments in this field and took action accordingly.

I am now told that we hide nothing from your duly authenticated people and even keep them informed of projected developments. If any of your people still have any doubts about this, I hope you will let me know.

Yours ever

(Signed) J. C. Dill

General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff,
Room No. 3E924,
Pentagon Building

~~SECRET~~

December 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL BRATTON:

Subject: Axis Clandestine Commercial Radio Traffic.

1. According to information received from Captain Haldane of the British Security Coordination Service, the British are intercepting about eight thousand words per day of German clandestine traffic on the continent of Europe. He states, "This traffic has been of vast importance to the British from an intelligence standpoint." He was somewhat uncertain whether all or even the greater portion of this traffic would also be of importance to the United States, but particularly in view of our increased participation in European operations. He expressed the opinion that that we might find this intelligence of more than ordinary importance. He also stated that the intelligence obtained by the British from clandestine traffic is currently being made available to General Eisenhower's staff.

C.W.C.

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December 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL STRONG:

1. Reference is made to the attached copy of memorandum, (A), which, I believe, was prepared by you in answer to letter from Sir John Dill to General Marshall.

2. At the request of Captain Hastings I went on December 12 to his office where he showed me a series of dispatches and communications which had passed between himself and Travis on the subject of Doctor Turing. Throughout all these messages there is the one central thought, to wit, that every effort should be made by Hastings, Tiltman and others to convince us that they have no projects, no matter how secret the nature, which they are concealing from us. Hastings kept repeating that he believes that we have made available to them everything which we have except this ultra secret scrambler and the wiring diagrams of our ECM's.

3. Hastings also stated that he had been directed by Sir John Dill to make formal request of the Military Intelligence Division for Doctor Turing to visit the Bell Laboratories and inspect this new device. He further stated that he had been directed to obtain either permission or a direct refusal of this request.

4. On December 14, at the request of Colonel Bullock, I went to Arlington Hall where he showed me a message which had

been received from London, (Copy inclosed, B). This message seemed to imply that the decision to deny Doctor Turing permission to visit the Bell Laboratory (ies?) was in reprisal for the failure of the British to give us certain cryptographic information relating to clandestine traffic. As shown by Bullock's reply, this assumption is entirely erroneous.

5. On December 14 Captain Hastings, Colonel Tiltman and Lieutenant Dudley-Smith, R.N. visited this office and again brought up the Turing case. They appear to be very determined to get Doctor Turing into the Bell Laboratory (ies?). They set forth the claim that in connection with this whole subject of secret communications equipment, either voice scrambling, cipher machines or anything of a similar nature, the specialists, who are experts in cryptanalysis or descrambling, should be in on the initial development of the equipment . In that way these experts, (according to Tiltman, et al), can point out weaknesses in design which could be corrected in the development period. They claim that hundreds of man hours could be saved if this procedure were followed rather then to have a machine developed in one laboratory and then to give to another laboratory the job of breaking down its traffic.

6. In my opinion, this is merely another attempt to gain technical information on our secret cipher machines and ultra secret scrambling device and is not a plausible argument.

7. In connection with this latest letter dated December 15

from Sir John Dill from General Marshall I have again discussed this entire matter with Brigadier General D. M. Crawford of the Signal Corps. Crawford confirms my previous report to you and says that so far as he knows the only things of this nature which we have ever denied to the British has been our cipher machines and the ultra secret scrambler. On all other S.I.S. matters we have made available to them all information which we possess. Both General Crawford and I urgently recommend that we adhere to our firmly established policy of reserving to ourselves the technical details of our most secret cryptographic division and that we continue to deny them this information. (The reason behind such policy are well known to you). I should like to point out here, however, the possibility that higher authority, to wit, the White House, might overrule us in this matter.

8. As for the question (1) on General Kroner's note asking what secret material or things we think the British are holding from us, this can only be answered by saying that we have not received from them any detailed information on German clandestine traffic, (this has been promised but not yet delivered), the German Army Field traffic, cryptographic material derived from Slavic nations, or the details of their high speed analyzer.

CARTER W. CLARKE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief, Special Branch.

December 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL STRONG:

1. Reference is made to the attached copy of memorandum, (A), which, I believe, was prepared by you in answer to letter from Sir John Dill to General Marshall.

2. At the request of Captain Hastings I went on December 12 to his office where he showed me a series of dispatches and communications which had passed between himself and Travis on the subject of Doctor Turing. Throughout all these messages there is the one central thought, to wit, that every effort should be made by Hastings, Tiltman and others to convince us that they have no projects, no matter how secret the nature, which they are concealing from us. Hastings kept repeating that he believes that we have made available to them everything which we have except this ultra secret scrambler and the wiring diagrams of our ECM's.

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4. On December 14, at the request of Colonel Bullock, I went to Arlington Hall where he showed me a message which had been received from London, (Copy inclosed, B). This message seemed to imply that the decision to deny Doctor Turing permission to visit the Bell Laboratories was in reprisal for the failure of the British to give us certain cryptographic information relating to clandestine traffic. As shown by Bullock's reply, this assumption is entirely erroneous.

5. On December 14 Captain Hastings, Colonel Tiltman and Lieutenant Dudley-Smith, R. N. visited this office and again brought up the Turing case. They appear to be very determined to

get Doctor Turing into the Bell Laboratories. They set forth the claim that in connection with this whole subject of secret communications equipment, either voice scrambling, cipher machines or anything of a similar nature, the specialists, who are experts in cryptanalysis or descrambling, should be in on the initial development of the equipment. In that way these experts, (according to Tiltman, et al), can point out weaknesses in design which could be corrected in the development period. They claim that hundreds of man hours could be saved if this procedure were followed rather than to have a machine developed in one laboratory and then to give to another laboratory the job of breaking down its traffic.

6. In my opinion, this is merely another attempt to gain technical information on our secret cipher machines and ultra secret scrambling device and is not a plausible argument.

7. In connection with this latest letter dated December 18 from Sir John Dill from General Marshall I have again discussed this entire matter with Brigadier General D. M. Crawford of the Signal Corps. Crawford confirms my previous report to you and says that as far as he knows the only things of this nature which we have ever denied to the British has been our cipher machines and the ultra secret scrambler. On all other S.I.S. matters we have made available to them all information which we possess. Both General Crawford and I urgently recommend that we adhere to our firmly established policy of reserving to ourselves the technical details of our most secret cryptographic division and that we continue to deny them this information. (The reasons behind such policy are well known to you). I should like to point out here, however, the possibility that higher authority, to wit, the White House, might overrule us in this matter.

8. As for the question (1) on General Kroner's note asking what secret material or things we think the British are holding from us, this can only be answered by saying that we have not received from them any detailed information on German clandestine traffic, (this has been promised but not yet delivered), the German Army Field traffic, cryptographic material derived from Slavic nations, or the details of their high speed analyzer.

CARTER W. CLARKE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief, Special Branch.

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
DISPOSITION FORM

1-53

26

AG
G-

SUBJECT: Lack of Exchange of Information between British and American Representatives Date December 22, 1942

TO:

X Secretary, General Staff

Forwarding for the signature of the Chief of Staff a Memorandum to Field Marshal Sir John Dill.

GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Incls:
Incl. 1 -- Note from Sir John Dill.
Incl. 2 -- Memo. for Sir John Dill for C/S sig.

Dec. 23 1942
Noted - Chief of Staff
S.F.

Noted Deputy Chief of Staff
S.F.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

Acknowledging note from Field Marshal Sir John Dill of November 15, and informing him of several instances of the lack of full exchange of information on the part of British representatives.

26

COPY

~~SECRET~~

27

December 23, 1942

WDCSA 350.05 (12/22/42)

MEMORANDUM FOR FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL:

Dear Dill:

Reference your note of 15th December, in which you request that I let you know the facts in regard to lack of full exchange of information between our two services.

G-2 tells me that we have been unable to get from your people any detailed information on German Army field traffic, on German clandestine traffic, although the latter has been promised, or on cryptographic material derived from Slavic nations. We have also been unable to get complete details of your so-called high speed analyzer.

(Sgd) G.C. Marshall

Chief of Staff.

Dec 23 1942

Original Dispatched From
Office Chief of Staff

COPY FOROFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF

(Not [redacted]ed)

COPY.

~~ORIGINAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL:

Dear Dill:

Reference your note of 15th December, in which you request that I let you know the facts in regard to lack of full exchange of information between our two services, I am informed that we have been unable to get from your authorities any detailed information on German army field traffic, on German clandestine traffic, although the latter has been promised, or on cryptographic material derived from Slavic nations. We have also been unable to get complete details of your so-called high speed analyzer.

May I reiterate the thought, expressed in my Memorandum of December 9, to the effect that it would be far better if duly accredited representatives of the British Government dealt with accredited representatives of the War Department, specifically G. S. of S., G-2, rather than dealing with subordinates who have no authority in the premises.

Faithfully yours,

Chief of Staff

(COPY)

653

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION

OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON

~~S E C R E T.~~

26th December, 1942.

29

Dear Marshall:

Thank you for your letter of 23rd December.

I wish to confirm the assurance I gave you in my letter of 15th December that all our Most Secret information including the items quoted in your letter of December 23rd are available to a duly authorized United States representative, indeed U.S. officers are already working with our authorities in London on these matters. The difficulties which have arisen have been due to a mutual misunderstanding of the British and U.S. procedure in making these requests. The duly authorized British organization which controls these matters is named the Government Code and Cipher School under the direction of Brigadier Stuart Menzies under the Foreign Office. This body has a representative in Washington, Captain F.G. Hastings, R.N., and the senior officials make occasional visits on liaison

General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff,
Room No. 3-0104,
Pentagon Building.

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work. One of these, Colonel J.H. Tiltman, is at present in this country and I am directing Captain Hastings and Colonel Tiltman to clear up any misunderstandings which still obtain.

Owing to a similar lack of knowledge on our part, the application for Dr. Turing to visit Bell Laboratories was made through the wrong channels and I hope he will now be permitted to make this visit.

I am so glad this exchange of letters has enabled us to take the necessary steps to eliminate any future misunderstandings in the conduct of this vital work.

Yours ever,

/s/ J. C. Dill

653

(COPY)

January 1, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Letter of Field Marshal Sir John Dill, dated December 28.

30

1. Reference paragraph 1 of this letter, I have had a talk with Colonel Tiltman who has promised to clear up the difficulty in regard to the first three items covered in your letter of December 23 to Sir John Dill. Details are being worked out between Colonel Tiltman and the S.I.S.

2. Reference paragraph 2 of the letter herewith, the Signal Corps and Navy Communications strongly urge that knowledge of the ultra secret voice scrambler now under development at the Bell Laboratories, New York, be withheld from all foreign countries and that foreign representatives be denied permission to view it. In this connection, the Deputy Chief of Staff asked Admiral King, on December 28, as to the attitude of the Navy Department in the premises. Under date of December 29, Admiral King informed the Deputy Chief of Staff that he desired the ultra secret voice scrambler be kept in the same secrecy classification as the TSEC apparatus. I concur in these views.

3. Under the circumstances, two lines of action can be taken: First, take no action on paragraph 2 of Sir John Dill's letter; or second, tell him perfectly frankly that our technical people, during the present development stage of the voice scrambler, are opposed to allowing anyone, other than the personnel charged with the experimentation and development, viewing this apparatus or being informed as to progress made, and that at present you do not feel disposed to overrule them.

GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A.C. of S., G-2.

Incl:
Ltr. to Gen. Marshall
from Sir John Dill,
12-28-42

Copy for OCS

Jan. 1, 1943
SEAL

30

COPY

~~SECRET~~

From London, January 1st.

Following for TILTMAN from TRAVIS.

Your _____. Johnson has finished his time with [illegible] and I am forwarding his report to War Department by next bag.

Your ____. Johnson now in Hut 6. Can you not plead with ARLINGTON or G-2 to assist in matter of TURING. I have refrained from taking retaliatory steps in regard to Johnson and it would help cooperation generally if they would reciprocate.

31

To London, January 2nd 1943.

Following for TRAVIS from TILTMAN

A. Question of TURING being taken up on highest level and should be decided shortly.

B. (not relevant)

C. At long meeting with General Strong this morning he told me he accepted my word that nothing was deliberately withheld by us. His interest is chiefly on long term intelligence grounds and I suggested that he would get best satisfaction if he applied for access to all decodes and intelligence evaluations at B.P. for a permanent competent representative of G-2. He is sending Lieutenant-Colonel McCORMACK on short visit and will direct him to report on the best method of implementing my suggestion. I asked him at same time to direct Lieutenant-Colonel McCORMACK to satisfy himself in conjunction with Colonel BICHER that we withhold nothing.

~~SECRET~~
COPY.

To London, January 5 1943.

Following for TRAVIS from TILTMAN.

Your XXX of January 4th.

A. Regret my suggestion to Strong not acceptable to Director. Does he understand that G-2 under Strong has complete control of Y policy? Recent serious misunderstanding in matter of TURING and suspicion of our sincerity arise largely from G-2's reluctance to take advice on policy from ARLINGTON experts with whom all our contact has been hitherto. I am convinced there is danger of further misunderstandings unless G-2 is placed fully in picture at S.P. So far War Department cannot be regarded as having been represented on Y policy at S. P. at all.

B. War Department's experiments towards new form of E bombe at Bell Laboratories were only disclosed to me yesterday. EACHUS knows details and TURING will now be allowed to see. They have ordered 2 bombes to be completed by Spring. I was not aware of this commitment when I saw Strong and I still hope that my suggestion may satisfy Strong and therefore save the Director from heavy pressure in near future to allow E. exploitation here by War Department. Situation is becoming involved and I feel it is necessary to adopt realistic attitude. I was obliged to take the line with Strong that we withhold nothing whatever from duly accredited representatives in U.K. [illegible] reserve the right to discourage duplication where our [illegible] are vitally affected.

[illegible] and I are in agreement on policy and he is writing [illegible] on this matter to G.C.&S.

34

COPY

~~SECRET~~

From London, January 4 1943

Following for TILTMAN from TRAVIS.

Your ____ para C.

Inform General Strong that Colonel McCORMACK should discuss with J.M.I. any complaints regarding lack of general intelligence. Director does not(repeat not) approve of your suggestion. There are G-2 officers in M.I. every day and there is a U.S. member of J.I.C.

COPY
~~SECRET~~

To London, January 5, 1943.

Following is for C.S.S. himself.

A. Your ____ of December 30th. Secret devices in question are exclusively for S.I.S., and we have not involved you further.

B. Reference ____ of January 4th from TRAVIS. General Strong is Assistant C.O.S. G-2, is the Army king-pin for all Y policy and is personally most security conscious. He is at last persuaded that you are the Director of C.C. & C.S. and not D.M.I.

C. To avoid further misunderstandings I strongly urge you to welcome McCORMACK as Strong's representative and not divert him to D.M.I.

D. I am convinced that this is the correct policy for future smooth cooperation.

35

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM

Gen Strong:

Please note and return. I presume you may wish to discuss this with the Chief.

s/ REY

Noted - GVS (s)

Young--

I have discussed this with C/S who will talk to Sir John on [illegible] 2

/s/ GVS

453

(COPY)

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION

OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ January 5, 1943

Dear Marshall:

You will remember that in my letter of the 28th December I told you that one of the senior officials of our Government Code and Cypher School, Colonel J.H. Tiltman, was now in this country and that I was telling him to clear up any misunderstandings which still obtained over the exchange of highly secret information in cryptographic matters.

Colonel Tiltman tells me that he had a long discussion with General Strong on January 2 and explained to him the whole position whereby we make available to any properly accredited representative of the War Department all the processes and results of any cryptographic investigation at the British Government Code and Cypher School. General Strong was apparently prepared to agree that nothing was deliberately withheld by us from your people.

On the subject of permission to Dr. Turing

General G.C. Marshall,
War Department,
Washington, D.C.

36

to visit the Bell Laboratories for consultation on the telephone scrambling device, General Strong informed Colonel Tiltman that the matter was now out of his hands and that a decision by you would be required. As there is some urgency in getting Dr. Turing back to England, I am writing this to you to ask whether the necessary authority could now be given to him.

Yours ever,

/s/ J. C. Dill.

COPY

~~SECRET~~

General Marshall's letter of 6/1/43

General Strong told me on 2/1/43 that he wished to be in a position to see all our decodes so that the staff of G-2 might carry out its own long term evaluation. I am not aware that G-2 has ever made this request officially, unless it has done so through the D.M.I. I suggested to General Strong that he should apply for "access to all decodes and intelligence evaluations at Bletchley Park for a permanent competent representative of G-2". I wired the Head of the G.C. & C.S. to the above effect but my suggestion has not yet met with approval. I shall, however, make every effort to obtain my director's approval of this policy, as I believe it to be vital that G-2, which controls all Y policy at the War Department, should satisfy itself that we withhold nothing.

37

~~SECRET~~

653

(COPY)

OCS
GCM

January 6, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL

Dear Dill:

Replying to your two communications of December 30th and January 5th regarding secrecy matters:

First, with reference to the Bell Laboratories and the telephone scrambling device which Dr. Turing wished to go into. I find that this involves other interests than the War Department and I have been unable to clear it in Dr. Turing's favor.

As to the matter of cryptography, I understand from General Strong that he wanted further information regarding the Germans which is not wise for me to refer to in more detail, so that our G-2 could do its own evaluating. He tells me that he has been unable to secure this, but he agrees with me that turning this information over to us does actually involve increased hazard. Therefore my opinion is that your people should not release to us more detailed data of this kind than they do at present. As I said before, General Strong has accepted this view.

I will have to talk to General Strong again in relation to Colonel Fillman to see if there are details regarding this cryptographic matter with which I am not sufficiently familiar to discuss at the moment. I apologize for the delay in handling this, but most of it has been due to my effort to meet your desires.

(Sgd) G.C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff

Original dispatched from OCS
1/6/43
OCS yellow copy

7 Jan. [illegible] - Dict to Mr. [illegible]

Complete mutual confidence is
all-important. It is of the utmost
importance in this [illegible] not to
allow any feeling of mistrust to [illegible]

We are prepared to allow your people
[illegible] in [illegible] but we [illegible]
the right to [illegible] [illegible]
in the U.S. of [illegible] [illegible] happen
when we are [illegible] concerned, unless we
are [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] We
have for example, [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] by the U.S. [illegible] in [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] which [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] to [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] of complete [illegible]
and [illegible] between your [illegible]
[illegible] in all these [illegible] [illegible].

C O P Y

~~[illegible]~~

General Marshall's letter to Field Marshal of 23/12/42.

High-Speed Analyzer.

This can only refer to the very extensive and costly scanning machinery which has been responsible for our success in keeping abreast of the German service high-grade traffic enciphered by means of the Enigma machine. A Mission consisting of 2 U.S. Navy and 2 U.S. Army officers visited Bletchley from February to April 1941. With the concurrence of the Prime Minister our successes with the service enigma were disclosed to the members of the mission who were required to give a pledge of secrecy and to state to whom they would pass the information. They were allowed free access to all stages of the work and had the functions of the scanning machinery explained to them. They were not at the time allowed to take notes, nor were they given full details on paper. Subsequently in 1941 the internal wiring of all the wheels of the German Army and Air Force machine were communicated to the U.S. services.

In 1942 the machinery in question has been shown to Brigadier-General Stoner and Lieutenant-Colonel Bicher. It was fully studied by Major Kullback, (now one of the senior crypt-analytic experts at Arlington) during his 2 months' attachment. Captain Johnson (also from Arlington) is at present studying the same problem at Bletchley, including all the latest developments.

The details of the special German submarine machine have been disclosed to the Navy Department, but not, to the best of my knowledge, to the War Department.

So far from not being in possession of the complete details of our "high speed analyzer" the War Department has been experimenting at the Bell Laboratories towards the production of a more efficient analyzer based on the details provided by us and on our experience. Such experiments towards greater efficiency are, of course, of the first importance to us, but the general

[illegible]

lines of the experiments were communicated to me only for the first time on 5/1/43 and no hint of the experiments has hitherto reached our technical liaison officer with the War and Navy Departments, Major Stevens.

General Marshall's letter of 23/12/42.

German Army Field Traffic

This was fully disclosed to Major Kullback and studied by him. One U.S. Army Officer and 3 U.S. Army N.C.O's have been working as part of the section dealing with this traffic at Bletchley for the past 2 months.

German clandestine traffic

Here I am not in possession of all the facts, but imagine that some of the results of decoding clandestine traffic in Europe were not forthcoming until the North-African operations and we may have been late in passing to General Eisenhower. I believe this has now been cleared up.

Cryptographic material derived from Slavic Nations

This presumably refers to our solutions of Russian and other Slavonic language ciphers. All such results were disclosed to the American Services Mission early in 1941. The general lines of our investigation of Russian ciphers up to June 1941 have been discussed with U.S. Army officers. The details were not, to the best of my knowledge, asked for. They can be provided without difficulty if required. On the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia the Y Board decided to cease interception of Russian service traffic, the W/T interception sets so released being applied to more urgent tasks. Since that date no Russian or Balkan investigations have taken place at the G.C. & C.S. There is, I believe however, a small Polish station in England which exploits very low-grade Russian field and air-to-ground ciphers. Some order-of-battle details may be derived from

this traffic, but the station is not under the immediate control of the G.C. & C.S.

It is just possible that the reference may be to the results of our liaison on Y matters with the Russians. Here our liaison has been most disappointing. We have received no "cryptographic" information, only some German police raw material.

(COPY)

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION
OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

~~VERY SECRET~~
~~AND~~
~~PERSONAL~~

Gen. Strong:
Discuss this this morning with Sec. of War. Show him my letter to Dill and Dill's other letter to me.
/s/ G.C.M.

7th January, 1943

Dear Marshall:

With reference to your letter of January 6th and our conversation today, the matter which causes me the most concern is to uphold the principle of complete frankness and reciprocity between your people and ours in all these highly secret matters. Our position is perhaps easier than yours in that all this business is concentrated in one agency in England, the Government Code and Cipher School, whereas in your case there is more than one Department concerned.

It seems to me however that the proposals in your letter derogate from the principle of full reciprocity. Our position, I understand, has been made quite clear. We are prepared to show your people everything in England, but we reserve the right to refuse to allow "exploitation" in the U.S. of vitally secret traffic where we are chiefly concerned, unless we are satisfied as to the necessity.

We have, for example, permitted such "exploitation" by the U.S. Navy in one particular type of traffic which we agreed was of vital importance to them.

It appears however from the refusal to permit Dr. Turing to have access to the scrambling device experiments at the Bell Laboratory that the U.S. wish to reserve the right not to show our people everything even in this country quite apart from the question of permitting parallel experiments in the U.K. This is a new principle contrary to the spirit of existing agreements. It would seriously disturb our people at home and would of course also involve the U.S. Navy who are very much dependent on free exchange with our people.

Dr. Turing was sent out from England for this one task as our expert representative, and if he has to return empty handed, it could not fail to have an unfortunate effect. I am sure you will agree with me that it is of the utmost importance in this vital matter not to allow any feeling of mistrust to arise. Complete mutual confidence is all-important.

/s/ The above is perhaps rather crudely worded but I did it in a hurry to catch you before you looked into the matter tomorrow.

Yours ever

/s/ J. C. Dill

General G.C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff,
Room 3E-924,
Pentagon Bldg.

~~BR. MOST SECRET~~
~~U. S. SECRET~~

From London, January 9th 1943.

Following for TILTMAN for STRONG.

A. Regret conflicting views contained in D.M.I.'s letter to SUMNER WAITE of December 16th and telegram 184 from TRAVIS to you of January 4th, due to pure misunderstanding.

B. All information derived from R.S.S. affecting E.T.O. is given to General EISENHOWER: equally anything affecting O.S.S.

C. As regards "Y", am discussing this with D.M.I. and hope to telegraph shortly on best method of dealing with this matter.

D. I trust it is fully appreciated that General EISENHOWER is treated on precisely the same terms as any British Commander.

~~Original~~

153

(COPY)

OCS
RNY
3542

WDCSA/350.05 (1-9-43)

January 9, 1943.

Lieutenant General G. N. Macready,
British Staff Mission,
Room 355, Public Health Building,
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Macready:

In General Marshall's absence I have inquired into the matter of exchange of secret information between the British and ourselves which has been the subject of considerable correspondence between General Marshall and Field Marshal Sir John Dill.

I am in complete agreement with the idea expressed in the Field Marshal's letter of January 7 that we should have complete frankness and reciprocity in all highly secret matters. For this reason I have instructed our Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 to permit Dr. Turing to visit the Bell Laboratory for the purpose of inspecting the scrambling device experiments which are being conducted there. However, the War Department must also reserve the right to refuse to permit the "exploitation" of these secret devices by the British unless such use is approved in each instance.

I wish you would express my regret and apologies to Dr. Turing for any inconvenience that he has been caused by these misunderstandings. It is hoped that this matter has been finally settled to the mutual benefit of both the United States and the United Kingdom and to the benefit of our war effort.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd) JOSEPH T. McNARNEY
Acting Chief of Staff.

Copies sent CG, SOS,
OPD & G-2
1-11-43

January 9, 1943

42

ORIGINAL DISPATCHED FROM
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
1-10-43
by Liaison

~~Original~~

42

350.15

653

(COPY)

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION

OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON

GENERAL STAFF

M/1/3/234. ~~S E C R E T~~ 13th January, 1943

Dear General McNarney,

Thank you for your letter of 9th January regarding Dr. Turing's visit to the Bell Laboratory. It is with much satisfaction that I learn of the approval for this to take place.

