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NINETEENTH CENTURY *AND AFTER*

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A MONTHLY REVIEW

FOUNDED BY JAMES KNOWLES

VOL. LXXVII

JANUARY—JUNE 1915

NEW YORK
LEONARD SCOTT PUBLICATION CO.
LONDON: SPOTTISWOODE & CO. LTD., PRINTERS

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THE
NINETEENTH
CENTURY
AND AFTER



No. CCCCLV—JANUARY 1915

VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY SERVICE?

(I)

THE CASE FOR VOLUNTEERS

SINCE the question of Voluntary versus Compulsory Service has divided the country on party lines, and as a curious consequence has closed many organs of Unionist opinion to any statement of the case for Volunteers, I gladly avail myself of the opportunity offered to me by the Editor of this Review to state in as brief a form as possible the genesis of this problem, and such of the facts as are personally known to me.

The *Nineteenth Century* circulates so freely amongst all classes that I have hopes of reaching some of the many who are in ignorance of the distortion of facts by which some advocates of compulsion are seeking to bolster up their case. This is the more necessary as very many of these distorted facts have been taken from papers and pamphlets which I wrote myself some years ago, not for the purpose of advocating compulsion in the United Kingdom, but in order to

prove that compulsory service in Germany was not the hated 'blood tax' it was at that time the fashion to call it, but, on the contrary, was popular in that country, and was, in fact, the mainspring of her growing commercial importance, and her bulwark against the undue spread of Socialism.

This was in 1890-95, when the German policy was still essentially controlled by some of the finer minds of that nation, tempered and developed by the storm and stress of the years from 1865 to 1870-71, who understood the greatness of the issues then involved, and were by no means minded to see the unity so hardly won endangered either by excess of militarism or by weak-kneed concessions to popular clamour.

Compulsory service first came into the focus of British public opinion after the wars in Bohemia in 1866, and in France in 1870-71, at a time when our own recruiting system for a long-service Army had hopelessly broken down, and Lord Cardwell, assisted by his most able military adviser, the late Colonel R. Home, R.E., was fighting the battle of short service and Reserves, which is now again, as it did during the Boer War, proving its efficiency for our own particular needs, and for those of our Allies.

At that time, though some very able soldiers, notably Colonel W. H. Hime, R.A., tried to rouse public sentiment in favour of compulsion, the feeling in the country was still so entirely under the influence of the old horror resulting from the appalling sacrifices in men that Napoleon had exacted (not only from France, but from all the other countries into which he had introduced, or caused to be introduced, the law of Jourdan, passed in 1797-98 by the French Chambers, from which law the principle of compulsory service without substitutes really dates), that it would not listen to the compulsory service advocates. Moreover, it was then an axiom of political economy that money spent on soldiers and military preparations was money wasted. People counted the cost of Germany's military institutions, and spoke of it as a drain upon her industries. This was the British official view, and was put forward by Lieutenant (afterwards Lieutenant-General Sir John) Ardagh, R.E., in a paper read at the Royal United Service Institution about 1875, which was really intended as a reply to the very strong case made out for compulsion by Colonel Hime, R.A., in an Essay which had won the gold medal of the same institution about two years previously.

I was at the time a very junior officer, but family affairs had taken me very frequently backwards and forwards between England, France, and Germany, and as I watched the astounding progress in the latter country year after year, especially along

the Rhine Valley, and compared it with the relative stagnation in the West Riding of Yorkshire, where my home lies, and where I had abundant financial reasons for being intimately acquainted with the land values in the vicinity of at least one of its great towns, the conviction grew on me that the money spent on military training in Germany was not being poured into a bottomless pit, but was, on the contrary, the real secret of her extraordinary commercial development.

It was not, however, till about 1886 that I first began to write on the subject, and during the succeeding years the columns of such papers as the old *St. James's*, under Frederick Greenwood, and the *National Observer*, under W. E. Henley, were always open to me to state my case, which ran briefly as follows :

'It is not true that Germany is suffering under a "blood tax" ; on the contrary, it can be shown that, allowing for all the men who have met their death in the field from wounds or disease since Waterloo, which is a very small percentage indeed on the numbers which have actually passed through the ranks, the health of the men who have undergone training is so much improved that their expectation of life is very materially increased. Hence there are at any given moment some 2,000,000 more men alive than would be the case had no military service been exacted from them. Further, each of these men not only lives some years longer (German statisticians agree that five years would be a reasonable average), but they are physically harder, and therefore better wealth-producers, throughout their whole working career. Accurate figures are wanting, but on the lowest assumption this extra production of wealth per head would show as a very large return indeed upon the 1,000,000,000*l.* odd spent on the Army during the last fifty years or so, and would compare more than favourably with the 3.7 per cent. earned by our railways, in which during the same period almost exactly the same sums in money have been sunk, and whose death roll exacts on an average of years a much heavier blood tax from their employees than the German Army has suffered during the same period.'

From these figures and arguments I concluded that German military expenditure should be considered on the same lines as the money we laid out in Famine Insurance in India, in canals, and in communications generally, and should therefore be classed as 'reproductive expenditure,' not as a drain on the national resources.

Finally, I pointed out that, with the storing up of energy resulting from her system of military service, the time must come when she would be forced into a career of colonial expansion which would bring her directly across our path, or else she

would split up by social upheaval, since the military machine drove the weakest to the wall, and tended to the production of the most violent contrasts between the condition of the physically fit and the unfit. This must obviously breed dangerous social discontent in clearly defined classes, and it is the existence of this clear definition of only two classes within the nation that constitutes the gravest danger in Germany.

Comparing her position with that of other nations under the same laws, I further showed that, whereas in Germany everything made for the growth of strength, which could only act in the above-mentioned two directions—viz. horizontally, by expansion, hence ultimately in War with Great Britain; or vertically, i.e. by social internal revolution; in the others, because the laws were not so well adapted to their environment they tended to produce relative weakness rather than strength, and therefore I came to a final conclusion, written in 1887, that Germany must ultimately be our great antagonist, not France or Russia, as we then thought.

The question of compulsion in Great Britain had hardly occurred to me at all, for it seemed too hopelessly outside practical consideration to waste time in discussing it, and as long as we kept pace with our possible rivals in naval expenditure, and could keep our Regular Army filled with seven years' service men, there was no reason from the point of view of the officers of that Army to consider the question at all.

In so far as I thought of the Volunteers and Militia, I looked upon them as invaluable agents for spreading the doctrine of an invincible Navy, for the cynical reason that the longer they were left to realise how exceedingly inefficient they then were, the stronger advocates for naval expenditure they would obviously become, for their own safety's sake. Since it was then clearly impossible for them to repel an invasion on land, common sense must compel them to clamour for a Navy sufficiently powerful to preserve them from such a trial.

At the time, also, it seemed unnecessary to trouble much about the question of numbers, for the impression was general almost all over Europe that, following the example of Germany in 1870, no nation would begin actual hostilities until its army had completed its mobilisation, a process requiring then (i.e. about 1887) at least three weeks. This would constitute a period ample enough for us to take all necessary measures for home defence, as our trial mobilisations in previous years, it was held, had sufficiently demonstrated. Moreover, once our Fleet had got out to sea, I do not think many of us felt any serious doubt as to the result to the enemy.

Had I remained in the Army, my views would doubtless

have become as stereotyped as those of most of my contemporaries; but during the years from 1890 to 1893 I had unusual opportunities of studying both the German and French armies from the civilian's standpoint. I soon became aware of the immense array of social and economic facts which enter into every great question of military organisation, and I was able to follow at first hand the changes just beginning to work in the German Army, as all the officers of company commanders rank, and the re-engaged N.C. officers who had served throughout the war of 1870, began to pass out of direct contact with the men, either by promotion or retirement.

It must be remembered that previously to the Franco-German War somewhere about nine tenths of the German recruits came from agricultural, not industrial, districts, and amongst the former class much of the old feudal spirit had survived. Promotion had been very slow, and the older captains had trained successive annual contingents of recruits until there was hardly a family in their several districts whose sons had not passed through their hands, and since discipline was patriarchal in those days, and there was none of the modern hustling, nearly everyone entertained a really kindly feeling for the 'Compagnie-Vater,' as the captain was always called. As a boy I had often been with officers of this stamp on walks and expeditions about the country and had seen how they were everywhere made welcome. They would stay and talk with the older men, who had been recruits when they were young lieutenants, and all the mothers in the village would come out to thank them for kindnesses shown to their boys; and if the latter had run off the reel after leaving the Colours, they would go first to the 'Compagnie-Vater' for counsel, and not to the village priest.

When at length the war was over and the whole nation was wild with the enthusiasm of success, the recruits came gladly to the Colours, and, falling into the hands of such officers as these, who had themselves in those days been humanised by their experience in the field, the whole machinery of discipline moved as on well-oiled wheels. There was practically no crime at that time; the punishment list was far smaller than in our own Army, and certainly as far as those regiments with which I had been personally associated were concerned, no one could be amongst them without realising the tie of human sympathy which bound both men and officers together. Never in all my ten years of going and coming amongst them did I see even a non-commissioned officer strike or bully a man.

But then, beginning from about 1890, I noticed a very great change, and my old friends discussed it with me quite openly. About this period there was scarcely a captain left who had com-

manded men in the field, and the last of the old colour-sergeants were also passing away. At the same time the demands, both on the drill-ground and on the march, which were being made on the troops by the General Staff were becoming altogether too exacting, and those officers who failed to present their commands up to the full standard required of them were being mercilessly retired.

Every officer with the men was getting 'inspection fever,' worse by far than I have ever seen this disease anywhere else; also they were beginning to find out by experience the real weak point of the whole Prussian organisation—viz. the method of providing non-commissioned officers.

Since 1870 German industry had been booming, and any intelligent man who had in him the makings of an N.C.O., after our own pattern, knew quite well that, his time being up, he could command a big industrial future in the world. No State could afford to compete with the prizes these opportunities in business offered to the time-expired man, and the only men who could be induced to re-engage to serve on for pensions were either the very unenterprising, who were dear at any price, or the dangerous type who saw how to exploit the young 'one-year' volunteers, and other sons of wealthy parents, to their own advantage.

Something of this sort has existed in all compulsory service armies since they first came into existence, but now, as it is shown in that exceptionally valuable contemporaneous study by Herr Beyerlen, *Jena oder Sedan*, this grew into an organised system of blackmail, and any honest man who tried to break down the conspiracy found himself very quickly outside the pale, and lucky indeed if he managed to escape without some serious court-martial charge being trumped up against him, from the consequences of which even his officers could not protect him. Further, the relations between men and officers were changing, rapidly, owing to the spread of industrialism, and the constant augmentation of the regiments. Originally the 'Ur Adel' had only barely sufficed to officer the contingents, but now their numbers became quite insufficient, and men had to be commissioned from the bourgeois moneyed classes, who possessed none of the hereditary power of command that most undoubtedly was the birthright of the aristocracy. In no other country and in no other army with which I have been acquainted was the contrast between the two types so clearly drawn. There is no approach to it in England, and certainly none in France. The evil lay in the fact that of all the industrial employers of labour in Europe the German is notoriously the worst slave-driver. That much every travelled German I have ever met has always frankly admitted. Now it was the officers of this class who first felt the pinch of elimination at the hands of the inspecting officers. They were not very

popular at any time, and where an inspector with knowledge of men had to choose between, let us say, Lieut. Freiherr von and zu — and Lieut. Meyer, the noble's sixty-four quarterings turned the scale every time. The Meyers and Müllers, poor fellows! however, felt the stigma of their removal even more keenly than did their titled comrades, when they were occasionally tried and found wanting, and in their attempts to evade it the bourgeois officers drove their men yet harder in their endeavours to escape the 'blue letter.'

Under the combined pressure of all these influences the army which, up to about 1890, had been looked upon as the surest corrective to Socialist tendencies in the young recruit, was now rapidly becoming a positive hot-bed for their propaganda.

The only palliatives the Higher Commands could devise took the form of enforcing yet stricter discipline, thus bringing about a yet harsher line of cleavage between officers and men, while culminating in a colossal effort to hypnotise the whole nation into a sense of its own invincibility as a military machine. It was the years before Jena over again. The spirit which had animated the troops after 1870 disappeared, and the letter of forms and exact prescription triumphed, leading step by step to the almost pitiful collapse of all higher leading, the results of which we are witnessing, both in Flanders and in Poland—machine-made devotion, carrying the men forward against hitherto almost unheard of punishment; only to collapse and leave them helpless against the bayonets of our determined counter-attacks. 'You can take horses to the water, but you cannot make them drink.' You can lead conscripts forward almost up to the muzzles of an enemy's rifles, but they will not fight like the men who war of their own free will.

I confess I did not at the time foresee the degree of success which actually has attended this effort at national hypnotisation. I rather expected that disintegration in the attack would set in at a much earlier stage, and when I returned to England and took up the command of a Volunteer battalion I had lost all confidence both in the economic and military value of the universal service about which I had previously written so much.

Meanwhile I had discovered that all the Great Powers of the Continent had gradually dropped the idea of awaiting the completion of mobilisation before beginning actual hostilities. They stood with their frontier Corps—practically at full war strength—ready to spring upon one another at a moment's notice; and this knowledge completely altered the whole aspect of our Invasion problem.

The Volunteers rose to the occasion even before the War Office, and, quite unaided by official advice, the nineteen Field

Brigades into which certain picked battalions had been grouped thought out a scheme of mobilisation, with transport and supply complete, which could be assembled for active service at about twelve hours' notice.

As yet, however, they lacked a reserve behind them, and it was while trying to find a method for providing one that I made my discovery of what the Auxiliary Forces generally had been doing, not only in keeping alive the fighting tradition in the country, which all admitted, but also in passing through their ranks the numbers that, taken in conjunction with the ex-Reserve soldiers and bluejackets of the Regular Services, brought our total of men available for an emergency very nearly up to the level of the other Great Powers.

At that time none of these nations expected to put into the field more than some two million men in the first line, leaving about two million more, approximately between the ages of thirty-five and forty-seven (the practice varied), to form Landwehr or 'Territorial' Commands, essentially for Home Defence.

Between the same age limits we could certainly have found about 1,800,000 of the first category, and 1,500,000 of the latter, and this material, grouped into battalions containing about ten to fifteen per cent. of ex-Reserve men, would, in my opinion, have made far better fighting units than any they were likely to be opposed to in any emergency sufficiently serious to call for their services.

Even the officers would, I contend, have been better leaders of men than would have been found in the opposing forces—for nearly all of them had been accustomed to handle workingmen without any military force to support their authority, and they were of such intelligence and keenness that they learnt all the technical details of command quite sufficiently well for the field in the course of the camps which they annually attended.

I may add that it was actually through my intercourse with German officers, some of them on the Kaiser's personal staff, that my eyes were first opened to the extraordinary potentialities existing in the Volunteer force, both in its officers and men. I recall a further testimony from the pen of a distinguished French officer, who had served all through the campaign of 1870 and was afterwards military attaché in London. Lecturing on his return to France before the Cercle Militaire in Paris, he described the British Volunteers in terms of extraordinary praise, at a time when they had, in their own country, hardly emerged from the sea of good-natured ridicule so lavishly poured on them by that most genial artist John Leech. The lecture can be found on the shelves of the Royal United Service Library, which will be again available after the War is over. I did not find it

myself till many years after it had been given and published, and with the experience I had gathered during eleven years of a Volunteer command I was simply astounded at the genuine insight of the writer, and could only marvel at the blindness of our own people in not discerning sooner the invaluable material lying ready to their hands.

The essence of the matter lay in this, that both the French observer and my German friends had recognised the true value of the Volunteer spirit. They had all seen conscripts of many nationalities under fire, and had spent many weary years trying to make soldiers out of them. They knew, or thought they knew, all that compulsion could effect and were far from satisfied with their experience. They felt at once—even in such ragged battalions as some of those which marched past the Kaiser at Wimbledon in 1887—just that life-spring of action which was missing from their own conscripted men.

General Langlois, the celebrated French artilleryman, who, had he lived, would have held the supreme command in France at the present moment, recognised the same force; and it is on record that it was his report on the potential value of the 'Territorials' (as they had then become in 1911) for defending these islands against invasion, and thus liberating our Navy and Army for their proper duties, which determined the many waverers on the French Staff to count henceforth on our effective assistance in case of an attack upon France by Germany.

It is worth while recalling at the present moment that opinion amongst the leaders of French military thought was at this time very strongly against the acceptance of any military co-operation from Great Britain, and even General Bonnal, the official founder of the modern French strategic doctrine, wrote strongly against us, on the grounds that since the course of the war would probably be decided in the first clash of the two frontier armies, which would move without waiting for complete mobilisation—as the Germans who attacked Liège actually did—our troops would arrive too late to be of service, *alors ils se réfugièrent dans leurs îles*—rather a quaint interpretation of our conduct in the Netherlands during past centuries, and coming from the lips of a military historian!

If, therefore, I overrate the value of our Voluntary system, at least I do so in good company—company which is entitled to respect, since they had all seen and exercised responsible command over compulsory service troops in a great European War, an advantage none of the supporters of the National Service League are, I believe, entitled to claim.

But I have yet other and stronger reasons for my confidence in our own system—of which my friends were not at the time

aware, or at least did not take into account—viz. the great superiority in composition that we could give to our battalions, owing to our being able to combine men of different ages in just the right proportions.

It is a fundamental difficulty in every compulsory system that the active corps, the first to move, are all far too young for solidarity, while the Reserve formations usually are far too old; and it is an admitted fact, based on the 'psychology of crowds,' that bodies of young men, all of about the same age, are, in spite of their dash, far more likely, not only to break down simultaneously under sickness, but to feel panic under conditions that would not materially disturb the equanimity of older men. Now, as I have shown, England could only be invaded seriously by a surprise raid, sprung on us at one and the same time as the delivery of an ultimatum; consequently we should have had only those corps composed of young men between twenty and twenty-five to encounter. The only valid objection to Voluntary Service came essentially from the Adjutant-General's side of the War Office, where it was urged, and not without reason, that something more binding in the form of enlistment was needed to ensure that the Volunteers would, in fact, turn up in full strength when the emergency bugles sounded the 'fall in.' That objection, I consider, was fully answered by the actual and immediate response to the first call for Volunteers at the time of the Boer War. A pound of practice, however, is worth a ton of theory; let us therefore turn to the results our Voluntary system has actually achieved during the past four months, and see how far my predictions have been verified, for, with variations too slight to notice, the Volunteers of whom I first thought and wrote are in all essentials the same as the 'Territorials,' and the same amount of money spent on the latter battalions would have produced just as good results had it been spent upon the former formations. Within less than forty-eight hours after the Declaration of War the Territorials were under arms, and ready to move; within the week they had recruited up to their authorised strength, very generally with time-expired ex-Territorials, and, therefore, they numbered 330,000.

The Regular Army was at once completed from its Reserves—no absentees at all being reported—and stood on parade some 300,000 strong, with about 100,000 waiting to follow. This was exclusive of the Special Reserves, nearly another 100,000, making in all some 830,000 men.

To these must be added the Navy and Marines, with their Reserves; the exact figure I have not been able to ascertain, but as the Navy Estimates provided for the payment of 130,000, their full total cannot have fallen far short of 200,000 more. This

makes it clear that, without counting the battalions in India and the Colonies, about 100,000 more, who do not figure in the British Census, we had already well outstripped the first million.

Everyone will remember the rush to enlist during the first few weeks of the War and the efforts of the War Office to keep the flood within bounds, so that it could be immediately handled. The limitation of age from 19 to 35, and a height standard of 5 ft. 6 in.—the greatest ever demanded since the year following the close of the Crimean War—did little to check it, for the men kept thronging in, astounding everyone with their excellent physique and bearing, until, when Lord Kitchener spoke in the House of Lords the first million of the new Armies had been reached, not counting very large enrolments in the Territorials (of which no figures were given), and still recruits were coming in at the rate of 30,000 a week.

Setting aside the unreported numbers of the Territorials, this gives us up to date about 2,500,000 men enrolled out of a total male population between the ages of 19 and 35 (according to the Census), in round figures, of 4,600,000 only! That is to say, well over the half of the males between these age limits are actually enrolled at the present moment; and raising the age limit to 40—it is still only at 38, but I allow the extra two years as a set off against uncounted Territorials and old soldiers up to 45—gives us only an additional 1,200,000. But even this does not exhaust all that we have done. Between the years 19 and 40 are included all the pick of the trades required for arming and equipping our ships, troops, etc.; all the railwaymen, who certainly cannot be spared, the merchant seamen (for the most part more indispensable than ever), the police, the fire brigades, and so forth; and after careful inquiry I cannot put the total number of these men at anything less than another million, leaving, out of the male population up to 40, only 2,300,000, which number includes doctors, Civil Servants, heads of many businesses, clergy, and those sick, crippled, and blind who under no conditions could be counted in the fighting strength of the nation. And the supply has not yet shut down by any means. Indeed since the Scarborough incident recruiting has again boomed.

For the moment we can leave out of account the further enlistments of older men for Home Defence and the men of the National Reserve detached for special duties, for the age, under 40, is the essential feature of all armies, and within these limits we have already drawn within a fraction of two thirds of the total men available—i.e. almost exactly the same proportion as the French law of compulsion, the strictest in Europe, would have given us, and one sixth more at least than the Germans have been taking out of their annual contingents.

What more in numbers could compulsion have afforded us? and what about the quality? After the distinction already won by many Territorial units in the field, it is hardly necessary to say anything on this point, and as to the Regulars, also volunteers, we will let the Prussian Guards and the German Staff tell us now what they really think of our Armies. Compulsion had done all that it could do, and more than even the best Prussians dared to expect, for their troops. It has carried them forward to almost certain death in a manner which has exacted the admiration of all our men and officers; but at that critical moment when the fate of empires hangs in the balance it has always failed them, and our men, Territorials and Regulars alike, have sprung forward upon them with the bayonet with a determination never dreamt of in warfare since the days of Waterloo and the Peninsula.

We know that our men—the immortal 7th Division, for instance—have often been exposed to extreme risks which they have most gloriously sustained and surmounted, but we know nothing of the causes that compelled their leaders to make this supreme demand upon them. It is conceivable that if we actually had had a compulsory system at work for some thirty years, and if everyone had known for certain that in 1914 we should be fighting in Flanders, we might have had more numbers available; but I submit that whereas we, the public, have absolutely no facts before us to justify the conclusion that mere numbers could have helped us, there is the strongest possible reason to believe that compulsion in England would have done more harm to the cause of the Allies as a whole than the available extra numbers could have redeemed. For on the day war broke out nine tenths of our factories would have automatically closed down, as they did in France and Germany. Had it not been for the power our manufactories preserved of supplying with absolutely necessary accoutrements, boots, etc., the millions of trained but unequipped soldiers of the Continental armies, we should not now hold the positions of such immense advantage which as a whole our combination of Allied Armies throughout Europe from East to West has now attained.

F. N. MAUDE.

VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY SERVICE?

(II)

AN INDIVIDUALIST'S PLEA FOR OBLIGATORY SERVICE

ALL of us who earnestly believe in the necessity of National or Obligatory Service, and earnestly wish to see it adopted during the War, ought to be careful not to speak or write a word which may appear like disparaging or 'crabbing' what has been achieved so far through voluntary enlistment. There is no occasion and no excuse whatever for doing so; and, as a fact, some of the most energetic recruiters to-day are wholly in favour of a law being passed without delay calling up to the defence of the country and the prosecution of the War the youth and manhood of the nation. There is nothing in the least degree contradictory, illogical, or insincere in our rejoicing over the fine spirit which fires the men who have been rallied by the voluntary method and are now being made into an army, but at the same time in our pressing for the adoption of a national and obligatory scheme. This is not a question as to whether the theory of individualism or the theory of collectivism, the theory of voluntarism or the theory of compulsion is the right theory: that is a dispute for political philosophers—some will say, for political pedants—at a season of profound peace and safety, when time does not matter and the debate need not be concluded. It is to-day a question of life and death for our liberties and our Empire, and a time when we must all set aside our pride or prejudice about principle this and theory that, and simply and solely concentrate with all our might on the one practical, essential matter of building up, well within the next twelve months, such an army as can, side by side with France, (1) thrust the Germans out of Belgium—a giant's task clearly—and (2) be still a great and powerful weapon in the sheath at the settlement on the close of the War. This second point should not for a moment be forgotten, for a Power whose weapon is only big and enduring enough just to see it through a war like this will cut a sorry figure at the close. If we fail to forge and temper a weapon for War and Settlement, we may find ourselves at the end of the struggle not much good to our

Allies and Europe, and none at all to ourselves. Have the optimists who believe that ere long we shall be rolling the German army towards the Rhine thought what it may cost us to clear Belgium? Have they forgotten what it cost Germany to cover Belgium and a portion of the North of France?

We, then, who earnestly desire an arrangement for a national obligatory army without undue delay—even if all agreed to it to-morrow, the thing must take time to work out—are not going to disparage what has already been done through purely voluntary means, through inviting and instigating the men to come forward. We see that a great deal has been done by these means. Mr. Bonar Law claims that what has been done is wonderful. Clearly, he is perfectly right. It is wonderful, and it is a true sign of the splendid spirit of our people throughout the British Isles—including certainly Ireland—that so many men have sprung to the call; wonderful indeed when we remember—what it is extremely unfair and foolish to forget—that military service has never in recent times been greatly encouraged in this country, and at some periods has been miserably discredited. It is not so long, after all, since the Volunteers, since the Yeomanry, were almost a butt for cheap but general wit: Hood's poem on the subject held good long after Hood's time. At Oxford in the 'eighties I remember that this service was about equal in 'Varsity 'form' to golf somewhere by Shotover or to float-fishing on the Upper River. And was Oxford even then so out of touch with the general tendency? I think not. Well, Oxford has atoned for that sleepy indifferentism—so nobly has she atoned that it was a question towards the close of the 'Long' last year whether it was worth while to reassemble: and the country has been atoning in the same fine temper.

Decidedly, no reasonable or patriotic men will 'crab' or disparage the recruiting movement; and Lord Kitchener spoke the generous truth when lately he declared that he had nothing to complain of in the answer to his call for men. In short, the men who have rolled up in the five months of war are splendid and the army into which they are being moulded promises to be splendid—Codford or Salisbury Plain, Wool or Lyndhurst, or even the strip of churned mud which was the Guards' Cricket Ground at Chelsea, should persuade any doubter of that. We have begun the forging of a glorious weapon to carry out the Prime Minister's ideal; we are making a New Model Army for his policy of Thorough.

These are admissions in favour of voluntary work. I concede them frankly—and indeed gladly, because, as it happens, I have always leant towards the voluntary or individualist method in life rather than towards the compulsory or collectivist.

But events move very rapidly in this struggle; they have moved greatly even since Lord Kitchener spoke the generous words about the answer to his call; and the signs that they will soon be moving far too quickly for voluntary recruiting really cannot be much longer overlooked. Voluntary recruiting, despite its mettle and its high fervour, is essentially a thing of spurts, very heartening, and inciting us to throw up our hats whilst these spurts last. But spurts are succeeded by reactions, which are deadly and depressing. We have lately had an object-lesson in this; and do even the 'incurable optimists' doubt that when the householders' inquiry is over, and the forms are all in, and the, say, two hundred thousand or two hundred and fifty thousand new men thereby secured, there will not be an inevitable reaction? By then we shall be able to deal with far more men per week than we can deal with now. And suppose those far more men do not roll in, or suppose we then get not even so many men per week as we get to-day, what will be our position and prospects then? Prophets of evil we may be called for supposing anything of the kind; but that was the name—or a harder one—given to those who watched Germany forging for years her mighty sword and dared to say she meant to use it. Besides, is it so prophetic? We saw a great spurt only a matter of weeks ago, and inevitable reaction followed. Is not the rash prophet he rather who predicts the steady and continuous flow from to-day on till we are that nation in arms which we must be if we are to (1) free Belgium, (2) cross the Rhine and march through Germany, and (3) be a great, dominant force at the settlement?

The steady and continuous current which fructifies the land it passes through, and can be utilised—that is the form in which we need our river of recruits to flow, like Denham's Thames by Cooper's Hill. Nothing else will serve us in the long run. The sudden spate soon runs down and is largely wasted, leaving a bed too dry and stony. It is no answer whatever to the overwhelming case now for Obligatory and National Service to urge that, if we had far more men to-day than voluntary recruiting brings us, we could not avail ourselves of them; for an obligatory arrangement provides for the slack time coming—the slack time which is humanly certain to come presently, after we have exhausted the supply of men whom the Prime Minister's appeal to householders will doubtless gather.

But what are the serious arguments against adopting Obligatory Service for men between, say, twenty and thirty-five years of age? I pass over with a few words the more trivial and scarcely serious objections, such as (1) that it would net in the cowards; (2) that one 'free' soldier is worth three (or is it six?) 'pressed' soldiers; (3) that we are 'an Island Power' and cannot

adopt ' Militarism ' ; (4) that we cannot go back on pledges and speeches to our constituents. As to the frequent but unfortunate objections (1) and (2), have Australia and New Zealand, and has France suffered through their obligatory systems netting in ' the cowards ' ? And is it not insolent and highly impolitic to say that one ' free ' British soldier is worth three or six ' pressed ' Austrians, New Zealanders, or Frenchmen ? I am sure that is not a claim which any British soldier would for a moment make. It is grotesque ; and, besides, an insult to our brave Kin and to our Allies—France, Russia, Serbia, and to Belgium where a national service was adopted in 1913 and is gradually coming into force. Objection (3) is palpably absurd, for even to-day under the voluntary system we are adopting ' Militarism '—there is no other way of winning the War. As for objection (4), surely no statesman pledged himself to oppose Obligatory Service even though of his own responsibility and initiative he should commit the country to war with a Power like Germany, and undertake a vast land campaign ? No Unionist statesman, so far as I know, has pledged himself at all against an Obligatory and National Service ; and no Liberal statesman has pledged himself against it in case of such a crisis for our Empire and our liberties as fronts us to-day. The political pledge objection may, therefore, be set aside as irrelevant.

But there remains, I admit, one serious and substantial argument against adopting such a system. It is this—that it would raise a considerable outcry among those who have scarcely realised as yet the exceedingly grave situation to-day ; and that it would import rancour and party feeling into our midst once more. I quite see that there is force in this objection, and that it is affecting a great number of believers in National and Obligatory Service who dread and hate the idea of an outcry and divided counsels ; and who, rather than cause that, prefer to wait awhile and see whether the vast army which we still need cannot be induced to join through pressure of public opinion, through education and eloquent appeals, and through promptings of patriotism. I recognise fully the force and sincerity of this objection ; but I think those whom it honestly weighs with have not fully considered the rancour and smouldering passion and the bitter reproaches which the present system must lay up for the nation. Already we are getting a faint idea, a passing glimpse, of it ; there is an angry dispute about football ; there is talk about the ' white feather ' and ' shirking ' and ' skulking '—most of it very unfair, but unfortunately under the present system only too natural. Districts are being contrasted with districts, counties with counties ; and even the Prime Minister himself the other day seemed to make a claim for Scotland as against other un-

named parts of the United Kingdom. Women are joining in these disastrous but, under the present methods, irremediable disputes; editors of daily and weekly papers receive many letters from the mothers and fathers of sons who have gone or are going to the War; and these letters are often terribly bitter against those who have not gone or will not go. All over the country indeed this dangerous feeling is springing up already. What will it be after the War? What will happen when the soldiers come back, and hundreds of thousands, even a million or two of them, want civilian work again, and in many cases a post cannot be found for them? What is likely to be the feeling between the families and friends of those who went and the families and friends of those who did not go? It is idle to reply that it will serve those men who did not go quite right if they are reproached and despised, and so forth; and that they will have to turn out of their snug berths when the heroes return. *That* will not banish the ills of rancour and of secret or open hostility between family and family.

By not adopting a simple, thorough, and perfectly fair and democratic service scheme, we are laying up for ourselves a world of ill-feeling, envy, and uncharity in the future, a world that may take a generation or more to pass away. Now by an honest Act all this ill-feeling, all these hideous comparisons must instantly disappear. Such a mischievous wrangle as that over football will cease automatically. Football can then go on much as usual, for the men qualified by age and physique to serve will obviously not be taken all at the same time. They will only be taken as there are the facilities for training and equipping them, and they will be chosen by the absolutely fair method of the ballot. Those who are not drawn at first will go on with their ordinary work and pursuits till their turn comes; and, of course, if the War is over far sooner than we expect, a very large number will not be drawn at all, and, therefore, will not be disturbed in their normal callings. But no invidious and hostile distinctions, under such an Act, will arise as between those who go to the War and those who stay at home. The Act will not tend to separate individuals and classes and particular villages, districts, or counties, as the present method unhappily is doing and will assuredly do far more as the War goes on.

The Prime Minister has declared a very great design: the country is not to stay its hand till the German war machine is destroyed. There is to be no compromise, no patched-up peace. It is to be Berlin or Nothing. He has pledged us irrevocably to this; and certainly Chatham never conceived nor Pitt carried through a more masterful design. Can anyone really doubt—with Belgium to-day one great entrenched German fort growing

stronger every day—that the Prime Minister's is a design which necessitates a British Army on a European scale? To secure such an army we shall clearly have to disturb the trades and occupations of the country equally whether the men volunteer or whether the men are called up by an Act. Therefore, assuming we are to have the army for the Prime Minister's design, assuming we are to win the War, trade will eventually suffer not less through the voluntary method than through an Act. If trade is to be hit, it will be hit as hard by voluntary enlistment as by obligatory enlistment. The difference between the two methods is that the latter will (a) spare the nation from a festering sore of reproaches, taunts, and rancour; and (b) secure to the nation that quiet, even, and continuous flow of recruits which we so greatly need.

A general Obligatory Service law to-day in this country must be a democratic law, rightly considered. But why be scared by names at this time? Democracy means the strength of the people; and the strength of the people exerted to its utmost is after all the only way by which we can prevail in this War.

GEORGE A. B. DEWAR.

VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY SERVICE?

(III)

THE VOLUNTEER SPIRIT

ONE of our ablest historical scholars has claimed for the Retreat from Mons that it is 'the finest British feat of arms since Waterloo.' Many people, who persistently disbelieved in the possibility of this European War until it actually burst upon us, are now making capital from the glories of Mons and from the splendid behaviour of the London Scottish in their first action. There, we are told, is the true British spirit, the Volunteer Spirit, which no other nation possesses, and which will always carry us through to victory. A large section of the nation is deliberately settling down into its old thoughtless optimism, and now, as of old, the cry of 'Scaremonger' begins to swell up against all who are trying to face the facts.

Let us, however, face the facts and shame all thoughtless abuse. Whose is the glory of this glorious Retreat from Mons? All glory, of course, to the men who actually fought in it: this will be most fully recognised, perhaps, by those who talk least noisily about it at the present moment. But to whom else has the Retreat brought glory? Will our sons, looking back upon all this, judge that it was a glorious affair for the Cabinet, or for the War Office, or for Parliament, or for the country at large? What precise proportion of this glory will an impartial posterity allot to the hundreds of thousands who were beginning to watch football matches before the Retreat had ceased?¹ And how far is it glorious even to those other thousands who would have gone to the Front if they had been young enough, and who have now at last received grudging permission to enrol themselves in some sort of Citizen Force which Government shows no intention of treating seriously? The world has grown critical of military glory during the last generation or two, and rightly critical. Those who have taken most pains to trace the advance of civilisation during the last seven or eight centuries are those who have

¹ There were 84,000 watching seven great Club matches, even as lately as November 7. These same Clubs had 126,000 spectators on November 17 of last year.—*The Times*, November 23, 1914.

most right to look forward to a distant century in which military glory will be a thing of the past. But, until that happier age comes, why should we shut our eyes to the actual world around us? How is it that we hear all this uncritical talk about military glory to-day from those very men who were most bitterly critical of military glory a few months ago? Why should we blink the fact that individual glory may mean national disgrace? Hannibal, perhaps the finest captain who ever led a voluntary army, perished at last because his country failed to back him up: because the Roman conscript armies could always be replenished, while his own was slowly wasting in quality, even when its actual numbers could be maintained. It is his peculiar glory that he gave all the best of himself to a thankless country, doing for his fellow-citizens what they refused to do for him. That which was most glorious in Sir John French's despatches may well seem, to our grandchildren, most inglorious for the country which sent him out. The Germans, it appears, were nearly three to our one; and their artillery at least four to one. It is splendid to read how one Briton faced three Germans; but where were the other two? At Mons, at Le Cateau, each of our soldiers fought for three and suffered for three. He earned glory for three; but can he transfer it to his absentee comrades? We say most truly of these soldiers 'They shed their blood for their country'; but we may add with almost equal truth 'They shed their blood for the Voluntary System.' If this nation had been armed only as the Swiss are armed, there would probably have been no war at all; or, at worst, a far shorter war, and one in which our soldiers would have fought at far greater advantage than now. Anything which prolongs this War costs Great Britain alone, in hard cash, four million pounds a week; enough, according to Lord Roberts, to organise a really efficient nation in arms for a whole year; or, to take the controversial counter-estimate of Lord Haldane, for six months. We have already spent, therefore, a ten years' Budget, even according to Lord Haldane's estimate; and the end is not yet in sight. If, then, this is the cost of a Voluntary System, let us ask ourselves, as a business nation, what we are getting for our money. We have tried to apportion the glory of Mons as our grandchildren will apportion it; let us try to see how our grandchildren are likely to judge of the theory that national success or failure in war ought to be left to the free choice of the individual citizen.

It is hard to reach fifty years forward in imagination; but we may often learn almost as much by measuring the same distance backward. Half a century ago, the question of compulsory education divided thinking men in Great Britain, much as they are now divided on the question of compulsory military service. The historical analogy, it will presently be seen, is

really very close at the present moment. Until last August, however, there was still one important difference. Fifty years ago, many men said openly, and far more thought secretly, that the education of the poorer classes was a thing rather to be discouraged than fostered; that *educational* efficiency was positively harmful to a State. These, however, were reactionaries, and bore the discredit of a decaying party. On the other hand, the ideal of *military* efficiency was decried as a false ideal, until a very few weeks ago, by a large party claiming to speak in the name of intellect and progress. In contrast with Continental Radicals and Socialists (who recognise clearly that a State unable to defend itself is a State in which social progress must be insecure), our democratic leaders have practically believed that war could be killed by ignoring war. One of the mainstays of Mr. Angell's *Great Illusion* was the plain fact that 'the Three per Cents. of powerless Belgium are quoted at 96, and the Three per Cents. of powerful Germany at 82 . . . all of which carries with it the paradox that the more a nation's wealth is protected, the less secure does it become' (p. 32). Thousands of well-meaning people, who prided themselves on being intellectual, swallowed this nonsense greedily, as thoughtless people will always swallow an illogical proposition stated in simple language and professedly based on an obvious fact. It has needed a bitter experience to awaken many Conservatives in Belgium, and many Radicals in Britain, to the fact that civilisation still depends to some extent upon military efficiency.* But the lesson is now fairly complete on both sides; and those who are still opposed to military efficiency *on principle* are as negligible, at the present moment, as were our reactionary fathers who opposed educational efficiency as an ideal false in itself. The analogy, therefore, is now fairly complete; and we may learn much from the pleas of Voluntarists (as they call themselves) in the middle of last century.

Let us begin with their doughtiest champion, Mr. Edward Baines, whose father had the honour of sitting as Macaulay's colleague for Leeds in the first Reformed Parliament. Our hero was himself chosen as Liberal candidate for Bradford, over W. E. Forster's head, and ended a distinguished parliamentary career as Sir Edward. He fought all his life for the Voluntary System; in honesty and abilities he at least equalled those who are now loudest against compulsion in military matters; we cannot take a better specimen. The *Great Illusion* itself was not more enthusiastically received, if we may judge from the 'Opinions of the Press':

* The apparent paradox that Belgian Liberals had for thirty years been working for compulsory military service, and Belgian Conservatives *against* it, is fully explained in the present author's *Workers and War* (Cambridge, Bowes & Bowes). This democratic plea for universal compulsion will be strange only to those who are ignorant of Continental politics.

The ability, the temper, the firm, fair, and argumentative tone . . . the genuine English spirit . . . admirable and unanswerable. . . . Nothing could more tend to deter the Legislature from meddling with the education of the people than the facts and arguments contained in these memorable 'Letters.'

Thus we read, from such opposite points of view as the *Quarterly* and the *Patriot*, on the back of a pamphlet which, by its very title, carries us at once into an almost antediluvian world. It bears the date of 1847, and runs 'An Alarm to the Nation, on the Unjust, Unconstitutional and Dangerous Measure of State Education, proposed by the Government.' It is only fair to premise that many of Mr. Baines's objections were religious; as a leading Nonconformist, he feared that the new educational movement would give undue influence to the Established Church. But he made it quite plain, as many more of his contemporaries did, that his objections to any compulsory system, as such, were insuperable. His very first words strike the keynote of this and of his other pamphlets: 'The measure proposed by his Majesty's Ministers, for bringing the Education of the People under the direction and control of the Government, is, in my solemn conviction, the most dangerous measure of the present age.' 'Naked despotism' (he presently pursues) 'is a clumsy form of government, which we have no reason to fear in England'; but here is a subtler and more dangerous despotism creeping in—the 'thin end of the wedge' so dear nowadays to all opponents of compulsory Territorialism. No ordinary type can do justice to his misgivings, which break out in a profusion of italics:

I fear it is [the Ministers'] wish to have every school in the land under Government inspection, and virtually subject to Government control. . . . It has been the boast of England that its people were self-governed and self-educated, and to these features in their national system has been owing in a great measure the robust energy of the national character. . . . And, if every other argument failed, I would rely confidently on this alone, namely, the proud consciousness which swells the breast of the freeman and gives him a moral dignity beyond all that schools can teach. It is because the measure now proposed by the Government is calculated altogether to change this system, and to introduce a Continental system new and strange into England, from which we may expect the same fruits as it bears elsewhere, that I feel painful alarm.

A State system of compulsory education will 'lay anew the foundations of national character.' Apart from all religious objections natural to a Nonconformist, he is dismayed at 'the servile bondage into which all schoolmasters, their pupil teachers, and monitors, will be brought, and the effect of this on the principles and character of the rising generation.' What would Dunning, Fox, and Burke have thought of such State despotism?

The character of Englishmen will depend on the training of the English children. And is any man so besotted as to think that you can make the schoolmaster a slave, and yet a trainer of freedom? That you can prostrate the educator and leave the educated erect? Nay, the proposed system would train the very children, from their earliest entrance into the school, to obsequious servility. . . . The very babe would become venal—the very boy a parasite!

These unanswerable arguments are in complete harmony with the author's almost contemporary *Letter to Lord Lansdowne* on the same subject. Here, however, he expresses still more plainly his fear lest the measure should introduce Prussian despotism and police surveillance into our free country. Government, having once established complete control over our schools, will inevitably proceed to take in hand the pulpit and the press: and 'the destruction of our liberties will be complete.' He makes as much of the question of expense as Lord Haldane made against Lord Roberts. And, lastly, he is still more emphatic as to the absurdity of finding fault with that Voluntary System which was already educating a yearly increasing number of scholars, and which might some day be expected to reach even as many children as we needed to reach. 'It would be as reasonable to plough up the wheat in spring because it did not yet bear the full corn in the ear, as to denounce our educational institutions because they have not sprung at once into preternatural perfection.' This, it must be noted, was written by a shrewd man of wide experience, a leader of advanced thought, at a time when impartial foreign observers had long directed attention to the 'preternatural perfection' of compulsory schools, not only in despotic Prussia, but even in constitutional Saxony. Moreover, in other countries like France and Belgium, the proposed systems of thorough national education were being bitterly opposed, not by Mr. Baines's friends, the Liberals in politics or religion, but by Jesuits and their reactionary allies. In education at that time, as in military matters less than three years ago, the British Liberal fought tooth and nail *against* compulsion, without ever asking himself why the Belgian Liberal was fighting *for* compulsion. We were not only insular, but proud of our insularity.

For Mr. Baines, it must be repeated, gave expression to the ideas of a very numerous and influential section of the community, and a section which claimed to be saying to-day what England would be saying to-morrow. How persistent their campaign was may be judged from a very full contemporary reply to them by Dr. Charles Mackay of Glasgow,³ who was at great

³ *The Education of the People.* Letters to the Right Hon. Viscount Morpeth, M.P. Glasgow. 1846.

pains to refute their arguments in detail. Dr. Mackay showed that the boasted progress of the Voluntary System had not yet enabled it to touch, even nominally, more than eighty per cent. of the children in an exceptionally civilised town like Glasgow, and that in Pollokshaws not one child in four could both read and write. But the men who quoted these plain facts were cried down exactly as we have been cried down for quoting similar Government statistics about the Territorials; they were condemned as the real enemies of education, who were trying to render Voluntaryism impossible by decrying it to the public. The result was that in 1870 Forster was obliged to produce even worse statistics in support of his Bill. At Manchester (tell it not in Gath!) there were 65,000 children of school age, of whom 16,000 were at no school at all; nor was the general population of Manchester ashamed of this fact. Liverpool was still worse; so was Birmingham; so was Leeds, where Baines had reigned supreme in the Liberal Party for at least twenty years. These were the recognised fruits of Voluntaryism; yet, even in 1870, the country in general was unripe for frank and universal compulsion, which was only gradually introduced as time went on.

How speciously Conservatism argued all this time under the guise of Liberalism transpires even more plainly from other sources than from Mr. Baines's pamphlets. As late as 1868 we find even Temple of Rugby opposing compulsion on the ground that 'it would create a new crime.' But the fullest array of argument is in Derwent Coleridge's address to the London Diocesan Board of Education, in 1867, on *Compulsory Education and Rate Payment*. The usual moving appeal to the pocket is here reinforced by arguments far more subtly ingenious than anything in Baines. Coleridge has not forgotten that our modern police, the 'Peelers,' had been at first opposed as un-English; and he would generously allow this objection 'if you can show that our present system of education is as inefficient as the old Charleys,' and that any compulsory schools are likely to be as efficient as the new police. But how can any compulsory measure be enforced in this free land? 'Who is to track these youthful breadwinners from house to house, from farmyard to farmyard, from workshop to workshop?' Moreover, you will only educate still more the already educated; 'your penalty will not touch the worst class of parents.' And, after thus anticipating most of the objections which we have read in recent years against Lord Roberts's proposal for Compulsory Territorialism, he ends with an apologue which will not be fully understood unless we realise the fear of foreign systems which haunted his generation, as it haunts many minds in ours. The good Pre-

bendary has just explained, at some length, that a thing may work well in America, Prussia, or Sweden, and very ill in England. And now he continues :

A man has a bad leg. . . . 'Cut it off,' says the hospital surgeon, famous as an operator. 'I will supply you with an artificial leg, so fitted with springs and bandages, such an exquisite piece of machinery, that it will do as well or better than the old limb, and will give you no further trouble.' The man hesitates. 'Your machine may be very clever, but what if, like the Dutchman's cork leg, it jerks off of itself and carries me I know not whither? Or what if it prove a heavy incumbrance and will not march? At any rate it will not be vitally connected with my bodily frame; it will not beat with the pulses of my heart.' But what says his own medical attendant—a safe practitioner? He cannot suggest an immediate, he cannot even promise an effectual cure. He recommends constitutional treatment—a more generous and at the same time a more careful diet—with some local application. 'It will not get well soon,' he adds; 'perhaps it may never get quite well. Perfect health is hardly to be expected at your age, if at any age; and after all the leg is a fairly good leg; it has carried you along pretty well hitherto, and I advise you to try it a little longer.' My Lords and Gentlemen, compulsory education is this artificial leg.

In that very year, 1867, poor J. R. Green was writing from the Stepney parish, where he was spending his last few months as a Radical parson :

What hinders Reform? The want of education among the people. . . . Nothing can touch it but a general system of compulsory National Education, supported by a national rate. I wish people could see the waste of the present system—half a dozen schools, British, National, Private, where one good large school would suffice at *one-third* of the total expense at double the present results. But what chance is there of such a change? Just none whatever.*

Two years earlier, J. S. Mill had written to a friend 'I am glad that you agree with me on the subject (much more urgent in this country) of compulsory education.'⁵ Mill was also frankly in favour of the Swiss system of compulsory military service, though Mill's political descendants conveniently ignore this nowadays.⁶ No doubt there were many reasons which made Mill and Green see so clearly to-day what Baines could not see even to-morrow; but one great difference lies on the surface: neither

* *Letters of J. R. Green*, edited by Leslie Stephen, p. 171. 1901.

⁵ *Letters of J. S. Mill*, vol. ii. p. 49: cf. pp. 72, 291, 303.

⁶ One of the worst of these recent offenders, who might be expected to know something, at least, of Mill's sentiments, is Mr. C. P. Trevelyan, in his extraordinarily inaccurate pamphlet on *Democracy and Compulsory Service*. Compare the present author's counter-pamphlet, *True Liberalism and Compulsory Service* (Miles & Co., 68 Wardour Street); and a criticism of Mr. Trevelyan's pamphlet by Captain Archibald J. Campbell in the *Nineteenth Century* last February, entitled 'A "Young Liberal" Pamphlet.'

Mill nor Green nursed, under a crust of Liberalism, the native British horror of all Continental fads.

Apart from the very serious religious question, that is what lies at the root of the whole Baines business. His Liberalism serves but to supply powder and shot for his ineradicable Conservatism. He is not content with negatively condemning compulsory education as un-English; it is far worse; it is positively Prussian, and would reduce us to the level of mere Prussians; it is 'the Dutchman's cork leg,' which will run away of its own accord, Heaven only knows whither! Samuel Laing, the well-known traveller, was at the same time bringing the gravest charges against the educational system of Prussia, and affirming its intimate connexion with the militarisation of that country. Neither he nor Baines troubled to notice that Prussian militarism had been even more rampant under Frederick the Great and his father; nor did they pause to consider whether the final effect of education must not be to undermine both militarism (in the evil sense) and all other forms of despotism. They did not compare the Prussia of their own day with the barbarous old Prussia before those days of national awakening which had freed her from Napoleon, and of which the double watchword had been that all citizens should go alike to school, and that all should alike take their share in national defence. They compared her, instead, with a Britain which had enjoyed constitutional government for three centuries; judged her from that narrowest British standpoint which Thackeray always exposed so unmercifully; and found her altogether wanting. Because the citizen-scholar and citizen-soldier of Prussia had not been able to reverse the traditions of a thousand years within half a century, therefore the national army system, and even the schools, were condemned offhand as mere engines of despotism. Thousands of intellectuals reasoned in 1850 as thousands of intellectuals reason in our own day, looking no further than the most obvious phenomena, and condemning the machine in itself, instead of condemning that immemorial tradition of despotism which has so often succeeded in guiding the machine. Often, but by no means always. The North German Constitution of 1867, for instance, was forced to grant universal suffrage, because the country already had universal education and universal service. It was impossible to draw any flagrant distinction of privilege among men who already shared so equally in the work of the State. As Colonel Stoffel wrote to Napoleon the Third, in a series of reports from Berlin which were never published until after the disaster of 1870: 'Chief among these regenerative forces there are two . . . compulsory military service, compulsory universal education. . . . And, Prussia having just adopted universal suffrage, none can

foretell where the destinies of this educated, energetic and ambitious people will stop.' 7

The most Pharisaical Briton must recognise that the German democracy has, on the whole, advanced even more rapidly than ours during this century of compulsory service; and one of the most probable results of this present War is an enormous further advance for those classes which are bearing its heaviest burdens. Nothing can be more fatal than to blink the fact that the German workman is bearing a crushing legal burden in the true Volunteer Spirit. We are shocked at the ignorance of Germans who deride our soldiers as 'hireling swine'; yet there is even less excuse for the silly delusion which three Britons out of four nursed last year, and which is nursed even now by many who pride themselves on advanced thought, that a conscript will not fight like a hero for his country. We have been too long deluded by that shallow pretence of philosophy which treats 'volunteer' and 'conscript' as mutually exclusive opposites. The Volunteer Spirit and the conscript organisation are to each other as soul and body; we may distinguish in theory, but in practice their interaction is enormous. Compulsory education has given such an impulse to voluntary study as the Early Victorian world of Baines and Coleridge never dreamt of. If the working man may now buy the classics of all literature for a few pence, this is due not so much to the improvement of machinery as to the fact that thousands of his fellows are volunteering to read the same books, and the thousands of pennies reward the publisher's venture. And (to return to a more direct, though less palatable, fact) conscripted Germany has, in this very War, produced more actual volunteers than free Britain. In Switzerland, after the immediate and compulsory mobilisation of an army which, in figures of our population, would amount to nearly three million men, the Government was forced to forbid volunteering by public proclamation. It is not necessary to allow two Swiss citizens to avoid soldiering in order that the third may volunteer. It is the same all over the Continent. Our insular and indiscriminate devotion to the Volunteer System can only be justified on axioms which are too shameful to be seriously defended. It postulates that the Briton is the only man in Europe who will not fight well unless he has volunteered, and who cannot be expected to volunteer until the day of grace is half spent. Our so-called leaders of democratic opinion are secretly haunted by a craven distrust of their own democracy. They know that, in an armed world, civilisation must be armed in self-defence; yet they dare not arm the British people lest

⁷ *Military Reports*, by Colonel Stoffel. H.M. Stationery Office. 1872. Pp. 145, 173.

we should pass from legitimate self-defence into the extremes of Prussian Junkerthum. Moreover, many of them are deluded by the devil's darling sin—the pride that apes humility, the conservatism that apes advanced thought. While Baines claimed to preach as an idealist to idealists, he took a firm stand on the basis of money and material comforts. Mill saw this clearly enough, and pleaded for compulsion because 'I do not see anything short of a legal obligation which will overcome the indifference, the greed, or the really urgent pecuniary interests of parents.'*

The Voluntary System does *not* inculcate a higher civic morality. On the contrary, it enables the shirker to pose as a more moral man than the 'militarist.' When a man tells us that the Volunteer Spirit must be kept on a pedestal, apart from all grosser contact, it is a safe speculation to bet five to one that he has never volunteered himself. Voluntary service is not the cross which these men take up, but the cross that they preach as a fetish, the vicarious sacrifice which excuses them from personal sacrifice. Hundreds, in their franker moments, deny even lip-homage to the Territorials. Mr. Benjamin Kidd, writing from Manchester to the *Manchester Guardian*, noted how that great city had not even given a send-off to its Territorials when they were mobilised at this awful crisis. An ironmonger in the South of England, advertising not long ago for an assistant, added 'No Territorial need apply.' He himself, and his trade journal in his defence, pleaded truly that he had only blurted out the maxim which necessarily guides nine out of ten men in his position. They will praise this thin line of khaki for standing between their own persons and compulsory service; they will howl down as unpatriotic whosoever ventures to quote even the Government statistics of Territorial deficiencies; but their own patriotism goes no farther than this. It is the patriotism of a crowd which sits shouting and betting on its eleven champions at a football match, and which hustles the referee for trying to tell the truth.

And how far more flagrant does this injustice become in war-time! It is not only that the Territorial, who has hitherto only sacrificed his time for his fellows, may now have to sacrifice his life for them. Far worse than this; we are positively obliged to welcome a heavy butcher's bill *pour encourager les autres*; the Voluntary Recruiting Machine must be lubricated with blood. It is not only a commonplace of our newspapers, but it has been coldly proclaimed in Parliament, that nothing stimulates enlistment like the news of a reverse. X, Y, and Z will not come forward until they can read that A, B, and C have been killed. The thing is as inexorably true as it is morally

* *Letters*, vol. ii. p. 107.

revolting: and our statesmen count upon it as a spendthrift gapes for his father's succession. A recent letter from a lieutenant who has received the Victoria Cross has attracted very little public attention, simply because we have read so many more of almost equal significance. He writes home to a friend of his old Bible-class:

The section and guns have gone, and I, the leader, am knocked out—a face torn with splinters, a bullet in it, too, and four holes in my shoulder. Nothing much because, fortunately, it did not blind me or smash my jaw. I do not want to come home; we need all our officers here. . . . God grant the country will realise the gravity of the crisis and send every able-bodied man to the ranks!*

Of all defects in a defective system, perhaps the worst is that the moment of its final and undisguised breakdown is just the least propitious moment for abolishing it. The hero must still drag his mutilated body back to the Front, because the un-hero has his own prescriptive right of sitting at a football match, and the super-hero is busy writing claptrap in the *New Statesman*. The hero must shed his blood again because it is expedient, under the Volunteer System, that one man should die for two recruits; because, otherwise, we could not keep up even the present rate of enlistment.

It is not one Minister's fault beyond that of his predecessor, or of that man's predecessor; because the whole nation has chosen to rely upon a system inherently incapable of proper prevision or provision. And the conflict itself has been precipitated, or even caused altogether, by an equally inevitable double misconception. While we have pharisaically despised the conscript, other nations have doubted falsely, though with more excuse, of our courage and honesty. Those who have known Germany for the last quarter of a century know also how steadily German scorn has increased for a nation in which the citizen hires another to discharge for him the imprescriptible duties of every able-bodied freeman. The Germans have great respect, on the other hand, for the Swiss system, which compels every able-bodied man to spend six months of his life in training for home defence, and produces extraordinarily favourable results. If only we could pass all our able-bodied manhood through six months of serious drill for home defence, we could not only afford to make the fullest allowance for conscientious objections, but also leave all foreign service to the volunteer impulse. The compulsory minimum would give real effect to the voluntary maximum; and our men would go to the Front no longer in niggardly dribbles, but in disciplined masses, so long as we were fighting a really national war.

G. G. COULTON.

* *The Daily Telegraph*, November 25, 1914.

*THOUGHTS ON THE WAGING OF
'GREAT WAR'*

It has been well said that the secret of success in war is to be found in the harmony between policy and strategy, and that the possibility of this harmony depends upon the statesman and the strategist seeing things as they really are, upon the truth of their vision. The coming of a war is always a time of strong feeling from which neither the statesman nor the strategist can escape. Most men are carried away by it. How then are they to see clearly and to preserve, amid the hopes and fears by which they and everyone else are possessed, the even balance of the mind?

In times of trial a true man falls back upon the resolves deliberately made during the meditations of quiet hours. He abides by the principles which he has previously sought and found. Those of us who during many years of peace have tried to clear our minds about the nature and conditions of war probably do well now to trust rather to such insight as they may have gained in those past efforts than to any of the impulses or new thoughts of the moment.

Our statesmen and the public men who have written about the War have been occupied chiefly with the statement of the British case. They have been finding arguments to justify the nation's course in going to war. I think this is really an effort made rather late in the day to bring their own consciences into harmony with that of the nation which knew quite well as soon as the crisis began where its duty lay. I have met no one who had any serious doubt on that subject. There is a deeper question which should have been asked and answered before. An ideally perfect Government would not make war unless and until it saw clearly not only the purpose to accomplish which it chose the method of a fight, but also how by fighting it could attain to the fulfilment of that purpose. Perhaps no Government is ideally perfect. The German Government, which is steeped in the theory of war, knew very well, and has let all the world know, what it wanted to get by the War. It thought it knew how it could get it; yet there may have been an error

in its vision, for it certainly did not see England as its inevitable antagonist. That is probably the explanation of its rage against this country.

There is only one theory of war—that which is set forth, with some differences of expression and of detail, by Clausewitz, by Jomini, by Mahan. It distinguishes between two sorts of wars. In the one class are small wars, the expeditions to which British Governments have been accustomed, and in the other class is 'absolute war,' 'great war,' 'national war,' the struggle of nations for existence, or, what is much the same thing, for the mastery. Everyone knows which kind we are now waging. The theory describes the lineaments, the large features of 'great war.' It is the war in which you aim at crushing the adversary, striking him down, disarming him, and dictating your terms. It is the kind of war made by Napoleon, the kind of war made by Moltke in 1866 with Bismarck to restrain him, and in 1870 with Bismarck to urge him on. It is the kind of war which in July Austria declared against Serbia, though she mistook it for an expedition, and which in August Germany declared against Russia and France, and of which in Belgium she has manifested the ruthlessness, perhaps the recklessness.

There are certain truths about 'great war' which can be deduced from its nature as a struggle between States for the mastery, and can also be gleaned from the experience of all the great wars of the past. The first is that if 'great war' is made against you, you can meet it only by 'great war.' The fundamental characteristic of 'great war' is that the whole nation throws itself into the fight. That is possible only when every man and woman realises that defeat means ruin to him and to her, and that there is no escape from it except by victory. When that happens a nation makes war with all its might; everyone contributes what he has—his money, his energy, his intelligence, his body if it is fit, his life if he has the chance. Then the nation is in earnest, and a nation in earnest will probably sooner or later evolve a plan grand enough for the occasion. It will perhaps not start with a grand plan. There have been nations which have been unexpectedly plunged into wars, even 'great wars.' In such cases the men at the head of affairs have not always thought out in advance the purpose of the war and the scope of the operations. They may have had quite other ends in view than victory in an international struggle. And if that end has not been constantly present to their minds they will not have been occupied beforehand with the means by which it is to be obtained. But a nation that means to have victory will find the right leaders, whether it starts with them or not, because when it is once awake it ceases to consider persons and reputa-

tions. It goes back to the elementary principle by which men must ultimately be judged: 'By their fruits ye shall know them,' the difficulty being that time is needed to reveal the strength or weakness of leaders, and that in 'great war' time is infinitely precious.

The ruling principle of 'great war' is the concentration of effort in time and space. 'Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might.' The aim in a war of this kind is to disarm the adversary, to crush his fighting forces, so that he is helpless and has no choice but to accept your terms. If that result is to be produced your forces must be so strong that they can shatter those of the enemy in a great battle or series of battles, and then go on to overrun his territory and occupy his capital. At sea you must destroy his fleet and coop up its relics in the ports in which they take refuge. Napoleon destroys an army at Ulm, seizes Vienna, and disperses a second army at Austerlitz. Then he dictates peace. He shatters an army at Jena, occupies Berlin, and then defeats the Russian armies that have come to the rescue. After that he does as he likes with Prussia. Moltke defeats one army at Gravelotte, captures another at Sedan, and then besieges Paris and defeats all the armies that try to relieve it. Then he expounds his terms. Nelson destroys a French fleet at the Battle of the Nile; after that the Mediterranean is his. He destroys a Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar; Great Britain could thenceforth treat all the ocean as her private property until in the third generation the Germans built a navy to remind her that the command of the sea is a matter not of right but of might.