It is quite understood that each country reserves the right to refuse to permit the "exploitation" of these secret devices by the other country.

Many thanks for your assistance in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ G. N. Macready.

Lieut. General J.T. McNarney,
Acting Chief of Staff,
Room 3E, 944,
Pentagon Building,
Arlington, Va.

IN REPLY REFER TO

HEADQUARTERS ARLINGTON HALL STATION

SPSIS 311.5-General

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER

SPSIS-7

ARLINGTON, VA.

February 8, 1943

Memorandum to Colonel Corderman:

1. It is estimated that our E solving machinery will begin to be assembled and installed in suitable quarters in the Operations Building B by April 1, 1943. It will shortly thereafter be in condition ready for practical operations.

2. For our operational exploitation of the German Army and Air Force E communications for which this machinery was designed four principal classes of items are essential:

a. Specially trained personnel. Steps are now being taken to obtain them.

b. Traffic, including documents applicable to its effective gathering (frequencies, schedules, etc., pertinent thereto). We do not now receive any of the applicable traffic from the British nor do we have the German Army call-sign books, information on discriminants, etc., which are essential for practical interception of this material. As regards the traffic desired, we are now dependent upon the British intercept service for it. It is true that we are currently receiving a small amount of intercept material of this category from our stations at Vint Hill, Newfoundland, and Iceland. Intercept service from these points will probably increase in effectiveness as time goes on but because of geographical locations these stations can never provide complete intercept coverage of the German Army and Air Force E traffic sufficient to permit of regular solutions nor the required continuity.

c. Special information and complex special procedures applicable to the solution of this traffic have been developed during the past several years by G.C. & C.S. as a result of concentrated work and practical exploitation on a large scale. This information and the procedures are extremely important, if not vital, for efficient exploitation of this traffic. We do not have this special information or procedures and have not developed the necessary procedures. Moreover, to do this would take several years.

[illegible]-7,311.5-Gen.
[illegible]al Cordorman

d. Special communication channels and cryptographic apparatus, as set forth in subsequent paragraphs.

3. Because matters of policy determined on a very high level are involved, a casual request by us for items b and c above would scarcely be honored at once by G.C. & C.S. Very informal discussion of the subject with Colonel Tiltman makes it clear that the special intelligence, resulting from their exploitation of this material, is now being furnished our forces in the ETO and in North Africa, and while material of the nature of that desired is available to our properly accredited representatives who visit G.C. & C.S., and can be made [illegible] there at any time, serious resistance to sending the material to Washington will be encountered, unless we make a good case, by stating important reasons why we must operate and have the data here. This position, Colonel Tiltman indicates, is dictated entirely by considerations of security and their great fear that present exploitation of this traffic may be jeopardized by allowing [illegible] data to leave England.

4. With a view to establishing our case in an adequate manner, it is recommended that a telegram substantially as follows be sent to [illegible] G.C.&C.S. at an early date.

"1. New type rapid analytical machinery is now under construction and will be ready for operation here in about four months. Our type of machinery bears no external or internal resemblance to your 'bombes' or to associated equipment and is capable of solving various types of cryptographic problems. Among latter is solution of German Army and Air Force E traffic.

2. Traffic and collateral solution data which will enable us here to solve German Army and Air Force E messages particularly applicable to North African Area are urgently desired at an early date so that we can undertake exploitation of this material in Washington.

3. It is realized that special intelligence resulting from your exploitation of this traffic at Bletchley Park is now available to our forces in North Africa and in England and that reluctance to send out of the country material of nature of that requested in paragraph 2 is based entirely upon considerations of security. Nevertheless high authorities here [illegible] it desirable and necessary for us to undertake operational

exploitation of this traffic in Washington under adequate safeguards for following reasons:

a. It is probable that we here can make important technical contributions in respect to type of machinery employed because of new design giving greater operational speeds and more flexibility. Developments now in progress give fair promise of overall operational speeds somewhat in excess of those now possible with your types, but only practical operation on actual traffic can establish this point. If successful, you will receive direct benefit from our developments.

b. It is desired to render all possible assistance to you with view to obtaining widest coverage and complete exploitation of all German Army and Air Force E traffic. This probably is not now possible in view of its large volume and shortage in machinery and personnel required for complete coverage.

c. Our undertaking assistance in exploiting traffic applicable to North African area gives promise of possibly better coverage of other areas in which you may have primary interest and are not now able to cover fully.

d. Possibility that German Army and Air Force may introduce fourth wheel in their service must be visualized. If actually introduced it would become much more difficult to obtain even present coverage as regards solution and we would be in position to assist very materially.

e. It is felt that operation of our special machinery on practical problems would afford best possible training of our cryptanalytic personnel and this sort of training is highly desirable in view of possibility that additional areas may become active theaters in which American forces will have primary interest and therefore should be prepared to exploit without imposing additional burdens upon G.C. & C.S.

f. Indications of possible adoption of E machine by Japanese Army have been noted in recently solved Japanese Military Attache messages. If actually adopted by Japanese, we must be in position to solve traffic.

g. Although it is understood that your present machinery is well distributed it seems wise to provide against even the most remote contingency of wholesale destruction of equipment and specially qualified key personnel in England.

OGA
EO 1.4.(c)
EO 1.4.(d)

SPSIS-7,311.5-Gen.
To: Col. Corderman
2/8/43.

4. ~~Signal Security Service~~ is not now in position to obtain much of the type of traffic desired but hopes to provide forces in Africa with necessary intercept equipment as soon as practicable. Until then it is assumed that arrangements for telegraphic forwarding of traffic by you to us can be made.

5. Establishment of direct communications using high grade cryptographic equipment between Washington and Algiers can afford adequate channels for safe and speedy transmission of special intelligence resulting from our proposed exploitation of traffic requested.

6. Until our equipment is ready for actual operation the traffic and special cryptanalytic data such as [redacted] essential for exploitation information can be sent by mail or safe hand. As soon as actual exploitation of current traffic is undertaken special communication channels for electrically forwarding traffic to Washington can doubtless be arranged.

7. Compliance with or comments upon our request are ~~urgently~~ desired. It is hoped our request ~~will~~ be favorably considered and an affirmative decision communicated at an early date."

5. Before sending a telegram such as that proposed in the foregoing paragraph, steps must be taken to ascertain (a) whether the communication channels mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the proposed telegram can be made available and (b) whether the necessary cryptographic apparatus for the protection of these communications channels requires coordination with Army Communications Division. Coincident with the making available of the communications channels the SSS Cryptographic Section can make available the necessary cryptographic apparatus.

6. We are now exchanging Japanese Army intercept material with the British and this fact should constitute some basis for establishing similar exchanges as regards German Army and Air Force intercepts.

7. In this connection I may add that if the British should accede to our request for traffic it will put our E section in a position to furnish G-2 with MT/I reports on German Army communications in the

SPSIS-7,311.5-Gen.
To: Col.Corderman
2/8/43

same way as we now provide MT/I reports on Japanese Army communications. Furthermore, once we get a good start on E solution methods, etc., we can progress rapidly, if necessary by ourselves and without further dependence upon the British.

8. After the steps outlined in paragraph 5 of this memo have been taken, I assume that this memorandum will be taken up with Colonel Clarke for concurrence in respect to the proposed telegram to G.C. & C.S., which, in my opinion, should be coordinated with Captain Hastings. Possibly the telegram itself should be sent by Captain Hastings but this point is subject to discussion. If you deem it desirable or necessary I would be glad to furnish any additional technical details or viewpoints in discussions with G-2.

William F. Friedman

William F. Friedman
Director, Communications
Research

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

War Department
Classified Message Center
INCOMING MESSAGE

NC 25
filed 6/2232
WI

CCFD
Feb 7, 1943
0123Z

From: Cairo
To: AGWAR

No. AMSME 4493 Feb 6, 1943

Radio intercept station is contemplated in vicinity of Asmara Eritrea per your 3087. For Marshall. Recommend this possibility be reconsidered and intercept station be located at a point more geographically consistent with our theatre and located at such a point that will lend itself to be capable of receiving from all areas to the north east and west. If such station is to be established recommend it be located in the Cairo area where personnel supplies and equipment exists and maintenance would be minimized. It is believed that the Asmara area is not desirable for intercept station due to its rugged geographical terrain and furthermore the possibility of locations for 30 receiving stations is not believed feasible in that area.

Brereton

Footnote: Reference 3087 is CM-OUT-9605 (28 Jan 43) OPD

Action: OPD

Information: G-2
SOS-TAG

CM-IN-3416 (7 Feb 43) 0656 Z mvs

Copy No. 31

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

By authority of the
Chief Signal Officer
HB 2/8/43

46

SPSIS-5 311.5-General
(2-8-43)

HEADQUARTERS ARLINGTON HALL STATION
Office of the Commanding Officer
Arlington, Va.

February 8, 1943

MEMORANDUM for Colonel W. Preston Corderman

Subject: Radio Intercept Station in Africa

1. Reference is made to radiogram from General Brereton (CMIN 3416 2-7-43). This radiogram points out the fact that Asmara is an undesirable location for such a radio station. An alternate location at Cairo is suggested in the same message. Cairo is not considered desirable due to the large British intercept and radio intelligence installation there.

2. In order to carry out the purpose for which the Asmara station was proposed, it is recommended that the following action be taken:

a. Abandon plans for a fixed station at Asmara, Eritrea.

b. Direct the Army Ground Forces to order two signal radio intelligence companies (T/O 11-77) to Vint Hill Farms Station, Warrenton, Virginia for orientation at the earliest practicable date. After arrival at Vint Hill Farms Station, these companies to have their personnel and equipment checked for completeness and to receive special instructions as to their tasks.

c. As soon as orientation is complete and not more than thirty days after arrival at Vint Hill Farms Station, these two companies to be assigned for operation overseas under the Allied Force Headquarters, North Africa. After arrival at Allied Force Headquarters these two companies to be assigned for active operation under the Signal Intelligence Service, Allied Force Headquarters.

d. The Signal Intelligence Service, Allied Force Headquarters and its two radio intelligence companies (122nd, 128th) plus the two additional companies assigned, to be placed under the operational control of the Signal Security Service, Arlington Hall Station, Virginia.

e. The establishment of a special radio communication channel, with suitable cryptographic equipment, between Allied Force Headquarters, Africa and Washington, D. C. for the sole purpose of passing intercepted material and operational instructions. This channel to be in operation by date of arrival of the two radio intelligence companies.

~~SECRET~~

46

SPSIS-5 311.5-General
(2-6-43)

3. The action recommended in paragraph 2 will provide a total of four signal radio intelligence companies, plus the signal intelligence service at an active theater under the Signal Security Service. This will provide the tactical military and air traffic desired over a communication channel capable of speedy results. This action should render unnecessary the establishment of a fixed station at either Cairo or Asmara, and will permit flexibility in following future military developments in the African Theater.

/s/
H. McD. Brown
Major, Signal Corps

I certify this is a true and correct copy:

Decker + Sawyer

Johnson

Stoner

Statements re Stoner Trapping

McCorp RAS

~~SECRET~~

IN REPLY REFER TO

SPSIS 311.5-General

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

SPSIS-7

47

February 10, 1943

MEMORANDUM For: Colonel C. W. Clarke

In connection with the matter of obtaining, from the British G C and C S, traffic and collateral data on German Military and Air Force E traffic, the following additional points are submitted for your information.

1. a. It is believed that the precautions taken from the very inception and now in effect with regard to our developments in this field afford perfectly adequate security. Security officers are now assigned for duty at the plant where the machinery is being manufactured and assembled. Furthermore, when the machinery is ready for shipment it will be conveyed by appropriate officer guards. The quarters in which the machinery will be installed at Arlington Hall Station are also to be segregated and under adequate special protection. Every person connected in the development and manufacture who has had to have imparted to him information considered important was cleared through the proper channels before such information was imparted. For the most part, the workers actually connected with the construction of the machinery have absolutely no knowledge of its purpose or its method of operation.

b. In this same connection, the following is quoted from a report made by Major G.G. Stevens, British Liaison Officer at this station:

"11. Security. The fact that only standard equipment is used lessens the security problem considerably. To my untutored eye there is little in the assembly of the machine that would give the ordinary artisan much idea of what it would be for. I have not seen the assembly plant nor do I know what precautions are taken there but I have the impression that the safeguards in the building we visited were unobtrusively very effective."

2. It should be emphasized that our machinery can be used for problems other than the E. The following is quoted from Major Steven's report.

"12. Flexibility. I understand that, owing to the abandonment of the rotary motion, this machine is readily adapted for use against problems other than that for which it was originally designed."

47

1

SPSIS 311.5-General-7
To: Col. Clarke
Feb. 10, 1943

3. Attention is invited to the fact that it took over eighteen months of concentrated effort on the part of SSB to solve the Purple machine. Not only were complete details of the solution imparted to the British G C and C S when our first cryptanalytic mission was sent to London (January-March 1940), but also two or more machines were especially constructed by us and turned over to them. All of this was done without any pressure having been brought upon us by the British and the contribution was made as an evidence of our desire for complete reciprocity in the exchange of technical information. The SSB need hardly point out that the Purple traffic has yielded the most vital information to the Allied Cause and in fact it might be said that this solution and the ability to read this traffic constitutes our secret weapon in our struggle with Japan. When the contribution was made there were no strings attached to it and from the very first, SSB has been the leader in solving modifications and new developments in that field and in each instance as soon as a new discovery was made the results were imparted immediately by fastest possible means to the British.

W Preston Corderman

W. Preston Corderman
Colonel, Signal Corps

TAB
(A)

TAB A.

1. On or about April 1 new type ultra-secret, high-speed analytical machinery which has been developed by our cryptanalytic experts will be assembled and installed, ready for practical operations.

2. This machinery was developed for general application and is suitable for the solution of various types of cryptanalytic problems. It bears no external or internal resemblance to the so-called "Bombes" or associated equipment developed by the British. It is, however, adapted to the solution of certain high-grade German Army and Air Force traffic.

3. When the experimental development of this machinery was undertaken there was no immediate intention on the part of our cryptanalysts of undertaking the exploitation of this type of traffic.

4. Now, however, in view of our operations in the North African area and of projected operations, together with the fact that there are indications that the Japanese may possibly adopt this same type of machine as is employed by the German Army and Air Force, it is felt that we should without delay engage in the operational exploitation of this traffic.

5. Before this operational exploitation can be undertaken, four principal classes of items are essential:

(a) Specially trained personnel. Steps are now being taken to obtain them.

(b) Traffic, including documents applicable to its effective gathering (frequencies, schedules, etc., pertinent thereto). We do not now receive any of the applicable traffic from the British nor do we have the German Army call-sign books, information on discriminants, etc., which are essential for practical interception of this material. As regards the traffic desired, we are now dependent upon the British intercept service for it. It is true that we are currently receiving a small amount of intercept material of this category from our stations at Vint Hill, Newfoundland, and Iceland. Intercept service from these points will probably increase in effectiveness as time goes on but because of geographical locations these stations can never provide complete intercept coverage of the German Army and Air Force E traffic sufficient to permit of regular solutions nor the required continuity.

SB/CM[illegible]r
72662

By authority A. C. of S., G-2

Date 2-12-43 (CWC)
Initials

February 12, 1943

48

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL STRONG:

SUBJECT: Radio Intercept Station in Africa

1. Reference is made to the radiogram from General Brereton, CM-IN-3416 (7 Feb 43) 0656 Z. This radiogram implies that Asmara is an undesirable location for an intercept station such as we are considering for that point. Of course, this can not be definitely determined until tests on the ground have been conducted. It has, however, always been my understanding, and this is confirmed by General Stoner, that Asmara is a far more suitable location than any other point in that general area. Furthermore, there is already available at Asmara a fixed radio station through which the intercept traffic could be channeled to Washington with the minimum of delay.

2. As for General Brereton's suggestion and recommendation that the station be located in the Cairo area, we, I believe, are all agreed that Cairo has many undesirable features, not the least of which is the fact that the British already have a large intercept and radio intelligence installation at that point.

3. We are going ahead with our plans to determine whether or not Asmara is, from a technical standpoint, a suitable location for a fixed station. In the event tests indicate that Asmara is unsuitable, or if for the sake of expediency we may decide to drop the plan, the following alternate plan is recommended:

(a) that two additional radio intelligence companies be given a special course of training at Vint Hill Farms for a period not to exceed thirty days;

(b) that these two companies then be sent to Allied Force Headquarters, North Africa and assigned for active operation with the Signal Intelligence Service, Allied Force Headquarters;

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(c) that the Signal Intelligence Service, Allied Force Headquarters, with its existing radio intelligence companies, plus the two additional companies assigned, be placed under the operational control of the Signal Security Service (in this connection please see study submitted today, subject "Relations Between the Signal Security Service and Field Agencies Performing Signal Security Functions");

(d) that a special radio communication channel with suitable cryptographic equipment be established between Allied Force Headquarters, Africa, and Arlington Hall for the sole purpose of passing intercept material and operational instructions, this channel to be in operation by date of arrival of the two radio intelligence companies.

4. The foregoing recommendation will give us a total of four radio intelligence companies in this theater. It will provide Arlington Hall with the technical, military, and air traffic desired over a communication channel capable of speedy results. This action will possibly render unnecessary the establishment of a fixed station at either Cairo or Asmara and will permit flexibility in following future military developments in the African theater.

5. If the Air Corps accedes to your recommendation to allow Arlington Hall to prescribe operational directives for Air Corps radio intelligence companies, the company which they have in Cairo may be very useful in supplementing the activities of the four companies at Allied Force Headquarters.

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, General Staff
Chief, Special Branch, M.I.S.

The machinery which we have developed is of general applicability. Don't want them to feel we started off with immediate intention of working on enigma. We developed machinery suitable for various types of problems and in view of increase in "E" traffic and the work of our Expeditionary forces in Africa and having machinery makes it now possible for us to go into exploitation. Tiltman felt bad because we did not consult them.

49

STAYBACK

651

By authority [illegible] of S. G.

Date 2-17-43 CWC Initials

February 12, 1943

50

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL STRONG:

Attached herewith is a draft of a proposed memorandum from you to General Marshall and a draft of a proposed letter from General Marshall to Sir John Dill on the same subject.

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, General Staff
Chief, Special Branch, M.I.S.

50

~~SECRET~~

651

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

By authority A. C. of S., G-2
Date 2-17-43 ( ) Initials

February 17, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

SUBJECT: Operational Exploitation of German Army and Air Force Traffic

1. Reference is made to the correspondence which passed between you and Sir John Dill on the case of Doctor Turing and his visit to the Bell Laboratories in New York City. Particular attention is invited to that portion of Sir John's letter in which he states that complete mutual confidence is all important and that it is of the utmost importance not to allow any feeling of mistrust to arise.

2. Sir John further stated that the British were prepared to show our people everything in England, but that they reserve the right to refuse to allow exploitation in the United States of vitally secret traffic where they were chiefly concerned unless they were satisfied as to the necessity. He further stated that they have permitted exploitation by the U.S. Navy of one particular type of traffic which they agreed was of vital importance to our Navy.

3. The traffic to which Sir John referred was a very special type of German traffic.

4. It has now become necessary for the Army to enter upon exploitation of traffic of a similar nature, but pertaining to the German Army and Air Force communications. We should, therefore, receive from the British the same treatment and consideration as they now give the Navy.

5. A detailed explanation of this whole problem is attached in TAB (A).

6. It is recommended that a letter substantially as outlined in TAB (B) be dispatched by you to Sir John Dill.

Geo. V. Strong

GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General
A. C. of S., G-2

DEPOSITORY
BUY
WAR
BONDS

~~SECRET~~

(c) Special information and complex special procedures applicable to the solution of this traffic have been developed during the past several years by G.C. & C.S. as a result of concentrated work and practical exploitation on a large scale. This information and the procedures are extremely important, if not vital, for efficient exploitation of this traffic. We do not have this special information or procedures and have not developed the necessary procedures. Moreover, to do this would take several years.

(d) Special communication channels and cryptographic apparatus, as set forth in subsequent paragraphs.

6. It is realized that special intelligence resulting from the British exploitation of this traffic is now in all probability available to our forces in North Africa and in England. It is also realized that any reluctance which the British might have to sending this material out of England is based entirely on considerations of security. In connection with this matter of security, however, we are confident that the precautions taken from the very inception and now in effect with regard to our developments in this field afford perfectly adequate security. Security officers are now assigned for duty at the plant where the machinery is being manufactured and assembled. Furthermore, when the machinery is ready for shipment it will be convoyed by appropriate officer guards. The quarters in which the machinery will be installed at Arlington Hall Station are also to be segregated and under adequate special protection. Every person connected with the development and manufacture who has had to have imparted to him information considered important was cleared through the proper channels before such information was imparted. For the most part, the workers actually connected with the construction of the machinery have absolutely no knowledge of its purpose or its method of operation. In this same connection the following is quoted from a report made by Major G. G. Stevens, British Liaison Officer at Arlington Hall:

"14. Security. The fact that only standard equipment is used lessens the security problem considerably. To my untutored eye there is little in the assembly of the machine that would give the ordinary artisan much idea of what it would be for. I have not seen the assembly plant nor do I know what precautions are taken there but I have the impression that the safeguards in the building we visited were unobtrusively very effective."

7. Again referring to this whole question of security, attention is invited to the fact that it took over eighteen months of concentrated effort on the part of our people to solve the so-called "Purple" machine. Not only were complete details of the solution imparted to the British G.C. and C.S. when our first cryptanalytic mission was sent to London (January-March 1940), but also two or more machines were especially constructed by us and turned over to them. All of this was done without any pressure having been brought upon us by the British and the contribution was made as an evidence of our desire for complete reciprocity in the exchange of technical information. We need hardly point out that the Purple traffic has yielded the most vital information to the Allied Cause and in fact it might be said that this solution and the ability to read this traffic constitutes our secret weapon in our struggle with Japan. When the contribution was made there were no strings attached to it and from the very first, we have been the leader in solving modifications and new developments in that field and in each instance as soon as a new discovery was made the results were imparted immediately by fastest possible means to the British.

8. There is no question whatsoever that the British are entirely justified in considering this German traffic vital. But we also consider the Japanese "Purple" traffic vital and, if, as Sir John Dill states, "complete mutual confidence is all important", we should also "uphold the principle of complete frankness and reciprocity between the British and ourselves in all these highly secret matters."

~~SECRET~~

By authority A. C. of S., G-

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
DISPOSITION FORM

Date 2-17-43 (Initials)

AG
G-2

SUBJECT: Operational Exploitation of German Army and Air Force Traffic.

Date February , 1943

TO	C/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	Air Staff	
	TAG	OPD	USW	ASW	ASWA	CG	Army
	AC	BLP	BOWD	ExRA	NGB	CG	Army Corps
	INF	FA	CAV	CA	ENGR	CG	CA
	ORD	QMG	CSO	SG	FIN	CG	Dept
	GHQ	JAG	CWS	IG	B/PR		
						X	Sec. General Staff

FOR:	S/W directs	Comment or Concurrence	Necessary action
	Draft of reply	Remark and recommendation	Information for reply
	Direct reply	Inviting attention to	Ind. approved
	Approved	See notation of	Primary interest
	Disapproved	Information	Notation and return
	File	Consult	Noted

INV:	Spcl Msgr	Radio	Air Mail	Immed. Action Ltr	Letter	.....

For the signature of the Chief of Staff.

GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General
A.C. of S., G-2

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 19, 1943.

Dear Dill:

Within a short time new type ultra-secret, high-speed analytical machinery which has been developed by our cryptanalytic experts will be assembled and installed ready for practical operations. In order to utilize this new type of machinery it will be necessary that we receive from Bletchley Park certain vitally secret data.

The new machinery will permit cryptanalysis of German Army and Air Force traffic. It is felt that our experts in the United States should without delay engage in the operational exploitation of this type of traffic in view of our present operations in North Africa, of projected operations, and more particularly since there are indications that the Japanese will possibly adopt the same type of machinery as is employed by the German Army and Air Force.

You may recall our conversation on this subject during Doctor Turing's visit in this country and the attached information prepared for your convenience covers our problem and what we propose. Will you be kind enough to furnish this to the proper authorities at Bletchley Park?

Faithfully yours,

Field Marshal Sir John Dill,
Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

TAB

"1. New type rapid analytical machinery is now under construction and will be ready for operation at Arlington Hall in about four months. This new type of machinery bears no external or internal resemblance to our 'bombes' or to associated equipment and is capable of solving various types of cryptographic problems. Among latter is solution of German Army and Air Force E traffic.

2. Traffic and collateral solution data which will enable Arlington Hall to solve German Army and Air Force E messages particularly applicable to North African Area are urgently desired at an early date so that they can undertake exploitation of this material in Washington.

3. It is realized that special intelligence resulting from exploitation of this traffic at Bletchley Park is now available to American forces in North Africa and in England and that reluctance to send out of the country material of nature of that referred to above is based entirely upon considerations of security. Nevertheless high authorities here deem it desirable and necessary to undertake operational exploitation of this traffic in Washington under adequate safeguards for following reasons:

a. It is probable that Arlington Hall can make important technical contributions in respect to type of machinery employed because of new design giving greater operational speeds and more flexibility. Developments now in progress give fair promise of overall operational speeds somewhat in excess of those now possible with our types, but only practical operation on actual traffic can establish this point. If successful, we will receive direct benefit from their developments.

b. The Americans desire to render all possible assistance to us with view to obtaining widest coverage and complete exploitation of all German Army and Air Force E traffic. This probably is not now possible in view of its large volume and shortage in machinery and personnel required for complete coverage.

c. Undertaking assistance in exploiting traffic applicable to North African area gives promise of possibly better coverage of other areas in which we may have primary interest and are not now able to cover fully.

d. Possibility that German Army and Air Force may introduce fourth wheel in their service must be visualized. If actually introduced it would become much more difficult to obtain even present coverage as regards solution and Arlington Hall would be in position to assist very materially.

e. It is felt that operation of this new special machinery on practical problems would afford best possible training of American cryptanalytic personnel and this sort of training is highly desirable in view of possibility that additional areas may become active theaters in which American forces will have primary interest and therefore should be prepared to exploit without imposing additional burdens upon G.C. & C.S.

f. Indications of possible adoption of E machine by Japanese Army have been noted in recently solved Japanese Military Attache messages. If actually adopted by Japanese, Arlington Hall must be in position to solve traffic.

g. Although it is understood that our present machinery is well distributed it seems wise to provide against even the most remote contingency of wholesale destruction of equipment and specially qualified key personnel in England.

4. Arlington Hall is not now in position to obtain much of the type of traffic desired but hopes to provide forces in Africa with necessary intercept equipment as soon as practicable. Until then it is assumed that arrangements for telegraphic forwarding of traffic by you to them can be made.

5. Establishment of direct communications using high grade cryptographic equipment between Washington and Algiers can afford adequate channels for safe and speedy transmission of special intelligence resulting from proposed exploitation of traffic requested.

6. Until the new equipment is ready for actual operation the traffic and special cryptanalytic data such as cribs, etc., essential for exploitation information can be sent by mail or safe hand. As soon as actual exploitation of current traffic is undertaken special communication channels for electrically forwarding traffic to Washington can doubtless be arranged.

7. Compliance with or comments upon this request are desired. It is urged that this request be favorably considered and an affirmative decision communicated at an early date."

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

WDCSA 311.23 (2-17-43)

February 22, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL STRONG:

Subject: Operational exploitation of German traffic.

Reference the recommendation in your memorandum of February 17th for letter to Sir John Dill. First, please take up your request personally with Captain Hastings, R.N., and see if you can clear it in that manner.

G.C.M.

dictated by Chief of Staff
AL Young

Incls.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WAR DEPARTMENT

2/23/43

From:	To:
The A. C. of S., G-2	
Secretary, G-2 Staff	
The Chief, M. I. S.	
Executive Officer	
EXECUTIVE GROUP	
Military Attache Branch	
Personnel Branch	
Finance Section	
Geopolitical Section	
Chief Clerk	
Record Section	
Mail Room	
INTELLIGENCE GROUP	
NAFIC	
AIC	
Dissemination Group	
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GROUP	
FOREIGN LIAISON BRANCH	
TRAINING BRANCH	
Translation Section	
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH	
PRISONER OF WAR BRANCH	
SPECIAL BRANCH	
LIAISON, BD.ECON.WAR.	
SECTY., INTER-AMER.DEF.BD.	
SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF	
EXECUTIVE OFFICER,	
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE	
BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS	
Necessary action	
Preparation of reply	
Recommendation or remark	
As a matter of primary Int.	
Note and return	
Information	
Mail Noted	
File Signature	

Gen. Strong: Memorandum for your signature to Captain Hastings, making formal request for traffic and collateral solution data for Operational Exploitation of German Army and Air Force Traffic.

C.W.C.

Col Clarke
Letter dec in [illegible]
to Hastings Feb 24 -

./ M.I.S. 911

STAYBACK

~~SECRET~~

SB/CWC/hr
72662

~~SECRET~~

By authority A. C. o

Date 2-23-43 (CWC Initials)

February 23, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN HASTINGS:

SUBJECT: Operational Exploitation of German Army and Air Force Traffic

1. In accordance with the wishes of Sir John Dill and at the direction of General Marshall, formal request is herewith made for the traffic and collateral solution data which will enable Arlington Hall to solve German Army and Air Force "E" messages.

2. I am informed that by the time Arlington Hall is in a position to undertake the day to day solution of this traffic there will be in operation a direct cable contact with Bletchley Park over which this vital traffic and solution data may be passed.

GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General
A. C. of S., G-2

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LETTER ADDRESSED TO FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL

BY CHIEFS OF STAFF.

You have already been made familiar with certain aspects of the position between U.S. Army Intelligence, U.S. Navy Intelligence and our own Intelligence Services in regard to our Most Secret Sources by the steps you took last December and January (during Colonel Tiltman's visit) to clarify the matter with General Marshall. Copies of the correspondence you had with him are in our hands.

In particular your letter of 7th January 1943 and General McNarney's reply of 9th January have laid down a general principle, intended to cover the subject of our Most Secret Sources of Intelligence, in a most satisfactory way.

We now wish to make this general principle operative throughout the British and the American "Y" Services, laying down more specifically certain provisions as a directive to the officers who have to deal with the many points that arise almost daily in connection with operational handling of the material in question. The intention is to cover all matters connected with SPECIAL and "Y" Intelligence Interception, Cryptography and Security, from the decoding of Axis messages in their highest grade cyphers down to the extraction of Intelligence from plain language telephony transmitted from aircraft and field stations. We feel sure that the American "Y" Services will welcome this suggestion as it must be as difficult for their officers to deal with ours as for ours with theirs and they are, as we know, as anxious about security as we are.

So delicate however is the technique of handling this type of Intelligence that if absolute security is to be maintained it is essential that the same methods should be pursued by both countries at every level and in every area concerned, since a leakage at any one point would jeopardize this source of Intelligence not in one area only but in all theatres of war and for all 3 Fighting Services.

The points on which we are anxious to achieve agreement in elaboration of the general agreement for complete reciprocity reached between you and General Marshall are set out below and we would suggest that you should submit them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order that a directive on these lines can be issued.

TO PCIS OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Certain high grade Axis codes and cyphers have been solved and, due to their complexity and value for intelligence purposes, have been specially handled as regards security. These are specified below and are the sources from which, and from which alone so called SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE is derived. They are:-

(i) All forms of German Enigma machine cyphers used by the German Armed Forces; all forms of 4-wheel Enigma machine adapted for German Secret Service and Military and Naval attaches.

(ii) All forms of German Secret Teleprinter Machine.

(iii) Italian Hagelin Machine and SIGMA submarine code.

(iv) Japanese Diplomatic Machine (Purple).

(v) Japanese Naval Code known as J.N.25.

(vi) Japanese Military Attache Code.

Other cyphers may be added to this list by either country as the circumstances dictate, in mutual agreement.

EXPLOITATION OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE.

(b) The exploitation of items (i), (ii) and (iii) will be left in British hands in all theatres of war in Europe, or in proximity to Europe, or where the Command is British. German Naval Enigma submarine keys will continue to be exploited by America, and the British as now.

Item (iv) will be exploited mutually as at present.

Item (v) will be exploited by America in the S.W. Pacific (conjointly with the British unit in Australia) and in the Command area of the C. in C. Eastern Fleet by the British.

Item (vi) will be exploited mutually as now.

DISTRIBUTION AND SECURITY OF SPECIAL AND "Y" INTELLIGENCE.

(c) British or U.S. Commanders-in-Chief of Naval, Military or Air Forces will receive all SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE necessary to them for the conduct of their operations from either British or U.S. exploitation centres as may be mutually agreed.

(d) The distribution of intelligence from the sources in question will be governed by the fundamental principle that distribution will be restricted to the minimum and will therefore be confined solely to those who require to receive the intelligence for the proper discharge of their duties.

(e) All recipients of SPECIAL or "Y" Intelligence, whether British or American Officers, shall be bound by the same regulations, the regulations now in force in the theatres of war where British forces are operating to be accepted at the present time. If at a later date either country wish to modify them in the light of further experience then this may be done by mutual agreement. The extension to officers of a knowledge of the existence of such intelligence shall be confined to as limited a number as possible and restricted to the levels of command in conformity with the above mentioned regulations. Great stress is laid on the principle that intelligence from these cyphers should not be intermingled in reports with that from other sources. If, however, it becomes imperative to do so the whole must be treated as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and given the same strictly limited distribution. Under no circumstances is it permissible to pass SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE in a cypher which can be read by other than the authorised recipients.

(f) Although "Y" Intelligence is not subject to the same stringent regulations as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE, since the two are closely connected, it is essential to maintain a high degree of secrecy in the handling of "Y" Intelligence also. In any action taken upon it and in any documents or telegrams based upon it it is essential that its origin should be disguised and the cyphers used for its dissemination absolutely secure.

(g) Specially appointed officers shall have full access in the British Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry to all SPECIAL and "Y" Intelligence. The same privilege will be extended to British officers in America.

COOPERATION OVER RESEARCH IN CRYPTOGRAPHY AND MOST SECRET DEVICES.

(h) Research on cryptography and all the means mechanical and scientific appertaining thereto shall be on an entirely reciprocal basis, together with all experiments and findings. U.S. Liaison officers will continue to be welcome at the British "Y" Centre in the U.K. and from those specially accredited nothing will be withheld. Similarly in the U.S. qualified British representatives will have access to all information. Either country reserves the right to refuse "exploitation" of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE to the other until it is satisfied that the necessity for dual exploitation exists and that the information is to be disseminated only to those to whom it is essential.

COOPERATION AND COORDINATION OF THE "Y" SERVICES.

(i) Cooperation between and coordination of U.S. and British "Y" effort must take place at all levels, technical cryptographic information being exchanged mutually at the same level and each country to agree not to degrade such information or the intelligence derived from it below that level without mutual agreement.

(j) Each country shall inform the other of the employment and scope in each theatre of war of their "Y" units in the field.

7th March, 1943.

DEFINITIONS

1) "Y" SERVICE. The branch of all three Services which is concerned with intercepting, decoding, interpreting, grading and dissemination of enemy (and neutral) signals, and the use of D/F apparatus for establishing locations of enemy transmitters.

2) SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. Certain enemy cyphers have been placed in a special category, owing to their importance and difficulty of solution. The intelligence derived from these cyphers is known as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. Such material is treated with most stringent security measures, a copy of which is attached hereto.

3) "Y" INTELLIGENCE. Intelligence derived from the solution of lower grade cyphers. Such cyphers may under certain circumstances be upgraded to the "Special" class. The dissemination of "Y" Intelligence is wider though always treated as Most Secret.

Whereas SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE is confined to a very strictly limited number of the most highly place officers and is mainly of strategical importance, "Y" Intelligence may be used tactically.

4) "EXPLOITATION" has no commercial significance but is used to cover the decoding, interpretation, grading and dissemination of all intelligence derived from the activities of the "Y" Service.

5) Certain prefixes are used in the dissemination by telegram of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and these prefixes may occur, loosely used, to denote SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE in some of the documents that have from time to time been exchanged with the U.S. authorities.

They are:-

ULTRA = SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE passed from U.K. abroad or to ships at sea.

ZYMOTIC = SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE originating from Melbourne.

SINDAR = " " " " India.

SWELL " " " " Middle East.

Others will be allotted from time to time as necessary.

No prefixes at present exist for "Y" Intelligence.

26th February, 1943

Col Clarke

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION
OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

BR. MOST SECRET
~~U. S. SECRET~~

February 26, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. V. STRONG;

SUBJECT: Operational exploitation of German Army and Air Force Traffic.

In accordance with your memorandum of February 23, I forwarded your request to the Director of the Government Code and Cipher School and have today received his reply stating that the whole question has been referred to the British Chiefs of Staff and is now under discussion with General Kroner.

E.G. Hastings,
Captain, R.N.

54

What on Jap

What many on..

- we can be worked we close
all [illegible] to them
and [illegible] the money
[illegible] as we get

[illegible]

Hoolmeda [illegible]
we give B [illegible]
to what they give us

[illegible]

STAYBACK ~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT—OFFICIAL BUSINESS

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Office of origin: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (Division, branch, section, and symbol) — Date: March 8, 1943

Special Branch/WDGBI/CMC/hr — Telephone: 72662 (Originating officer)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~ (Restricted—Confidential—Secret) — Precedence: URGENT (Deferred—Routine—Priority—Urgent)

To: U. S. MILITARY ATTACHE

LONDON, ENGLAND

AM UNABLE TO ACCEPT YOUR CONCLUSIONS AS TO GRAVE UNDESIRABILITY FOR DISPATCH OF RAW MATERIAL TO UNITED STATES NOR DO I SEE ANY REASON WHY SECURITY WOULD IN ANY WISE BE JEOPARDIZED BY BRITISH FURNISHING US TRAFFIC WHICH I DESIRE EXPLOITED HERE. YOUR MESSAGE TO ... THROUGH LESTINGS MARCH 4. FROM STRONG TO KROMER. EXPLOITATION OF TRAFFIC BY ARLINGTON HALL ESSENTIAL TO OUR WAR EFFORT AND I DESIRE YOU PRESS THIS POINT TO THE LIMIT OF YOUR ABILITY. IF YOU NEED TECHNICAL ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE CONSULT CAPTAIN JOHNSON OF THE SIGNAL CORPS NOW TEMPORARILY AT BLETCHLEY PARK.

55

This message is on official business and is for the public service

DISTRIBUTION:

Content and classification authenticated by

55

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

AMTAR 3
11/12GP
alt

INCOMING MESSAGE

CCWD
8-11-43
[illegible]

EYES ONLY

P R I O R I T Y

From: Amembassy London
To: MILID

In reply cite: 4414, March 11, 1943

Have made closest contact with very highest authority just short of Prime Minister regarding your instructions 9th March (Personal private for Strong only from Bremer sgd Hughes). Frankly and emphatically in your name and you high position ask-all raw traffic as you directed be sent USA for exploitation at a hall. The unshakable answer at the moment is "US participation in UK no exploitation in USA". I cannot say that your desires are understood but I do find every indication to meet USA needs for intelligence. However British will not at present agree to exploitation in USA of raw material procured here short of direct order from PM. The way can be made for appeal to PM if you wish it but I recommend waiting until Sir John Dill gets British Chiefs of Staff proposition to lay before General Marshall of which my cable through Hastings was brief summary. I do hope you appreciate that I could not refuse offer of the Hastings channel and for our own security I did not wish to repeat message through our own channels. Davidsons long letter reply to yours and British Chiefs of Staff letter to Dill are in air mail and probably arrive when I do. I am bound to tell you that British lay great store by General Marshalls letter 6th January 43 to Sir John Dill in which he, Marshall, agrees that British should not send more raw German material to USA and stated "General Strong also accepts this view". Existence this letter surprise

CH-IN-5623 [illegible] (11 Mar 43) COPY [illegible] 1

~~THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN~~

55

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Amembassy London
To: MALID

In reply cite: 4414, March 11, 1943

to me. You will find Davidson refers to it.

Faced as we are with definite refusal of British to give raw German material for exploitation in USA I believe your ultimate objective is now more likely to be gained by the step by step method. That is, participate contribute exploit here as sort of combined show of a forward or operational echelon; later develop rear echelon looking to long range values and USA special interests by exploitation in USA. It makes me very unhappy not to bring home bacon as you wish it. I have talked very privately to Johnson and Bicher who each separately agree with me that method promises hope of ultimate success for us whereas insistence on direct method might jeopardize even present arrangements. I submit that no one, save yourself, could lay USA point of view before British more frankly and persistently than I have. They are adamant in refusal your request but I cannot detect the slightest hostility toward you or USA in their refusal to permit exploitation of this traffic in USA. It is insisted that refusal is based solely on protection of this vital link to operations and has nothing whatever to do with lack of confidence in your security itself. I have seen how British commanders are handled in this matter. It is severe and restrictive backed by orders of Prime Minister.

It only remains for you to come here yourself and devote your team energies to this task. I could not recommend any one else coming except to keep the technical people always on the job in both places.

We will probably leave London afternoon 12th and Military Attache will inform you exact time departure. While I do not expect further reply from you would

CM-IN-5023 (11 Mar 43) COPY No. 1

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56

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

~~EYES ONLY~~

From: Amembassy London
To: MILID

In reply cite: 4414, March 11, 1943

appreciate cable saying you have received this.

No Sig

ACTION: GEN. STRONG

CM-IN-5623 (11 Mar 43) 1829Z mjc

1

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED

56

SECRET

641

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON, D.C. March 17, 1943

MEMORANDUM for Colonel Corderman

Subject: Traffic Exchange with B. S. C.

1. Attached to this memorandum is a report showing the volume of traffic received from and sent to the British Security Coordination during February, 1943.

2. Traffic received from and sent to British Security Coordination represents messages exchanged with both the British and the Canadians. It is impossible to state exactly how many messages were exchanged with each, inasmuch as the British Security Coordination office in New York represents both the United Kingdom and Canada in traffic exchange. In some cases a given message forwarded by this office to British Security Coordination is intended for Canada; in other cases the message may be intended for Britain; and in quite a number of cases the one message may be intended for both Britain and Canada. This section forwards each day to British Security Coordination such traffic as is requested on the combined United Kingdom-Canada list, leaving the final decision as to where the message shall ultimately be sent to British Security Coordination in New York.

3. The agreement to exchange intercepted Diplomatic traffic on a three-way basis between the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom was reached in a conference held at Arlington Hall January 15, 1943, attended by representatives of the Signal Security Service, Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, the United States Navy, Canada, and the United Kingdom. At that time it was decided that each country would be provided with Diplomatic coverage schedules of the other countries and that from these schedules requests for traffic would be prepared. This agreement has been in effect since that time and traffic has been exchanged regularly on that basis. Revised requests are prepared from time to time by each country to conform with changing coverage schedules.

4. The exchange of Japanese Army traffic between the United States and the United Kingdom originated approximately two years ago and has continued since that time. At

VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

SECRET

the present time this office is sending to the United Kingdom Japanese Army traffic intercepted by Monitor Station 15 which represents approximately 40 per cent of all the Japanese military traffic intercepted by American Army intercept stations. This traffic is relayed to British Security Coordination the same day it reaches Arlington Hall. In exchange we receive the total Japanese Army intercept from the two Canadian stations. In addition, we receive more of this material from the British in India, and through our representatives in the Central Bureau in Australia we receive further intercepts copied by Australian stations. Even though some of this traffic arrives here several weeks after interception it still has much value for the traffic analysis section as well as for "B" section.

5. At the present time the exchange of traffic between Arlington Hall Station and British Security Coordination is confined principally to Diplomatic and Japanese Army material. To discontinue the exchange agreement at this time would cut off a very valuable source of these important types. Because the United Kingdom has monitor stations in areas which at present are not covered by American intercept stations, we are able to receive from Britain many messages which we could not otherwise hope to get. This applies particularly to traffic transmitted within the continent of Europe where low-frequency, low-powered stations can be heard by British monitor stations because of their relatively close position but which American monitors fail to receive. Thus, we get from Britain much of the traffic emanating from Sweden, Spain, Switzerland and the countries of Central Europe under German domination.

6. Similarly Japanese Army traffic received from Britain and Canada represents approximately 30 per cent of our total volume of intercepts of this type. The study of such traffic by our traffic analysts provides us with many frequencies, circuits and other operational data which our own intercepts do not afford. British intercepts, for example, cover Burma, Thailand, China and the Dutch East Indies much better than our American intercept stations are able to do. Most of the material received from Canada, India, and Australia represents traffic not intercepted by our own monitor stations. The degree of duplication -- approximately 10 per cent -- rather than retarding traffic analysis or cryptanalysis serves a useful purpose in checking garbles and verifying doubtful information.

7. To facilitate the transmission of exchange traffic between London and British Security Coordination in New York it is planned to have full time cable facilities available within a short time. When this cable becomes operative -- on or about March 31 -- British material will be transmitted over that circuit from London to New York and thence relayed to us by teletype. The teletype circuit linking Signal Security Service

with the British Security Coordination office in New York is already in operation. At the present time much of the traffic we receive from Canada is forwarded by teletype from Ottawa to British Security Coordination in New York and relayed by teletype from British Security Coordination to us. Similarly, British traffic now cabled or air mailed to this country is forwarded by teletype from British Security Coordination to our office. Traffic which we send to the British and Canadians is transmitted over this teletype circuit to New York, and relayed from there to Ottawa and/or London by British Security Coordination.

8. During the period we have been exchanging diplomatic traffic with the United Kingdom much of the material has not yet arrived from London, because of the delays involved in sending this material by sea bag. The use of the cable circuit contemplated for this purpose will overcome such delays and show a greater volume of material received each day from the British.

H. McD. Brown

H. McD. Brown
Major, Signal Corps

SECRET

TRAFFIC SENT TO BRITISH SECURITY COORDINATION
(CANADA AND UNITED KINGDOM) DURING PERIOD FEBRUARY 1 - 28, 1943

DIPLOMATIC

	FEB. 1 - 7	FEB. 8 - 14	FEB. 15 - 21	FEB. 22 - 28	TOTAL
Argentina	63	91	59	93	306
Belgium	1		1		1
Bolivia			1	1	2
Brazil	4	13	4	4	25
Bulgaria	8	8	11		27
Chile	15	21	30	11	77
China			3	2	5
Columbia			1	1	2
Denmark	2	2			4
Finland	6	12	20	6	44
France	320	647	303	732	2002
Germany	557	463	472	449	1941
Greece				1	1
Guatemala				1	1
Hungary	8	10	13	18	49
Italy	160	166	198	292	816
Japan	655	803	693	1457	3688

Purple	290
J-19	1261
LA	1786
J-22	35
Miscellaneous (CA,YO,Plain Text, etc.)	316
	3688

	FEB. 1 - 7	FEB. 8 - 14	FEB. 15 - 21	FEB. 22 - 28	TOTAL
Manchukuo	29	36	24	58	147
Mexico			1		1
Panama			3		3
Paraguay				1	1
Peru			9	4	13
Poland	1			1	
Portugal	23	23	35	22	103
Rumania	13	19	34	32	89
Russia	153	110	90	212	565
Spain	84	98	91	171	444
Sweden	22	29	52	45	148
Switzerland	43	35	78	78	234
Thailand	22	34	36	56	148
Turkey	2	12	22	16	52
Venezuela			1		1
Yugoslavia			2		2
TOTAL	2150	2703	2267	3724	10844

* Includes messages from Far Eastern Diplomatic Net

~~SECRET~~

COMMERCIAL

	FEB. 1 - 7	FEB. 8 - 14	FEB. 18 - 21	FEB. 22 - 28	TOTAL
Argentina	6	3			9
Chile		1			1
German	1				1
Japan	1	10		3	14
TOTAL	8	14		3	25

MILITARY ATTACHE

	FEB. 1 - 7	FEB. 8 - 14	FEB. 18 - 21	FEB. 22 - 28	TOTAL
Japan	315	177	61	233	786

WEATHER

	FEB. 1 - 7	FEB. 8 - 14	FEB. 15 - 21	FEB. 22 - 28	TOTAL
Japan	6	49	49	21	125
Portugal	3	2	37	4	47
TOTAL	9	51	86	25	171

JAPANESE MILITARY & NAVAL

	FEB. 1 - 7	FEB. 8 - 14	FEB. 15 - 21	FEB. 22 - 28	TOTAL
Army	8831	6495	6240	6125	27691
Navy	5	15		16	36
JM/JN			15	51	66
TOTAL	8836	6510	6255	6192	27793

RECAPITULATION

	FEB. 1 - 7	FEB. 8 - 14	FEB. 15 - 21	FEB. 22 - 28	TOTAL
Diplomatic	606	365	378	636	1985
Commercial	8	14		3	25
Military Attache	315	177	61	233	786
Weather	9	51	86	25	171
Jap. Military	8836	6510	6255	6192	27793
TOTAL	9769	7117	6780	7089	30760

SECRET

TRAFFIC RECEIVED FRO. BRITISH SECURITY COORDINATION
(CANADA AND UNITED KINGDOM) DURING PERIOD FEBRUARY 1 - 28, 1943

DIPLOMATIC

NATION	FEB. 1 - 7	FEB. 8 - 14	FEB. 15 - 21	FEB. 22 - 28	TOTAL
Argentina	9	19		2	30
Bolivia			1		1
Brazil	5				5
Bulgaria	2				2
Chile	17	6	3	6	32
Columbia				1	1
Finland	1			5	6
France	168	17	14	40	239
Germany	173	72	1	63	209
Hungary	1	1	2	1	5
Italy	21	16	3	14	54
*Japan	154	168	335	469	1126
		Purple	250		
		J-19	256		
		LA	203		
		J-22	1		
		YO	1		
		Miscellaneous (Plain text, press, etc.)	225		
			916		
Manchukuo		6		4	10
Peru				2	2
Portugal	6	1		2	9
Rumania	4			1	5
Russia	6	22		1	29
Spain	13	18	14	31	76
Sweden	1	4	2	3	10
Switzerland	23	8	3		34
Thailand	2	7			9
Turkey				1	1
TOTAL	606	365	378	636	1985

* Includes messages from Japanese Far Eastern Diplomatic not

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COMMERCIAL

	FEB. 1 - 7	FEB. 8 - 14	FEB. 15 - 21	FEB. 22 - 28	TOTAL
Argentina	5	1			6
Bulgaria	1				1
China	2				2
France		3			3
Germany	107	42			149
Hungary	1				1
Italy	22	5			27
Japan	308	121			429
Portugal	1				1
Sweden	3	3			6
Switzerland	7	1			8
TOTAL	457	176			633

MILITARY ATTACHE

	FEB. 1 - 7	FEB. 8 - 14	FEB. 15 - 21	FEB. 22 - 28	TOTAL
Japan	82	300	180	641	1283

JAPANESE MILITARY & NAVAL

	FEB. 1 - 7	FEB. 8 - 14	FEB. 15 - 21	FEB. 22 - 28	TOTAL
Army	5273	9254	6175	10074	30776
Navy	33	529	61	163	786
Civil			1372	39	1411
TOTAL	5306	9783	7608	10276	32973

RECAPITULATION

	FEB. 1 - 7	FEB. 8 - 14	FEB. 15 - 21	FEB. 22 - 28	TOTAL
Diplomatic	2190	2703	2287	3704	10994
Commercial	457	176			633
Military Attache	82	300	180	641	1283
Japanese Military & Naval	5306	9783	7608	10276	32973
TOTAL	8035	13962	10075	14621	45693

SECRET

24 MARCH 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DOUD:

TOTAL PURPLE MESSAGES RECEIVED (ALL SOURCES) including dupes
1 MARCH 1943--23 MARCH 1943 443

TOTAL ORIGINAL PURPLE MESSAGES RECEIVED excluding dupes
(ALL SOURCES) SAME DATES 401

TOTAL PURPLE MESSAGES RECEIVED FROM BRITISH including dupes
SOURCES 173

TOTAL ORIGINAL MESSAGES RECEIVED FROM BRITISH excluding dupes
SOURCES 147

PERCENTAGE OF ORIGINAL PURPLE MESSAGES
FURNISHED BY BRITISH SAME PERIOD ~~27.73~~ 38%

PERCENTAGE OF ALL PURPLE MESSAGES FURNISHED
BY BRITISH, SAME PERIOD ~~25.30~~ 35%

52

Carlisle C. Taylor
CARLISLE C. TAYLOR
1ST. LT., SIGNAL CORPS

Col Corderman
Herewith the figures
on the Purple.
HD

DRAFT

MIS/I
WLC

SECRET

March 26, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL CLARKE:

Subject: Liaison Between British Security Coordination and MIS.