It is popularly supposed that you can buy victory with blood, but history shows that you may shed blood in plenty and shed it in vain. For defeat you pay with bloodshed; for victory more is required. Victory as a rule is the result of forethought. To most of our people forethought has long seemed a trifle or an accident or a happy inspiration. But in truth the power of thought which wins battles is something that has to be acquired. It is a costly acquisition; a man gets it only by giving his life to it. That is the history of Alexander, of Hannibal, of Caesar, of Gustavus, of Frederic, of Napoleon, of Wellington, and of Moltke. At any rate, a man cannot possibly direct the operations of war successfully unless he has worked hard to master it, and that is a wrestle which requires his whole strength. Cromwell's letters reveal Cromwell at white heat, his whole soul thrown into his war. They do not reveal his labour in mastering the methods of Gustavus, but we know that he had mastered them.

Mr. Asquith has told us that the War must go on until Prussian militarism has been destroyed. I do not know whether

by force you can destroy an -ism, for an -ism is something spiritual. You can destroy the Prussian army and the German navy provided you go the right way about it. But I am sure that you cannot do it by Prussian methods, for a copy is not likely to be as good as the original. Prussia is a military despotism of the first order. Any attempt to imitate it in England would be an admission that Prussia is right. It would be an acceptance of the very thing which the Prime Minister says must be destroyed.

The conditions of victory in this War, in order of importance, though not necessarily of time, are first that the German Navy must be shattered in battle. It must be beaten in a Trafalgar or a Quiberon Bay or a Port Arthur. Secondly, the German army must be crushed in a Sedan, a Jena, or a Waterloo, or in a series of such battles. And, thirdly, the Allied Armies, victorious, must march to Berlin, to Munich, to Hanover. There might indeed be peace without these pre-requisites, but it would be only a truce. Unless she is well beaten Germany will begin it all over again.

The German navy, I say, must be destroyed. That is no light matter. There are German admirals who have paid the price of knowledge, having given their lives to nothing else. We shall have to pay dearly for victory over them. The price may be our own Navy. We must not grudge it. The purpose of our Navy's existence is to destroy the enemy's navy. If it succeeds it will have repeated Nelson's achievement and given England all the sea; no price is too high for that. 1 2 1 1 1

I hear men saying that it will be hard work to push the German army back to the Rhine. There is harder work than that to be done. The German army should never be allowed to go back across the Rhine. Nothing but its broken remnants ought to escape across that stream. The passage of the Rhine by the Allied Armies ought to be the beginning of the end.

So much and no more as to the scope of the War in regard to which I merely wish to assert that we ought to think about it, to suggest the right way of looking at it, and to hint at the kind of thoughts which our admirals and generals must now be thinking, in order that we at home may adequately support them by our sympathy. To say more would be to trespass on their province, which is far from my intention.

The only question which occupies us all just now is not what our admirals or our generals ought to do, not even in the first place what they are doing; we are giving them and shall give them our full trust, knowing that they are doing and will do their best. The question is, What is the best that the nation can do to back them? What can any of us do to contribute towards

victory? This is the joint affair of the Government and the people, which together make up the nation. To begin with, let us recognise that the Government, too, has done its best and that its best has been very good. When the crisis came the Cabinet felt that it must beware of entrance to a quarrel and paused before crossing the Rubicon. We can all understand that, although many of us were ashamed that there should be doubts of England's duty and shuddered at the consequences of delay. But once the plunge had been taken the Government showed that it had large views. Wise measures were taken to prevent a commercial panic and they were rewarded with success. The prompt mobilisation of the Navy, followed soon after by that of all the military forces, and the vote for half a million men taken on the 5th of August were an awakening call to which the people responded. But then came a series of measures by which a great many people were puzzled and which were accompanied by vague impressions among a part of the public which created a certain uneasiness. There was an impression that the Territorial troops were not appreciated at their full value, that an exaggerated importance was attached to the word regular—to the word rather than to what it really means—that perhaps the calls for recruits were made a little in advance of the organisation for dealing with them, and that rifles were a long time in coming. At the same time it was felt that all concerned must be loyally and heartily doing their best; that those who received the impressions I have described were necessarily unacquainted with the tremendous difficulties that inevitably beset the work of improvising armies, and that it would be impracticable for those charged with the military administration to give public explanations of all that they were doing, as such explanations might be useful to the enemy. People rightly felt that in a great war the Government must be supported, that it was no time for fault-finding, and that even the best of human efforts are full of imperfection. This is the right spirit and we are all possessed with it. We are all contributing to the success of the country's efforts by sinking our pet theories and our fads, by remembering that *le mieux est l'ennemi du bien* and by throwing our whole energies into accomplishing the tasks given us even when their meaning is shrouded in obscurity. At the same time one of our strongest natural instincts is that which, if we were to express it, would perhaps take the form of the cry for more light.

I cannot but think that the light for which men are longing would be given by setting before them the idea or design which is to guide the effort which the nation is now making. I mean, of course, not the design of the naval and military operations. That could in no case be divulged; it would be worth millions

to the enemy, and all the precautions of the censorship aim at nothing but preventing his discovering it. I mean the design for the making of armies, for solving the very special problem, of quickly, we might almost say suddenly, transforming a nation of citizens into a fighting organism. Here it is the large principles that are essential, and those principles all men are free to think about, free because thought is always free.

It may be well first to define two familiar words which, I think, denote two opposite perversions of thought—pacifism and militarism. Pacifism is the wrong thinking which mistakes peace, which is a means, for the end. Militarism is the wrong thinking which mistakes war, which is a means, for the end. As wrong thought always does, militarism carries with it further errors. For while right thinking sets up as the immediate object of the act of fighting, to gain the victory, to destroy the enemy's forces, and accepts every means consistent with self-respect which will conduce to that end, militarism, mistaking the means for the end, regards as vital the forms which at some time or other in past circumstances have been adopted as conducive to victory irrespective of those circumstances. Right thinking about war, like all right thinking, values forms only in relation to their meaning, to their use as means to an end.

The War has been sprung upon us in conditions which guard us for the moment against the error of pacifism. How are we to guard against the opposite error of militarism? I think by attempting to see as a whole the piece of work that is laid upon us. The Prime Minister's view implies that the forces of the Allies are to crush in a military sense the forces of the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires. That is a task of tremendous difficulty. In August last, Germany, besides her navy, upon the arming and training of which the German Government has for many years brought to bear its best thought and spent very large sums of money, had, as far as I can ascertain, about five million trained soldiers, for whom the arms and the military organisation were ready. She had also, I think, a further two million men capable of being trained and put into the field, and she had ready the plan and the means of training them. Her plan was to throw the bulk of her forces against France, while Russia was to be resisted by the Austrian army assisted by so much of the German army as could be spared from the great attack upon France. The British Navy was to be paralysed by the German navy's keeping itself within an area in which coast and harbour defences, mines, torpedoes, and submarines might protect it against attack and destruction, and, therefore, postpone indefinitely the acquisition by Great Britain of the absolute command of the sea. It is a sound plan to which, I think, Germany

will adhere. We must expect the German attacks in the western theatre of war to be renewed again and again always with very large forces, or, if the pressure exerted by Russia should seriously diminish the German strength in the west, we must count upon an obstinate German defence of some such line as she now holds covering not only her Rhine provinces but also Belgium. She holds in support of this line the great fortresses of Metz, Namur, Liège, and Antwerp. Behind it she has the line of the Rhine, with the great fortresses of Strasburg, Mainz, Coblenz, Cologne, and Wesel. If the Allies are to fulfil Mr. Asquith's programme and dictate terms of peace to Germany, the enormous German army in this carefully prepared theatre of war will have to be attacked and decisively beaten. It is doubtful whether France alone, even with an extreme effort, can put into the field forces so superior to those of Germany as to suffice for the crushing blow required. The balance needed to produce this superiority must be provided by British forces. You cannot count on a crushing victory without greatly superior numbers, especially where you have to deal with an enemy whose troops are remarkably well trained, organised, and led. The greatest of all writers on strategy, discussing between 1820 and 1830 a plan of campaign to be undertaken in case of need by the Allies against France, assumed that they would put into the field altogether 725,000 men, knowing that Napoleon at his best had never had a French army larger than 450,000. If three million Germans are to be crushed in the region which I have roughly defined, the Allies would do well to attack them with six millions, and if France provides four millions England ought to provide two. The difficulty lies not in finding the number of men but in arming and training them so that they may be fit to cope on terms of equality, regiment for regiment, with the troops of the German army. That is the problem which Great Britain has to solve.

Germany's immense number of trained men is the result of a military system which is a Prussian invention and which it is important that we should understand, as it has been adopted by all the Great Powers of Europe except Great Britain. In the United Kingdom every child born must be registered, but after its birth the State takes no means of following its life's history. In Germany the registration continues, so that the State can follow the career of every person. Every year there is a muster of all the males that were born twenty years before, and of these the larger part, a little more than half, those who are the strongest and most active, are sent for two years to be soldiers in the army. During those two years they are given a thorough military training, according to a carefully prepared programme

drawn up with a view to the exigencies of war. They are then turned out of the army, though they remain soldiers, and are liable to be called back to the ranks in case of war. When, at the end of July, the army was put on a war footing twenty annual classes were called to the ranks; all the young men who had been born in each of the twenty successive years and had served their two years in the army. Afterwards were called out men of the same classes who had been excused from training, and men of some classes born before or after the twenty years which had been covered by the first call. This system makes the standing army—the various regiments of infantry, cavalry, artillery, of the army service corps, and of the railway corps—a war school in which all the able-bodied young men are educated. And at the end of twenty years it produces the result that the better part of the male population, rather more than half of it, between the ages of twenty and thirty-nine, are ready for the field, either immediately or after a very short course for recapitulating the lessons they have learned. The system enables the nation that has adopted it, provided that it has been in force for twenty years, to begin a war with a very large army indeed. No one, as far as I know, has ever proposed that it should be adopted in the United Kingdom. The National Service League indeed advocated a scheme by which every young man should be compelled to receive a few months' military training. The League, if I remember right, at first proposed two months, then four, and ultimately six, and there was to be no liability to fight England's battles except upon British soil. Five years ago, at the request of the proprietor of the *Morning Post*, I tried to show how the Prussian system might be adapted to the peculiar case of Great Britain, and what its costs and results would be on the basis either of a one year's or a two years' course; but I held that Great Britain's needs would not be met by the possession of any force the employment of which was to be limited to fighting in the United Kingdom, and that a British Army, if it was to be useful, must be ready to go and win its country's battles in any theatre of war in which England required victory. The point which it appeared to me needed to be cleared up was one of educational psychology. What is the shortest period of training which will suffice to produce habits? I think it is largely a matter of the spirit and method with which the training is conducted.

At the present moment the discussion of the Continental or Prussian method is a waste of time. Its whole value lies in its continuous application for many years, in its taking the young men in annual classes year after year, so that everything can be done without hurry in a leisurely and orderly manner. It is

applicable for making an army which you may have to use twenty years hence or ten years hence, for its essence consists in its taking the young men in a manageable body composed of those of twenty and those of twenty-one. It is of no use whatever when you have to improvise a large army in a short time.

Some people seem to think that you can make an army quickly by compulsion. I doubt it. If you had a well-trained regiment you could increase its numbers a little by putting into it a few pressed men, because after a time most of them would catch the spirit of their comrades, though a few of them would always cause trouble. It could be done in old days for the Navy, because a few pressed men on a ship were actually in a prison from which there was no escape, and found it more convenient to do as they were told than to resist. But, again, it seems to me idle to talk of compelling men to come in at a time when the authorities have already many thousand more recruits than they are able either to arm, train, or equip. On the 1st of January 1914 the Regular Army numbered 156,000 and the Army Reserve and Special Reserve 200,000. In August and September supplementary estimates for a further million were voted, and in the middle of November, when a second million were voted, Parliament was informed that the first million had, roughly speaking, been raised, and that recruits were presenting themselves at the rate of 30,000 a week. These figures did not include the Territorial force, which numbered in January 250,000, was recruited early in August up to its full establishment of 315,000, and has since then been duplicated by the creation of reserve units. Thus the United Kingdom alone began the War with 350,000 trained men of the Regular Army and its Reserves, with 250,000 more or less trained Territorial troops, and has now nearly a million and a half of further recruits undergoing training. All the evidence points to a continuance of the influx of recruits in proportion to the popular grasp of the need for them, and to the strength of the conviction that the school to which they are sent is a good and successful school.

It is quite evident that the business of turning one or two million recruits into soldiers fit for the field in a few months is a very different thing from that by which standing armies in the course of two or three years transform a limited number of recruits into trained soldiers. The standing armies are not content with the mere drill and instruction of their new men. The British Army, for example, has for many years past been in the habit of giving its recruits a four months' course, in which the lessons occupy a few hours a day. But it has never thought that recruits so trained would be ready for war, because it has never passed men into the Reserve until they have completed three years in the

ranks, and it very much dislikes letting them off with so short a course as three years. The French and German Armies have for many years insisted upon a two years' course as normal. England's necessities now require her to turn citizens into good soldiers in something like six months. If this is to be possible it is evident that the school ought to be provided with the very best teachers and with the very best appliances. But the best officers have all been sent to the Front, and I know not how many battalions are still waiting for the rifles, without which their training for war cannot begin. These are the difficulties which have to be overcome and which ought to be thoroughly realised by anyone who should attempt at the present time to criticise the military administration.

I cannot but think that the work has been to some extent embarrassed and impeded by the survival of some traditions which are not those of war but of the militarism of peace. Everyone appreciates the great value of the thoroughly trained and seasoned soldier, and as in our own Regular Army the training is longer than in any other, while the relations between officers and men are better than in any other, the small British Regular Army, which since the South African War has so much improved, was probably when it mobilised at the beginning of August the best military force in the world. No wonder that those who know war set a high value on the quality of our Regular troops. They cannot be replaced, nor can troops of the same character possibly be produced in the time that is given us for preparation. Behind them were their own Reserves, which have been fused with them, and then the Territorial troops, which used to be known by the better name of Volunteers. These Territorials had their own officers, full of zeal and intelligence, most of whom well understood their duty and lacked only a period of continuous practice to make them fully competent for the field, while the men had mastered the elements and also needed but a few months of hard training, and especially of musketry practice, to make them very good troops. The bulk of them volunteered for the Front; a minority held to the terms of their engagement, which do not require them to serve out of the United Kingdom. Those who have volunteered for service abroad are, as regards the military law under which they serve and the pay which they receive, in precisely the same position as the soldiers of the Regular Army. When it was decided largely to increase the forces available and calls were made for further men, the extra recruits asked for were described as new 'Regulars.' It was like asking for new 'old china.' The special quality of our Regulars comes from their long period of training and their long association with a complete staff of

professional officers. To call the new recruits Regulars was to misuse the term Regular; to try to transfer the qualities which it implied to troops which cannot possibly have those qualities. It was a piece of wrong thinking and carried with it a second piece of wrong thinking, for it implied that the new Regulars would be better troops than the old Territorials. This was impossible, unless the new Regulars were given opportunities such as were to be denied the old Territorials, which would have been an injustice and would involve a loss of time and energy. Yet I find it hard to resist the conviction that this mistake has been made and that there has survived from the militarism of peace a prejudice against the Territorial troops which has been detrimental to the nation's effort to arm itself. I am familiar with the prejudices which in 1792 and 1793 impeded the development of the resources of the French Republic for war. There were then three classes of troops—Regulars, Volunteers, and Conscripts—and the attempt to maintain the distinctions between them greatly embarrassed the generals who were fighting in the field. Not until after two and a half years of war was it decided to abolish those distinctions and to treat all classes of French soldiers on the same footing as citizens fighting for their country. England would do well now to imitate that example.

The training of troops should be ruled by what they have to do in war, and in war the soldier must always be ready and able to march and to use his weapons. He must also be accustomed to follow the direction of his leaders, which implies that mutual understanding between leaders and followers which is called discipline. Discipline comes of itself when officers and men live together, provided that the officers have the qualities that make good leaders. To march is a matter of training and organisation; to use weapons a matter of skill, which comes only from practice. These are the fundamental requisites of an army, and there are no others. The time it will take to acquire them depends upon the spirit of those immediately concerned. The finest army ever made was composed of Cromwell's Ironsides, and Cromwell rightly judged that to make a good army he must get men of the right spirit. Since the 4th of August there has been only one spirit animating the people of this country, and it has given us men of the right stamp by the million. If you took a thousand such Englishmen determined to make themselves into soldiers, and gave them fifty men of the character, intelligence, and education that qualify them to be leaders, they would make themselves into soldiers without wasting time, even if there were not a trained officer among them. They can read, there are plenty of good text-books which they can master, and, provided they have the tools—that is the rifles and cartridges—

they would not be very long in learning how to handle them. If you could give to each thousand one first-rate officer, they would pick his brains in an incredibly short space of time. The ante-Boer-War type of officer could not help them, for he was brought up in ignorance of war and filled with the dead traditions of peace militarism, which in war are encumbrances to be got rid of. You cannot improvise an army by means of voluminous regulations; it is a question of the selection of first-rate men to educate, to lead, and to command their fellows.

There is only one thing that the typical hypothetical thousand men with its leaders cannot do for themselves. They cannot supply themselves with arms and ammunition. The quickest way to get the new troops ready is for the central administration to concentrate its energies upon the supply of weapons, to leave the supervision of the training of the troops to local officers, who should be the best that the Army can find, even if they have to be withdrawn from the Front or promoted from the Territorial force, and to entrust the movement of troops that are ready for the field, at home or abroad, to the General Staff. To centralise everything and to decentralise everything lead equally to chaos. The art of organisation consists in doing at the centre only what can be done nowhere else, and doing in the localities everything that can possibly be done away from the centre.

SPENSER WILKINSON.

December 21, 1914.

BELGIUM ON THE RACK:

A BYSTANDER'S TESTIMONY

IN the last town of refuge left to the Belgian people there rest as a memory of old unhappy days the instruments of a religious persecution. The grim robe which the Judge-Executioner wore, the weapons of burning, of tearing, of stretching his victims are preserved in the torture-room, whose old timbers still, when the wind is high over the marshy plains of Flanders, seem to re-echo the sighs, the groans, the shrieks of that dead century.

When I write *are* preserved, I should say rather *were* preserved until very lately. To-day that room is stripped of robe and cowl and brazier and rack. In November it was thought that the Germans would enter the town, and the instruments of torture were hurriedly hidden away in a buried chest. Why? Was it that the fear existed that the sight of these means of cruelty would prompt the German invader to new efforts of 'frightfulness'? Was it with the symbolical idea of showing the flight of the old and the inefficient before the new and the scientific—the modest retirement of a brazier which could roast but one man at a time, before the great modern German army with its up-to-date equipment for the burning and sacking of whole cities? Or was it merely that the fearful relics had a value and were therefore hidden, as everything of value should be hidden, from a German army which cannot be trusted to spare anything of public or private worth?

Often I asked and never knew quite clearly. The old torture-museum, with its means of brazing and tearing the human flesh in the effort to conquer the human mind, will be restored no doubt when the tide of invasion has receded and Belgium is free again. Then the traveller coming on a fearful pilgrimage to the War scenes of 1914-15 may stand there by the side of the old rack and call up to his vision the torture of Belgium.

The victim of the rack, helpless in its grip, had from his torturer the invitation to recant, to betray, before he had suffered anything but the agony of anticipation. Then, if he were steadfast, the penalty was not a swift death coming straight upon the glow and ardour of his heroic 'No.' One turn of the rack brought a quivering torture: and again the invitation to betray.

If his mind remained firm, little by little its fortresses were sapped, with increasing savageness its citadel assailed. With every fresh pain came a fresh temptation to recant.

So it was with Belgium. The faithful courage with which she refused on the 2nd of August to sell the pass, so that one neighbour who had been her pledged friend and her promised protector should attack by a treacherous back-path two other neighbours, also her friends and protectors, did not end the test of her courage. After the first demand and the first blow came another demand with the threat of another blow and with the bribe of peace and ease for a word of betrayal. The nation was kept on the rack, the torture applied little by little, with more and more savagery in the effort to break down the first faithful 'No.' A new seizure of territory, another massacre, another sackage—after each the helpless victim was tempted with the demand 'Will you yield now? There is ease for you if you will.'

For four months I stood by the rack whilst the strength of the martyr ebbed away: heard the shouted 'No' of Liège fade and fade until it came down to the barely heard whisper of Ypres. But always it was 'No,' indomitably 'No.' During those four months of the torture of Belgium there have been incidents of cruelty which went beyond the relentless, the fiendish, and were actually bestial. But no incident could equal in 'frightfulness' the cold, considered malignity which at every turn of the rack offered to the tortured victim surcease from agony at the price of treachery. Germany pleads that to pass through Belgium to attack France was a necessity of her war policy. In no court of national honour could such a plea be accepted. If Germany were not strong enough to come against France by the open road, let her have waited. It is vain to attempt to justify a murderous assault upon a little friend, to whom you have solemnly promised protection, with the plea that it was necessary in order to help a treacherous attack on a powerful enemy. But after the initial wrong, after the decision to try to murder Belgium, it was a madness of hate and pride to decide to accompany the killing with torture, and to accompany every phase of the torture with a new invitation to play the traitor. And that last was the unforgivable sin, the attempted outrage on the soul of a nation.

It failed. Belgium still whispers feebly 'No,' whilst her executioner trembles at the sound of the forces of relief thundering at his gates. But if the German plan had succeeded—as it must have succeeded if Belgium had not saved, during a century of worldly prosperity, a moral courage of heroic strength? If it had succeeded, what expiation could have ever wiped out the record of the infamy? Those martyrs who withstood to the last a Nero's cruelty won life by losing it and could bless their execu-

tioner as they died. But what of those who recanted and carried out of the torture-chamber their twisted limbs to continue a shamed life?

It was to that fate Germany tried to drive Belgium : and the effort was the most wicked of her cruelties. Having decided to attack her neighbour without a shadow of right, the German nation might have mitigated its guilt by following in the strictest way the humane rules by which international law limits the horrors of war. Instead, she conducted the War against Belgium with an extreme savagery that recalled the Huns of Attila. Yet that was not the final, the deepest infamy. The deepest infamy was reached in the constant invitation to the tortured victim to abandon her faith and save extremest pangs. As to what gave to the Belgian people and their ruler the courage to withstand this invitation the human mind must confess its failure to understand, and must fall back for explanation on a belief in a sustaining and ruling Providence. Writing now, at a time when the high fame of Belgium has been established without fear of any criticism, it is possible to say that the national history of the people before 1914 did not indicate clearly that they were of the stuff of which martyrs are made. Europe knew them best as people of an astonishing material prosperity whose wealth and good ease of living had inclined them rather to a national *embonpoint*. Julius Caesar had said that of all the Gauls the Belgians were the most brave ; and in the Middle Ages the Low Countries showed a fine mettle of courage more than once. But the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it was thought, had changed all that. Certainly German diplomacy so concluded and reckoned confidently that, if not its first, its second attempt to induce Belgium to betray France and Great Britain would be successful. That second temptation (after the first mild turn of the rack and before any massacres of civilians) was plausible enough to give to the Belgians an easy road to faithlessness, if faithlessness had been in their minds. But the reply was as sturdy as the temptation was contemptible.

The offer :

The fortress of Liège has been taken by assault after a courageous defence. The German Government regrets most deeply that in consequence of the attitude taken up by the Belgian Government against Germany such sanguinary encounters should have taken place. Germany does not come into Belgium as an enemy ; it is only due to the force of circumstances that she has been compelled, on account of the French military preparations, to take the grave decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liège as a *point d'appui* for her subsequent military operations. After the Belgian Army has, by an heroic resistance against greatly superior forces, maintained the honour of its arms, the German Government begs the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government to save Belgium

from the subsequent horrors of war. The Government is ready to come to any agreement with Belgium which can be reconciled with its differences with France. Germany again solemnly declares that she has no intention of seizing Belgian territory, and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is at all times ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of hostilities permits.

The reply :

The proposal which the German Government makes to us reproduces the proposal which was formulated in the ultimatum of August 2. Faithful to its international obligations, Belgium can only repeat the answer it gave to that ultimatum, particularly as since August 3 its neutrality has been violated, a grievous war has been carried on in its territory, and the guarantors of its neutrality have loyally and at once answered her appeal.

Whenever terms of peace come to be talked of, Germany's rulers must be judged in the light of their continued invitations to Belgium to play the traitor, the first on the 2nd of August, the second on the 9th of August, and the several subsequent offers, the refusal of each one of which was followed by fresh acts of brutal outrage. If the British mind needs to be steeled to the task of seeing that those terms of peace make due provision for punishment and due precaution against repetition, the story of those invitations should be clearly known. Before the second invitation of the 9th of August, German 'frightfulness' was not made fully apparent to Belgium. After, the laws of war and the dictates of humanity began to be ignored. Each day the spirit of atrocity grew until the day of the fall of Antwerp, when—the last stronghold of Belgium fallen and the nation prostrate—there was a sudden relenting of the German torturer, seemingly because there was for the time being no further advantage in the policy of torture. That the torture was a policy, a deliberately, cold-bloodedly designed policy ordered from headquarters, is the conclusion established on the evidence; and the fact that the judges of Germany must keep in view.

Following on the heroic defence of Liège the Belgian Field Army, from a position flanked by Antwerp on one side and Namur on the other, 'contained' the German Army very cleverly. I was present at several of the little battles, such as that of Haelen, at which the Belgians baffled the reconnaissance in force of the German host. The delay, precious to Europe, was profoundly irritating to the Germans. The War became more savage: still, there were no organised atrocities to my knowledge, though there were many individual acts of savagery. On the 16th of August, on the battlefield of Haelen, I wrote :

Many stories of atrocities are in circulation. These I refuse to record except on direct proof, but near here the body of a Belgian soldier cyclist has been found mutilated and another hanged. I have, on the word of

officers, accounts of similar barbarities. Evidently these are due to the savagery of individuals; when German officers are present no outrages on the laws of war are recorded.

On the 18th of August the German army, tired of the delay inflicted by the 'slim' tactics of the Belgian commanders, developed a frontal attack towards Tirlemont in crushing force. Unable to get out of Brussels that night, I left the city at dawn, and, reaching Louvain about six, found the Belgian army in retreat. Anxious to know if the German main attack had actually developed, I cycled forward from Louvain until I came in touch with the German forces, was fully informed by the sight from a hill of their dense masses, and cycled back to Louvain in front of the Uhlan scouts. Louvain then was deserted to a great extent by its inhabitants: but its desolate streets were still sprinkled with fugitives making their way towards Brussels or Antwerp. The line of retreat of the army was clearly towards Antwerp. This was the morning of Wednesday, the 19th of August. I left Louvain that day just before noon, and was, so to speak, 'in touch' with the city until ten the following morning, when I left Brussels just in advance of the entering Uhlans. The Germans had established themselves at Louvain on the afternoon of the 19th, and their occupation during the afternoon and evening was to my certain knowledge peaceable in the sense that there were no massacres, and there was no sacking of the city. These facts are important to keep in mind in view of what follows.

We have now reached the turning-point in the history of the German campaign in Belgium. The Belgian army fell back on the Antwerp fortified position. The German army occupied Louvain and Brussels without serious opposition and without outrage on their part. The time had arrived for the third offer to the Belgian Government, which, I am informed,¹ took the form of an invitation to withdraw the Belgian Field Army definitely behind the Antwerp forts, to leave the German lines of communication unattacked, and to observe an armistice until the end of the War. It was refused: and Germany began to wage on Belgium the form of war which there is much good evidence to indicate she had prepared for England, a form of war in which military strength was reinforced by the most callous and murderous cruelty to the civil population, and a nation was sought to be subdued through the tears of its women and children.

¹ Since the formal offer of August 9 I have no official documentary records of the German *parlementaires*. I must ask the readers of the *Nineteenth Century* to accept as trustworthy my conclusions, founded on the confidential communications made to me from time to time by Belgian officers and officials, and on my own direct observation of the arrival at various times of German *parlementaires*.

The outrages of Dinant, Louvain, Aerschot—of a score of other places—followed.

On the 19th of August, as I have set out, the German army occupied Louvain peaceably. Up to the 20th of August, to my personal knowledge, and up to the 25th of August, to my knowledge on the most trustworthy evidence, there were no outrages. On the 24th and 25th of August a German force moving towards Antwerp was defeated, and withdrew towards Louvain in some disorder. On their arriving at Louvain on the night of the 26th of August, it is said that there was some mistake on the part of the German sentries in firing upon them, and that this let loose the flood of mischief which ravaged Louvain. It is a possible explanation, but hardly a full explanation. The sack of Louvain was so systematic that it could hardly have sprung out of the impulse of a moment. The circumstantial evidence rather points to the fact that it was a designed act of war, decided upon after the defeat of the 24th of August, and intended to warn Belgium of the consequences of continuing to harass the German advance. The Germans do not allege any incident of the 26th of August to justify the massacre: and, by putting forward a very palpable falsehood as their explanation, confess in effect that they have nothing true to say in palliation of the monstrous crime.

On this point let a German witness enter the box. At Liège the Germans in September established a paper, *The Friend of the People*, which in French and German gave their version of the course of the War for the benefit of the Liégeois. *The Friend of the People* printed the German account of the entry into Louvain, and told the story of 'a great plot' of the Louvain people to murder all the German soldiers on the night of their entry, which plot led to the sack of the city that night. The story is a clumsy lie. Its details of the gay, cheerful appearance that Louvain presented on the day of entry 'as a mask for the murderous plan' I can deny from my own observation. I left Louvain that day in the rear of the Belgian army with a pitiable crowd of refugees from Tirlemont, whose tales of ruthless acts there set everyone fleeing from Louvain who could possibly do so. Before a single German entered, Louvain was desolate and in mourning, and abandoned by a great part of its population. But the German account speaks of crowded cafés and animated streets. In recording the massacre of the inhabitants as having happened that very night, owing to the treacherous uprising of the inhabitants, the Germans again lie clumsily. There is the clearest evidence that the massacre occurred a week later, after the German force had had ample time to see that the civil inhabitants were not armed. But

perhaps the following can be accepted as a fairly truthful German account of their own doings in Louvain which follows the untruthful apologetic. It reads :

Our force concentrates at the railway station and opens fire on the houses around them and on other houses. We fire on the windows, force open the doors. The inhabitants are killed or dragged out, and the houses are burned. In a little while Louvain is in flames. At first we thought that the greater part of its inhabitants had been killed in the flames, for all who showed themselves in the streets received bullets. But after our return we found ladders placed in such a fashion as to facilitate the escape from the houses by their gardens at the rear. A very great number thus were saved, another proof that this attack on us had been prepared beforehand. That night at Louvain was a very grave experience, and we were lucky to get out of it so well.

It was in Malines on the 27th of August at noon that I encountered the first refugees from Louvain and heard their stories. The horror of that experience has not yet been effaced from my mind. The road from out of Louvain was crowded with refugees—nuns fleeing from their cloisters, priests from their churches, the sick carried on their beds, the aged tottering along with the help of their children, many carrying some poor article of household furniture. In one cart were collected seventeen children, evidently of several families. Another hand-cart held an old palsied woman, pushed on by her grandchild. All had terrible accounts of murder and outrage. In the fields were the more pitiful victims wandering distraught—the young women driven mad by rape, the old women and the old men driven mad by the massacre of their children.

Of all the terrible train one figure in particular stood out clearly for many weeks after, coming often to my bedside to rebuke sleep, putting out a hand of reproach before the dish set before me at table. It was that of a gaunt young priest. What particular horror he had seen or suffered I cannot say, for his words were distraught and he grinned vacantly as he spoke, saying chiefly that he 'knew English' and that 'it is a fine day.' But his lean face was twisted horribly, and his long cassock was wet, as if he had been through a heavy shower of rain, from the sweat of agony which poured from him. The procession of horror was long. Many of the fugitives could accuse in clear, stony words most foul deeds of rape, of burning and murder. Yet, of all, that distraught priest stands out in my memory.

Following close on the sack of Louvain came another invitation to the Belgian nation stretched on the rack to give the word of treachery and let such horrors cease. A civic dignitary of Malines brought to Antwerp the offer that the Germans would not attempt to attack further the Belgian people if the Fort of

Walhaem, the key of the Antwerp defences, were given up to them : otherwise Malines would be destroyed utterly. (Its bombardment had already begun, all the shells being fired at the noble cathedral—a fact of which I assured myself with certainty during several visits to the town.) The offer was refused.² By the 28th of August the Germans had found it necessary to set aside a force of 70,000 to 'contain' the Belgian army within the fortifications of Antwerp. It was to set free that army of 70,000 for service in France that the policy of 'frightfulness' was now directed with full force against Belgium.

It would be outside the purpose of this article to attempt to describe in detail or even to enumerate the record of German atrocities in Belgium. Its purpose rather is to establish the cause of those outrages, to invite an examination of the facts so that it may be seen clearly that they were not sporadic cases of military brutality, springing from drunkenness or lust of cruelty on the part of individual soldiers, but manifestations of an actual policy directed from Berlin. After the refusal of the Belgian Government to give an undertaking to keep the Belgian army within the Antwerp fortifications, and after a sally of the garrison towards Louvain, that noble city was sacked. Then Malines was threatened in order to extort the surrender of a fort, and partly destroyed. Perhaps the powerful influence in the Roman Catholic Church of Cardinal Mercier saved his cathedral city from utter destruction. But its churches were savagely wounded, and the neighbouring town of Aerschot suffered complete ruin, and many of its inhabitants were murdered and tortured.

In the case of Termonde 'cause and effect' show very clearly. It was destroyed for just the same reason as Louvain. On the 4th of September a German force came back from the field after a severe beating by the Belgians, and the German commander, Sommerfeld, announced : 'It is our duty to burn the town.'

The inhabitants were given two hours to leave; then with well-drilled precision companies of German soldiers marched through the streets, breaking windows on each side with rifles as they marched. They were followed by two files of men with machines, who sprayed kerosene through the broken windows. Most of these spraying machines were operated by hand, but one at least was a big engine of arson driven by motor-power. The next stage was for soldiers to pass along throwing lighted fuses

² It is perhaps necessary to repeat that since August 9 I have no documentary evidence of the German offers to Belgium: possibly no documents exist, even the German mind recognising the infamy of its policy of torture and hesitating to put it on written record. But I have not a shadow of doubt as to the truth of the statements repeatedly made to me by credible, responsible witnesses as to the mission of the various German *parlementaires* which came to our lines at different times.

on the kerosene. Termonde was thus systematically destroyed. All the inhabitants of Termonde gave the same version of its destruction. The sack of the town was not marked by massacre, but eighty civic notables were taken away as prisoners to Germany, and there were a few incidental murders.

'Some other outrages, such as those of Dinant,' seem to be explainable by the German rage at the French co-operation in Belgian defence, and do not fall into what may be called the main policy of the German racking of Belgium. Berlin may be acquitted thus of some of the murders of civilians (totalling at least 5000 in the districts where I was able to make direct investigations), and may be acquitted also of the horrible and sometimes bestial incidents which accompanied 'official' outrages. Nothing will be gained by attempting to prove too much. But I have cited enough to show the existence of an official 'policy' of outrage. That policy shows most clearly in the records of Louvain, Malines, Termonde, and in the sudden cessation of outrage when outrage was no longer useful.

The incidents of beastliness, the strange degenerate acts of nastiness and sacrilege, with which the Germans spiced their ordered and deliberate cruelties, must be set down to the account of the tiger and the ape still surviving in our human nature. German officers and soldiers were not always content to kill out of hand and to burn quickly. They had to torture men

³ A Belgian who lived through the Dinant massacre could give me no clear explanation of its reason. He told me that on August 15, when the first big combat took place around Dinant, the town suffered somewhat from shell fire, but its great misfortunes only began when the French evacuated the district under orders for a general retirement. On the night of August 21 a German armoured motor-car came into Dinant by the Rue St. Jacques, and without any reason began firing promiscuously in the street and at the houses. Many citizens were killed by this fire. A girl was mortally wounded in her cot. An innkeeper and his wife, who opened their door to see what was going on, were both killed. A gas-worker going out to his work was killed on his threshold. The assassins followed up their shots by throwing incendiary bombs at the houses and then went away. Next day a German force entered the town. The doors of the houses were forced open, men were killed, and women were driven up into an abbey, where for three days they were imprisoned without food except some carrots. Some workers in a cloth factory of which the director, M. Himmer, was murdered, took refuge in a drain. They were discovered and all shot as they cowered in their hiding-place. At the Brewery Nicaise, in the suburb of St. Pierre, the workers, with their employers, two venerable brothers, both aged over seventy, hid in the cellars of the brewery, and being discovered were all killed. At the Place d'Armes, in front of the prison, two hundred men were collected by the Germans, and to make the slaughter quicker they were mowed down by a machine-gun. The people thus murdered were aged from twelve years to seventy-five years. These wholesale murders took place in the suburbs of Leffe, St. Pierre, and St. Nicolas chiefly. In the central quarter of the town the rage for slaughter was not so furious. Hostages were taken and driven out of the town almost naked to the Ardennes. Then the town was systematically burned. On August 23 hardly a vestige of it remained.

beforehand, and to desecrate and insult beautiful buildings before destroying them. A Belgian friend, talking to me on the point, used the illustration (borrowed from a Fourain cartoon) of a low-minded servant, in envy of her beautiful mistress, deliberately soiling the pillow on which she would sleep. It is exact. Beautiful churches, carved out in lace-like stone by medieval piety, were often deliberately befouled. In one château of rare beauty the German officers, after pillaging the cellar and destroying the marbles and bronzes, brought in a cow from the fields, disembowelled it, and spread its entrails and blood over the carpets and tapestries, so that they might be spoiled. Very frequently, too, there was physical and moral torture of the cruellest kind. Peasants were kept on their knees with hands uplifted for hours under the threat of instant death if they moved. They were shut up, and told to be ready to die in three hours, then released, then shut up again, and again sentenced to death. They were shut up for long periods, with hardly any food or water, and with no means to observe the decencies of life.

To such incidents the judges of the authors of the German War on Europe cannot wisely attach too great importance. They indict human nature rather than German policy. They show how deplorably low man may fall when the bonds of civilised restraint are loosed. But they cannot be said to have been ordered or foreplanned. Heavy as is their indirect indictment of the policy of 'frightfulness' which permitted them, they should not divert attention from the weighty evidence supporting the direct indictment, which is this: that the Berlin Government deliberately ordered and organised gross outrages against all the laws of war as part of a policy of frightening Belgium into an act of treachery, and continued that policy from the 9th of August until the middle of October, cold-bloodedly, resolutely.

It is with a glow of pride, as well as a sigh of compassion, that one can add 'unsuccessfully.' The heroic King Albert, as the mouthpiece of his nation, never quailed before the torture. That, too, the judges must remember who have to requite Belgium as well as to punish Germany.

FRANK FOX.

VENGEANCE IN WAR:

A STUDY OF REPRISALS IN PRACTICE AND THE CASE OF LOUVAIN

VENGEANCE is an ugly word. Nor is the idea which underlies it traceable to any noble sentiment. It is but the cold unvarnished expression of the least generous of the human instincts—the instinct on which the cruel criminal laws of our forefathers were based, the instinct of half-civilised or degraded peoples in countries where the spirit of revenge has survived, the spirit which those of chivalry, fair play, and justice are displacing in our civilian life.

As it is still practised in war in the name of ‘reprisals,’ it is desirable that we should closely examine the nature of reprisals and see whether those who label so inglorious a spirit as vengeance with a more or less respectable term are not confusing two totally different ideas.

I

In approaching the consideration of the subject we must bear in mind that there is no Law Court, no independent authority which can enforce belligerent observance of the laws and usage of war. Art. 3 of The Hague Convention relating to land warfare, it is true, provides that belligerent Powers are responsible for all acts of violation of the Regulations annexed to the Convention; but, obviously, this is merely intended to be an emphatic assertion of their obligatory character. The fact remains that the only sanction for enforcing observance of the rules of war is the power of the enemy to exercise reprisals for their non-observance. However barbarous the method at first sight may seem, being the only one by which an unscrupulous or cruel enemy can be coerced, the exercise of reprisals is and remains an indefeasible right of commanders in the field.

Christian morals and the public conscience of civilised mankind require certainly that in the exercise of reprisals there shall be a proportion between the reprisals and the acts which occasion their exercise. I shall revert to this later on. Meanwhile we must make some distinctions clear.

There are legitimate acts of violence in war affecting civilians which, however cruel, have nothing to do with reprisals. The destruction of a village for the purpose of preventing the enemy from using it as cover, the requisitioning of food, wood, and other goods, even of personal service, the removal, with little or no reference to comfort, age, or health, of thousands of people from whole areas within the war area, may all entail the most undeserved hardship and suffering on the victims. Yet as they may be inflicted by the military authorities of the nation to which the victims belong, the right of the enemy to inflict them is unquestionable. Such acts are ascribed in the language of the law and custom of war to military necessity or *raison de guerre*.

Distinct from these legitimate acts of violence in war are legitimate *ruses* of war, with which I dealt in my last article in this Review.¹

There are also illegitimate acts of war which, according to the British *Manual of Land Warfare*, 'owing to the advance of civilisation and the high state of discipline and training of modern armies . . . have become more and more uncommon . . .' Charges, nevertheless, have been brought by British commanders against German practices which conflict with this statement. Instances of the misuse of the white flag, Red Cross badge, etc., however, are obviously more likely to occur among the millions of men of all classes of society and degrees of education and morality who form a modern Continental army than among a small, highly trained and carefully recruited army like our own, in which officer and man are taught together the duties of chivalry and comradeship as indistinguishable from civilian honour. Still we must in justice to the enemy believe that acts of treachery would not be condoned by, at any rate, the vast majority of German commanders, especially as the *Kriegsbuch im Landkriege*, which authorises the most ruthless warfare, specifically forbids them.

We can now, I think, define 'reprisals.' 'Reprisals between belligerents,' says the British *Manual of Land Warfare*,² 'are retaliation for illegitimate acts of warfare, for the purpose of making the enemy comply in future with the recognised laws of war.'

My own definition is that they are 'one of the modes by which the belligerents obtain redress for violation of the laws of war.'

The British Manual, it is seen, adds an element to mine, viz. that reprisals are 'for the purpose of making the enemy comply in future with the recognised laws of war.' I think,

¹ *Nineteenth Century and After*, December 1914.

² P. 97.

³ *Law and Usage of War*, p. 114. London 1914.

with all deference to my respected friend, Professor Oppenheim, of Cambridge, joint author of the Manual, that this only applies where knowledge of such a purpose exists. Who is the enemy he refers to? The enemy in warfare is the opposing army, and reprisals against an army which does not comply with the recognised rules of warfare, says the Manual, as we have seen above, are rarely necessary, because violations of the recognised rules of warfare are now rarely committed by regular forces. The Manual explains that 'reprisals are an extreme measure because in most cases they inflict suffering on innocent individuals,' . . . and that 'in this . . . their coercive force exists.'

Whichever definition is the more correct one, reprisals are of so many kinds that some of them fit better into the one and others better into the other. One thing is certain. To exercise a coercive effect, reprisals have to be deliberately directed to producing it. Thus, at the beginning of the War, the German Government did not at once institute the *Bureau de renseignements sur les prisonniers de guerre*, for which provision is made by Art. 14 of The Hague Regulations.⁴ Or, at any rate, the German Government was unduly slow in furnishing information as to both British and French prisoners. Both the British and French Governments declined to furnish the German Government with their lists until it complied with The Hague Regulations. The desired effect was produced. This is a mild instance of reprisals in which the object was attained by direct appropriation of the retaliation to the offence. Non-observance of The Hague Convention as to granting a delay of grace and *laissez-passeurs* to merchant ships in an enemy port at the commencement of hostilities by one of the belligerents warrants the other belligerent in refusing to comply with the Convention, although the rule is one of established usage not dependent on the Convention. Such a case arose as between the British and German Governments. The German Government failed to respond to the British invitation to respect the rule. German ships were not allowed to depart. Here the desired effect was not produced and the German Government, which left German merchant ships in British waters to their fate, seized British ships in German waters by way of reprisals.

These are direct instances. Let us suppose, however, that the enemy takes advantage of the immunity of hospitals from bombardment, for the purpose of saving armed forces from attack. To appropriate the retaliation to the offence would be to violate the rules of war in the same way, which would not be to the ultimate benefit of our own troops. In this case there is no

⁴ See *op. cit.* pp. 100 and 152.

penalty, apart from the universal reprobation of civilised communities, but the bombardment of the hospital.

Then, there is the abuse of the white flag, which seems to be regarded by some of the German soldiery as a fair ruse of war. To abuse it in return would not be in our own interest. Not to respect it would not be in our own interest either. The only remedy is to decline to regard the display of the white flag as in itself sufficient for its purpose, a sort of compromise between respecting and disregarding it.

The German *Kriegsbuch* permits the shooting of prisoners where they may be a danger to the capturing force. I am not aware that any case of the kind has occurred as yet in the present war, but, if it did occur, it is probable that a British commander, to prevent its recurrence, would shoot an equal number of German prisoners, and take care that the fact reached the knowledge of the enemy's General Staff.

There are, however, reprisals of a much more complicated kind, reprisals where the retaliation is different in kind from the offence, where the object is at once punitive and deterrent, where no moral turpitude attaches to the offenders, and the nature and magnitude of the redress depend rather on the state of mind of the enemy commander than on any proportion or adjustment to the offence.

II

The law of war grants belligerent rights only to those who carry arms openly and are under the command of an officer. Any others who attack or resist invading forces are not entitled to belligerent rights and, if caught, are not prisoners of war, but are entirely at the mercy of the enemy commander. There is only one exception—viz. where the population of a territory *which has not been occupied*, spontaneously on the enemy's approach take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organise themselves as military forces. Even in this case they are only entitled to belligerent rights *if they carry arms openly*. Against civilians who commit acts of hostility against an invading force the custom of war permits the commander to take such immediate measures for the punishment of the offender or offenders as he thinks fit. The Hague Regulations only step in to forbid any 'general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise,' being 'inflicted on the population on account of the acts of individuals for which it cannot be regarded as collectively responsible (*dont elles ne pourraient être considérées comme solidairement responsables*).' I may say here that if the article had said, instead of 'cannot be regarded as collectively responsible,' 'is not collectively responsible,' this would have confined punishment

to the guilty individuals. As it stands the article authorises the infliction of punishment on the community for acts of individuals, though not the direct result of collective action.

An infraction of the laws of war having been definitely established [says the British War Manual], every effort should first be made to detect and punish the actual offenders. Only if this is impossible should other measures be taken in case the injured belligerent thinks that the facts warrant them. As a rule the injured party would not at once resort to reprisals, but would first lodge a complaint with the enemy in the hope of stopping any repetition of the offence or of securing the punishment of the guilty. This course should always be pursued unless the safety of the troops requires immediate drastic action and the persons who actually committed the offences cannot be secured.⁵

It may also be necessary, adds the Manual, 'to resort to reprisals against a locality or community for some act committed by its inhabitants or members who cannot be identified.'⁶ I have some doubt as to what kind of proceedings the War Manual contemplates when it speaks of lodging a complaint with the enemy. This question, however, is of minor importance. In the present War complaints have been made public on both sides, but in no case am I aware that they have been made as a method of obtaining redress preliminary to the exercise of reprisals. The above passages, it will be observed, seem to claim for the British commander in the field the right to exercise untrammelled discretion in the infliction of any such punishment as he may reconcile with his own moral sense.⁷

III

I have tried to make it clear that the object of reprisals is to obtain redress for offences against the law and custom of war. In civilian affairs justice and expediency require that there shall be a proportion between the offence and the redress. In war more or less in the same way any disproportion between the redress and the offence can only lead to a sense of injustice. Of the sense of injustice that of vengeance is begotten. In no war in recent times have we seen the dividing line more strongly marked than in the gigantic struggle now pending. German witnesses accuse Belgians of atrocities which if true are acts of vengeance due to revival of the primal instincts of mankind, instincts of those who have been driven to desperation by gratuitous and deliberate destruction of all they possessed. Atrocities are acts of vengeance, and herein the difference lies. For such acts I think we may assume no

⁵ Section 456.

⁶ Section 458.

⁷ This is confirmed in Section 459.

Government or military commander among those concerned in the present War will admit liability.

This brings us down to the concrete instances of reprisals exercised by the German commanders in Belgium. That wholesale and deliberate destruction not only of villages but of cities in Belgium has taken place by way of reprisals has been admitted by the German commanders. The ground alleged in justification of them has consistently been the firing by civilians on German troops. That there has been such firing I do not propose to question. It would be a miracle if under the provocation of invasion it had been otherwise. Nor do I doubt that the German commanders, like most other commanders (for instance, the commanders of the French regular forces in the repression of the Paris Commune in 1871), lost their moral balance in street fighting and took vengeance out of all proportion to the provocation. For this too we must make due allowance.

A doubt, however, is warranted as regards the genuineness of the alleged reprisals as such. Were they reprisals at all?

Let us examine the greatest case of all, the sacking of Louvain, and to avoid bias let us, in examining it, confine ourselves to the evidence of German witnesses only. As regards the trivial ground alleged by German newspapers that the Belgian women poured boiling oil on the passing German troops we may give their accusers the benefit of it. If true, it would surely have been easy to locate the offence and convict the culprits then and there, in which case there would have been no call to burn down even a house. Officially the sacking of Louvain has been ascribed to firing on the German troops by its civilian inhabitants. It is admitted that there were two bodies of German troops in different parts of the town. It is denied by the Germans that the second body were fired at by the first, who are alleged by Belgians to have mistaken them for Belgian forces, or *vice versa*, or that it is true that the Belgian authorities had disarmed the whole population of Louvain before any German forces appeared on the scene. There may be a doubt as to the possibility of collecting every rifle in a city of the size of Louvain or of preventing acts of vengeance on the part of civilians goaded to fury.

It is reasonable to suppose that both the Belgian and the German allegations are relatively correct. That two bodies of German troops entering the town at night time from different sides should have immediately recognised each other as friends, while in so many other cases belligerents in the present war have made mistakes,^{*} is sufficiently improbable to warrant the belief

^{*} Several wounded French soldiers in the hospitals at Bordeaux have told me they were wounded with French bullets, having been mistaken for the enemy.

that the firing in question may not have been confined to Belgian civilians.

Another fact which must be borne in mind, and which is not contested, is that there was an interval of a day between the two admittedly devoted to the burning of the city.

Still another, and a very important one, uncontested by German witnesses, is that the German officers who were told off to prepare the work of destruction had a list of houses to be sacked and burnt, that the list distinguished between inhabitants who were 'gute Leute' and those who were not, and that these officers wrote 'gute Leute' on the houses which were to be spared and marked with some other sign those which were to be destroyed.

No details have ever been furnished as to the part of Louvain in which the alleged shots were fired. Nor does any explanation seem to have been given of why there was an interval of a day between the two days devoted to destruction, nor of the distinction made between the houses spared and those destroyed, nor of the origin of the list supplied to the officers.

As an act of reprisal the sack of Louvain was out of all proportion to any of the acts alleged. The most indulgent view cannot ascribe to it any purpose of redress. Nor can it be regarded as an act of vengeance, seeing that it was deliberately and carefully executed, so carefully that every blanket or sheet or thing which could be of use to the invading army was methodically removed from each house before it was destroyed. Down to the mode of destruction nothing was left to the determination of any passing emotion.

The obvious surmise, in the absence of any explanation of the facts, is that the sacking of Louvain was not a case of reprisal at all, but an act of intimidation deliberately planned before the outbreak of the war and slavishly carried out on the third day by a new officer in obedience to orders incompletely fulfilled by his predecessor.

And this I say, after having had access to information from a perfectly unbiassed source, which I have refrained from using in order to rest my argument entirely on admitted facts—information, however, which in every particular confirms the above description of what took place.

In war a belligerent commander is tempted by many feelings which in peace he might think wantonly cruel or mean and unworthy of a man of honour. In peace he would sympathise with the civilian householder who strikes or even kills an aggressor deliberately setting fire to his dwelling, with the peaceful peasant who is driven from his home at the point of the bayonet, his

crops, his barn, and his cottage in flames while he aimlessly struggles with his wife, children, and what they can carry in any direction away from the terror of the booming artillery. At Boulogne some weeks ago, at five in the morning, I met 700 French refugees with babes heaped like sacks of vegetables on wheelbarrows, young children crying with hunger, the old men murderously angry, the women artificially cheerful, all mud-stained and footsore. As I have said the devastation of war is not necessarily confined to acts of the enemy. This Boulogne episode was an object-lesson in the practice of war as it affects the most innocent civilians. They had been driven from their homes, not by Germans, but by war, victims not of the enemy, but of a fate in which those who were sacrificing life and limb in their defence were the unwilling cause of their ruin.

War implies hardships, cruelty and atrocities inherent to its bare exercise which make every sufferer a potential advocate of its cessation without need of artificial devices to reinforce the desire for peace. The methods of intimidation practised by German commanders in Belgium are in vain called reprisals. Nobody has been deceived by either official or non-official apologists. They have not only failed in their purpose, but have aroused throughout the civilised world a feeling of horror at the gratuitous addition of new cruelties to war. Instead of producing a longing for peace, they have only excited a thirst for revenge among their peace-loving victims, and among onlookers a contempt for the intelligence of those who are responsible for this supreme miscalculation of the German General Staff.

THOMAS BARCLAY.

LICENSING REFORM: A NEW POLICY

By those who hope with Mr. Bonar Law that the new unity in our national life will not end with victory, the following article on Licensing Reform will be read with interest. Written by Mr. Alexander F. Part, the managing director of the most aggressive and successful of the various Trust Companies formed with the object of substituting 'Disinterested' for 'Tied House' management in the public-houses of the United Kingdom, it reveals with expert clearness the chief causes of the failure of our existing liquor legislation to lessen evils which up to now have been the despair of every patriot, and the standing proof of the helplessness of party politicians.

Mr. Part also shows with equal clearness how under the guidance of sane legislation, based not on irrational sentiment or blind prejudice, but on a scientific regard for cause and effect, the public-houses of the United Kingdom may be made instruments not of national degradation, but of national and social advancement.

I earnestly commend his article to the serious consideration of all who wish to divert to useful purposes a large portion of the huge annual unproductive expenditure of 160,000,000*l.* in alcoholic drink. This expenditure is not only unproductive, but tends to the deterioration of our national manhood, and to the impoverishment of our national resources which, depleted by war, it is more than ever necessary that we should vigilantly conserve. The policy described in the following article will be welcomed by the increasing number of Temperance Reformers who believe that the substitution of Disinterested for Tied House management in the public-houses of the United Kingdom will tend to increase the happiness of the people without injuring their morals or their health, and, by causing a gradual change in manners and habits, will help to make attainable a higher standard of National Life.

GREY.

In the true and permanent interests of the Trade, no less than in respect of the public well-being, Reform of Licensed Houses and of Licensing is a vital necessity.

The revolting conditions under which most of the drink of

the country is purveyed are evidence enough of the urgency of the matter, and if further proof were necessary a study of the latest available licensing statistics would give additional point to the need for a change.

The influence of the Trade is all-pervading, and affects a larger number of individuals than any other. Its power and wealth are enormous, its ramifications so widespread and diverse, its organisation so elaborate and complete, its revenue, which exceeds the national income, so huge, and its effects so ruthless and destructive that it has become, almost unconsciously, the most powerful and dangerous factor in the life of the nation.

From a growing sense of public decorum, the State, in the struggle to limit so mighty a factor, has evolved a system of control which in complexity, ineptness, inefficiency, and artificiality is probably unrivalled.

The purpose of this epitome of failure is merely to indicate, by reference to the mistakes of the past and present, a live policy more in accord with common sense and practical politics than the present system—a policy, in short, which, if carried out, would effect in very large degree the solution of the Licensing and Temperance problems, thorny and difficult though they are.

This assertion may appear to be presumptuous, but a close and intimate study of these questions from a practical point of view has shown that the main difficulty is not so much to find a solution as to elaborate a policy which will at once be effective and gain general support.

The comparative failure of the teetotallers warns us that, while the public demands a change, it requires one which will give individual freedom of choice, and equally one which is as just to the interests involved as is reasonably consistent with the public welfare. Excesses on the part of extremists are equally distasteful to the ordinary man, whether they are the manifestations of zeal or of indiscretion.

Real and lasting reform must be constructive and not merely restrictive, and it must be to some extent gradual and voluntary, otherwise the effect will be merely to drive the drink into other and even less desirable channels. Any attempt at a short cut to temperance will result in being the longest way round.

The common mistake is to lay all the blame upon drink, whereas the true evil is to be found in the conditions under which it is distributed and in over-indulgence. To insist, in the present state of the public taste, upon the prohibition of beer-drinking is as futile as to deny the value of the dietetic properties of pure malt and hop beer. In many working-class districts hosts of labouring men engaged in the hardest manual labour very largely live upon it.

Experience shows rather that guarantee of purity of alcoholics, limited indulgence, and healthy surroundings should be the first aims of the practical temperance reformer. Once concede this, and it is possible to instil some reality into licensing reform.

The whole tendency of the Acts of Parliament relating to this subject has hitherto been merely repressive in character. The want of certainty and uniformity in licensing practice, owing to the wide discretion given to Justices, has been and still is a very great hindrance to reform of a comprehensive character. Thus a practice which is well settled in one division is frequently sternly discountenanced in one adjoining, although often apparently quite within the law. The variety of the conditions and amounts of monopoly value attached to new licenses furnish striking examples of this lack of uniformity.

The restrictive character of legislation and of the local rules of licensing Benchmen seems almost to assume that the sole endeavour of the average licensee is to overstep the bounds of decorum and good order, and this in spite of the fact that a man who wishes to acquire a license must produce certificates of good character, which, if strictly accurate, would place him above the angels. Nor is this, frequently, petty tyranny on the part of benevolent Benchmen and their clerks capable of acting as a real deterrent to a blackguard; at the most it restricts him to certain practices which are quite as undesirable as any of those which are illegal.

On the other hand, the multiplication and complexity of the laws and rules when administered by an unwise or over-zealous and tactless constabulary, backed by a harsh and unsympathetic Bench, have been the downfall of many an honest man, and have prevented many another from entering the Trade. This is to be regretted, for, if experience teaches anything, it is that the personal equation is all-important. Every encouragement should be given to the best men to enter the Trade, and in any scheme of reform, if the publican is to give of his best, full play and wide discretion must, and can, be given for the exercise of his abilities.

Almost the whole of the reason for the existing undesirable condition of most licensed houses can be traced to the tied-house system, which places the retailer entirely in the hands of the merchant. The former is often tied down to purchase all his goods at usurious prices, compared with those charged to 'free' houses; and this applies sometimes even to sawdust and china. From his Brewer or Distiller, too, he generally obtains his capital, so that, in the result, though he is a tenant in name, he is often but a slave in fact. Everything therefore depends upon the brewer or the distiller, who, having acquired some eighty-five

per cent. to ninety per cent. of the licensed houses in the country, controls the situation.

Thus the old English hostelry, once so famous for its all-round hospitality and good cheer, has been deposed, and has become, since the growth of the limited liability company, the mere catspaw and counter of the wholesaler; whilst its value is almost exclusively calculated nowadays in gallons of output of alcoholics.

Drink, in fact, instead of being a convenient adjunct to an eating-house, has now become the sole object of the existence of a licensed house; and legislation, which has been drafted largely upon the assumption that licensed houses are tied, has contributed to make it solely the object of everyone connected with the Trade to increase the alcoholic output to the greatest possible amount, by selecting, not the quantum of drink, but the size of the house, as the basis of taxation. So that it is to the tenant's advantage to limit the accommodation to the smallest extent, in order to secure as small a license duty, compensation charge, and assessments as possible.

Could any system be more insane than that which whittles down the ideal licensed house to one which is capable of distributing the greatest quantity of alcohol in the smallest possible space? Can anyone wonder that, with the additional pressure of recent taxation, the Trade has not hurried to add amenities beyond the bars?

Although public opinion has long revolted against this state of things, combined circumstances have prevented any real improvement. Music, dancing, cafés chantant, stage plays, cinematographs, and all games, save billiards, are either illegal or sternly discouraged, and in some licensing areas are absolutely forbidden. Thus, in the absence of counter-attractions, the only diversion left is to drink.

The Legislature effects nothing, because it realises that, short of drastic steps, which might reduce the revenue arising from the taxation of drink and licensed houses, it is powerless in the face of the tied-house system, which has been rendered impregnable, largely by reason of the technicalities of the licensing question, such as make a complete understanding of the subject a matter of difficulty to laymen. In these days of ever-increasing national expenditure no Government cares about reform at the expense of loss of revenue. The Justices, even with all the will in the world, see no course open to them, in the existing state of affairs and the present state of the law, other than to restrain and restrict the sale of drink as far as possible. They hesitate to create precedents, and prefer to follow the safest and easiest course.

So far indeed has this policy of restriction been carried that in many divisions temperance seems to be measured by the square yard, and permission to improve premises is refused merely on the ground that to grant it would be to increase the licensed area ! In some divisions permission to improve licensed premises can only be obtained upon payment of a sum of money.

The Trade, in view of these restrictions, is unable to carry out improvements, or is unwilling to bear the burden of extra taxation, which would be the reward, and in the case of the provision of dining-rooms, etc., often the sole reward, for improving and enlarging the accommodation of its houses. The fact is that a very large proportion of the applications, made in the most specious manner, are only cleverly disguised attempts to increase the drinking facilities, while in the case of many honest applications the altered premises come to be used for a purpose very different from that originally intended.