1. In a memorandum by the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, subject "Security Measures in Latin America" stated that the British Chiefs of Staff were anxious to see an end of Axis machinations in Latin America." It was stated that in order to create a security organization whose members could be trained to protect key points against sabotage, British Security Coordination was training in Canada British officials in key positions in companies operating in South America. Likewise it was stated that the Canadian authorities were cooperating with the British Security Coordination and arrangements were being made for members of Canadian companies to train in the same way as the British. The representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff desired to coordinate the work of the U.S. and British security organizations and requested information as to which U.S. authorities British Security Coordination should deal with.

2. On September 16, 1942, in a memorandum by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British were informed that the American Intelligence Command was undertaking a program ~~determined~~ deemed adequate to meet security measures in Latin America. The British Chiefs of Staff were informed that it was the firm conviction of the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff that the status quo should be maintained in Latin America, as the introduction of a third party into the area might seriously impair the accomplishment of the projected program of the American Intelligence Command and thus harm their

our combined war effort. In a memorandum for the Security, British Joint Staff Mission dated September 19, 1942, Colonel Duff of the AIC was designated liaison officer in Washington with whom the British Director of Security Coordination should deal on questions of security measures in Latin America.

3. It was as the result of these memorandums that contact with the British Security Coordination was established by AIS. Since that time the FBI has taken over responsibility for plant protection in Latin America, and the British have been authorized to deal directly with the FBI on this subject. AIS has continued to maintain liaison with the British Security Coordination. From information available, it is indicated that the AIS representative accompanied the British officers and U.S. Navy officers on their tour of South America and the Caribbean islands at the direction of Colonel Heard.

4. Two incidents in the relation between AIS and British Security Coordination may be of interest to you. First, it is believed that the British attempted to penetrate our undercover intelligence by sending one of their agents to our officer who is responsible for selecting agents. Second, the British were particularly anxious that Colonel F. M. Harris should continue the trip around Latin America with the British officers because the British were able, according to my informant, to obtain from him more information concerning our system of undercover intelligence than from any other officer.

5. From a reliable source it is stated that the British have permitted OSS to use their diplomatic pouch from Argentina to the U.S. for reports. This is interesting to note, because OSS is by directive forbidden to enter the Latin American area.

WJC

MR. KENWORTHY

Should have at least one man here to study intercept of [Vanny] type material (hand transmission [illegible] signal)

Also should have [illegible] 15K (German Agents [illegible] - somewhat different) full time - cryptanalyst.

SECRET

[illegible]

) No. _____ Army Form W.5175A.

Ship _____

No. of Packages.				Discrepancies.
Shipped. (11)	Shut Out. (12)	Landed. (13)	Delivered to consignee. (14)	(15)

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

LLW-3 Nr 32
Filed 29/1826Z
osf

INCOMING MESSAGE

CCWD
Mar 29, 1943
2003Z

From: USFOR-London
To : War

In Reply Cite: 8288, March 29, 1943

Believed inexpedient for Captain Roy D Johnson 0417580 Signal Corps to be withdrawn present station unless replacement be provided first. Agreed to by British. (cite ETAGO signed Andrews) your R 6949 March 251600Z SPSIS. Most advantageous to keep SIS contact at BP. Suggest consult General Kroner who is cognizant of situation.

No Sig.

FOOTNOTE: Reference not identified in WD CMC.

ACTION: ASF

INFORMATION: OPD
G-2

CM-IN-16010 (30 Mar 43) 0229Z ved

COPY No.

~~THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN~~

60

~~[illegible]~~

Proposed Basis for Agreement with the British:

A. Cryptanalytic and Cryptographic

1. Full ~~intelligence~~ of cryptanalytic data, including machine devices, covering all "Y" intelligence and "Y" inference.

2. As to special intelligence, we should have (a) mutuality on Purple and JMA and (b) freedom to develop our own technique for dealing with Enigma and Tunney, the British to furnish us with some traffic and some cribs to help us develop continuity, eventually working into a supplementary position so as to improve joint coverage.

3. Cooperation on cryptography (including keys, systems, and mechanical developments) on a case basis only.

B. Intelligence

1. Free and full interchange, with due regard for security, of all "Y" intelligence and "Y" inference.

2. Free and full interchange of all special intelligence of a diplomatic or semi-diplomatic nature, including European clandestine.

3. As to special intelligence of a military nature, we will follow the British proposal, except that the War Department should have the same status as the Commander in Chief of a field force, and thereby get access to British special military intelligence on the same basis as our theater commanders do.

4. Follow the British proposal on intelligence liaison officers, but also we should have access in Britain to the foreign office, including the Secret Service at St Albans.

T.T.
4/1/43

SECRET

C O P Y

1 APRIL 1943.

FREEDOM ALGIERS

OUR APPARATUS FOR WORK ON GERMAN HIGH COMMAND EASY TRAFFIC EXPECTED TO BE READY BY MAY FIRST PD IN ORDER TO DEVELOP TECHNICAL BACKGROUND FOR OUR PROPOSED EXPLOITATION OF THIS TRAFFIC PAREN TO COL HAYES FREEDOM ALGIERS FROM SPOIS DASH OPT SIGNED OLMSTEAD PAREN WE WISH TO KNOW IF ANY SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE RESULTING FROM G. C AND C S EXPLOITATION OF THAT TRAFFIC RELATING TO YOUR THEATER IS NOW BEING FURNISHED AFHQ AND IF SO COMMA WHAT TYPES COMMA TO WHAT EXTENT COMMA AND THROUGH WHAT CHANNELS ARE THOSE RESULTS FURNISHED THAT IS WHETHER DIRECTLY TO G TWO OR DIRECTLY TO YOU

SEND IN SPECIAL RADA SYSTEM

62

ARLINGTON HALL STATION
MESSAGE CENTER

C O P Y

INCOMING MESSAGE

Date filed APRIL 3, 1943
Time filed 2053Z

FROM: FREEDOM ALGIERS
TO: WAR
NR: 1143

BEFORE COMPLETE ANSWER YOUR FIVE ONE ZERO EIGHT FOR SPSIS RPT SPSIS DASH ONE FROM HAYES SIGNED EISENHOWER CAN BE GIVEN IT IS MOST NECESSARY I BE ADVISED CONCERNING YOUR AGREEMENT WITH GC AND CS CONCERNING YOUR EXPLOITATION OF E RPT EASY MAY I INFORM BRITISH HERE THAT YOU INTEND THIS WORK QUERY EASY INTELLIGENCE FROM DF RPT BAKER PETER IS HANDLED VIA SPECIAL RADIO LINK AND IS GIVEN GEORGE TWO HERE PERSONALLY Y RPT YOKE SERVICE HERE HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH IT ~~NOWHERE~~ BEFORE I TO MAKE FURTHER INVESTIGATION MUST HAVE INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE AS MATTER IS EXTREMELY DELICATE

___ - MEANS GARBLE

Special Hada System

AS Nr #2858

Date completed APRIL 4, 1943
Time completed 0330Z

COPY

MEMO FOR COL. CORDERMAN:

Please rewrite this so that we will be satisfied. Gen. Strong says he wants to include full, free, and frank interchange of technical data, solution data, and military information; put in under heading of "exploitation" of special intelligence only whatever we think is reasonable and practicable; in the heading "application" (employment, resulting action, or utilization to us) make provision for us not only to get it but also to use it; give due regard to all phases of security; be reasonable and conservative.

We will work on a copy over here and get together and reconcile our differences before we submit the paper to Gen. Strong.

CMC

LETTER ADDRESSED TO FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL

BY CHIEFS OF STAFF.

You have already been made familiar with certain aspects of the position between U.S. Army Intelligence, U.S. Navy Intelligence and our own Intelligence Services in regard to our Most Secret Sources by the steps you took last December and January (during Colonel Tiltman's visit) to clarify the matter with General Marshall. Copies of the correspondence you had with him are in our hands.

In particular your letter of 7th January 1943 and General McNarney's reply of 9th January have laid down a general principle, intended to cover the subject of our Most Secret Sources of Intelligence, in a most satisfactory way.

We now wish to make this general principle operative throughout the British and the American "Y" Services, laying down more specifically certain provisions as a directive to the officers who have to deal with the many points that arise almost daily in connection with operational handling of the material in question. The intention is to cover all matters connected with SPECIAL and "Y" Intelligence, Interception, Cryptography and Security, from the decoding of Axis messages in their highest grade cyphers down to the extraction of Intelligence from plain language telephony transmitted from aircraft and field stations. We feel sure that the American "Y" Services will welcome this suggestion as it must be as difficult for their officers to deal with ours as for ours with them and they are, as we know, as anxious about security as we are.

So delicate however is the technique of handling this type of Intelligence that if absolute security is to be maintained it is essential that the same methods should be pursued by both countries at every level and in every area concerned, since a leakage at any one point would jeopardize this source of intelligence not in one area only but in all theatres of war and for all 3 Fighting Services.

The points on which we are anxious to achieve agreement in elaboration of the general agreement for complete reciprocity reached between you and General Marshall are set out below and we would suggest that you should submit them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order that a directive on these lines can be issued.

SOURCES OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Certain high grade Axis codes and cyphers have been solved and, due to their complexity and value for intelligence purposes, have been specially handled as regards security. These are specified below and are the sources from which, and from which alone so called SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE is derived. They are:-

(i) All forms of German Enigma machine cyphers used by the German Armed Forces; all forms of 4-wheel Enigma machine adapted for German Secret Service and Military and Naval Attachés.

DEFINITIONS

1) "Y" SERVICE. The branch of all three Services which is concerned with Intercepting, decoding, interpreting, grading and dissemination of enemy (and neutral) signals, and the use of D/F apparatus for establishing locations of enemy transmitters.

2) SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. Certain enemy cyphers have been placed in a special category, owing to their importance and difficulty of solution. The intelligence derived from those cyphers is known as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. Such material is treated with most stringent security measures, a copy of which is attached hereto.

3) "Y" INTELLIGENCE. Intelligence derived from the solution of lower grade cyphers. Such cyphers may under certain circumstances be upgraded to the "Special" class. The dissemination of "Y" Intelligence is wider though always treated as Most Secret.

Whereas SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE is confined to a very strictly limited number of the most highly place officers and is mainly of strategical importance, "Y" Intelligence may be used tactically.

4) "[illegible]" has no commercial significance but is used to cover the decoding, interpretation, grading and dissemination of all intelligence derived from the activities of the "Y" Service.

5) Certain prefixes are used in the dissemination by telegram of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and these prefixes may occur, loosely used, to denote SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE in some of the documents that have from time to time been exchanged with the U.S. authorities.

They are:-

ULTRA = SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE passed from U.K. abroad or to ships at sea.

ZYMOTIC = SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE originating from Melbourne.

SIPDAR = " " " " India.

SKELL " " " " Middle East.

Others will be allotted from time to time as necessary.

No prefixes at present exist for "Y" Intelligence.

26th February, 1943

(ii) All forms of German Secret Teleprinter Machine.

(iii) Italian Magolin Machine and SIGMA submarine code.

(iv) Japanese Diplomatic Machine (Purple).

(v) Japanese Naval Code known as J.N.25.

(vi) Japanese Military Attache Code.

Other cyphers may be added to this list by either country as the circumstances dictate, in mutual agreement.

EXPLOITATION OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE.

(b) The exploitation of items (i), (ii) and (iii) will be left in British hands in all theatres of war in Europe, or in proximity to Europe, or where the Command is British. German Naval Enigma submarine keys will continue to be exploited by America, and the British as now.

Item (iv) will be exploited mutually as at present.

Item (v) will be exploited by America in the S.W. Pacific (conjointly with the British unit in Australia) and in the Command area of the C. in C. Eastern Fleet by the British.

Item (vi) will be exploited mutually as now.

DISTRIBUTION AND SECURITY OF SPECIAL AND "Y" INTELLIGENCE.

(c) British or U.S. Commanders-in-Chief of Naval, Military or Air Forces will receive all SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE necessary to them for the conduct of their operations from either British or U.S. exploitation centres as may be mutually agreed.

(d) The distribution of intelligence from the sources in question will be governed by the fundamental principle that distribution will be restricted to the minimum and will therefore be confined solely to those who require to receive the intelligence for the proper discharge of their duties.

(e) All recipients of SPECIAL or "Y" Intelligence, whether British or American Officers, shall be bound by the same regulations, the regulations now in force in the theatres of war where British forces are operating to be accepted at the present time. If at a later date either country wish to modify them in the light of further experience then this may be done by mutual agreement. The extension to officers of a knowledge of the existence of such intelligence shall be confined to as limited a number as possible and restricted to the levels of command in conformity with the above mentioned regulations. Great stress is laid on the principle that intelligence from these cyphers should not be intermingled in reports with that from other sources. If, however, it becomes imperative to do so the whole must be treated as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and given the same strictly limited distribution. Under no circumstances is it permissible to pass SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE in a cypher which can be read by other than the authorised recipients.

(f) Although "Y" Intelligence is not subject to the same stringent regulations as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE, since the two are closely connected, it is essential to maintain a high degree of secrecy in the handling of "Y" Intelligence also. In any action taken upon it and in any documents or telegrams based upon it it is essential that its origin should be disguised and the cyphers used for its dissemination absolutely secure.

(g) Specially appointed officers shall have full access in the British Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry to all SPECIAL and "Y" Intelligence. The same privilege will be extended to British officers in America.

COOPERATION OVER RESEARCH IN CRYPTOGRAPHY AND MOST SECRET DEVICES.

(h) Research on cryptography and all the means mechanical and scientific appertaining thereto shall be on an entirely reciprocal basis, together with all experiments and findings. U.S. Liaison officers will continue to be welcome at the British "Y" Centre in the U.K. and from those specially accredited nothing will be withheld. Similarly in the U.S. qualified British representatives will have access to all information. Either country reserves the right to refuse "exploitation" of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE to the other until it is satisfied that the necessity for dual exploitation exists and that the information is to be disseminated only to those to whom it is essential.

COOPERATION AND COORDINATION OF THE "Y" SERVICES.

(i) Cooperation between and coordination of U.S. and British "Y" effort must take place at all levels, technical cryptographic information being exchanged mutually at the same level and each country to agree not to degrade such information or the intelligence derived from it below that level without mutual agreement.

(j) Each country shall inform the other of the employment and scope in each theatre of war of their "Y" units in the field.

7th March, 1943.

HEADQUARTERS ARLINGTON HALL STATION
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA SPSIS-1

DATE April 3, 1943.

INFORMAL MEMO FOR: Colonel Clarke.

It appears from the second paragraph of the British document that they have seized upon and are proposing to exploit to the fullest something which General McNarney said in a letter dated Jan. 9, 1943 to Field Marshal Dill.

In my proposed draft of an agreement with the British I have omitted the five preliminary paragraphs of their paper, since I think they have no place in a formal agreement.

WPC.
W. Preston Corderman
Colonel, Signal Corps
Commanding

~~RESTRICTED~~ CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~

26-32
(26)

66

Col. Corderman's "points" re the counterproposal to present to the British.

1. We want to expand on several of the paragraphs that have been included in the British document.

2. We want to expand the whole to include not only the field of cryptanalysis but also cryptography.

3. We have converted this to American from English. We include a definition of cryptography and cryptanalysis.

AGREEMENT CONCERNING COOPERATION IN ALL MATTERS RELATING TO SPECIAL AND TRAFFIC ANALYSIS INTELLIGENCE

1. Certain high grade Axis codes and ciphers have been solved and, due to their complexity and value for intelligence purposes, have been specially handled as regards security. These are specified below:

a. All forms of German Enigma machine ciphers used by the German Armed Forces; all forms of Enigma Machines adapted for German Secret Service and Military and Naval Attaches.

b. All forms of German Secret Teleprinter Machine.

c. Italian Hagelin Machine and SIGMA submarine code.

d. Japanese Diplomatic Machine (Purple).

e. Japanese Naval Code known as J.N. 25.

f. Japanese Military Attache System.

g. Japanese Diplomatic J-19 (Fuji) System.

h. German Diplomatic Keyword System (Floradora).

Other systems may be added to this list by either country as the circumstances dictate, in mutual agreement.

EXPLOITATION OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE AND TA INTELLIGENCE.

2. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and TA Intelligence in all theaters will be exploited cooperatively at all exploitation centers, with a full, free, and frank interchange of raw material, technical data, solution data and collateral intelligence.

DISTRIBUTION AND SECURITY OF SPECIAL AND TA INTELLIGENCE.

3. British or U.S. Commanders-in-Chief of Naval, Military or Air Forces will receive all SPECIAL and TA Intelligence necessary to them for the conduct of their operations from either British or U.S. exploitation centers as may be mutually agreed. There will be an exchange of liaison officers for the purpose of facilitating the execution of this provision.

4. The distribution of intelligence from the sources in question will be governed by the fundamental principle that distribution will be restricted to the minimum and will therefore be confined solely to those who require to receive the intelligence for the proper discharge of their duties.

5. All recipients of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE ~~or TA Intelligence,~~ whether British or American officers, shall be bound by the same regulations, the regulations now in force in the theaters of war where British forces are operating to be accepted at the present time. If at a later date either country wish to modify them in the light of further experience then this may be done by mutual agreement. The extension to officers of a knowledge of the existence of such intelligence shall be confined to as limited a number as possible and restricted to the levels of command in conformity with the above mentioned regulations. Great stress is laid on the principle that SPECIAL ~~or TA~~ Intelligence should not be intermingled in reports with general intelligence from other sources. If, however, it becomes imperative to do so, the whole must be treated as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and given the same strictly limited distribution. Under no circumstances is it permissible to pass SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE in a cryptographic system which can be read by other than the authorized recipients.

6. Although TA Intelligence is not subject to the same stringent regulations as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE, since the two are closely connected, it is essential to maintain a high degree of secrecy in the handling of TA Intelligence also. In any action taken upon it and in any documents or telegrams based upon it it is essential that its origin should be disguised and the cryptographic systems used for its dissemination absolutely secure.

7. Specially appointed U.S. officers shall have full access, at all British headquarters, to all SPECIAL and TA Intelligence. The same privilege will be extended to specially appointed British officers at all U.S. headquarters.

8. The British and the U.S. Signal Intelligence Services are permitted to investigate and to satisfy themselves as to the efficacy of the security measures taken by the other Service for the protection of the operations and activities of the signal intelligence service. In particular, each Service will immediately notify the other Service when one has information indicating compromises of cryptographic systems used by the other, this having been ascertained as a result of the solution of enemy communications indicating such compromises.

COOPERATION IN CRYPTANALYSIS, AND IN CRYPTANALYTIC, INTERCEPT, D/F, AND TA APPARATUS.

9. Research in cryptanalysis and in the development of cryptanalytic, intercept, D/F and TA apparatus shall be on an entirely reciprocal basis, together with all experiments and findings. Specially accredited U.S. representatives will continue to be welcome at all British Signal Intelligence centers, and from them nothing in the field covered by this paragraph will be withheld. Similarly, specially accredited British representa-

DEFINITIONS

1. SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. The branch of all three Services which is concerned with intercepting, decoding, interpreting, classifying and dissemination of enemy (and neutral) communications, and the use of D/F and other specialized apparatus for establishing locations and identities of enemy transmitters.

2. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. Intelligence derived from the texts of solved cryptograms is known as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. It is divided into two categories:

   a. That embracing the cryptographic systems enumerated in paragraph 1, which is based on their importance and difficulty of solution. Such material is treated with most stringent security measures.

   b. All other systems.

3. TA (TRAFFIC ANALYSIS) INTELLIGENCE. Intelligence which is derived from the study of communications with a view to penetrating the camouflage superimposed upon the communications networks for purposes of security. Specifically, it involves the reconstruction of communications networks by noting changes in the volume, direction, and routing of messages; correlating the transmission frequencies and schedules employed; locating the transmitters; developing the system of assigning and changing call signs; and studying operators' conversations within the networks. The dissemination of TA Intelligence is wider, though always treated as SECRET.

4. "EXPLOITATION" covers the decoding or deciphering of enemy cryptograms and translating, classifying and disseminating the intelligence derived therefrom.

5. Certain prefixes are used in the dissemination by telegram of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and these prefixes may occur, loosely used, to denote SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE in some of the documents that have from time to time been exchanged with the U.S. authorities. They are:

ULTRA	-	SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE passed from U.K. abroad or to ships at sea.
ZYTOTIC	-	SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE originating from Melbourne.
BIRDAR	-	" " " " India.
SHELL	-	" " " " Middle East.

Others will be allotted from time to time as necessary.
No prefixes at present exist for TA Intelligence.

tives will continue to be welcome at all U.S. Signal Intelligence centers and from them nothing in the field covered in this paragraph will be withheld. So far as practicable, the security regulations adopted for the protection of the activities at the operations centers of the Signal Intelligence Services will be identical.

COOPERATION AND COORDINATION OF THE SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

10. Cooperation between and coordination of U.S. and British Signal Intelligence effort must take place at all levels, technical cryptanalytic information being exchanged mutually at the same level and each country to agree not to lower the classification of such information or the intelligence derived from it below that level without mutual agreement.

11. Each country shall inform the other of the employment and scope in each theater of war of their Signal Intelligence units in the field.

COOPERATION WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

12. It is agreed that before engaging in cooperation in signal intelligence activities with any other member or members of the United Nations, and before furnishing any of the latter with SPECIAL or TA Intelligence, the British Signal Intelligence will consult with the U.S. Signal Intelligence, and vice versa, in order to obtain approval of the proposed action.

COOPERATION IN CRYPTOGRAPHY.

13. Where necessary for the establishment of cryptographic systems for combined operations, the British and the U.S. Signal Intelligence Services will exchange technical information relative to the systems proposed for use or actually in use. Each service reserves the right to withhold any or all information relative to cryptographic systems not in or proposed for use in combined operations. It is further agreed that neither Service will provide new cryptographic systems or technical information for the improvement of existing cryptographic systems to any other members of the United Nations without prior consultation with and approval of the other Service.

DEFINITIONS (cont'd)

6. CRYPTOGRAPHY. - That branch of knowledge which treats of the various means, methods, and devices for converting plain-language into cryptogram form and for reconverting the cryptograms into their plain-language form by a direct reversal of the steps or processes employed in the original conversion.

7. CRYPTANALYSIS. That branch of knowledge which treats of the various means, methods, and devices for solving cryptograms, that is, deriving their plain-language contents, without knowledge or possession of the specific method, means, or key employed in the production of the cryptograms.

Col. Clarke -

(1) I have not consulted Col. Corderman on this - he has been out of town.

(2) I have not seen Gen. McNarney's letter, on which perfidious Albion relies.

(3) I have writ at lenghth herein on matters I do not understand.

(4) On reading it over, I seem to have gone on a limb, but its my best guess.

T.T.

23-47

(3)

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

62

April 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL CLARKE:

Subject: Cooperation between United States Signal Intelligence Service and British Y Service.

References: (1) Letter to Field Marshal Sir John Dill from the British Chiefs of Staff, dated February 26, 1943.

(2) Col. Corderman's memorandum and redraft of the British proposal, dated April 3, 1943.