Considering their elaboration, there is curiously little to be learnt from the latest Licensing Statistics upon which it is safe to deduce anything accurately and with certainty ; but the following facts are, at any rate, incontrovertible. They show a considerable increase in the number of convictions for drunkenness, a very large increase in the numbers of registered clubs, and the fact that a high proportion of these have been struck off as not *bona fide*. They show, too, a constant increase in the convictions of women for drunkenness.

From this it is fair to deduce that drunkenness has rather increased than diminished during the last four years, and that, although the number of licensed houses has been reduced, a very large part of the trade has been driven into clubs, which are free from license duty, and are not restricted as to hours of opening or closing, or subject to the same inspection as licensed houses. (During the War the sale of alcoholics is in certain districts suspended during certain hours both in clubs and licensed houses.) It is also incontrovertible that the great majority of registered clubs rely as much as, or more than, the ordinary public-house upon the sale of drink for their revenue. Clubs and off-licenses are very largely responsible for increased drinking among women. Brewers' vans (which in many cases are nothing but public-houses on wheels), clubs, off-licenses, and brewery taps compete very severely with the fully licensed house, and undoubtedly create far greater opportunities for secret drinking.

These facts, and the evidence presented by the conditions prevalent in many parts of our crowded towns and country districts, surely present a case for reform of a far-reaching character. It is evident that no sudden revolution would prove a lasting success.

What then is the practical remedy?

Obviously, in the first place, the license duty should be levied, *not* upon the house, but upon the drink. It should vary with the quantity of drink sold or purchased, and not at all with the size of the premises. This plan would be an encouragement to licensees to extend their non-alcoholic trade at the expense of the alcoholic.

It is believed that hitherto the Excise authorities have objected to this very obvious reform on the ground of difficulty of collection. But if, as is the fact, it can be worked in the case of clubs, it can equally well be adapted to licensed houses. All that is necessary is to extend the 'permit' system, now in vogue in the case of spirits, to other alcoholics; to require every licensee to keep an account of his purchases of alcoholics, which he could easily do on the very simple 'permit' system, and to make his return. These returns could be checked by reference to the books of the merchants whence the goods were obtained, and the penalty for a false return should be the loss of the license.

By this plan, if the returns of tied houses were taken at the breweries, an enormous saving in the cost of collection could be effected, and license duties would bear equally upon all houses. The provision in the Finance Act, 1909 (1909-10), which gives a large rebate off license duty where licensees can show that two thirds of their receipts are referable to non-alcoholics, is a clumsy attempt towards this purpose. But there is ample evidence to show that these returns are frequently false, and there is no adequate machinery for checking them. Nor can many licensed houses which are honestly catering on an extensive scale properly produce two-third proportions.

No greater single incentive to temperance could be given than this reform of the incidence of license duty, and its tendency would be in all probability to break down the tied-house system. A license duty of 1*s.* to 1*s.* 3*d.* in the 1*l.* on purchases would probably produce a greater revenue than is now produced, and would affect all houses in like degree; whereas under the present system the duty varies from the equivalent of 1½*d.* to as much as 5*s.* and 6*s.* in the 1*l.* on purchases, the houses with the best accommodation being almost invariably penalised.

The next remedy is to place clubs upon the same footing, at least as regards taxation, as licensed houses; for it is obviously futile to expend large sums in reducing the number of redundant public-houses, if the result of such reduction is to increase the number of drinking clubs. Every club is run with a view to profit, otherwise it would not be continued, as a general rule; and, as we have seen, clubs compete directly with hotels and public-houses, so that it is difficult to see why they should not contribute

substantially to the revenue. A large proportion are proprietary, either directly or indirectly, and only differ in technicalities from public-houses. Many of them indeed are tied and highly profitable to their owners, who most frequently are the nominees of brewers and distillers.

These two reforms would, it is believed, not be objected to by the majority of those interested in the Trade. Indeed the latter would be warmly welcomed by licensees.

But these proposals by themselves could not be regarded as more than a step in the right direction and a first instalment. The next move is to effect the divorce of the retail from control by the wholesale trade. In the present circumstances this can be only effectively accomplished by enabling the State to regain control over the liquor traffic by means of an extension of the principle of the Public-House Trust.

The Trust system, which is now becoming tolerably well known, at least by name, may be roughly and shortly defined as the adaptation to English conditions of the principles which have proved so successful in Scandinavia. So far as the Scandinavian countries are concerned, it is not possible to find a responsible statesman who denies the efficacy of the system, or who would return to the old order of things.

Let us examine shortly the result of the introduction of the Public-House Trust system into this country, where it exists only upon a voluntary basis, without any legislative or preferential assistance, as in Norway and Sweden.

In the first place, it was commenced by inexperienced amateurs, who had to buy their experience, in some cases rather dearly. It had to fight jealousy and opposition from the Trade, misrepresentation and misconception by teetotallers, suspicion and distrust on the part of magistrates, police, and public, and all the prejudice which attaches to any new movement in this country.

The Trust scheme was inaugurated upon an extensive scale by Lord Grey at the very commencement of the present century. Separate and independent companies, bound together only by a common ideal, a common principle, and similar methods, and all affiliated to a central organisation, were incorporated in many counties to acquire licensed houses of all descriptions by purchase or on lease, and to manage them on lines never before attempted upon a comprehensive scale, in the interests of the public rather than the publican. The dividend of each company is limited to a fixed maximum rate, and any surplus after provision for reserves is devoted to objects of public utility.

All the houses are 'free' for the purchase of goods in the open market. They are under the control of managers,

generally married couples, drawn from all ranks of life, according to the status of the house. These receive commissions upon all trade other than alcoholics, and thus the managers have a direct incentive to push the non-alcoholic side of the business. They also receive a fixed salary.

The business of the Company is controlled by directors, and the objects of the Trust are safeguarded by a council, who (through their trustees) hold all the deferred shares, which are of nominal value, but have a voting value equal to the whole of the ordinary (and preferred shares, if any), and thus retain a preponderating voting power. The council is composed of a large number of gentlemen of the highest standing.

The managers are bound by various rules, which effect the abolition of credit and other evils, such as the 'long pull,' but in the main they are given a large discretion and opportunity to indulge their individual idiosyncrasies and to give full play to their abilities. They are selected for their capacity as hosts and as caterers.

Since these companies were incorporated several have amalgamated, and a few have failed, until there exist to-day three companies of considerable importance, and a larger number of others each operating a comparatively small number of licensed houses. All the original objects and methods, as laid down by Lord Grey, have been retained, and more than 320 houses are at present being operated in various parts of the country on these lines.

It is perhaps unfortunate that no records of the whole of these companies are available, but the experience of one of the largest and most important of the companies, managing sixty houses in town and country, slum and village, colliery and other industrial areas, and in lonely districts, will give a good and sufficient indication of the success of the movement as a whole.

This company, which is the product of an amalgamation of several Trust Companies with the successful Hertfordshire Company, is registered under the title of Home Counties Public-House Trust, Limited.

It is a company limited by shares with a nominal capital of 150,000*l.*, of which about 120,000*l.* is paid up. The annual turnover is at present about 150,000*l.*, and the net profits earned during the last three years average more than ten per cent. upon the paid-up capital. The maximum dividend is paid to the shareholders, substantial reserve funds have been accumulated, and a considerable sum paid over to the trustees for objects of public utility.

The company employs approximately 900 managers and assistants, and during its ten years' existence has served more

than eleven millions of customers. During the whole of that period not a single employé has been convicted of any breach of the Licensing Acts or in respect of any other offence.

This immunity is the more-remarkable when it is remembered that the company's houses are in many cases situated in very rough districts, that they have most frequently been acquired upon the failure of their previous occupants, and that they consist to the extent of one-half of houses acquired from the Trade and purchased in the open market. During the period of ten years the non-alcoholic receipts have risen from less than ten per cent. to more than forty-eight per cent. of the whole.

Games and music have shown themselves to be a powerful counter attraction to drink, and interesting experiments in cinematograph entertainments have also proved most successful. All classes of the public frequent the houses, and in one house alone 150,000 working men are catered for every year.

'The whole atmosphere of these Trust Houses,' says an independent observer, 'where flowers, pictures, and good taste in decoration have been substituted for vulgar and tawdry displays, is essentially different to that of the average Trade house.' Every house contains ample accommodation for the provision of non-alcoholics, and each contains an entrance separated from the bars. In several cases bars have been entirely swept away and refreshment-rooms substituted.

The success of this company is dependent upon and due to its managers and their assistants. At the outset it was difficult to get the best managers for such a novel experiment, but to-day the pick of the market are available, for in the absence of gross negligence and dishonesty they run no financial risk, and they share in all the receipts or profits, with the exception of those relating to alcohol, and are besides in receipt of a fixed salary.

Cordial approval of the work of these Trust Companies finds constant expression not only in the Press, but on the part of all classes and interests. If results such as these can be obtained by mere amateurs, working with poor material in the shape of houses, and in spite of fierce competition, what could not be effected by professionals, working in a monopoly area, with legislative and State assistance? There is in fact no practical obstacle to the adoption of this system upon a national scale.

It may be argued that if it is possible to effect so much upon a purely voluntary basis, it would be as well to continue to extend the movement in this way, and some colour can be given to such an argument by the success which has attended the efforts of most of the other Trust Companies. The answer is that expansion, on a voluntary basis, upon a very large scale is impossible. The growth and extent of the tied-house system is such

that more than ninety per cent. of the houses in England are tied. In many places all the licensed premises have been acquired by the Trade. Of the ten per cent. remaining, a considerable proportion are large hotels or restaurants, while most of the remainder, like the majority of Trade houses, are redundant, and worthless except as objects of compensation.

Another evil which requires remedy is the enormous percentage of redundant houses. Probably, with the doubtful exception of Middlesex, two thirds of the licensed houses in the Home Counties are redundant. The number of 'on'-licensed houses in England and Wales in 1912 was 89,849, and of 'off' licenses 23,815, and besides these there were 8209 registered clubs. This gives one on-licensed house to about every forty-two available customers.

The chance of making a living is, therefore, generally dependent upon adventitious attractions, or other employment. Thus, the weekly trade of many a house is less than one barrel weekly. The tied tenant, before the imposition of the so-called new War Tax on beer, paid 36s. for this and, if careful, obtained 48s. for it, a gross profit of 12s. per week, out of which he had to pay all the impositions, his rent, and his expenses. Such houses are either not licensed for spirits or, if they are, sell but little. How is a man in such case to live?

A barrelage of three per week probably represents approximately the average for the Home Counties. A loss is, therefore, almost a certainty if the house is to be carried on in a legitimate way, and this with working hours longer than any other business. Trading under these conditions is simply an invitation to malpractices and adulteration; the adulteration of beers and spirits is a most frequent evil. So also is selling under false labels. Small wonder is it that good tenants with financial means are difficult to find.

At the present rate of progress in reducing the number of licensed houses by payment of compensation, it will take seventy years to effect a reasonable reduction in their numbers, if the test of redundancy is that every licensee should be enabled to make a good living, without other occupation, in a strictly legitimate way.

Experience has proved that large houses are much more healthy, much less likely to lead to excess, much more easily inspected, than small ones. The only reason for which the police sometimes favour the latter is that they are in some cases the resort of the criminal classes. The advantage in every other respect lies with fewer and larger houses, where all drinking is *coram populo*. All back doors and dark entrances should be abolished.

All these, and many more reforms, too numerous to mention, can be effected by a State monopoly as regards public-houses; and experience has taught that, to obtain the best results, monopoly is a vital necessity.

To bring this about upon a national scale it is advisable to divide all on-licensed houses into three classes, viz. (1) hotels, in regard to which the definition in the Scottish Licensing Acts might be of some assistance; (2) *bona-fide* restaurants, which could be limited to those where the non-alcoholic takings amounted to at least two thirds of the whole; and (3) public-houses, which would include the remainder. Of these, classes (1) and (2) would remain concerns of private enterprise, and should be encouraged as contributing to public convenience, but no counter bars should be allowed in hotels, unless they fell under the head of restaurants.

It is in regard to class (3) that legislation is requisite. This should provide a time-limit of fourteen years, during which the maximum compensation charge levy should be exacted, and this should be invested to form the nucleus of a compensation fund for the extinguished licenses. During the fourteen years such new licenses as are applied for, and granted, should pay their monopoly payments into the compensation fund. At the end of the time-limit all licenses, as now granted, should be extinguished, including grocers' and 'off' licenses (and these two last mentioned should not be renewed in any form).

Statutory companies should be formed in every county or in sections of counties, based upon the lines regulating existing Public-House Trust Companies. Upon the termination of the time-limit these statutory companies should have the power to acquire, at their unlicensed value, such old-licensed or other premises as are deemed necessary, in 'populous places' according to a definite ratio of population, and in other places according to geographical area. Regard must be had and provision made for those places to which the public come in large numbers at intervals, such as market towns and tourist resorts, and for these machinery must be set up for the grant of occasional and seasonal licenses. The existing provisions in respect of occasional and seasonal licenses are very inconvenient and inept. All such houses as are acquired should be remodelled upon model lines. Existing Trust Companies furnish numerous examples.

So far as good order is concerned, the companies should be regulated and controlled by the Justices to the same, or to a similar extent, as at present. The power to regulate the number of hotels and restaurants should also be left to Justices. All the profits arising from the operation of the houses by the statutory companies should be paid into the Imperial Exchequer and not

to the local authorities. Additional reforms could be introduced from time to time, in accordance with the dictates of public opinion.

The brewers and distillers would continue to supply the statutory companies with such commodities as they required, upon fixed formulæ as regards quality, gravity, strength, and age. In this way a much needed check upon the nature and quality of alcoholics would be effected.

Commissioners appointed by and responsible to a central board, under the authority of the Imperial Parliament, should control the companies, direct their policy, and make rules in accordance with the needs of each district. Such rules should be as few as possible.

When some such system as that indicated is instituted we may see the end of the gin palace, which has forged the yoke of the working classes, demoralised their mind, lessened their capacity for labour and affected its quality. Then, and not till then, we may reasonably hope to see the last of the type of drunken mother, bearing and rearing a race of feeble-minded and unfit offspring, who carry from their birth the curse of over-indulgence in drink, and are besotted from their earliest years by their surroundings.

Improved housing is useless without improved habits of sobriety, and sobriety is largely influenced by environment. The environment of a licensed house should and can be fit in any locality for all classes and both sexes. It should be a place into which it is the privilege of the respectable to enter, and not the refuge of the outcast.

It may be that drunkenness is less apparent in our streets and lanes than in days gone by, but statistics tell their own tale. If the statistics do not suffice, the inquirer can easily prove the case for reform by spending a few mornings at some of the police courts, or a few Saturday nights at or near licensed houses, or Sundays in some of the clubs, and it will then be patent to him that the Drink Question is the most urgent of the day, as drink remains, purveyed as it is at present, our great national curse.

ALEXANDER F. PART.

THE SOUL OF RUSSIA

THE other day I went to see a play, the scenes of which were set in many different countries. One of these, the bill announced, was to be in Russia: I whispered to my companion 'That scene will be about a revolutionary who has been exiled to Siberia.' Of course it was. Our popular imaginative artists, eagerly searching for the picturesque, have picked up no other information about this huge nation, have taught their public nothing else. 'Tis not that these thrilling incidents are untrue. They have all happened over and over again; the best is true and the worst is true of the Russian Empire.

It is quite easy to make a fancy picture of Russia. It is also easy to make a fancy picture of England; and it has been done by Treitschke and his German disciples—with results as surprising now to the artists as to the sitter. All such portraits are made with facts, just as all pictures are made with colours; but the truth of your picture depends upon your insight and your sense of proportion—otherwise your 'Portrait of a Master of the Hounds' may turn out to be a Sunset in the Sahara. If a foreign writer selects extracts from the speeches of Sir Edward Carson, Michael Davitt, Mr. Bonar Law, and a member of the Shinn Fein, adds a few picturesque tragedies from Ireland, a few incidents from the lives of Clive and Warren Hastings, with an account of the firing of Sepoys from the cannon's mouth in the reign of Queen Victoria, and a few gruesome facts from the history of Newgate; and appends to this a description of what Florence Nightingale found in the Crimea (without mentioning Florence Nightingale), and an account of how we lost our American Colonies, giving the whole a historical flavour by sketches of the characters of King John, Richard the Third, Henry the Eighth, Queen Mary, and Titus Oates: he may prove to the satisfaction of his hearers that our Empire was built up by crime, and is held by cowardly incompetence. Many Germans quite sincerely believe that this is a picture of England. They all believe in the picture they have made of Russia as a bloodstained Cossack: it was the bogie of 'Muscovite savagery,'

of 'Oriental Slavic quasi-civilisation'—or, to quote the Socialist and Pacificist *Volkstimme*, of 'Russian despotism,' 'Russian bestiality,' 'a merciless and barbaric enemy'—which closed their ranks at the beginning of the War; and learned philosophers, exact scientists and acute critics, like Eucken and Häckel and Harnack, wrote about 'Asiatic Barbarism,' as if this was a self-evident fact, a postulate common to them and to us. Yet Russia had never done England or Germany any harm; its 'hordes' had never descended upon Germany or upon us, though we had in the Crimean War, without any decent excuse and in the sole interest of the Antichrist of Stamboul, descended upon Russia; it was indeed these same Muscovite hordes which had saved Germany from utter destruction at the hands of Napoleon; had in fact emancipated her and made possible the formation of the German Empire.

Russia is one of the youngest brethren of the Christian family—almost as young as Prussia, which has had not nineteen but only six centuries of Christianity; for she was held back by the Tatar domination (just when we were establishing our freedom upon the basis of Magna Carta), and she was until modern times isolated from the West of Europe. Consequently she has had to cram an enormous amount of progress into the last century, and in certain ways is still a backward nation. It may with some truth be said that in Russia the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries were all telescoped into the nineteenth; and consequently things were done then by the Russian Government which we used to do in the Tudor period. Russia had much leeway to make up; and moreover Russia is a country of extremes—externally of great distances and isolated satrapies, of extremes of heat and cold, which strongly affect the national character; and spiritually it is a country of extreme opinions, and of swift changes. Even when he is an unbeliever, the Russian is a man of intense faith; he transfers to his politics the same fervent receptiveness which he used to give to his religion. He is ever an idealist, and his politics *become* a religion. He wants to die for them. He is a 'whole-hogger.' In the West an extreme Socialist may sometimes seem to swallow Marx or Henry George intact; but, unless he is young, he has some reservations: visions of compromise are at the back of his mind, a touch of half-acknowledged scepticism, a tendency to substitute evolution for revolution, a sense that *when* Utopia comes it will be somewhat different from the Utopias. In Russia it is much less so: the revolutionary is apt to be passionately idealistic, to swallow whole the creed he has got from the West: he is still 'Orthodox,' still loyal to the death, and a martyr, with that strange Russian instinct for suffering, and that strange mixture of sanguine

buoyancy and sudden despair; he puts into his theory a faith which would surprise his Western teachers. Hence the horror which reactionaries of the Pobyedonóstseff stamp had both of Liberalism and of the West. The mildest Western ideas became a flaming sword in the hands of the Russian student. And this intensified the contrary evils of Prussian bureaucratic methods, which have been fastened upon Russia since the days of Peter the Great: they have been bad enough in Prussia; they have been worse in Russia, so sweeping in her thought, so casual in her action. Hence the clash of ideals; hence the sins, negligences and ignorances both of the Bureaucracy and its opponents.

The change of name from Petersburg to Petrograd—long desired by Pan-Slavists—is itself a sign that the evil of a Prussianised Russia is coming to an end; the far greater change—also long desired—of the virtual headship of the Church from the Oberprokurator of the Holy Synod to a revived Patriarchate of Moscow (or perhaps of Constantinople), will, when it comes, carry the process infinitely farther; for the Teutonic device by which Peter made the Church politically a department of his bureaucratic state has enchained the clergy and injured some of the deepest strongholds of religion. Indeed the qualities of Slav and Teuton do not mix well; Treitschke and Nietzsche are themselves results of the mixture, as is much of the peculiar Prussian spirit, for the blood of the two races is intermingled throughout the patrimony of the Hohenzollerns. The German virtues as we see them in the Bavarian peasant, and the Russian virtues as we see them in the Russian peasant, are better kept distinct. As with blood, so with customs and ideas. Russia has drunk at the source of Prussian methods, and they have not suited her. She can never have the persistent industry or the bovine docility of her neighbours: the very rigours of her winter climate produce a capacity for doing nothing during long periods which vitiates the methods of bureaucratic organisation. It is indeed perfectly true that the first words a stranger learns in Russia are *Nichevó* and *Syeichass*, which, with *Pozháluiста*, make him realise that he is with a people easy-going, dilatory, and polite. None of us have had dealings with Russia who have not learnt to make allowances for men who will put off answering urgent letters for weeks or for ever, and who are perfectly charming, and enthusiastically active when we get to close quarters. The German is a great organiser, and a sober, weighty unit in the machinery which he devises so well. The Russian is the most unbusinesslike person in the civilised world; his government is fitful, sometimes too cruel, often too kind, and generally too lax—laggard and tolerant for a generation, and then swiftly making a vast change that would take an Englishman centuries to effect.

How long were we abolishing serfdom? How much longer shall we be abolishing drunkenness?

The real government of Russia has always been a government by intuition. The fatherland, to which the hearts of all Russians turn, is a family; the Russia in which every Russian believes is that large, patient, communal soul which not even the Tatar domination could quell or change, which caused her people to cling together by an inveterate instinct of solidarity at times when rulers were not to be found and nobles were false. Ruled by Moslems, overrun by Poles, invaded again to the heart of the land by Swedes, struggling desperately with Turks, trampled by the Grande Armée till she sacrificed her gloriously beautiful Moscow to be free—this enduring brotherhood has never weakened, but has waxed in every desperate adversity, like an army that can go on fighting when all its leaders are killed, because each man trusts and understands the other. The great poet Pushkin has described the spirit of his country :

By lasting out the strokes of fate,
In trials long they learned to feel
Their inborn strength—as hammer's weight
Will splinter glass but temper steel.

Russia is a family as no other nation is; and the Tsar deserves his popular title of Little Father, because he is the head of a family: it is a title that certainly could not be applied to the Emperors who weld together twenty recalcitrant peoples in Germany and Austria; but it could not be applied either in the Russian sense to any other ruler in the world. For this reason is Russian patriotism so indomitable and Russian loyalty so intense. Under difficulties, and amid privations, which we in the West can hardly imagine, the nation has grown from the obscure principality which Vladimir made Christian in the tenth century, to the remote unconsidered Muscovy which Shakespeare had heard talk of, to the vast coherent Empire of to-day, which still we know so little: and the texture is still the same throughout; the people cling together and understand. Their quarrels are family quarrels, resounding and tragic; but when an outsider tries to thrust his hand between the bark and the tree he learns something about Russian unity, and about a wider unity still, the unity of the Slav race, which, if it makes all Russians brothers, makes first cousins of all the Slavonic nations. The Russian Government could not have avoided helping Serbia, for the Russian people would not have allowed the Tsar to stand aside, and when the people choose they rule. The Russian Government can defy the 'Intelligentsia,' but it cannot overrule the people—not even to bring the Kalendar up to date. Every

Russian felt a responsibility for Serbia, because the Serbians are Slavs and are Orthodox. And even the Poles, Westernised as they were in the Middle Ages, and severed as they are by religion, have rallied to Russia. The world has rung with the wrongs of Russian Poland, for the Poles are a brilliant and eloquent people; but when the War broke out the Polish members of the Duma did not hesitate for a moment. The quarrels of the past had been terrible; but they were family quarrels after all. The Pole has hated the Russian bureaucracy, and no wonder; but he hates the Prussian, man for man, with a continual vigour that must be seen to be realised. He remembers, too, that the crime of the partition of Poland was done by three Germans: Frederick the Great, Maria Teresa, and Katharine of Russia. Perhaps he remembers in justice too that before this it was Russia herself that had been carved by Poland, and that in the first partition she won back the White Russians who were her own people. But, if the rally of Poland is a wonderful thing, the rally of Russian revolutionaries is still more significant. Exiles come back and give themselves up to arrest, in order that they may be allowed to fight in the army. Advanced Liberals write to explain that all their cherished ideals are bound up with the future of Russia and her present success. They believe in their political faith, and yet, and yet—they believe in Russia more, and something within tells them that all will be well if Russia triumphs.

They are right. The future of the world lies in the accomplishment of brotherhood. And the future of the world lies in the peasantry; and the real, enduring Russia is the Russia, not of the Intelligentsia but of the peasant—that unspoilt child of nature and religion, simple, brave, faithful, loyal, and most marvellously strong and patient. Foreigners speak of Russian barbarism, and it is the peasant they have in their minds. Russians speak of the evils of Western corruption, and they too are thinking of the peasant: they see how badly Russia has suffered, in methods, in morals, in religion, since Peter ‘opened a window to the West.’ The gains they recognise also, and the necessity of competence in modern sciences and arts; but they see in the aristocracy, in the commercial class, in the Intelligentsia, in the industrials of the towns, abundant signs that Western influences may rot rather than ripen the Russian character. The Russian peasant, they feel, so long as he remains on the land, preserves the national character in its strength and purity; he changes rapidly for the worse, they say, in the industrial centres, just as we are told the Irish peasant loses some of his beautiful unworldly qualities when he emigrates to America. But the peasant is Russia, overwhelmingly he is Russia; and the other classes are but as the clothes and ornaments on a man.

The peasant needs more education, like the rest of us; but if he can be kept free to develop on his own lines, and to lose nothing of his ancient virtues in the onward march, then it will be well with Russia, and she will contribute to the civilisation of the future quite as much as she borrows. The conviction of the ablest Russian Liberals that their country has an immense civilising mission in Europe as well as in Asia—and that the true democratic ideal cannot be established without her—is based upon this faith in the peasant. Tolstoy personifies the idea. He stands before the world in peasant garb, as one who has turned his back upon the gilded saloons of Petersburg (it was Petersburg then), to live on the land, to speak the thoughts and to use the well of Russian undefiled which is the language of the peasantry. And he finds the summary of his peasant ideal in the Gospel: Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.

'Russian barbarism,' say the Germans; and their dread of it has plunged Europe in war. Many of our own people have said the same thing—I notice that even Mr. Wells has occasionally fallen into the habit in his most able book about the crisis; while the little band of Liberals, who are telling us in a series of tracts how to avoid war for ever, continually press the accusation upon their English readers, and are thereby unwittingly sowing the seeds of another war; for this is the way that wars are made—the dragon's teeth are sown long before, and fear, hatred, and contempt accumulate till they can be contained no more, and the word goes out to kill. Now, what these denunciators all have in their minds when they speak of barbarism must be the Russian peasant; for no one in his senses could use the phrase of the brilliant and cultivated educated classes: to compare the education of the English middle class, for instance, with that of Russia would be, as Mr. Maurice Baring says, 'merely silly.' No, the Englishman who can speak no language but his own has at least learnt to respect the Russians as linguists. But the peasant? He is still largely illiterate—some 80 per cent. of the population in Russia, and about 40 per cent. (a significant drop) among the Russian colonists of Siberia; he is different from our peasantry in appearance, for he looks like a real peasant and does not wear the townsmen's shabby clothes; and he is poor. He is really proud of being a peasant. Would that we could say the same of England! And he has the thoughtful, retentive mind of the man who has not been spoilt by cheap reading. 'I belong to the shallow Intelligentsia,' said in all complacency one of Mr. Stephen Graham's half-Westernised Russians; and of how many in the West would this be true also! The Russian peasant is not shallow. He is full of natural poetry, his talk is shrewd and humorous, and he is observant and reflective as well as good-natured and sociable;

lazy and slow he often is, but wonderfully clever with his hands, and also unalterably stubborn. Like the Irish peasant, he has a mind steeped in folk-lore, folk-song, and religion. Some inquiring person instituted a census as to the favourite books in certain Russian village libraries. No one would ever guess the favourite work which these uncultured peasants read to one another. It was a translation of Milton's *Paradise Lost*! I have mentioned Tolstoy, whose estimate of the peasantry would deserve consideration even if it were not also that of most Russian writers. His peculiar literary excellence in the eyes of his fellow-countrymen is that he writes in such beautiful Russian, and the language he habitually uses is the simple speech of the peasants. There are no dialects in Russia; there is nothing like the Cockney accent. The peasant speaks like a gentleman.

Above all things, he is religious. We are apt, when people are not religious in our funny way, to call them superstitious, and so to dispose of them. And Russia we are apt to judge by her picturesque and moving acts of devotion—calling them superstitious if we think that beauty is a superstition. The outward religion of Russia is indeed wonderful and touching: it is so universal, in all places and among all classes, so free from Western threadbare chilliness—for indeed it is Oriental in its freedom from self-consciousness, in its simple fervour. A Western cannot but be immensely struck when he sees a general in uniform bowing at a wayside shrine, a policeman saying his prayers aloud in the snow, a fat merchant in astrakhan crossing himself with his cigar before an ikon in a crowded railway station. Devotion is poured out fervently at all times and in all places. And this gives the whole country an aspect of immanent Christianity, and we feel that it has a right to the title of *Svyataya Russ*, 'Holy Russia'—more perhaps than we to that of 'Merrie England.' If Christ were to come through the streets of London to-day, comforting and healing people, we know that all our ways would have to be suddenly transformed. In Russia there would be no change—I had almost said no surprise. Indeed, underneath the gorgeous and elaborate rites of the Eastern Church which impress an Englishman and puzzle him, Russian religion is singularly evangelical. The Russian Church has many faults of organisation, and a wise reform will soon be a matter of terrible urgency; her clergy need a higher standard of education—they need, I think, a full and true intercourse with our English clergy, for the advantage of us all; but the Russian Church is the Church of the people, as is no Church of Western Christendom (except perhaps in some parts of Ireland, for here again the geographical extremes of Europe meet); she belongs to the people, and the people belong to her; and the common faith is Gospel Christianity—in many ways more evan-

gelical than anything we have in the West. We often say here that the Sermon on the Mount is impracticable. It is not impracticable in Russia. The spirit of it comes naturally to the peasants, the *Krestianye*¹; they have learned through a long endurance lessons which may one day work as a leaven throughout Christendom. I think, if Christ came down to earth to-day, He would gather the peasants of Russia together, and say over them the Beatitudes.

If the future of the world lies in the men of the soil, if it lies in the spread of brotherhood, if it lies in religion, as the past has lain, then Russia has great and precious treasures to bring to the building of the new age. She has many faults—there is something medieval in the sharp mixture of violent sins and violent virtues, of unworthy acts and ecstasies of worship; her peasants are not saints, though they are the stuff from which saints are often made—their character has been marred by drunkenness and its resultant crimes; her Government has been guilty of base blunders, of cruel and foolish policies of repression, her statesmen have sometimes run after wild and aggressive ambitions; acts of medieval savagery are nearer in her history than in ours. All Europe has heard of the Tatar in the Russian character. All Europe has heard of the worst in Russia—of the knout, of serfdom, of exile to Siberia, of pogroms, secret police, a persecuted Press, and military executions. Her vivid mixture of black and white is very unlike our Western greyness. But much of the black has gone already: the knout and the clanking of exiles' chains, so dear to melodrama, have gone, and serfdom has been long abolished; drunkenness has even now been swept away, and we here in our shame look with envy at the nation which has purged itself—with a great price has obtained this freedom. That is so like Russia! We pity her faults; and, lo, with a bound she has passed far ahead of us, and it is we who are still wallowing in our Occidental barbarism! Now, every Russian is confident about the future because he knows that his nation has this wonderful vitality in reform. The evils which we think peculiarly Russian he attributes to foreign influences; he remembers that few of her leading statesmen in the nineteenth century were of Russian birth, that the chief Foreign Minister from the time of Napoleon to the Crimean War could not even speak the Russian language; he thinks of his country as the champion of Christendom against the Turk and his atrocities—alas! that England opposed her in her work—as the protector of free Montenegro, the liberator of Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Rumania, of half Armenia—and now of all Armenia. He knows that the secret police are a temporary body

¹ A Christian in Russian is *Christidnin*, a peasant *Krestyanin*, from *Krest*, the cross; *Muzhik* is a more familiar expression.

whose crimes are a disgrace and whose days are numbered ; the ordinary police are as kindly as our own. He attributes the persecutions in his country to the officials of the past—to a system that was not Russian, trying to defend itself against very dangerous doctrines, and driven to repression as our own Liberal Government was driven by the far milder excesses of the militants here. He admits that his country is behind ours in political freedom ; but he is confident. The Duma for all its disabilities is very much alive ; the electoral system is indeed deliberately undemocratic, but not worse than the three-class system of Prussia ; and the freedom of the executive from parliamentary control is only another Prussian fault. Henceforward the influence will be that of England and France alone, and there will be no *Dreikaiserbund*. The Duma has secured the principle, and practice will not follow on so slowly as it has often done in Russia ; the peasant has the instinct of self-government, long traditions in the village communism of the Mir, and much practice in the more modern Zemstvo. Russians often speak of their country as the most democratic in Europe, and socially this is true. In social freedom, too, a Russian will insist that he is ahead of us—that people live their own life, that there is no tyranny of public opinion as with us, that the woman's movement is more advanced than in England, and far more than in France or Germany.

He will perhaps ask us whether it is really true that we have a dramatic censor who forbids the production of Maeterlinck's *Monna Vanna* ! There is a saying that in Russia everything is forbidden but everything is done : an enormous list of rules hangs in the railway stations, but no one has ever read them. Russia is very tender, very lenient—too lenient in some ways. Many terrible things have happened in Siberia ; but yet it is true that prisoners were generally released when they arrived there ; and now that transportation is in principle abolished, Russian criminals must regret that they have to put up with the monotonous certitude of a convict prison—though even the prisons, as Mr. Bernard Pares describes them, are pleasant places compared with the solitary horror of our British cells. We used to think of Russia as a country of torture and death ; and yet Russia is ahead of us in having no capital punishment—except when martial law is proclaimed, as too often has been the case. The story of Dostoyévsky's famous novel *Crime and Punishment* would be impossible in England, for the neurotic student who is its hero would with us have been summarily hanged for his very bad case of murder ; as it is, he gets a few years in Siberia, is converted by the devotion of a woman who had been driven on the streets and follows him to exile, and the story ends with a

vista of their living happily ever after. It is a Christian story of redemption, and not a pagan story of judicial vengeance; and it expresses the true Russia—as indeed does not only Dostoyévsky, but the great company of Russian writers in their deep and most Christlike compassion for the suffering, the sinful, the outcast, and the poor.

It is always an impertinence to attempt the description of another nation, and the more so when the writer has no special qualifications for the work. But war-time, for all its horrors, is a time for making national friendships; and we must all help in the great opportunity of cementing by respect and affection the alliance between two nations which lie so far apart and yet have so much in common. One cannot hope to do justice to the task; and yet the ignorance of Russia among Englishmen is so great—far greater than their ignorance of us—that even the humblest must help to educate. And certain facts need emphasising. No Englishman has been in Russia without liking the Russians: he finds himself among a people eager, friendly, clever, simple, expansive; he is in the East, but it is an East which has drunk deep of the spirit of Christ. He has passed into a fraternity, where you exchange confidences with your neighbour, where you call the cab-driver ‘my dove’ and the porter ‘brother’—where the coachman kisses his master and mistress at Easter and says ‘He is risen indeed’—where for good and evil all are a family together, and if one member suffers all the members suffer with it. He sees faults too, rather naïvely displayed and too easily condoned—much corruption in some classes, as of a nation whose blood is less immune than ours against infection. But he is drawn to the heart of this people, and when he is away he longs to be back—back into what an eminent Englishman described to me as the atmosphere of kindness and freedom which he feels as he crosses the frontier—back into the busy varied life of a versatile people, full of character, full of vitality, a youthful nation gathered round old-world Byzantine churches.

And if we English are wise, we shall be quick to appreciate and slow to judge, since it is difficult for us to do justice to a race so different from the Latin, Teuton, or Briton as is the great Slav family. The Germans fail utterly to understand the Slavs—Poles and Russians alike hate the Teuton, and are hated with a Central-European intensity. We English have not succeeded in understanding the Russian people—through the thousand leagues that separate us we have seen a grim, unkempt, bent figure wading through the snow in clanking chains. . . . When the War began our newspapers invented the phrase ‘the Russian steam-roller’: they were so pleased with it that the public were

bored to death with the constant repetition. Well, recent events in the East have shown that it would be more exact to speak of the Russian *corps de ballet*—for surely troops never before have shown such agility and *élan*. Yet both phrases are significant of the Slav character, which we find it so difficult to understand. It has the strength and patience with which the steam-roller is gifted; it has also the verve, the quickness, the light fancy of the dancer. The Slavs in fact are, as London has learnt with some surprise, the greatest dancers of the world, and not at all like the Esquimaux. It is a mixture that we are not familiar with: the dash, and heat, and vitality are in the blood; perhaps the endurance is due to the winter hardships—the patience to religion, and the sombre courage to the immense difficulties of Russia's history—difficulties to which, as Mr. Pares says, she has always been only just a little more than equal. The small nation which is now become so great won its strength under the hammer of foreign oppression; she crawled out of the welter of savage tribes that surrounded her by virtue of the Christian faith that was in her; she drew herself up and rolled away the oppression of the Yellow Horde of Islam, and freed herself from Pole and Swede by virtue of that family instinct, both racial and religious, which held her people together and preserved her integrity in the darkest hours. 'It was,' says the same high authority, whose *Russia and Reform* should be read side by side with Sir D. Mackenzie Wallace's standard work on Russia and Mr. Stephen Graham's penetrating sketches of Russian psychology, 'it was the constant, versatile, inexhaustible vitality of the people, always fresh in fancy, but always broken to patience, that made success possible. It is this varied mass of humour, good-hearted patience, and quaint resource which has given the body to Russian history.' And he speaks of the instinct for order, the faith in Christianity and championship of it, and the life and labour of the people, as the three great principles that have made Russian history.

Of the literature, the art, and the scientific work of Russia I have not the room to speak. It is strange that Germans should think her barbarous, when during the last fifty years she has taken the place in world-literature which Germany had held for fifty years before. In spite of the immense difficulties of her language, which make her poetry a sealed book to the West, her prose writers are now coming by their own—at least the supremacy of Turghényeff, Dostoyévsky, and Tolstoy is recognised, and the translators are ever more busy with her writers. Great as has been the service of Germany in quarrying out knowledge for the world, it is three other nations whose modern creative writers are now translated into all the languages of Europe—Britain, France, and Russia; and the Russians, he

it said, know our literature far better than we know theirs. In music Russia alone threatens the high supremacy of Germany; in the other arts she is vigorous and accomplished; in science she has given us Mendeléyeff and Metchnikoff. She has the powers of a great and civilising people.

And Russia is immense: the Slavs, so long oppressed that they gave to Medieval Europe the word for slavery, have come by their own, and a vast future is unrolled before them. From the Adriatic to the Sea of Japan, from the Arctic Ocean to the Aegean and the deserts of Central Asia, the Slav race extends—under the shadow of the Orthodox Church; and after this War none will be again under Teutonic or under Turkish domination. The Slav race is the most prolific in the world: already the hundred and seventy millions of the Russian Empire form a nation larger than Great Britain and France, Italy and Spain, the Netherlands and Scandinavia put together; this population increases by three millions every year—three quarters of the population of Scotland; within the next generation, now that strong measures are being taken to deal with her terrible infant mortality, she can hardly be less than two hundred and fifty millions; within the century her numbers will probably be doubled. We can hardly imagine what this will mean to the world, and what it will mean to Christendom, if Russia avoids a religious *débâcle* and the Eastern Church attains a vastness of unity unparalleled in the history of the Christian faith. The Russian Empire, with material resources in Siberia, in Central Asia, and in the old country, comparable to those of America, with a complete equipment of education, with the old indomitable spirit still at her heart, and her internal agonies long past—what a prospect is spread before her children of to-day! Can we wonder at their confidence?

This great nation is now our ally. The old blind jealousies are gone; our people are beginning to understand one another, our Churches are making friends; our Empires, when the War is over, will be rounded off, and we shall not be tempted to aggression, but shall have before us the task of civilisation and consolidation, and our common work in Asia. The two races are very different but strangely complementary, and in Russia the value of English influences is realised; her nascent constitutionalism looks to ours as its mother and its model, her people admire our characteristics and read our literature, her most carefully trained children are put into English hands and taught our language and our ways. We have something in our spirit that Russia needs. And she has something that will be good for us.

PERCY DEARMER.

G 2

THE CHANCES OF PEACE AND THE PROBLEM OF POLAND

A CENTURY ago, at the Congress of Vienna, the question of Poland proved extremely difficult to solve. It produced dangerous friction among the assembled Powers, and threatened to lead to the break-up of the Congress. The position became so threatening that, on the 3rd of January 1815, Austria, Great Britain, and France felt compelled to conclude a secret separate alliance directed against Prussia and Russia, the allies of Austria and Great Britain in the war against Napoleon. Precautionary troop movements began, and war among the Allies might have broken out had not, shortly afterwards, Napoleon quitted Elba and landed in France. Fear of the great Corsican re-united the Powers.

Because of the great and conflicting interests involved, the question of Poland may prove of similar importance and difficulty at the Congress which will conclude the present War. Hence, it seems desirable to consider it carefully and in good time. It is true that the study of the Polish problem does not seem to be very urgent at the present moment. In view of the slow progress of the Allies in the east and west, it appears that the War will be long drawn out. Still, it is quite possible that it will come to an early and sudden end. Austria-Hungary is visibly tiring of the hopeless struggle into which she was plunged by Germany, and which hitherto has brought her nothing but loss, disgrace, and disaster. After all, the War is bound to end earlier or later in an Austro-German defeat, and if it should be fought to the bitter end Austria-Hungary will obviously suffer far more severely than will Germany. A protracted war, which would lead merely to the lasting impoverishment of Germany, would bring about the economic annihilation of impecunious Austria. Besides, while a complete defeat would cause to Germany only the loss of territories in the east, west and north which are largely inhabited by disaffected Poles, Frenchmen and Danes, and would not very greatly reduce the purely German population of Germany, it would probably result in the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy which lacks a homogeneous population, and it might lead to Austria's disappearance as a great State. If complete disaster should overwhelm the Empire of Francis

Joseph, Hungary would undoubtedly make herself independent. The Dual Monarchy would become a heap of wreckage, and in the end the German parts of Austria would probably become a German province, Vienna a provincial Prussian town, the proud Hapsburgs subordinate German princelings. If, on the other hand, Austria-Hungary should make quickly a separate peace with her opponents, she would presumably lose only the Polish parts of Galicia to the new kingdom of Poland, and Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia; and she might receive most satisfactory compensation for these losses by the acquisition of the German parts of Silesia and by the adherence of the largely Roman Catholic South German States, which have far more in common with Austria than with Protestant Prussia. As a result of the War, Austria-Hungary might be greatly strengthened at Germany's cost, provided the Monarchy makes peace without delay. In any case, only by an early peace can the bulk of the lands of the Hapsburgs be preserved for the ruling house, and can national bankruptcy be avoided. There is an excellent and most valuable precedent for such action on Austria's part. Bismarck laid down the essence of statesmanship in the maxim '*Salus Publica Suprema Lex*,' and defined in his memoirs the binding power of treaties of alliance by the phrase '*Ultra posse nemo obligatur*.' Referring particularly to the Austro-German Alliance, he wrote that 'no nation is obliged to sacrifice its existence on the altar of treaty fidelity.' Before long the Dual Monarchy may take advantage of Bismarck's teaching. After all, it cannot be expected that she should go beyond her strength, and that she should ruin herself for the sake of Germany, especially as she cannot thereby save that country from inevitable defeat. Austria-Hungary should feel particularly strongly impelled to ask for peace without delay, as her recent and most disastrous defeat in Serbia has exasperated the people and threatens to lead to risings and revolts not only in the Slavonic parts of the Monarchy but also in Hungary. Civil War may be said to be in sight.

The Dual Monarchy is threatened besides by the dubious and expectant attitude of Italy and Roumania. If Austria-Hungary should hesitate much longer to make peace, Italy and Roumania may find a sufficient pretext for war and may join the Entente Powers. Italy naturally desires to acquire the valuable Italian portions of Austria-Hungary on her borders, and Roumania the very extensive Roumanian parts of the Dual Monarchy adjoining that kingdom. To both Powers it would be disastrous if Austria-Hungary should make peace before they had staked out their claims by militarily occupying the territories which they covet. Both States may therefore be expected

to abandon their neutrality and to invade Austria-Hungary without delay as soon as they hear that that country seriously contemplates entering upon peace negotiations; it follows that if Austria-Hungary wishes to withdraw from the stricken field she must open negotiations with the utmost secrecy and conclude them with the utmost speed. It is clear that if Italy and Roumania should be given the much desired opportunity of joining the Entente Powers, the Dual Monarchy would lose not only Polish Galicia and Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina, but Roumanian Transylvania and the Banat, with about 5,000,000 inhabitants, and the largely Italian Trentino, Istria, and Dalmatia, with at least 1,000,000 people, as well. These vast losses would probably lead to the total dismemberment of the State, for the remaining subject nationalities would also demand their freedom. Self-preservation is the first law and the first duty of individuals and of States. It is therefore conceivable, and is indeed only logical, that Austria-Hungary will conclude overnight a separate peace. If she should take that wise and necessary step, isolated Germany would either have to give up the unequal struggle or fight on single-handed. In the latter case, her defeat would no doubt be rapid. It seems, therefore, quite possible that the end of the War may be as sudden as was its beginning. Hence, the consideration of the Polish Question seems not only useful but urgent.

Henry Wheaton, the distinguished American diplomat and jurist, wrote in his classical *History of the Law of Nations*: 'The partition of Poland was the most flagrant violation of natural justice and International Law which has occurred since Europe first emerged from barbarism.' In Koch's celebrated *Tableau des Révolutions de l'Europe*, written by a diplomat for the use of diplomats, and published in 1825, when the partition of Poland was still fresh in men's minds, we read:

The partition of Poland must be considered the forerunner of the total revolution of the whole political system of Europe which had been established three centuries before. Hitherto numerous alliances had been formed and many wars had been undertaken with a view to preserving weak States against the ambitions of strong ones. Now three Great Powers combined to plunder a State which had given them no offence. Thus the barriers which had hitherto separated right from arbitrary might were destroyed. No weak State was any longer secure. The European balance of power became the laughing-stock of the new school, and serious men began to consider the European equilibrium a chimera. Although the Courts of St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Vienna were most strongly to blame, those of London and Paris were not free from guilt by allowing without protest the spoliation of Poland to take place.

The Polish problem is not only a very great and extremely interesting problem, but it is unique of its kind. It can be

understood only by those who are acquainted with the history of Poland and of its partitions. Many Englishmen are unacquainted with that history. Most believe that Russia has been the worst enemy of the Poles, that she caused the partitions, that Germany and Austria-Hungary were merely her accomplices, and that Great Britain has never taken a serious interest in Polish affairs. Polish history, as usually taught, is a tissue of misconceptions and of falsehoods. In the following pages it will be shown that not Russia, but Prussia, was chiefly responsible for the partitions of Poland and for the subsequent oppression of the Poles, that Russia and Austria were, in their Polish policy, merely Prussia's tools and dupes, and that England, well informed by able and conscientious diplomats, has with truly marvellous insight and consistency unceasingly recommended the adoption of that liberal and enlightened policy towards Poland which seems likely to prevail at last. History has wonderfully vindicated the wisdom and the far-sightedness of British statesmen in their treatment of Polish affairs from the middle of the eighteenth century to the present day. A brief *résumé* of the largely secret or unknown inner history of Poland and of its partitions is particularly interesting, because it throws a most powerful light on the true character and the inner workings of Prusso-German, Russian and Austrian diplomacy from the time of Frederick the Great, of the Empress Catharine the Second, and of the Empress Maria Theresa to that of Bismarck, Bülow, and Bethmann-Hollweg. I would add that much of the material given in the following pages has never been printed, and has been taken from the original documents.

Frederick the Great wrote in his *Exposé du Gouvernement Prussien*, his Political Testament, which was addressed to his successor :

One of the first political principles is to endeavour to become an ally of that one of one's neighbours who may become most dangerous to one's State. For that reason we Prussians have an alliance with Russia, and thus we have our back free of danger as long as the alliance lasts.

He wrote in his *Histoire de Mon Temps* :

Of all neighbours of Prussia the Russian Empire is the most dangerous, both by its power and its geographical position, and those who will rule Prussia after me should cultivate the friendship of those barbarians because they are able to ruin Prussia altogether through the immense number of their mounted troops. Besides, one cannot repay them for the damage which they may do to us because of the poverty of that part of Russia which is nearest to Prussia, and through which one has to pass in order to get into the Ukraine.

These two passages summarise and explain Prussia's policy towards Russia during the last century and a half, and furnish a key to her subtle and devious Polish policy.

During the Seven Years' War Russia had given to Prussia the hardest blows. Guided by the considerations given above, Frederick the Great was most anxious to make peace and to conclude an alliance with Russia. He stated in his *Memoirs on the Events following the Peace of Hubertusberg of 1763*, referring, like Julius Caesar, to himself in the third person :

England's faithlessness (during the Seven Years War) had broken the bonds between Prussia and that country. The Anglo-Prussian alliance, which had been founded upon mutual interests, was followed by the most lively hostility and the most serious anger between the two States. King Frederick stood alone on the field of battle. No one was left to attack him, but at the same time no one was ready to take his part. That position of isolation was tolerable as long as it was only temporary, but it could not be allowed to continue. Soon a change took place. Towards the end of the year negotiations were begun with Russia with a view to concluding a defensive alliance with that country. . . .

The King of Prussia desired to obtain influence over Russia. . . .

The power of the Russians is very great. Prussia still suffers from the blows which she had received from them during the Seven Years War. It was obviously not in the interest of the Prussian King to contribute to the growth of so terrible and so dangerous a Power. Therefore two ways were open: Prussia had either to set bounds to Russia's conquests by force, or she had to endeavour to take skilful advantage of Russia's desire for expansion. The latter policy was the wiser one, and the King neglected nothing in order to carry it into effect.

The desired opportunity of concluding an alliance with Russia arose owing to the death of the Empress Elizabeth, his great opponent, which took place on the 5th of January 1762. Her successor, the foolish and imbecile Peter the Third, became a tool in Frederick's hands. He made peace with Prussia on the 5th of May 1762, and five weeks later, on the 8th of June, he concluded with Frederick a treaty of alliance to which the following secret articles were appended :

Articles Secrets :

. . . Comme l'intérêt de S.M.I. de toutes les Russies et de S.M. le roi de Prusse exige qu'on porte un soin attentif à ce que la république de Pologne soit maintenue dans son droit de libre élection, et qu'il ne soit permis ni concédé à personne d'en faire un royaume héréditaire, ou bien même de s'ériger en prince souverain, LL.MM. l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et le roi de Prusse se sont promis mutuellement et se sont engagées de la manière la plus solennelle, à ce que, dans tous les cas et dans toutes les circonstances, si quelqu'un et qui que ce soit voulait entreprendre de dépouiller la république de Pologne de son droit de libre élection, ou d'en faire un royaume héréditaire, ou de s'ériger soi-même en souverain, LL.MM. de Russie et de Prusse ne le permettront pas; mais qu'au contraire elles écarteront, repousseront et mettront à néant de toutes manières et par tous les moyens, des projets si injustes et si dangereux aux puissances voisines, en se concertant mutuellement, en réunissant leurs forces et même en ayant recours aux armes, si les circonstances l'exigeaient. De plus, les deux puissances s'uniront pour faire tomber le choix sur un

Piast, après la mort du roi actuel Auguste II, et elles se concerteront sur le choix du candidat le plus convenable.

Articles Séparés :

... S.M.I. de Russie et S.M. le roi de Prusse, voyant avec beaucoup de chagrin la dure oppression dans laquelle vivent, depuis bien des années, leurs coreligionnaires de Pologne et de Lithuanie, se sont réunies et alliées pour protéger de leur mieux tous les habitants de la Pologne et du grand-duché de Lithuanie, qui professent les religions grecque, réformée et luthérienne, et qui y sont connus sous le nom de dissidents, et veulent faire tous leurs efforts pour obtenir du roi et de la république de Pologne, par des représentations fortes et amicales, que ces mêmes dissidents soient réintégrés dans leurs privilèges, libertés, droits et prérogatives qui leur avaient été accordés et concédés par le passé.

Exactly a month later, during the night from the 8th to the 9th of July, Czar Peter was deposed and his wife, Catharine the Second, was elevated to the throne. On the 17th of July Peter the Third was assassinated.

By the Secret Articles quoted, Russia and Prussia pledged themselves to maintain with their whole united strength the right of free election in Poland, to prevent the establishment of a hereditary Polish kingship, to cause the election of a 'Piast' suitable to Russia and Prussia in case of the death of the ruling King, Augustus the Second. By the Separate Article given above, Russia and Prussia further agreed to protect with all their power the Poles belonging to the Russian Orthodox and to the Lutheran religion who at the time did not enjoy full citizen rights in that Roman Catholic State.

Many years before that treaty of alliance was concluded, when Russia was disunited, weak and overrun by Eastern hordes, Poland was a powerful State. It had conquered large portions of Russia, including the towns of Moscow and Kieff. Hence, many Russians saw in Poland their hereditary enemy and endeavoured, not unnaturally, to keep that country weak and disunited. Poland was a republic presided over by an elected king. All the power was in the hands of a numerous and mostly impecunious nobility. The State was weak because of two peculiar institutions—an elected king, who might be either a Pole or a stranger, and the *Liberum Veto*. In consequence of the latter the resolutions of the Polish Diet had to be unanimous. The Veto of a single man could prevent the passage of any measure and cripple the Government. The *Liberum Veto*, possessed by the numerous aristocracy, and the election of a king, whose power was jealously circumscribed by the ruling nobility, made anarchy and disorder permanent in Poland, and weakened that country to the utmost. While patriotic Poles desired to establish the strength and security of the State by reforming their Government, by abolishing the *Liberum Veto*,

replacing it by majority rule, and by making Kingship hereditary, their enemies wished to perpetuate Polish anarchy in order to take advantage of it. In the Treaty of Constantinople, concluded between Turkey and Russia in 1700, during the reign of Peter the Great, we find already an attempt on Russia's part to perpetuate disorder and anarchy in Poland by 'guaranteeing' the preservation of the vicious Polish constitution. In Article Twelve of that Treaty we read :

Le czar déclare de la manière la plus formelle qu'il ne s'appropriera rien du territoire de la Pologne, et qu'il ne se mêlera point du gouvernement de cette République. Et comme il importe aux deux empires d'empêcher que la souveraineté et la succession héréditaire ne soient point attachées à la couronne de Pologne, ils s'unissent à l'effet de maintenir les droits, privilèges et constitutions de cet Etat. Et au cas que quelque puissance qui que ce soit envoyât des troupes en Pologne, ou qu'elle cherchât à y introduire la souveraineté et la succession héréditaire, il sera non seulement permis à chacune des puissances contractantes de prendre telles mesures que son propre intérêt lui dictera, mais les deux Etats empêcheront, par toutes les voies possibles, que la couronne de Pologne n'acquière la souveraineté et la succession héréditaire; que les droits et constitutions de la République ne soient point violés; et qu'aucun démembrement de son territoire ne puisse avoir lieu.

Following the policy which Peter the Great had initiated with some reason against Poland, Russia and Prussia agreed by the Secret Articles quoted not only to keep Poland weak and distracted by preserving the constitutional disorder of that country, and preventing all reform, but they further agreed to use all their influence with a view to having elected a king suitable to themselves. Besides, they had agreed to create the most serious difficulties to the Republic by protecting the non-Roman Catholic Poles. In her secret instructions, sent on the 6th of November 1763 to Count Keyserling and Prince Repnin, her Ambassadors in Warsaw, Catharine the Second, acting in conjunction with Frederick the Great, gave orders that the gentle Count Poniatowski, her former favourite and lover, should be elected. She placed large funds at the disposal of her Ambassadors for the purpose of bribery, and gave directions that, if the Poles should oppose Poniatowski's election, Russian troops, acting in conjunction with Prussian soldiers, should treat all opponents to the Russo-Prussian candidate as rebels and enemies. We read in that most interesting secret document :

... Il est indispensable que nous portions sur le trône de Pologne un Piast à notre convenance, utile à nos intérêts réels, en un mot un homme qui ne doive son élévation qu'à nous seuls. Nous trouvons dans la personne du comte Poniatowski, panetier de Lithuanie, toutes les conditions nécessaires à notre convenance, et en conséquence nous avons résolu de l'élever au trône de Pologne. . . .

... Que si quelqu'un osait s'opposer à cette élection, troubler l'ordre

public de la république, former des confédérations contre un monarque légitimement élu; alors, sans aucune déclaration préalable, nous ordonnerons à nos troupes d'envahir en même temps sur tous les points le territoire polonais, de regarder nos adversaires comme rebelles, perturbateurs, et de détruire par le fer et par le feu leurs biens et leurs propriétés. Dans ce cas, nous nous concerterons avec le roi de Prusse, et vous, de votre côté, vous vous entendrez avec son ministre résident à Varsovie.

Soon it was whispered that Russia and Prussia had agreed to partition Poland. These rumours were indignantly and most emphatically denied by Frederick the Great and Catharine the Second. Frederick the Great made on the 24th of January 1764 the following public declaration through his Ambassador in Warsaw :

... Les faux bruits qui se sont répandus dans le royaume, et que les ennemis de la tranquillité publique ne cessent de divulguer, que les cours de Prusse et de Russie voulaient profiter des circonstances présentes pour démembrement la Pologne ou la Lithuanie, et que le concert de ces deux cours tendait uniquement à y faire des acquisitions aux dépens de la république; ces bruits, qui sont aussi dénués de vraisemblance que de fondement, ont porté le soussigné à les contredire, non-seulement de bouche, mais aussi par une note préalable remise au prince primat. . . .

... Sa Majesté le roi de Prusse ne travaille et ne travaillera constamment qu'à maintenir les Etats de la république en leur entier. S.M. l'impératrice de Russie ayant le même en vue, ce n'est que dans un pareil but que le roi s'est concerté avec elle.

The statement of the Prussian Ambassador was followed by a letter from Frederick the Great himself to the Prince Primate of Poland on the 24th of July, in which the King, in sonorous Latin phrases, stated that he was most anxious 'ut libertates et possessiones reipublicae, sartae omnino et intactae maneant. Haec est sincera et constans animi nostri sententia.' Catharine the Second, with similar unequivocal directness, publicly declared :

... Si jamais l'esprit de mensonge a pu inventer une fausseté complète, c'est lorsqu'on a audacieusement répandu que, dans le dessein que nous avons de favoriser l'élection d'un Piast, nous n'avions pour but que de nous faciliter les moyens d'envahir, par son secours ou son concours, quelque morceau du territoire de la couronne de Pologne ou du grand-duché de Lithuanie, pour le démembrement du royaume et le mettre sous notre domination par usurpation. Ce bruit, si peu fondé et inventé aussi mal à propos, tombe de lui-même comme dénué de toute sorte de vraisemblance.

The British diplomats hesitated to accept these solemn declarations. Mr. Thomas Wroughton, the British Ambassador to Poland, reported on the 15th of June 1763 from Dresden to his Government, enclosing the Empress's Declaration of the 2nd of May 1763 :

The enclosed declaration of the Empress of Russia appears to me to be very vague; the idea here is that there is certainly an understanding

between the King of Prussia and that Sovereign to divide the major part of the Polish Dominions between them. I cannot by any means adopt this sentiment, conceiving it to be inconsistent with the interest of either of them. The manner in which that unfortunate country is treated on both sides shows that they are as much absolute masters of it as possible, and that without awakening the jealousy of their neighbours. Russia is inattackable on that side at present, which she would not be if she appropriated to herself that barrier. I can easily imagine Polish Prussia and the town of Dantzic to be tempting objects to the King of Prussia, but would even Russia, on whatever amicable footing she may be, permit him to make so formidable an acquisition on that side and so dangerous for the Baltick Navigation when in the hands of so great a Prince?

By bribery and persuasion, and by ruthless intimidation, supported by the threatening presence of a large body of Russian troops brought into the Polish capital, the Russian and Prussian Ambassadors secured in 1764 the election of Count Poniatowski to the Polish throne. He reigned in the name Stanislaus Augustus. Soon after his election the Empress Catharine, supported by Frederick the Great, demanded that the dissenters of Poland should be given equal rights with the Roman Catholics, and these demands were backed by force.

In his Memoirs Frederick the Great described this as follows :

Towards the end of 1765 the Polish Diet came again together. The Empress of Russia had declared herself Protectress of the Dissenters, part of whom belonged to the Greek religion. She demanded that they should be permitted to exercise their religion freely and to obtain official positions on a footing of equality with the other Poles. This demand was the cause of all the disturbances and wars which soon broke out. The Prussian Ambassador handed to the Polish Diet a memoir demonstrating that his Master, the King of Prussia, could not view with indifference the abolition of the *Liberum Veto*, the introduction of new taxation, and the increase of the Polish Army, and the Polish Republic acted in accordance with Prussia's representations.