A. Nature of the Problem

In considering the British proposal embodied in reference letter to Field Marshal Sir John Dill, and Col. Corderman's counterproposal, we must keep in mind (1) the manner in which the present "crisis" in our relations will be resolved, (2) the long-term interest of the United States Intelligence Service, and (3) our particular strengths and weaknesses in the field of signal intelligence at the present time.

1. The Chiefs of Staff of the United States and British Governments will not countenance an outright breach between the United States and British Signal Intelligence Services.

The principal cause of the British proposal is the current controversy over exploitation of German Army and Secret Service "Enigma" traffic. This controversy has arisen between the United States G-2, as policy-maker in signal intelligence, and the British

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officials in control of their Y Service. But if G-2 and the British intelligence officials do not reach a solution, the problem will undoubtedly be settled at a higher level, probably by the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff, although the possibility of involvement of the President and the Prime Minister must not be forgotten. Indeed, the British Chiefs of Staff suggest in their letter to Field Marshal Sir John Dill that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should consider this matter and issue a directive.

Signal intelligence is a highly technical field, and the High Command will no doubt be guided largely by the advice of the experts. But, if confronted by disagreement between United States and British experts, surely their first impulse will be to tell the experts that they must reach an agreement, and if none is then forthcoming the Combined Chiefs of Staff will by directive to the experts establish an agreement themselves.

From time to time within G-2 and S.S.D. there has been discussion of a complete breach of relations with the British Y Service, in the event that they should persist in their demands for a British monopoly of "Enigma" exploitation. Certainly, in the employment of the delicate weapon of cryptanalysis--hardly less useful in peacetime than in wartime--it is wise to keep under constant scrutiny the advantages and disadvantages of sharing some or all of our techniques with any other country.

But this is wartime, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff will no doubt treat signal intelligence as one of many important wartime weapons. From a military standpoint, the United States and Britain have both profited from signal intelligence collaboration. In other military matters, so far as I know, the trend is toward increasingly close collaboration. As military activity in the European theater intensifies, the two countries must, willy-nilly, become increasingly interdependent. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will surely approach this particular question from that standpoint. Unique as the field of cryptanalysis is, I cannot conceive that they will countenance a severance of signal

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intelligence relations. And I think that we must approach our immediate problem on that premise. Furthermore, it seems to me that it would be poor tactics for us to mention the possibility of breaking off relations either to the British or to the Chiefs of Staff. I think the Chiefs of Staff will be so definitely opposed to such a result that this kind of talk is likely to arouse impatience and constitute an obstacle to our securing an advantageous solution of this problem.

Captain Hastings has, I think, striven hard to convince us that the British Y Service is quite ready to break relations if we do not accept their proposal. No doubt the British Y Service has surveyed the advantages and disadvantages of collaboration, just as we have done. But I think this kind of talk--as well as Captain Hastings' frequent disparaging allusions to the Purple and to our signal intelligence performance in general--is intended primarily to frighten us into accepting the British proposal and I strongly doubt whether they think such an upshot possible.

If necessary, I think we can perhaps turn Captain Hastings' talk to our own advantage by characterizing the British proposal, accompanied by these oral threats, as an ultimatum, and pointing out to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the absurdity and impropriety of any such ultimatum in times like these.

We should also bear in mind that the British proposal comprehends Naval Signal Intelligence. I do not know the nature of the relations between the British and our Navy in this field; certainly the Army does not want to find itself isolated when this matter is settled.

In short, I conclude that (a) there will be no breach of relations with the British, (b) we should not threaten a breach, (c) we should, if the record will support us, put the British in the position of having threatened a breach, and (d) our whole effort should be concentrated on securing the most advantageous (from our standpoint) basis for British-American collaboration.

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2. The long-term interest of the United States requires the greatest possible self-sufficiency in the field of signal intelligence.

This is an established War Department policy and needs no proof. But we must insure that United States representatives on the Combined Chiefs of Staff (if the matter is settled there) are made fully aware of the importance of this policy. Self-sufficiency will become increasingly important as the war progresses and the military situation improves. When post-war political adjustments move toward the center of the stage, diplomatic signal intelligence will be at a premium. And the closer the end of the war appears to be, the less eager the British will be to share their diplomatic secrets with us. When the parting of the ways comes, as it probably will, the United States must be in full command of the art in its then state.

3. At the present time, the United States has much to gain from collaboration with the British in the field of signal intelligence.

Much could be said on this point, but it seems enough to point out that the present situation arises directly out of our request that the British supply us with traffic and "cribs" so that we can start to handle "Enigma." We are pressing that request to the limit; certainly it would be an unsatisfactory result for us to fail to get what we want so badly. Breaking off relations would not give us what we want.

Furthermore, there are numerous other types of traffic in which we do not as yet have a foothold. Before the war, our efforts were largely concentrated on Japanese diplomatic traffic, and we achieved conspicuous success. But events are pushing us deeper and deeper into the European picture. In working on European traffic we are suffering from lack of cryptanalytic continuity, inadequate intercept facilities, and a shortage of fully trained personnel. British assistance can greatly expedite our progress, and we are now in a position to require that assistance. We should make hay.

Finally, concrete results have been obtained from joint attacks on difficult problems, notably JMA and German KW. We are not yet into Japanese Army, and should not cut ourselves off from assistance in cracking this nut. The same holds true for several Italian secret diplomatic codes and Scandinavian Hagelin, and doubtless for many other current problems.

B. The British Proposal

1. Essence of the proposal.

The "high points" of the British proposal are as follows:

a. It establishes the category of "special intelligence." Items included therein of particular interest to the Army are German Army "Enigma"; German Secret Service and semi-diplomatic "Engima"; Germany "Tunney"; Japanese Purple; and JMA.

b. It provides that exploitation of the three German items shall be a British monopoly.

c. It provides that exploitation of the two Japanese items shall be mutual.

d. It lays down general principles governing the dissemination of special intelligence.

e. It provides for liaison intelligence officers between the British and American exploitation centers.

f. It calls for joint and reciprocal research and technical collaboration in the field of "cryptography," by which I believe is meant cryptanalysis.

g. It calls for reciprocal disclosures of the employment of field signal intelligence units.

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2. Principal defects of the British proposal.

One defect ~~with~~ of the British proposal is its vague and cloudy language. For instance, paragraph (h) calls for complete reciprocity in research in "cryptography," but apparently (though not certainly) the scope of this paragraph is confined to cryptanalysis. Furthermore, no specific provision has been made for exchange of what the British call "Y Intelligence." There are other ambiguities that should be cleared up.

But the most important feature of the proposal and the most undesirable from our standpoint, is the apparent exclusion of the United States from all participation in cryptanalyzing German "Enigma" and "Tunney" traffic or disseminating intelligence derived therefrom.

I do not think we should agree to this feature of the proposal. If the matter is kicked up to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we should make every effort to convince them that they should not approve this restriction on us. And I think we can be successful in this effort, because it is obviously and inherently unreasonable. Britain is relying heavily on American manpower and productive capacity to reduce "fortress Europe." In a military sense Europe is now German. How can it be argued that, in a joint British-American attempt to overthrow Germany, we should not even learn how to handle "Enigma" traffic? To say nothing of the further considerations (a) that Blechley might be bombed or suffer other catastrophe, in which case elementary security requires that we be in a position to fill in, and (b) that there is more "Enigma" traffic than the British can handle, so that supplementary exploitation by us would be immediately helpful.

On the other hand, if this matter reaches the Combined Chiefs of Staff, our request should be so framed that it will meet a sympathetic reception. We should not phrase it so broadly that it seems to envisage a duplicate operation at Arlington Hall, or to impose undue burdens on the British in supplying us with traffic and other aids.

What we really want at this time is to gain a

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foothold in "Enigma" and develop technical competence, and gradually develop a supplementary operation so as to improve joint coverage. What we ultimately want is independence, but if we get the foothold and develop our technique, independence will come anyhow. As our position in Europe gets better established, we will be less dependent on the British for intercept assistance; as our skill in dealing with the traffic grows, we will need less help in securing "cribs."

There are other bothersome points in the British proposal, but they do not appear insuperable and probably are the result of English draftsmanship. These are dealt with below under the recommendations.

C. Colonel Corderman's Proposed Revision of the British Proposal.

Colonel Corderman's memorandum of April 3, 1943, encloses a redraft of the British proposal which makes nine changes therein:

1. He revises the language of the British proposal so as more nearly to correspond to our terminology and includes definitions of cryptography and cryptanalysis. This seems to me a desirable change, but not an important one.

2. He adds J-19 and German KW to the category which the British call "Special Intelligence." Again, this seems to me to be all right, but not very important.

3. He completely revises paragraph (b) of the British proposal, with the result that the exploitation of all Special Intelligence is made a mutual and cooperative proposition. This is highly desirable, and would rectify at one stroke the critical defect in the British proposal. However, I am afraid that Colonel Corderman's solution may need a little qualification, if we are to prevail.

4. As a result of change No. 3, the whole nature of "Special Intelligence" as defined in the

British proposal is changed. Under Colonel Corderman's redraft, there is no monopoly in Special Intelligence; there is merely a specification of those codes which are so secret and important that special security precautions are desirable.

5. Colonel Corderman's redraft specifically calls for complete reciprocity in the fields of Y Intelligence and Y Inference. This is an extremely desirable change; furthermore, I doubt that the British will raise any objection.

6. He widens the access of United States and British intelligence officers who are performing liaison functions. This, again, is a desirable change.

7. He provides that the British and American Signal Intelligence Services may investigate each other in order to insure that proper security measures are being observed. I question the desirability of this provision, as it would seem to allow British officers to go wherever they please in the name of investigation. I don't believe we would like this, and I doubt whether the British would like to have our officers snooping around.

8. He provides that neither England nor the United States can cooperate in the signal intelligence field with other members of the United Nations without the agreement of the other. I question the desirability of this provision.

9. He adds a provision specifically reserving the right to withhold information relative to cryptographic systems. I agree with the purpose of this provision, but doubt its necessity, particularly if the general language of the agreement is revised in accordance with change No. 1 so that the agreement is in terms applicable only to cryptanalysis.

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D. Recommendations

1. The British proposal in its present form be not accepted.

2. We proceed on the premise that there will be no breach of relations, and submit a counterproposal.

3. That the proposal be that embodied in TAB A attached hereto.

TAB A consists of Colonel Corderman's draft, amended in the following important particulars:

a. Paragraph 2 thereof has been qualified in a manner which I believe will give us all we need at the moment, and stands a better chance of acceptance than Colonel Corderman's proposal would.

b. A sentence has been added to paragraph 7 of Colonel Corderman's draft so as to insure that we in Washington will be able to get full access to intelligence available in London, and vice versa.

c. Paragraph 8 has been very much restricted.

d. Paragraphs 12 and 13 have been omitted.

e. Definition (No. 3) of traffic analysis has been amended.

Telford Taylor
Telford Taylor
Lt. Col., AUS

SECRET

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AGREEMENT CONCERNING COOPERATION IN ALL MATTERS RELATING TO SPECIAL AND TRAFFIC ANALYSIS INTELLIGENCE

1. Certain high grade Axis codes and ciphers have been solved and, due to their complexity and value for intelligence purposes, have been specially handled as regards security. These are specified below:

a. All forms of German Enigma machine ciphers used by the German Armed Forces; all forms of Enigma Machines adapted for German Secret Service and Military and Naval Attaches.

b. All forms of German Secret Teleprinter Machine.

c. Italian Hagelin Machine and SIGMA submarine code.

d. Japanese Diplomatic Machine (Purple).

e. Japanese Naval Code known as J.N. 25.

f. Japanese Military Attache System.

g. Japanese Diplomatic J-19 (Fuji) System.

h. German Diplomatic Keyword System (Floradora).

Other systems may be added to this list by either country as the circumstances dictate, in mutual agreement.

EXPLOITATION ~~OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE AND TA INTELLIGENCE~~.

2. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and TA Intelligence in all theaters will be exploited cooperatively at all exploitation centers, with a full, free, and frank interchange of raw material, technical data, solution data and collateral intelligence. It is recognized that, at the present time, the exploitation of items a. and b. above is primarily a British responsibility, and that of items d. f. and g. a responsibility of the United States. However, with respect to all items, full advantage shall be taken of the intercept, cryptanalytic and other signal intelligence facilities of the United States and Britain, in order to improve coverage and guard against interruption of operations. To this end, the United States will furnish Britain with all raw material under items d. f. and g. which the British

lack together with such technical data, solution data and collateral intelligence as may be needed by them; Britain will furnish the United States with sufficient raw material and all technical data, solution data and collateral intelligence under items a. and b. so that the United States exploitation centers will be able to furnish supplemental coverage at all times, and provide security against interruptions in British operations.

[New paragraph ~~or items c. and e. which the Navy must write~~].

DISTRIBUTION AND SECURITY OF SPECIAL AND TA INTELLIGENCE.

3. British or U.S. Commanders-in-Chief of Naval, Military or Air Forces will receive ~~all SPECIAL and TA~~ Intelligence necessary to them for the conduct of their operations from either British or U.S. exploitation centers as may be mutually agreed. There will be an exchange of liaison officers for the purpose of facilitating the execution of this provision.

4. The distribution of intelligence from the sources in question will be governed by the fundamental principle that distribution will be restricted to the minimum and will therefore be confined solely to those who require to receive the intelligence for the proper discharge of their duties.

5. All recipients of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE whether British or American officers, shall be bound by the same regulations, the regulations now in force in the theaters of war where British forces are operating to be accepted at the present time. If at a later date either country wish to modify them in the light of further experience then this may be done by mutual agreement. The extension to officers of a knowledge of the existence of such intelligence shall be confined to as limited a number as possible and restricted to the levels of command in conformity with the above mentioned regulations. Great stress is laid on the principle that SPECIAL Intelligence should not be intermingled in reports with general intelligence from other sources. If, however, it becomes imperative to do so, the whole must be treated as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and given the same strictly limited distribution. Under no circumstances is it permissible to pass SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE in a cryptographic system which can be read by other than the authorized recipients.

6. Although TA Intelligence is not subject to the same stringent regulations as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE, since the two are closely connected, it is essential to maintain a high degree of

secrecy in the handling of TA Intelligence also. In any action taken upon it and in any documents or telegrams based upon it it is essential that its origin should be disguised and the cryptographic systems used for its dissemination absolutely secure.

7. Specially appointed U.S. officers shall have full access, at all British headquarters, to all SPECIAL and TA Intelligence. The same privilege will be extended to specially appointed British officers at all U.S. headquarters. Through these officers there shall be full and free exchange of SPECIAL and TA Intelligence of all types, between the responsible U.S. and British authorities in Washington and London.

8. The British and the U.S. Signal Intelligence Services will immediately notify each other when either has information, from any sources, indicating compromises of cryptographic systems used by the other.

COOPERATION IN CRYPTANALYSIS, AND IN CRYPTANALYTIC, INTERCEPT, D/F, AND TA APPARATUS.

9. Research in cryptanalysis and in the development of cryptanalytic, intercept, D/F, and TA apparatus shall be on an entirely reciprocal basis, together with all experiments and findings. Specially accredited U.S. representatives will continue to be welcome at all British Signal Intelligence centers, and from them nothing ~~in the field covered by this paragraph~~ will be withheld. Similarly, specially accredited British representatives will continue to be welcome at all U.S. Signal Intelligence centers, and from them nothing ~~in the field covered in this paragraph~~ will be withheld. So far as practicable, the security regulations adopted for the protection of the activities at the operations centers of the Signal Intelligence Services will be identical.

COOPERATION AND COORDINATION OF THE SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

10. Cooperation between and coordination of U.S. and British Signal Intelligence effort must take place at all levels, technical cryptanalytic information being exchanged mutually at the same level and each country to agree not to lower the classification of such information or the intelligence derived from it below that level without mutual agreement.

11. Each country shall inform the other of the employment and scope in each theater of war of their Signal Intelligence units in the field.

DEFINITIONS

1. SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. The branch of all three Services which is concerned with intercepting, decoding, interpreting, classifying and dissemination of enemy (and neutral) communications, and the use of D/F and other specialized apparatus for establishing locations and identities of enemy transmitters.

2. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. Intelligence derived from the texts of solved cryptograms is known as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. It is divided into two categories:

   a. That embracing the cryptographic systems enumerated in paragraph 1, which is based on their importance and difficulty of solution. Such material is treated with most stringent security measures.

   b. All other systems.

3. TA (TRAFFIC ANALYSIS) INTELLIGENCE. Intelligence which is derived from the study of communications, without resort to cryptanalysis. Specifically, it involves the reconstruction of communications networks; correlating the transmission frequencies and schedules employed; locating the transmitters; analyzing the volume, direction and routing of messages; developing the system of assigning and changing call signs; studying operators' conversations; noting correlations between transmission and other circumstances or evidence; deriving all possible intelligence from the foregoing studies and all other features of the traffic, without resorting to cryptanalysis. The dissemination of TA Intelligence is wider, though always treated as SECRET.

4. "EXPLOITATION" covers the decoding or deciphering of enemy cryptograms and translating, classifying and disseminating the intelligence derived therefrom.

5. Certain prefixes are used in the dissemination by telegram of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and these prefixes may occur, loosely used, to denote SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE in some of the documents they have from time to time been exchanged with the U.S. authorities. They are:

ULTRA	-	SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE passed from U.K. abroad or to ships at sea.
ZYMOTIC	-	SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE originating from Melbourne.
SINDAR	-	" " " " India.
STELL	-	" " " " Middle East

Others will be allotted from time to time as necessary.
No prefixes at present exist for TA Intelligence.

DEFINITIONS (cont'd)

6. CRYPTOGRAPHY. That branch of knowledge which treats of the various means, methods, and devices for converting plain language into cryptogram form and for reconverting the cryptogram into their plain-language form by a direct reversal of the steps or processes employed in the original conversion.

7. CRYPTANALYSIS. That branch of knowledge which treats of the various means, methods, and devices for solving cryptograms, that is, deriving their plain-language contents, without knowlege or possession of the specific method, means, or key employed in the production of the cryptograms.

~~SECRET~~

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WAR DEPARTMENT

4/8/43

From: To:

: The A. C. of S., G-2 :
: Secretary, G-2 Staff :
: The Chief, M. I. S. :
: Executive Officer :
:
: EXECUTIVE GROUP :
: Military Attache Branch :
: Personnel Branch :
: Finance Section :
: Geopolitical Section :
: Chief Clerk :
: Record Section :
: Mail Room :
:
: INTELLIGENCE GROUP :
: NAFIC _____ :
: AIC _____ :
: Dissemination Group _____ :
:
: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GROUP :
:
: FOREIGN LIAISON BRANCH :
:
: TRAINING BRANCH :
: Translation Section :
: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH :
: PRISONER OF WAR BRANCH :
: SPECIAL BRANCH :
: LIAISON, BD.ECON.WAR. :
: SECTY., INTER-AMER.DEF.BD. :
: SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF :
: EXECUTIVE OFFICER, :
: _____ :
: ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE :
: BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS :
:
: Necessary action :
: Preparation of reply :
: Recommendation or remark :
: As a matter of primary Int. :
: Note and return :
: Information :
: Mail Noted :
: File Signature :

Gen.Strong: Memo to you re "Cooperation between United States and British Signal Intelligence Services."

C.W.C.

65c

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

By authority A. C. of S., G-2
Date 4-8-43 (Bart Initials)

April 8, 1943

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MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL STRONG

SUBJECT: Cooperation between United States and British Signal Intelligence Services

1. In considering the British proposal embodied in the correspondence handed you by Sir John Dill, I believe that we must keep in mind:

(a) the manner in which the present crisis in our relations will be resolved;

(b) the long term interest of the United States Intelligence Service;

(c) our particular strength and weaknesses in the field of Signal Intelligence at the present time.

2. I firmly believe that, regardless of what Captain Hastings says to me, to you, or to anyone else, the Chiefs of Staff of the United States and British governments will not countenance an outright break and severance of contact between our respective intelligence services.

3. The British proposal is submitted as the result of the current controversy over whether or not the Americans should be permitted to exploit German Army and Secret Service "Enigma" traffic. The controversy has arisen between the United States Army G-2 as the policy maker in Signal Intelligence and the corresponding British officials. We must bear in mind that if G-2 and the British Intelligence officials each acting in accordance with what they consider to be their respective governments' best interests do not reach a solution, the problem will undoubtedly be settled at a higher level, probably by the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff, although the possibility of involvement of the President and the Prime Minister must not be forgotten. As a matter of fact, the British Chiefs of Staff in their letter to Field Marshal Sir John Dill suggest that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should consider this matter and issue a directive.

WAR DEPARTMENT

4. Signal Intelligence is a highly technical field, and the High Command will no doubt be guided largely by the advice of the experts. But, if confronted by disagreement between United States and British experts, surely their first impulse will be to tell the experts that they must reach an agreement, and if none is then forthcoming the Combined Chiefs of Staff will by directive to the experts establish an agreement themselves.

5. From time to time within G-2 and S.S.D. there has been discussion of a complete breach of relations with the British Y Service, in the event that they should persist in their demands for a British monopoly of "Enigma" exploitation. Certainly, in the employment of the delicate weapon of cryptanalysis--hardly less useful in peacetime than in wartime--it is wise to keep under constant scrutiny the advantages and disadvantages of sharing some or all of our techniques with any other country.

6. But this is wartime, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff will no doubt treat signal intelligence as one of many important wartime weapons. From a military standpoint, the United States and Britain have both profited from signal intelligence collaboration. In other military matters, so far as I know, the trend is toward increasingly close collaboration. As military activity in the European theater intensifies, the two countries must, willy-nilly, become increasingly interdependent. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will surely approach this particular question from that standpoint. Unique as the field of cryptanalysis is, I cannot conceive that they will countenance a severance of signal intelligence relations. And I think that we must approach our immediate problem on that premise. Furthermore, it seems to me that it would be poor tactics for us to mention the possibility of breaking off relations either to the British or to the Chiefs of Staff. I think the Chiefs of Staff will be so definitely opposed to such a result that this kind of talk is likely to arouse impatience and constitute an obstacle to our securing an advantageous solution of this problem.

7. Captain Hastings has, I think, striven hard to convince us that the British Y Service is quite ready to break relations if we do not accept their proposal. No doubt the British Y Service has surveyed the advantages and disadvantages of collaboration, just as we have done. But I think this kind of talk--as well as Captain Hastings' frequent disparaging allusions to the Purple and to our signal intelligence performances in general--is intended primarily to frighten us into accepting the British proposal and I strongly doubt whether they think such an upshot possible.

8. I have a feeling that the British "ultimatum" offers an opportunity to clarify the whole signal intelligence problem and to set our own house in order. Furthermore, before submitting this proposal to Sir John Dill, it may be well to point out to General Marshall the absurdity and impropriety of anything which approaches the nature of an ultimatum in times like these.

9. We should bear in mind that the British proposal comprehends Naval signal intelligence. I have never been able to learn the exact nature of the relations between the British and our own Navy in this field. Certainly we would prefer not to find ourselves isolated when this matter is finally settled. There is, however, one very important point which I would like to stress. This point is that first, last and always the primary mission of our Army Signal Intelligence Service is to intercept and solve all available enemy army traffic. Everything else is, or should be, subordinate to this primary mission. The fact that we are not yet solving the army traffic of our principal foe, to wit Japan, does not change this proposition. I firmly believe that very shortly we will be solving this traffic and will be in a position to furnish the resulting intelligence to the field commanders. We also have an army in contact with the Germans. The fact that it is an allied force is of no importance. We will sooner or later be in contact with the Germans with an independent American Army and should be in a position to do for that army the same thing that we hope to do for General MacArthur and his forces. Regardless of what we can do or will in the future be able to do, the point is that we should never put ourselves in the position of having any foreign government tell us what we can or cannot do in the matter of intelligence for our own forces.

10. In short, I conclude:

(a) that there will be no breach of relations with the British;

(b) that we should not threaten a breach;

(c) that we should emphasize the fact that it is the British, not ourselves, who are threatening a breach;

(d) that our whole effort should be concentrated on securing the most advantageous basis (from our standpoint) for a British-American collaboration;

(e) that we should submit the attached counter-proposal;

(f) that if the British reject this counter-proposal our next move should be to forget the whole matter and let Bletchley Park and Arlington Hall go their respective ways, exchanging information when it is mutually advantageous to do so.

11. Referring now to Paragraph 1 (b), "the long term interest of the United States Intelligence Service", it is an established policy of the War Department that we should have the greatest possible self-sufficiency in the field of signal intelligence. This statement, in my opinion, needs no proof. We must, however, insure that the United States representatives on the Combined Chiefs of Staff (if the matter is settled there) are made fully aware of the importance of this policy. Self-sufficiency will become increasingly important not only as the war progresses and the military situation improves but also when it reaches its final stages, ends, and we sit down to the peace table. In this latter period when post-war political adjustments move toward the center of the stage diplomatic signal intelligence will then be at a premium and the closer the end of the war appears to be the less eager the British will be to share their diplomatic secrets with us. When the parting of the ways comes, as it most assuredly will, the United States must be in full command of this art in its then state.

12. Discussing 1 (c) above, "our particular strengths and weaknesses in the field of Signal Intelligence at the present time", I feel that the United States has much indeed to gain from collaboration with the British in the field of signal intelligence.