The Dissenters were hostile to the ruling Poles. In view of the existence of the *Liberum Veto*, by means of which a single dissentient could bring the machinery of Parliament and Government to a standstill, the demands made by Russia and Prussia could be fulfilled only if the *Liberum Veto* was replaced by majority rule. However, acting in accordance with their secret treaty, Russia and Prussia opposed that most necessary reform. The demands made by Russia and Prussia on behalf of Dissenters were particularly unwarrantable if we remember that even now Poles cannot obtain 'official positions on a footing of equality' either in Prussia or in Russia. However, notwithstanding the unreasonableness of the request, the new King, who possessed far more patriotism than Frederick the Great and Catharine the Second had believed, promised to fulfil their demands if he was given sufficient time. Sir G. Macartney, the

British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, reported on the 28th of November (7th December) 1766 :

The King of Poland five months ago declared to Mr. Panin by his Minister that if Russia would act moderately he would undertake in this Diet to obtain for the dissidents the free exercise of their religion, and in the next he would endeavour, nay promise, to render them not only capable of Juridicatory Starosties, but of being elected to the Nunciature. Unfortunately this proposal did not content the Court of Petersburg. She [the Empress] thought it possible to obtain everything she demanded, and did not comprehend the difficulty, the impossibility, of persuading a Great Assembly [the most august part of which consists of Ecclesiasticks] to grant all at once without hesitation free participation of their privileges to a set of men whom they have been taught to look upon as equally their spiritual and temporal enemies. The King of Prussia by his minister here endeavours by all methods, *per fas et nefas*, to irritate this Court against the Poles, and as an indiscreet zeal for religion has never been reckoned among that Monarch's weaknesses, his motives are shrewdly suspected to be much deeper than they are avowed to be.

Driven to despair by the threats of armed interference, made by the Russian and Prussian Ambassadors, King Stanislaus Augustus appealed on the 5th of October 1766 to Catharine the Second in a most touching private letter, which, alluding to their former intimacy and love, ended as follows :

Lorsque vous m'avez recommandé au choix de cette nation, vous n'avez assurément pas voulu que je devinsse l'objet de ses malédictions; vous ne comptiez certainement pas non plus élever dans ma personne un but aux traits de vos armes. Je vous conjure de voir cependant que si tout ce que le prince Repnin m'a annoncé se vérifie, il n'y a pas de milieu pour moi : il faut que je m'expose à vos coups, ou que je trahisse ma nation et mon devoir. Vous ne m'auriez pas voulu roi, si j'étais capable du dernier. La Foudre est entre vos mains, mais la lancerez-vous sur la tête innocente de celui qui vous est depuis si longtemps le plus tendrement et le plus sincèrement attaché? Madame, De Votre Majesté Impériale le bon frère, ami et voisin,

STANISLAUS-AUGUSTE, roi.

The King pleaded in vain. Catharine the Second and Frederick the Great were freethinkers. Their championship of the rights of the Dissenters was merely a pretext for crippling Poland completely and for interfering in that country with a view to partitioning it. Mr. Thomas Wroughton, the British Ambassador in Poland, sent on the 29th of October 1766 a despatch to his Government, in which we read :

I had another long conversation with the King, who represented to me in the most touching colours the situation of his affairs and the manner in which he thinks himself and the nation treated. He saw himself, he said, upon the brink of the most serious danger; that he was determined to suffer all rather than betray his country, or act like a dishonest man; that Her Imperial Majesty had never pretended to more than procuring the Protestants the full exercise of their religion, and that he had laboured for many months past on that plan; that this sudden and violent resolu-

tion of the Empress to put them on a level with his other subjects convinced him that religion was only a pretext, and that she and the King of Prussia, repenting of having placed a man on the throne that worked for the elevation of his country, were taking measures to upset what they themselves had done; that he awaited the event with the utmost tranquillity, conscious of having ever acted on the principles of Justice and Patriotism.

The British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Andrew Mitchell, confirmed in his despatches the views of his colleagues in Petersburg and Warsaw as to the ultimate aims of Russia and Prussia in Poland. He wrote, for instance, on the 22nd of November 1766 :

Neither the Empress of Russia nor the King of Prussia would wish to see such an alteration in the constitution of Poland as could not fail to render the Republic more independent, more powerful, and of more weight and importance than it has hitherto been in Europe.

Before the first partition of Poland the Province of East Prussia was separated from the rest of the Kingdom of Prussia by Polish territory. The present Province of West Prussia, with Thorn, Dantzic and the mighty River Vistula, formed then part of Poland. Frederick strove to acquire that province, and with this object in view he had advocated the partition of Poland with Russia. However, an event occurred which seriously affected the King's plans. In 1768 war broke out between Russia and Turkey. It was long drawn out and, to Frederick's dismay, Russia proved victorious. The King strongly desired the existence of a powerful Turkey friendly to Prussia, which, in case of need, might afford valuable support to Prussia by attacking Russia in the flank or Austria in the rear. The King wrote in his Memoirs :

It was in no way in Prussia's interest to see the Ottoman Power altogether destroyed. In case of need excellent use could be made of it for causing a diversion either in Hungary or in Russia in the event that Prussia was at war either with Austria or with the Muscovite Power.

Germany's traditional philo-Turkish policy was originated not by Bismarck and William the Second, but by Frederick the Great.

During a long time Frederick strove to bring about a war between Russia and Austria by telling the Austrians that if Russia should conquer large portions of Turkey she would become too powerful, and would become dangerous to Austria herself, that Austria should not tolerate the Russians crossing the Danube. As his attempts at involving these two States in war proved unsuccessful, he resolved to divert Russia's attention from the Balkan Peninsula to Poland, and for greater security he wished to make use of Austria as a tool and a partner in his designs.

As Maria Theresa, the Austrian Empress, refused to take a hand in the partition of Poland, he began to work upon her son and successor. Joseph the Second, born in 1741, was at the time young, enthusiastic, inexperienced, hasty, vain, and he thirsted for glory. He envied Frederick's successes. Playing upon his vanity and upon that of Prince Kaunitz, the leading Austrian statesman, Frederick the Great obtained their support for partitioning Poland. After a long but fruitless resistance against her son and her principal adviser, Maria Theresa signed, it is said with tears in her eyes, on the 4th of March 1772, the Partition Treaty. However, in signing it, she expressed her dissent and disapproval in the following prophetic phrase :

Placet, puisque tant et de savants personnages veulent qu'il en soit ainsi ; mais, longtemps après ma mort, on verra ce qui résulte d'avoir ainsi foulé aux pieds tout ce que jusqu'à présent on a toujours tenu pour juste et pour sacré.

To preserve the appearance of legitimacy the partitioning Powers wished to receive the consent of the Polish Diet to their act of spoliation. Frederick the Great describes how that consent was obtained. After mentioning that each of the partitioning Powers sent an army to Poland to overawe the people, and that Warsaw was occupied by troops, he wrote in his *Memoirs* :

At first the Poles were obstinate and rejected all proposals. The representatives did not come to Warsaw. Having grown tired of the long delay, the Court of Vienna proposed to appoint a day for the opening of the Diet, threatening that in case of the non-appearance of the delegates, the three Powers would partition not merely part but the whole of the country. If, on the other hand, the cession of the outlying districts was effected by voluntary agreement, the foreign troops would be withdrawn from Poland. That declaration overcame all difficulties. The Treaty of Cession was signed with Prussia on the 18th of September, and Poland was guaranteed the integrity of her remaining provinces. . . The Poles, who are the most easy-going and most foolish nation in Europe, thought at first that they could safely consent because they would be able to destroy the work of the three Powers within a short time. They argued thus in the hope that Russia might be defeated by Turkey.

At the first partition Prussia, Austria, and Russia were, according to their treaty concluded with Poland, to take certain vast but clearly defined territories from that unhappy State. However, by fraud and violence they greatly exceeded the stipulated limits. Frederick the Great tells us with his habitual cynical candour :

The Poles complained loudly that the Austrians and Prussians increased their shares without limit. There was some reason for these complaints. The Austrians used a very wrong map of Poland on which the names of the rivers Shruze and Podhorze had been exchanged, and making use of

this pretext enlarged their portion very greatly beyond the limits agreed upon by the Treaty of Partition. The basis of the Treaty had been that the shares of the three Powers should be equal. As the Austrians had increased their share, King Frederick considered himself justified in doing likewise, and included in Prussia the districts of the old and the new Netze.

Careful study of the Memoirs and of the diplomatic and private correspondence of the time shows convincingly that Frederick the Great was the moving spirit, and that he was responsible for the first partition of Poland, that Russia and Austria were merely his tools and his dupes. He has told us in his Memoirs that he sent the original plan of partition to Petersburg, attributing it to the fertile brain of a visionary statesman Count Lynar. The late Lord Salisbury wrote in his valuable essay 'Poland,' published in the *Quarterly Review* in 1863, in which, by the by, he treated the claims of the Poles with little justice :

By a bold inversion of the real degrees of guilt the chief blame is laid on Russia. Prussia is looked upon as a pitiful and subordinate accomplice, while Austria is almost absolved as an unwilling accessory. . . .

To Frederick the Great of Prussia belongs the credit of having initiated the scheme which was actually carried into execution. It is now admitted, even by German historians, that the first partition was proposed to Catharine by Prince Henry of Prussia on behalf of his brother Frederick, and with the full acquiescence of Joseph, Emperor of Germany. Frederick had never been troubled with scruples upon the subject of territorial acquisition, and he was not likely to commence them in the case of Poland. Spoliation was the hereditary tradition of his race. The whole history of the kingdom over which he ruled was a history of lawless annexation. It was formed of territory filched from other races and other Powers, and from no Power so liberally as from Poland.

The fact that Frederick the Great was responsible for the first partition of Poland is acknowledged not only by leading German historians, but even by the German school-books. As an excuse, it is usually stated that necessity compelled Frederick to propose that step because the anarchy prevailing in Poland made impossible its continued existence as an independent State. However, German writers never mention that the Poles themselves earnestly wished to reform the State, and that Frederick not only opposed that reform but greatly increased disorder by putting his own nominee on the Polish throne, by causing civil war to break out in the country, by raising the Polish Dissenters against the Government, by occupying Poland in conjunction with Russia, by interfering with its elections and Government, and by bribing and overawing its Legislature by armed force.

The second partition of Poland in 1793 is perhaps even more disgraceful to Prussia than was the first, because it involved that country and her King in an act of incredible treachery.

Frederick the Great died in 1786. His successor, Frederick William the Second, was a worthless individual, and he brought about the second partition by means which his uncle would have disdained. Mr. M. S. F. Schöll, a German diplomat of standing, described in Koch's classical *Tableau des Révolutions de l'Europe*, which is still much used by students of history, and especially by diplomats, the infamous way in which Prussia betrayed Poland at the time of the second partition in the following words :

While in France, during the Revolution, the nation was seized by a sudden rage and abolished all institutions and all law and order, giving itself up to excesses which one would have thought to be impossible, another nation in the North of Europe, which was plunged in anarchy and oppressed by its neighbours, made a noble effort to establish good order and to throw off its foreign yoke.

The Poles had persuaded themselves that they might be able to change their vicious constitution and to give renewed strength to the Government of the Polish Republic during a time when Russia was occupied with wars against Sweden and Turkey. An Extraordinary Diet was convoked at Warsaw, and in order to abolish the inconvenience of the *liberum veto*, which required unanimity of votes, it adopted the form of a Confederation. The Empress, Catherine the Second of Russia, approached the Polish Diet and endeavoured to conclude with it an alliance against the Turks. Her plan was spoiled by the King of Prussia, who, in consequence of arrangements made with England, did all in his power to rouse the Poles against the Russians. He encouraged them by offering them his alliance to undertake the reformation of their Government which Prussia had recently guaranteed. A Committee of the Polish Diet was instructed to draw up a plan of a constitution designed to regenerate the Republic.

The resolution taken by the Diet was likely to displease the Empress of Russia, who considered that step as a formal breach of the Treaty between Russia and Poland concluded in 1775. As the Poles could foresee that the changes which they desired to effect were likely to involve them in differences with the Empress of Russia, they ought before all to have thought of preparing their defence. However, instead of improving their finances and strengthening their army, the Diet lost much in discussing the projected new constitution. Prussia's protection, of which they had officially been assured, made the Poles too confident. The alliance which the King of Prussia actually concluded with the Republic on the 27th of March 1790 gave them a feeling of absolute security. King Stanislaus Augustus hesitated a long time as to the attitude which he should adopt. At last he joined that party of the Diet which desired to draw Poland out of the humiliating position in which she had fallen. The new constitution was proclaimed on the 3rd of May 1791.

Although that constitution was not perfect, it was in accordance with Poland's conditions. It corrected the vices of her ancient laws, and although it was truly Republican in spirit, it avoided the exaggerated ideas to which the French Revolution had given rise. The throne was made hereditary. The absurd *liberum veto* was abolished. The Diet was declared permanent and the legislative body was divided into two chambers. The lower one was to discuss laws. The upper one, the Senate, presided over by the King, was to sanction them and to exercise the veto. The

executive power was entrusted to the King and a Council of Supervision composed of seven responsible Ministers. . . .

The exertions made by the Poles for ensuring their independence aroused Russia's anger. As soon as the Empress of Russia had concluded peace with Turkey, she induced her supporters in Poland to form a separate confederation which aimed at revoking the innovations which the Diet of Warsaw had introduced. It strove to bring the old Polish constitution once more into force. That confederation was concluded on the 14th of May 1792, at Targowice, and the Counts Felix Potocki, Rzewuski and Branicki were its leaders.

The Empress of Russia sent an army into Poland in support of the new Confederation, and made war against those Poles who were in favour of the new constitution. Only then did the Poles seriously think of vigorous counter measures. The Diet decreed that the Polish Army should be placed on a war footing, and a loan of 33,000,000 florins was arranged for. However, when the Prussian Ambassador was asked to state what assistance the King, his master, would give in accordance with his pledges contained in the Treaty of Alliance of 1790—according to Articles 3 and 4 he was to furnish the Republic with 18,000 men, and in case of need with 30,000 men—he gave an evasive answer which threw the patriotic party into despair. The refusal of the Polish Diet to sanction a commercial proposal by which Poland would have abandoned the towns of Danzig and Thorn to Prussia had angered that monarch against the Poles, and the Empress of Russia did not find it difficult to obtain the Prussian King's consent to another partition of the country. The aversion which the sovereigns felt against everything which resembled the French Revolution, with which, however, the events in Poland, where King and nation acted in harmony, had nothing in common except appearances, strongly influenced the Berlin Court and caused it to break the engagements which it had contracted with the Republic. The Poles understood the danger of their position. Their enthusiasm cooled, and the whole Diet was seized with a feeling of consternation. Having to rely on their own strength, and being torn by dissensions, the Poles were unable to face their Russian opponents with success. The patriotic party was unfortunate in the campaign of 1792. After several victories the Russians advanced upon Warsaw and King Stanislaus, who was easily discouraged, joined the Confederation of Targowice, denounced the Constitution of the 3rd of May, and subscribed on the 25th of August 1792 to all the conditions which the Empress of Russia prescribed. An armistice was declared, and in consequence of its stipulations the Polish Army was reduced. In virtue of the Convention of Petersburg of the 23rd of January 1793, concluded between Prussia and Russia, the Prussian troops entered Poland and spread throughout the country, following Russia's example. Proclamations of the Courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg were published, by which these States took possession of those districts of the country which their troops had occupied. The adoption by Poland of the principles of 1789 and the propagation of the democratic principles of the French by the Poles were given as reasons for the second partition of Poland. . . .

The partitioning Powers renounced once more all rights and claims to the territories of the Republic, and bound themselves to recognise, and even to guarantee, if desired, the Constitution which the Polish Diet would draw up with the free consent of the Polish nation.

Notwithstanding the reiterated promises of respecting the integrity of the much-reduced country, the third partition took place in 1795.

From the very beginning Prussia, Austria, and Russia treated Poland as a *corpus vile*, and cut it up like a cake, without any regard to the claims, the rights, and the protests of the Poles themselves. Although history only mentions three partitions, there were in reality seven. There were those of 1772, 1793, and 1795, already referred to; and these were followed by a redistribution of the Polish territories in 1807, 1809, and 1815. In none of these were the inhabitants consulted or even considered. The Congress of Vienna established the independence of Cracow, but Austria-Hungary, asserting that she considered herself 'threatened' by the existence of that tiny State, seized it in 1846.

While Prussia, Austria, and Russia, considering that might was right, had divided Poland amongst themselves, regardless of the passionate protests of the inhabitants, England had remained a spectator, but not a passive one, of the tragedy. She viewed the action of the Allies with strong disapproval, but although she gave frank expression to her sentiments, she did not actively interfere. After all, no English interests were involved in the partition. It was not her business to intervene. Besides, she could not successfully have opposed single-handed the joint action of the three powerful partner States, especially as France, under the weak Louis the Fifteenth, held aloof. However, English statesmen refused to consider as valid the five partitions which took place before and during the Napoleonic era.

The Treaty of Chaumont of 1814 created the Concert of Europe. At the Congress of Vienna of 1815 the frontiers of Europe were fixed by general consent. As Prussia, Austria, and Russia refused to recreate an independent Poland, England's opposition would have broken up the Concert, and might have led to further wars. Unable to prevent the injustice done to Poland by her opposition, and anxious to maintain the unity of the Powers and the peace of the world, England consented at last to consider the partition of Poland as a *fait accompli*, and formally recognised it, especially as the Treaty of Vienna assured the Poles of just and fair treatment under representative institutions. Article 1 of the Treaty of Vienna stated expressly:

Les Polonais, sujets respectifs de la Russie, de l'Autriche et de la Prusse, obtiendront une représentation et des institutions nationales réglées d'après le mode d'existence politique que chacun des gouvernements auxquels ils appartiennent jugera utile et convenable de leur accorder.

By signing the Treaty of Vienna, England recognised not explicitly, but merely implicitly, the partition of Poland, and she did so unwillingly and under protest. Lord Castlereagh

stated in a Circular Note addressed to Russia, Prussia, and Austria, that it had always been England's desire that an independent Poland, possessing a dynasty of its own, should be established, which, separating Austria, Russia, and Prussia, should act as a buffer State between them; that, failing its creation, the Poles should be reconciled to being dominated by foreigners, by just and liberal treatment which alone would make them satisfied. His Note, which is most remarkable for its far-sightedness, wisdom, force, and restraint, was worded as follows :

The Undersigned, His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Plenipotentiary to the Congress of Vienna, in desiring the present Note concerning the affairs of Poland may be entered on the Protocol, has no intention to revive controversy or to impede the progress of the arrangements now in contemplation. His only object is to avail himself of this occasion of temperately recording, by the express orders of his Court, the sentiments of the British Government upon a European question of the utmost magnitude and influence.

The Undersigned has had occasion in the course of the discussions at Vienna, for reasons that need not now be gone into, repeatedly and earnestly to oppose himself, on the part of his Court, to the erection of a Polish Kingdom in union with and making a part of the Imperial Crown of Russia.

The desire of his Court to see an independent Power, more or less considerable in extent, established in Poland under a distinct Dynasty, and as an intermediate State between the three great Monarchies, has uniformly been avowed, and if the Undersigned has not been directed to press such a measure, it has only arisen from a disinclination to excite, under all the apparent obstacles to such an arrangement, expectations which might prove an unavailing source of discontent among the Poles.

The Emperor of Russia continuing, as it is declared, still to adhere to his purpose of erecting that part of the Duchy of Warsaw which is to fall under His Imperial Majesty's dominion, together with his other Polish provinces, either in whole or in part, into a Kingdom under the Russian sceptre; and their Austrian and Prussian Majesties, the Sovereigns most immediately interested, having ceased to oppose themselves to such an arrangement—the Undersigned adhering, nevertheless, to all his former representations on this subject has only sincerely to hope that none of those evils may result from this measure to the tranquillity of the North, and to the general equilibrium of Europe, which it has been his painful duty to anticipate. But in order to obviate as far as possible such consequences, it is of essential importance to establish the public tranquillity throughout the territories which formerly constituted the Kingdom of Poland, upon some solid and liberal basis of common interest, by applying to all, however various may be their political institutions, a congenial and conciliatory system of administration.

Experience has proved that it is not by counteracting all their habits and usages as a people that either the happiness of the Poles, or the peace of that important portion of Europe, can be preserved. A fruitless attempt, too long persevered in, by institutions foreign to their manner and sentiments to make them forget their existence, and even language, as a people, has been sufficiently tried and failed. It has only tended to excite a senti-

ment of discontent and self-degradation, and can never operate otherwise than to provoke commotion and to awaken them to a recollection of past misfortunes.

The Undersigned, for these reasons, and in cordial concurrence with the general sentiments which he has had the satisfaction to observe the respective Cabinets entertained on this subject, ardently desires that the illustrious Monarchs to whom the destinies of the Polish nation are confided, may be induced, before they depart from Vienna, to take an engagement with each other to treat as Poles, under whatever form of political institution they may think fit to govern them, the portions of that nation that may be placed under their respective sovereignties. The knowledge of such a determination will best tend to conciliate the general sentiment to their rule, and to do honour to the several Sovereigns in the eyes of their Polish subjects. This course will consequently afford the surest prospect of their living peaceably and contentedly under their respective Governments. . . .

This despatch was sent on the 12th of January 1815, exactly a century ago. The warnings were not heeded and the past century has been filled with sorrow for the Poles and with risings and revolutions, as Lord Castlereagh clearly foretold.

In their reply, the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian representatives promised to act in accordance with England's views. However, soon after the overthrow of Napoleon, reaction set in. The promises made to the peoples at the Congress of Vienna, and the claims of the nationalities, were disregarded. Representative government was either not established, or, where established, was destroyed. Under the guidance of Prince Metternich, the evil genius of Austria, an era of petty tyranny and of persecution began. An example will show how the Poles were treated. On the 15th of May 1815 King Frederick William the Third of Prussia, on taking possession of the Polish territories which fell to him under the Treaty of Vienna, addressed the following proclamation to the inhabitants :

Inhabitants of the Kingdom of Poland! In again taking possession of the district of the former dukedom of Warsaw, which originally belonged to Prussia, I wish to define your position. You also have a Fatherland, and you receive proof of my appreciation for your attachment to me. You will be incorporated in the Prussian Monarchy, but you need not abandon your nationality. You will take part in the constitution which I intend granting to my faithful subjects, and you will receive a provincial constitution similar to that which the other provinces of my State will receive. Your religion shall be respected, and the clergy will receive an income suitable to its position. Your personal rights and property will be protected by the laws which will be made with your collaboration. The Polish language shall be used side by side with the German language in all public transactions and affairs, and every one of you shall be able to obtain official positions, honours, and dignities according to his ability.

In 1813, at the beginning of the War of Liberation against Napoleon, Frederick William the Third had solemnly promised a constitution to the Prussian people. At that moment he needed

their help. That promise, which was received with the greatest enthusiasm, was renewed in the document given above and in many others, but it was not kept, although the King lived till 1840. He and his successors treated the Poles with absolute faithlessness. Not a single one of the promises made to them in the Proclamation quoted was observed. During a century Prussia has disregarded her pledges of fair and equal treatment. Instead, the Poles were persecuted and oppressed in Prussia, and their persecution in Austria, and especially in Russia, was largely, if not chiefly, due to Prussia's instigation.

Since the time of Frederick the Great, and in accordance with his advice given in the beginning of this article, Prussian statesmen, distrusting and fearing Russia, aimed at maintaining the most intimate relations with that country, for Russia's support was most valuable, but her hostility was dangerous. Fearing and distrusting Russia, they strove to keep that country weak. Animated by fear and distrust, they aimed at possessing themselves of a powerful weapon which could be used against the Northern Power in case of need. These three purposes of Prussian statesmanship could best be served by inducing Russia to pursue in her Polish districts a policy which exasperated the Poles, which created disaffection on her most vulnerable frontier. Russia was an autocracy, and the Poles, remembering their ancient Republic, have always been democratically inclined. An autocrat is naturally afraid of revolution and conspiracy. Taking advantage of these feelings, Prussia succeeded during more than a century in influencing and guiding Russia's policy to her advantage. She unceasingly pointed out to the Czar that the three States which brought about the partition of Poland were equally interested in combating democracy and revolution. The Poles were depicted to the Russians as born revolutionaries and anarchists. Russia had good reason to fear a Polish rising on her western, her most vulnerable, frontier, on which dwell nearly 12,000,000 Poles. The Poles are exceedingly warlike, and Russia has in the past found it extremely difficult to suppress their risings. Besides, an invader could always hope to raise the Poles against the Czar by promising them liberty, as was done by Napoleon the First in 1812. Prussian statesmen never tired of pointing out to the Czar that the danger of a Polish revolution could be overcome only by severe repressive measures taken jointly with Prussia. Thus Prussia and Russia were to remain partners, being jointly interested in the persecution of Poland. Poland's unhappiness was to be the cement of the two States. For the same reason for which Frederick the Great desired to preserve disorder in Poland, his successors

desired to see chronic dissatisfaction prevail in Russia's Western Provinces.

Prussia contemplated with fear the possibility of Poland receiving her independence. It is clear that the re-creation of an independent Poland within the limits of 1772 would affect Russia only slightly, but would damage Prussia very severely. The Prussian Poles dwell in dense masses in Southern Silesia, one of the wealthiest coal and industrial centres of Germany, and in the provinces of Posen and Western Prussia. If the province of Posen should once more become Polish, the distance which separates Berlin from the eastern frontier of Germany would be reduced to about one half. The capital would be in danger. If the province of West Prussia should once more become Polish, Prussia's position in the province of East Prussia would be jeopardised, for Polish territory would once more separate it from the rest of the Monarchy. Russia, on the other hand, with her boundless territories, could easily bear the loss of her Polish provinces, especially as her capitals lie far from the frontier. Prince Bülow stated, not without cause, in the Prussian Diet on the 19th of January 1903: 'The Polish question is, as it has ever been, one of the most important, nay, the most important, question of Prussia's policy.'

In modern Russia there have always been absolutist and liberal-minded Czars and a reactionary and a progressive party. Those who depict Russia as a land of pure and undiluted absolutism, and her Czars as a race of cruel and unenlightened despots, are not acquainted with Russian history. While the reactionary party in Russia favoured the policy of oppressing the nationalities, the liberal-minded were in favour of a wisely limited constitutionalism. They desired to give representative institutions to the people and some suitable form of self-government to the Poles. In 1859 Bismarck became the Prussian Ambassador in Petrograd. At that time Russia was recovering from the effects of the Crimean War, and many of the most enlightened Russians had become convinced that her defeat was largely due to her backwardness, that her backwardness was caused by her unprogressive institutions, that a more liberal policy in the widest sense of the word was needed. The Czar himself and his principal adviser, Prince Gortchakoff, were in favour of Liberalism and of Constitutionalism. Both desired to give greater freedom to the Poles. However, Bismarck, following the policy of Frederick the Great, resolutely opposed their policy in Prussia's interest. Owing to his persuasiveness and personal magnetism, that great statesman obtained the ascendant over the Czar and induced him to pursue a reactionary policy

towards the Poles. Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador in Paris, reported to Earl Russell on the 26th of March 1863 :

I have had a curious conversation with the Prussian Ambassador, and not altogether without importance, as showing that the Prussian Government has, if possible, greater repugnance to the restoration of Polish independence than the Cabinet of St. Petersburg itself. Adverting to the well-known desire of the Emperor to accomplish this event, Count Goltz said that it was a question of life and death to Prussia. . . . In the course of this conversation Count Goltz said that M. de Bismarck, while Prussian Minister at St. Petersburg, had strenuously and successfully opposed the few concessions made to Poland by the present Emperor.

In his Memoirs Prince Bismarck candidly described his anti-Polish policy in Russia as follows :

In the higher circles of Russian society the influences which made for Poland were connected with the now outspoken demand for a constitution. It was felt as a degradation that a cultivated people like the Russians should be denied institutions which existed in all European nations, and should have no voice in the management of their own affairs. The division of opinion on the Polish question penetrated the highest military circles. Those Russians who demanded a constitution for themselves pleaded at times in excuse for the Poles that they were not governable by Russians, and that as they grew more civilised they became entitled to a share in the administration of their country. This view was also represented by Prince Gortchakoff.

The conflict of opinion was very lively in St. Petersburg when I left that capital in April 1862, and it so continued throughout my first year of office. I took charge of the Foreign Office under the impression that the insurrection which had broken out on January 1st, 1863, brought up the question not only of the interests of our Eastern provinces, but also that wider one, whether the Russian Cabinet were dominated by Polish or anti-Polish proclivities, by an effort after Russo-Polish fraternisation in the anti-German Panslavist interest or by one for mutual reliance between Russia and Prussia.

For the German future of Prussia the attitude of Russia was a question of great importance. A philo-Polish Russian policy was calculated to vivify that Russo-French sympathy against which Prussia's effort had been directed since the peace of Paris, and indeed on occasion earlier, and an alliance (friendly to Poland) between Russia and France, such as was in the air before the Revolution of July, would have placed the Prussia of that day in a difficult position. It was our interest to oppose the party in the Russian Cabinet which had Polish proclivities, even when they were the proclivities of Alexander II.

That Russia herself afforded no security against fraternisation with Poland I was able to gather from confidential intercourse with Gortchakoff and the Czar himself. Czar Alexander was at that time not indisposed to withdraw from part of Poland, the left bank of the Vistula at any rate—so he told me in so many words—while he made unemphatic exception of Warsaw, which would always be desirable as a garrison town, and belonged strategically to the Vistula fortress triangle. Poland, he said, was for Russia a source of unrest and dangerous European complications; its Russification was forbidden by the difference of religion and the insufficient capacity for administration among Russian officials.

. . . Our geographical position and the intermixture of both nationali-

ties in the Eastern provinces, including Silesia, compel us to retard, as far as possible, the opening of the Polish question, and even in 1863 made it appear advisable to do our best not to facilitate, but to obviate, the opening of this question by Russia. It was assumed that liberal concessions, if granted to the Poles, could not be withheld from the Russians; Russian constitutionalists were therefore philo-Polish.

Russia's history has often been most unfavourably affected, and the clearly expressed will of the Czar himself been totally deflected, by the incompetence of a single powerful individual. The Czar Alexander was a kindly, liberal-minded, and broad-minded man, and he was, as we have learned from the testimony of Bismarck and Lord Cowley, very favourable to the Poles and to their aspirations. He intended to give the Poles a full measure of self-government, and he entrusted an eminent Pole, Count Wielopolski, an old revolutionary of 1830, with that difficult task. Wielopolski, though probably well meaning, was tactless, rash, and inclined to violence. Some of his measures had caused dissatisfaction among the Poles and had led to riots. Wielopolski resolved to rid himself of his opponents, who were chiefly young hot-headed enthusiasts, by enrolling them in the army, and sending them for a long number of years to Siberia and the Caucasus. By his orders numerous young men, belonging to good families, were to be arrested in their beds by soldiers during the night of the 1st of January 1863. In the words of Lord Napier, the British Ambassador in Petrograd, 'the opposition was to be kidnapped.' That foolish and arbitrary step led to a widespread revolt and a prolonged but hopeless struggle between Polish guerillas and Russian soldiers. Bismarck, who had unceasingly recommended a policy of reaction while he was in Petrograd, made the best use of his opportunity, and he did so all the more readily as Prince Gortchakoff was a friend not only of Poland but also of France. Foreseeing a struggle between Prussia and France, Bismarck desired to obtain Russia's goodwill, to create differences between that country and France, and to discredit the Francophile Prince Gortchakoff with the Czar. Sir A. Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Berlin, informed Lord Russell on the 21st of March 1863 :

Prince Hohenzollern, in speaking to me some days ago with regret of the foreign policy of the Prussian Government, said that one of its principal objects has been the overthrow of Prince Gortchakoff, whose wish to promote an alliance between France and Russia is, they believe, the only obstacle in the way of re-establishing the relations which existed between the three Northern Courts previously to the Crimean War.

Bismarck exaggerated to the Czar the scope, character, and consequences of the Polish revolt to the utmost, and while France and England expressed their sympathy with the Poles, and

reproached Wielopolski for his blundering, Bismarck hastened to demonstrate his attachment to Russia and his devotion to the Czar by offering Prussia's assistance in combating the revolutionists. On the 22nd of January 1863 the first sanguinary encounter took place. Ten days later, on the 1st of February, General Gustav von Alvensleben was despatched by Prussia to the Czar with proposals for joint action against the Poles. Sir A. Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Berlin, telegraphed on the 12th of February to Earl Russell :

Insurrection in Poland extending, and numbers of Russian troops said to be insufficient for its suppression. . . . Two corps of observation are forming on the frontier, and assistance, if required, will be afforded by Prussia. Bismarck says Prussia will never permit the establishment of an independent Kingdom of Poland.

Two days later the British Ambassador telegraphed :

. . . General Alvensleben, who is now in Warsaw, having arrived there two days ago from St. Petersburg, has concluded a military convention with the Russian Government, according to which the two Governments will reciprocally afford facilities to each other for the suppression of the insurrectionary movements which have lately taken place in Poland. . . .

The Prussian railways are also to be placed at the disposal of the Russian military authorities for the transport of troops through Prussian territory from one part of the Kingdom of Poland to another. The Government further contemplate, in case of necessity, to give military assistance to the Russian Government for the suppression of the insurrection in the kingdom; but I am told that no engagement has yet been entered into with respect to the nature or extent of such assistance. In the meanwhile, however, four corps of the Prussian Army are concentrating on the frontiers under the command of General Waldersee, whose headquarters are at Posen.

To demonstrate Prussia's zeal for Russia, one third of the Prussian Army was placed at Russia's service on the Polish frontier, to help in suppressing the rising of a number of men armed chiefly with scythes and pistols.

For reasons given in these pages, Bismarck was alarmed by the possibility that the Czar might establish an independent Poland on Prussia's border. Sir A. Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Berlin, informed Earl Russell on the 14th of February 1863 :

M. de Bismarck, in acquainting me a few days ago with his intention to take measures in concert with the Russian Government to prevent the extension of the insurrectionary movements which have lately taken place in Poland, said the question was of vital importance to Prussia, as her own existence would be seriously compromised by the establishment of an independent Kingdom of Poland. I asked whether he meant to say that if Russia found any difficulty in suppressing the insurrection, the Prussian Government intended to afford them military assistance; and he not only replied in the affirmative, but added that if Russia got tired of the contest and were disposed to withdraw from the kingdom—a course which some

Russians were supposed to think advantageous to her interests—the Prussian Government would carry on the war on their own account. . . .

The Emperor William the First, who at the time was only King of Prussia, frankly said to the British Ambassador, according to his telegram on the 22nd of February 1863 :

It was equally the duty and the interest of Prussia to do everything in her power to prevent the establishment of an independent Polish kingdom, for if the Polish nation could reconstitute themselves as an independent State, the existence of Prussia would be seriously menaced, as the first efforts of the new State would be to recover Dantzic, and if that attempt succeeded, the fatal consequences to Prussia were too evident to require him to point them out.

While Prussia, for purely selfish reasons, advocated a policy of persecution and repression towards the Poles, which would only increase their resentment to the advantage of Russia's enemies, Great Britain, following her traditional policy of disinterested detachment and wise humanity, recommended once more the adoption of a liberal policy towards the Poles in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna. Earl Russell sent to the British Ambassador in Petrograd on the 2nd of March 1863 the following most remarkable despatch :

MR LORD,—Her Majesty's Government view with the deepest concern the state of things now existing in the Kingdom of Poland. They see there, on the one side, a large mass of the population in open insurrection against the Government, and, on the other, a vast military force employed in putting that insurrection down. The natural and probable result of such a contest must be expected to be the success of the military forces. But that success, if it is to be achieved by a series of bloody conflicts, must be attended by a lamentable effusion of blood, by a deplorable sacrifice of life, by widespread desolation, and by impoverishment and ruin, which it would take a long course of years to repair.

Moreover, the acts of violence and destruction on both sides, which are sure to accompany such a struggle, must engender mutual hatreds and resentments which will embitter, for generations to come, the relations between the Russian Government and the Polish race. Yet, however much Her Majesty's Government might lament the existence of such a miserable state of things in a foreign country, they would not, perhaps, deem it expedient to give formal expression of their sentiments were it not that there are peculiarities in the present state of things in Poland which take them out of the usual and ordinary condition of such affairs.

The Kingdom of Poland was constituted and placed in connection with the Russian Empire by the Treaty of 1815, to which Great Britain was a contracting party. The present disastrous state of things is to be traced to the fact that Poland is not in the condition in which the stipulations of that Treaty require that it should be placed. Neither is Poland in the condition in which it was placed by the Emperor Alexander I, by whom that Treaty was made. During his reign a National Diet sat at Warsaw and the Poles of the Kingdom of Poland enjoyed privileges fitted to secure their political welfare. Since 1832, however, a state of uneasiness and discontent has been succeeded from time to time by violent commotion and

a useless effusion of blood. Her Majesty's Government are aware that the immediate cause of the present insurrection was the conscription lately enforced upon the Polish population; but that measure itself is understood to have been levelled at the deeply-rooted discontent prevailing among the Poles in consequence of the political condition of the Kingdom of Poland.

The proprietors of land and the middle classes in the towns bore that condition with impatience, and if the peasantry were not equally disaffected they gave little support or strength to the Russian Government. Great Britain, therefore, as a party to the Treaty of 1815, and as a Power deeply interested in the tranquillity of Europe, deems itself entitled to express its opinion upon the events now taking place, and is anxious to do so in the most friendly spirit towards Russia, and with a sincere desire to promote the interest of all the parties concerned. Why should not His Imperial Majesty, whose benevolence is generally and cheerfully acknowledged, put an end at once to this bloody conflict by proclaiming mercifully an immediate and unconditional amnesty to his revolted Polish subjects, and at the same time announce his intention to replace without delay his Kingdom of Poland in possession of the political and civil privileges which were granted to it by the Emperor Alexander I in execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of 1815? If this were done a National Diet and a National Administration would in all probability content the Poles and satisfy European opinion.

You will read this despatch to Prince Gortchakoff and give him a copy of it.

Earl Russell's wise suggestions were sympathetically received at Petrograd, and on the 31st of March Czar Alexander published in the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg* a manifesto in which he stated that he did not desire to hold the Polish nation responsible for the rebellion, and promised to introduce a system of local self-government in Poland, admonishing the rebels to lay down their arms. Unfortunately, they did not do so. A prolonged campaign was necessary to re-establish order in Poland, and meanwhile the Czar had been so much embittered through the agitation of the Russian reactionaries and their Prussian friends, and by the follies of some of the Polish leaders, that he deprived Poland of her constitution. Urged on by the statesmen at Berlin, another period of repression began. On the 23rd of February 1868 Poland was absolutely incorporated with Russia, and the use of the Polish language in public places and for public purposes was prohibited.

Ever since, Bismarck and his successors have endeavoured to create bad blood between Russia and her Polish citizens, being desirous of retaining Russia's support at a time when she was drifting towards France. Solely with the object of demonstrating to Russia the danger of the Polish agitation Bismarck introduced in 1886 his Polish Settlement Bill, by which, to the exasperation of the Prussian Poles, vast territories were bought from Polish landowners and German peasants settled on them. When the Conservative party wished to oppose that policy in the Prussian Parliament as being unpractical, its leader was,

according to Delbrück's testimony, urged by the Chancellor to vote for the Bill because its passage was necessary 'for reasons of foreign policy.'

During a century and a half Russia's Polish policy has been made in Germany. During 150 years Russia has persecuted and outraged the Poles at Prussia's bidding and for Prussia's benefit. The confidential diplomatic evidence given in these pages makes that point absolutely clear.

Until recent times Russia was a very backward nation, and, not unnaturally, she endeavoured to learn the arts of government and of civilisation from Germany, her nearest neighbour. Unfortunately, Germany did not prove a fair and unselfish friend to Russia. Germany aimed not so much at advancing Russia as at benefiting herself. German rulers and statesmen saw in the Russians good-natured savages to be exploited. Impecunious German princes and noblemen went to Russia to make a fortune, and poor German princesses married Russian princes. Thus German influence became supreme not only in the Russian Army and Administration, but even within the Imperial Family.

During 150 years German influence was supreme in Russian society. While, during this period, Prussia, and afterwards Germany, unceasingly urged Russia to oppress and ill-treat her Poles, England consistently recommended Russia to adopt liberal treatment as being in Russia's interest.

One of the first British diplomatic despatches dealing with the partition of Poland is that of Mr. Thomas Wroughton, dated the 15th of June 1763, and given in these pages. In that remarkable document the forecast is made that Russia would scarcely consent to a partition of Poland, partly because such a partition would strengthen Prussia too much, partly because an independent Poland would form an efficient buffer State between herself and the Western Powers. He wrote: 'Russia is inattackable on that side at present, which she would not be if she appropriated to herself that barrier.' Since then Russia has more than once had occasion to regret that she was the direct neighbour of Prussia, and that she had given large Polish districts to that country.

Soon after the beginning of the present War the Grand Duke Nicholas, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces, addressed an appeal to the Poles of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary in which he promised them the re-creation of a Kingdom of Poland, comprising all Poles dwelling within Russia, Austria, and Germany, under Russia's protection. The full text of that remarkable manifesto will be found in my article, 'The Ultimate Disappearance of Austria-Hungary,' which appeared in the November number of this Review. The enemies

of Russia have sneeringly described that document as a death-bed repentance, and have complained that it was not issued by the Czar himself. Of course, the Grand Duke acted in the name and on behalf of the Czar. That needs no explanation. If the Czar was not of the Grand Duke's mind he would have disavowed him. Besides, Russia's resolve to give full liberty to the Poles was not born from the stress of the War. It was formed long ago; however, it was obviously impracticable to give full self-government to the Russian Poles without laying the foundation of a Greater Poland. Hence such a step on Russia's part would have met with the most determined opposition and hostility in Germany and Austria-Hungary, and it would most probably have been treated as *casus belli*. Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador in Paris, informed Earl Russell, on the 26th of March 1863, 'The Russian Government could make no concessions of any value to the Polish Provinces which would not lay the foundation of the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland.' Lord Napier, the British Ambassador in Petrograd, informed his Government on the 6th of April 1863 that 'The restoration of the Polish State on the basis of nationality will assuredly not be effected while the strength of Russia and Germany remains unbroken. During the struggle, whatever may be the fate of Poland, the frontier of France would be pushed to the Rhine.' That remarkable prophecy seems likely to come true before long.

Formerly there was no Polish nation. The Poles consisted of 150,000 nobles and of many millions of ill-treated serfs. Hard times and misfortune have welded the Poles into a nation. The property-less serfs have become prosperous farmers, and the people of the middle and of the upper class have become earnest workers. Between 1900 and 1912 the deposits in the Polish Co-operative Societies have increased from 12,420,057*l.* to 46,970,354*l.* In every walk of life Poles have achieved most remarkable successes. Although education among the Poles, especially among those in Russia and Austria-Hungary, is still extremely backward—there are only two Polish universities—the Poles have created a most wonderful literature. The Polish literature is the richest among the Slavonic literatures, and it need not fear comparison with any of the Western literatures. In music and in science also Poles have accomplished great things. Among the leading living writers is Sienkiewicz, among the greatest living musicians is Paderewski, among the leading living scientists is Madame Curie-Sklodowska. Formerly, the Poles were thriftless and incompetent in business and agriculture. How wonderfully they have changed may be seen from the fact that in the Eastern Provinces of Germany they are rapidly ousting the Germans, although these receive most powerful support

from the State. Notwithstanding the enormous purchases of land made under the Settlement Acts, by which 35,000,000*l.* have been devoted to the purchase of Polish land for German farmers, the Germans have on balance since the year 1896 lost 250,000 acres of land to the Poles in the Polish districts.

The Poles are to a certain extent to blame for their misfortunes. In the past they have lacked self-command and a sense of proportion. It is noteworthy that during the revolution of 1863 Polish leaders published in Paris maps of an independent Poland, which comprised large and purely Russian districts with towns such as Kieff, on the ground of historical right. Yet Kieff was the cradle of the Russian Orthodox faith.

In Western Russia, in Eastern Prussia, and in Galicia, there dwell about 20,000,000 Poles. If the War should end, as it is likely to end, in a Russian victory, a powerful kingdom of Poland will arise. According to the carefully worded manifesto of the Grand Duke the united Poles will receive full self-government under the protection of Russia. They will be enabled to develop their nationality, but it seems scarcely likely that they will receive entire and absolute independence. Their position will probably resemble that of Quebec in Canada, or of Bavaria in Germany, and if the Russians and Poles act wisely they will live as harmoniously together as do the French-speaking 'habitants' of Quebec, and the English-speaking men of the other provinces of Canada. Russia need not fear that Poland will make herself entirely independent, and only the most hot-headed and short-sighted Poles can wish for complete independence. Poland, having developed extremely important manufacturing industries, requires large free markets for their output. Her natural market is Russia, for Germany has industrial centres of her own. She can expect to have the free use of the precious Russian markets only as long as she forms part of that great State. At present, a spirit of the heartiest good will prevails between Russians and Poles. The old quarrels and grievances have been forgotten in the common struggle. The moment is most auspicious for the resurrection of Poland.

While Prussia has been guilty of the partition of Poland, Russia is largely to blame for the repeated revolts and insurrection of her Polish citizens. The late Lord Salisbury, who as a staunch Conservative could scarcely be described as an admirer of the Poles, and who in his essay 'Poland,' printed in 1863, treated their claims rather with contempt than with sympathy, wrote in its concluding pages :

Since 1815 the misgovernment of Poland has not only been constant but growing. And with the misgovernment the discontent has been growing in at least an equal ratio. Yet they ought not to have been a difficult race

to rule. The very abuses to which they had been for centuries exposed should have made the task of satisfying them easy.

Russian statesmen might well bear in mind the recommendations of that great statesman as to the way by which Russia might satisfy her Poles. Lord Salisbury wrote :

The best that can be hoped for Poland is an improved condition under Russian rule. The conditions which are needed to reconcile the Poles to a Russian Sovereign are manifest enough and do not seem very hard to be observed. The Poles have not only been oppressed but insulted, and in their condition insult is harder to put up with than oppression. A nation which is under a foreign yoke is sensitive upon the subject of nationality. . . . If Russia would rule the Poles in peace she must defer to a sensibility which neither coaxing nor severity will cure. All the substance of power may be exercised as well through Polish administrators as through Russian. The union between the two countries may for practical purposes be complete, though every legal act and every kind of scholastic instruction be couched in the Polish language.

It would be hazardous, and it would probably be foolish, to give Poland complete independence. Poland has grown into Russia and Russia into Poland. After all, it cannot be expected that Russia will abandon her principal and most promising industrial district with two of her largest towns. In politics one should endeavour to achieve only the practical. The question therefore arises : How much self-government will Russia grant to Poland? Will she give her a separate legislation, taxation, post office, coinage, finances, army? The arrangement of these details may prove somewhat difficult. It is to be hoped that during the negotiations between Poles and Russians regarding a settlement the Poles will endeavour to be cool and reasonable, and that the Russians will be trusting and generous. Happily, a spirit of hearty good will is abroad in Russia, the Czar is kind-hearted and liberal-minded, and the reactionary party is weak.

The greatest grievance of the Polish nation is not that it lives under foreign rule, but that it lives under oppression and that it has been parcelled out among several States. Owing to the partition of Poland, Poles have been taught to consider as enemies men of their own nationality living across the border, and now they have been compelled by their rulers to slaughter each other. At present more than a million Polish soldiers are engaged against their will in a fratricidal war. That terrible fact alone constitutes a most powerful claim upon all men's sympathy and generosity.

Although Russia has in times past treated the Poles far more harshly than has Prussia, and although the German Poles are far more prosperous than are the Russian, the Poles see their principal enemy not in Russia but in Prussia. After all, the Russian is their brother Slav, and they are proud of their

big brother. Besides, they recognise that Russia has been misguided by Prussia, and that Prussia was largely responsible for Poland's partition and for Russia's anti-Polish policy. The bitterness with which the Prussian Poles hate Prussia may be seen from the Polish newspapers published in Germany, which, during many years, have successfully advocated the policy of boycotting Germans and everything German, both in business and in society. The *Dziennik Kujawski* of Hohen-salza wrote on the 18th of January 1901 :

To-morrow the Kingdom of Prussia celebrates the second century of its existence. We cannot manifest our joy, because Prussia's power has been erected chiefly upon the ruins of ancient Poland. Prussia's history consists of a number of conquests made by force and in accordance with the old Prussian principle revived by Bismarck, ' Might is better than right.' Prussia's glory has been bought with much blood and tears and she owes her existence chiefly to Poland's destruction.

In the *Gazeta Gdanska* of the 24th of November 1906, published in Dantzig, we read :

The Prussian and the Russian.—If one asks a Pole whether he would rather live under German or under Russian rule his reply will be ' I would a hundred times rather have to do with Russians than with Germans, and the Prussians are the worst of Germans.' Many Poles will scarcely be able to tell why they hate the Prussians. Many will find their preference illogical. Still it is there. From the fullness of the heart speaketh the mouth. After all the worst Russian is a better fellow than the very best German. That feeling lies in our blood. The Russian is our Slavonic brother, and in his heart of hearts every Pole is glad if his brother is prospering and when he can tell the world ' There you see our common Slavonic blood.' The more we hate the Prussians, the more we love the Russians.

The *Gazeta Grudzionska*, of Graudenz, wrote in March 1899 :

Take heed, you Polish women and Polish girls! Polish women and Polish girls are the strongest protectors of our nationality. The Poles can be Germanised only when Germanism crosses our Polish doorstep, but that will never happen, if God so wills it, as long as Polish mothers, Polish wives, and Polish maids are found in our houses. They will not allow Poland's enemies to enter. For a Polish woman it is a disgrace to marry a German or to visit German places of amusement or German festivals. As long as the Polish wife watches over her husband and takes care that he bears himself always and everywhere as a Pole, as long as she watches over his home and preserves it as a stronghold of Polonism, as long as a Polish Catholic newspaper is kept in it, and as long as the Polish mother teaches her children to pray to God for our beloved Poland in the Polish language, so long Poland's enemies will labour in vain.

Innumerable similar extracts might easily be given.

When the peace conditions come up for discussion at the Congress which will bring the present War to an end—and that event may be nearer than most men think—the problem

of Poland will be one of the greatest difficulty and importance. Austria-Hungary has comparatively little interest in retaining her Poles. The Austrian Poles dwell in Galicia outside the great rampart of the Carpathian mountains, which form the natural frontier of the Dual Monarchy towards the north-east. The loss of Galicia, with its oilfields and mines, may be regrettable to Austria-Hungary, but it will not affect her very seriously. To Germany, on the other hand, the loss of the Polish districts will be a fearful blow. The supreme importance which Germany attaches to the Polish problem may be seen from this, that Bismarck thought it the only question which could lead to an open breach between Germany and Austria-Hungary. According to Crispi's Memoirs, Bismarck said to the Italian statesman on the 17th of September 1877 :

There could be but one cause for a breach in the friendship that unites Austria and Germany, and that would be a disagreement between the two Governments concerning Polish policy. . . . If a Polish rebellion should break out and Austria should lend it her support, we should be obliged to assert ourselves. We cannot permit the re-construction of a Catholic kingdom so near at hand. It would be a northern France. We have one France to look to already, and a second would become the natural ally of the first, and we should find ourselves entrapped between two enemies.

The resurrection of Poland would injure us in other ways as well. It could not come about without the loss of a part of our territory. We cannot possibly relinquish either Posen or Dantzic, because the German Empire would remain exposed on the Russian frontier, and we should lose an outlet on the Baltic.

In the event of Germany's defeat a large slice of Poland, including the wealthiest parts of Silesia, with gigantic coal mines, iron-works, etc., would be taken away from her, and if the Poles should recover their ancient province of West Prussia, with Dantzic, Prussia's hold upon East Prussia, with Koenigsberg, would be threatened. The loss of her Polish districts would obviously greatly reduce Germany's military strength and economic power. It may therefore be expected that Germany will move heaven and earth against the re-creation of the kingdom of Poland, and that she will strenuously endeavour to create differences between Russia and her Allies. The statesmen of Europe should therefore, in good time, firmly make up their minds as to the future of Poland.

J. ELLIS BARKER.

PAUL FORT, THE 'PRINCE OF POETS'

PHILOMEL.

(From the French of Paul Fort.)

O sing, in heart of silence hiding near,
 Thou whom the roses bend their heads to hear!
 In silence down the moonlight slides her wing:
 Will no rose breathe while Philomel doth sing?
 No breath—and deeper yet the perfume grows:
 The voice of Philomel can slay a rose:
 The song of Philomel on nights serene
 Implores the gods who roam in shades unseen,
 But never calls the roses, whose perfume
 Deepens and deepens, as they wait their doom.
 Is it not silence whose great bosom heaves?
 Listen, a rose-tree drops her quiet leaves.

Now silence flashes lightning like a storm:
 Now silence is a cloud, and cradled warm
 By risings and by fallings of the tune
 That Philomel doth sing, as shines the moon,
 —A bird's or some immortal voice from Hell?

There is no breath to die with, Philomel!—
 And yet the world has changed without a breath.
 The moon lies heavy on the roses' death,
 And every rosebush droops its leafy crown.
 A gust of roses has gone sweeping down.
 The panicked garden drives her leaves about:
 The moon is masked: it flares and flickers out.
 O shivering petals on your lawn of fear,
 Turn down to Earth and hear what you shall hear.
 A beat, a beat, a beat beneath the ground,
 And hurrying beats, and one great beat profound.
 A heart is coming close: I have heard pass
 The noise of a great Heart upon the grass.
 The petals reel. Earth opens: from beneath
 The ashen roses on their lawn of death,
 Raising her peaceful brow, the grand and pale
 Demeter listens to the nightingale.

¹ The new anthology of Paul Fort's poems, *Choix de Ballades françaises* (Figuère, 6 fr.), may be recommended to intending readers whom our poet's prolific output might otherwise bewilder and repel. In it Paul Fort has for the first time properly classified his work.

WHAT a large contribution French literature of the last ten years has made to the splendid unity achieved by France in face of the great but long foreseen danger of war, how firmly that reaction to heroic ideals of discipline and religion has been led by men like Barrès and Maurras, is hardly realised in England at all, where the Press, choked with articles on unimportant and obscure curiosities like Strindberg² or Tagore, has no time to attend to the one foreign literature worth reading. Indeed, the only modern French writer known in England is Anatole France, imagined a solitary star in a waste of night!

It cannot be pretended that Paul Fort has been a direct leader of this renovating movement in France; indeed, it would be vain to expect the Poet to take the didactic lead. A poet should teach discipline by the severity of his verse, courage by the strength of his line, honour by the scrupulous sincerity of his achievement. But that is merely to say a poet should be a good poet. Paul Fort gives us more than this—he gives us the new spirit of France, that brave commonsense that bursts out in gaiety and imagination, and gives the impression that though the world is deadly serious it is still disreputably young.

The possibility of the creation of poetry like this may be said to mark a revolution in the French mentality. A few years ago French critics did really and honestly consider that literature and civilisation had reached their last stage of cynical corruption. But of late the whole youth of France seem to have been recaptured by the old ideals of the peasant, the soldier, the priest; and though neither militarist nor clerical, Paul Fort yet has all the irrepressible hopefulness of the young generation that drives on the soldiers of France in charge after charge against their monstrous enemy. For him a few mechanical inventions or scientific improvements have not spoilt the sunrise; and accepting the civilisation of to-day as Homer accepted that of three thousand years ago, he celebrates simply, but with startling novelty of inspiration, the scenery and actors of that once so pleasant stage—the France he lives in.

The Prince of Poets is no Futurist, though Marinetti has bidden his followers admire him. He writes no odes on aeroplanes or automobiles. He does not lay a particular stress on the mechanical side of modern life, being too fond of his contemporaries to insult them by considering them less interesting than machines. The minor poets of the Futurist school, in their struggle to escape those trammels of the centuries which oppress all timorous minds, adopt any childish eccentricity of metre,

² Mr. E. Gosse, who wrote a charming criticism of Paul Fort some years ago, has lately given a crushing opinion on Strindberg in the first number of the *New Weekly*.

language or subject that comes into their heads. At the same time they impose upon themselves a harder law than any Academy ever yet invented for the suppression of that free play which is so necessary for the expansion of genius. They are not allowed by their leaders to write a line, except in derision, about the past. Paul Fort has described the past as well as the present; but when, as often, he deals with modern life, he has courage enough to envisage it in its proper relation to the past and genius enough to reveal its fascination without distorting its reality. He is only able to do this because he has dug down to the bed-rock of human nature, because he understands the good old basic things of life—the soil, the sun, the rain; the labour, sorrows and songs of the people. He can himself actually write Folk Songs—a unique achievement for a great literary artist—folk songs that seem as if they must be traditional, must have been composed hundreds of years ago. When one thinks of the evolution of French poetry during the last few generations, with its imposing array of schools—Romantics, Parnassians, Symbolists, Unanimists, and the rest—one realises what superb detachment is required (not to mention other and higher qualities) for a Frenchman and a Parisian to write a poem as finely unadorned as this :

Si toutes les filles du monde voulaient s'donner la main tout autour de
la mer elles pourraient faire une ronde.

Si tous les gars du monde voulaient bien être marins, ils f'raient avec
leurs barques un joli pont sur l'onde.

Alors on pourrait faire une ronde autour du monde si tous les gens
du monde voulaient s'donner la main.

It is natural that a poet so much haunted by the peasant should have sought inspiration from medieval France. Paul Fort's longest work, *le Roman de Louis XI*, is a fantasy half in verse half in prose, remarkably close in feeling and in style to Rabelais. The hero is presented with humour and sympathy, for the King, who had nothing but a shrewd wit to save his impoverished kingdom from the menace of the bellicose, parading, pompous Duke of Burgundy, is a man after the author's heart. French critics have quoted as a masterpiece of pathos the little scene in which Louis discovers that his son Joachim is dead. But the most memorable passage in the book is the hilarious description of the siege of Beauvais with its catalogue of the missiles (beginning with paving stones and ending with complete houses) which the besieged dropped with gorgeously noisy effects on to the heads of the besiegers. It must have been this passage that awoke in Marinetti an admiration for Paul Fort, for granted that realising in poetry the effect of a tremendous noise be a Futurist

ideal, Paul Fort has certainly beaten Marinetti on his own ground. The latter's *Battle of Tripoli* is very thin piping compared with the *Siege of Beauvais*.

Yet neither the excellent *Louis XI* nor that ambitious poem sequence, *l'Aventure Eternelle*, is the real achievement of Paul Fort. It is by his lyrics that he will be remembered, lyrics so numerous, so brilliant, and so diverse that even briefly to discuss their leading characteristics is rather a bewildering task. However, of these characteristics, the most obvious and pervading one beyond any doubt is humour—humour of the great lyrical quality, which can remind us at times of Heine, of Cervantés, of Browning, and, as will be hereafter observed, most specially of Shakespeare—yet a humour which combines with an impudence almost English a lightness entirely French :

Les Baleines

Du temps qu'on allait encore aux baleines, si loin qu'ça faisait mat'lot, pleurer nos belles, y avait sur chaque route un Jésus en croix, y avait des marquis couverts de dentelles, y avait la Sainte-Vierge et y avait le Roi !

Du temps qu'on allait encore aux baleines, si loin qu'ça faisait mat'lot, pleurer nos belles, y avait des marins qui avaient la foi, et des grands seigneurs qui crachaient sur elle, y avait la Sainte-Vierge et y avait le Roi !

Eh bien, à présent, tout le monde est content, c'est pas pour dire, mat'lot, mais on est content ! . . . y a plus de grands seigneurs ni d'Jésus qui tiennent, y a la république et y a le président, et y a plus de baleines !

A still more extravagant poem, called *The One-Eyed Cat*, recalls nothing written in the French language except the *Poèmes en prose* of Baudelaire :

La femme est aux varechs, l'homme est à la Guyane. Et la petite maison est seule tout le jour.

Seule ? Mais à travers les persiennes vertes, on voit luire dans l'ombre comme une goutte de mer.

Quand le baigne est à l'homme, la mer est à la femme, et la petite maison au chat borgne tout le jour.

Among scores of poems in this vein the reader may be specially referred to *Le Marchand de Sable*, *La Reine à la mer*, *Le Paysan et son âne*, perhaps the most amusing of all, and to one unaccountably excluded from the anthology, *Le petit roi du Nord*. Similar in humorous treatment, but more subtle, are some of the poems on Shakespearean characters, to which Englishmen will turn with special interest. *Hamlet* begins thus :

Hamlet, que la folie des autres importune, a fait le tour du monde mais dans le clair de lune il retrouve Elsenieur qu'il n'avait pas quitté.

Hamlet a fait le tour du monde, comme il fait tout, en pensée.

Still more exquisitely subtle is Seigneur Fortinbras :

Moi que l'on attendait, j'entre en disant ma phrase . . . Je viens clore le drame avec un clairon d'or—tout seul—car mon immense armée ne viendra pas, que voulez-vous ? Je l'ai perdue dans les décors ombreux de la coulisse. Enfin ! Taratata !

The genius of all this is near enough to the pathetic, and Paul Fort is as clever as Verlaine or de Banville in catching what may be called the Pierrot mood. *The Dead Clown* is rather an obvious subject charmingly treated, the *Song of the little Valet who hanged himself* is as delicately mysterious as a lyric by Mr. Yeats. His masterpiece of humorous pathos is the *Complaint of the Little White Horse*, who worked so bravely on in a country of black rain where there was never any spring :

Il est mort sans voir le beau temps : qu'il avait donc du courage !

Paul Fort has more ambitious flights than these, but his humour seldom deserts him ; indeed it often breaks out in unexpected places with a most startling effect. His *Poèmes Marins* and ballads of modern Paris have plenty of laughter in their realism. The *Poèmes Marins* need special attention as being perhaps the most powerful volume the Poet has produced. They are ballad poems of modern life somewhat in the tradition handed down from Béranger to Richépin and the singers of Montmartre. But Paul Fort's sailors—sentimental, coarse, amusing, passionate—put Richépin's tedious 'Gueux' out of court. They hate every one who is not washed clean by the sea—farmers, beggars, priests, soldiers, opoponaxed Parisians. And above all, says one of them, 'tu me dégoûtes, ma garce.' It is not gallant, but French mariners are a privileged race and know it. 'Je ne suis pas marine, mais il n'y a que les marins' cries a mountain lass in her sailor's arms. Excellent too is the young fisherman who complains to his mother that he loves three girls at once, and they will not understand ! But there are savage and bitter poems in the book, and the description of the drunkard who kills his wife is terrible enough for a Russian novel :

Ne gueule pas comme ça, l'ciel n'est pas solide. Y tourne comme un fou : le bon Dieu s'est soulé. Qui, c'est ça, tais-toi . . . bois ton rhum salé. Eh bien quoi ? . . . t'es morte ? Tiens, tu n'as plus de rides !