13. Much could be said on this point, but it seems enough to point out that the present situation arises directly out of our request that the British supply us with traffic and "cribs" so that we can start to handle "Enigma." We are pressing that request to the limit; certainly it would be an unsatisfactory result for us to fail to get what we want so badly. Breaking off relations would not give us what we want.

14. Furthermore, there are numerous other types of traffic in which we do not as yet have a foothold. Before the war, our efforts were largely concentrated on Japanese diplomatic traffic, and we achieved conspicuous success. But events

are pushing us deeper and deeper into the European picture. In working on European traffic we are suffering from lack of cryptanalytic continuity, inadequate intercept facilities, and a shortage of fully trained personnel. British assistance can greatly expedite our progress, and we are now in a position to require that assistance. We should make hay.

15. Finally, concrete results have been obtained from joint attacks on difficult problems, notably JMA and German KW. If we can maintain a cooperative relationship with the British we may be able to get help from them on other unsolved systems, e.g., certain Italian secret diplomatic codes and the Scandinavian Hagelin.

The British Proposal

1. Essence of the proposal.

The "high points" of the British proposal are as follows:

(a) It establishes the category of "special intelligence." Items included therein of particular interest to the Army are German Army "Enigma"; German Secret Service and semi-diplomatic "Enigma"; German "Tunney"; Japanese Purple; and JMA.

(b) It provides that exploitation of the three German items shall be a British monopoly.

(c) It provides that exploitation of the two Japanese items shall be mutual.

(d) It lays down general principles governing the dissemination of special intelligence.

(e) It provides for liaison intelligence officers between the British and American exploitation centers.

(f) It calls for joint and reciprocal research and technical collaboration in the field of "cryptography," by which I believe is meant cryptanalysis.

(g) It calls for reciprocal disclosures of the employment of field signal intelligence units.

2. Principal defects of the British proposal.

One defect of the British proposal is its vague and cloudy language. For instance, paragraph (h) calls for complete reciprocity in research in "cryptography", but apparently (though not certainly) the scope of this paragraph is confined to cryptanalysis. Likewise, their proposal does not refer to traffic analysis (which they call "Y inference"), although it is an important feature of signal intelligence work.

But the most important feature of the proposal and the most undesirable from our standpoint, is the apparent exclusion of the United States from all participation in cryptanalyzing German "Enigma" traffic or disseminating intelligence derived therefrom.

I do not think we should agree to this feature of the proposal. If the matter is kicked up to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we should make every effort to convince them that they should not approve this restriction on us. And I think we can be successful in this effort, because it is obviously and inherently unreasonable. Britain is relying heavily on American manpower and productive capacity to reduce "fortress Europe." In a military sense Europe is now German. How can it be argued that, in a joint British-American attempt to overthrow Germany, we should not even learn how to handle "Enigma" traffic? To say nothing of the further considerations (a) that Bletchley might be bombed or suffer other catastrophe, in which case elementary security requires that we be in a position to fill in, and (b) that there is more "Enigma" traffic than the British can handle, so that supplementary exploitation by us would be immediately helpful.

On the other hand, if this matter reaches the Combined Chiefs of Staff, our request should be so framed that it will meet a sympathetic reception. We should not phrase it so broadly that it seems to envisage a duplicate operation at Arlington Hall, or to impose undue burdens on the British in supplying us with traffic and other aids.

What we really want at this time is to gain a foothold in "Enigma" and develop technical competence, and gradually develop a supplementary operation so as to improve joint coverage. What we ultimately want is independence, but if we get the foothold and develop our technique, independence will come anyhow. As our position in Europe gets better established, we will be less dependent on the British for intercept assistance; as our skill in dealing with the traffic grows, we will need less help in securing "cribs."

There are other bothersome points in the British proposal, but they do not appear insuperable and probably are the result of English draftsmanship.

16. It is recommended:

(a) that the British proposal in its present form be not accepted;

(b) that we proceed on the premise that there will be no breach of relations;

(c) that we submit the counter-proposal embodied in Tab (A) attached hereto.

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, General Staff
Chief, Special Branch, M.I.S.

TAB A

70

AGREEMENT CONCERNING COOPERATION IN MATTERS RELATING TO SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE

1. Certain high grade Axis codes and ciphers have been solved and, because of their complexity and value for intelligence purposes, have been specially handled as regards security. These are specified below:

a. All forms of German Enigma machine ciphers used by the German Armed Forces; all forms of Enigma machines adapted for German Secret Service and Military and Naval Attachés.

b. All forms of German Secret Teleprinter Machines.

c. Italian Hagelin Machine and SIGSA submarine code.

d. Japanese Diplomatic Machine (Purple).

e. Japanese Naval Code known as J. N. 25.

f. Japanese Military Attaché System.

g. Japanese Diplomatic J-19 (Fuji) System.

h. German Diplomatic Keyword System (Floradora).

Other systems may be added to this list by either country as the circumstances dictate, in mutual agreement.

EXPLOITATION

2. It is recognised that, at the present time, the exploitation of items a. and b. above is primarily a British responsibility, and that of items d., f. and g. is primarily a responsibility of the United States. However, with respect to all items, full advantage shall be taken of the intercept, cryptanalytic and other signal intelligence facilities of the United States and Britain, in order to improve coverage and guard against interruption of operations. To this end, the United States will furnish Britain that all raw material under items d., f. and g. which the British lack together with such technical data, solution data and collateral intelligence as may be needed by them;

Britain will furnish the United States with sufficient raw material and all technical data, solution data and collateral intelligence under items a. and b. so that the United States exploitation centers will be able to furnish supplemental coverage at all times, and provide security against interruptions in British operations.

DISTRIBUTION AND SECURITY OF SPECIAL AND TA INTELLIGENCE.

3. British or U.S. Commanders-in-Chief of Naval, Military or Air Forces will receive all intelligence derived from the systems listed in paragraph one, which is necessary to them for the conduct of their operations, from either British or U.S. exploitation centers as may be mutually agreed. There will be an exchange of liaison officers for the purpose of facilitating the execution of this provision.

4. The distribution of intelligence from the sources in question will be governed by the fundamental principle that distribution will be restricted to the minimum and will therefore be confined solely to those who require to receive the intelligence for the proper discharge of their duties.

5. All recipients of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE whether British or American officers, shall be bound by the same regulations, the regulations now in force in the theaters of war where British forces are operating to be accepted at the present time. If at a later date either country wish to modify them in the light of further experience then this may be done by mutual agreement. The extension to officers of a knowledge of the existence of such intelligence shall be confined to as limited a number as possible and restricted to the levels of command in conformity with the above mentioned regulations. Great stress is laid on the principle that SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE should not be intermingled in reports with general intelligence from other sources. If, however, it becomes imperative to do so, the whole must be treated as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and given the same strictly limited distribution. Under no circumstances is it permissible to pass SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE in a cryptographic system which can be read by other than the authorized recipients.

6. Although TA Intelligence is not subject to the same stringent regulations as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE, since the two are closely connected, it is essential to maintain a high degree of

secrecy in the handling of TA Intelligence also. In any action taken upon such intelligence and in any documents or telegrams based upon it, it is essential that its origin be disguised and that the cryptographic systems used for its dissemination be absolutely secure.

7. Specially appointed U.S. officers shall have full access, at all British headquarters, to all SPECIAL and TA Intelligence. The same privilege will be extended to specially appointed British officers at all U.S. headquarters. Through specially accredited liaison officers there shall be full and free exchange of SPECIAL and TA Intelligence of all types, between the responsible U.S. and British authorities in Washington and London.

8. The British and the U.S. Signal Intelligence Services will immediately notify each other when either has information, from any sources, indicating compromises of cryptographic systems used by the other.

COOPERATION IN CRYPTANALYSIS, AND IN CRYPTANALYTIC, INTERCEPT, [illegible]

9. Research in cryptanalysis and in the development of cryptanalytic, intercept, D/F, and TA apparatus shall be on an entirely reciprocal basis, together with all experiments and findings. Specially accredited U.S. representatives will continue to be welcome at all British "Y" centers, and from them nothing will be withheld. Similarly, specially accredited British representatives will continue to be welcome at all U.S. Signal Intelligence centers and from them nothing will be withheld. So far as practicable, the security regulations adopted for the protection of the activities at the operations centers of the Signal Intelligence Services will be identical.

COOPERATION AND COORDINATION OF THE SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

10. Cooperation between and coordination of U.S. and British "Y" effort must take place at all levels, technical cryptanalytic information being exchanged mutually at the area level and each country to agree not to lower the classification of such information or the intelligence derived from it below that level without mutual agreement.

11. Each country shall inform the other of the employment and scope in each theater of war of their "Y" units in the field.

DEFINITIONS

1. "Y" SERVICE OR SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. The British, U.S. Army, and U.S. Navy services concerned with intercepting, decoding, interpreting, classifying and dissemination of enemy (and neutral) communications, and the use of D/F and other specialized apparatus for establishing locations and identities of enemy transmitters.

2. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. Intelligence derived from the texts of solved cryptograms (enemy and neutral) is known as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. It is divided into two categories:

   a. That embracing the cryptographic systems enumerated in paragraph 1, which is based on their importance and difficulty of solution. Such material is treated with most stringent security measures.

   b. All other systems.

3. TR/I OR TA (TRAFFIC ANALYSIS) INTELLIGENCE. Intelligence which is derived from the study of communications, without resort to cryptanalysis. Specifically, it involves the reconstruction of communications networks; correlating the transmission frequencies and schedules employed; locating the transmitters; analyzing the volume, direction and routing of messages; developing the system of assigning and changing call signs; studying operators' conversations; noting correlations between transmission and other circumstances or evidence; deriving all possible intelligence from the foregoing studies and all other features of the traffic, without resorting to cryptanalysis. The dissemination of TA Intelligence is wider, though always treated as SECRET.

4. "CRYPTANALYSIS" covers the decoding or deciphering of enemy cryptograms and translating, classifying and disseminating the intelligence derived therefrom.

5. Certain prefixes are used in the dissemination by telegram of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and those prefixes may occur, locally used, to denote SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE in some of the documents they have from time to time been exchanged with the U.S. authorities. They are:

ULTRA	-	SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE passed from U.K. abroad or to ships at sea.
[illegible]	-	SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE originating from Melbourne.
[illegible]	-	" " " " India.
[illegible]	-	" " " " Middle East.

Others will be allotted from time to time as necessary. No prefixes are [illegible] for TA Intelligence.

DEFINITIONS (cont'd)

6. CRYPTOGRAPHY. That branch of knowledge which treats of the various means, methods, and devices for converting plain language into cryptogram form and for reconverting the cryptogram into their plain-language form by a direct reversal of the steps or processes employed in the original conversion.

7. CRYPTANALYSIS. That branch of knowledge which treats of the various means, methods, and devices for solving cryptograms, that is, deriving their plain-language contents, without knowledge or possession of the specific method, means, or key employed in the production of the cryptograms.

~~MOST SECRET.~~

AZ/232

LETTER ADDRESSED TO FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL

BY CHIEFS OF STAFF.

You have already been made familiar with certain aspects of the position between U.S. Army Intelligence, U.S. Navy Intelligence and our own Intelligence Services in regard to our Most Secret Sources by the steps you took last December and January (during Colonel Tiltman's visit) to clarify the matter with General Marshall. Copies of the correspondence you had with him are in our hands.

In particular your letter of 7th January 1943 and General McNarney's reply of 9th January have laid down a general principle, intended to cover the subject of our Most Secret Sources of intelligence, in a most satisfactory way.

We now wish to make this general principle operative throughout the British and the American "Y" Services, laying down more specifically certain provisions as a directive to the officers who have to deal with the many points that arise almost daily in connection with operational handling of the material in question. The intention is to cover all matters connected with SPECIAL and "Y" Intelligence, Interception, Cryptography and Security, from the decoding of Axis messages in their highest grade cyphers down to the extraction of Intelligence from plain language telephony transmitted from aircraft and field stations. We feel sure that the American "Y" Services will welcome this suggestion as it must be as difficult for their officers to deal with ours as for ours with them and they are, as we know, as anxious about security as we are.

So delicate however is the technique of handling this type of Intelligence that if absolute security is to be maintained it is essential that the same methods should be pursued by both countries at every level and in every area concerned, since a leakage at any one point would jeopardize this source of intelligence not in one area only but in all theatres of war and for all 3 Fighting Services.

The points on which we are anxious to achieve agreement in elaboration of the general agreement for complete reciprocity reached between you and General Marshall are set out below and we would suggest that you should submit them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order that a directive on these lines can be issued.

SOURCES OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Certain high grade Axis codes and cyphers have been solved and, due to their complexity and value for intelligence purposes, have been specially handled as regards security. These are specified below and are the sources from which, and from which alone so called SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE is derived. They are:-

(i) All forms of German Enigma machine cyphers used by the German Armed Forces; all forms of 4-wheel Enigma Machine adapted for German Secret Service and Military and Naval Attaches.

(ii) All forms of German Secret Teleprinter Machine.

(iii) Italian Hagelin Machine and SIGSA submarine code.

(iv) Japanese Diplomatic Machine (Purple).

(v) Japanese Naval Code known as J.N.25.

(vi) Japanese Military Attache Code.

Other cyphers may be added to this list by either country as the circumstances dictate, in mutual agreement.

Same as #65 above.

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EXPLOITATION OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE.

(b) The exploitation of items (i), (ii) and (iii) will be left in British hands in all theatres of war in Europe, or in proximity to Europe, or where the Command is British. German Naval Enigma submarine keys will continue to be exploited by America, and the British as now.

Item (iv) will be exploited mutually as at present.

Item (v) will be exploited by America in the S.W. Pacific (conjointly with the British unit in Australia) and in the Command area of the C. in C. Eastern Fleet by the British.

Item (vi) will be exploited mutually as now.

DISTRIBUTION AND SECURITY OF SPECIAL AND "Y" INTELLIGENCE.

(c) British or U.S. Commanders-in-Chief of Naval, Military or Air Forces will receive all SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE necessary to them for the conduct of their operations from either British or U.S. exploitation centres as may be mutually agreed.

(d) The distribution of intelligence from the sources in question will be governed by the fundamental principle that distribution will be restricted to the minimum and will therefore be confined solely to those who require to receive the intelligence for the proper discharge of their duties.

(e) All recipients of SPECIAL or "Y" Intelligence, whether British or American Officers, shall be bound by the same regulations, the regulations now in force in the theatres of war where British forces are operating to be accepted at the present time. If at a later date either country wish to modify them in the light of further experience then this may be done by mutual agreement. The extension to officers of a knowledge of the existence of such intelligence shall be confined to as limited a number as possible and restricted to the levels of command in conformity with the above mentioned regulations. Great stress is laid on the principle that Intelligence from these cyphers should not be intermingled in reports with that from other sources. If, however, it becomes imperative to do so the whole must be treated as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and given the same strictly limited distribution. Under no circumstances is it permissible to pass SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE in a cypher which can be read by other than the authorised recipients.

(f) Although "Y" Intelligence is not subject to the same stringent regulations as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE, since the two are closely connected, it is essential to maintain a high degree of secrecy in the handling of "Y" Intelligence also. In any action taken upon it and in any documents or telegrams based upon it it is essential that its origin should be disguised and the cyphers used for its dissemination absolutely secure.

(g) Specially appointed officers shall have full access in the British Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry to all SPECIAL and "Y" Intelligence. The same privilege will be extended to British officers in America.

COOPERATION OVER RESEARCH IN CRYPTOGRAPHY AND MOST SECRET DEVICES.

(h) Research on cryptography and all the means mechanical and scientific appertaining thereto shall be on an entirely reciprocal basis, together with all experiments and findings. U.S. Liaison officers will continue to be welcome at the British "Y" Centre in the U.K. and from those specially accredited nothing will be withheld. Similarly in the U.S. qualified British representatives will have access to all information. Either country reserves the right to refuse "exploitation" of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE to the other until it is satisfied that the necessity for dual exploitation exists and that the information is to be disseminated only to those to whom it is essential.

COOPERATION AND COORDINATION OF THE "Y" SERVICES.

(i) Cooperation between and coordination of U.S. and British "Y" effort must

take place at all levels, technical cryptographic information being exchanged mutually at the same level and each country to agree not to degrade such information or the intelligence derived from it below that level without mutual agreement.

(j) Each country shall inform the other of the employment and scope in each theatre of war of their "Y" units in the field.

7th March, 1943.

DEFINITIONS

1) "Y" SERVICE. The branch of all three Services which is concern intercepting, decoding, interpreting, grading and dissemination (and neutral) signals, and the use of D/F apparatus for establish locations of enemy transmitters.

2) SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. Certain enemy cyphers have been placed in a special category, owing to their importance and difficulty of solution The intelligence derived from these cyphers is known as SPECIAL INTELLI Such material is treated with most stringent security measures, a copy which is attached hereto.

3) "Y" INTELLIGENCE. Intelligence derived from the solution of lower grade cyphers. Such cyphers may under certain circumstances be upgraded to the "Special" class. The dissemination of "Y" Intelligence is wider thou always treated as Most Secret.

Whereas SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE is confined to a very strictly limited nu of the most highly placed officers and is mainly of strategical importance "Y" Intelligence may be used tactically.

4) "EXPLOITATION" has no commercial significance but is used to cover the decoding, interpretation, grading and dissemination of all intelligence derived from the activities of the "Y" Service.

5) Certain prefixes are used in the dissemination by telegram of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and these prefixes may occur, loosely used, to denote SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE in some of the documents that have from time to time been exchanged with the U.S. authorities.

They are:-

ULTRA = SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE passed from U.K. abroad or to ships at sea.

ZENITH = SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE originating from Melbourne.

SPOOR = " " " " India.

SELL = " " " " Middle East.

Others will be allotted from time to time as necessary.

No prefixes at present exist for "Y" Intelligence.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

April 12, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Cooperation between United States and British Signal Intelligence Services.

SUMMARY

1. The British Cryptanalytic Service ("Y" Service), through Field Marshal Sir John Dill, has put forward a proposal (TAB A) under which the British would have a complete monopoly in the handling of German armed forces and Secret Service communications. This monopoly would extend not only to the technical processing of the traffic, but also to the dissemination of intelligence derived from it. The British have suggested informally that, if we do not agree to their proposal, they may break off entirely cooperative relations between them and ourselves in the signal intelligence field.

2. The British proposal is unreasonable, and it does not meet the requirements of the situation. The United States Army cannot consent to a proposal which would exclude it from any participation in the technical handling of German Military traffic, and from any share in disseminating derived intelligence.

3. I have prepared a revision (TAB B) of the British proposal, which I believe is a reasonable solution of this question.

4. Action recommended: That the attached draft, TAB B, be presented to the British for concurrence.

Geo. V. Strong

GEO. V. STRONG
Major General
A. C. of S., G-2

See 74 + 75 73

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

April 12, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Cooperation between United States and British Signal Intelligence Services.

1. During the past 2 years, the British and ourselves have been exchanging cryptanalytic information and intelligence derived from enemy encoded communications. This exchange has been of substantial benefit to both countries. Recently, however, the British officers in control of their cryptanalytic service (which they call the "Y" Service) have put forward a proposal which threatens the continuance of this mutually advantageous relationship.

2. The British have succeeded in developing a technique for "breaking" highly secret cipher systems (known as "E" traffic) used by the German armed forces and Secret Service. A very few United States liaison officers were shown the technique in England, and as a result we have developed an analogous (though not identical) method for handling this traffic. However, our progress will be much retarded unless the British cooperate by furnishing us with some "raw" intercepted messages and collateral intelligence which they, by virtue of their proximity to Europe and their longer experience in this field, can and do obtain more easily than we can by the utilization of <u>present</u> facilities.

3. To date, the British "Y" Service has declined to cooperate in this respect. They have taken the attitude that the cryptanalysis of "E" traffic <u>and the dissemination of intelligence derived therefrom</u> should be left entirely in British hands. Furthermore, the British have recently put forward, through Field Marshal Sir John Dill, a proposed general agreement between the United States and British Signal Intelligence Services. Under this proposed agreement (attached

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hereto as TAB A), German "E" traffic, Japanese secret diplomatic traffic, and a few related types of German and Japanese secret systems are placed in a special category called "Special Intelligence." The "exploitation" (which includes both technical handling and dissemination of intelligence) of German "E" traffic is declared to be a British monopoly; the Japanese traffic, to which the British contribute less than 40%, is to be "exploited" on a mutual and cooperative basis as heretofore. The British have suggested informally that if we do not agree to their proposal they may decide to break off relations entirely in the signal intelligence field.

4. I believe that the British "Y" Service is mistaken and, indeed, quite unreasonable in demanding a British monopoly for the handling of German Military and Secret Service communications. As you can well understand, this is one of the most important sources of military intelligence in the European-African theater. There is more of this "E" traffic than the British are equipped to handle, and our participation should yield more intelligence than is now being procured from this source. Furthermore, Britain is not yet immune from bombing, and the possibility of interruptions in British exploitation of this traffic must not be overlooked. Elementary security requires that the United States be in a position to provide both materiel and trained personnel if necessary. But, more fundamentally, the attitude of the British "Y" Service seems to me strangely out of keeping with the times. The British and ourselves have embarked on the gigantic task of destroying German military power. I do not see how they can reasonably say to us that we should not even <u>learn how</u> to handle German military secret communications and extract intelligence from them. Nor do I understand why the British "Y" Service should serve an "ultimatum" on us under these circumstances, and demand compliance as the price of continued collaboration in other types of signal intelligence. I cannot believe that the British members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff would approve the attitude which the "Y" Service has assumed.

5. However, there is one matter which the

British "Y" officers have repeatedly raised, in connection with which they are on firmer ground. As you know, intelligence derived from cryptanalysis must be handled under rigorous security safeguards lest the source be dried up. The British "Y" Service is highly centralized; the dissemination of intelligence is carefully controlled at central headquarters, and theater commanders are given only such information as is vital to them. Our Signal Intelligence Service is quite different. Signal intelligence units attached to the theater commands are not directly controlled by the War Department, but operate semi-independently under the theater commanders. Often we have very little information in Washington about the operations of these units. The British believe this is poor security, and point to this situation as a reason why we should not be entrusted with a share in exploiting "E" traffic. I think their criticism is, to a degree, well-founded, that we should promptly take steps to rectify this situation, and that we should so inform the British.

6. With respect to the British "Y" Service proposal submitted through Field Marshal Sir John Dill, I do not see how we can agree to it in its present form. If we do, we deprive ourselves of any participation in extracting intelligence from German military secret communications, and any share in disseminating derived intelligence.

7. Attached hereto as TAB B is a revision of the British agreement which I believe is a reasonable solution of this question. There are a few other shortcomings in the British proposal, but I do not believe the correction of these, as proposed in TAB B, will present any serious problems.

8. <u>Action recommended</u>: That the attached draft, TAB B, embodying a revision of the British proposal submitted through Field Marshal Sir John Dill (TAB A), be presented to the British for concurrence therein.

Geo. V. Strong

GEO. V. STRONG
Major General
A. C. of S., G-2

TAB A TO 74

LETTER ADDRESSED TO FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL

BY CHIEFS OF STAFF.

You have already been made familiar with certain aspects of the position between U.S. Army Intelligence, U.S. Navy Intelligence and our own Intelligence Services in regard to our Most Secret Sources by the steps you took last December and January (during Colonel Tiltman's visit) to clarify the matter with General Marshall. Copies of the correspondence you had with him are in our hands.

In particular your letter of 7th January 1943 and General McNarney's reply of 9th January have laid down a general principle, intended to cover the subject of our Most Secret Sources of Intelligence, in a most satisfactory way.

We now wish to make this general principle operative throughout the British and the American "Y" Services, laying down more specifically certain provisions as a directive to the officers who have to deal with the many points that arise almost daily in connection with operational handling of the material in question. The intention is to cover all matters connected with SPECIAL and "Y" Intelligence, Interception, Cryptography and Security, from the decoding of Axis messages in their highest grade cyphers down to the extraction of Intelligence from plain language telephony transmitted from aircraft and field stations. We feel sure that the American "Y" Services will welcome this suggestion as it must be as difficult for their officers to deal with ours as for ours with them and they are, as we know, as anxious about security as we are.

So delicate however is the technique of handling this type of Intelligence that if absolute security is to be maintained it is essential that the same methods should be pursued by both countries at every level and in every area concerned, since a leakage at any one point would jeopardize this source of intelligence not in one area only but in all theaters of war and for all 3 Fighting Services.

The points on which we are anxious to achieve agreement in elaboration of the general agreement for complete reciprocity reached between you and General Marshall are set out below and we would suggest that you should submit them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order that a directive on these lines can be issued.

SOURCES OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Certain high grade Axis codes and cyphers have been solved and, due to their complexity and value for intelligence purposes, have been specially handled as regards security. These are specified below and are the sources from which, and from which alone so called SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE is derived. They are:-

(i) All forms of German Enigma machine cyphers used by the German Armed Forces; all forms of 4-wheel Enigma Machine adapted for German Secret Service and Military and Naval Attachés.

(ii) All forms of German Secret Teleprinter Machine.

(iii) Italian Hagelin Machine and SIGMA submarine code.

(iv) Japanese Diplomatic Machine (Purple).

(v) Japanese Naval Code known as J.N.25.

(vi) Japanese Military Attache Code.

Other cyphers may be added to this list by either country as the circumstances dictate, in mutual agreement.