Ma petite chérie, ma petite chérie ! T'es morte, moi je suis soulé. L'ton Dieu bat la crème. Toutes les étoiles tournent. Y a des loups dans l'rau qu'ont d'lor plein leur gueule. T'auras pas ma paye !

A striking contrast to this realistic work is afforded by the poems which he has in this anthology called 'Hymnes'—heroic odes in praise of nature. They are powerful in expression and grand in conception, but one of them, a poem, called *Le*

Dauphin, is so passionately inspired as to make the magnificence and brilliance of the other *Hymnes* seem almost frozen in comparison. Swinburne himself has no better song on the joy of swimming and the enchantment of the sea. The chase of the dolphins as the swimmer 'turns with the wheel of the sun' among the waves, the seaweed and the flying fish, is not so much described as seen and heard in the sparkling splashing verses, while in the vision of the sea's floor the poem assumes a note of grandeur—one of the rarest notes of Paul Fort's brilliant lyre :

Je vois! (la petite mort est entrée dans mon cœur) j'ai revu tous ces monts soulevés de douleurs. En eux la mer contente sa destinée sauvage. Elle fouille la terre, elle s'accouple aux laves, ensemence leur sein de toute sa vigueur, et mille bouches de feu bavent des coquillages. Volcans, brûlez la mer des feux de votre cœur! Les étincelles vivent: ô que de poissons nagent! Les étincelles meurent et c'est là votre ouvrage: vous attirez les morts qui vont en vous reprendre la chaleur et la Vie. O cendres, cendres, cendres. Etincelles! . . . et déjà, vos rochers sont couverts de coraux, de varechs, d'épais ombrages verts, de crabes fourmillants et de ces belles pieuvres envahissant la mer de leurs bras amoureux; les hippocampes noirs s'échappent de vos feux; la bleue holothurie scintille: c'est votre œuvre; le bas limon s'étoile à l'exemple des cieux. Qu'un jour tout cela meure, vous attendez les cendres. La mer, buvant la mort, devient phosphorescente. Vous l'aspirez. Vos feux déjà, se renouvellent —et les oiseaux marins volent jusqu'au soleil!

The *Hymnes* lead us naturally to the poems dealing with classical subjects, grouped in the new anthology as *Hymnes héroïques*, *Eglogues*, and *Chants paniques*. These lyrics are hardly the most characteristic work of the author, whose sympathies are medieval rather than Greek. Paul Fort sings of Jason, of Hercules, of Orpheus simply because he loves all delightful tales, not because he has a special appreciation of the classical world. But he is at his best when he deals with Morpheus, with the nymphs and fauns—with all those suggestive whispering little gods who have haunted Christian Europe far more tenaciously than the white Olympians. One of these pictures is unforgettable—the old faun clumsily dancing round the frozen lake, trying to reawaken the old magic voices which have abandoned the forest for ever.

Yet, though we hold these 'classical' poems to be a mere side issue of Paul Fort's genius, what great poems they really are—*le Voyage de Jason*, *Orphée*, *les Néréides*, with what freshness does the poet attack the age-worn themes, with what humour does he charm Olympus! It is surely with these poems, moreover, that we should class the most beautiful lyric Paul Fort has ever written, the haunting *Philomèle*.³

³ A verse translation of *Philomèle* precedes this article.

English readers who study for themselves the *Poèmes Marins* will be bound to remark the extraordinary, almost pagan innocence of their author, which seems to enable him to deal with any subject under the sun without prudery and without licentiousness. Certainly Paul Fort never feels himself obliged, like so many modern English writers, to adopt a tone of fictitious manliness to palliate anything which a very timorous curate might find shocking. And he is no less innocent when he deals with the externals of religion. *Coxcomb*, half poem half story, is a masterpiece of merry humour—blasphemous only as Benozzo Gozzoli blasphemes when he turns the laughing girls and boys of Florence into saints, angels and virgins. To the truly and deeply religious mind, far more dangerous than this quaint irreverence is the utilising of the aesthetic beauty of Christianity to decorate poems that are not quite sincere, a moral fault from which our author is not entirely free, and in which our own PreRaphaelites revelled.*

To discover the real religion or philosophy of Paul Fort we must turn to one of his later poems, *Vivre en Dieu*, a work more interesting in thought than happy as poetry, in which he has made a direct, but still amusing, attempt to state and arrange his views on God and the world. The divine function, according to the poet, is to dream, for dream or imagination is a creative force. There is no creative dream in stone, but everything that is alive has a certain power of vision and is, therefore, God: 'l'herbe est un Dieu hâtif doué de rêve ayant une âme visionnaire.' Trees are gods, men are gods—but there are degrees. The Poet, who above other men possesses the faculty of creative imagination, is the greatest god on earth. All lives dream each other into existence; 'no other explanation of the universe,' adds the writer with his accustomed laugh. 'Messieurs, levez votre chapeau.'

This conception of the universe is more arresting at least than the admired Wordsworthian pantheism, but it is neither particularly new nor important taken purely as philosophy. It possesses nevertheless both personal interest and poetical force, being very well adapted to provide a logical background to the inexhaustible gaiety and loveliness of the poet's disposition. There is always something religious in Paul Fort's attitude to Nature; his whole work is bathed in spiritual sunshine, and when

* Yet what rings false in these thrilling lines from *le Plus doux Chant*?

'Mais oh! le chant que j'aime . . . Il me faut l'air câlin plus nonchalant et triste dont Marie enchantait l'ouïe au petit Christ, et que siffia si doux Joseph le menuisier qu'il fit naître à ce chant le Rêve de l'Enfant.

'O les plus frères sons! le suprême chant que répétait Jésus au ciel de Bethléem, et que les Syriennes, éveillant les cithares, murmuraient—s'y penchant—aux ciels de leurs fontaines!'

he is closest to tragedy the consolation he evokes wears the traditional Christian raiment :

Do not believe in death. Here are the birds who have flown out of their cages, which were the dark and silent woods. Shed no more vain tears, Heaven is singing like your soul, is dumb no longer—and here is radiant Death.

And here is luminous and tuneful Death, and here is Life. Here is the pearl of your soul that an angel of that calm world is threading, and here the radiant music of the Archangel's song.

A vast section of Paul Fort's work is devoted to delightful poems in which the country towns and villages near Paris are described with incomparable charm and sentiment. The poet wanders from Reclose, from Velizy, from Morcerf (whose sweet name reminds him of fairies dancing round a sleeping Knight), to Nemours :

Pure Nemours, silver seal on France's noblest page, or great lily of the isle, is not thy destiny, white town, soul of a sky like pearl, to school in elegance the proud world itself ?

to la Ferté Milon, where seven distinct houses claim to be the birthplace of Racine, like the seven islands which disputed Homer, and to a hundred little towns beside—and we have their history, their legends, the girl at the window, the ducks in the pond, the ghosts in the castle, the auction in the town hall, all set forth in a whirl of humour or sentiment. But there is pathos now in the exquisite poems on Senlis, which recently, as a result of special and atrocious barbarity on the part of the Germans, has been irretrievably destroyed, Notre Dame and all.

Senlis Matinale.

Je sors. La ville a-t-elle disparu ce matin ? Où s'est-elle envolée ? Par quel vent dans quelle île ? Je la retrouve, mais n'ose plus étendre les mains. Senlis est vaporeuse comme une mousseline.

Moi, déchirer Senlis ? Prenons garde. Où est-elle ? Toits et murs sont un transparent réseau de brume. Notre-Dame livre à l'air sa gorge de dentelle, son cou si fin, son sein léger couleur de lune,

Où bat l'heure irréal, que seuls comptent les anges, tant l'écho s'en étouffe dans l'oreiller du ciel fait des plumes doucement étendues de leurs ailes, où Dieu repose un front qui vers Senlis se penche.

Alas, Senlis is torn, and the tower of Notre Dame will shine in the morning mist no longer !

It is for the glory of France that these poems were written—and such passionate patriotism is almost too personal a thing to be discussed by the foreign critic. One would naturally conclude that Paul Fort, considering the great patriotic reaction, would be at least as popular in France, were it on the score of this section of his work alone, as, say, Mr. Masfield in England. One could well imagine such a national, direct, simple, and

humorous poet holding a position in his lifetime somewhat similar to that which Carducci used to hold in Italy. Yet Paul Fort—and this would appear to be a very curious fact of literary history—however much he may be the idol of the young literary circles who this year elected him Prince of Poets, however numerous and enthusiastic may be the articles on his work which appear from time to time in the literary reviews, is hardly more known to the general public than was the classicist Moréas or, to take an English example, that fine poet Mr. Delamare.

Moreover, the reason for this comparative neglect, for these second and third editions of work which one would expect to sell by the ten thousand, cannot possibly be that Paul Fort stands in any way apart from his time. Nationalism, regionalism, medievalism, the love of country and the soil have been the very breath of the gospel of Maurice Barrès, and of a thousand lesser pens, and are enormously in fashion. Again, while Paul Fort is perhaps hardly like Barrès a Catholic, yet he has an unshaken belief in the Catholic virtues and a sure insight into Catholic ideals. The antipathy—almost hatred—of the Parisian mind for humour may have something to do with the neglect of Paul Fort. Humour to many Frenchmen is a gross extravagance, and they are all a little apt to take poetry too seriously. Yet there is plenty of good work in Paul Fort which is not humorous, and one is driven to the only conclusion possible, queer as it may sound to English readers, that the chief reason of this comparative neglect is to be found in our poet's metrical peculiarities. As will have been seen by the extracts given in French, Paul Fort has abandoned the general practice of writing out poetry line by line and writes it out verse by verse instead. He also has a habit of letting his poetry 'degenerate' either into a prose with internal rhymes, similar to that Oriental prose of which the curious can find a horrible parody in Beaconsfield's *Alroy*, or (as often in the longer poems) into pure prose. In addition to this our poet frequently disregards the rule that the final *e* mute counts as a syllable for poetic purposes. This is a licence frequently used in popular poetry and songs, but Paul Fort does not take the trouble to mark the suppression of the sham syllable in the regular way by omitting the *e* mute and substituting an apostrophe. Indeed the effect if he did so would be very ugly and tiring. These innovations do not seem to an English student very terrible, and indeed about half of Paul Fort's poetry could perfectly well be printed out in lines and be read as popular poetry, and no one would any more dream of cavilling at it as a breach of tradition than at Richépin's

Il y avait un' fois un pauvre gas
Qui aimait cell' qui n'l'aimait pas.

Besides it might be observed there is nothing very revolutionary in the printing of verse as prose. It might even be called on the contrary a return to the old tradition, for a monkish scribe copying Virgil would go to greater lengths than our author in jumbling up the lines—would in fact jumble up the very words.

This is not to say, however, that Paul Fort's practice in this respect is perfectly reasonable and wise. The greatest enthusiast for his work must admit that in the longer poems it is often very puzzling to know, without careful scrutiny, whether the poet has any rhythmical intentions or not. It is also invariably difficult to discover the words which are intended to rhyme. It is at least doubtful whether the 'half-way house' and quick transition from verse into prose, at which the author says he aims by his peculiar typography, would not be better served by simply printing verse as verse and prose as prose. The only real advantage about the system, as far as one can see, is that the reader is imperceptibly led to read the lines more rapidly, and that the licences taken, which include, besides those already mentioned, the occasional use of very vague assonance in the place of rhyme,^{*} look less alarming. Certainly the innovation attracted attention and discussion to the poet's early work, but unfortunately as years went on critics continued to discuss the metre instead of the poetry, and the French with their passion for order and tradition are still very worried about this comparatively trifling aspect of a great achievement—so that for many Frenchmen even to-day Paul Fort is 'the poet who writes in prose,' and is unjustly confounded with a thousand maudlin writers of amateurish prose poems. I believe that if he were to publish his shorter lyrics printed in the old-established way they would be received with immense enthusiasm not only by a literary clique but by the whole French nation.

The ranking of poets is a tedious and rather childish pastime which many critics at once deride and enjoy; yet there is somehow an undoubted pleasure in constructing a hierarchy, in picturing modern French poetry to oneself as being led by two great chiefs, Henri de Régnier and Paul Fort—two men of genius strikingly dissimilar to each other and only alike in towering above all possible rivals of the present day. Unfortunately this is no very high compliment, for if we count Verhaeren as a Belgian—and even he seems to write steadily worse year by year—there is very little left in modern French poetry, since the untimely deaths of Samain and Moréas, which calls for more

^{*} Assonance is frequently used by Francis Jammes and even by the classical Henri de Régnier.

than respect outside the work of these two men of genius. Exception must be made in favour of the delicate and charming spirit of Francis Jammes.

But a more interesting and more legitimate part of the critic's task is the study of affinity. In criticising this author one is apt to make endless comparisons with the great writers and especially with the great humorists of the past. But strangely enough it is Shakespeare himself who, more than any other writer living or dead, is recalled by the work of Paul Fort. In this assertion, of course, no comparison of value is implied; the Tragic and the Sublime are not regions into which Paul Fort has entered. It is to the Shakespeare of the *Midsummer Night's Dream*, not to the Shakespeare of *Macbeth*, that our Frenchman has affinity. But the affinity is very striking nevertheless; there is something deep in the nature of both poets that positively coincides. Is it perhaps their exuberance that makes them kin, their bravado air of looking at the world, their delight in Nature not as a pantheistic manifestation but as a delightful and complicated toy? Is it the absence of all bitterness from their godlike laughter, an absence of bitterness not due, as in the work of our modern English cartoonists, to a mawkish desire to hurt nobody's feelings, but to an innate loftiness of soul? One cannot say exactly, but I think that many English readers of Paul Fort will admit that had Shakespeare been born a Frenchman of to-day he would have written, at least when in comic or lyric mood, work closely resembling this. One might even add that Shakespeare handles his classical subject in *Venus and Adonis* much as Paul Fort has handled *les Néréides*, and, as if to clinch our argument, what insight do the little poems—some of them already quoted—on Hamlet, Ophelia, Lear, show into even the tragic Shakespeare. Few French poets ought to be so profoundly appreciated by English readers.

JAMES ELBOY FLECKER.

*THE 'DEVIL-DIPLOMATISTS' OF PRUSSIA:**AS SEEN IN THE HOTHAM PAPERS*

IN a recent speech Mr. Lloyd George referred to the 'press-gang of Frederick the Great of Prussia,' by means of which he asserted that monarch was wont to procure men of abnormal stature for his army. The idiosyncrasy specified, however, belonged to the father of Frederick the Great, Frederick William the First, second King of Prussia, an ancestor of the present German Emperor, and a Sovereign whose career in the light of the events of to-day it is of singular interest to review. This interest is moreover greatly enhanced owing to the fact that in the possession of Lord Hotham, by whose kind permission I have been enabled to inspect them, are papers bearing on this period of history, certain of which have never before been made public, so that with them Thomas Carlyle and other authorities on Prussian history were unacquainted.

It was in 1701 that Frederick, Elector of Brandenburg, was raised to the dignity of King of Prussia, that being the only independent portion of his dominions, and the emancipation of the family of Brandenburg from the yoke of Austria was at first viewed with some amusement by a country which, in the assumption of sovereignty by so inconsiderable a Monarch, saw little cause for alarm. Nevertheless it was remarked by those possessing greater perspicuity 'that the Emperor of Austria, in consenting to such an arrangement, ought to hang the Ministers who had given him such treacherous advice'; and the event proved that there were grounds for this opinion.

Yet for a while all seemed well. Frederick, that first King of Prussia, was a vain and frivolous Prince, feeble alike in mind and body, who contented himself by expending his time and money in devising fresh pageants, processions, and more precise etiquette for his little Court. It was not till Frederick William, his son, succeeded him upon the throne that Austria began to realise the grave mistake which she had committed. For this second King of Prussia was obsessed by one idea—the aggrandisement of his little kingdom. To this end he held no

sacrifice too great. In two months he had reduced the previous outlay of the Royal establishment to one fifth of what it had been during the lifetime of his father; all needless expenses in every department were similarly curtailed; his efforts, before referred to, to ensure a race of giants for his troops, his press-gang which tore priests from the altar and kidnapped men of abnormal stature throughout the countries of Europe roused universal indignation; and in brief, while encouraging commerce and industry, he increased the army till at last a population of two-and-a-half million souls were supporting the unheard of number of 83,000 men under arms. When success attended his methods, Austria, alarmed, viewed with dismay the growing power of Prussia, and further cause for disquietude was soon her portion.

Without entering into the intricacies of the political situation, the main cause for what ensued may be briefly stated. In 1717 Charles the Sixth of Austria had founded an East Indian Company in Ostend. He had given this company, to the exclusion of all his other subjects, the right and privilege for thirty years of extending their trade to Africa and India. In 1725 he further made a secret treaty of commerce with Spain in favour of such trading, one of the articles of this agreement being an undertaking on his part to compel the restoration to the Spaniards of Gibraltar and Port Mahon, which were then in the possession of the English. The principal maritime Powers having discovered the plans of Austria, and recognising therein the ruin of that commerce upon which their own greatness depended, forthwith concluded amongst themselves a defensive alliance in which Prussia joined. Austria, terrified at this league which she had not power to resist openly, determined upon dissolving it by means of intrigues. Specially inimical to her project therefore was any closer link between England and Prussia, two countries whose Sovereigns were already united by the tie of relationship, for Frederick William had married Sophia Dorothea, daughter of George the First and sister to George the Second. Moreover, for long the ambition of the Queen of Prussia had been to see her eldest daughter, the Princess Wilhelmine, wedded to the heir of that throne of England which had been occupied in turn by her father and her brother. The project had been discussed since the Princess's earliest childhood, and with it was involved another, that of the marriage of Frederick, the Prince Royal of Prussia, with Princess Amelia, daughter of George the Second. Nevertheless, while the friendship of a powerful country like England was palpably to the advantage of the new principality of Prussia, the achievement of this double union which would have cemented it was hedged about with difficulties that, but

for a comprehension of the secret diplomacy of Austria, would seem incredible.

For Austria, in furtherance of her secret schemes, had despatched to the Court of Prussia her Minister Seckendorf. The character of this envoy, if we may trust the description given of it by Frederick, Crown Prince of Prussia, afterwards Frederick the Great, was 'sordid and venal; his manners were vulgar and uncultivated. Falsehood was become so habitual to him that he had lost the power of speaking the truth.' Arriving at the poor Court of Berlin well plied with gold, this emissary found his way made easy before him. He had previously been a friend of Grumkow, Prime Minister to the King of Prussia, a diplomat of more polished exterior but equally unscrupulous as himself. Grumkow at once played into the hands of the Austrian spy, and to their schemes Reichenbach, the Prussian Minister at the Court of St. James's, was likewise won over. The task to which this trio of intriguers forthwith devoted themselves was primarily that of preventing any further strengthening of the tie between England and Prussia; still more of promoting, in so far as was practicable, a disruption between the two countries. Although both projects involved persuading the King of Prussia that his advantage was his disadvantage, in view of the character of that monarch this was not so difficult as at first sight appears.

For the very foibles of Frederick William lent themselves to the plans of his enemies. Like all autocratic natures, his terror of being ruled made him a ready prey to those astute enough to play upon this propensity. 'The King,' writes his daughter, 'had the misfortune to be always deceived by those who least deserved his confidence; and these, knowing his violent temper, used his weakness to assist them in attaining whatever end they wanted.' Obstinate as he was arbitrary, he was totally without ballast; an asylum rather than a throne had been more fitting for such a Monarch of Moods. The ungovernable violence of his temper, the vindictive brutality of his anger overpassed the limits of sanity. As has been aptly remarked, he viewed his sceptre as a cudgel, while he ruled his family and his subjects with equal harshness. Vain of his very failings, to cross his selfish will at all times meant disaster—or death; to bow to it was to feed his pride and to earn his unbounded, if transient, approbation.

Thus the sufferings and privations to which his family were subjected baffle description. In the rigid economy which prevailed at his Court, not only was the semblance of luxury denied them, but they lacked for bare necessities and seldom had sufficient to eat. The King personally was a gross feeder, and

habitually ate, as he invariably drank, too much, more especially when such food and drink could be obtained through the hospitality of one of his subjects. But, partly through malevolence, partly through miserliness, he delighted in starving his family and their retinue, while the existence to which he condemned them, the complete lack of happiness or of any intellectual interest, is piteous reading. Despite the creed of that age that kings, though butchers, could do no wrong, and parents, though tyrants, were sacred, Wilhelmine, Princess of Prussia, has, as we know, left behind a Memoir of her life which is exceedingly curious, and a few quotations from this bring before us more vividly than any laboured description what she endured. In this she speaks of the Royal Family dining off 'coarse pot-herbs'—i.e. carrots and parsnips, which they particularly detested; while in 1726, when they were at Potsdam, she gives an account of their daily life there which is eloquent in its simple statement of facts :

We led a most sad life. We were awakened at seven every morning by the King's regiment, which exercised in front of the windows of our rooms, which were on the ground floor. The firing went on incessantly—piff, puff—and lasted the whole morning. At ten we went to see my mother, and accompanied her to the room next to the King's, where we sat and sighed for the rest of the morning. Then came dinner time; the dinner consisted of six small, badly-cooked dishes, which had to suffice for twenty-four persons, so that some had to be satisfied with the mere smell. At table nothing else was talked of but economy and soldiers. The Queen and ourselves, too unworthy to open our mouths, listened in humble silence to the oracles which were pronounced.

When dinner was over the King sat himself down in a wooden armchair and slept for two hours. But before doing so he generally managed to make some unpleasant speech for the Queen or for us. As long as the King slept I worked, and as soon as he woke up he went away. The Queen then went back to her room where I read aloud to her till the King returned. . . .

Supper, from which we generally got up hungry, was at eight in the evening. The Queen played at cards with her lady-in-waiting and mine, who were the only attendants. . . . My only resource was my books. I had a small library which I hid under all the beds and tables, for the King despised all learning, and wished me to occupy myself with nothing but needlework and household duties or details. Had he ever found me writing or reading he would probably have whipped me.

At a later date the Princess describes the daily life at the Court of Berlin, where economy and dreariness appear accentuated :

I had to be with the Queen at ten. We then went with her to the State-room, which was never warmed, and remained there doing nothing till noon. After this we went to the King's private room to bid him good-morning, and then went to dinner, to which four-and-twenty guests

were invited. The dinner consisted of two dishes, the one vegetables, which were boiled in water on the top of which floated some melted butter with chopped herbs, the other pork and cabbage, of which every one got only a very small portion. Sometimes a goose was served, or a tough old chicken, and on Sundays there was one sweet dish. A very long-winded person sat at the middle of the table over against the King and narrated the news of the day, on which he then poured forth a flood of political nonsense which engendered a deadly weariness. After dinner the King sat in his armchair near the fire and went to sleep. The Queen and my sisters sat round him and listened to his snores. . . . We went to supper at nine. This meal lasted four or five hours, after which everyone retired to bed. Such was the life we led, it never varied in the least, each day resembled its predecessor.

One pictures that dinner for the large Royal Family, their attendants and twenty-four guests with its one dish of pork, of which each person present could expect only a 'very small portion,' and were fortunate if they got that. One pictures, too, the mental stagnation, the wasted hours of unspeakable tediousness which that life further represented. Yet the existence thus described was a halcyon one compared with the tempestuous interludes which too frequently relieved its monotony.

The members of the Royal Family on whom the tyranny of the King pressed most mercilessly were the two involved in the projected double marriage, the Crown Prince Frederick and his sister Wilhelmine. The unfortunate heir to the throne who excited his father's malevolence was, the Princess emphasises, 'the most amiable Prince possible, handsome and well-made. His intellect was superior to his age, and he possessed all the qualities which make a perfect Prince.' But his very talents were a crime in his father's eyes, his appreciation of literature, his love of music, his prepossessing appearance, his taste in dress, above all his popularity. The King designed this Prince, brilliant and profound, to submerge all his faculties in the art of drilling; he lost no opportunity of humiliating his defenceless son, whose life was in constant danger, while the known devotion to each other of the brother and sister undoubtedly involved the Princess in the jealous hatred with which the Sovereign regarded his heir.

In that Memoir, wherein the Princess vented something of the uncontrollable misery of her existence, she describes how, when the King was suffering from one of his periodical fits of religious mania, 'We lived like Trappists, to the great grief of my brother and myself. No one dared laugh or be cheerful in his presence.' She relates too that, scanty as was the daily allowance of food when they were permitted to partake of it, there were occasions when even this was denied them. When

the King, for instance, had a fit of gout, 'the pain of which added to his natural violence of disposition,' the Princess states :

The pains of purgatory could not equal those which we endured. We were obliged to appear at nine o'clock in the morning in his room. We dined there, and did not dare to leave it for a moment. Every day was passed by the King in invectives against my brother and myself. . . . He obliged us to eat and drink the things for which we had an aversion, or which were bad for our healths, which caused us sometimes to bring up in his presence all that was in our stomachs. Every day was marked by some sinister event, and it was impossible to raise one's eyes without seeing some unhappy people tormented in one way or the other. The King's restlessness did not suffer him to remain in bed ; he had himself placed in a chair on rollers, and was thus dragged all over the place. His two arms rested upon crutches which supported them. We always followed his triumphal car like unhappy captives about to undergo their sentence. . . . We were become as lean as hack-horses from mere want of food.

On another occasion the Princess writes :

The King almost caused my brother and myself to die of hunger. He always acted as carver and served everybody except us ; and when by chance there remained anything in a dish he spat into it in order to prevent our eating of it. We lived entirely upon coffee and milk and dried cherries which quite ruined my digestion. In return I was nourished with insults and invectives, for I was abused all day long in every possible manner and before everybody.

Moreover, this King who, as we are told, would fling plates at his children during meals ; would try to hit them with his crutches, careless whether he killed them or not ; who caned his grown-up son in public till he bled, or endeavoured to strangle him with his own hands ; who once, having felled his helpless daughter to the ground, was only with difficulty prevented from kicking her to death—this King, autocrat in the bosom of his affrighted family, did not hesitate in like manner to thrash defenceless prisoners of State who were brought before him, or to belabour the judges of his kingdom and fling them downstairs when they had given a verdict not in accordance with his wishes. 'On one occasion,' Lavissee relates, 'he obtained the reconsideration of a judgment pronounced by one of the Courts by means of blows upon the heads and shoulders of the judges, who ran away spitting out their teeth as they fled, pursued by the King.' In short, Lavissee adds :

No slave-driver, I believe, ever dispensed more blows than this King. Not to mention here his family tragedies, there was no class of his subjects, save the officers, who had not felt the weight of his stick. He beat his servants on the smallest provocation. It was said in Berlin that 'he has furnished a small room with a dozen sticks of great weight, placed at a certain distance apart, so as to be ready for him to seize and apply to whomsoever approached him and did not satisfy his every whim.' A blow followed every answer he did not like ; whether it were really bad or whether it were so good as to be unanswerable did not signify. He one day met the Potsdam brewer in the street. 'Why is your beer so dear?' asks he.

'Because I regulate it by the price of barley. If your Majesty will allow me to get barley from Stralsund where it is cheap I can reduce my prices.' Nothing could be fairer than that, so the King gives him twenty cuts with his cane.

On one occasion, we are told, Frederick William scaled a living fish and compelled his guests to eat it; on another he beat a doctor who, he decided, took too long to cure one of the Princesses of smallpox; on yet another he threatened that he would send the whole of the medical faculty in Prussia to the fortress of Spandau if they did not within a given time rid him of some blisters on his tongue. Although such incidents may be taken as an indication of insanity, Lavissee insists that in the Royal outbreaks of fury the effects of alcohol were clearly discernible, and he considers that Frederick William was largely responsible for his own bad temper and sufferings.

Be that as it may, it was with such a human anomaly, such a monster of uncontrollable impulses, that the intriguers who surrounded the Prussian throne had to deal; yet the material which they desired to mould was sufficiently plastic if handled with an astuteness devoid of scruple.

'Seckendorf, Grumkow!' exclaims Carlyle, 'we have often heard of Devil-Diplomatists, and shuddered over horrible pictures of them in novels, hoping it was all fancy; but here actually is a pair of them, transcending all novels, perhaps the highest cognisable fact to be met with in Devil-Diplomacy.' 'The whole story,' sums up Lavissee, 'is perhaps that of the greatest network of deception ever conceived.'

By the time that George the Second had acceded to the throne of England the friendly relations between the Courts of England and Prussia had cooled down. The negotiations respecting the marriage of Wilhelmine with Frederick, Prince of Wales, made little progress, and finally the Queen of Prussia, in despair, despatched to her sister-in-law, the Queen of England, a missive the tactlessness of which was little calculated to further the object which she had at heart. While pointing out that '*je crois qu'il serait tems de conclure cette affaire, sur tout puisque je crains que si cela trainoit encore long tems, le Roy ne prit d'autres mesures,*' she added, '*Il faudroit pour cet effect la demander sans conditions.*' George at once saw in this the handiwork of his brother-in-law of Prussia. The idea that England was thus to be dictated to by Berlin, that she was ordered to beg for the hand of the Princess Wilhelmine 'without conditions,' roused the ire of his Britannic Majesty. Wherefore, while his Consort returned to her sister-in-law a conventionally civil answer, the appeal of the latter produced exactly the opposite effect to that which its writer had desired. The negotiations

proceeded no further, and at last Frederick William, hesitating between different policies, perpetually irritated by his Ministers against England and fearful of offending the Austrian Emperor, decided to betrothe his daughter to one of two other suitors for her hand, both of whom she particularly disliked.

At such a crisis Dubourgay, the English Minister at Berlin, and those favourable to his cause, decided to make one last attempt, ere it was too late, to bring about the alliance with England. For this purpose they despatched as emissary to the Court of St. James's Dr. Villa, the English tutor to the Princess, who would be able to plead in his native tongue the cause of the unhappy Queen and her family. So well did this Envoy exert his eloquence, imploring his Majesty to send to Berlin 'some Man of Distinction' to treat about the marriages while it was yet possible to do so, that King George could not ignore his appeal. True, there was but scanty love lost between the rulers of England and Prussia. George, when referring to the warlike Frederick William, was wont contemptuously to style him 'The Corporal of Potsdam'; Frederick William retaliated by calling his irascible little brother-in-law 'Mon beau-frère le Comédien!' Yet so long as George could make advances without any infringement of his cherished dignity, he was willing to enlist his sympathies actively on behalf of the victims of Frederick William; and he therefore cast his eyes about his Court to discover the 'Man of Distinction' worthy to be entrusted with this delicate and important mission.

He soon decided that nowhere could he find a man more qualified for his purpose than Sir Charles Hotham, who, by a strange coincidence, was an old friend and college contemporary of Villa, the emissary of the Queen of Prussia. Of ancient family and unblemished record, a courtier and a soldier from his earliest manhood, Hotham was of striking appearance, of polished manners, and noted for his learning and accomplishments. The fact that he was likewise the brother-in-law of Philip Dormer, the celebrated Lord Chesterfield, then Minister at The Hague and a man of Continental celebrity, was calculated to enhance his prestige abroad.

Forthwith George, in a document of many pages, proceeded to ply his Ambassador Extraordinary with instructions respecting the conduct of the mission with which he was to be entrusted, and these dealt at length with the crucial point in the proposed negotiations—the rock upon which it was possible that they might split.

The King of Prussia, as already stated, had long shown himself willing for the marriage of his daughter to the Prince of Wales; that was a matter in which great issues for the Court

of Berlin were not involved, and, since the Princess must needs wed some Prince of suitable rank, the English alliance promised a provision for her future at which Frederick William could not look askance. But the marriage of the Prince Royal with a Princess of England was a far other matter. If such a union were permitted to take place, it meant, in the present, a certain measure of protection for the son-in-law of the King of England, it meant recognising the manhood, strengthening the power and importance of that heir whom Frederick William hated, that victim whom as yet he could torture with impunity; it meant for the future a close alliance between a reigning Sovereign of Prussia and the Court of England—the enemy to Austria. Frederick William, the tool of unscrupulous Ministers and his own evil passions, disliked the prospect thus presented both in the present and the future, and was minded to permit the marriage of his daughter, but to forbid the marriage of his son. George, whose principal object was to bind the interests of Prussia with those of England and to enlist on his own behalf the gratitude of the future Sovereign of that country, was equally minded to achieve both marriages or consent to none.

The instructions to Hotham concluded with the significant sentence :

It is to be hoped that the errand you go upon will procure you an easy access to the King of Prussia and all manner of civil treatment from him. But if he should fly out at any time into expressions not becoming our Minister to bear, you will support our Honour and Dignity with Resolution and Firmness.

It is entertaining to observe that at the same date Reichenbach, the Prussian spy at the Court of St. James's, is describing in somewhat similar terms the comportment of his Majesty of England for the benefit of his Majesty of Prussia :

On sçait d'une bonne main que le Roy d'Angleterre s'emporte quelque fois extremement, et appelle en presence propre le Chevalier Walpole et my Ld Townshend *Coquins*, *Cujons* (*cochons*), *Diable vous emporte*, *allez vous en*, etc., etc.

Hotham, in short, considering the nature of the monarch whom he represented, and the monarch to whom he was to make representations, had no enviable task; yet it is doubtful whether he was at first aware of the secret forces leagued against him. Even as he set forth upon his journey Reichenbach wrote regretfully to the Devil-Diplomatist, Grumkow, at the Court of Berlin, '*Ce Grand Oracle est un homme fort joli!*' Lest therefore the dangerous fascination of the English Ambassador Extraordinary, and his supposed importance as 'le beau-frère de my Lord Chesterfield,' should weigh too seriously with his Majesty of Prussia, Reichenbach, at the instigation of Grumkow, pre-

pared a counterblast. The modern lie-bureau at Berlin had its origin far in the past. 'The time has now come,' wrote Grumkow in cipher to his tool at the English Court, 'when Reichenbach must play his game'; and ten days later he adds: '*Reichenbach will tell his Prussian Majesty what Grumkow finds fit.*'

This news of the Court of England, concocted by Grumkow in Berlin, may be summarised as follows: Reichenbach, the faithful servant of his Prussian Majesty, devoutly hoped that that great and good monarch would not allow himself to be duped by the wiles of his enemies. The nefarious design of St. James's was to reduce Prussia to the position of a province dependent upon England. When once the Princess Royal of England should be wedded to the Prince Royal of Prussia, the English by that means would form such a powerful party in Berlin that they would altogether 'tie his Prussian Majesty's hands.' If, lamented Reichenbach, the beloved King but knew the truly base schemes of England which were concealed beneath this apparently harmless mission of Hotham, how that good monarch would be on his guard! But Prussia was in serious danger of being innocently made the catspaw of Britain, and the despicable intrigues involved in this affair were truly inconceivable. Dexterously, indeed, did Reichenbach play upon the foibles of the credulous King, instilling into the mind of that choleric Corporal of Potsdam the belief that England was only looking forward to the day when the Prince, *a son-in-law of King George*, with his Consort, *an English Princess*, would be seated on the throne of Prussia, which would then be merely a tributary to Great Britain. But besides thus cunningly arousing the ire of the weak monarch, Reichenbach strove to diminish the supposed lustre of the Ambassador Extraordinary in the eyes of Frederick William by insinuating that his Britannic Majesty in his choice of deputy had done but scanty honour to Prussia. In England, he announces, '*ce grand Oracle* is of so little importance that no one had even heard of his existence till he was named Ambassador!' Few things, he was aware, could be better calculated to wound the vanity of the Corporal of Potsdam than the insinuation that this Envoy on whom he and his people were prepared to look with awe was in truth a man of small account in the country whence he came; that even the great Lord Chesterfield himself, from whom the 'Knight Hotham' derived an additional lustre, occupied in his native land a far other position than that which the Continental Powers ignorantly assigned to him. On the 27th of March 1730 Reichenbach wrote sarcastically:

Ce grand Oracle est arrivé à Berlin, dont on n'a pas su s'il existait dans le Monde ou non; et à la Court on fait d'abord un bruit de luy

comme d'un autre Alexandre; c'est une affaire bien étrange qu'on a une idée trop petite icy des Allemands, et que nous autres Allemands avons une Idée trop vaste et magnifique des Anglois, et croyons que c'est un Ange même qui vient; par exemple, Ld Chesterfield passe icy pour un bon homme, qui est en crédit auprès de Sa Majesté Britannique, mais on n'a pourtant une Idée si extraordinaire de lui icy, comme on a de lui en Allemagne.

Hotham, arriving in Berlin, was destined soon to discover that the task which he had undertaken was far less simple than he had been led to anticipate; nevertheless the letters in which he describes his mission, and all which befell him in that infantine kingdom of Prussia, afford a striking contrast to the other documents among which they are preserved. Through the tortuous intrigues of his opponents, through the timorous championship of his supporters, his narrative darts like a gleaming shuttle, direct, unwavering, carrying with it an unbroken thread of statement, fearless, uncompromising, exact. His private correspondence and his despatches alike show him to be a loyal subject, a staunch friend, an excellent hater, too proud to be a sycophant, too sincere to be a diplomatist. They show that, through all the intricacies of his negotiation, never once did he stoop to court those Devil-Diplomatists whom he despised, and that from the first he was minded to risk the success of his undertaking rather than the integrity of his conduct.

Further, those yellowing papers which he has left are endowed for us with a curious magic. Reading them, out of the silence of the grave there springs once more to life that little Court of long ago, with all its petty, troublous existence resuscitated. We are in the midst of it—the babel of tongues, the clash of schemes, the intrigues, the lying, the heart-burnings, the heart-breakings, the note of vice triumphant, the plaint of integrity oppressed. Once more the puppets strut across the stage, once more each plays his appointed part—that rôle apportioned to him by Fate—so all-important then, so piteously insignificant now after the lapse of nigh upon two centuries. We watch that King of Moods, that Queen of Plots, that wan, handsome Prince, that Princess with her tortured brain and failing health, those diplomatists pursuing their eternal game of Chance, toiling warily along a treacherous road with dazzling heights above and a bottomless pit beneath. We see the tall grenadiers shouldering arms; piff, puff, go the guns, the game of mimic warfare echoes noisily through the busy kingdom; the undercurrent of Statecraft progresses silently. And still, with the wisdom of the centuries, we see how each human unit is striving for Self; how that King of it all, that autocrat of cudgels and fisticuffs, is but

a madman, the dupe of every unscrupulous knave, a Monarch of Thunder crowned with a fool's cap.

Nevertheless, his Majesty of Prussia could recognise that there were occasions when he must discard his rôle of official bully, and he received the English Ambassador with good humour and gracious condescension. Yet even in this affability there was a danger. The first brief audience over, Hotham relates :

We went to dinner, where his Majesty was pleased to make both himself and the Company inordinately drunk. The Company consisted of General Grumkow, Seckendorf, Borch, Cnyphausen, and several other foreign Ministers and Persons of distinction. The King of Prussia in his Cupps began his Majesty's health, the Queen's, and to the Royal Marriage and good Union of the two Familys. I observed that it had been strongly insinuated to him that the marriage of the Prince of Wales and the Princess Royal, his daughter, was the only Purport of my Commission, and though I took frequent opportunities of insinuating to him that I begged to know what his Prussian Majesty's intentions and propositions were upon the Subject that I might transmit the same to his Majesty, yet I could at that time get no other answer than that on Saturday I should be acquainted with them, and therefore in the good Humour he was in I did not think it proper then to urge Matters further to him.

All, indeed, was uproarious merriment at that banquet. The lean dishes of pot-herbs and water which too often formed the sole diet of the starving Royal household were now replaced by savoury meats and ample abundance; servants, magnificently dressed, paced the gaily lighted apartments—for once regal splendour prevailed in the Royal Palace. And beneath the genial glow of that unwonted festivity, 'in his Cupps' Frederick William threw discretion to the winds; he proposed the health of his 'dear son-in-law, the Prince of Wales,' and Hotham found himself confronted by an unexpected dilemma. He had to hold in view two opposing aims—the mandates of his Master and the happiness of that Master's sister. Aware of the dire need for keeping the King of Prussia in a good humour and thus ameliorating the condition of Queen Sophie and her family, he yet might be held blameable if he allowed any misapprehension to exist on the part of Frederick William with regard to the true nature of the mission from England, which was to arrange two marriages, not one.

Meanwhile, news of the supposed betrothal sped through Berlin, and the partisans of Austria were dumbfounded. On the 6th of April 1830 Grumkow wrote to Reichenbach :

I returned dead drunk as the post was going, and I was not in a condition to write. The audience lasted only a quarter of an hour, and, after having read the letter from the King of England, the Master said to Seckendorf and his Friend: 'This speaks only in general terms of blood relationship, and of the marriage, and I think that it is humbug.' At table there were witticisms to the effect that a German ducat was worth

as much as an English ducat, and that all well and good to marry a daughter, but it was not necessary for that to marry a son—and other *picoteries*. But you would have fallen from the skies, when all at once the King announced that the Princess was promised to the Prince of Wales, and his Majesty received the congratulations of the whole table, while Borch cried with joy. The King was dead drunk, and Dubourgay and Hotham, who appeared in no hurry to offer their congratulations, *affectèrent un grand froid*. At the close the drinking was terrible, and the King returned much inconvenienced to Potsdam; but the next morning he caused to be conveyed to the company who had been at Charlottenbergh that they had better not mention what had taken place; and Hotham had a grand conference with Cnyphausen and Borch, but as they cannot so far agree about conditions, he has sent a Courier to get further instructions. In short, no one ever witnessed any scene to equal it. For myself, I am distracted at all this.

Grumkow in truth, at this juncture, might well have considered his position desperate. His back was against the wall; he was fighting not only for all which made life palatable, but for life itself. Frederick William, self-constituted supreme Magistrate of Prussia, had a short way with those who fell from his favour; and Grumkow, conscious of double dealing, might have trembled at this knowledge had he not gauged with unerring accuracy the power of his wit when pitted against that of his Royal Master. Neither Frederick William, with his besotted intellect, nor the 'Knight Hotham' with his rigid integrity, was likely to prove a match for the cunning of a Grumkow. In Hotham, Grumkow had speedily recognised not merely a political antagonist, but an enemy so frank that he did not trouble to disguise that enmity. Hotham, he likewise discovered, was not to be bought. The Englishman resisted all the friendly advances of Grumkow, he refused Grumkow's proffered hospitality, he responded coldly to the oily speeches of the Minister. 'Reichenbach has depicted Hotham to perfection!' wrote Grumkow angrily to his accomplice; 'his manners are extremely haughty and impertinent, and I cannot sufficiently admire the patience of the brother-in-law of the King of England to be able to endure them while awaiting the conclusion of this affair!' Hotham, on his side, with an accuracy equal to Grumkow's own, had taken the measure of his antagonist. In a letter dated the 18th of April he writes:

Grumkow knows every word that passes at the Conferences, and has already been playing tricks with me. . . . Grumkow is ever at the King's elbow. I meet every day with fresh instances of his Power, and there is hardly a Person who is often about the King that is not either in his pay or Seckendorf's. Upon my arrival he made a great many advances and Professions of Service, but meeting with no other Returns but Personal Civilities, he has since set all his Engines to work to prepossess the King against me.

To the onlooker of a later generation who can watch each movement of both players, that game between the astute Prussian and the Englishman with '*les manières fort hautaines et imperitinentes*' is one of absorbing interest, all the more that at this time each antagonist believed himself secure in a measure which would inevitably checkmate his opponent. With feverish energy Grumkow was plying Reichenbach with material wherewith to frustrate the plans of England. His accomplice was to furnish him, for use in Berlin, with every available scandal against the Prince of Wales, with every trivial gossip disadvantageous to the King and Queen of England, with any news, true or untrue, which would serve to portray in lurid colours the miserable existence that awaited a Prussian Princess amid such surroundings. He even strove to rouse the animosity of England itself against the match. In a letter designed for Reichenbach to show in England, he described the Queen of Prussia as 'frantic to get rid of the Princess Royal, who has become thin, ugly, and spotty,' a description obviously calculated to affright the fastidious, pleasure-loving Prince of Wales. But the trump-card of Grumkow lay in his ability to whisper in the ear of Frederick William the warning that Hotham had come to negotiate *two marriages*, not one, as his Majesty fondly imagined; that he could urge the King, before proceeding further with the negotiations, to insist upon a clear understanding on this point—a point which Hotham was not prepared without further instructions to elucidate.

Hotham's counter-move was nevertheless a potent one. The secret correspondence between Grumkow and Reichenbach had been intercepted in England, certain of the letters had been deciphered, and while the originals were despatched to their destination, in order that the intriguers should not be put on their guard by any knowledge of the discovery, copies of the incriminating correspondence had been transmitted to the British Envoy at Berlin. Hotham, thus furnished with proofs of the duplicity of his foe, was only deterred from taking immediate action in the matter by the timid policy of the Prussian Minister Cnyphausen, who, although friendly to England, was fearful of any too precipitate measure. Forced thus to abide his time, Hotham, however, determined to strengthen his hand against the moment when he should be ready to strike. He at once foresaw that the defence proffered by Grumkow would be that the copied letters were forgeries; therefore, when describing to Lord Townshend the manner in which Grumkow had been manœuvring against him, he added feelingly :

As I should be glad, therefore, before I leave this Place to do him also some Service in my turn, I beg your Lordship would, if you think con-

venient, stop an original letter of his to Reichenbach whenever you can meet with one strong enough to break his neck, and upon a proper occasion I shall with great pleasure put it with the Rest myself into the King's hands.

Meantime, the tide of the negotiations with regard to the proposed alliances ebbed and flowed continuously. The King inclined first to this course, then to that. One day he lent a willing ear to the insinuations of Grumkow and Seckendorf; another he recognised the advantages which might accrue from the proposals of Hotham. Finally he announced that he would consent to the marriage of his son if the Crown Prince and his bride could be established as Stadtholders in Hanover. 'It is very plain,' wrote Hotham to St. James's, with extreme frankness, 'that he will sell his son, but not give him. If no prospect of advantage be in view it will be impossible to bring the King of Prussia to reason on that head, considering the excessive jealousy and avarice of his temper.'

Awaiting instructions on this proposal, Hotham was bidden to be for a few days the guest of Frederick William at Potsdam; and there for the first time, to his extreme curiosity, he saw the Crown Prince, who had hitherto been carefully kept out of the way of the English Ambassador, as he himself stated: '*De peur que le vent Anglais ne le touchât.*'

The Prince was also at table, and it is impossible to express the dejection and melancholy that appears in him. There is something so very engaging in the Person and Behaviour of this young Prince, and everybody says so much good of him, that one is the more moved at the unhappy Circumstances he is under. As I was presented to him in the King's presence our conversation was soon over.

A few days later Frederick William again invited Hotham to visit him for some hunting, and again the Envoy was haunted by the sight of that Prince of romance and misfortune.

All I can say is the more I see of the Prince Royal, the more I wish for everything that can facilitate the conclusion of that match, for, if I am not much mistaken, this young Prince will one day make a very considerable figure, and from his good Qualities and engaging Person, there is all the reason in the world to believe that it will prove a most happy marriage.

But while these plans were being secretly formulated, Hotham was still chafing at the persistent refusal of Cnyphausen to consent to the incriminating letters of the Devil-Diplomatist being shown to the King of Prussia, and thus, as he believed, scoring an advantage before the arrival of the expected Courier from St. James's.

Let the proposals from England be what they will [wrote Hotham in disgust], I do not see why that should hinder the King of Prussia from doing himself justice and punishing two of his own servants that have

so infamously abused him; besides I cannot help thinking that these letters, if delivered now, might very much facilitate the success of any Overture that may come from his Majesty (King George) by defeating at once the Opposition we meet with from that Quarter. However, as I was absolutely tied down by my instructions to have Mr. Cnyphausen's entire approbation of the steps I should take in this matter, I was forced to acquiesce in his opinion.

Since I have wrote this letter I have been to Potsdam, and found the King not altogether in so good a humour. . . . As I am determined a Day or two after the Arrival of the Courier to lay open the whole scene of Villainy to the King of Prussia, and to put the Letters into his hands, it is hazarding nothing now to stop an original of each, which may be produced in case his Majesty be so credulous as not to give entire faith to them without seeing their own handwriting.

At last the long looked-for messenger returned from England bearing tidings which Hotham believed would place the game in his hands. George, it must be remarked, had first secured from the Prince an understanding that, when bidden, he would return from Hanover to reside in England. Having thus rendered such concessions a negligible quantity, his Majesty of England unhesitatingly subscribed to the proposition of his Majesty of Prussia. Hotham was indeed instructed to make a formal proposal for two marriages, not one, but in so doing he had permission to state that the Crown Prince and his wife would be installed in the Government of Hanover as Stadtholders. The English Princess would have no fortune but this appointment; but, on the other hand, England exacted no marriage portion with Wilhelmine.

Armed with these good tidings, and with the letters which he believed were further to strengthen his position, Hotham triumphantly demanded and obtained an audience from Frederick William on the 5th of May. He unfolded the purport of his message from England, pointing out that 'both his Prussian Majesty's children would thus be provided for in the greatest and most honourable way, and he himself entirely eased of the burden of maintaining them'; and Frederick William, although observing that in an affair of such consequence it was impossible for him to give an answer without consideration and consulting his Ministers, nevertheless seemed so gratified that Hotham seized the moment to introduce tactfully the subject he so long had had at heart:

I said I was sorry that as to one of his Ministers he had acted so infamous a part towards us and so treacherous a one towards His Majesty that I hoped his opinion would have little weight with him; and then I laid open the whole Scene of villainy between Grumkow and Reichenbach, and made him sensible that, without any regard to truth, Reichenbach writ nothing but what was dictated to him from hence by Grumkow.

I remarked in reading some passages of Reichenbach's letters, wherein he reflects upon the King of Prussia himself, that it moved His resentment; but as to Grumkow's (which 'tis true are not altogether so strong

as Reichenbach's) His Prussian Majesty seemed rather inclined to excuse him. Tho' he said that Grumkow had indeed informed him of the Correspondence he had with Reichenbach, but that he always understood it was only to have an account of the news of the town and the Transactions in Parliament.

I endeavoured as much as I could to stir up his Indignation against Grumkow, being very sensible how much my success depended upon his Ruin, but am sorry that it did not seem to me to make all the Impression I wished for.

Through the reticence of Hotham's account one reads the bitter disappointment occasioned to him by this signal failure of his carefully prepared scheme. The bomb had fallen which was to have annihilated the Devil-Diplomatists, and they remained smiling, unscathed. Frederick William, the choleric over trivialities, could be unduly phlegmatic when it suited his policy to play a different rôle; and though later Hotham sent him a second batch of letters, begging that, if he doubted their authenticity, he would compare their contents, dictated by Grumkow, with the pretended information supplied from England by the 'incendiary' Reichenbach, yet Hotham writes in despair:

Every day produces fresh instances of Grumkow's power. I can give no stronger instance of the strange Ascendancy he has over the King than that ever since his Prussian Majesty has read all the intercepted letters he is still as much in his favour as ever. . . . I am informed General Grumkow says that ever since he has known that his Letters are opened in England, he has filled them with nothing but what relates to me. I don't suppose he used me very favourably!

Grumkow, as Hotham had anticipated, promptly denied his authorship of the intercepted correspondence. The letters, he stoutly maintained, were forgeries; names had been interpolated which he had never written, sentiments ascribed to him of which he was guiltless. The whole, he boldly asserted, was a gigantic fraud—of a piece with the rest of the conduct of England. In consequence, the vacillations of Frederick William increased. Although his avarice was tempted by the proposals of England, yet his vanity—his dread of being duped by that rival Power and his genuine fear of Austria—prevented his arriving at any decision. Moreover, his Ministers in the pay of the latter country never ceased to point out to him that if he once consented to the marriage of the Crown Prince he would no longer be master of the person of his son. 'It will be difficult,' Hotham wrote, 'to propose anything to him that will remove his jealousy'; while the Prince, in a letter conveyed secretly to Hotham, frankly stated his opinion that 'the real reason why the King will not consent to this marriage is that he wishes always to keep me in an inferior position, so that he can plague me all his life whenever the spirit moves him.' Finally, Frederick William, deter-

mined that, if his consent were wrung from him, he would make yet better terms with England, sent word that before the marriages could take place King George must first ensure to him the right of succession to the coveted Duchies of Juliers and Berg. To this the British Ministry replied that the question of this succession had nothing to do with the marriages, which must be concluded without any political motives, and that England would never agree to one marriage taking place without the other.

Ere this decision from the Court of St. James's reached Hotham, he had journeyed into Saxony in the wake of the King of Prussia, who had arranged to be present at the fêtes which the King of Poland designed to give at Muhlberg at the end of May. This meeting between the two Kings at the Camp of Radewitz, in its reckless extravagance and splendour has been compared to the Field of the Cloth of Gold; and historians throughout succeeding generations have loved to dwell on the pomp and the pageantry which immortalised it, the parading of 30,000 men in new uniforms, the tedious reviews beginning at daybreak and ending only when the spectators were wearied to exhaustion; the ceaseless banquets, concerts, theatrical displays, and, beneath all, that tragic under-current of intrigue in which the Ambassador Extraordinary from England, the hapless Prince, and the half-demented Monarch were the chief performers. For the fantastic grandeur and the regal display of which Frederick formed one of the central figures but served to enhance his misery and his humiliation. To the nobles, the Ambassadors, the officials who bowed before him—nay, to the very scullions who served him—he saw himself an object of pity, more of a slave than the humblest carl who paraded before him in the dust and heat. The more importance he acquired by taking his true position in the pageantry, the more did the mad hatred of his father determine to humble him to the earth. 'Never,' writes Lavissee, 'had the King treated him with such brutality. One day he had beaten him cruelly, thrown him on the ground, and dragged him about by the hair. Frederick had to appear on the parade ground in a very disorderly condition.' All the world knew and discussed his plight, all eyes scanned him with curiosity. His fate had become past endurance; and when, amid the thunder of guns and the tramping of troops, Hotham succeeded in establishing further communication with the unhappy Prince, it was to learn that he had definitely determined on attempting an escape to England.

Immediately Captain Guy Dickins was despatched to the Court of St. James's with this intelligence, under the pretence of carrying from Hotham a request for further instructions with regard to the protracted negotiations respecting the Royal

marriages. Soon after his departure the great military display at the Camp of Radewitz terminated in a protracted orgy. First, a bewildering exhibition of fireworks which lasted from ten o'clock one evening till sunrise the following morning; next, a gigantic banquet, whereat every man feasted and drank till he could swallow no more; finally, a hunt conducted on the same colossal scale, where above a thousand stags, wild boars, and roebuck were slaughtered. Then the Kings dined together for the last time, and afterwards bade each other an affectionate farewell.

Their parting was, however, marked by a tragi-comic incident, of which Hotham makes amused mention. Frederick William's craze for giants remained irrepressible, and he had noted with considerable jealousy the abnormal stature of some of the components of King Auguste's infantry. On a previous occasion, when he had ventured to solicit the transference of certain of these desirable units of the Polish Army to his own, King Auguste had responded curtly, '*Qu'il n'était pas marchand de chair humaine.*' At Radewitz, on the contrary, Hotham relates :

The two Kings parted with great protestations of Friendship for each other. . . It was impossible, however, for the King of Poland to withstand the importunity of his Majesty of Prussia in an affair not altogether, it is true, of much consequence, for he made him a present of twenty-four tall men, much against his will, and to the inexpressible grief of the poor Fellows!

It was on the 2nd of July that Hotham re-entered Berlin. Within a week from that date Captain Guy Dickins had returned from England bearing, to the surprise of all, fresh suggestions from King George which were calculated to fan into a brief flame the expiring negotiations between the Sovereigns. Dickins had pleaded the cause of the unhappy Wilhelmine and Frederick till he had obtained this concession—that his Majesty of England would consent either to delay both marriages so that they might be celebrated together, or to conclude the marriage between the Prince of Wales and Wilhelmine under a definite promise from the King of Prussia that the marriage between Frederick and the Princess Amelia should take place within a given time limit. To the Prince, his uncle sent secret assurances of his commiseration and desire to aid him, but he pointed out that the present moment was unsuitable for putting the Prince's plans into execution. He begged Frederick to delay taking the fatal step at least till he saw the result of the fresh concessions made by England in the matter of the negotiations for his marriage.

But in the eyes of Hotham all other news brought from England sank into insignificance when he learnt that Captain

Dickins was the bearer on his behalf of an original letter which had been intercepted from Grumkow to Reichenbach. With what feelings Hotham received this treasure which he had so long coveted may be imagined. The precious document was brief—only one page was covered by writing. The autograph was all but illegible—tortuous and difficult to unravel as Grumkow himself. But its authorship was incontestable; its contents such as Hotham believed must at last carry conviction even to the stolid brain of Frederick William.

Immediately upon hearing of the return of the messenger from England the King of Prussia granted an interview to Hotham, which took place early on the 9th of July, and lasted four hours. Perplexed at a new development of the situation, the irresolute Monarch, who neither wished to terminate nor to comply with the proposals from England, was more than ever unable to come to a decision. Finally, seizing any loophole for further delay, he declared that the marriage of Wilhelmine to the Prince of Wales was with him a point of honour; as for his son, when the time arrived he would doubtless prefer an English Princess to any other, and the marriage should be celebrated, at the latest, within ten years. This reply Hotham was to take back to England.

Was the King sincere? Who shall say? Ten more years of torture and humiliation for his hated heir, ten more years of procrastination for himself, ten more years in which the affairs of Europe should mature, and then—well, matters might decide themselves.

It was a long way off, that ten years' limit of which he spoke. Nevertheless, at the moment when Frederick William announced this decision the negotiations seemed approaching a definite completion more nearly than had ever previously been the case.

But that same evening, after the interview with Hotham, the Devil-Diplomatists, according to their time-honoured practice, sowed mistrust in the mind of their Royal Master. Amid the smoke of their evening pipes, and doubtless after the fumes of wine had as usual clouded the judgment of the King, Grumkow told him that in the first proposition, the postponement of Wilhelmine's marriage, England was deliberately attempting to play fast and loose with him. If in the future she required to make use of his Prussian Majesty, she would do so; if her policy did not require him, he would go to the wall. Frederick William at once veered round. He was enraged to think that he had so nearly been made the tool of England's perfidy, and it was in no amicable frame of mind that he received Sir Charles Hotham on the morrow.

Hotham, for his part, came to this, his final interview, light

of heart and full of confidence. It was now the 10th of July, and his mission had extended over many weary weeks. Eagerly he anticipated his return to England, and the conclusion of his negotiation, if not so entirely satisfactory as could have been wished, was not wholly a failure. But more than all, within his grasp, for the present safely hidden away, was that precious document which, in disclosing the treason of the King's chief adviser, might yet turn the scale and leave the English Ambassador triumphant in the hour of departure. Hotham had determined to conclude his mission by a master-stroke.

It was mid-day when he entered the Palace with Guy Dickins, whom he had come to present as the British Minister about to succeed Dubourgay. Frederick William received the credentials of the new Ambassador with outward civility, and for a quarter of an hour the conversation drifted into desultory channels. At last Hotham, considering the moment propitious, took the step for which he had so long been waiting.

'As General Grumkow has denied that he is the author of the letters I handed your Majesty,' he announced, 'I have received orders from the King, my Master, to place in the hands of your Majesty an original letter from the General.' He drew the precious document from his pocket—with its peculiar tortuous writing, its brief damning evidence—and held it towards the King. Frederick William, scarcely realising all it purported, took it from him; but, as the King's glance fell on the well-known autograph, in a lightning-flash there was brought home to him the unpleasant conviction that that little slip of paper in his hand proved him to be a dupe and a fool. And the anger of Frederick William blazed forth. The restraint which he was so little wont to exercise forsook him. He forgot that he could not with impunity treat the Ambassador of England as he had treated his own son, his judges, his family, and his subjects. '*Monsieur*,' he stormed, '*j'ai eu assez de ces choses là!*' and, abruptly leaving the room, he slammed the door upon the astonished Ambassadors.

In Hotham's subsequent despatch he related the incident as above, treating it with a reticence which encouraged Carlyle to doubt the full extent of the King's ill-behaviour on that memorable occasion; but the more explicit account preserved among the Hotham muniments, coinciding as it does with the account written by the Princess Wilhelmine, unquestionably may be accepted as correct:

H.M. the King of Prussia . . . was offended at the message which Sir Charles delivered. He burst into a furious fit of passion . . . and threw the letter in the face of the Ambassador, *raising his foot as if he meant to kick him. Sir Charles stepped back and laid his hand upon his sword.*

The King retired in anger, clapping the door after him with the utmost violence. Sir Charles on his part withdrew, indignant at the gross affront which had been offered him as representative of his Britannic Majesty and shocked at so great a violation of his sanctity of character and privileges of an Ambassador of England. He called together all the foreign Ministers, and, bitterly complaining of the insult which his Master had received, declared his fixed determination to return to England.

'Where,' asks Carlyle, 'is the Original Letter? Ask some Minute reader. Minute readers the *ipsissimum corpus* of it is lost to mankind. . . . It (has) no date of its own, we say, though by internal evidence and light of *Fassmann*, it is conclusively datable Berlin, May 20th, if anybody cares to date it. . . . Prussian Dryasdust is expected to give it in Facsimile, one day—surely no British Under-Secretary will exercise an unwise discretion and forbid him that pleasure!'

But Carlyle need not have feared that the publication of this curious document would be prohibited. Hotham, in his despatch descriptive of the incident in which it played so important a part, expressly states that after Frederick William had left the room—'*I took the letter that he had thrown upon the floor.*' It returned in Hotham's keeping to England, whence it had already journeyed, and for nigh upon two centuries it has reposed peacefully among the family muniments of that Ambassador Extraordinary. There it lies to-day, that yellowing paper which the Devil-Diplomatist of Prussia once sent to his spy in England; which the Prime Minister Newcastle intercepted and conveyed to his Royal Master; which George the Second fingered thoughtfully, then, writing '*Yes, send it,*' decreed that it should go back with Captain Guy Dickins to Berlin, greatly to gladden the heart of the 'Knight Hotham.' There it lies—that paper which a mad Monarch once flung into the face of an insulted Ambassador, which decided the fate of two Royal marriages and God knows what besides between two great nations—that paper of ill-omen which, after the passing of generations, by a strange coincidence has again come to light when an issue of yet mightier import than it once determined hangs in the balance between the Courts of Berlin and Britain :

Je vous felicite de tout mon cœur de l'augmentation de Gages de mil
ens que le Roy vous a accordé, avec le titre de vice-president du Con-
sistoire, et jespere que celle cy vous trouvera encor a Londres, et que vous
debarqueres bientost en bonne sante, on se vante icy qu'on a des originaux
de lettres que je vous ai ecrites en main, quoyque je ne vous ai rien ecrit,
que de fort innocent, je ne puis croire que vous les ayez garde, puisque
vous m'avez souvent mande, que vous bruliez les lettres que je vous ai
ecrites, pour les bagatelles que vous m'avez ecrites je les ai d'abord brulees
et je defie au diable de les produire, Hier les fiancailles (die verlobung) du
prince de beven fil aine du Prince de beven Feldmarsch[all] de l'empereur

s'est faite au chateau au grand contentement du Roy et de toute la famille Royale, il y a eu [un] bal et grand souper je suis sans reserve tout a vous. Cele. 20 de May, 1730.

A harmless letter this, to the ignorant reader, nevertheless so damning in its insisted innocence that, when despatching it to George the Second, Newcastle had written in regard to it: '*It seems so material acknowledging all the other originals, and shows such an apprehension lest they should have been stopped*, that I most humbly submit it to your Majesty whether it may not be proper to stop this original letter.' And in sooth it had proved a greater firebrand than Newcastle even can have anticipated. Within an hour of its reception by the Prussian King the news of what had occurred sped through Berlin. The tale lost nothing in the telling. Wilhelmine heard it, and uncertain whether to rejoice or lament at the escape of wedlock with the vicious Prince of Wales, trembled for what might be in store for herself and her brother. Frederick, the unhappy Crown Prince, heard it, and read in it the end to his cherished desires, the destruction of that romance which alone had lent a ray of brightness to his intolerable existence. Yet one hope still remained to him. He personally would plead his cause with the British Envoy, hitherto sympathetic. It is said that at the instigation of the Danish Minister, and with the approval of his mother and his sisters, he made a last appeal to Hotham to accept the apology offered by his father; indeed, Wilhelmine purports to give a brief letter which the Prince thus indited and which Carlyle quotes, not without misgiving, together with the answer made thereto by Hotham. But the true document, hurriedly written by Frederick on receipt of the tidings which confounded him—showing by its penmanship and its wording the agitation and haste of the writer—a pitiful human document palpitating with despair, appears to have been unknown to Wilhelmine, as to Thomas Carlyle and historians of a later date. It remained in the possession of Hotham, a memento, together with the letter of Grumkow, of his strange mission to the strange Court of Prussia and—like that other document of different import—only to-day to be presented to the public in all the freshness of its first appeal.

Sieur, je viens d'apprendre dans ce moment que vous voulez partir je ses la reson pourquoi et tout, mais je vous prie au nom de Dieu ne renversez pas tout ce que vous avez acomodez jusqu'a present, le Roy ce repent extremement de tout ce qui c'est pace, et je suis persuade que tout jra le mieux du mondé pourvu que vous voulez rester, pencez y, encore Monsieur il y va du bonheur de la famille de votre Roy car ce qui regarde sa sœur le regarde aussi, je vous prie par tout ce qu'il y a de Seins ne prenez point si haut, tache de racomoder tout a l'amiable et pences que

c'est votre amie qui vous en prie et que vous me metez le poigniar au cœur ci vous rompez avec ma Sœur, tenez vous me rendre le plus grand service du monde ci vous ne rompez point cete affaire, mon dieu pazez l'histoire de la lettre sous silence, vous avez les promeces en mein tout est a la vellye d'etre heureux encore une foix au nom de la parolle que vous m'avez donez pour faire tout ce que vous pouvez pour faire reusir ce maryaje ne prenez point cela ci haut enfein reste et racomodez tout, je vous en prie au nom de tout ve qui vous peut flechir, adieu.

FREDERIC P. R.

P.S.—Je suis persuade que vous ferez reflection a ceci, et que ma lettre ne sera pas ecrite pour rien.

P.S.—Notre Roy a dit aujourd'hui a la Reine qu'il ne Souhaitait mieux que le maryage de ma sœur, il m'a conte ce qui c'est passe hier et dit qu'il seroit au desespoir de voir tout rompu, Au nom de tout les dieux monsieur ne galez don rien que le regret du Roy vous tiene lieu de satisfaction.

But Hotham was inexorable. It was not his personal pride which was at stake, but that of his Royal Master; and neither the piteous plight of the unhappy Prince nor the fretful repentance of Frederick William could shake his resolution. He had received his instructions in the first instance: '*If he (the King of Prussia) should fly out at any time into expressions not becoming our Minister to bear, you will support our Honour and Dignity with Resolution and Firmness.*' The attention of Europe was directed towards his conduct, and never must it be said that the Corporal of Potsdam had insulted with impunity the representative of the Majesty of England. Frederick William had behaved badly, and Frederick William must be punished.

Bitterly did the Royal culprit—possibly for the first time in his life—repent his momentary ebullition of temper by which he had irretrievably placed himself in the wrong. Accustomed as he was to vent unhesitatingly every passing mood on defenceless victims, the recognition must have come somewhat in the nature of a surprise that he had at last met with defiance, that he had attacked where the blow had rebounded upon himself. It was annoying, too, to reflect that his conduct would be freely criticised and condemned by the Courts of Europe. Wilhelmine relates that he had scarcely reached his own room than he began to regret what he had done, foreseeing the result, 'he was in perfect despair.' Like a spoilt child who despises what is within his grasp and craves the unattainable, no sooner did he see the alliance with England, 'that comfortable possibility,' slipping from him than he desired it—temporarily, perhaps, but nevertheless ardently. Like a child, too, he bemoaned his fault plaintively: 'My temper got the better of me. I was in a bad humour, and when that happens I must relieve my feelings.' He even added, 'Had it been a letter from the King of England which I had treated thus, well and good; there would have been some reason for being so angry. But the letter of a

porter like Grumkow! What is there to be said? Am I not master to do as I please? The English are very touchy!’

But Hotham was not to be beguiled. Vainly did Frederick William invite him to dinner, vainly did he send Ministers first to remonstrate, then to plead. Hotham’s reply was to demand post-horses; and only two days after that momentous incident he set off on his journey to England.

And so Hotham [relates Carlyle], spirited, judicious Englishman, rolls off homewards, a few hours after his courier, steady there henceforth. He has not been successful in Berlin: surely his negotiation is now *out* in all manner of senses! Long ago (to use our former ignoble figure) he had ‘laid down the bellows, though there was still smoke traceable’; but by now, by this Grumkow letter, he has, as it were, struck the *poker* through the business, and that dangerous manœuvre, not proving successful, has been fatal and final! Queen Sophie and certain others may still flatter themselves, but it is evident the negotiation is at last complete. What may lie in Flight to England and rash, desperate measures which Queen Sophie trembles to think of, we do not know; but by regular negotiation this thing can never be.

And what of the aftermath? Of the Prince’s desperate attempt to escape, of the betrayal of the project by his page on the 6th of August, of the subsequent arrest and imprisonment of Frederick on the charge of being a deserter, and of all the brutal treatment meted out to him till his reason and his life were at stake, historians have written fully. Reports of these dire events followed Hotham to England and filled him with a horror which was shared throughout the civilised world. ‘All over Europe,’ we are told, ‘nothing was talked of save the cruelties of the King of Prussia.’ But Hotham had shaken the dust of Berlin from his feet for ever; and that mission on which he was despatched—with all the anxiety and diplomacy it entailed, the sharp encounter of brilliant wits, the fierce antagonism of stubborn wills, all the hundred-and-one influences at work, crossing and re-crossing each other in tireless conflict—all this finds its sole tangible result in those packets of yellowing papers which lie amongst the Hotham muniments, and which for us to-day are filled with a strange significance. For even as we lay them back into the box, even as the puppets which we have conjured up vanish and that phantom world sinks back into the silence of the grave, still the cannon of Frederick William is echoing in our ears, still we hear the tramp of the legions which he created, still we see Austria and Prussia bound by a link at which each secretly chafes, and still is England the antagonist of both.

A. M. W. STIRLING.

SOME PERSONAL MEMORIES OF TREITSCHKE

AFTER years of studied neglect Heinrich von Treitschke is having a posthumous boom in this country. His name is on every lip, his writings and sayings are quoted every day on the platform and in the Press, and the essence of his political philosophy has lately been reproduced in quite a number of popular volumes. 'Why have we not heard of Treitschke's teaching before?' naively asked a reviewer of one of these books recently. We have heard, but we have not heeded. Treitschke has, of course, been known always to English students of modern German history, but it is certainly a singular irony of fate that the most brilliant annalist of modern Germany and of German unity should have come so tardily into prominence amongst us, and then only because of the close relationship between his political theories and the events which preceded and have accompanied the war. For it is more than half a century since Treitschke began to write on historical and political subjects, and he has now been dead eighteen years.

Even now the haziest notions appear to be current about the man, his character, and his influence. Only a few weeks ago a distinguished novelist spoke of him as a disciple of Nietzsche. Apart from the fact that Treitschke was Nietzsche's senior by ten years, and began to write when Nietzsche was a schoolboy, the idea of his strong, masculine mind being fed on the excitative pabulum served out to the neurasthenic young men and women of Germany by the inventor of the Superman is humorous enough for tears. Another writer describes him as spare of form and of only medium height—again a curiously inaccurate picture. He was tall and massive, the very embodiment of his own doctrine of power. I see him still, as I saw him in Berlin over twenty-five years ago in his own study, and constantly while hearing his lectures (for one term he signed me into a place just in front of him, for a reason to be explained), a man of commanding presence, finely built, his large head firmly poised, his hair and beard full and dark, his keen eyes flashing restlessly, unspectacled even in that much-spectacled country. He was

no weakling, no half-man, but as strong and masterful in figure and bearing as in spirit and word.

Outwardly Treitschke suggested rather the officer than the scholar, and indeed he came of an old Saxon military family, which has given a General to the present war. His parents intended him likewise for the army, but to their sorrow this career was closed to him by the misfortune of total deafness, left by illness in boyhood. It is said that before the final choice of scholarship was made—and here Treitschke followed his own bent—his relatives inquired whether, as he could not be an officer, an opening could not at least be found for him under the Royal Saxon Master of the Horse.

Treitschke had attracted the attention of the Prussian Government before he was invited to Berlin University early in the 'seventies. Even in his native Saxony he had preached national unity, the extinction of the small States, and the obligation and right of Prussia to take the lead in the creation of a Germanic empire. Just as Bismarck was the strong man he had waited for, so he himself was to prove the pre-eminent apostle of Germanism and of Prussian hegemony. All his life the interests of Germany, and particularly of Prussia, were everything to him, and nothing else in God's earth greatly mattered.

Ranke said that his task as an historian was to tell 'the naked truth without gloss, with no romance even in the least degree, and no fancies of the brain,' and it is recorded that he consented with much misgiving to become the official historian of the Prussian State and Crown, knowing that his scientific conscience and love of objectivity would be sorely tried by the duties associated with that position. Such scruples never troubled Treitschke when in due time he took Ranke's place. It was characteristic of him as an academic teacher that he combined political philosophy and history, and both bore the Prussian-Hohenzollern stamp; his political theories were drawn from the life of the Prussian State in practice, and in his teaching of German history Prussia was the centre and its glorification the purpose. He may be said to have reduced the Prussian State to a single formula, which was the formula of power. No other modern German writer of the first rank taught so systematically the doctrine that 'force rules the world, has ruled it, shall rule it.' His influence as the theoretical representative of the force doctrine was as great as Bismarck's success in its practical application.

This enthusiasm for Prussia and all things Prussian was the more remarkable since Treitschke was not himself a Prussian, and, strictly speaking, only partially a German, for he came of Slav ancestry. It is noteworthy, however, that in his

German History he in one place uses the words 'we Prussians,' and it may be surmised that he changed his political nationality on settling in the northern kingdom. His admiration for Prussia was primarily the political admiration of a glowing patriot who saw no hope for German unity and for the progress of German ideas and influence unless Prussia became both Germany's leader and its interpreter to the rest of the world. The particularism of the past had disgusted him, as it disgusted Hegel, and, seeing in it the changeless enemy of every aspiration towards national unity, he wiped his hands of the Central and South Germany of nearly twenty States, Courts, and Parliaments, embraced the ideal of Germanism realised through and in Prussia, and made Prussia his home and the scene of his labours. Treitschke can rebuke the 'boastful self-complaisance of Teutonism,' but of Prussia he speaks as 'not only the most powerful but the noblest and most intelligent of the German States'—a verdict in which the rest of Germany has never concurred.

Since the death of Ranke no one has disputed Treitschke's pre-eminence amongst contemporary German historians, omitting, of course, Mommsen, whose dominion was unique. Treitschke's colleagues in historical science crowned him with their own hands, and his countrymen cordially confirmed the choice. The glorification of Germany in European history, and of Prussia in German history, was his mission for over thirty years, and he pursued it with singular fidelity and success in elaborate books, in a long succession of essays published in his own and other historical reviews, and still more in the lectures which he delivered as a professor of Berlin University. Yet the peculiar merit of Treitschke as an historian suggests his peculiar defect. Germany and Prussia bulked so large in his mind that he fell into a partiality and a partisanship which were inexcusable in an historian. He viewed the world and mankind from the Teutonic angle of vision, and theorised and judged accordingly. His strong prejudices lessened the value of his work when tried by such a test as Niebuhr or Ranke would have applied, but they increased rather than diminished his position and authority with his countrymen.

Treitschke's Prussian one-sidedness was even more conspicuous in his spoken addresses as a professor than in his writings. In the lecture-room no one expected complete objectivity from him, and seldom did a lecture pass without drastic judgments upon some country or other that had failed to take Germany at its own valuation, or that stood in Germany's light. German *Kultur* was never the 'culture' of the English drawing-room, and even in Treitschke's day that *Kultur* was becoming a prickly, *Noli-me-tangere* sort of thing, proud and puffed up,

the *Kultur* of the Cynic who bade Plato remark that the straw of a tub was better than all his fine carpets. Now it was Russia, now France, now England, now the United States which came under Treitschke's censure; each had its turn, but on the whole England and France received more than their share of unfriendly attention. Extreme in opinions, he was extreme, too, in language, and if he had a dislike he expressed it strongly and at times offensively. Often his passing outbursts of sarcasm and ill-will had no relation whatever to either history or political philosophy, but it was 'Treitschke's way,' for so the indulgent verdict went. It was not a gracious or a persuasive way, but the man's candour and earnestness, and the impression which he gave at all times—even when in his worst humours—that he was uttering his honest convictions, disarmed serious resentment. Moreover, Treitschke's tendency to exaggerate Germany's place and importance in the world was in part a natural reaction against the old national spirit of excessive humility. It will be found that much of his aggressive polemic fell to a time when Germany had only just ceased to be a geographical expression, and Germans to apologise for their nationality, as Boswell excused his to Johnson, 'because they could not help it.'

Treitschke's attitude towards England was distinctly less friendly in the later than the earlier part of his public life. I am inclined to think that for some reason or other there came a turning point in his political development at which his attitude towards this country, which had formerly been benevolently neutral, became positively hostile, and that from that time onward his Anglophobism increased to the end. It is certain that some at least of his prejudices were due to the fact that his opinions of England and English institutions, once formed, were never modified, however English life and thought might have broadened. In his lectures to the last he spoke of the English as a nation of sour-tempered Puritans, and in the course of a more than usually bitter attack upon the Anglican Church, he said (I quote from my notes of his lectures) 'All the livings are sold to the rich. The Anglican clergy make it their business to teach the small folk that it is their duty politely to get out of the way of the well-to-do.' He believed that the English mind was full of hypocrisy, and English national life built upon shams. Here are equally impressive *dicta* taken at random from the same source: 'A German could not live long in the atmosphere of England—an atmosphere of sham prudery, conventionality, and hollowness; it is too much for us.' 'The English imagine themselves to be the most moral of nations, but happily they are not.'

It may be questioned whether Treitschke's political theories

alone would have found such a ready acceptance had they not been enforced by a singular brilliancy of language and an enthusiasm which to the young in particular counted for more than fidelity to fact. Of Treitschke's literary style his books speak, but the fascination of his vivacious periods was not half so great as the vivid eloquence of the living voice, an eloquence whose effect, strange to say, seemed not to be spoiled in the least by a monotonous and somewhat indistinct articulation due to his deafness from childhood. His command of language was complete, and once you were able to follow him there was no resisting his charm. Without haste, yet literally without rest, he would pour out from the treasure of an inexhaustible vocabulary a continuous stream of language, every sentence as perfect in construction as though read from one of his books. He never faltered unless overcome by feeling, for his passions were vehement. Beginning his lecture directly he had ascended the desk, he gave you no breathing space until he had spoken his full three-quarters of an hour or hour and a half, as the case might be, and then suddenly and without warning the voice ceased, and a moment later he had disappeared. Yet a more finished, more concise, more logical manner of address was seldom heard. On one occasion I discussed Treitschke with one of his Berlin colleagues, Professor Koser, who succeeded him as Prussian Historiographer, and I remarked on his prejudices. 'Yes,' was the sudden reproving rejoinder, 'but think of his language!' If brilliancy of language could redeem historical partiality, then indeed Treitschke would be beyond reproach.

I doubt whether he had a sense of humour. So profoundly serious was he in character, so absorbed by the importance of his message, that I never once saw any trace of a smile pass over his face, even when he was launching mordant sallies which moved his hearers to laughter.

There can be no question that Treitschke's teaching has been an immense power in Germany. Successive generations of students, comprising the officers, scholars, statesmen, politicians, administrative officials, and journalists of the future, sat at his feet, and his class-rooms were always crowded. A number of his colleagues also invariably attended the 'public' lectures which he, like certain other leading Berlin professors, was expected to give during the winter term. They occupied chairs on each side of the reading desk, and formed a guard of honour when, at the end of his oration, he went out to the accompaniment of thunderous applause. Only the foremost lecturers enjoyed this flattering attention from their peers. The physicist, Du Bois Reymond, was another who at that time was always sure of it.

Thus there went forth from his lecture-room powerful influences and impulses which reached into every part of the national life. The effect was not altogether good where Treitschke's pupils accepted his teaching as a whole, for with the pure gold of political wisdom there was much alloy. Let me recall some words of another colleague of Treitschke, my revered friend the late Dr. Friedrich Paulsen—beloved of gods and men—who sincerely admired the man without endorsing his 'tendency': 'Amongst contemporary historians Treitschke has exercised the greatest influence upon the political thought of the rising generation. With the characteristic vehemence of his eloquence he preaches the maxim that the State is power, and war is its first, most elementary function.' For that conception modern Germany, to its hurt, has largely to thank Treitschke.

On the other hand, while his lectures might be faulty presentations of history, warped by prejudice and full of uncharitableness, they were powerful incentives to high living and to unselfish conceptions of citizenship. If he was dogmatic beyond the right of an instructor addressing men who had already tasted of the tree of knowledge, his enthusiastic nature, his fervid eloquence, and his unique power of interpreting to Germans their own minds and aspirations made him the idol of the rising generation. Above all, no writer or teacher of his time did so much to stimulate the patriotic spirit of Young Germany as Treitschke. His patriotism was one-sided, blind, and not always just, and it saw no good save in Judea, but it was intensely sincere. It was no sentiment of the lip, but a passion of the heart; it was no patriotism *d'occasion*, no Sunday, bandbox patriotism, but one for every day, and all his life. Love of the Fatherland may be said to have been the motive of his literary work and his public action. Hence he talked patriotism vehemently because he so felt, and because he was under a sacred compulsion. The burden of his thought was 'Woe unto me if I preach not *this* gospel.'

And how he preached it! I happened to be present when in March 1887 Treitschke brought to a close a course of lectures on German history. At that time the public mind was more unsettled on the question of war with France than it had been since 1875. Just before, Bismarck had made in the Reichstag one of his most famous speeches (it was my good fortune to hear it), wherein he made known the terms of the Austro-German alliance and pressed for a large increase in the army estimates on pain of imminent national disaster. When he had finished his lecture, Treitschke spoke of the conflict which many believed to be impending. 'We live in troublous times,' he said, 'and war may occur at any moment. But whether it

come in a few weeks or be deferred for a few years, the certainty is unquestionable. Bear in mind, young men, all I have said about the rise of our country. Patriotism is the highest and holiest of passions'—and here the tears rolled down the professor's cheeks—'and if before we meet again some of you are called to fight, remember that it will be for the unity of the German Empire, which has just been won, and against the anarchical tendencies of the times.' He could not go further, and ended in sobs, but the feelings of his hearers had been worked up to the highest point, and for some moments all we could do was to look at one another in silence. Those who know anything of the impressionable German character will be able to picture to themselves the rapturous enthusiasm which followed. I know how I felt myself under the spell of Treitschke's appeals, for the sensation has stayed with me ever since.

This demonstrative avowal of patriotic sentiment is far more respectable in Germany than in our own country of dignified reserves and mighty repressions, and it may be, as we are sometimes told, that our quieter mood is that of a higher order of citizenship. What we are apt to forget is that the great majority of men and women do not belong to that order; they are honest, stolid folk whose torpid imaginations need to be vigorously fanned into flame, and who often only get their emotions, the emotion of patriotism amongst them, as they get certain diseases—by infection. How otherwise explain the fact that in this immensely grave crisis of our national history we are still footballing and horse-racing, business is going on 'as usual,' and Kitchener is slowly working to the end of his first million men, instead of having completed his second?

These memories must not end with any suggestion of captious criticism of Germany's supreme modern patriot. I for one find myself unable to join in the popular hue-and-cry against Treitschke, as though he were a sort of political outlaw and his influence wholly pernicious. As a nation we owe him no thanks. From the English standpoint he was a Chauvinist, but so from the German were Seeley and Cramb—alas! too soon taken from us, to our loss—and they, too, were both professors. And yet I am confident that upon those of my countrymen who heard Treitschke's lectures his glorification of Prussia to the disparagement of the rest of the world had an effect which he cannot have anticipated. For when he spoke of 'Prussia' we heard 'England'; the pictures of Prussia's deeds and prowess called up in the mind the mightier deeds and brighter lustre of England's far older history; and we found ourselves asking (for one hearer I can speak with confidence): 'If Prussia, which has done so much for itself, so little for the world, be really so great and

glorious, what of the mother of races, at whose breast new nations have been nourished and from whose genius new civilisations have sprung—the England which has given her very self, body, soul, and spirit, to mankind?’ In his judgments upon this country, Treitschke was often unjust, sometimes bad-mannered, but even under provocation one had the comforting thought that England was big and big-hearted enough to bear both abuse and spite. Besides, Treitschke’s dislike of England came unquestionably from the traditional *invidia* of his nation, and people do not at heart think unworthily of those whom they envy. Hence, in spite of himself, one could mentally put this Prussian swashbuckler into the witness-box, and make him, even against his will, turn Crown evidence for England’s greatness. Thus it was that many an Englishman owed to Treitschke a welcome and precious deepening of his own national consciousness, new and larger perceptions of his country’s place in the world, its mission and destiny, and a brighter glow of his patriotic ardours.

Even at this long distance of time the instincts of loyalty and gratitude refuse to be overborne, and I confess that I, for one, am still so unredeemed that, were I required to throw stones at Heinrich von Treitschke, I should wish my stones to be pebbles, and when I had thrown them I should want to run away.

WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON.

THE EFFECTS OF THE WAR UPON NON-CHRISTIAN PEOPLES

A FELLOW-TRAVELLER from London to Gloucester last month propounded to me the following question : What are the Indian troops in Europe likely to think about Christianity now? The question is not an easy one to answer by itself, but it becomes much more difficult when the worldwide character of the War is taken into consideration. The far-flung battle lines of France and Flanders do not occupy the whole stage of the theatre. The confused sounds have literally gone forth into all lands, and they have echoed over the uttermost parts of the sea. One of the fiercest contests outside Europe has taken place upon Chinese soil. There Japanese troops have fought side by side with ours, as Indian troops are doing, not only in Europe, but also in Egypt, in East Africa, and around the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The Germans have foretold unutterable results that will ensue from the entry of Eastern troops into a Western quarrel, but on the other hand they have called into the fray the Turks, and through them has been preached a Jihad among the Moham-madan tribes of Asia and Africa. There may be few bold enough to attempt an estimate of the ultimate result of this War upon the future relations of the human race, but there are few foolish enough to deny that it will have a profound effect throughout the world, and not least, one might think, upon the future of the Christian religion.

In attempting to form an estimate of the effect that the War may exercise upon the attitude of the non-Christian peoples towards Christianity, I write with great diffidence. It is only because it affects a matter of policy that no man can afford to disregard that I venture to do so at all. For whatever view men take of Christian Missions they cannot overlook their formative influence in the world. To remain uninterested in the 'moral religious future' of mankind is not so much irreligious as it is stupid. Before doing anything else, however, let me frankly confess that I consider the conditions of our social life that made this War as inevitable as a Greek tragedy are profoundly unchristian. The late Professor Cramb expressed his conviction that

the spirit of materialism, or Napoleonism as he called it, is contending with Christism for domination over the souls of men in Europe. In Germany alone—and particularly in Berlin and the places coming under the influence of Berlin—has this spirit acquired something of the clearness and consistency of a formulated creed. Throughout Europe he opined ‘Corsica in a word has conquered Christ.’ No one who has wandered to and fro in the world with open eyes, as I have done, can doubt that the spirit of materialism is at work everywhere. It is to be found in Tokio and Pekin just as surely as it exists in Europe. Yet my appreciation of this momentous fact has not convinced me that Christianity is bankrupt, nor that all Christians are either false or self-deluded. There are to be found still those who have never bowed the knee to Baal and whose lips have never kissed him. But this War has shown indeed how vital and persistent are the forces against which Christianity is pledged to contend. It is therefore a legitimate question to ask: if in Europe men and women have been tempted to turn aside with disgust from a religion which appears to be identified with bloodshed on so huge a scale, will not a similar nausea be felt by non-Christian peoples who look upon Christianity from without, and assess it by the way in which these Christians love one another?

It is humiliating to say so, but in order to understand the conditions of the inquiry it must be remembered that non-Christian races are not swayed, to any appreciable extent, by pacifist ideals, Christian or otherwise. The Indian troops, for instance, are peoples that delight in war. In the main they have been recruited from amongst the Rajputs, the Gurkhas, the Mahrattas, the Sikhs, the Pathans, and the other fighting clans of Mussalmans. Their warlike traditions stretch far back into the misty past. For over a hundred years some of them have been fighting side by side with the British. So far, then, from being shocked by the spectacle of bloodshed on so huge a scale, they are much more likely to be pleased at it. This view has received confirmation from a recent letter of an artillery officer at the front published in the *Morning Post*. In response to a question, a Gurkha advanced with a delighted smile this opinion: ‘All war is good: this is heaven.’

A furious indictment of Christianity, or rather of American civilisation visualised as Christian, has recently been made in the *Forum* by a Muslim gentleman called Achmed Abdullah. The article is entitled ‘Seen through Mohammadan Spectacles.’ The argument runs thus:

If you wish to conquer with the right of fire, and the might of sword, go ahead and do so, or at least say so. It would be a motive that we Muslim, being warriors, could understand and appreciate. But do not

clothe your greed for riches and dominion in the hypocritical nasal sing-song of a heaven-decreed Mission to enlighten the poor native, a Pharisee call of duty to spread the word of your Saviour, your lying intention to uplift the ignorant pagan. . . . You are deaf to the voice of reason and fairness, and so you must be taught with the whirling swish of the sword when it is red.

Putting aside, for a moment, the accusation of hypocrisy, which is largely deserved, and Mr. Achmed Abdullah's confusion of thought, which is understandable, this estimate of war, in contrast to what is euphemistically called 'peaceful penetration,' is not without interest and importance.

The next point is one that can be approached with less reluctance. In one form or another it is constantly affirmed that the 'moral side of the War is the Allies' best asset.' This is true all over the world. Count Okuma, the Premier of Japan, in a dignified statement in the *Japan Magazine*, reiterates with moving conviction the Japanese outlook upon the moral issues at stake. He says :

It will be our one ambition at this time to show the West, what it is slow to believe, that we can work harmoniously with great Occidental powers to support and protect the highest ideals of civilisation even to the extent of dying for them. Not only in the Far East, but anywhere else that may be necessary, Japan is ready to lay down her life for the principles that the foremost nations will die for. It is to be in line with these nations that she is at this time opposing and fighting what she believes to be opposed to these principles. Japan's relation to the present conflict is as a defender of the things that make for higher civilisation and a more permanent peace.

Indian opinion is not likely to be divergent from Japanese opinion. Here again let me produce a witness from the country. Saint Nihal Singh, in an article in the *London Magazine* upon the Indian troops, writes of the Rajputs thus : 'Haughty, easily provoked, the Rajput's word is his bond. His loyalty once pledged is never shaken.' Is it conceivable that men of whom this can be said could be incapable of realising the principles involved in the 'scrap of paper'? The faithfulness of the Gurkhas has been proved unto death over and over again. The Sikhs everywhere have won unstinted praise from their British officers and foreign critics as much for their faithfulness as for heroism. The same is true of other races who have sent their sons to fight for the British Raj. All are perfectly capable of understanding the simple moral issues at stake. √ If there was little danger of their being offended at Christianity because of the War, there was a very real danger of their despising both us and our religion if we had been false to our oath to Belgium. √ To a man they would applaud, if they ever heard of it, the

simple fidelity displayed by the Archbishop of Canterbury when he declined to sign the appeal for peace which hailed from Sweden, on the ground that the 'conflict forced upon Europe, now it has begun, must proceed for the bringing to an issue the fundamental moral principle of faithfulness to a nation's obligation to its solemnly plighted word.'

A deep interest in China, and many years' close observation of Chinese character, emboldens me to write with greater confidence upon the attitude the Chinese are likely to adopt with regard to this 'fundamental moral principle of faithfulness.' As all the world knows, they are an astute, capable, level-headed people. They are, perhaps, far more swayed by emotion than it is the custom to assume. But they possess a highly developed ethical sense. A perusal of the translated writings of Confucius, Mencius, Lao Tzu, and other Chinese sages, leaves no doubt upon this point. Any merchant who has lived in the East, and has had regular dealings with Chinese traders, will testify to their general probity and respect for contracts. The Chinese aliens of Northern Australia are not without their gleams of moral idealism. Some few years ago I dedicated a Chinese church in North Queensland. The title of the dedication, at the request of the Chinese Christians, was 'The Church of the Perfect Way.' The title has a strange sound to Western ears. It had a very familiar ring to the Chinamen themselves, for Lao Tzu, the 'old philosopher,' in the sixth century before the Christian era, had tried to teach his countrymen a Way of Life. I gladly accepted the suggestion, judging that they would be no worse followers of Him Who called Himself 'the Way,' because they did not despise one of their own sages who had felt after Truth that haply he might touch the fringe of His robe of Righteousness. Those who know the East, and Eastern character intimately, may be tempted to smile at this incident. They may say that Chinese ideals are very far ahead of Chinese practice. But are Christian ideals so easily realised as all that? Do we never find our actions limping far behind our sentiments? Are not our best endeavours baffled and incomplete? The fact of this War should at least rebuke any easy smile. For my own part, for many years, I have tested Chinese converts in Australia by the same standard I rightly could apply to white men, and I have not found them wanting. They proved by their lives that they were sincere. But it is my experience, not of Chinese Christians alone, but of the non-Christian Chinamen also, that emboldens me to assert that they are well able to appreciate the fundamental moral issues of the War. They realise, perhaps more clearly than we do, that not all masquerading in the dress of Christianity is Christian. They will recognise

equally clearly that the Allied Forces, in contesting for the stability of treaty obligations, for the rights of weak States, for democracy against militarism, are moved by moral considerations. They will regard them as more truly representative of Christianity—even though they see that the Prince of Peace has been grievously wounded in the house of His friends.

Look at another point. The racial question has become urgent in America during this present year—on the one hand, between the United States and Japan, and on the other hand, as an open quarrel between some Indians and the British Columbian authorities. By great care, and by the co-ordinating forces of a common cause, the question has been postponed, at least for a time. Mr. Achmed Abdullah speaks of racial prejudice, as 'that terrible blight which modern Christianity has forced upon the world.' I am not concerned with the writer's confusion of thought as to Christianity and Western civilisation. But I have found, over and over again, that not only the Chinese and Japanese, but the South Sea Islanders, and even the Australian Aborigines, are seriously puzzled, not by the fact that Christianity enjoins a brotherhood of all men, but that this brotherhood is so often set at naught by those who call themselves Christian. The exact point that I desire to elucidate is the relative position of the racial problem in regard to Christianity in the light of the present War. √ So far as India and the Far East is concerned, I believe the general leading opinion will be that the Germans have shown themselves as far below the Christian idea of racial interdependence as they have been found wanting in the 'fundamental moral principle of faithfulness to a nation's obligation to its solemnly plighted word.' √ When the Kaiser grandiloquently bade the members of his contingents in China so to bear themselves that not a Chinaman dare look askance at a German, he did a deadly dis-service to his own people. He laid up in Eastern minds a debt that the Chinese have never forgotten. The same is true of Japan. With a national self-control that should be impressive even to the Prussian mind, the Japanese have taken no outward notice of the many ferocious insults hurled at their country from Berlin, but it is impossible for those of us who have any intimate knowledge of their character to think that the Japanese do not see because they are silent, or to fancy that they forgive because they smile.

Writing in the *Asiatic Review*, Colonel A. C. Yate substantiates this view with regard to India. He remarks :

It has probably escaped the memory of most people to-day that in 1900, during the relief of Peking, the German troops under Field Marshal von Waldersee treated the natives of India with studied insolence. Sir Pertab

Singh will not have forgotten that, and we can hardly doubt that those who served in the International Force which relieved Peking will have told their comrades in arms now ordered to Europe that there is an old score to be wiped out.

Again, let me make it quite clear that I am not stating these facts with anything approaching satisfaction, neither do I regard the racial question, so far as it affects ourselves and our Imperial administration, as being anything more than quiescent. ✓ The point I desire to elucidate is that the War has not appreciably affected the non-Christian outlook upon Christianity in the East. ✓ On the contrary, as may be assumed, indeed, from Count Okuma's remarks, ✓ it has fired non-Christian people concerned with the ambition for proving to a dull-sighted West that they can work harmoniously with Occidental Powers to support and protect the higher ideals of civilisation—Christian as opposed to Napoleonic ideals. ✓ The position of affairs is so far improved, and the abiding status of Christianity among non-Christian races may be said to depend upon the way in which Christianity will be applied after the War has been brought to an end.

It is not easy to construct any satisfactory estimate of the exact position that Christianity occupies among non-Christian peoples. Missionary statistics are obviously inadequate. They show organisation in process of growth, and little more. Western civilisation, on the other hand, cannot be reduced by any known form of denominator. Regarded as wholes, there is much that is truly Christian in Western civilisation, while there is not a little amongst Christian converts and in definitely Christian methods that the truest friends of Missions, and believers in their great usefulness, openly deplore. In order to estimate even tentatively what non-Christians think of Christianity a certain breadth of outlook is required, and an appreciation of tendencies which cannot be adequately divided into their component parts. ✓ Let me again adduce China. We have been watching the progress of a revolution, social and political, in an ancient and great nation. So far the revolution has been practically bloodless, and it has progressed with a rapidity and thoroughness that is simply astounding. It would be ridiculous to assert that the development of China has been inspired by Christian influence apart from the Christian element in Western civilisation. It would be equally short-sighted to disregard the direct influence of Christian Missions. Many of the Republican leaders were Christians—some were the sons of Chinese clergymen. The Christian Churches were used, often without the knowledge of the missionaries themselves, for disseminating Republican views. It is not easy to state accurately how much there was in these views that was materialistically

Western, or ideally Christian, or frankly Eastern, but the fact remains. Furthermore, no one who has any intimate knowledge of Chinese affairs would desire to identify Christianity with all the devious steps by which Yuan Shi Kai is now leading China forward to unity and effective government. On the other hand, no one with insight can fail to realise that the idealism which lies behind his political actions was affected, let it be said, by the tenets of Western civilisation in its non-materialistic aspects. The Presidential Mandate on the Cardinal Virtues, issued on the 20th of September 1912, is an example in point. The Mandate is recorded in the Official Year Book of the Chinese Government for 1913. The text concludes thus :

Good principles and morality are the same all the world over. The change of a Governmental system should certainly not be taken as a warrant to depart from the well-established ethical principles of morality. Nowadays, agitated by the great political changes made in our country, many seekers of foreign ideas, who have failed to grasp the real spirit of Western sciences and who have simply been impressed by its material progress, begin to deprecate the great moral principles of our nation which have been handed down for hundreds of generations. ¶I am well convinced of the fact that no nation can be called civilised without making the eight great virtues as the basis of its government. ¶I, the President, firmly maintain that the great danger of to-day is not in the material weakness of our nation, but in the condition of the human heart. If every person has his heart turned towards good, the country will be set on a firm foundation.

It will be remembered that little more than a year ago Yuan Shi Kai made an appeal to Christians in China for prayers on behalf of the Republic. The appeal was responded to in this country—a contingency probably never contemplated by the statesman himself. A few days later a *coup d'état* followed, and Europe was shocked or scornful according to personal bias. Europe had made the mistake of thinking Yuan Shi Kai was a Christian with an objective belief in prayer, which was not the case. The fact Europe had overlooked was that the President's appeal was symptomatic of the changed attitude in China towards the Christian religion regarded as a political and social asset. The actual number of Chinese Christians is little more than half of one per cent. of the whole population, but this gives a very inadequate idea of their importance, and still less of the influence Christianity is felt to be exercising at the present time. So also the establishment of Confucianism has been regarded by some as a serious blow to Christianity. This is not the view of many devout Christians who believe that Confucius should be regarded as an ally, not as a foe, and who believe, further, that a worse thing than the establishment of a Pagan religion would happen if a nation were left morally rudderless at such a critical period of its history.

Those Europeans who have had any intimate intercourse with the Chinese and Japanese are always inclined to be tentative in their estimates of the values the Far East places upon Western ideas. But, from what I have observed, I do not for one moment think that China 'might be willing to accept our Christianity for the sake of our civilisation,' or that the Japanese 'might turn to Christianity for a social, not for a spiritual or even moral motive.' Both these theories have been suggested to me confidently during the past few days. On the contrary, I venture to maintain that such conceptions are profoundly at variance with Far Eastern thought. A very casual study of the Chinese daily Press, the *Peiching Jih Pao*, or *Peking Daily News*, leaves no room for any misapprehension as to how the Chinese regard Western civilisation *qua* Western civilisation. While a far more convincing witness has arisen in Japan since the commencement of the present War. Mr. Uchimura, a well-known educationalist, writing in the English column of the *Yorodsu*, asks this question :

What is the Western civilisation after all? They say it is Christian. But is it? Is it civilisation based upon the Crucified One? Certainly it is not. It is a civilisation based upon the crucifying one. . . . The present conflagration of Europe is the veriest evidence . . . that theirs is a sham civilisation beautiful upon the surface but within dead vacuity.

The conclusion Mr. Uchimura reaches is that this War will 'leave the world clearer for better and more beautiful things,' and that the 'European heathen' may realise in happy case more clearly than he does now the things that belong to peace.

I have little heart at such a time as this—indeed, if I ever have had the desire—to be dogmatic upon the progress of Christianity throughout the world. For reasons I have indicated, I do not believe that the War, regarded as a war, has had, so far, any disastrous effect upon Christianity in the eyes of non-Christian peoples. [The real weakness of the situation lies in the fact that Western civilisation is so largely materialistic, frankly or covertly, and in the subsidiary fact that the individual Europeans that call themselves Christian are not sufficiently alive to what should be implied by their claim.] Sir William Macgregor, whose unflagging zeal for humanity in many parts of the globe has done so much for the course of Christianity, once discussed with me the relatively rapid progress of Moham-madanism in West Africa as compared with that of Christianity; 'It's just this,' he said, 'every Moham-madan regards himself as a missionary; the majority of Christians think it is another man's work.' Will Christians maintain this attitude? That is the critical question. And I am by no means hopeless as to the answer. The national trial has revealed unexpected depths of

earnestness and self-sacrifice in our midst. It has torn aside much of the frivolity that was maiming our social life. It has demonstrated that all men are not materialistic nor unready to hazard their lives for an ideal. I am not one of those that rejoice in war, but I have never felt so confident as I am now for the future of England, and, what is infinitely more important to the world, for the future of Christianity.

GEORGE H. FRODSHAM (*Bishop*).

*DISRAELI THE THIRD*¹

He said many things that were strange, yet they immediately appeared to be true.—Sidonia in *Coningsby*.

THE third volume of Disraeli's *Life* (and he lives in it) unfolds a corresponding stage in his development. His broodings and aspirations have taken shape. His wild oats have been sown, and, though debt still hampers him, his course is clear. Smart Bohemia has receded. He is happy in his home and devoted to his 'guardian angel,' soon to become the 'Lady of Hughenden.' Aggressive exuberance he has chastened in more ways than one. There is less of the meteor, more of the fixed star now about him. And on every side he has grown in stature. Experience has reinforced genius, while scope has been added to a success which, though signal, is not yet free from struggle. His power and his influence have matured. Like the Genie of the *Arabian Nights* he has escaped from the narrow bottle, and can now rise to his full height. At last he finds room alike for his statesmanship and his fantasy. Nevertheless these faculties have not yet been wholly accepted, and later volumes must reveal what a hold they took, how they were to ripen into national habits. Already they have come to stay. If some misjudge or malign them, this is only natural. Newness and strangeness perplex and provoke, and ideas remain alien till they are naturalised among the people. Disraeli's was no ordinary remoteness whether of source or affinity. Yet more and more he wins upon such as know him best, and gains ground (and converts) by the mastery of his mind despite the mystery of his manner, which, wrote Lord Malmesbury even in 1848, 'has much of the foreigner about it,' adding, however, that it was but 'a mask for his great abilities.' To the 'Conservatives' Disraeli still often seemed a revolutionist, to the Radicals a reactionary. But his intimates knew better, and they comprised men and women of the most manifold distinction. He could not be called 'remote' or 'unfriended,' and if he could, under no circumstances could he have been called 'slow.' His imagina-

¹ *The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield*. By William Flavelle Monypenny and George Earle Buckle. Vol. iii., 1846-1855. John Murray.

tive speeches, to which humour, literature, and paradox were sparkling tributaries, pressed truth home and gave a new delight to debate. So did his informal letters to his friends, and especially to the clever and beautiful Lady Londonderry, for whose benefit he 'unbuttoned his brains.' All round he begins to modify the conventional scene and to rehearse for the serious future. He discerns those new ideas in the air which he wants to acclimatise, and when he expresses them he robes them in fancy dress and lends them a brilliant background. More and more he makes for growth as opposed to upheaval, for popular stability. And he correlates in all their bearings the big, contemporary movements to which, as they march past, his ear is abnormally sensitive. Already he speaks with authority—there is a touch of Napoleon about him. The world is becoming aware—as one puts it—of his 'directing' mind, or as Lord Ponsonby avows, that he should be the leader for whom they wait. Lord John Manners, his dear comrade, bears witness to his charm and fame, while European celebrities, like Metternich, swell the chorus. Lord Derby himself, a prejudiced colleague, bates his imperfect sympathies and pays his tribute not merely to intellect but to 'self-sacrificing generosity.' Palmerston, always sympathetic, after Disraeli first took office actually rebuked Gladstone for the pharisaism of his condescensions; and Bright himself owned Disraeli's fairness to opponents. Indeed, Lord John Russell contrasts it in debate with Gladstone's bias. The 'misrepresentations of the Whigs,' as one calls them, begin to pause, but sarcasm has made too many enemies for them to cease, and in a number of episodes he is wrongfully taken to task.

These pages conclusively disprove those detractions of the ignorant or ignoble. His truthfulness is constantly confirmed, its contemporary impugnors cut rather shabby figures, and to such as still consider him a clever charlatan this volume may be specially commended. Indeed, he towers above the throng. He is a statesman born and trained, not, like so many, an amateur, a subsidiary, or an understudy. He has both length and width of view, and to statesmanship he brings artistry with the world for his studio. Amid the mistrust of some and the derision of others he calmly pursues his way, even courting unpopularity in his predestined path. Opportunist in beliefs he certainly never was. He was far too proudly persuaded of their truth, far too romantically ambitious. Men and moments, doubtless, he used: he was creating a party, not clinging to any, breathing a spirit into the British instinct for 'work and order.' Above all, he is a man of ideas as opposed to set and colourless ideologies. He was perhaps more a man of ideas than any of his time in England. While Gladstone—then, oddly enough,

not nearly so prominent as his future rival—was lecturing on the virtues, in which he wrapped himself up as in some professor's gown, Disraeli steeped them in the glow of atmosphere. His mind—at once versed and vivid—played like firelight round the main problems and, under its flicker, linked them together in strange, central pictures. Everywhere he made wonderland. His eloquence and epigram—often melodramatic—were not his main armour. They formed the popular appeals of his ideas. But even his criticism was creative, and his insight has over and over again proved prophetic. That is part of this volume's fascination. It is contemporary with the present, and it supplies what *we* lack—a commanding imagination. Disraeli's life—like his own Contarini's—is 'a psychological romance.' No other expression so well fits it. And his psychology made him a seer. Not only are many of his forecasts in process of being accomplished, but, as chief actor in a piece of which he was also the author, he himself often conduced to their fulfilment.

Surely Mr. Buckle trips (as occasionally elsewhere) in attributing inspiration to 'aloofness.' 'Aloofness' may stand for much but not for that. It is the power of vision that divines the future, and he who sees foresees. Such a visionary was Disraeli. Commerce with the world is no obstacle to such foresight. Was not Isaiah a prince and historian as well as a prophet and poet? 'Aloofness' may rather contribute to Disraeli's other side—his tact and management of men, for dispassionateness is an aid to diplomacy. 'When,' wrote Bolingbroke, 'great warmth of imagination is united to great coolness of judgment we get that happy combination which is called a genius.' There we get Disraeli. Doubtless these combined faculties often wrought fantastically—in spirals or arabesques; but it was reality that they enriched. And they proved irresistible. Another form of his duality was the double—perhaps treble—strain in him of mission and career. I say 'perhaps treble,' because they were derived from race ('All is race'), Italy, and the English eighteenth century. These were his *provenance*, and by virtue of them a sense of career and mission was inextricably blended. He himself was conscious of the combination, which more than once he symbolised in his novels. There was thus the day-by-day Disraeli and ever latent the Disraeli of the day after to-morrow. On the one hand he was the nonchalant wit, the wise worldling, the cheery cynic; on the other he was intense—a prophet dreamer and idealist. Indeed, it was the clash and union of these elements in and around him that called forth his irony—at once tears and laughter, satire and pathos, invective and enthusiasm. His attitude was most consistent, and it was so spontaneously. It was himself. Never was there a man more inwardly at one, and

this book confirms what was not generally conceded when I pointed it out long ago—that there is a Disraelian philosophy. Indeed, its weakness perhaps is that, however flexible its form, it is inherently invariable. Not that it is monotonous. His grasp is comprehensive; in each particle may be seen the whole. And his romance and humour render him lively even when most profound.

The thrilling story of the present volume is illustrated by snatches from his own cursive pen—so picturesque and pointed that we might well have been favoured with more of them. It embraces that little explored half-decade between the fall of Peel and the first throes of the Crimean War, a period brief, yet crowded with events and pregnant with influence. Politically, it tracks Disraeli's penetrating purposes through all the vexed issues of the day—enfranchisement, emancipation; Ireland and, for a moment, India—both congenial to his imaginative sympathy; imperialism, in a sense far in advance of his generation; foreign policy—while crowns tottered abroad and sedition stalked at home; rumours of wars—and at length the war itself. It was a time of storm. Capital and authority were in danger. Everywhere the old order fled and took shelter.

In career, it sees him climbing the ladder of leadership, gradually, grudgingly, recognised as the inevitable head of Opposition—its brain and its courage. We mark him at first as a philosophic waiter on Derby's fumbling providence, a keen critic of Palmerston's careless dash. After Derby's abortive attempts at office in 1851, after place without power in the succeeding year, when Disraeli surpassed himself and his rivals—even in the uncongenial sphere of finance, after the rash, the fatal, the farcical Coalition first came in, we witness Derby's second fiasco at the very moment when his hour had struck—a fiasco which his lieutenant forgave but could not forget. The deaths, too, of great figures accentuate great changes and seem to cut steps for his career. Bentinck dies, Peel dies, Wellington fades away. In performance, we read—and can almost revive—those amazing speeches of 1848, the second of which—a review of the session—won him the leadership; his bold and peculiar championship of the Jews; his resolve to compensate the land by relief rather than by any recurrence to rigid and 'abrogated' protection; his foreseeing and farseeing pronouncements on the suffrage, on every issue of peace or war. In literature we study his *Tancred*, the deepest of his novels, and that 'Political Biography' of his dear Lord George Bentinck, which I have been told was acclaimed by a circle, of which Gladstone was one, as the best work of its kind in existence. We view him founding, inspiring, furthering his own organ—the *Press*. We

see him hailed as 'the most remarkable man of the time' by Lady Blessington shortly before she died—Lady Blessington whose 'sympathy, grace and affection' he had prized so gratefully. He receives the 'inimitable' D'Orsay's last farewell. He comes to know the Queen who was one day to be his devotee, and he finds in Prince Albert the pink of education. We watch him on a great stage and in a great part. In society he marches from strength to strength attaining and maintaining a supremacy. We find him turned, despite embarrassments and as if by some spell of Aladdin's lamp, into the Squire of Hughenden, whose trees and glades and châtelaine he loves. He is active beyond belief, a centre as well as a cultivator of distinction, an employer of more than one aristocratic 'agent,' a student of secret societies, feared only when in alliance with some popular movement—always behind, always before the scenes. Yet often alone—drudging unceasingly over Blue books nor immune from the blue devils, but ever comforted by his wife and sister; his father whom he lost but a year after his mother's death (and of whom he finely said that the best consolation for his death was his life); and at length by that little fairy godmother of an old lady whom he met so romantically and with whom he pursued so regular and charming a correspondence—the Mrs. Brydges Wylliams, born Sarah Mendez Da Costa, who rests, at her own request, next to his own grave and Lady Beaconsfield's. So hardly was he worked that he could write of having no time even to eat, and, later on, of feeling himself 'something between a notary and a house-steward,' and this, he added, 'was ambition.' Yet his spirits rose to—indeed beyond—every occasion, and, as in his boyish days, when he planned out the *Representative*, El Dorado was always in sight directly large schemes allured his imagination. A strange blend he was of rashness and prudence, but his rashnesses were daemonic, and usually brought him into port. All along, however, under a marble calm, lurked both passion and melancholy. Disappointments were many; he had often much to complain of privately in Lord Derby, who, as presented in these pages, was a prime opportunist—save in loyalty to the land—and loitered as brilliantly over affairs of State, in the gout, as Godolphin, the Vizier of Queen Anne, had done long before him. And the gout excused more.

As for our chief [sighs Disraeli in the August of 1854 to Lady Londonderry], we never see him. His house is always closed; he subscribes to nothing, though his fortune is very large, and expects nevertheless everything to be done. I have never yet been fairly backed in life. All the great personages I have known, even when what is called 'ambitious' by courtesy, have been quite unequal to a grand game. This has been my fate and I never felt it more keenly than at the present moment with a

confederate always at Newmarket or Doncaster when Europe—nay, the world—is in the throes of immense changes and all the elements of power at home in a state of dissolution.

Yet he never flew out at Fate. He only sighed and persevered. Did he not write of his own grandfather 'He never made difficulties but always overcame them'?

While convulsions and dissensions boded a new birth, and perhaps a new world, the Whigs under Lord John Russell jogged on with their old and stale prescriptions for 'the people.' They were a most uncomfortable alliance with the Radicals, whose schemes they only nursed in the certain hope of their death in infancy. Meanwhile the Peelites, who retained most of the orthodox talent, held themselves fastidiously apart as men too good for a wicked world, although in 1853 they were as rapacious as the worst for office—in such a hurry for it, wrote Disraeli, that they quite forgot 'a policy.' In the House they now trimmed the party-balance, at one time supporting the Whigs; at another occasionally even Disraeli—for at least twice Gladstone voted in his favour, though he disliked him a shade more than he did Palmerston. Palmerston, moderate at home, immoderate abroad, attracted Disraeli and was attracted by him. Both of them were men of the world who knew what they wanted, and patriots who preferred country to party. They flaunted no broad phylacteries, nor did they shrink in horror from anyone they could not understand—for the simple reason, if a 'bull' may be pardoned, that they had the wit to understand him. Meanwhile the Whigs staggered on, lingering, like all weak Governments, till in despair they coalesced with the too candid Peelites and struck up a league less coherent than any since the Ark. That Coalition had no common creed, nor, as Disraeli said of it, even 'any principles—for the present.' It was composed of elements incongruous, mutually indifferent and sometimes repugnant. And so it brought forth the Crimean War, a blunder of incompetence and the crime of virtue—the war which would never have happened but for their self-satisfied hesitations about a French *entente*. This unlucky bag of all the talents was perpetually wearing out. So perpetually did they peddle with theory that as often they were ruined by practice. There was an earlier moment when Disraeli thought that some of the Whigs—especially Palmerston—might have joined him as against some of the Radicals, or even some of the Radicals as against some of the Whigs. And one night in the 'forties he actually dined with John Bright just as much later—at the close of 1852—he appealed to him personally about the budget. Yet neither of them certainly believed in abolishing poverty by removing riches. I should like to have been present at that dinner and that interview—

'Job Thornberry' and Sidonia-Tancred in conclave! He was always ready to waive his claims. Among the Peelites, however, Graham and Gladstone were the sole accessions he ever dreamed of as possible, and of the second—that 'Jesuit of the closet, sincerely devout'—he only dreamed three years beyond the bounds of this volume. That was the crisis when he solemnly adjured him with 'Deign to be magnanimous.'

There was a general break-up of the old party lines, and, step by step, Disraeli recalled Toryism to its first elements. In the confusion and dislocation a lull ensued, by which he profited. He began to breathe life into the dry bones. He associated ideas with the Tories as Bolingbroke had done with 'the boys.' He dived deep into the recesses of things, contrasting, like his father, 'causes' with 'pretexts.' He took large and long views, perceiving that any Jacobin democracy was unnational, abstract, metallic, insatiable, but that an English democracy—as an element, not a class—must be re-rooted in the soil. What should fence round a free and ancient monarchy was those institutions which express the English character and are yet infinitely expansive. National character he regarded as the one thing needful. Character was above all 'measures,' and measures must be judged by their ultimate effect on character. He had headed the mutiny against Peel not merely as the champion of a betrayed interest which was yet the backbone of England—for fiscal expedients were not principles; but firstly because for him the commercialisation of England—the gospel of the 'cheapest'—was the antithesis to that real reciprocity which he had always regarded as the freest trade. And, secondly, he headed it—indeed, mainly—because, with all his fine qualities, politically Peel stood for mummification, and even chimeras were better than mummies. For what had Peel 'conserved'?—remnants not realities, 'phrases' not 'facts.' Disraeli's first postulate was vitality—a real Church drawing force and fire from those mystic origins which he always averred that it still misunderstood; a really 'national' party answering national needs and aspirations—in fine, a nation rather than a 'State,' everywhere the organic rather than the mechanical. 'It is always,' he exclaimed in an outburst uncited in this volume, 'always the State never Society, always machinery never sympathy.' This is the clue to his whole outlook, and in all the big problems of the time he alone seems to have discerned an interplay and interconnexions. When the national verdict indiscriminately reversed the protective system, the squirearchy was as indiscriminate in its obstinate adherence to the obsolete—'whole-hoggers' like the cut-and-dried among our modern Tariff

Reformers. Disraeli alone saw that—pending some equally national reversal of the new system—‘unrestricted competition’ was a question quite as much social as economical—a still burning question. Agriculture was hurt, urban labour would also, in the long run, suffer. ‘Free’ trade would lead to overstrain and overcrowding, to feuds between town and country, to class-provocations, to all the tendencies, including despotism, of the new, detached democracy. It involved even taxation which would more and more tend to be ‘direct’ in incidence and perhaps confiscatory in character. Again, the Colonies, which he, in great advance of his hour, wished to see linked in a close chain of imperial consolidation and represented in the mother of parliaments, would be discouraged, not to speak of the bar to that Colonial preference which he was the first to forecast. The Empire would be set back. All the elements, too, of government were fast being weakened, and with these a doctrinaire democracy would play the devil. Free-trade, in fact, spelled the mob, and the Book of Numbers is rarely the Book of Wisdom. As a counter-poise, a democracy native not imported, loyal not arbitrary, a genuine democracy, was imperative. It should be choice, not common in character. It was there all the time, though demagogues might pervert it—at heart ‘aristocratic’ in the best sense of the word, proud to earn privileges, ashamed to extort ‘rights’ or exploit them, equal to responsibility. Real rights it certainly had—the great rights of Labour, which must be recognised, as must be also its duties. But the rewards must be no bureaucratic bribes. ‘Democracy’ should be a leaven, not an explosive. In fine, his was the democracy of Bolingbroke, not the Socialism of Rousseau—no gushing formula. ‘Nothing is calculation,’ he makes his Baroni exclaim in *Tancred*, ‘all is adventure.’ So as ‘adventurer’ let him stand. He set sail for discovery.

The collapse of Peel rent in twain the whole fabric of party. It was a great misfortune, for party, thought Disraeli, means organised opinion, and great parties mean opinions greatly organised and fights that are not factious. And parties then meant more than they can ever do again, for the newspapers did not yet create opinion—they only advocated or advertised it. Strong personalities did the thinking for the mass and symbolised the issues. Disraeli did so dramatically, and as a foil to him Gladstone was to do the same. The old Tory party was dead, or rather embalmed—an image of itself. Disraeli set himself to reconstruct it, to give it resurrection. He looked both before and after. He would have no ‘leaders who are not guides.’ What he missed in the anaemic anarchy of parties was the living

flesh and blood of the past which alone in England can develop the future. He desired

the disciplined array of traditionary influences—the *realised experience* of an ancient society, and of a race that for generations has lived and flourished in the high practice of a noble system of self-government. For these the future is to provide us with a compensatory alternative in the conceits of the illiterate, the crotchets of the whimsical, the violent courses of a vulgar ambition that acknowledges no gratitude to antiquity—to posterity no duty. . . . I trace all this evil to the disorganisation of party. I say you can have no Parliamentary Government if you have no party.

And by party he means a free party unfettered in discussion.

For five years we mark him watching, waiting, working—often alone—to bridge over the gulf between abrogated protection (one day, he thought, after suffering to revive) and some form of compensation to outraged land, still the backbone of England—a great industry in disorder, as much an industry with ‘material’ as trade. At the same time, by every resource he sought to reconcile the town and country parties, to cause parties in lieu of factions. In ‘parties of progress’ he descried a cosmopolitan disruption which could only convert ‘a first-rate monarchy into a second-rate republic.’ Their theories of *physical* equality implied internationalism, for, if one reflected, they were only compatible with unlimited employment. ‘Progress! Whither?’ It was vain, as he mused in *Tancred*, to ‘mistake comfort for civilisation.’ Utilitarianism gave no firm footing whatever. No wonder that in the same poetic allegory his ‘Guardian-spirit of Arabia’ announces to the pilgrim on Mount Sinai, ‘Power is neither the sword nor the shield, for these pass away, but ideas which are divine.’ This is the highest aspect, the deepest teaching of Disraeli. Infinite were its applications. ‘Some three years ago,’ he urged, in a spirited speech of 1849,

we thought fit to change the principle on which the economic system of this country had been previously based. Hitherto this country had been, as it were, divided up into a hierarchy of industrial classes, each one of which was open to all, but in each of which every Englishman was taught to believe that he occupied a position better than the analogous position of individuals of his order in any other country in the world. . . . I have heard it stated that the superiority of these classes was obtained at the cost of the last class of the hierarchy—at the cost of the labouring population of this country. But . . . I know of no great community existing, since, I will say, the fall of the Roman Empire, where the working population has been upon the whole placed in so advantageous a position as the working classes of England. . . . In this manner in England Society was based upon the aristocratic principle in its complete and most magnificent development. You set to work to change the basis upon which this Society was established; you disdain to attempt the accomplishment of the best; and what you want to achieve is the cheapest. But I have shown you that, considered only as an economical principle, the principle is fallacious; that its infallible consequence is to cause the impoverishment

and embarrassment of the people. . . . But the wealth of England is not merely material wealth; it does not merely consist in the number of acres that we have tilled and cultivated, nor in our havens filled with shipping, nor in our unrivalled factories, nor in the intrepid industry of our mines. . . . We have a more precious treasure, and that is the *character of the people*. That is what you have injured. In destroying what you call class legislation you have destroyed that noble and indefatigable ambition which has been the best source of all our greatness, of all our prosperity, and all our power. I know of nothing more remarkable in the present day than the general discontent which prevails, accompanied as it is on all sides by an avowed inability to suggest any remedy. The feature of the present day is depression and perplexity. That English spirit which was called out and supported by your old system seems to have departed from us.