EXPLOITATION OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE.

(b) The exploitation of items (i), (ii) and (iii) will be left in British hands in all theatres of war in Europe, or in proximity to Europe, or where the Command is British. German Naval Enigma submarine keys will continue to be exploited by America, and the British as now.

Item (iv) will be exploited mutually as at present.

Item (v) will be exploited by America in the S.W. Pacific (conjointly with the British unit in Australia) and in the Command area of the C. in C. Eastern Fleet by the British.

Item (vi) will be exploited mutually as now.

DISTRIBUTION AND SECURITY OF SPECIAL AND "Y" INTELLIGENCE.

(c) British or U.S. Commanders-in-Chief of Naval, Military or Air Forces will receive all SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE necessary to them for the conduct of their operations from either British or U.S. exploitation centres as may be mutually agreed.

(d) The distribution of intelligence from the sources in question will be governed by the fundamental principle that distribution will be restricted to the minimum and will therefore be confined solely to those who require to receive the intelligence for the proper discharge of their duties.

(e) All recipients of SPECIAL or "Y" Intelligence, whether British or American Officers, shall be bound by the same regulations, the regulations now in force in the theatres of war where British forces are operating to be accepted at the present time. If at a later date either country wish to modify them in the light of further experience then this may be done by mutual agreement. The extension to officers of a knowledge of the existence of such intelligence shall be confined to as limited a number as possible and restricted to the levels of command in conformity with the above mentioned regulations. Great stress is laid on the principle that Intelligence from these cyphers should not be intermingled in reports with that from other sources. If, however, it becomes imperative to do so the whole must be treated as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and given the same strictly limited distribution. Under no circumstances is it permissible to pass SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE in a cypher which can be read by other than the authorized recipients.

(f) Although "Y" Intelligence is not subject to the same stringent regulations as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE, since the two are closely connected, it is essential to maintain a high degree of secrecy in the handling of "Y" Intelligence also. In any action taken upon it and in any documents or telegrams based upon it it is essential that is origin should be disguised and the cyphers used for its dissemination absolutely secure.

(g) Specially appointed officers shall have full access in the British Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry to all SPECIAL and "Y" Intelligence. The same privilege will be extended to British officers in America.

COOPERATION OVER RESEARCH IN CRYPTOGRAPHY AND MOST SECRET DEVICES.

(h) Research on cryptography and all the means mechanical and scientific appertaining thereto shall be on an entirely reciprocal basis, together with all experiments and findings. U.S. Liaison officers will continue to be welcome at the British "Y" Centre in the U.K. and from those specially accredited nothing will be withheld. Similarly in the U.S. qualified British representatives will have access to all information. Either country reserves the right to refuse "exploitation" of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE to the other until it is satisfied that the necessity for dual exploitation exists and that the information is to be disseminated only to those to whom it is essential.

COOPERATION AND COORDINATION OF THE "Y" SERVICES.

(i) Cooperation between and coordination of U.S. and British "Y" effort must take place at all levels, technical cryptographic information being exchanged mutually at the same level and each country to agree not to degrade such information or the intelligence derived from it below that level without mutual agreement.

(j) Each country shall inform the other of the employment and scope in each theatre of war of their "Y" units in the field.

7th March, 1943.

DEFINITIONS

1) "Y" SERVICE. The branch of all three Services which is concerned with intercepting, decoding, interpreting, grading and dissemination of enemy (and neutral) signals, and the use of D/F apparatus for establishing locations of enemy transmitters.

2) SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. Certain enemy cyphers have been placed in a special category, owing to their importance and difficulty of solution. The intelligence drived from these cyphers is known as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. Such material is treated with most stringent security measures, a copy of which is attached hereto.

3) "Y" INTELLIGENCE. Intelligence drived from the solution of lower grade cyphers. Such cyphers may under certain circumstances be upgraded to the "Special" class. The dissemination of "Y" Intelligence is wider though always treated as Most Secret.

TAB B TO #74.

Whereas SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE is confined to a very strictly limited number of the most highly place officers and is mainly of strategical importance, "Y" Intelligence may be used tactically.

4) "[illegible] INTELLIGENCE" has no commercial significance but is used to cover the decoding, interpretation, grading and dissemination of all intelligence derived from the activities of the "Y" Service.

5) Certain prefixes are used in the dissemination by telegram of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and these prefixes may occur, loosely used, to denote SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE in some of the documents that have from time to time been exchanged with the U.S. authorities.

They are:-

ULTRA = SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE passed from U.K. abroad or to ships at sea.

[illegible] = SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE originating from Melbourne.

[illegible] = " " " " India.

[illegible] = " " " " Middle East.

Others will be allotted from time to time as necessary.

No prefixes at present exist for "Y" Intelligence.

26th February, 1943

AGREEMENT CONCERNING COOPERATION IN
MATTERS RELATING TO SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE

1. Certain high grade Axis codes and ciphers have been solved and, because of their complexity and value for intelligence purposes, have been specially handled as regards security. These are specified below:

a. All forms of German Enigma machine ciphers used by the German Armed Forces; all forms of Enigma machines adapted for German Secret Service and Military and Naval Attachés.

b. All forms of German Secret Teleprinter Machines.

c. Italian Hagelin Machine and SIGMA submarine code.

d. Japanese Diplomatic Machine (Purple).

e. Japanese Naval Code known as J. N. 25.

f. Japanese Military Attaché System.

g. Japanese Diplomatic J-19 (Fuji) System.

h. German Diplomatic Keyword System (Floradora).

Other systems may be added to this list by either country as the circumstances dictate, in mutual agreement.

EXPLOITATION

2. It is recognized that, at the present time, the exploitation of items a. and b. above is primarily a British responsibility, and that of items d., f. and g. is primarily a responsibility of the United States. However, with respect to all items, full advantage shall be taken of the intercept, cryptanalytic and other signal intelligence facilities of the United States and Britain, in order to improve coverage and guard against interruption of operations. To this end, the United States will furnish Britain with all raw material under items d., f. and g. which the British lack together with such technical data, solution data and collateral intelligence as may be needed by them;

Britain will furnish the United States with sufficient raw material and all technical data, solution data and collateral intelligence under items a. and b. so that the United States expolitation centers will be able to furnish supplemental coverage at all times, and provide security against interruptions in British operations.

DISTRIBUTION AND SECURITY OF SPECIAL AND TA INTELLIGENCE.

3. British or U.S. Commanders-in-Chief of Naval, Military or Air Forces will receive all intelligence derived from the systems listed in paragraph one, which is necessary to them for the conduct of their operations, from either British or U.S. exploitation centers as may be mutually agreed. There will be an exchange of liaison officers for the purpose of facilitating the execution of this provision.

4. The distribution of intelligence from the sources in question will be governed by the fundamental principle that distribution will be restricted to the minimum and will therefore be confined solely to those who require to receive the intelligence for the proper discharge of their duties.

5. All recipients of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE whether British or American officers, shall be bound by the same regulations, the regulations now in force in the theaters of war where British forces are operating to be accepted at the present time. If at a later date either country wish to modify them in the light of further experience then this may be done by mutual agreement. The extension to officers of a knowledge of the existence of such intelligence shall be confined to as limited a number as possible and restricted to the levels of command in conformity with the above mentioned regulations. Great stress is laid on the principle that SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE should not be intermingled in reports with general intelligance from other sources. If, however, it becomes imperative to do so, the whole must be treated as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and given the same strictly limited distribution. Under no circumstances is it permissible to pass SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE in a cryptographic system which can be read by other than the authorized recipients.

6. Although TA Intelligence is not subject to the same stringent regulations as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE, since the two are closely connected, it is essential to maintain a high degree of

secrecy in the handling of TA Intelligence also. In any action taken upon such intelligence and in any documents or telegrams based upon it, it is essential that its origin be disguised and that the cryptographic systems used for its dissemination be absolutely secure.

7. Specially appointed U.S. officers shall have full access, at all British headquarters, to all SPECIAL and TA Intelligence. The same privilege will be extended to specially appointed British officers at all U.S. headquarters. Through specially accredited liaison officers there shall be full and free exchange of SPECIAL and TA Intelligence of all types, between the responsible U.S. and British authorities in Washington and London.

8. The British and the U.S. Signal Intelligence Services will immediately notify each other when either has information, from any sources, indicating compromises of cryptographic systems used by the other.

COOPERATION IN CRYPTANALYSIS, AND IN CRYPTANALYTIC, INTERCEPT, D/F, AND TA APPARATUS.

9. Research in cryptanalysis and in the development of cryptanalytic, intercept, D/F, and TA apparatus shall be on an entirely reciprocal basis, together with all experiments and findings. Specially accredited U.S. representatives will continue to be welcome at all British "Y" centers, and from them nothing will be withheld. Similarly, specially accredited British representatives will continue to be welcome at all U.S. Signal Intelligence centers and from them nothing will be withheld. So far as practicable, the security regulations adopted for the protection of the activities at the operations centers of the Signal Intelligence Services will be identical.

COOPERATION AND COORDINATION OF THE SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

10. Cooperation between and coordination of U.S. and British "Y" effort must take place at all levels, technical cryptanalytic information being exchanged mutually at the same level and each country to agree not to lower the classification of such information or the intelligence derived from it below that level without mutual agreement.

11. Each country shall inform the other of the employment and scope in each theater of war of their "Y" units in the field.

DEFINITIONS

1. "Y" SERVICE OR SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. The British, U.S. Army, and U.S. Navy services concerned with intercepting, decoding, interpreting, classifying and dissemination of enemy (and neutral) communications, and the use of D/F and other specialized apparatus for establishing locations and identities of enemy transmitters.

2. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. Intelligence derived from the texts of solved cryptograms (enemy and neutral) is known as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. It is divided into two categories:

   a. That embracing the cryptographic systems enumerated in paragraph 1, which is based on their importance and difficulty of solution. Such material is treated with most stringent security measures.

   b. All other systems.

3. WT/I OR TA (TRAFFIC ANALYSIS) INTELLIGENCE. Intelligence which is derived from the study of communications, without resort to cryptanalysis. Specifically, it involves the reconstruction of communications networks; correlating the transmission frequencies and schedules employed; locating the transmitters; analyzing the volume, direction and routing of messages; developing the system of assigning and changing call signs; studying operators' conversations; noting correlations between transmission and other circumstances or evidence; deriving all possible intelligence from the foregoing studies and all other features of the traffic, without resorting to cryptanalysis. The dissemination of TA Intelligence is wider, though always treated as SECRET.

4. "EXPLOITATION" covers the decoding or deciphering of enemy cryptograms and translating, classifying and disseminating the intelligence derived therefrom.

5. Certain prefixes are used in the dissemination by telegram of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and these prefixes may occur, loosely used, to denote SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE in some of the documents they have from time to time been exchanged with the U.S. authorities. They are:

ULTRA	-	SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE passed from U.K. abroad or to ships at sea.
ZYMOTIC	-	SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE originating from Melbourne.
SIRDAR	-	" " " " India.
SWELL	-	" " " " Middle East.

Others will be allotted from time to time as necessary. No prefixes at present exist for TA Intelligence.

DEFINITIONS (cont'd)

6. CRYPTOGRAPHY. That branch of knowledge which treats of the various means, methods, and devices for converting plain language into cryptogram form and for reconverting the cryptogram into their plain-language form by a direct reversal of the steps or processes employed in the original conversion.

7. CRYPTANALYSIS. That branch of knowledge which treats of the various means, methods, and devices for solving cryptograms, that is, deriving their plain-language contents, without knowledge or possession of the specific method, means, or key employed in the production of the cryptograms.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

April 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL CLARKE

Subject: Blechley Park v. Arlington Hall.

1. I fear our gentle Allies will not be happy with "dropping the whole thing." They are likely to pursue their efforts to obtain a directive embodying their proposal. They won out in the Turing case. They have direct access to W. C. and therefore to F. D. R. The Sea Lord knows we prepared a counter-proposal; he will now deduce that we couldn't put it across. Our cousins will want to get us tied up now, while they own a hot iron.

2. Our counterproposal is so clearly reasonable and sound that it must have been turned down for reasons other than the merits. Perhaps the C. of S., having been let down on Turing, is fearful of being let down again.

3. Likewise, we will never make progress as long as the British (a) can play various U. S. organizations off against each other, and (b) have a direct channel to W. C. and F. D. R. while we have none.

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

4. Ergo, we must solidify our position as rapidly as possible. We have, I think, a potential Ally in the State Department, which is dependent on us for diplomatic intelligence of this type. I think General Strong, or you, should discuss the matter with Sumner Welles.

5. We should also recapture from our sailors the function of "servicing" the White House with this intelligence, and develop a channel thereby.

6. We should also, as soon as possible, commence construction of a fixed intercept station in the European theater.

Spoken rashly and out of great ignorance.

T. T.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

April 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL STRONG:

SUBJECT: Discussions with British regarding Bletchley Park vs. Arlington Hall

1. In order to get on paper the thoughts which I rather vaguely voiced to you this morning I would like to submit for your consideration the following alternatives:

First: We can continue to press this matter with both General Marshall and the British; or

Second: We drop the whole affair and employ another tack.

2. As for the first line of action, since our counter-proposal is so clearly reasonable and sound, General Marshall must be "side-stepping" for reasons other than the merits of the case. Perhaps having been let down in the Turing case he is fearful of being let down again. Does General Marshall realize that large as our S.S. operations are compared to what they were a year ago, they are still on a very, very small scale compared with various comparable operations of the British. This is also true of the intelligence side of the picture, and so long as it remains true we will continue to be at a disadvantage in dealing with the British in this field. At present they receive from us, in one way or another, the whole output of our radio intercept activities. We, on the other hand, got from them only what they choose to give us. Of the enormous number of Continental European messages which they intercept and read--said by British officers to run as high as 4,000 per day of German "E" traffic alone--they give us nothing in its original form, and practically nothing in any other form. They give our Generals who command Allied forces such information as, in the opinion of the British authorities, is "necessary" in the conduct of operations, and they have an exchange of naval traffic and information with our Navy. Except for what is obtained in these two ways, we get the intelligence derived from British intercept facilities only when it becomes public information, or is given to the economic warfare authorities, or is communicated to the State Department or some other U.S. agency for the purpose of inducing action or because the British

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FOR VICTORY BUY WAR

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think it to their advantage to keep us informed. Thus there are today 2 classes of intercept intelligence--that which is a British monopoly and that which is shared equally with the British. The first includes the bulk of the intelligence about Europe. This situation leaves us in ignorance of a mass of information about Europe which, in the nature of things, must add up to a considerable body of intelligence. Though the British defend their position on security grounds, it is obvious that they can maintain it only because they think they have nothing more to gain from us in this field; that if present relations were to be severed we would lose much more than they. They do not have a high opinion of Arlington Hall, and they know that their intelligence activities in the cryptanalytic field are on a much larger scale than ours, with the result that they get more information and better information than we do, and they get it more quickly because their facilities are better and their trained manpower more numerous. While we may be able to break down the British insistence on a complete monopoly of German "E" traffic--the class of Continental European traffic having the greatest military significance--we will never get on a parity with the British in the field of intercept intelligence, unless and until we attain greater independence in the cryptanalytic field and pay more attention to the intelligence aspects of that field. Unless we are careful, therefore, we are as likely as not to end the war in the position of having shared with our ally our one great cryptanalytic attainment--the breaking of the Japanese machine cipher and reconstruction of the machine--and having got very little in return.

3. In view of the rumblings that are going on beneath the service and the possibility of a strong comeback by Donovan, I feel that we would be unwise to press General Marshall any further. We might be playing too strongly into Donovan's hands.

4. As for the second proposal, to drop the whole thing, I greatly fear that the British would not be at all happy with, nor will they consent to, dropping the whole thing. They are very likely to pursue their efforts to obtain a directive embodying their proposal. They won out in the Turing case by having direct access to W.C. and therefore to F.D.R. They, of course, know that we prepared a counterproposal, and they will now deduce that we were unable to put it across. They will, therefore, make every effort to get us tied up now while they have control of the hot iron.

5. I am convinced that we will never make real progress so long as the British can continue to play various U.S. organizations off one against the other and have at the same time a direct channel to W.C. and F.D.R. while we have none. I think that we should immediately send to London at least six of the ablest and most agressive officers that we can find. These officers would go into the Air Ministry, the Foreign Office, the Office of the D.M.I., Office of D.N.I., etc., and devote their entire time to discovering and transmitting to us all possible intelligence. At the same time Arlington Hall can be doing the same thing at Bletchley Park.

6. While this is going on we should on this side of the water be striving to solidify our position as rapidly as possible. We have, I think, a potential ally in the State Department which now is totally dependent on us for diplomatic intelligence activities. I strongly recommend, if you can do so, that you discuss this entire matter with ~~Secretary Stimson and~~ Mr. Sumner Welles. We should also "recapture" the function of servicing the White House with our particular intelligence, developing an additional channel to the highest level.

7. I have given considerable thought lately to the advisability of moving this Branch out of the Pentagon Building to some secluded spot separated physically from the rest of G-2 and also from Arlington Hall. There are certain functions in connection with our activity which we have not developed, and which the British employ to their very great advantage, ~~which we have not developed~~, and which if developed at all should obviously be kept separate from our normal intelligence and counter-intelligence organization. By this latter I mean an information service, or secret service if you prefer, patterned after the British Secret Service but created with our own particular problems and national psychology in mind. I am prepared to embark on this undertaking whenever I get the green light from you.

WDGE
GVS

April 20, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER H. REIMAN,
Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. Reference our conversation yesterday afternoon, the main points of difference concern the allocation and the "exploitation" of the matters covered in the Memorandum of the British Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated March 7. You will note that this allocation puts Items 1, 2 and 3, from a practical standpoint, entirely in the hands of the British. As far as Items 4, 5 and 6 are concerned, the matter is on an equal basis. The net result is, if you choose to look at it from an arithmetical standpoint, the British have a 75 per cent interest and the Americans a 25 per cent. [illegible] this [illegible] in full, [illegible] exchange on a [illegible] basis. It does not [illegible].

2. I am not satisfied with the provisions in regard to the distribution of the subject matter of the memorandum. It is all very well to say that an interested theater commander is furnished such information as is considered necessary. The fact remains that this [illegible], charged with obtaining and furnishing military intelligence to all theaters as well as to the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, receives practically nothing under the proposed scheme. If the War Department General Staff in the United States is, in regard to the subject matter of this memorandum, to become merely an unimportant [illegible] of effort, it might be better definitely so [illegible] put on with the war.

3. I have very little sympathy with the provisions of the memorandum in regard to security. The subject matter of this section, from a practical standpoint, does not appear to be eminently sound. I believe that [illegible] in matters of this [illegible] in some respects, [illegible]. In this connection, I can only reiterate my former suggestions that I place [illegible] on the distribution desk [illegible] with full [illegible] all intelligence from [illegible] and Y sources, and that I become the sole agency for [illegible] in so far as Allied Headquarters in North Africa is concerned, that is to [illegible] responsibility.

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4. In regard to the definitions appended to the Document, that of "exploitation" is totally unacceptable. Under no circumstances will I be bound to accept a British interpretation on any piece of intelligence. I will place my own interpretation thereon. I would not presume to demand or require that a British General Staff Officer be bound to accept my interpretation, for instance, of a piece of information obtained from American sources.

5. It seems to me that the basic trouble lies in the unwillingness of the British to permit Americans to enter the German field. Inasmuch as the United States has interests in these matters, quite separate and distinct from British interests, the plea of security does not appear a sufficient reason to deny American training and activity in this field.

6. I trust the compromise draft you took away yesterday afternoon will be found to be a reasonable solution.

GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

ml

MOST SECRET

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION
OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

May 16, 1943.

Dear Colonel Clarke,

Colonel Corderman and I have, I hope, come to agreement on British and U.S. co-operation over Special Intelligence, etc.

Our problem was, so far as I see it, to ensure that: -

(U.S. requirements)

(a) G-2 obtain the long term intelligence they require from the "E" source, (that is they do not wish to have purely local operational intelligence.)

(b) A U.S. section is formed to gain actual experience in the solution of the "E" type of cypher.

(British requirements)

(c) Intelligence from "E", so vital to the British, is restricted to those who have the "need to know" for the prosecution of the war and for the same reason duplication of the work of solution is avoided.

(d) The highest security standards are adopted for the handling of this intelligence.

There is, however, one outstanding matter over which I foresee some difficulty, and I think with some justification, and that is the refusal of the U.S. (so far) to give access to the systems employed in U.S. cyphers(we don't want the keys or wiring) which will be used for transmission of Special Intelligence.

The British have afforded the U.S. full knowledge of all their cyphers and future cyphers, and I consider that the withholding of knowledge of U.S. cyphers may rankle and in some cases impede the war effort.

Another point I would like to make is that whilst this agreement gives both sides every right to appoint Liaison officers I hope that at B.P. we may be allowed to work out matters with Colonel Taylor. Our reporting organisation has had very great experience and once given directions as to what is required will, I know, carry out these directions loyally, and Taylor will have the full access to everything to see that this is so. I think McCormack and Taylor should go carefully into the matter as soon as we are agreed here and prepare with our Intelligence officers a direction of what should be sent to you.

The reason for keeping the number of officers to a minimum is the great difficulty in accommodation for officers at Bletchley.

I am hoping to see you tomorrow afternoon at 2 p.m.

Yours Sincerely

S. Menzies

U.S. ~~SECRET~~
BRITISH ~~MOST SECRET~~

May 17, 1943.

Agreement between British Government Code and Cipher School and U.S. War Department concerning cooperation in matters relating to:

U.S.	British
Special Intelligence A	Special Intelligence
Special Intelligence B	Y Intelligence
TA Intelligence	Y Inference

A distinction is made in nomenclature and procedure in handling intelligence derived from the solution of enemy high grade and that obtained from low grade codes and ciphers. The preservation of secrecy in regard to either category is a matter of great concern to both countries and if the highest degree of security is to be maintained, it is essential that the same methods should be pursued by both countries at every level and in every area concerned, since a leakage at any one point would jeopardize intelligence from these sources not in one area only but in all theatres of war and for all services.

This agreement is limited to the traffic specifically designated herein. It does not cover traffic emanating from non-service enemy or neutral sources. These subjects will be covered by future negotiations between Director, G.C.C.S. and A.C. of S., G-2, War Department.

(1) Both the U.S. and British agree to exchange completely all information concerning the detection, identification and interception of signals from, and the solution of codes and ciphers used by, the Military and Air forces of the Axis powers, including secret services (Abwehr).

(a) The U.S. will assume as a main responsibility the reading of Japanese Military and Air codes and ciphers.

(b) The British will assume as a main responsibility the reading of German and Italian Military and Air codes and ciphers.

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(4) Both countries agree that special security regulations shall apply to intelligence obtained from decoding telegrams in enemy high grade codes and ciphers.

(5) Both countries agree to use their most secure codes and ciphers for transmission of the decodes of enemy signals and transmission of technical cryptanalytic data.

(6) British or U.S. Commanders-in-Chief, Military or Air, will receive all Special Intelligence necessary to them for the conduct of their operations from either British or U.S. centers as may be mutually agreed. Liaison officers will be appointed as desired for facilitating this. They will be given full access to all decodes.

(7) The distribution of intelligence from the sources in question will be governed by the fundamental principle that distribution will be restricted to the minimum and will therefore be confined solely to those who require to receive the intelligence for the proper discharge of their duties.

(8) All recipients of Special Intelligence A, whether British or American officers, shall be bound by the same regulations, the regulations (Appendix B) now in force in the theaters of war where British forces are operating to be accepted at the present time. If at a later date either country wishes to modify them in the light of further experience then this may be done by mutual agreement.

(9) The extension to officers of a knowledge of the existence of such intelligence shall be confined to as limited a number as possible and restricted to the levels of command in conformity with the above mentioned regulations. Great stress is laid on the principle that Special Intelligence A should not be intermingled in reports with general intelligence from other sources. If, however, it becomes imperative to do so, the whole must be treated as Special Intelligence A and given

the same strictly limited distribution. Under no circumstances is it permissible to pass Special Intelligence A in a code or cipher which can be read by other than the authorized recipients.

(10) Although Special Intelligence B is not subject to the same stringent regulations as Special Intelligence A, since the two are closely connected, it is essential to maintain a high degree of secrecy in the handling of Special Intelligence B also. In any action taken upon such intelligence and in any documents or telegrams based upon it, it is essential that its origin be disguised and that the codes or ciphers used for its dissemination be absolutely secure.

(11) All intelligence available from decodes shall be made available to Liaison officers, and if they deem necessary it will be exchanged between London and Washington. These Liaison officers will be specially appointed and given full facilities for this purpose.

(12) British and U.S. will notify one another without delay, giving full particulars, when either has information from any source indicating the compromise of any code or cipher used by the other. Action on such information will be most carefully considered in order not to compromise the source and if possible mutual agreement in such action will be sought.

(13) Cooperation between and coordination of U.S. Signal Intelligence Service and British "Y" Service must take place at all levels, technical information being exchanged mutually at the same level and each country to agree not to lower the classification of such information or the intelligence derived from it below that level without mutual agreement.

(14) Each country shall inform the other of the employment and scope in each joint theater of war of their Signal Intelligence (Y) units in the field.

(15) This agreement or the appendices thereto may be supplemented or modified from time to time governing any special feature for which either party wishes to make special provision.