Three years onwards, and he put before the country the parting of its ways.

This country will have to decide whether it will maintain a Ministry formed on the principles of conservative progress; whether it will terminate for ever by just and conciliatory measures the misconceptions which have so long prevailed between producer and consumer and extinguish the fatal jealousy that rankles between town and country; whether our Colonial Empire shall be maintained and confirmed; whether the material development of Ireland shall at length be secured; whether such alterations as time and circumstances may appear to justify in the construction of the House of Commons shall be made in that spirit of revolution which has arrested the civilisation of Europe *or in the spirit of our popular, though not democratic, institutions*. . . .

A year later he wrote to the following effect in the *Press* of Reform:

There were two men in England occupying intelligible positions, and only two. They were both Liberals, both Reformers, and both Lancashire men. . . . Derby was a disciple of progress as much as Bright. But Derby's [i.e. Disraeli's] was English progress in the spirit of the English Constitution and the national character, while Bright's was American progress in the spirit of the American Constitution and the American character. Derby would effect change by a wise management of traditional influences. *Bright by means of a tyrant majority*. Between these two intelligible systems the people of this country must sooner or later choose.

Has it not chosen? Bright for the moment has won, but Disraeli's outlook will surely recur. He regarded land as a possession fraught with duty and to be invested with power because by its nature it must be held for the common good. In his biography of Lord George Bentinck he had pressed the inapplicability of any American models to England. There was between the two great countries 'sympathy and feeling,' but 'no analogy in their political conditions.' 'In America there was a virgin soil, no tradition, and no surplus population.' For aristocracy he demanded that variety which he claimed always for every department, for representation, for franchise, for finance—that dull finance which he actually once declared 'must consult

people's feelings.' It is only through variety that elasticity can be secured. In this instance he thus delivers himself :

The governing aristocracy must be broadly conceived and widely recruited. The aristocracy of England absorbs all other aristocracies and receives every man in every order and every class who defers to the principle of our society which is to aspire and excel.

There, surely, he hits the mark and touches the weak—the fatally weak—spot of modern Socialism. That is why he wished to cement the country and the town together. He had a way of regarding and handling such matters as fragments of eternal history—a habit distasteful to utilitarians. 'Your system and theirs (the agriculturists),' he told the Manchester Radicals, who were ready to dispense with agriculture so long as England remained 'the workshop of the world'—

Your system and theirs are exactly contrary. They invite union. They believe that national prosperity can only be produced by the prosperity of all classes. You prefer to remain in isolated splendour and solitary magnificence. But, believe me, I speak not as your enemy when I say that it will be an exception to the principles which seem hitherto to have ruled society, if you can succeed in maintaining the success at which you aim without the possession of that permanence and stability which the territorial principle alone can afford. Although you may for a moment flourish after their destruction. . . . I see no reason why you should form an exception to that which the page of history has mournfully recorded; that you, too, should not fade like the Tyrian dye and moulder like the Venetian palace. But, united with the land, you will obtain the best and surest foundation upon which to build your enduring welfare. . . . I wish to see the agriculture, the commerce, and the manufactures of England not adversaries, but co-mates and partners, and rivals only in the ardour of their patriotism and in the activity of their public spirit.

And so he opposed 'popular principles' to 'Liberal opinions'—a watchword which forms the refrain of his historical address in May 1847 to the electors of Bucks, as it was to form the refrain of a great speech nearly a quarter of a century afterwards :

. . . I hope ever to be found on the side of the people and of the institutions of England. *It is our institutions that have made us free and can alone keep us so; by the bulwark which they offer to the insidious encroachments of a convenient yet enervating system of centralisation which, if left unchecked, will prove fatal to the national character.* Therefore I have ever endeavoured to cherish our happy habit of self-government as sustained by a prudent distribution of local authority. . . . It is unnecessary for me to state that I shall support all those measures the object of which is to elevate the moral and social condition of the working classes by lessening their hours of toil—by improving their means of health and by cultivating their intelligence.

His was no lip-service. He reached forward towards reforms—social, fiscal, federal, Irish, Indian, imperial. He realised that the lessons of his *Sybil* might be completely thwarted by

the benevolence of the Manchester millennium and its laziness of *Laisser faire*. Disraeli was no waiter on Providence. He believed that as events marched a statesman should march at their head, and so he lost no time in pressing his contrast home. The eighteenth century Tories had been the popular party, and modern doctrinaires should not rob them of their birthright. Very soon after his Address, in a speech at Newport Pagnell :

It was a popular principle, he said [I quote Mr. Buckle's summary], to interfere to protect the factory workers; but the advocates of Liberal opinions said that in no circumstances must labour be interfered with. It was a popular principle to make a difference between the industry of our fellow subjects and that of foreigners: Liberal opinion treated them alike. It was a popular principle that the National Church should be independent of the State, exercising a beneficial effect on public feeling and morals, and vindicating the cause of liberty; but Liberal opinion treated the Church [this is true still] as a mere stipendiary of the State. That the administration of justice should be conducted by an independent proprietary was a popular principle; that it should be conducted by a man paid by the State a Liberal opinion. In one word, it is a popular principle that England should be governed by England, while the Liberal opinion is that England should be governed by London.

Bureaucracy he abhorred, and much later he denounced and deprecated (as if by anticipation) 'its equipage of clerks.' Sympathy not machinery, Society not the State, that remained his attitude, it has been said, towards the Chartists. The cause of the factory hands he again urged three years later, and that too in the teeth of Whig compromise :

Why abrogate the act? [he said]. . . . The honour of Parliament was concerned in not taking advantage of a legal flaw. The voice of outraged faith is no respecter of persons. Its cry cannot be stifled. . . . The most important elements of Government are its moral influences.

Years afterwards we know how largely his performance fulfilled his promise. But in the case of another reform, the inspection of coal mines, he was not so sympathetic and (apropos of Lord Londonderry the coal-owner), in the words of Mr. Buckle, he 'seems rather to have listened to the voice of friendship than followed his natural political course.' All along he was against interference except in the redressal of great wrongs, against compulsion, against cutting up the human spirit into those paper patterns which windy theorists devise for despotic demagogues to enforce.

Nothing could exceed his dislike of the new crop that had sprung up of professional agitators. His denunciation of them formed a striking episode in his great Reform speech of 1848, but he traced their usurpations to the true source. It was not because the gentlemen of England, the natural leaders of the people, the dispensers of local influence, were becoming lukewarm in their

trust, or inclined to abdicate their duties, that quacks and hirelings stepped into the breach. As regards his devotion to the land both from sentiment and conviction, it was in this regard that he first quoted the 'Imperium et Libertas' of Tacitus. It was in 1851 on his Motion on agricultural distress. The passage is characteristic both in its historical breadth and its train of association :

I now appeal to the House of Commons. . . . They may step in and do that which the Minister shrinks from doing—terminate the bitter controversy of years. They may bring back that which my Lord Clarendon called 'The old good nature of the people of England'—that land to which we owe so much of our power and of our freedom ; that land which has achieved the union of those two qualities for combining which a Roman Emperor was deified, *Imperium et Libertas*. And all this too, not by favour, not by privilege, nor by sectarian arrangements, but by asserting the principles of political justice and obeying the dictates of social equity.

Perhaps his broad political position is best summed up by a brief passage from a speech of 1851 (on the franchise) which Mr. Buckle omits :

' . . . I am for the system,' he proclaimed (and he was 'educating' his party), 'which maintains in this country a large and free Government having confidence in the energies and faculties of man. Therefore I say make the franchise a privilege, but let it be the privilege of the civic virtues. Honourable gentlemen opposite would degrade the franchise to the man, instead of raising the man to the franchise. If you want to have a free aristocratic country, free because aristocratic—I use the word . . . in its noblest sense—I mean that aristocratic freedom which enables every man to achieve the best position in the State to which his qualities entitle him, *I know not what we can do better than adhere to the mitigated monarchy of England with power in the Crown, order in one estate of the realm, and liberty in the other.* It is from that happy combination that we have produced a state of society that all other nations look upon with admiration and envy.'

There, in a nutshell, lies his political creed. It differed in tone and teaching from the creed of his contemporaries ; year after year, to the very end, he impressed it on England—and for years it was made light of. Still he persisted. It is not made light of now—it is justified, it is missed. When Disraeli brought forward long afterwards his last scheme for enfranchising the artisan—a scheme constantly preluded by him during this transition of the 'fifties, he accompanied it by the checks of what Bright and Gladstone then derided as 'fancy franchises,' franchises for education and the like which they expunged. These very franchises were urged by him at this quite earlier period, so far were they from being impudent inventions of the moment. In the same way—and this among many other persistent misunderstandings Mr. Buckle has definitely cleared up—he was violently attacked for declaring, after Protection had

become 'obsolete,' that since the definite repeal of the Corn Laws he had never advocated any return to a strictly protective system. Yet it was literally true. And thus it was ever—so long as he repeated what some wished to misunderstand, others grudged to his understanding, and the ruck who want plain roast and boiled could not understand at all. Lord Derby himself, when the Coalition was still in office, and he had learned to know Disraeli far better, emphasised in a letter the jealousy that dogged the footsteps of genius. Everything is often forgiven to a man but genius—at least till he is dead, and when ideas take bizarre shapes this is perforce doubly the case. People like the *speakers* who (in Metternich's distinction) utter their own thoughts rather than the *orators* who give out theirs. People love platitude, believe in platitude, and it is platitude that they hope for. Often doubtless a speaker's manner, or the presumption of it in the minds of his audience, may be responsible for their irritation. People resent being put in the shade by any kind of superiority, especially if any air of superiority be supposed. It affronts their intelligence, and though nothing succeeds like success, nothing fails like success in evidence. But there is no affront in platitude, nothing to lower self-esteem. Now platitude was exactly what Disraeli could not utter, though he sometimes took refuge in oracles. And then he had so biting a wit. When Gladstone and the Peelites deigned to be associated with Palmerston, and the former brought in his first budget after procuring Disraeli's overthrow on *his* second, he still looked back with regret on 'the rupture of ancient ties' (casting an injured glance on the anti-Peelites), and forward with 'hopes of reunion.' This gravity fairly upset Disraeli's, and a passage in one of his early contributions to the *Press* (undoubted in its absolute attribution, though others instinct with Disraeli's ideas and even with his accent are here proved to have come from the *pen* at least of Bulwer Lytton)—a passage omitted by Mr. Buckle—thus satirises the scene. It is too good to neglect.

... Amiable regret; honourable hope! Reminding us of those inhabitants of the South Sea Islands who never devour their enemies—that would be paying them too great a compliment; they eat up only their own friends and relations with an appetite proportioned to the love that they bear to them. And then they hasten to deck themselves in the trappings and feathers of those so tenderly devoured, in memorial of their 'regret' at the 'rupture of ancient ties' and 'hope of some future reunion.' Do you feel quite safe with your new ally? Do you not dread that the same affectionate tooth will some day be fastened on your own shoulders?

That same 'tooth' had already been gnawing at the traditional obligation to pay his share (in this case most modest) for his predecessor's furniture in Downing Street. His evasion is not

dignified. It is to be regretted that Gladstone, who could be noble when he was not spiteful, behaved so poorly in this transaction. Lord Derby's earlier attitude (before he was yet Lord Derby) is also much to be deplored. It was much more that of a suspicious usher than that of a 'Rupert of debate,' and whatever he may then have felt or imagined it was quite unworthy of him. Disraeli, it is true, excused or condoned it, but Lord George Bentinck, in the February of 1848, told Stanley flatly and frankly that he had not played 'a generous part.' His words must be quoted :

Disraeli [he said], who was earning by his writings 6000*l.* or 7000*l.* every two years or so, was dragged out of his retirement by special invitation [a forgotten fact] from the Protectionist Party before I was even thought of as their leader; and the reward he has met with (were it not that a manly, a generous, and an honest English indignation promises to be expressed to-morrow) would leave a blot on the fair name of the gentlemen of England.

When those country gentlemen, either from bewilderment or the suggestions of others, or from the position taken up by both Bentinck and Disraeli on Protection and the Jew Bill, failed temporarily to support the man whom they had once cheered and were bound again to cheer to the echo, how did Disraeli behave? He treated them with a delicate consideration which his enemies might well have imitated. Writing in 1851 to his old family friend Thomas Baring about the 'broader' basis which he craved for Conservatism, he thus continues :

. . . Totally irrespective of all personal considerations which I trust I never intrude, I am naturally grievously distressed at leaving in so forlorn a condition a body of gentlemen who have conducted themselves to me with great indulgence and cordiality, and for many of whom I entertain a sincere affection.

Mr. Buckle seems surprised that Disraeli did not assign a more prominent part to Stanley in his *Lord George Bentinck* with regard to the campaign against Peel. I would venture to suggest that Stanley's part in the episode of the letter to Peel, which was regarded as soliciting office in 1841, may have had much to do with the feelings in the breasts of both men. What Disraeli could not ignore was what Stanley perhaps still mistrusted. But Lord Derby came to acknowledge Disraeli's single-minded devotion to his party, his unselfish readiness to give way now to Graham, now (it was thrice if I remember) to Palmerston, now even to Herries, if by so doing he could consolidate the cause, and his invariable refusal to put any blame on another man's shoulders. And so, in 1852, he owed to Prince Albert how 'straightforwardly' Disraeli had behaved, and he added that Gladstone was quite unfit to lead the House, while Disraeli

possessed the confidence of his followers. He came to recognise that in his colleague there was no grain of pettiness, nothing retail—that always, whether in ideals or ambitions, it was ‘the high game’ that he played. Indeed, there is a long list in this volume alone of Disraeli’s magnanimities both towards persons and parties, some of which, such as that underlying his so-called pushfulness when Bentinck retired, have been shamefully misconstrued and are now set right. So is the worn charge of ‘plagiarism’ in the matter of the speech on Wellington. It was an affair of subconscious memory not uncommon in literature and the literary mind. ‘I am a plagiary,’ wrote Disraeli (remembering Sheridan), ‘but I must bear the mortification, and not at least be Sir Fretful.’ Even in these elucidatory pages some insinuations still seem to linger without a cause.² No doubt sometimes Disraeli made false steps, but these were not due to falsehood. No doubt he was passionately ambitious, but his ambition was noble. No doubt during his earlier career there was debateable ground, there were perhaps debateable frontiers, but it was the point of view that decided the point of honour. We can see this even in such a trifle as the conflict of Gladstone’s after-recollection of Peel’s last relations to Disraeli with Disraeli’s own clear and supported memory of the matter. But never has a great man been less vindicated. It is surprising, when we consider his standing at this time, his impact and influence, that mediocrities unworthy to fasten his shoe-strings and the Tartuffes of ‘unctuous rectitude’ should have combined, like big bullies in a second-rate school, to belittle their superior. We have only to read of how Wood and Grey sniggered together openly during the superb speech, in 1852, on his second budget to realise the impertinence, and to admire the electric retorts which avenged him—or again the graceful ease with which they were afterwards withdrawn when he tendered amends. Another time when his eyes again flashed fire was in 1854, when Lord John Russell twitted him on abstaining from voting on the Jew Bill, though he well knew that Disraeli only did so because he deemed that, by its then association with other emancipations, his championship of this cause of his heart as a right (and this, too, has escaped emphasis) would be prejudiced. Nothing could have been more courageous and honourable from first to last than his disinterested conduct in this struggle, and it is only fair to add that Lord John, never prejudiced, did him ample amends.

² On p. 267 for example, why say of the letter to the Lord Lieutenant (which in 1850 Disraeli sent to the *Times* as a counterblast to the ‘Durham Letter’ of Lord John Russell) ‘contrived to get in,’ and why in the spirited ‘defence’ (on p. 79) of his disinterested courage on the Jew Bill, write ‘it cannot be gainsaid’? Why, too, in another place again vindicating him, leave an impression that he was not so well born and bred as, say, Graham, for instance?

Apropos of Wood, I happen to know a good *mot* of Disraeli's. Sir Charles gave notoriously poor dinners, and when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1846 invited Disraeli to one of them. A fellow-martyr inquired of Disraeli on the eve of the infliction what he thought they would lead off with. 'Oh, *deferred stock* for the soup of course,' was the reply. When he let himself go in his natural style, at once terse, playful and vivid, as he shows himself throughout his informal letters, nobody can be more effective than this master of sentences. Over and over again—to Lady Londonderry among others—he hits off a scene, a character, a comedy to perfection—and of how many strange scenes and characters was he not a spectator!

The driest themes, the dullest people, live under the magic of his touch. Of Protection he said that it was not only dead but damned; of the papist scare in 1848, that while Sir Robert Inglis was horrified at the idea of red stockings, he had 'less fear of them than of blue'; of the doctrine of perpetual peace (which he traces back to the Abbé St. Pierre at Utrecht) that it really spelled perpetual taxation; of the Peelites in 1851 that they were 'a staff without an army'; of the Duke of Wellington's statue, when it was set up on the arch opposite Hyde Park Corner, that now he should call him an Arch-duke; of *Sin and Sorrow*, attributed to his friend Smythe [Lord Strangford] and his sister, that the sin must be Smythe's and the sorrow the lady's; of Lord Aberdeen's mixed Government during the Crimea, that the country had refused it nothing but confidence; of its progressive ministers, that they justified their epithet by standing still; of its home-reforms at the outset of war, that we seemed to be making war not on Russia but ourselves; of the stock cries in 1850, that 'there we have only two subjects, and both gloomy ones—religion and rents. Schisms in the Church and the ruin of landed proprietors are our only themes. . . . Gracious Majesty much excited and clapped her hands with joy when the critical decision of the Privy Council against the Bishop of Exeter was announced to her. On this you may rely.' And this is a fraction of a long account (like all Disraeli's running diaries—literature) of the *pourparlers* and preliminaries connected with the abortive Cabinet of 1852. It is a picture worthy of Hogarth:

. . . All this time Henley, whom I believe Lord Derby did not personally know, or scarcely, sat on a chair against the dining-room wall, leaning with both his hands on an ashen staff, and with the countenance of an ill-conditioned Poor Law Guardian censured for some act of harshness. His black eyebrows, which met, deeply knit; his crabbed countenance doubly morose; but no thought in the face, only ill-temper, perplexity, and perhaps astonishment. In the midst of this Herries was ushered, or rather tumbled, into the room exclaiming 'What's all this?' Then there were explanations how and why he had not received a letter, and had not been there at twelve o'clock in the morning to know that he was to be Chancellor of the

Exchequer. If Henley were mute and grim without a word, suggestion, or resource, Herries . . . was as unsatisfactory in a different manner. He was garrulous and only foresaw difficulties. . . . Lord D. and I exchanged looks . . . We dispersed. Lingered in the hall, Lord Lonsdale said never was such an opportunity lost. . . . 'The best thing the country party can do,' said Malmesbury, 'is to go into the country. There is not a woman in London who will not laugh at us.' Herries, who seemed annoyed that all was over, kept mumbling about not having received his summons till three o'clock, and that he remembered Governments which were weeks forming. Henley continued silent and grim. Beresford [the Whip-wirepuller] looked like a man who had lost his all at roulette, and kept declaring that he believed Deedes [a nonentity] was a first-rate man of business.

His letters are fascinating and in more than one respect recall Byron's. There is one to Lady Londonderry of extraordinary interest recounting with brilliant accessories his visit to his old friend Louis Philippe (whose good offices years before he had begged for Palmerston), and also he has left his own record of that historical conversation. It is clear that it was the secret societies (on whose foreign influence Disraeli laid immense stress) that profited by the King's vacillations and struck the chance blow that felled him. Louis Blanc triumphed while the 'Republicans' were indulging in expensive affectations of simplicity. There was a rumour of his impending arrest :

What a noise for so little a man, not so tall as Tommy Moore at his best, and twelve months ago calling in vain at a café for a waiter. But such is the magnetic power of brains. Who would ever have supposed that Louis Blanc would have beaten Louis Philippe?

Forthwith Louis Blanc found asylum with Monckton Milnes—the Vavasour in *Tancred*, of whose eclectic breakfasts Disraeli has left another picture—a lighter pendant to the political conclave previously portrayed. Not only are Disraeli's letters amusing and exhilarating, but in their power of suggestion what he said of Metternich's epistles holds good of his own, 'They are too full of thought ever to be obsolete.'

As for his Parliamentary wit, it is inexhaustible, and a booklet might be made of the similes alone which sally forth, as it were, from the fortresses of literature to do battle with stupidity. In his crowning oration of 1848—the *dies irae* of revolutions and Bank crises—he added to his ingenious illustration of St. Januarius' Day ('congealed circulation') a satire on Sir Charles Wood's three budgets in a single year. It was drawn from Cervantes and recalls the simile of the Reform Ministry and Ducrow's circus in the 'thirties :

I never shall forget the scene. It irresistibly reminded me of a celebrated character who, like the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had four trials in his time, and whose last was the most unsuccessful. I mean the great hero of Cervantes when he returned from his fourth and final

expedition. The great spirit of Quixote had subsided; all that sally of financial chivalry which cut us down at the beginning of the session and which trampled and cantered over us in the middle, was gone. . . . He returned home crestfallen and weary. The villagers, like the Opposition, were drawn out to receive him; and Cervantes tells us that, although they were aware of his weakness, they treated him with respect. His immediate friends—the barber, the curate, the bachelor Samson Carrasco—whose places might be supplied in this house by the First Lord of the Treasury [Russell], the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [Palmerston], and perhaps the President of the Board of Trade [Labouchere], were assembled, and with demure reverence and feigned sympathy they greeted him; . . . but just at the moment when everything, though melancholy, was becoming—though sad, was in the best taste—Sancho's wife [the Government of the middle classes] rushes forward and exclaims 'Never mind your kicks and cuffs, so you've brought back some money.' But this is just what the Chancellor of the Exchequer has not brought. . . .

This is the speech, too, in which we learn that, at the prospect of a doubled income tax, an 'uneearthly yell as of a menagerie before feeding time' 'went up' from the *bourgeoisie*, 'those friends of Free trade.'

Another instance, but of unadorned sarcasm, comes from the sugar debate of the same year, and may appeal to us now.

The Government [he said], however a class may be beset, have always their stock remedies—'a certain number of abstract qualities and cardinal virtues.' Competition is always at hand at the head of the list; then follow, you may be sure, energy and enterprise. . . . What is this competition of whose divine influence we hear so much? . . . It inspires all their solutions of economical difficulties. Is the shipping interest in decay? Competition will renovate it. Are the Colonies in despair? Energy will save them. Is the agricultural interest in danger? Enterprise is the panacea.

Not the least of his virile qualities was his independence. 'I am not the organ of any section,' he repeated at the Bucks election, as years before he had affirmed at High Wycombe, 'or the nominee of any individual.'

. . . I cannot take a seat in the House of Commons if I am not the master of my political destiny. I have not gained the position which I am proud to remember I occupy there but by my own individual exertions. It has cost me days of thought and nights of toil—it has cost me unwearied industry, frequent discomfiture, and many unequal contests. I have gained that position by myself, and I must maintain it by myself.

He was the same in the everlasting conflict yet combination of intrigue with politics, ideals with statesmanship. This finds a literal expression in *Tancred*, where the higher conquers :

Send forth a great thought, as you have done before, from Mount Sinai, from the villages of Galilee, from the deserts of Arabia, and you may again remodel all their institutions, change their principles of action, and breathe a new spirit into the whole scope of their existence.

Dependence on what or whom could achieve such an ambition as this? He was the same again in his extreme courage and peculiar attitude in everything relative to the Jew question. Indeed, it is constantly forgotten that his nurture was outside Jewish surroundings. He was a precursor of Daniel Deronda, and perhaps Joseph in Egypt may typify both.

It is race [he confided to Mrs. Brydges Willyams] not religion that interests me in the instance in question. All Europeans and many others profess the religion of the Hebrews. I, like you, was not bred among my race and was nurtured in great prejudice against them. Thought and the mysterious sympathy of organisation have led me to adopt the views with respect to them which I have advocated, and which, I hope I may say, have affected in their favour public opinion.

It was so personally always. He was an adherent, never an on-hanger, and independence in his views, studies and purposes was the breath of his nostrils. He was so with regard to science. He had been so in connexion with Peel, and in the very letter which puts down a firm foot on Lord Derby's first attempts at suppression he snubs him by consoling him for the gout. His independent action cast temporary occasions to the winds, and in 1850 he supported a ministerial motion for the repeal of the malt tax because it wholly tallied with his views—practically to be expressed in his second budget. Eminently independent he was, too, in his refusal of any pledge to Gladstone in 1852 of a dissolution; in his whole course of action, despite Derby, during his first brief tenure of office. Nowhere, however, was his independence, both of insight and foresight, more displayed than in his firm handling of foreign affairs. Europe was in him. It will be remembered that in *Endymion* he presses the need of a foreign minister's acquaintance with the controlling figures abroad. He knew Louis Philippe, Louis Napoleon, Metternich, Prince Jerome, Prince Frederick of Holstein, with hosts of others, and at one time it was believed he would be minister for foreign affairs. He was ever a warm advocate for an *entente cordiale* with France, and (with Bolingbroke in his mind) urged a commercial treaty with her long before Cobden negotiated one. He discerned the future of the Slavs, above all he sighted in two remarkable speeches of 1848 the destinies and hidden ambitions of Prussia. There had been rumours of designs by Potsdam on Schleswig-Holstein under the plea of German nationality—'dreamy and dangerous nonsense' he called it (for, if one reflects, nationality is the union under a common ideal of different races, not merely a geographical extension), and he denounced, to Denmark's delight—this pretext for invasion.

What was the real reason? It was the lack of a northern port, a design to gain the harbours of the Baltic :

. . . Hitherto in the Baltic Russia and the Scandinavian Peninsula have prevented this project of Germany. . . . This I wish to lay down as a principle that it is for the interest of England, and not of England alone, but of all Europe, that peace should be maintained. . . . *I never can believe that the peace of Europe is to be maintained by hiding our heads in the sand and comforting ourselves with the conviction that nobody will find us out.*

He added that we had guaranteed Schleswig-Holstein and were therefore bound to fulfil our obligations. The other speech concerns Prussian ambition. He is answering the perpetual pacifists—it is the piece already mentioned about St. Pierre and Utrecht :

. . . Only a few years before St. Pierre laid down his principles Prussia did not exist. But Margraves of Brandenburg, conscious of great talents and power, determined, instead of being Margraves, to become Kings of Prussia, and that produced many struggles, and among them a seven years' war. . . .

The professional pacifists usually conduce to the worst breaches of peace, for their appeals to sentimental indolence prevent that preparation which is the truest—the cheapest—insurance. Indeed, it was partly the pacifism of Lord Aberdeen that landed us in the Crimean War.

He held that 'the presence of England is the best guarantee of peace,' but he held also that the fussy interventions of Palmerston were a mistake. This is true. We were always trying our constitution on to figures it would not fit, and then assuring remonstrants that the clouds were big with blessings and would break on every sainted head. Who were we to 'teach politics in the country where Machiavelli was born'?

You looked on the English Constitution as a model farm. You forced it on every country. You laid it down as a great principle that you were not to consider the interests of England, or the interests of the country you were in connection with, but you were to consider the great system of Liberalism which had nothing to do with the interests of England, and was generally antagonistic to the country with which you were in connection.

And then he set on its proper foundations the natural friendship with France :

If you mean by an alliance with France, by a cordial understanding with France, or whatever other phrase you may use, that those important affairs and those great events which periodically and surely occur in the world should be regulated and managed in concert by these two leading nations, after previous counsel, animated by a wise spirit of concession and compromise and leading to a cordial co-operation, that is a system of which I shall ever be a feeble but a warm supporter.

He instanced Queen Elizabeth and Henri Quatre, Cromwell with Mazarin, Bolingbroke and Walpole, so different yet united in the desire for an Anglo-French *entente*.

But an understanding which is only founded on forced occasions and forced opportunities—the incidents invented to justify and occasion the co-operation instead of the co-operation arising from the natural order of the events—that is an understanding and that is an alliance which before this time has occasioned the greatest evil, and which, in the present case, might lead to the greatest possible disasters.

With regard to the Crimean War (mismanaged by a vacillating 'clique of doctrinaires'), not only did he lay down the principles which should actuate a patriotic Opposition (and this perhaps the other day Mr. Bonar Law may have forgotten), but he showed both by precept and practice how these could be conjoined with helpful criticism. Of Russia, as of Austria, he was mistrustful, and in this conflict, oddly enough, he named the Czar a modern Attila.

We are instantly menaced [he wrote at the opening of 1854] with war and domestic revolution, and neither of these calamities has arisen from the necessities of things, but from the incompetence or short-sighted ambition of second-rate men. . . . They were a Coalition [he urged in the next year] each with an *arrière pensée*. . . . They expected that their negotiations would end in peace and that they would never be called upon to act; from the first they flattered themselves with the belief that the circumstances they had now to encounter would never happen in their lifetime.

Surely history repeats itself. It was rumoured that France might invade Italy. He denied that she had any right to do so. And he protested against any concert with the Parisian Jacobins who were then in power.

It is the system [he adds with a force justified by history] that commences with fraternity and ends with assassination; it is the system which begins by preaching universal charity and concludes by practising general spoliation.

Your theorist likes robbery without risk.

There is no space to pursue his prophetic views as to Ireland and India. In the first he advocated, during this very period, those railways that have proved such material benefits, the commerce which was indispensable, and that 'complete code for Irish land' which might have saved years of waste and friction. He attempted a Tenant Right Bill. Not without cause did he claim in 1870 that if this and another measure had become law there would have been no need for Gladstone's remedies. And the following passage of 1851 shows with what inward sympathy and foresight he diagnosed the eternal dilemma of Celtic government. Mr. Buckle well styles it a 'remarkable deliverance.'

It is utterly impossible that Ireland can be again governed, openly or covertly, directly or indirectly, on the principle of Protestant ascendancy. But equally certain it is that no Government can exist which is not faithful and devoted to the Protestant Constitution of this country. In its maintenance are involved greater interests than the existence of a Government, the fate of a Crown, and the destinies of an empire; and trust me, among all the blessings which it assures to us, not the least important and not the least precious are the civil and religious liberties of the Catholics themselves.

Could he have better balanced the problem that is still with us? His Indian policy—which the succeeding volume will probably elaborate—was equally psychological. He understood both the people and their past, and he discerned—as befitted one who had long known his Burke by heart—that so vast an Empire could not advantageously remain under the sway of John Company. His prophecies are perpetual, and he read the weather-signs at a glance.

Prophetic in another sense is his *Tancred*; it is the tracking of inspiration to its source. It blends in a remarkable degree the duality on which I commented at the outset, and I cannot but think that in more than one regard these pages have treated it imperfectly. They describe it, and with justice, as a protest against materialism, but it is more than that. Both its irony and its peculiar import have been missed. And first let me clear up at least three misunderstandings which have some connexion with the meaning of this spiritual romance. Disraeli always held that Christianity was the completion of Judaism, and in so holding he really only repeated our Saviour's own announcement that He came not to take away but to fulfil, or St. Paul's meaning in the fifteenth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. But so far from inventing this theory for any purposes of *Tancred*, as this volume hints, it was, if I mistake not, the elder Disraeli's conviction that the son—as so often—developed. Then, again, when Lord Henry Bentinck, as the brother of Disraeli's intimate, certainly aware of the Christianity which Disraeli not only practised but proclaimed in more than one debate on the Jew Bills—when Lord Henry speaks in a letter to him of 1849 about 'your Church,' Mr. Buckle, who has arranged so much so well, adds a footnote to explain that Lord Henry 'wrote as if he thought that Disraeli was a Jew in religion.' He must have forgotten a letter of the previous year from Disraeli to Lord John Manners (given only a few pages back), where he speaks of 'Samuel Oxon' (Wilberforce) as 'a pillar of the Church in *our sense*'—the italics are mine. What Disraeli, what Lord Henry meant, of course, was a real, an ideal Church, at once spiritual and unpolitical, a Church not 'the stipendiary of the

State,' a Church that reseeks the true fountains of its inspiration and remounts to its first origins. That is one of the significances of *Tancred*, and of that Disraeli and his disciples must often have discoursed. Then, again, we are told that in *Tancred* our Church dignitaries are by no means exalted, and this is supposed to be in some way dissonant from the theme. But, surely, this very contrast is one of the book's main purposes. More than this, since this criticism alludes presumably to a passage unfavourable to our theologians, it may be as well to point out a pertinent sentence from a letter of Disraeli's, in 1852, to his new and youthful friend Lord Henry Lennox, referring to some printer's mistakes in the famous twenty-fourth chapter of his *Lord George Bentinck*. He continues :

... I don't know of any other errors, for the passages denounced as heterodox by English clergymen, who are more ignorant of theology than any body of men in the world (the natural consequence of being tied down to Thirty-nine Articles and stopped from all research into the literature which they are endowed to illustrate), are only reproductions from St. Augustin and Tertullian.

Now, as regards the message of *Tancred*. The central idea, so laughed at as 'the Asian mystery,' is that we profess not only a creed but a religion that springs from an Arabian tribe. Our worship, its poetry and its prophecies, its message and its meaning, are admittedly Semitic ideas. The Bible is the fatherland of the spirit. What, then, are these sacred Semitic ideas—are they the conventional screeds that we repeat by rote? Disraeli answers emphatically 'No.' If religion be politicised, he would seem to say, where then is your Christianity? Has it become forced and full of formula? Is the parliament which regulates it a theocracy? Are votes divine? But ideas are. Truth is divine, and the Church should be so too. Religion is man's craving for direct communication with God. Where did He reveal art but in Athens, or law but in Rome, or man's spiritual nature and power but in Jerusalem? Disraeli recalls us to the land which he declares—if we believe what we believe—should still shed inspiration. He shows us even there, in varying characters at once ideal and ironic, the contrasts and conflicts between spiritual ideas and political intrigues, between the bustle of Europe and Syrian repose. It is a wonderful fairy-tale, and it is essentially true. Since, then, these ideas are not quite what they often seem to ordinary England, since, so to speak, St. Paul was not a rural dean, it may be necessary to requicken faith and to reinspire religion. 'We cannot save ourselves,' exclaims Eva, the ideal incarnation of Judea in the person

of a banker-prince's noble daughter. It is the young, the high-born Englishman who replies :

Send forth a great thought, as you have done before, from Mount Sinai, from the villages of Galilee, from the deserts of Arabia, and you may again remodel all their institutions, change their principles of action, and breathe a new spirit into the whole scope of their existence.

Did Disraeli himself feel no such divine call? I think, bearing other sentences in mind, that he did, but then again intrigue constantly intruded on faith. Yet faith rose superior. And in him it sprang from race. 'All is race,' and race embodies itself in individuality. There is a passage which the critique on *Tancred* omits : 'What on the whole,' asks Eva in her Bethany garden, 'is the thing most valued in Europe?' Tancred pondered, and after a slight pause said :

I think I know what ought to be most valued in Europe ; it is something very different from what I fear I must confess is most valued there. . . . I think that in Europe what is most valued is—money.

And this also may be repeated ; it occurs in one of the ironical bits of the Emir's would-be worldly wisdom :

. . . The English are neither Jews nor Christians, but follow a sort of religion of their own, which is made every year by their bishops, one of whom they have sent to Jerusalem, in what they call a parliament—a college of muftis—you understand.

He smiles as, alternately, he turns the tables both on East and West.

This irony pervades the whole, which is a dramatic dream floating among memories, and midway between earth and heaven. So far from its abrupt close being imperfect, it must be regarded as most poetical. The dream opens directly this Childe Harold of the Church quits the realities of roast beef and lands on the dreamland of the Syrian soil, ' . . . Sunny regions laved by the Midland Ocean.' It ends when, amid affectionate bustle, the Duke and Duchess with their retinue re-enter like a refrain. Their incursion chases away the dream. The rapt dreamer, as it were, rubs his eyes and awakes to the recurrence of the West. The hour, too, is in keeping. It is the moment when Tancred avows his love. It is the twilight.

There are further omissions, the humour of those honest servants Freeman and Trueman, who so miss the home-brewed and the family prayers in the desert of 'this 'ere Siny' ; the symbolic fantasy of the Baronis ; Queen Astarte's pageant of sculptured Greek Gods in her hidden galleries—a fancy which, I have been assured, has been since found to be a fact.

The strength of *Tancred* is in its spiritual appeal ; its weak-

ness, perhaps, that ideas are not **always** 'divine,' but sometimes hover in the regions between **sense and spirit**. Yet always they are a **medium**. Through them it is **that the spirit**, blowing where it listeth, inspires. And with the **dead letter** of the sectaries ideas have **nothing to do**. 'The letter **killeth**, the spirit **giveth life**.' In this sense Disraeli, for all his **joy in the whirligigs of life**—nay, perhaps, because of it—is a **force far more spiritual** than Gladstone's ecclesiasticism or the dissenting dogmas of Bright. At *Tancred's* very outset Disraeli scathes the policy 'that confounds the happiness with the wealth of nations.'

You have announced to the millions [he cries out in the wilderness] that their welfare is to be tested by the **amount of their wages**. . . . If you have seen an aristocracy **invariably become degraded** under such an influence; if **all the vices of the middle class** may be traced to such an absorbing motive—why are we to believe that the people should be more pure?

Do we still believe it?

'The Spirit giveth life.'

WALTER SICHEL.

LETTERS FROM PARIS AND SOISSONS
A HUNDRED YEARS AGO

II

THE 'HUNDRED DAYS'—AND AFTER

Two letters written by Madame de Pougens in 1814, which in their natural sequence should have appeared with the correspondence in last month's issue of this Review, have only just come into my possession, and appear here by way of preface to the letters of 1815. Their publication at the present time has a singular appropriateness, for they afford the most convincing proof of the overbearing and cruel conduct of the Prussian and Russian troops following on the invasion of France by the Allied Powers in 1814. In view of the stories which for some months past have thrilled the world with horror, it is worthy of note that while the Russian troops have long since discarded the barbarities of a hundred years ago, the Prussians appear to have moved steadily on the downward path, and to-day show even greater cruelty in their methods of warfare than was the case in 1814 and 1815.

Paris, Rue du Bac, No. 18, Faubourg St. Germain.
20th March, 1814.

I am sure you will be glad to hear we are alive and tolerably well, which is saying a great deal after all we have suffered. . . . You are happy my good friends¹ to feel the calamities of War only in your pockets, be assured next to a wild beast a Cosaque is the animal the most to be dreaded, though we were rather less exposed than the poor City of Soissons, still our pretty quiet retreat has suffered much; two poor old *paysans* died of the ill treatment they received, our good Lorin had many a lash, and the knout was once held over dear M. de Pougens' head. Our house was pillaged from top to bottom, all our provisions, so that one day we remained with 11 eggs among 15 and a few potatoes; we were obliged to kill our old hens to make some soup, but that was the least of our cares, the horrible presence

¹ It will be remembered that Madame de Pougens' letters were written to Mrs. (afterwards Lady) Dundas, who resided at Richmond.

of these *Tartares du désert armés jusqu'aux dents* continually entering our house, and menacing us with their drawn sabres, was too much, and as soon as the road was safe, we removed hither. Poor M. de Pougens is grown so thin, his friends here were much shocked to see the alteration, for 6 weeks he had never undressed except to change his linnen. Though upon recollection I am glad to find I have more courage than I ever thought I possessed, yet I own it was nearly exhausted, and my poor nerves so shattered 'the least noise appalls me.' An Army of heroes headed by a Hero have driven the enemy from Soissons, still we shall remain here till a more quiet moment.

Meantime I must say we have supt full with horrors, like Macbeth. We were at Soissons the first time the Town was taken by assault, but most marvellously preserved by a Cosaque officer, a Polonais 'full of the milk of human nature,' and Heaven directed, I think to us. I said how I trembled for M. de Pougens, he answered '*Ah Madame, qui pourrait faire du mal à une figure aussi respectable?*' but few were like him. The next time our poor Soissons was taken the Town capitulated, and was treated still more cruelly than the first time, the women especially, no age was safe from violence. A poor old woman above 60, who makes my corsets, was a victim to their brutality, a poor girl on the body of her dead mother, and 2 thirds of the inhabitants stript of all their effects and clothes. A friend of ours had 40 Cosaques at once in her house, her Apartments are on the ground floor, they rushed into her Bedchamber with their horses, carried off all she possessed in linnen and clothes, broke all her fine china and frightened her out of her senses almost, as you may well believe. My old English friend was at first so little alarmed she remained quietly in her *fauteuil*, and sent them word *not to smoke in her house!* However she presently found she was no longer *Maitresse chez elle*, but though the General was so *méchant* he beat her servants, yet she lost less than her neighbours.

The Bishop of Soissons told me that having 3 Generals lodged at his house, he remonstrated with them on the conduct of their soldiers after the Town had capitulated, one answered '*ce ne sont pas mes Soldats,*' another answered '*ce ne sont pas mes affaires,*' the third '*cela ne me regarde pas.*' Happily we had concealed all our valuables and the best part of our clothes, but the servants and the household linnen have been pillaged, M. de Pougens had buried his manuscripts, but they did not disturb his books; the proprietors remaining in their houses, at least in our Village, was a safeguard, where the soldiers found nobody they broke and destroyed without mercy. At Château Thierry the good Curé (a man of great merit and who having inhabited

their country some years understands their language) filled his Church with poor helpless women and children. These barbarians forced the doors in spite of his prayers and entreaties, and treated the women with the most savage brutality even on the Altars, and would you believe it they never departed from our house *sans faire le signe de la croix* and many would not touch meat or butter because it was Lent! Since their departure we have had many of our officers and soldiers to lodge, they are all so exasperated, they declared continually '*nous nous ferons hacher en mille morceaux plutôt que de reculer,*' others '*nous ne voulons pas de canons, nous ne demandons que la baïonnette,*' and accordingly they have performed prodigies of valour. . . .

Vauxbuin, près Soissons, (Aisne)

October 14th, 1814.

You will, I think, be as tired of hearing of the Cossacks as we were seeing them, but as they are the general subject of conversation, everybody having some terrible history to relate, they naturally find their way to the tip of my pen. Indeed we ought to be very thankful we suffered so little, Major Lewestein protected us one night by giving us Ivan the Cossack for a guard, and the next the *saue garde* sent by Count Woronsow though composed of insolent officers yet they certainly prevented our being all treated like poor Lorin who was lashed and pillaged pretty handsomely.

The other day a Mdme. Aubriot who lives at a village about 2 leagues off, came to visit us, she remained at her house with her husband and little girl all the time, except indeed that she and her child passed some time in the woods, her poor husband was near being minced into small meat by them, and all from a mistake. They accused him of having a *dragon français* concealed in his house, he denied stoutly, at last happily for him (who is but a simple Cymon) somebody had the wit to find out it was Dragon the housedog, whose name they heard repeated, they were still hard of belief and held the lance at his throat till the good animal appeared to the call of *dragon* and relieved his poor trembling Master.

Amongst many traits of barbarity one was glad to hear of at least one trait of humanity, Mdme. Aubriot says the soldiers entered a cottage in their village which was deserted by the inhabitants, who had left behind a poor child in a cradle; they took cradle and child and carried it carefully to a neighbouring cottage where they found an old woman, they gave her the child in charge, assuring her they would not take her cow or anything she possessed if she would promise to take care of the poor child, which you may be sure she did; they staid to see her give the

child milk for it was half starved, and then departed. The inhuman parents only returned 2 days after. Mme. Aubriot says and so does M. Dansé that the Prussians were worse than the Russians, happily for us they only arrived here after our departure and then the General Thielman lodging in our house protected it in some measure.

They tell a good story of a thief who was taken the other day in the very act of stealing, a guard was ordered to convey him to prison to which place said M. le Voleur proceeded slowly and reluctantly, the Guard impatient said '*S—é Cosaque marchez en avant*'—*le voleur répondit—'Monsieur c'est votre devoir d'arrêter les voleurs, non pas de les insulter.'* . . . Though we seldom talk of fashions I must tell you they wear caps *à la cosaque*² which puts Mdlle Thiery in a fine passion, she would make a bonfire of them all.

Alas! the vintage is not only bad but small and the wine will be *hors de prix*, the allied Armies have exhausted the Country so entirely, we give 150 fr. for what used to cost 70, and after all not so good. An acquaintance of ours who lives at Crouy (a village on the road to Laon pillaged and re-pillaged by the Cosaques) says their grapes are all frozen, the poor *paisans* in despair. They had lived on the credit of what they should get at the vintage, and that has failed them, meantime they are threatened by the tax gatherers to seize all they have left, and we sufferers gave in a list of our losses, being so required and thus do they make compensation. A poor man in our village lets a cottage for 30 fr. a year and he is taxed at 33, a mistake no doubt, but such is the confusion which reigns, a general augmentation having taken place instead of the contrary.

I was amused the other day with an article in the *Moniteur*, the King of Prussia is going then to dress up his old Protestant religion with a little Roman Catholic finery, our good stiff Presbyterians would say turning it into Queen Jezebel, or the W. of Babylon, but bigotry seems to be the order of the day everywhere and not confined to Spain and the Inquisition. But it is the Pope who amuses me, ought he not according to his own principles and above all according to the judgment he passes on others, to have suffered martyrdom rather than submitted to crown the *impie* as he now calls him? We are all impatience for the result of the Congress, I think it will be difficult amongst all the other potentates to shut the door against the Goddess of discord. . . . Adieu, Adieu,

Ever, ever yours,

F. J. de POUGENS.

² To-day the same thing is happening and fashions *à la Cosaque* are much in vogue in this country.

To determine the arrangements for carrying into effect the Treaty of Peace signed at Paris on May 30, 1814, the signatory Powers had stipulated that a general Congress should be held at Vienna in the following autumn. The month of August was fixed for the sittings to open, but to meet Lord Castlereagh's parliamentary engagements, and allow of the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia making a brief sojourn in their respective capitals at the conclusion of the English visit, the plenipotentiaries did not assemble till late in September. Prince Metternich presided over the proceedings of this illustrious and important gathering which may be said to have paved the way for its successor in title, the Concert of Europe.

During the period of the Congress the Emperor Francis, as well as the city of Vienna itself, dispensed the most lavish hospitality and, for the time being, the attention of Europe was concentrated on the Austrian capital and its distinguished guests. No one in power, least of all Louis the Eighteenth, appears to have given so much as a thought to Napoleon, whose career it would seem was considered to have ended with his abdication at Fontainebleau and subsequent acceptance of the island of Elba as his future home and dominion. In short the man who for so many years had dominated an entire continent had passed out of mind, absolutely and entirely forgotten by the very Powers that but a few months before had regarded him as their most formidable and deadly foe.

Not so the French people. They had never taken kindly to the changes brought about by the new regime, and in spite of the privations and losses they had undergone still looked back with regret to the reign of Napoleon. By creating a Parliament, Louis the Eighteenth may be said to have brought political liberty where before there was none, but on the other hand, he and his Court unsettled domestic affairs, the prospects of the Army and the titles of estates. The holders of national property were also becoming alarmed at the encroachments of the Church, and, except in the case of the more highly placed officers, the prevailing feeling in the Army was one of general dissatisfaction. Hardly had Napoleon left France than the soldiers who had fought under his leadership were praying for his return. 'They guarded the Emperor's Eagles as their household gods, kept the tricolour cockades with pious care in their knapsacks, spoke with raptures of his exploits in their barracks and worshipped his image in their hearts.'³

Such was the position when on the 7th of March, 1815, while a ball given by Prince Metternich was in progress, the disquiet-

³ Alison's *History of Europe*, vol. x. p. 800.

ing news reached Vienna that Napoleon, accompanied by Generals Drouot, Bertrand, and Cambronne, had landed at Cannes with a force of 1000 men. The intelligence spread consternation at the Congress, where it was an open secret that instead of the permanent accord expected to result from its deliberations, a combination against Russian aggression was by no means a remote possibility. However, with the return to France of the common enemy, as Napoleon was so often called, unanimity again prevailed, and the Great Powers bound themselves together, not for the purpose of securing the throne of France to the Bourbons, but to place it out of Napoleon's power ever again to disturb the peace of Europe.

The Congress was brought to an abrupt conclusion, and the Allies set about organising three large armies, the first to consist of Austrian troops led by Prince Schwarzenberg; the second, the Russian contingent, with the Emperor Alexander in command; and the third to comprise the British, Hanoverian, Prussian, and Belgian forces under the Duke of Wellington and Field Marshal Blücher. To place these armies in the field, and to equip them for another campaign in France, occupied the attention of the Powers during the next few months. The necessity of making a supreme effort to crush Napoleon was impressed upon the British Government by the Duke of Wellington, whose views, however, did not go unchallenged. The Whigs, led by Whitbread, protested against the war; but they failed to carry their resolution, the Budget of the year was raised to 90,000,000*l.*, and the Duke proceeded to Belgium to prepare for the approaching hostilities.

Meanwhile Napoleon was making rapid strides, the army rallying to his standard as, step by step, he advanced towards the French capital. That he was fully conversant with the affairs of Vienna may be gathered by the observation he is credited to have made on landing at Cannes—'*Le Congrès est dissous*,' while that he was *en rapport* with the feeling in the Army may be gathered from his action when, for the first time, he came face to face with the Royalist troops. Advancing alone, he exclaimed 'Soldiers, if there is one among you who desires to kill his General, his Emperor, he can do so; here I am.' Needless to say, these inspiring words did not fail of their effect, and the Emperor's march to Paris may be described from beginning to end as a triumphal progress. Once only was there danger, and that was from Marshal Ney, who had pledged his word to Louis the Eighteenth that he would 'bring back the Corsican to Paris in an iron cage.' Fate, however, willed it otherwise, for on meeting his former chief the Marshal's professions of loyalty to the King quickly evaporated, and both he and the troops he commanded ranged themselves under Napoleon's

banner. Louis the Eighteenth left Paris on the 19th of March, and Napoleon took up his residence at the Tuileries on the following evening, his reception being of the most enthusiastic kind, all classes vying with each other to do him honour.

Practically no resistance was offered to Napoleon, who now posed not as an autocratic sovereign but as a constitutional monarch. With the object of satisfying the demands of the patriot or liberal party he framed an Act giving greater popular liberty than the Charter promulgated by Louis the Eighteenth, and the new constitution was proclaimed on the 1st of June at a ceremony designated by him as the *Champ de Mai*.

It became apparent to Napoleon that if he wished to hold France he would have to fight against a united Europe. Accordingly he set to work with something like his old determination to reorganise the army, and, with the assistance of the veterans who had returned from captivity in Russia and Germany, he succeeded in getting together, in addition to the National Guard, an army of 284,000 men. With this force on the 14th of June he crossed the Belgian frontier, hoping to attack Wellington and Blücher before assistance could arrive from other quarters. Four days later the Battle of Waterloo was fought and Napoleon's sun was set. He fled to Paris, where, at the dictation of the Chambers, he tendered his abdication, at the same time drawing up a Declaration addressed to 'the French people,' in which he proclaimed his son Emperor of the French under the title of Napoleon the Second. Thus ended what is known in history as the Hundred Days.

Meanwhile the Allies had entered Paris, and Louis the Eighteenth, returning from Ghent, where he had taken refuge, occupied once more the throne of France. Unlike what happened on the former occasion, the Allies, especially the Prussians, treated the French capital as a conquered city, and its inhabitants with much unnecessary harshness. Indeed, it is said that Blücher was with difficulty restrained from blowing up the Pont d'Iéna and destroying the column of the Place Vendôme.

For some months peace negotiations had been proceeding, and conferences between France and the Allied Powers, protracted and acrimonious, had taken place; but it was not until the 20th of November that the final Treaty of Peace was signed. During the intervening period the greater part of France was overrun by foreign troops, who committed many excesses, and the humiliation of the French people was complete when it became known that the provisions of the new Treaty provided for the frontiers of their country being garrisoned by foreign troops for a period of five, afterwards reduced to three, years.

The command of this army, known as the Army of Occupation, was placed in the hands of the Duke of Wellington.

It is with the events narrated above that Madame de Pougens' letters now deal.

Vauxbuin, près Soissons (Aisne)
Monday April 10th 1815

If you knew how I have longed to write to you dearest Friends during all these wonderful, almost miraculous events, you would I am sure pity me for the restraint laid on my pen first by fear and prudence and since by the assurance here that the letters did not pass. But to-day I have received a letter from M. de Pougens who is at Paris, he tells me the couriers pass as usual, and that several English are arrived at Paris, so I hope the sweet blessing of Peace will be continued to both countries. What a revolution, I call it a *révolution à la violette*. You know doubtless the soldiers during the last year gave the Emperor the name of *le petit père la violette*, and used to say to each other '*allons camarade allons boire à la violette*' which continued a profound secret amongst themselves.⁴

An almost universal discontent prevailed against the regal government at Paris, the Emigrants and Priests had rendered the King very unpopular, the Duc d'Angoulême a mere cypher, always drunk after dinner, and the Duc de Berri detested, especially by the Army, the proprietors of national lands not able to sell them, or to mortgage them, so universal was the opinion that the Emigrants would enter in possession again. *Enfin* all prepared the way for our great Emperor, never so truly great as at this moment, but till ye 20th we were so in the dark.

I was extremely uneasy about M. de Pougens who set out for Paris the day before we heard the news. I was reading quietly in my room when Mdme. Louise came and told me. I could not at first believe it, and when it was confirmed I was very anxious for the state of Paris, and wrote letter after letter to entreat M. de Pougens to return. Happily though every means was tried to enflame the people, Paris, thanks to the good conduct of the National Guard, remained perfectly quiet, a detachment went out the memorable 20th to meet the Emperor another detachment had escorted in the morning the King to St. Dennis. I think the Emperor was too good to land with 1000 men, his *valet de chambre* was quite sufficient, the troops sent out against him he used to pass in review *tout de suite* they say—poor Mdme.

⁴ *Le petit Père la violette* was a name by which Napoleon was secretly known practically throughout the entire French Army; it was commonly rumoured that 'he would appear with the violet in Spring on the Seine, to chase from thence the priests and emigrants who have insulted the national flag.—Alison's *History of Europe*, vol. x. p. 800.

Martenot was very uneasy, knowing her husband's real sentiments, he was in Garrison at Metz, but since arrived at Paris, his regiment the Old Imperial Guard had hid their eagles and their cockades. When the Emperor reviewed them they bent one knee to the ground, the whole was so affecting M. Martenot wrote word that the Emperor shed tears as well as his soldiers, *enfin voilà les Aigles de retour et les Dindons sent a grazing.*

M. de Pougens though he did not share my fears returned here before his books were ready to be sent to St. Petersburg, but as soon as he heard the Institute was to go *en corps* to the Tuileries, he set out and arrived just in time, the Emperor received them most graciously and spoke to M. de Pougens *d'une manière très aimable.* All the works at Paris, the improvements, are resumed especially at the Louvre, suspended for the last year. Clarice Dansé at school at Paris writes word she was taken by some friend to see the Emperor, she was near him as he stepped into his carriage, a *voiture bourgeoise avec un seul laquais derrière . . .* he has been to see David's celebrated picture just finished, Leonidas aux Thermopyles, they say it is a *chef-d'œuvre . . .* I hasten to dispatch this letter, it must be sent to Soissons early to-morrow in order to set out from Paris Wednesday. M. de Pougens is still at Paris *accablé d'affaires.* I expect him in a day or two and will soon be in continuation. Adieu, adieu, Ever yours, most truly,

F. J. DE PUGENS.

Vauxbuin,

Tuesday, April 18th, 1815.

I think it was last week that I wrote to you my dear friends a very hurried letter, having heard from M. de Pougens that the post still passed between the two countries I was impatient to avail myself of it for fear of what might happen. Since then I have lived in fear lest all intercourse should be stopped but a letter I received this morning from my *Caro sposo* (who is still at Paris) puts me in such good spirits it has set my pen agoing immediately. He says '*Je ne puis nommer la personne, c'est une bien bonne tête, je viens d'avoir une conversation bien tranquillisante sur l'espoir fondé de n'avoir point de guerre.*' He says too *on vient de tirer le canon pour le sédition de Marseille,* and that several English were at Paris. The civil war then (a mere *feu de paille*) is quite at an end and indeed if you are tempted to let slip once more the dogs of War God knows where or when the havoc may end.

The Army is filled with the most surprising enthusiasm, which added to their sense of lost glory and to their revenge

for the invasion of last year I am certain would make them perform wonders. The Baron Martenot came to visit me yesterday, he is not young or flighty, but a sober sedate character, he says there are now two hundred and fifty thousand *vieilles troupes*, he added '*Nous jurons de vaincre ou de mourir.*' The National Guards are organising all over the Country and Mr. W. Dundas can tell you what a fine body of men they compose at Paris.

Enfin, I fear you have in England a very mistaken idea of things here—in the name of common sense how could the Emperor have performed his journey with a *poignée d'hommes*, if the Country had not been devoted to him, as well as the Army? M. Martenot says when he, with the Old Imperial Guard, stationed at Metz, were summoned to Paris by the late Government, passing through Champagne (a province which you know had suffered cruelly by the War) the peasants met them in troops crying out '*Vive l'Empereur, vive la vieille garde,*' and the Emperor was not then amid Paris; he added too the peasants were mostly armed with fire-arms collected by them during the march of the allied troops and were determined on all the resistance they could make. Mme Louise has just told me a conversation she overheard between two labourers in the garden, who did not know she was in a bosquet near them, one said to the other '*Je ne voudrions pas que ce vieux Cagotan (Louis 18) revînt avec ses Callotins, je ne sommes pas cagot moi, et ils me mettent à l'amende pour faire un petit brin d'ouvrage le dimanche,*' the other answered '*Bah, il ne reviendra pas, nous ne le connaissons pas, nous sommes nés pour ainsi dire sous l'Empereur*' and a great deal more which I forget but which she represented very pleasantly. Our friend Dansé is an Elector and will be a performer in the champ, no longer *de Mars*, but *de Mai*. If they all had as good a head, as sound a judgment as our said friend, one might expect great or rather good things; the sight will be very fine as well as very interesting. . . . I do assure you I feel not the least fear we should be otherwise defended in case of War than the last time when we were betrayed on all sides, but I must indeed hope for the sake of humanity such a calamity will be spared. I think it will.

Meantime we are much amused with the absurd reports which one hears continually. M. de Pougens writes me '*Il y a trois jours on m'a dit avoir parlé à un homme arrivant de Soissons, qui avait vu de ses propres yeux qu'on déparait la ville à cause des ennemis qui en étaient à une petite demilieue, je t'entends rire d'ici,*' ainsi du reste. . . . I expect my dear M. de Pougens

to-morrow morning and shall wait his arrival on the Mountain top in spite of the cold which is very severe, there was ice this morning and the vines (very forward) have suffered cruelly, a sad loss to the poor *paisans*.

Wednesday morning. M. de Pougens certainly communicated a part of his activity to the slow unwieldy diligence for it arrived an hour sooner than usual, I was dressing when Annette exclaimed '*voilà la diligence sur la Montagne.*' I scrambled on my clothes put on my seven league boots and was just in time to meet him in the little winding path down the hill; a good fire, a good breakfast awaited him in my room and such a talking, for Mdlle Thiery arrived brim-full of news and anecdotes, I wish you could have heard her it would have amused you as would the caricatures she mentions but none of which she has brought, for which I scold. One she described is the Duke d'Angoulême—at the head of a number of old Emigrés, *cy devants* (as the vulgars say) *bien poudrés bien coiffés à l'ancienne mode*, and seated in Sedan chairs, the Duke says '*marchez en avant*' to which they gravely answer '*Monseigneur, nous attendons les porteurs pour nous porter en avant,*' it seems flat on paper but they say the costume, the different faces are admirable.

General Drouot is an intimate friend of a relation of Mdlle. Thiery's, he was the first who landed in France with only 8 men, he says a troop of country people met him on the shore and almost stifled him with their embraces, congratulations, etc., and when the Emperor landed a young man threw himself at his feet saying '*Sire je vous apporte cent mille francs et ma vie*'—'*Je les accepte*' was the answer. On the Emperor's arrival at the Tuileries he found his old Ministers assembled to receive him, he immediately began his *travail* with them and worked hard till 5 in the morning. Meantime the old Imperial Guard who had followed him from *l'Isle d'Elbe*, remained 8 leagues from Paris, fatigue preventing them going further; some fugitives from Paris spread the report of tumults, disasters, etc, the poor soldiers tired as they were, snatched up their knapsacks and marched in all haste to Paris, arrived at the *barrières* they were informed all was quiet, however they would proceed to the Tuileries where they arrived at one in the morning and finding all things safe and well, they threw their knapsacks on the ground in the court and were going to make that their bed but the National Guard hastened to them, carried them to the *corps de garde* where all the officers got up, gave them their beds, even the Emperor. Mameluc, an ungrateful creature, did not follow him to *l'Isle d'Elbe*, he is now ready to hang him-

self and lays it all on his wife. You have seen in the papers with what acclamation the Emperor's bust was replaced on the *Colonne Place Vendôme*, the shouts of *Vive l'Empereur* are so frequent and so loud they are heard in the *Champs Elysées*, and he is obliged to show himself continually at the window. The soldiers call la Duchesse d'Angoulême *la Nonne Sanglante*—

Ye Duke of Wellington has rendered himself very unpopular, even to the former government, they say (but that I cannot believe) that he dated his dispatches *de mon quartier général à Paris*, but what is very true, I believe, is that invited to a very great dinner by one of the Maréchaux (I think Macdonald) he made them wait about 2 hours, and then arrived *en bottes*. The Maréchal said to him '*votre Excellence a eu sans doute de grandes affaires*' . . . '*Non, je viens de me promener au bois de Boulogne*'—but if I was to repeat all I hear I should be perhaps a greater liar than all the newspapers put together and yet I cannot resist gossiping with you *chère amie*, especially when anything interesting is on the carpet.