(16) Definitions:

(a) Y Service or Signal Intelligence Service. The British, U.S. Army, and U.S. Navy services concerned with intercepting, decoding, interpreting, classifying and dissemination of enemy (and neutral) communications, and the use of D/F and other specialized apparatus for establishing locations and identities of enemy transmitters.

(b) Special Intelligence A. Certain ciphers are placed in a special category, owing to their importance and difficulty of solution. The intelligence derived from those ciphers is known as Special Intelligence A. Such material is treated with most stringent security measures. Special Intelligence A is confined to a very strictly limited number of the most highly placed officers and is mainly of strategical importance.

(c) Special Intelligence B. Intelligence derived from the solution of lower grade ciphers. Such ciphers may under certain circumstances be upgraded to the "Special A" class.

The dissemination of Special Intelligence B is wider though always treated as British Most Secret--U.S. Secret. Special Intelligence B may be used tactically.

APPENDIX (A)

Special Provisions Regarding Work on German Machine Ciphers

Since it is believed unnecessary and impracticable to duplicate work on German machine ciphers and in view of the large number of personnel required and the unavoidable extra risk to the security of the source involved, agreement which follows has been arrived at. This agreement provides that:

(a) All desired intelligence from this source will be made available to the War Department in Washington.

(b) U.S. personnel will obtain experience by engaging in the solution of this type of cipher in Great Britain.

(c) Research into new methods of attack will be made in Washington.

(d) Transmission of Intelligence to Commanders-in-Chief in the field will be accomplished by special routes and staffs who will maintain a watch over the use of the intelligence to guard against compromise of the source.

(1) U. S. liaison officers will be appointed at G. C. & C. S. to examine messages and summaries and select those desired for transmittal to Washington for G-2 or the Theater Commanders. All decoded material will be made available to those officers. Decodes giving information regarding Order of

Battle will be handled as at present, i.e., through U. S. liaison officers in War Office and Air Ministry, respectively.

(2) Decodes or summaries to be passed to Washington through existing British channels.

(3) U. S. party to effect independent solution of keys will be established in Great Britain, but so co-ordinated by mutual agreement to avoid duplication. This party will cooperate with the British in regard to tasks and will be given every assistance for instruction of personnel. They will be furnished British machines. Decodes from this section will be passed to Bletchly Park for examination, translation and distribution, but U. S. party will conduct complete processing, including examination and translation to such an extent as they desire.

(4) Formulas will be supplied by Great Britain for use on machines now at Arlington Hall.

(5) U. S. to undertake research for finding a new method for solution and to be rendered every assistance by the British for this purpose.

(6) In conformity with British policy, U. S. personnel engaged in solution work in Great Britain will not be transferred elsewhere except for very urgent reasons.

(7) Special Intelligence from this source will be passed to Commanders-in-Chief in the field through the Special British units provided for this purpose. The officer in command of these units will have direct access to the Commander-in-Chief and advise as necessary on the security aspect of handling and using this intelligence. Where an American officer is Commander-in-Chief, an American officer, properly trained and indoctrinated at Bletchly Park, will be attached to the unit to advise and act as liaison officer to overcome difficulties that may arise in regard to differences in language.

(8) The Director of the G. C. & C. S. will have the final decision when matters of security are involved in intelligence items (gossip) and as to what is passed to Commanders-in-Chief in the field.

[illegible]

APPENDIX (B)

British Security Regulations for Special Intelligence

CO-ORDINATION OF ROUTING, SECURITY AND USE OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

Part I

1) SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE is the agreed name for the highly secret information obtained by cryptographic means from enemy high grade ciphers.
2) Lower grade cryptographic material classed in general as "Y" Intelligence, is not included in the definition of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE.

PART I TO BE DESTROYED BY FIREWORKS READ

Part II

1) All SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE emanating from the United Kingdom and transmitted to Commands abroad will receive the prefix 'Ultra'.

2) All SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE emanating from centres other than the United Kingdom and transmitted either to the United Kingdom or to another Command abroad, is to receive the prefix specially allotted to each producing centre as follows: -

[illegible]	prefix	[illegible]
WASHINGTON	prefix)	
[illegible]	)	ZYMOTIC
KILINDINI	)	
MIDDLE EAST	"	SWELL

3) SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE produced by U.S.A. centres either in U.S.A. or elsewhere if transmitted over British routes either to the United Kingdom or to British Commands overseas, is to receive the prefix of the Command or centre through which it is distributed.

4) Where it is necessary for SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE to be transmitted between Commands or centres other than the United Kingdom, special routes and ciphers are to be arranged and approved by London.

Part III

[illegible] (see Para. 1 above) information can be regarded as reliable and action can be taken on it, but experience has shown that the following security regulations are vital to the preservation of this source. [illegible] as sole personally responsible for ensuring that they are [illegible] adhered to: -

1) The utmost secrecy is to be used in dealing with ULTRA information. Attention is called to the fact that if from any document that might fall into the hands of the enemy or from any message that the enemy might intercept, from any word that might be revealed by a prisoner of war, or from any ill-considered action based upon it, the enemy were to suspect the existence of the ULTRA source, that source would probably forever be lost to our cause.

2) This loss would vitally affect operations on all fronts, not only the particular front on which the source had been compromised.

3) Commanding Officers of those Commands authorized to receive ULTRA information, i.e., normally only General and Air Officers commanding Armies and Air Forces, are to be instructed that ULTRA messages are for them, their personal representative, and their Senior Intelligence and Operations staff officer only, and are not to be seen by, read to, or discussed with any other person. ULTRA messages are to be destroyed by fire immediately action has been taken on them. No records of Intelligence based on ULTRA information may be kept, except at the H. . of the Commander-in-Chief.

4) When ULTRA information is to be used by the Commander of an Army or an Air Force as a basis for action to be taken by a subordinate command, the information must be translated, when passed to the subordinate command, into terms of an operational order, so worded that if captured or intercepted by the enemy the origin of the information could not be traced back to the ULTRA source, i.e., orders must never contain the precise time, date or place of an enemy operation revealed by ULTRA. Such orders based on ULTRA information if transmitted by W/T must be enciphered only in authorized ciphers. Under no circumstances whatever is it permissible to transmit ULTRA information as such to lower formations.

5) In general, if any action is to be taken based upon ULTRA information, the Local Commander is to ensure that such action cannot be traced back by the enemy to the reception of ULTRA Intelligence alone. A momentary tactical advantage is not sufficient ground for taking any risk of compromising the source. No action may be taken against specific sea or land targets revealed by ULTRA unless appropriate air or land reconnaissance has also been undertaken. Names of enemy ships revealed by ULTRA sources may never be quoted.

6) The utmost care is to be taken in briefing pilots for an operation based on ULTRA information that only such details are given them as might have been obtained by other means, such as air reconnaissance, and only such as are essential to the success of the operations.

7) No reference to ULTRA information is to be made in any summary whatsoever, however limited the circulation. No discussion of it is permissible except between the senior officers who are immediately concerned with the action to be taken upon it.

8) If it is necessary to ask questions, or make comments on ULTRA material, whether on matters of Intelligence, Operations, Routing or Security, such messages are to be transmitted only over the special channel and in the special ciphers provided for ULTRA traffic.

9) Recipients of ULTRA may not under any circumstances carry on their persons outside their Headquarters, ULTRA messages which have been delivered to them.

1st March 1943

Geo. V. Strong

GEO. V. STRONG
Major General
A.C. of S., G-2

Ultra's

D.D.(S)

Ec res

DOCID: 2051510

~~SECRET~~ ID: A249906

~~SECRET~~

By authority A. C. of S., G-2
Date 6/10/43 (BWG)
Initials

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Agreement between British Government Code and Cipher School and U.S. War Department in regard to certain "Special Intelligence."

I. Discussion.

1. There is attached an original copy of the agreement between the British Government Code and Cipher School and the U.S. War Department, signed by E. W. Travis, Deputy Director (Services), G.C. and C.S., acting for the British Chiefs of Staff, and by the undersigned, acting for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

2. This agreement covers the production, exchange and dissemination of all special intelligence derived by cryptanalysis of the communications of the military and air forces of the Axis powers, including their secret services. It does not cover traffic from non-service enemy or neutral sources. It provides for complete interchange of technical data and special intelligence from the sources covered, through liaison officers stationed at Washington and at London, and for dissemination of such intelligence to all field commanders through special channels and subject to special security regulations. Provision is also made for United States personnel to obtain experience by engaging in the independent solution of keys in Great Britain.

The United States assumes as a main responsibility the reading of Japanese military and air traffic; the British assume a like responsibility for German and Italian military and air traffic.

3. This agreement, when implemented, will enable us to fulfill our immediate needs for special intelligence from these sources and will safeguard our long term interests by allowing us to gain the experience required for achieving independence in this field.

II. Action recommended.

Approval of this agreement is recommended.

Approved; by order of the Secretary of War.

JOSEPH T. McNARNEY,
Lieut. General, U. S. Army,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

1 Inclosure
Agreement between British G.C. and C.S. and U.S. War Department

APPROVED
By order of the Secretary of War
JOSEPH T. McNARNEY
Deputy Chief of Staff
15 JUN 1943
By O. L. NELSON
Col. G.S.C., Asst. to the Deputy Chief of Staff

GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A.C. of S., G-2.

Security of Stolen Goods

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 643

By authority A. C. of S., G-2
Date 6/10/43 (BWB)
Initials

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-07-2010 pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended. ST56834

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
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GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A.C. of S., G-2.

~~SECRET~~

NARA 350115 10 Jan 43

May 17, 1943.

E43

Agreement between British Government Code and Cipher School and U. S. War Department concerning cooperation in matters relating to:

U.S.	British
Special Intelligence A	Special Intelligence
Special Intelligence B	Y Intelligence
TA Intelligence	Y Inference

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This agreement is limited to the traffic specifically designated herein. It does not cover traffic emanating from non-service enemy or neutral sources. These subjects will be covered by future negotiations between Director, G.C.C.S. and A.C. of S., G-2, War Department.

(1) Both the U.S. and British agree to exchange completely all information concerning the detection, identification and interception of signals from, and the solution of codes and ciphers used by, the Military and Air forces of the Axis powers, including secret services (Abwehr).

(2) The U.S. will assume as a main responsibility the reading of Japanese Military and Air codes and ciphers.

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(8) All recipients of Special Intelligence A, whether British or American officers, shall be bound by the same regulations, the regulations (Appendix B) now in force in the theaters of war where British forces are operating to be accepted at the present time. If at a later date either country wishes to modify them in the light of further experience then this may be done by mutual agreement.

(9) The extension to officers of a knowledge of the existence of such intelligence shall be confined to as limited a number as possible and restricted to the levels of command in conformity with the above mentioned regulations. Great stress is laid on the principle that Special Intelligence A should not be intermingled in reports with general intelligence from other sources. If, however, it becomes imperative to do so, the whole must be treated as Special Intelligence A and given

the same strictly limited distribution. Under no circumstances is it permissible to pass Special Intelligence A in a code or cipher which can be read by other than the authorized recipients.

(10) Although Special Intelligence B is not subject to the same stringent regulations as Special Intelligence A, since the two are closely connected, it is essential to maintain a high degree of secrecy in the handling of Special Intelligence B also. In any action taken upon such intelligence and in any documents or telegrams based upon it, it is essential that its origin be disguised and that the codes or ciphers used for its dissemination be absolutely secure.

(11) All intelligence available from decodes shall be made available to Liaison officers, and if they deem necessary it will be exchanged between London and Washington. These Liaison officers will be specially appointed and given full facilities for this purpose.

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(b) Special Intelligence A. Certain ciphers are placed in a special category, owing to their importance and difficulty of solution. The intelligence derived from these ciphers is known as Special Intelligence A. Such material is treated with most stringent security measures. Special Intelligence A is confined to a very strictly limited number of the most highly placed officers and is mainly of strategical importance.

(c) Special Intelligence B. Intelligence derived from the solution of lower grade ciphers. Such ciphers may under certain circumstances be upgraded to the "Special A" class.

The dissemination of Special Intelligence B is wider though always treated as British Most Secret--U.S. Secret. Special Intelligence B may be used tactically.

APPENDIX (A)

Special Provisions Regarding Work on German Machine Ciphers

Since it is believed unnecessary and impracticable to duplicate work on German machine ciphers and in view of the large number of personnel required and the unavoidable extra risk to the security of the source involved, agreement which follows has been arrived at. This agreement provides that:

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(b) U. S. personnel will obtain experience by engaging in the solution of this type of cipher in Great Britain.

(c) Research into new methods of attack will be made in Washington.

(d) Transmission of Intelligence to Commanders-in-Chief in the field will be accomplished by special routes and staffs who will maintain a watch over the use of the intelligence to guard against compromise of the source.

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U. S. liaison officers in War Office and Air Ministry, respectively.

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(3) U. S. party to effect independent solution of keys will be established in Great Britain, but so coordinated by mutual agreement to avoid duplication. This party will cooperate with the British in regard to tasks and will be given every assistance for instruction of personnel. They will be furnished British machines. Decodes from this section will be passed to Bletchly Park for emendation, translation and distribution, but U. S. party will conduct complete processing, including emendation and translation to such an extent as they desire.

(4) Formulas will be supplied by Great Britain for use on machines now at Arlington Hall.

(5) U. S. to undertake research for finding a new method for solution and to be rendered every assistance by the British for this purpose.

(6) In conformity with British policy, U. S. personnel engaged in solution work in Great Britain will not be transferred elsewhere except for very urgent reasons.

(7) Special Intelligence from this source will be passed to Commanders-in-Chief in the field through the Special British units provided for this purpose. The officer in command of these units will have direct access to the Commander-in-Chief and advise as necessary on the security aspect of handling and using this intelligence. Where an American officer is Commander-in-Chief, an American officer, properly trained and indoctrinated at Bletchly Park, will be attached to the unit to advise and act as lisison officer to overcome difficulties that may arise in regard to differences in language.

(8) The Director of the G. C. & C. S. will have the final decision when matters of security are involved in intelligence items (gossip) and as to what is passed to Commanders-in-Chief in the field.

APPENDIX (B)

British Security Regulations for Special Intelligence

CO-ORDINATION OF ROUTING, SECURITY AND USE OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

Part I

1) SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE is the agreed name for the highly secret information obtained by cryptographic means from enemy high grade ciphers.

2) Lower grade cryptographic material classed in general as "Y" Intelligence, is not included in the definition of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE.

PART I TO BE DESTROYED BY FIRE WHEN READ

Part II

1) All SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE emanating from the United Kingdom and transmitted to Commands abroad will receive the prefix 'Ultra'.

2) All SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE emanating from centres other than the United Kingdom and transmitted either to the United Kingdom or to another Command abroad, is to receive the prefix specially allotted to each producing centre as follows: -

DELHI	prefix	SIRDAR
WASHINGTON	prefix)	
MELBOURNE	)	ZYMOTIC
KILINDINI	)	
MIDDLE EAST	"	SWELL

3) SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE produced by U.S.A. centres either in U.S.A. or elsewhere if transmitted over British routes either to the United Kingdom or to British Commands overseas, is to receive the prefix of the Command or centre through which it is distributed.

4) Where it is necessary for SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE to be transmitted between Commands or centres other than the United Kingdom, special routes and ciphers are to be arranged and approved by London.

Part III

ULTRA (see Para. 1 above) information can be regarded as reliable and action can be taken on it, but experience has shown that the following security regulations are vital to the preservation of this source. The Commander-in-Chief is held personally responsible for ensuring that they are scrupulously adhered to: -

1) The utmost secrecy is to be used in dealing with ULTRA information. Attention is called to the fact that if from any document that might fall into the hands of the enemy or from any message that the enemy might intercept, from any word that might be revealed by a prisoner of war, or from any ill-considered action based upon it, the enemy were to suspect the existence of the ULTRA source, that source would probably forever be lost to our cause.

2) This loss would vitally affect operations on all fronts, not only the particular front on which the source had been compromised.

3) Commanding Officers of those Commands authorized to receive ULTRA information, i.e., normally only General and Air Officers commanding Armies and Air Forces, are to be instructed that ULTRA messages are for them, their personal representative, and their Senior Intelligence and Operations Staff Officer only, and are not to be seen by, read to, or discussed with any other person. ULTRA messages are to be destroyed by fire immediately action has been taken on them. No records of Intelligence based on ULTRA information may be kept, except at the H.Q. of the Commander-in-Chief.

4) When ULTRA information is to be used by the Commander of an Army or an Air Force as a basis for action to be taken by a subordinate command, the information must be translated, when passed to the subordinate command, into terms of an operational order, so worded that if captured or intercepted by the enemy the origin of the information could not be traced back to the ULTRA source, e.g., orders must never contain the precise time, date or place of an enemy operation revealed by ULTRA. Such orders based on ULTRA information if transmitted by W/T must be encoded only in authorized ciphers. Under no circumstances whatever is it permissible to transmit ULTRA information as such to lower formations.

5) In general, if any action is to be taken based upon ULTRA information, the local Commander is to ensure that such action cannot be traced back by the enemy to the reception of ULTRA Intelligence alone. A momentary tactical advantage is not sufficient ground for taking any risk of compromising the source. No action may be taken against specific sea or land targets revealed by ULTRA unless appropriate air or land reconnaissance has also been undertaken. Names of enemy ships revealed by ULTRA source may never be quoted.

6) The utmost care is to be taken in briefing pilots for an operation based on ULTRA information that only such details are given them as might have been obtained by other means, such as air reconnasissance, and only such as are essential to the success of the operations.

7) No reference to ULTRA information is to be made in any summary whatsoever, however limited the circulation. No discussion of it is permissible except between the senior officers who are immediately concerned with the action to be taken upon it.

8) If it is necessary to ask questions, or make comments on ULTRA material, whether on matters of Intelligence, Operations, Routing or Security, such messages are to be transmitted only over the special channel and in the special ciphers provided for ULTRA traffic.

9) Recipients of ULTRA may not under any circumstances carry on their persons outside their Headquarters, ULTRA messages which have been delivered to them.

1st March 1943

GEO. V. STRONG
Major General
A.C. of S., G-2

D. D(S)

S. C. G.

15 JUN 1943

Approved for the U. S. War Department.
By order of the Secretary of War.

JOSEPH T. McNARNEY,
Lieut. General, U. S. Army,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

COPY

From London, 16th June 1943.

CXG 26

Following for Hastings from Brigadier Menzies.

Please convey to General Strong personally from me my appreciation for his cordial reception of Travis and the facilities that were afforded him, both at the War Department and at Arlington. I also wish to thank him for sending Colonel McCormack and Mr. Friedman whose visit here has been of great assistance to us in discussing our joint endeavours.

We are glad to have Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor still with us.

COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

4/24/44

Dear Menzies:

Reference is made to paragraph 8 of the agreement, dated 17 May 1943, between the U.S. War Department and British Government Code and Cipher School, which provides that all recipients of high-grade signal intelligence ("ULTRA"), whether British or American, shall be bound by the security regulations annexed to the agreement, and that if at a later date either country wishes to modify them in the light of further experience, this may be done by mutual agreement.

As you know, U.S. regulations conforming to the requirements of the agreement were issued in October 1943. Also, in March 1944, the War Department accepted a modification of the security regulations, proposed by G.C. & C.S. pursuant to the agreement, but limited its acceptance to the European, North African and Middle East Theaters of Operation because the modifications proposed appeared unsuitable in certain respects for the Pacific and Asiatic theaters, for which the U.S. under the agreement has assumed the main responsibility with respect to Ultra.

There is inclosed herewith a new set of regulations, which are proposed as a modification of existing regulations for the Pacific and Asiatic Theaters. These regulations have been prepared with special regard to the fact that Japanese Ultra is produced not only by the War Department and G.C. and C.S. but also by a U.S. - Australian organization in Brisbane and both British and U.S. organizations in India. Because of that fact and because of the different intelligence requirements of the several widely separated theaters in the Pacific and Asia, it is felt that the collation and evaluation of Japanese Ultra from all sources and the preparation of Ultra messages to field commands cannot be confined as in the case of German Ultra to a single disseminating agency for all theaters, but must take place within each theater as well as in Washington and London. The proposed regulations permit that to be done, and provide for centralized control only of the security aspects of the handling of Ultra within theaters.

The inclosed regulations, like those for Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, recognize that in combined U.S. - British operations within any theater the maximum security and efficiency in the handling of Ultra can be achieved only by having a single agency to receive all Ultra and disseminate it to both U.S. and British recipients within the theater. However, regulations for the Pacific and Asiatic theaters must take into account the fact that at present some of those theaters include only U.S. forces. Also as the situation develops in theaters of combined

operations it may become impractical to adhere in every case to the requirement of only a single such agency within each theater. The proposed regulations therefore provide for a combined agency only in theaters of combined operations and permit separate U.S. and British agencies in such theaters when the situation requires.

The proposed regulations are being forwarded by the War Department to the U.S. Theater Commanders concerned, for their comments prior to final adoption. They are therefore proposed at the present time subject to such changes as may appear desirable after the comments of the Theater Commanders are received.

CLAYTON BISSELL,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2

Incl. - Regulations
dtd 19 May 44.

Major General Stewart G. Menzies,
Chairman,
Signal Intelligence Board, London.

DEFINITIONS (cont'd)

6. CRYPTOGRAPHY. That branch of knowledge which treats of the various means, methods, and devices for converting plain language into cryptogram form and for reconverting the cryptogram into their plain-language form by a direct reversal of the steps or processes employed in the original conversion.

7. CRYPTANALYSIS. That branch of knowledge which treats of the various means, methods, and devices for solving cryptograms, that is, deriving their plain-language contents, without knowledge or possession of the specific method, means, or key employed in the production of the cryptograms.

[illegible]

~~MOST SECRET~~

Part II

1. All Special Intelligence emanating from the United Kingdom and transmitted to Commands abroad will receive the prefix "ULTRA".

2. All Special Intelligence emanating from centres other than the United Kingdom and transmitted either to the United Kingdom or to another Command abroad is to receive the prefix specially allotted to each producing centre as follows:

DELHI	prefix	SIRDAR
WASHINGTON	prefix	
MELBOURNE	prefix	ZYMOTIC
KILINDINI	prefix	
U.S.S.R.	prefix	ARSENIC
MIDDLE EAST	prefix	SWEIL

3. Special Intelligence produced by U.S.A. centres either in U.S.A. or elsewhere is transmitted over British routes either to the United Kingdom or to British Commands overseas is to receive the prefix of the Command or centre through which it is distributed.

4. Where it is necessary for Special Intelligence to be transmitted between Commands or centres other than the United Kingdom, special routes and cyphers are to be arranged and approved by London.

Part III

ULTRA (see para 1 Part II above) information can be regarded as reliable and action can be taken on it, but experience has shown that the following security regulations are vital to the preservation of this source. The Commander-in-Chief is held personally responsible for ensuring that they are scrupulously adhered to.

1. The utmost secrecy is to be used in dealing with ULTRA information. Attention is called to the fact that if from any document that might fall into the hands of the enemy or from any message that the enemy might intercept, from any word that might be revealed by a prisoner of war, or from any ill-considered action based upon it, the enemy were to suspect the existence of the ULTRA source that source would probably for ever be lost to our cause.

2. This loss would vitally affect operations on all fronts, not only the particular front on which the source had been compromised.

3. Commanding Officers of those Commands authorised to receive ULTRA information [illegible] normally only General and Air Officers commanding Armies and Air Forces are to be instructed that ULTRA messages are for them, their personal representatives, and their Senior Intelligence and Operations Staff Officers only, and are not to be seen by, read to or discussed with any other person. ULTRA messages are to be destroyed by fire immediately action has been taken on them. No records of intelligence based on ULTRA information may be kept, except at the H.Q. of the Commander-in-Chief.

4. When ULTRA information is to be used by the Commander of an Army or an Air Force as a basis for action to be taken by a subordinate command, the information must be translated, when passed to the subordinate command, into terms of an operational order, so worded that if captured or intercepted by the enemy the origin of the information could not be traced back to the ULTRA source, e.g. orders must never contain the precise time, date or place of an enemy operation revealed by ULTRA. Such orders [illegible] on ULTRA information [illegible] must be encoded only in authorised cyphers. Under no circumstances [illegible] permitted to transmit ULTRA information [illegible] such to lower formations.

Part III (Continued)

5. In general, if any action is to be taken based upon ULTRA information, the local Commander is to ensure that such action cannot be traced back by the enemy to the reception of ULTRA intelligence alone. A momentary tactical advantage is not sufficient ground for taking any risk of compromising the source. No action may be taken against specific sea or land targets revealed by ULTRA unless approp[illegible] air or land reconnaissance has also been undertaken. Names of enemy ships revealed by ULTRA source may never be quoted.

6. The utmost care is to be taken in briefing pilots for an operation based on ULTRA information that only such details are given them as might have been obtained by other means, such as air reconnaissance, and only such as are assessed to the success of the operations.

7. No reference to ULTRA information is to be made in any summary whatsoever, however limited the circulation. No discussion of it is permissible except between the senior officers who are immediately concerned with the action to be taken upon it.

8. If it is necessary to ask questions, or make comments on ULTRA material, whether on matters of intelligence, operations, routing or security, such messages are to be transmitted only over the special channel and in the special cypher provided for ULTRA [illegible].

9. Recipients of ULTRA may not under any circumstances carry on their persons outside their headquarters, ULTRA [illegible] which have been delivered to them.