M. de Pougens confirms to me the hope of peace or else I should not be so gay, though I can assure you and from the bottom of my heart without one fear for my personal safety, and yet I am no great heroine and suffered much last year . . but now a little word on the politics of our village, our pretty Mdlle. de Chandelas was married the day before yesterday, I was invited *à la Messe du Mariage*, and to pass *la Soirée*, which, when I heard her sister was brought to bed early in the same morning, I, like a sober Englishwoman thought, as it was to consist of a Ball and Supper, would not take place, the Salon being under her room. Saying so to my Maid she answered '*Oh non, Madame, nous autres françaises nous ne sommes pas comme ça; si Madame la Baronne entend la musique cela l'amusera.*' Accordingly the Ball was given, the pretty Misses danced, and happily the *petite accouchée* (for she is less than I am and very delicate) is not the worse for it.

The Bride was very pretty, very well dressed and danced away most indefatigably all the time we staid, which was not late as you may believe having no longer any taste for such pleasures. The Marié a very handsome *militaire* in the Imperial Guard understands fighting better than dancing and soon quitted the ranks while our young *sous Préfet* distinguished himself by his capers *entrechats* etc, to the great delight of the pretty Misses who preferred him greatly to the Hero. It is true he is rich *et à marier*. I hear he is what they call here *fou de Mdlle de Gestas*, with which I should be delighted as, with her wild, comical Father, and though good very *sans esprit* Mother, she

stands a bad chance of establishment especially as she is *sans argent* and not a great beauty. Mdlle Thiery was at the *Théâtre français* last Sunday very full and the people made the music play several patriotic airs such as *la Victoire est à Nous* and *l'Hymne des Marseillais*. . . .

Vauxbuisin,

Wednesday 19th July⁵ 1815.

I am so sure my kind and dear friends will be glad to hear from me that I am no scone certain the intercourse between our two Countries is restored than I take up my pen though my letter will not depart from Paris till Saturday, perhaps not so soon. . . .

You will be delighted to hear we have not as yet seen an enemy, no not in the shape of honest John Bull, whose good discipline is universally allowed, therefore I do not feel much *afraid* of him, but the horrid Prussians spread havoc and devastation wherever they pass, insomuch that my good countrymen beat them sometimes most handsomely. Our pretty quiet Valley is almost the only spot which can boast that 'trenching War has not channel'd her fields or bruised her flowerets with the armed hoofs of hostile paces'—the frequent passage of troops which we have been obliged to lodge has been ruinous indeed, but otherwise without the shadow of a complaint, for my part, I am quite sick of revolutions, and hope we shall now go on quietly; everything promises better than last year I think. However I can find cause to rejoice in the restoration of our good King,⁶ yet I own I am indignant at the fine Ladies who dance all day long at the Tuileries, when the country round Paris presents a scene of misery and desolation; the poor peasants ruined, obliged to leave their miserable cottages to take refuge in Paris, and there to sleep on the bare stones. The situation of things was dreadful before the arrival of the allied Sovereigns, but the papers inform you of all that passes and, as Mrs. Slipslop says, 'comparisons are *od'rous*.' I make none. . . .

Though I boast of our security yet it is with fear and trembling, Laon and Soissons being well fortified and the latter defended by the same young man who made last year such a stout resistance while we were at Paris; the allied troops having other roads open would not lose their time in besieging us, and as I hear the Commandant has submitted to the King and that the

⁵ Three months had elapsed since Madame de Pougens' last letter. Meanwhile Napoleon had fought and lost Waterloo.

⁶ Madame's political opinions would appear to have changed considerably since her letter of April 10.

white flag is flying, I trust there is nothing to fear, still M. de Pougens is not easy, and will not hear of undoing the *cachettes*. We had soon after the Battle a sad *alerte*, (you must expect me to speak in military phrase I have lived so much with soldiers lately) Annette came breathless one day '*Madame il faut vite tout cacher, les ennemis sont à trois lieues de Laon, on attend des éclaireurs à chaque instant*'—all hands therefore to hide, while I was occupied about the few valuables we possess. Mdlle. Annette packed up my clothes with so much care, I have hardly anything in the world, she passes her life in the wash tub and I must take to my bed soon in my own defence. . . . Our neighbour has been very uneasy about her husband who was terribly wounded, but as he is going on well I believe she is comforted to have him quietly here, or rather at Soissons, where he remains to be near his surgeon and for other reasons; he was shot through the groin I believe, however the ball rolled into his boot, he remained two hours after at the head of his Grenadiers, till two of them absolutely forced him from the field, as one of them repeated to our servants. He is in no danger they say but his recovery will be tedious. . . .

I am uneasy about my native Country still very dear to me, do you recollect a passage in Montesquieu in which he says that large standing Armies will be the ruin of Europe? I know not where to look for it now but I remember its striking me much when I read it . . . *revenons à nos Moutons* . . . our little Curé struts about like a Bantam cock, and poor Mdlle. Thiery will soon not have a nerve left, indeed M. de Pougens and I have had some fears for her head, there is a great deal of fanaticism in her character, the terrors of the revolution made too I think a lasting impression on her mind.

Lorin laughs and talks, and tells you at the same time '*Oh c'est bien triste*,' but now we begin to breathe a little. God grant this devoted Country peace and a free government after all the storms and tempests which have assailed it for so many years past. . . . Alas! Mr. Whitbread, his death, the manner of it affected me much, such a virtuous upright character, what a loss! I am doubly gratified by the handsome manner in which his merit and virtues have been deplored by all parties in the House of Commons as here people spoke of him sometimes with such contempt I felt ready to beat them. You will I know be glad to hear we are all pretty well, though I must own our healths have been a little shaken by constant terror and anxiety, for the allied Armies were hovering round us constantly, my sleep had nearly forsaken me so had M. de Pougens, but now we are regaining our lost ground. . . .

Vauxbuin,

Wednesday July 26th, 1815.

No good comes of boasting, so last Sunday evening as I was reading my book very quietly in our pretty hermitage, I was interrupted by Louise out of breath, who entreated me to return to the house, there being 300 Russians or Prussians arrived in a village about 2 miles off. I found M. de Pougens much alarmed, Mdle. Thiery wringing her hands, in a rage as well as a fright. M. Dansé set off as a scout, and returned giving us the comfort to know they were very quiet, only required food, and on the next evening there arrived here a party of 20 Prussians. Our clever active friend (who is only Mayor elect) in a moment collected at the different houses in the village the meat, bread, wine, brandy which they required, he established them in the large court of the Château, at present uninhabited, and the officer at our *voisine* la Baronne's in order to be near his men; she says said officer's conversation was a little *persiflant sous des formes polies*, but he was *rather cruel*, his poor man was half dead with a fever, and hardly able to crawl about, his Master beat him so unmercifully, he almost cut off his ear with a whip, much to the horror of our *voisine's* maids, and right glad were they when the whole party departed. The next day (yesterday) M. Dansé having heard there was a large party at Coeuvres, (a village famous as the family residence of la belle Gabrielle and where he has a Sister) rode over, and found all in great disorder owing to the neglect of the Mayor; he had been informed 6 hours before of their arrival and had made no preparations, so when 400 Russians arrived hungry as wolves, they found nothing, and set about beating the Mayor and all the inhabitants or as many as they could catch. Our good friend, who has an admirable, firm, bold, gay manner with them set them a little to rights. He says, he laughed heartily when he found some of them eating a raw ham, and greasing their boots with the fat . . . so here we are always in fear of their appearance though the Commandant of Soissons has sent them word not to approach the Town nearer than 2 leagues and we are but one.

Wednesday 2nd August. A whole week has passed and I fully intended sending off my letter by Saturday's post, but alas! our letters and newspapers for several days past have been stopped, the Courier arrives as usual and says the Allied Troops consider Soissons in a state of Siege, and detain all letters directed thither. It is true parties of Russians are stationed in the villages round the Town, but as the Commandant visits and dines with our Commandant and goes to the Play at

Soissons, we hope all will end amicably ; we have a post of about 40 on the Hill near our house, they are in general very quiet thanks to the activity and good sense of M. Dansé. The Mayor of the Village (who is as arrant a Vicar of Bray as ever lived in the days of good Queen Anne), resides at Soissons and leaves us entirely to the care of his deputy the Blacksmith *qui perd la tête à chaque menace*.

The other day they were impatient for the meat which did not arrive, a soldier said to M. Dansé '*Viande ou caput*' (kill). M. Dansé took him by the arm gave him a good shake and he became quiet as a lamb ; at the same time he is very attentive to please them especially the officer, helped them to make a sort of Hut for the officer, as they all slept *à la belle étoile*, and sent fruit ; still we must be in care till all is settled with the Town. M. Dansé says they shock him much when they become clamorous for another commodity not possible to furnish them, he has therefore forbid all the women of the Village approaching the post. . . . Ah my dear friend in spite of all the pomp and circumstance of War, I detest it more than ever, the poor *paysans* suffer much, the soldiers carry off not only any fire arms they may find, but even their spades and scythes.

Friday 4th. Having an opportunity of sending to Paris, I will despatch this tardy letter. . . .

Our Russians are very quiet, we feed them as well as we can, that is the village in their different shares. I will write again my dear friends, as soon as I can, for I am sure you will be anxious about us, however, I firmly believe all will end peaceably.

Vauxbuin,

7th August 1815.

M. Dansé breakfasts with us almost every morning having a passion for tea, he would rival all the washerwomen in the district of London and its environs ; he made us laugh heartily, the Russians perplex him so cruelly with certain requisitions, he says he must follow the example of a Mayor in a neighbouring village, who sent off a cart to Soissons for a cargo of *Mdles Cocos*. . . . I really know not what we should do without this clever active *voisin*, our own Mayor living at Soissons and only coming here *pour faire le fanfaron*, saying '*Oh, j'arrangerai tout cela avec le commandant Russe, j'irai dîner chez lui, etc.*' meantime we might be beat black and blue. Friday night at eleven o'clock arrived a heavy requisition of cows, fowls and butter. M. Dansé was up at 3 in the morning to provide all this, he came

to breakfast half dead with fatigue; then their men desert and they require us to run after them.

M. Dansé mounted his horse after breakfast and rode to the Russian headquarters to represent that our requisition was almost exhausted, but he found the Russian General in a very bad humour, he had been assured he should take possession of Soissons yesterday, but he had just received a *parlementaire* from our Commandant to say it must be delayed for two or three days. The truth of the matter is the Commandant is willing to obey the King's orders to surrender the Town, but the Garrison is refractory, and this morning we are a little uneasy. They require the Garrison to depart without their arms which they refuse absolutely, the Commandant slept on the Place with them last night saying '*tuez moi si vous le voulez.*' How it will end I know not, but I think it hard to send them out as prisoners (they carried off their arms). Why the Town is at all surrendered to the allied troops I cannot guess, since it has long since submitted to His Majesty. Meantime I must tell you we are all anxious to have the English, honest John Bull, alias 'Jack pay all' (as my poor father used to say) pays for everything in good hard money.

Wednesday 9th. I have no thought of Paris at present, and should be wretched if M. de Pougens was obliged to go there on business. A few days ago the conductor *de la diligence* said he had seen with his eyes the cannon replaced on the bridges. Here we are in hopes all will end quietly, 'money makes the mare to go' according to the old proverb, so 30,000 frs. given by the Town to the soldiers has disposed them to march out to-day I believe, and the Russians march in to-morrow, but only *provisoirement* they say, and are to be soon succeeded by the English and Hanoverians, who are to guard our department for the ensuing year. I will not answer for the truth of all this, it was news brought by our old puffing, quaking President of Cosaque memory, who came to dine with us yesterday, and was by no means encouraging. The Master of the Poste (*aux chevaux s'entend*) assured us yesterday the letters would arrive to-day, but they are not come. M. Dansé is rejoiced he has got rid of his cavalry, who were a very heavy load; we have still the 40 men on the Hill. A poor old woman of the village, a certain Mère Dominique, whom we all love very much, is now a good nurse and has been an excellent cook, undertook the latter office for our *libérateurs*, they thump her, poor soul, so unmercifully she dares not approach them.

You ask my dearest friend, when I shall visit England. Alas! I dare never promise myself such a satisfaction, or I would again

say next Spring, I could not expose M. de Pougens to the winter journey, but the early part of the Summer I do and will hope; having little business in London we would make Richmond our headquarters where there are always lodgings like a water drinking place. I often arrange such pretty *Châteaux* in my solitary walks. . . .

Friday 11th. Alas! my friend when may we hope for quiet at least, it seems farther off than ever but no more. We are glad to have our post restored, and our 40 Russians are departed but they have quite ruined us, otherwise very inoffensive, however that is much owing to our good neighbour's admirable management. Lady Pembroke is very good, I delight to hear of her happiness, most certainly we were much obliged to her brother last year, the *sauve garde* he sent us saved us one day, while the officers staid, it was only after their departure we were so pillaged; we are assured we shall have no Prussians, they are terrible still we ought to be thankful, I do not believe there is a corner in France which has suffered so little as our Valley. At Cœuvres (a village near) in one house during the term of 3 weeks they drank 79 bottles of brandy! It is true our expense is heavy, but thank God without terror. . . . Adieu, my excellent friend, M. de Pougens says you are a real treasure and you may be sure I join in feeling you such. . . .

Vauxbuin,

Friday, August 18th 1815.

I trust a letter set out for you dearest friend last Monday, not being yet quite sure of our post I dispatched it to Paris, it was my 3rd since the renewal of the intercourse. You are too good to love my letters, for party runs so very high just now, I am almost afraid of writing anything more than the old story '*if you are well I am well, etc*', however my English independent spirit is not yet damped, and my pen is so used to give you all I think, that I yield to the temptation and after all what can be more innocent? God knows all I wish for is peace and quiet.

We have lived lately really as Hermites, seeing nobody but our very near neighbours, Sunday last however arrived the Gestas in great spirits, their son being named Sous Préfet de Rheims, a very desirable station, honourable too on account of the Coronation. M. le Comte though turned of 60 is as great a rattle as our Sir R. Baker when he used to be called *Bob Baker* in our girlish days, all is sunshine and fair weather with him, Paris the seat of joy and tranquility. I asked if the cannon were still on the bridges, he denied stoutly, but was at last obliged

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to own *qu'il y en avait aux embouchures des ponts*. Madame la Comtesse seemed much delighted with her restored title, she is a good soul, loves M. de Pougens dearly, though he scolds her most unmercifully sometimes, to all his reproofs she answers coolly '*Monsieur c'est égal*' which is become quite a proverb with us, she is *dévoté*, *et n'a pas le sens commun*. She told me very gravely Sunday, she could not bear the words *patriote*, or *idées libérales*; her husband set out next day for his college electoral.

On Monday I (being no longer like the parson tattered and torn in The house that Jack built) determined to make my first publick appearance at Soissons. Mdle Thiery shuts herself up in her cell and will not suffer her eyes to dwell on the human face divine in the shape of a Russian, but little Clarice Dansé was delighted to go with me and see the world, our Jean (who has been during 3 months a National guard at Lisle and looks ten degrees fiercer) was my *escorte*, besides Mdle Annette, who says '*Messrs. les Russes ont toujours été très polis, pour moi je ne les crains pas du tout.*' To be sure I found the streets swarming with them, such a bad smell, which always belongs to them, a *parfum à la Russe*, they fill the houses with lice, and so like the Bible lice are in all their quarters! I made divers visits and finished with Mdme de Gestas. I found her however quite in despair; when the Russians arrived, she ordered the gates of her Hôtel to be thrown open, a magnificent *drapeau* was suspended over the door, and her servants ordered to receive all the Russians who should enter, and to give them everything they desired.

They desire to eat and drink all day and all night, she says she is half ruined already; she has three tables, one for the superior officers, another for the inferior and a third for the servants. They all invite their friends and as her cellar is well furnished with Champagne, they carouse finely, and when M. de Gestas returns he will rave and storm as finely. I found her at table with her daughter; soon after entered the cook (a reverend grey-headed old Gemman) I could not hear what he said but his gestures so expressive of despair, his folded arms, eyes uplifted amused me much, at last I heard '*Ils mangent jusqu'aux coquilles des écrevisses.*' He told Annette he had not a moment either night or day and yet like his mistress was delighted with their arrival. Several other complaints I heard as they are all quartered *chez les bourgeois* till the barracks are ready. After listening to all these *doléances* and fearing we should end by having our share I returned home; the walk was then delightful the landscape by moonlight sweetly pretty, wanting only a silver Thames.

At the entrance to our Village M. Gehien, the Mayor's servant, passed at full gallop, I thought directly that boded us no good, accordingly I found *l'allarme au camp*, an order having arrived *pour préparer logemens et vivres pour cent fantassins Prussiens*. M. Dansé in an hours time had made his preparations and was up at three in the morning to see them executed. Yesterday they arrived, and a young officer came here first to prepare, a pleasing young man with polished manners speaking very good French. Lorin did not fail to say '*Il est aimable, il a la phisionomie française, il a plus l'air d'un officier français que d'un Allemand.*' He announced his superior officer for 4 o'clock, we waited dinner for him till near 6, he was disposed to be rather insolent, Lorin received him at the door, he said roughly '*Ma chambre,*' but afterwards M. de Pougens' extreme politeness subdued him and he conversed very freely. I could not help smiling when he said to me '*Madame vous avez beaucoup de Russes à Soissons, mauvais voisinage*' (*en haussant les épaules*) '*puis ce sont des imbécilles des lourdauts.*' The Russians in their turn call them *des coquins, des voleurs*. He told me too '*vôtre Duc de Wellington est toujours couvert de crachats* (orders) *nôtre General Blucher n'en porte jamais.*' He said they came from the blockade *de la Fère*, a strongly fortified place, a depot of military stores which has hoisted the white flag, but will not open its gates to the Prussians; they have, according to his own accounts, exhausted the country and so they will this, already we begin to feel a scarcity of corn and M. Dansé says the harvest is very indifferent this year. The Prussians were marching to Paris to take the white flag as they are to be in the service of the King, and from thence to be stationed in Normandy. Our officer told me the English guineas flew about the Palais Royal and many of my countrymen lost much at the gaming tables. I doubt much if all the allied powers will not have to regret the time their troops pass in this country in different manners *s'entend*.

Our Prussians departed early next morning having behaved tolerably, only beat a few of the poor *paysans*, but that (as they say) *n'est rien, moins que rien*. Our neighbour, though his wound is not quite well, left Soissons to avoid the Russians and arrived here, to be obliged to receive 2 Prussian officers at dinner, judge his feelings.

Wednesday 23rd. The news from Soissons to-day is that the Russians are soon to depart, by whom succeeded we know not as yet. Mdme de Gestas may rejoice for the old cook told our John this morning they had drank 80 bottles of brandy *at least* in 9 days! I think they have preserved us however from the

Prussians. 10,000 were announced as taking this road to Paris, but the Russian Commander swore *ses grand dieux* they should not enter Soissons, so they have taken another road. . . .

Vauxbuin,

Friday August 25th 1815.

A letter was dispatched to Paris to-day for the Courier of to-morrow. I finished I believe very abruptly, M. de Pougens arriving to tell me the consternation and indignation excited in the whole department by the conduct of the Prussians, they besieged Laon as the Russians Soissons, and the Garrison, like ours, only surrendered after having received the royal mandate. The Commandant demanded of the Préfet the trifling sum of 1500,000 fr. he was answered it was impossible, the Commandant immediately sent 25 soldiers to the Préfet, the next day 50, so on to 100, what they call *en garnisaire*, I know not how it has ended. Compiègne has been treated worse than our Soissons last year, how happy we are to have the Russians, they too, however, exact 'trembling contributions' and at first demanded 600,000 fr. General Sacken arrived and struck off 300,000, but the rest is to be furnished in cloth, shoes for horses and men, etc. An order arrived this morning in our village to furnish 50 horse shoes, the Russians are departing they say, and we shall not have as we hoped honest John Bull, but my Lord Strutt, (as I think Swift calls the Austrians), they say too 50,000 of them are to remain in France, 50,000 Prussians and 50,000 Russians, this devoted Country will be quite ruined.

The Mayor of Soissons is famous for good wines and liqueurs. A Russian officer invited himself to breakfast with him, *M. le Maire* had to bow and to accept; of course, he expected two or three other guests, they arrived 15, much to the consternation of *Mdme la Maitresse*, as you may believe. The officer liked his breakfast so well he said he would return to dinner. Of course the *Maire* invited the rest of the Party—they arrived 40! The poor *Maire* was obliged to send to all the *restaurateurs* in Soissons and *faire main basse* on all the *volailles*, pigeons, *fricassees* and *ragouts*. Friday night there was a riot at the playhouse, the Russian officers present, however, soon set things to rights, and have quite gained *Mdlle Thiery's* good graces, wonderful to tell.

Last night I visited my neighbours and found the poor little Baronne very *triste*, her husband's wound is by no means healed, and he has decided on joining his regiment, she justly fears the journey. Her pretty sister (whose marriage to an officer in the same corps I think I described to you in the Spring) is going

to join her husband likewise in the *Army de la Loire*. M. Martenot told us yesterday a conversation he had with the Prussian officers quartered at his house—one of them said, with rather a saucy ironical tone, '*Monsieur est militaire ?*'—our friend answered drily '*Oui, Monsieur*'—'*Monsieur a-t'il été à Berlin ?*'—'*Oui, Monsieur*'—'*A Vienne ?*'—'*Oui, Monsieur, j'ai été partout, j'ai été blessé partout et me voici*'—upon which they softened their tone, but he could not repeat it without emotion.

Alas! how I wish I could transport myself, my better half and our whole colony indeed, to quieter regions; all who reflect I think must be aware of our very dangerous and critical position, placed on the crater of a volcano which threatens every instant the most terrible explosions. You have no doubt seen a certain alarming paper not printed but in almost everybody's hands, and will not wonder at my fears, however, I endeavour to keep up my spirits and amuse myself and others, as well as I can, so does M. de Pougens, but he trembles every inch of him. Our neighbours set out as I told you, but went no farther than Paris, having heard there of the disbanding of the Army, he (M. Martenot) is returned but his wound so much worse I have not seen him. Soissons has still a Russian Garrison, the inhabitants being alarmed at the report of their leaving the town to the mercy of the Prussians (who are in the neighbourhood) applied to the Russian Commandant who assured them if the Garrison was obliged to depart before it was replaced by a fresh detachment he would leave them 200 men '*alors fermez vos portes et défendez vous, je vous autorise à le faire.*'

This continual passage of troops is preparatory to the great review of the Russian Army in Champagne by the Emperor Alexander. 35 Russians had been long stationed at a great farm near us, they have behaved very well but the farmer, tired of the expense, said one day '*Eh bien! Messieurs, quand partirez vous ?*' Some who could *baragouiner* a little French answered '*Non partir, reste, reste, bonne France, paysans pas battus; méchante Russie paysans battus*'—the Farmeress who repeated this, said our *paysans* give them good lessons. She overheard them saying to the Russians '*Nous autres nous travaillons pour nous, on dit que chez vous ce n'est pas comme ça, et qu'on vous bat, je voudrions bien voir celui qui me battons, dame je le lui rendrons, bien*' etc., in their *patois*. The said Russians do not speak very well of their Master, and make comparisons which recommend them well to Mdlle Thiery, the Prussians the same.

Oh! I forgot to tell you an escape we had the other day, we had 60 Prussians to lodge on their way to Paris. We had 4 soldiers here, *bons enfants au possible*, Westphalians, and speak-

ing French. M. de Pougens though he refuses them brandy yet is so good he gains all their hearts, they call him *bon Papa*; *enfin*, we were reconciled to our Prussians. The next morning very early the detachment required carts and horses which the farmer and an alehouseman were stupid enough to refuse. They broke into the houses of both, pillaged them completely, and said they had a right to pillage the whole village, the *bon Papa* I think would not have escaped, but our Mayor arrived, ordered the carts and horses, sent the alehouseman to prison and they departed, but not till they had caused M. Dansé and M. de Pougens many uneasy moments. I knew nothing of the matter till afterwards.

I went the other day to dine with Mdme de Gestas, and visited our poor old President who has had a paralytic stroke which has deprived him of the use of his left side, but has not affected his speech. These lively people can neither live without society or die without it. I found him in bed in the Salon, a large circle of women knitting, netting and talking one faster than the other, a knot of men in the middle, the Physician (not our *philosophe* he being too *impie*) of the party, all gesticulating most furiously and discoursing of Russians, Prussians, etc.—such a sick room you hardly ever beheld. A lady next me amused me with her adventure with a Prussian officer who she was ordered to receive at dinner, he arrived followed by a *Jockey* neatly dressed. To her great surprise the officer made signs to said Jockey to place himself at the table, she could not help saying ‘*Monsieur est ce votre usage de manger avec vos domestiques?*’ ‘*Oui, Madame.*’ She then began examining the Jockey and when she perceived very pretty delicate white hands and a pretty face she was very near laughing at the discovery she made.

I found Mdme de Gestas glad to be delivered of her troop of hungry Russians, she now owns when they first arrived they held up the sabre over M. de Gestas, and when her maid refused them brandy one day, they threw her on the table in the eating room and beat her so violently she has not yet recovered; it looks ill and Mdme de Gestas is afraid of some inward bruise; and yet we prefer them to the Prussians. The latter at Compiègne, when they first arrived, entered the house of the receiver of the department, demanded the *caisse* of his wife, who assured them her husband had paid all the money the day before, they trampled on her, stabbed her, and threw her out of the window. Alas! poor humanity.

Vauxbuin,
September 22nd 1815.

At present we are tolerably quiet, the Russians however departing much to our regret, for we have always the fear of the

terrible Prussians before our eyes; the former have conducted themselves very well in Champagne at the great review, having only exhausted the Country which was obliged to feed them, but the Bavarians have pillaged they say in a most terrible manner. M. Dansé is gone to Soissons to assist at the assessment of the War tax, the sum of 100 millions is required of the Nation, our department is to furnish 750,000 frs., meantime nothing is paid.

I am much concerned for our neighbour, he loses 14,000 fr. a year, his *retraite* will produce only 2000 fr. and they have little besides; his wound continues, an abscess is formed, his poor little wife is the picture of woe, obliged to part with almost all her servants, two little children one of 5 months very ill with the whooping cough; when I consider this and so many more distresses one hears daily, I dare not complain. I cannot boast of much philosophy, but I scrape up all I can against the storm which alas! I fear hangs over our heads, and endeavour to divert my thoughts as much as possible from always presenting horrible pictures of what may happen. It is now Sunday 24th and the *Journal* has not raised our spirits, already a good deal depressed yesterday when our neighbour Dansé returned from Soissons and told us that the Town was in great alarm, the Prussians *font le diable* all round; the Mayor of a Village 2 miles from Soissons was obliged to make his escape disguised in a waggoner's frock, and took refuge in Soissons. They seize the public money, stop the couriers and *diligences*, *enfin* I know not if it is very safe to write this though as yet they have not appeared on our side of the Town. When the *Préfets* and Mayors remonstrate they answer '*Nous sommes d'accord avec le Roi.*' A Russian General is still at Soissons, but I believe more for *les beaux yeux d'une Mdlle Coco en masque*, than to guard the Town.

The inhabitants implore a Russian garrison, which they say he promises, but I doubt, as all the Russians near us have decamped, those I mentioned in my last, at a great farm near us, cried most bitterly when they departed, their Master, we hear, listens much to Bergassa (a *philosophe* of the school of Turgot), I know not if he is a convert. Mdlle Thiery has relapsed into all her horrors and terrors, and we begin to think of playing hide and seek, *c'est-à-dire* our clothes, for we have nothing for it but to remain here, I would not go to Paris for the world. M. de Pougens received a letter yesterday from an acquaintance of his who lives I believe between Paris and Meaux, I wish I could send you it, his house pillaged from top to bottom (and that very lately), his library spoilt, himself obliged to take refuge in the woods to avoid being *assommé*; happily an English officer arrived who preserved the garden, and yet he is a very good Royalist, but that is no defence.

M. Dansé could not take his tea with us this morning, being gone to Soissons about the War tax; how I grudge the money, we had begun a purse destined to a much happier purpose but God knows all these expenses have exhausted it quite. Indeed, my dear friends, you are too good to love my letters they are as tiresome as *les lamentations de Jérémie*, I can give you no other news than what relates to our little circle so that my letters remind me of 'memoirs of P. P. Clerk of this Parish.' You have better intelligence on your side the water than we can have in our secluded Valley, and a Prussian officer said to me '*Madame, ne croyez pas un mot de ce que vous disent vos journaux.*'

Monday 25th. Our good neighbour breakfasted with us and set out again for Soissons about this eternal tax, he dined yesterday at the Sous Préfet's and worked from 9 in the morning till 10 at night, he says the Mayor proposed the Bishop should be exempt from the tax, our friend answered warmly '*quoi Monsieur vous faites payer de pauvres pères de famille qui meurent de faim et vous voulez qu'un homme riche et sans enfans soit exempt*'—it was decided Monsieur should pay; he disappeared some time ago, nobody knew what was become of him, it turns out he took his flight to England and is returned here all over fine muslin and lace *rochets* given him by some of your Benedictines.

They say we are to have a French garrison, and that the Prussians have received orders not to pass the River Aisne, but to remain in their present cantonments, I think that very likely, otherwise we should have received their visit by this time, therefore we begin to take courage. . . . I must tell you how M. Dansé has laughed about our Michaelmas Goose, which M. de Pougens makes a point of obtaining, but I fancy the Russians have devoured them all, the race seems quite extinct. M. Dansé says he likes our Saints much better than theirs as they seem to be feasting Saints. But my paper really puts a stop to my bavardage. . . .

Vauxbuin.

Thursday September 28th 1815.

Since we have heard of the burning of six poor heretics by the Inquisition M. de Pougens says I should date 815. Alas! my dear friend, these are sad times, still as we read Mr. Gibbon, and a certain *Histoire des Croisades* by Michaud, I am inclined to believe in Mdme. de Stael's *perfectionnement* and that as Goethe says it advances at least *en ligne spirale*. A letter for you set out yesterday and here I am already in continuation, I hope it will find you still by the seaside for I never remember more

glorious weather. I am in the garden all day long and yesterday evening as I was, like one of Mrs. Radcliffe's heroines, admiring from the hermitage *the tints of the evening fading on the opposite wood*, I espied Mdlle Thiery looking for me.

I feared something extraordinary had happened but as she drew near I perceived she did not wear her '*vinegar aspect*,' I was reassured, on the contrary she laughed as she said '*Madame voilà de vos compatriotes qui nous arrivent.*' I felt quite glad and hastened to meet a band of mighty heroes as I thought, but instead of that I found a troop of poor helpless women and crying children, who could not speak one word of French, escorted by an inferior officer, who when Lorin spoke to him in English (with a very French accent observe) my countryman gravely assured him he did not understand French; he fell to our share to lodge, the women are dispersed about. Mdme Dansé sent to beg I would come and interpret, Clarice Dansé understands a little English, I give her lessons, she translates *Telemachus* very prettily, but there was little relation between Calypso and Eucharis and my poor countrywomen, or between their wants and Nectar and Ambrosia.

I wish you could have seen their joy when I arrived and proposed some tea to them. I thought they would have embraced me, though one was much occupied giving suck to a little child of 7 weeks old who looked as many months; there were in the whole party 6 women, 4 who had infants of the same age, all ill poor things with the jolting of the waggon. They came from Antwerp and, as one told me after much recollection, were going to St. Dennis; the others were in different houses, I took Lorin for my escort as it was late, and visited them all, but the children cried so bitterly that I could hardly comfort the poor mothers, especially as they were to set out to-day at 5 in the morning. We sent them sugar, etc., and this morning before I was up they came to thank me. The officer supt with us, a decent man very timid though an Irishman (who have a different reputation), he had served 5 years in Spain and said they are going into winter quarters and are to stay 4 years in them, he is perhaps mistaken but certainly they would not have permitted these soldiers' wives to come from Antwerp if they were not to remain some time. They hope to reach St. Dennis to-morrow. I am glad they have fine weather poor souls. They were very decent looking and tidy, the waggoner belongs to Antwerp and was put in requisition to convey them to Paris. The officer was on horseback, his servant could speak a little French. I found as I passed our whole village swarming out to see the peaceable strangers.

Happily as yet we hear nothing of any other strangers, at least on our side of the river. A small village opposite, near Soissons, consisting only of cottages, and a farm or two was visited by Prussians, and a requisition demanded of 900 frs. They are besieging La Fère in good earnest, it is full of military stores and has long hoisted the White Flag. They make all the *paysans* work at their *travaux de siège*, and even others. A nephew of M. Dansé just arrived here, says he was put in requisition much against his will. . . .

Tuesday, 3rd October. And here we are, my good friends, all of a tremble (as the maids say), the Mayor of Soissons has received orders to prepare for the passage of 20,000 Prussians, 10,000 arrive Friday, and the rest Sunday, 200 are allotted to Vauxbuin, that is 400 in all. Our Mayor and M. Dansé are busy making preparations, meat, bread, wine, etc., they have chosen too a most unlucky moment for their passage—the vintage; here the poor *paysans* (who have most of them a few vines, the produce of which they sell to the cabarets which helps to pay their rent), sensible they should not have a grape left, have hastened the vintage, so to-day all hands have been employed in the finest October sunshine I ever remember. I have passed the whole day in the vineyard, which rises rapidly on the hill-side behind the garden, and this evening I again *played romance* and delighted myself with the prettiest landscape possible, the village and the old Chateau at my feet ‘embosom’d in tufted trees,’ *enfin* I enjoyed it in spite of the Prussians, who will I fear sadly disturb at least the *repose* I was so much admiring, however we must hope the officers will keep them in tolerable order.

M. Martenot who knows well what stuff soldiers are made of, M. Dansé too, and the Mayor were against gathering the grapes, they say very justly if the soldiers find it made into wine, though so new, they will drink it, and what mischief may not proceed from intoxication. However in the council summoned on the occasion Messrs. *les paysans* had a vast majority and when the vineyard is not enclosed you must *vendanger* with the rest. As this Army is to pass through Champagne where the vintage is of much more consequence, I think it strange they did not delay the passage a week or ten days. A brother of M^{me} Dansé’s has been here for a day or two, he rents a very large farm about 8 leagues from Paris, and has lost 18 cows besides considerable quantities of corn and hay in requisition. Tell the dear traveller the 4 bronze horses on the *Arc de Triomphe* at the Tuileries have been taken down, and many fine *chefs d’œuvre* from the Gallery as I hear, but they have not been specified to me.

I will not dispatch my letter till after our rough visitors have left us.

Monday, 9th. I am more than ever confirmed in my rose-coloured system, and endeavouring all I can to convert poor Mdlle Thiery from her dismal tints, for our Prussians are come and gone and except expense we are no sufferers. It was indeed *l'élite de l'armée, la garde royale*. A young officer arrived Wednesday evening with whom we all fell in love, especially Mdlle Thiery, though he grieved us much by saying the Apollo and the Venus were on their way to England, but as another officer on Friday assured us he had seen them the day before his departure I hope our young Baron d'Ilzenplitz was mistaken. He told me we were very happy not to be at Paris and that he was very glad to have left it. I cannot tell you the emotion he gave me when he said he was born in England at *Kew*, do you remember them? He left Kew at 3 months old and is now 22, had he told me the same thing at Richmond Green I should have felt just nothing at all, but here it sets so many recollections afloat.

The next day we had two officers, five soldiers and 10 horses all very disagreeable (I beg pardon of the horses) the officers wore a kind of cold ironical civility and the soldiers threatened poor Louison to throw her on the fire. Mdlle. Annette who has a very good opinion of her eloquence began to preach to them '*qu'ils étaient dans une maison respectable*,' etc., her sermon was cut short by '*Mdlle vous méchante, vous aussi sur le feu.*' They happily departed next morning, dear good M. de Pougens got up at 5 o'clock and went downstairs for fear they should beat our poor Louison. M. Martenot received them in his uniform, the Colonel lodging there (as their house is very large, more château-like than ours) the soldiers set about pillaging the garden. M. Martenot went to the Colonel and said in a very firm tone '*M. le Colonel, je désire que vos soldats aient tout ce qu'il leur faut mais je ne veux pas qu'ils pillent mon jardin, s'ils continuent de la faire, c'est à vous Monsieur que je témoignerai mon mécontentement*,' upon which M. le Colonel turned his men out of the garden and shewed M. Martenot all manner of *égarde*, his conversation would surprise you.

On Friday we were in some care about those who were to arrive, we had a Colonel, 7 men and 14 horses, the latter caused a great revolution in the *basse cour*, cow, *baudets*, rabbits, all obliged to *déménager*. The officer was a most agreeable young man of very polished manners loving the arts, and having well employed the time he passed at Paris. The commanding officer

(a natural son of the late King of Prussia's, Comte de Brandebourg) was at M. Martenot's. The music of the regiment played after dinner in the garden, I went there and was much pleased with his manners. He expressed the highest consideration for French valour. Our soldiers too were admirable, they refused the brandy offered them saying '*nous prenez vous pour des Russes, pour des Cosaques?*' They staid with us all Saturday and a part of yesterday morning, and our officer seemed as well satisfied with us as we were with him, invited us to Berlin, etc. So far so good, by their account I think we are not likely to have any more in our village, one of the officers asked our friend Dansé if their *arrière garde était en sûreté?* Though so numerous they are not without fear you see.

Vauxbuin,

Friday 27th October 1815.

I long to hear the effect sea air and sea bathing have had on your health so precious to the dear family circle in which though absent I love still to include myself. How I envy M. de Thiery, he sets out I believe very soon for dear old England, he will see you, converse with you without restraint which I would fain do but alas! mum is the word more than ever and my letters will be dull as if dipt in the mud of the *Dunciad*.

We have been sadly tormented lately by our good friends the Prussians. I was in hopes the sad accident which has destroyed so many houses in Soissons, and injured so many others, would have preserved us from such continual passages. Our poor village however had 200 the other day, volunteers I think; such a set, reminding one of Swift's Yahoos. M. de Pougens says and I believe he is very right that it is good policy to dine with them, it gratifies them and keeps them in order at the same time. We had 4, a surgeon and 3 *sous officiers*, all so dirty and smelling so ill I really could not eat my dinner. One was half drunk beforehand and I thought would have broken my glass continually, by *trinqué'ing* what the vulgars call *Hob Nob*, however he was good humoured in his cups for he told us continually '*vous êtes de braves gens; si nous trouvions toujours de ces braves gens là, nous serions plus contents.*'

We dined late in order to avoid supper, they required tea and brandy, which latter we gave reluctantly. Mdlle Thiery told me *qu'elle avait baptisé l'eau de vie*, '*Comment donc baptisé*'—'*C'est que j'ai mis de l'eau.*' '*Ah mon Dieu, ils le*

decouvriront et ils viendront nous battre. I was in a fine fright but it passed off very well, the drunken one required John to show him his room, poor John had been obliged to give him his, and as I am sure said John would rather see the *D— en propre personne* than these Gemmin, he contented himself with opening the door and was I believe delighted to hear the Yahoo knocking himself against all the tables and chairs, without ever finding the bed, till one of his comrades came to his assistance. I often preach to our John to conceal a little his aversion, he answered me one day '*Eh, Madame, que voulez vous? Ils viennent de menacer ma pauvre Grand'mere avec leurs sabres, elle en est presque morte de peur.*'

The next morning M. de Pougens got up at 4 o'clock to be present at their departure in order to protect the servants, they carried off all the eatables they could find, wine, etc., and alarmed the village terribly, for certain carts they had sent for from another village, a mile off, not arriving they tied the poor deputy Mayor to a tree and were preparing to lash him most severely, threatening to pillage the village, when luckily the carts arrived, and they departed.

Our military neighbour told us he had a *brailard chez lui*. '*Mais je ne me suis pas laissé mener par lui, il m'a demandé de la viande, etc., pour emporter, je lui ai repondu fort sèchement, Monsieur vous trouverez tout ce qu'il vous faut à Braisne.*' The same corps were very *méchant* at Soissons, and boasted at Laon they had been so, our friend Mdme Marechal wrote to enquire after us in consequence. She says they are quite ruined at Laon, and had the Prussians remained there longer most of the inhabitants would have left the town, but why or wherefore we cannot tell. The troops are certainly in great haste to depart, *marches forcées*, horses in requisition, *enfin* all the marks of anxious precipitation. They say here but I cannot believe it, that the Russians are pillaging the Prussian dominions as they pass, all I am very sure of is that there is a mortal antipathy between the two nations. Our poor Mdle Thiery is worn to a thread. Lorin calls her Mdme Heraclite and me Mdme Democrite, but indeed I should be ashamed to laugh at the real miseries I hear of.

A soldier travelling to his friends *en Bretagne* was lodged here the other night, and one of his comrades at M. Dansé's. They both came from Givet, and said the villages they passed through in that neighbourhood were many entirely deserted, the corn left standing on the ground. We were in continual dread of having more to receive, I feel it doubly because it affects poor M. de Pougens so severely, and we were in hopes our old half

demolished Soissons would have been spared these continual passages, since the explosion of the *Poudrière*, . . . *mais non . . . il faut se résigner.*

Wednesday, 1st November. And here I am writing to you, dearest friend, in the midst of 200 Prussians. Your long wished for and most welcome letter arrived Monday to counterbalance the discomfort which the news of their visit had occasioned me. We were the more alarmed since we heard it was the Landwehr of sad reputation, and that Mdme de Barin, the wife of the new Proprietor du Château expected by her husband on Saturday, had written to say she had just put off her journey, as the Prussians passing through Paris had beat the Parisians on the boulevards with their sabres, and she did not care to travel the same road at the same time. However we have now 7 or 8 soldiers, very young men, smoking and playing at cards in our kitchen, who seem really very inoffensive, they do not understand a word of French so M. de Pougens, who being intended for the diplomatic line was taught German when very young, is every moment put in requisition as interpreter.

We expect an officer but he is not yet arrived. They began rather ill yesterday (the *avant garde*) they would play at billiards at M. Martenot's, and as they were very dirty he refused, on which one, a young man, went to M. Dansé's in a great passion and said '*Je n'aime pas ce Colonel mais j'ai mon sabre*', putting his hand fiercely on the hilt, our friend took him gently by the arm '*Tenez Monsieur,*' said he smiling, '*vous et votre sabre sont bien jeunes, vous vous calmerez et vous serez content de ce brave Militaire,*' and happily he followed our friend's advice. This morning our brave Colonel came in his regimentals (which he always puts on when he receives such guests) and frightened me when he said '*Avec mon bâton en une main et mon pistolet dans l'autre je mènerai vingt de ces gaillards là sur la Montagne.*' I could say with Falstaff 'I don't like this gunpowder Percy.' Our Mayor expostulated with him saying '*Monsieur, vous êtes trop vif avec ces gens là—pour moi s'ils voulaient me battre je leur tendrai le dos.*' '*Ma foi, Monsieur, comme vous voudrez*' answered our Colonel.

Thursday morning. I am going to Soissons to dine with the Gestas the first time I have visited our poor old Town since the explosion which we felt here severely as we are only two miles from it. Some windows in a farm at the entrance of the village were broken. All our soldiers departed at 4 o'clock, M. de Pougens got up as usual to preside at their departure, they had coffee and carried off some eatables and some wine, but were very quiet, and did not ask for *la petite goutte* as our soldiers

call a glass of brandy. Yesterday evening they amused themselves with singing hymns, John lent them his fiddle, they played and danced in the eating room but were content with beer, they would drink M. de Pougens' health. The Captain's man (his Master never arrived) could speak a little French. He taught them all to say *vive Charles Pougens*, till the house rang again. M. Dansé (who is delighted with the honourable mention you make of him) was well satisfied with his soldiers, and after they had drank a little I think Mdlle Thiery had she been there would have embraced them all round! Our good Colonel had an officer with whom he likewise agreed perfectly, *enfin* all passed off well, they say we have always the *élite* as there are so many *maisons bourgeoises* in our village. M. de Pougens would not consent to my going to Soissons to-day till he had enquired of the Mayor of Soissons if any Prussians were expected, he says he has received no orders and I write in expectation of the *cabriolet* every minute. . . .

Poor Soissons was in great terror the other day, a Frenchman who served as an Interpreter was struck by the Prussian commanding officer upon which he collared the officer and returned the compliment, darting off immediately fearing the consequences. The officer threatened *le pillage, le sac de la ville* if he was not delivered up. The Mayor and the Préfet were frightened to death and did all they could to find the man but in vain, but I believe have promised to send him after, *enfin* it is made up they say, but at first it spread a great and general alarm.

Thursday evening. Just returned from Soissons the entrance is melancholy but at the Gestas' we drank all manner of loyal healths in busk Champagne, I said I would drink all but *le grand Inquisiteur*. . . . Adieu my dear and kind friends, I do not wish for an *iron pen* like Job but I wish for one of another description, being like you bursting now and then.

Ever, ever yours, F. J. DE POUGENS.

This letter concludes Madame de Pougens' correspondence for 1815. Though the Army of Occupation remained in France for some three years, she was not called upon again to experience the horrors and discomforts of war. But, in 1820, we find her writing from Vauxbuin 'The times are sadly out of joint, and in this country there are at present so many *arrestations* that I fear "something is rotten in the State of Denmark." As for my native country, it alas! presents a melancholy picture and affects

me more than I can say.' Madame de Pougens lived to the great age of ninety-three. She died in France, and her remains were conveyed to England, where she was buried in the family vault at Godstone in Kent, by the side of her mother, who was a daughter of Mr. Evelyn of Welbridge, a direct descendant of the well-known Diarist of Wotton.

FLORENCE KINLOCH-COOKE.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE WAR

NOT the least of the economic evils of war is its injurious effect on industry. Exports are restricted, manufactures reduced, and the labour market is upset, and these troubled conditions must more or less continue in many, if not in most, branches of industry, until the apparently distant day of peace arrives. An immediate and in some respects the most regrettable phase of this economic disturbance is its effect upon employment. When the present War broke out one of the consequences most promptly prognosticated was a calamitous interference with the wage-earning power of the nation. The pessimists certainly did their best to justify their forebodings. In the first wave of depression merchants, manufacturers, and shopkeepers innumerable adopted the drastic policy of either cutting down wages or putting their employees on short time. One satisfactory result of these scared precautionary measures has undoubtedly been to limit the area of total unemployment, but it is an obvious corollary that the official unemployment figures issued by the Board of Trade do not fully represent the sacrifices which the working-classes, shopmen, warehousemen, clerks, and others have been forced to make through the actual or anticipated depression in trade. Having regard to this qualification, it is, nevertheless, a pleasant duty to admit that the volume of unemployment amongst the working-classes is neither so big nor so difficult to cope with as might have been expected at the beginning of such a colossal struggle. This fortunate conclusion has been made possible partly by the comparative immunity of our overseas trade and partly by the demand for labour in connexion with military and naval contracts. Many trades have suffered and some staple industries have been very hard hit, but the general effect on national employment has not been either so widespread or so severe as was at first apprehended. In fact, the conditions have been steadily improving month by month, and each official return of general results has been better than the one immediately preceding it.

It is well, at the outset, to bear in mind that trade was already experiencing a serious reaction before any war-cloud had

appeared upon the horizon. In nearly every department a set-back had occurred and work was increasingly scarce. Employment in last July as compared with July in 1913 showed a material falling-off in coal mining, iron mining, the pig-iron industry, iron and steel works, engineering trades, shipbuilding, the cotton, woollen and worsted trades, the jute and linen trades, the hosiery and lace trades (except in the plain net branch), bleaching, printing, dyeing, and finishing, the carpet trade, and the leather and pottery trades. Employment was exceptionally better in the tinplate and steel-sheet trades, the silk trade, the boot and shoe trade, and the brick and cement trades; and the demand for agricultural labour over a considerable area of the country was greater than the supply. Most of the other trades did not show any marked difference compared with a year ago.

It is desirable to throw a little more light, by way of statistics, upon these contrasts. Taking coal mining, for instance, the average number of days worked per week by collieries affecting 710,453 men, during the fortnight ended the 25th of July 1914, was 5.06, as compared with 5.26 a year before. In iron mines and open works, affecting 16,251 men, the weekly average number of working days (for the same fortnight) was 5.53, as compared with 5.65 a year ago. At the end of July 255 pig-iron furnaces were in blast, against 319 in July 1913, and the exports of pig iron (British and Irish) amounted to 74,617 tons against 96,135 tons. The aggregate number of shifts worked in the iron and steel trades for the week ended the 25th of July was 542,598, a decrease of 33,797 (or 5.9 per cent.) on a year ago. In the engineering trades, Trade Unions, with a membership of 233,985, reported 3.4 per cent. of unemployed at the end of July, as compared with 1.9 per cent. in July 1913; but a better view is obtained from the figures with regard to 817,931 workpeople in the same trades insured against unemployment under the National Insurance Act, the percentage of unemployed amongst whom was 3.2, as compared with 2.3. The number of people in the shipbuilding trades insured against unemployment who were unemployed at the end of last July was 4.7 per cent., as compared with 3.4 at the end of July 1913. The cotton trade was to some extent affected by poor trade conditions, and by an agreement made by the Federation of Master Spinners spinning American cotton to curtail production between the 7th of July and the end of September. Returns from cotton-spinning firms employing 110,093 workpeople in the week ended the 25th of July showed a decrease of 1.4 per cent. in the number employed and of 6.7 per cent. in the amount of wages paid. In the woollen and worsted trades, compared with a year ago, there was a decrease of 5.2 per cent. in the number employed and of 7.4 per cent. in

the amount of wages. The jute trade showed decreases of 0.5 per cent. and 3.7 per cent. respectively, and the linen trades decreases of 1.3 per cent. and 2.5 per cent. In the leather trades the percentage of unemployed at the end of July was 5.2, compared with 4.2. Many other trades showed similar increases in the figures of unemployment.

Further light is thrown upon the subject by the statistics of the Board of Trade Labour Exchanges, but the figures already given clearly establish the fact that, generally speaking, trade was in a much less active and prosperous condition just before War was declared than it was at the corresponding period of 1913. Except in the case of trades that were specially benefited by it, the War naturally made things a great deal worse. To put the matter in a nutshell, the general result was to increase the percentage of unemployed in Trade Unions making returns from 2.8 at the end of July to 7.1 at the end of August. But this figure, high though it was, has been frequently exceeded in periods of bad trade, and was much lower than that recorded during the coal strike of 1912, when it rose to 11.3 per cent. It has, however, to be borne in mind that through the adoption of reduced time by many employers the discharge of a portion of their work-people was avoided. The Trade Unions' statistics, moreover, do not cover the whole of the ground. The Board of Trade's monthly returns contain four different tables headed respectively :

1. 'Trade Union Percentages of Unemployed.'
2. 'Unemployment in "Insured" Trades.'
3. 'Employers' Returns : Mining and Metal Trades.' And
4. 'Employers' Returns : Textile and other Trades.'

There is, of course, a certain amount of overlapping in these four sets of figures. This is unavoidable owing to the variety of sources of information used in order to get a complete and unbiassed view of the whole industrial situation. The Department publishes all the available figures, but in estimating the position of a particular trade it has regard to the representative character of the several data. Thus, while in table (1) it gives for certain textile trades the Trade Union percentages of persons wholly unemployed, it relies mainly on the figures in table (4), which also cover short time, and are the real index to the state of employment in these trades. Similarly, with coal mining the figures in table (3) are better than those in table (1), as miners are very seldom discharged. These illustrations show that while twenty years ago the Department was largely dependent on Trade Union returns, it has gradually remedied the defects in this source of information by getting returns direct from the

employers. A recent notable addition to the Department's information are the records in connexion with unemployment insurance. Here the figures are quite complete for the trades insured, and include all branches of these trades and non-Unionists as well as Unionists. So far as these trades go, the results are, therefore, more comprehensive than anything the Trade Unions can give. They covered a total of 2,341,508 workpeople against the 987,692 in Union membership. At the end of August 145,194 (or 6.2 per cent.) of these were unemployed, whereas a year before the percentage was only 3.1. The great majority of these workpeople are connected with building and construction, engineering and iron founding, shipbuilding and construction of vehicles. Employers' returns in the mining and metal trades and the textile trades deal with the short-time aspect of the case. The 682,587 workpeople engaged in coal mining worked 0.99 fewer days per week than in August 1913; there were 67 fewer furnaces in blast, 170 fewer tinplate and steel-sheet mills working, and 11.3 per cent. fewer shifts worked in the iron and steel trades. In the textile and other trades, representing 352,840 workpeople, the returns for the week ended the 22nd of August showed a decrease of 15.5 per cent. in the number employed, and of 30.5 per cent. in the wages paid, as compared with a year before.

During September, October, and November there was an encouraging recovery, illustrations of which will be found in the table of comparisons on the opposite page.

Although the cotton trade has relatively suffered more than any other and the War has intensified its depression, a heavy decline due to purely trade causes had set in before. The percentage of unemployment, which was 3.9 for July, jumped up to 17.7 for August; since then it has dropped to 14.5, 9.2, and 6.3 per cent. for September, October, and November respectively. The November returns show a great reduction in the short time reported, especially in the spinning branch. Tinplate works and the textile and furnishing trades were badly hit, but even these have improved since the end of August. For September, 46 more tinplate and steel-sheet mills were in work owing to the cessation of Continental imports, and by November 43 more were employed. In the textile trades there was an increase for September of 9.4 per cent. in the number employed, and of 16.8 per cent. in the wages paid, compared with August. October was better than September, and November was better than October. Comparatively little harm was done to the shipbuilding trade if the percentages can be taken as a criterion. It would seem, though, that increased activity in the naval yards accounts for much of the steadiness of the position, and this may

Trade Unionists Unemployed.

Unions	Number of Unemployed, July 1914	Percentage	Number of Unemployed, Aug. 1914	Percentage	Number of Unemployed, Sept. 1914	Percentage	Number of Unemployed, Oct. 1914	Percentage	Number of Unemployed, Nov. 1914	Percentage
Building	2291	3.2	6182	7.4	4712	5.6	2425	3.0	1503	1.8
Coal-mining	792	0.5	2170	1.3	3111	1.9	3585	2.5	2184	1.6
Iron and steel	2078	5.5	2839	7.6	962	2.6	1050	3.1	606	1.9
Engineering	7908	3.4	16,079	7.1	11,256	4.8	7305	3.3	4087	1.8
Shipbuilding	4896	6.6	4680	6.3	4145	5.7	4373	6.5	1968	2.8
Miscellaneous metals	519	1.4	3130	9.0	1497	4.0	724	2.2	525	1.5
Cotton	3455	3.9	15,640	17.7	12,957	14.5	7391	9.2	5398	6.3
Woolen and worsted	370	4.3	626	7.2	530	6.1	512	6.1	446	5.1
Other textiles	1205	1.9	3784	6.1	5051	8.2	3640	6.4	3692	6.5
Printing, etc.	1688	2.5	4974	7.4	4647	7.0	4170	6.7	2914	4.7
Furnishing, etc.	1299	2.3	5521	9.8	4433	8.3	2959	6.2	2280	4.5
Clothing	1127	1.7	3525	5.3	1691	2.6	962	1.5	818	1.3
Leather	221	5.2	268	6.2	194	4.2	127	2.9	94	2.1
Glass	6	0.6	11	1.1	15	1.6	15	1.7	17	2.0
Pottery	55	0.7	198	2.7	109	1.5	79	1.3	92	1.4
Tobacco	103	4.5	319	14.0	468	20.5	289	12.8	147	6.5
	28,013	2.8	69,956	7.1	55,778	5.6	40,146	4.4	26,771	2.9

Unemployed in 'Insured' Trades.

Building and construction	36,599	3.8	59,837	6.2	61,118	6.3	51,897	5.3	50,013	5.4
Engineering and ironfounding	26,549	3.2	53,878	6.6	40,954	4.9	27,120	3.2	17,717	2.3
Shipbuilding	12,491	4.7	13,132	4.9	12,093	4.4	10,692	3.9	6843	2.7
Construction of vehicles	6376	3.0	15,782	7.5	11,847	5.6	8189	3.9	6366	3.3
Saw-milling	381	3.2	498	4.1	437	3.6	310	2.5	264	2.3
Other trades	1016	1.6	2067	3.2	1589	2.5	1104	1.7	755	1.3
	83,412	3.6	145,194	6.2	128,038	5.4	99,312	4.2	81,958	3.7

point to a corresponding sluggishness in shipbuilding for mercantile purposes. Most of the Continent being a closed book so far as exports and imports are concerned, there has been a serious interference with those trades which are dependent upon raw materials from enemy countries, and with others through the cessation of exported manufactures. In the table given above, the column for August affords a fair indication both of the range and the volume of the first shock. It was severe, but it was not any worse than might have been expected; indeed, all things considered, it was not as bad. But even on the most favourable view, it was of sufficiently grave import. A sudden increase of 4.3 per cent. in unemployment in the Trade Union returns alone, at a time, too, when most articles of food were appreciably higher in price, was an ugly enough reminder of the indirect damage caused by war. Fortunately, as will be seen from the other columns, the first shock was the worst. The September returns showed a distinct recovery. Both the short-time figures and those of the workpeople entirely unemployed were smaller. The Trade Union percentage of unemployment, which was 7.1 for August, fell to 5.6, and the percentage in the 'insured' trades, which was 6.2 in August, fell to 5.4. For October there was a further improvement, though the lower percentages were still considerably higher than the figures for the corresponding month of 1913, except in a few cases of trades which directly benefited from the War. The Trade Unions' percentage of unemployment fell to 4.4 for October,¹ and to 2.9 for November, the latter figure comparing with 2.0 per cent. for November 1913. The percentage in the compulsorily insured trades, which was 5.4 for September, dropped to 4.2 for October and to 3.7 for November which is actually 0.4 per cent. lower than it was for the corresponding month in the previous year. Comparing November with the bad month of August, we find that 272 pig-iron furnaces were in blast, against 255; 442 tinplate works were in operation, against 353; and in the iron and steel trades 543,842 shifts were worked, against 511,975. In the textile, boot, pottery, glass, and other miscellaneous trades 396,519*l.* was paid in wages for the last week in November, as compared with 276,253*l.* for the last week in August.

The materials for measuring the effect of the War on trades that are unconnected with insurance schemes are necessarily less trustworthy, but the returns of the Labour Exchanges will be found helpful. If we take the figures for the 11th of September, nearly six weeks after the War began, we find that the total

¹ The official figures of Trade Union unemployment in Germany for October are 10.9 per cent. They were 22.4 for August.

number of workpeople remaining on the registers was 207,429, as compared with 110,853 on the 12th of June. The number of registrations of unemployed in uninsured trades rose for the four weeks ended the 11th of September from a daily average of 6334 to 7622, and the number of uninsured remaining on the register was 89,383, against 47,345 on the 17th of July. It may be as well to put the figures in tabular form.

	June 12	July 17	Aug. 14	Sept. 11	Oct. 10	Nov. 13
Total number of registrations during month ending .	200,363	270,269	309,887	385,145	378,268	272,494
Daily average of registrations .	8711	9009	13,473	16,048	12,609	11,354
Total remaining on registers at .	110,853	112,622	194,580	207,429	157,248	133,215
Uninsured registrations for month .	95,566	139,396	145,686	182,927	193,927	144,992
Daily average of ditto .	4155	4647	6334	7622	6464	6041

The sharp recovery which these various statistics clearly indicate is due to several causes. In the first place, there is to be considered the abnormal activity in trades affected by Army and Navy contracts. Shipbuilding, ordnance, and small-arms factories, ammunition works, steel-plate mills, Army clothing and equipment manufactures, marine-engine works, food contractors, and other industries stimulated into abnormal activity by the War have been working at high pressure, and have given employment to many more men than they did immediately before the War. The position in November, according to the *Board of Trade Labour Gazette*, showed such a great improvement that some shortage of male labour was reported. The engineering, shipbuilding, cutlery, woollen, worsted, hosiery, leather, boot and shoe, and the wholesale clothing trade—in fact, every trade manufacturing anything for the Army or Navy—was exceptionally busy, and working overtime. Carpenters and woodworkers, too, were fully employed with the erection of military huts. On the Tyne and the Clyde warships are being built, in Birmingham the rifle and ammunition factories are working night and day, soldiers' uniforms, boots, blankets, and horse cloths are being manufactured at top speed, and it is no exaggeration to say that a number of big contracting firms are congested with orders. The conditions, indeed, are similar to those described by Marcellus in the opening scene of *Hamlet*—'Such daily cast of brazen cannon and foreign mart for implements of war,' 'such impress of shipwrights whose sore task

does not divide the Sunday from the week,' such 'sweaty haste' that makes 'the night joint labourer with the day.'

This increase in employment was encouraged by the wise action of the War Office, which early in the War issued the following suggestions to its contractors :

1. Rapid delivery to be attained by employing extra hands, in shifts or otherwise, in preference to overtime, subject always to the paramount necessity of effecting delivery within the times requisite for the needs of the Army.

2. Subletting of portions of the work to other suitable manufacturers situated in districts where serious unemployment exists, although contrary to the usual conditions of Army Contracts, is admissible during the present crisis, and it is desired to encourage such subletting.

Another reason for the consistent decrease in the percentage of unemployment during September, October, and November was the effect of the great volume of enlistment for the new Army, and of the number of chauffeurs, artificers, etc., sent abroad. This swept up many thousands of working-men both in and out of employment, and diminished the pressure for relief in the industrial centres. The employment figures for October and November were also made better on account of the large number of aliens who have been recently discharged, although the majority of them belonged to classes that do not fall into the above categories—clerks, waiters, hairdressers' assistants, and hotel employees, for example. There is also the most important factor of all to be noted, namely, the tendency of trade to get back into a normal groove, mainly through the ability of the Navy to secure our shipping on the high seas.

But when all these ameliorative influences are taken into account, there still remains a great deal of unemployment in the wage-earning class, with its consequent tax upon benefit and insurance funds, and distress amongst those who have no such aids to fall back upon. Many clerks, shop assistants, and typists have been thrown out of work, and many more have had their meagre stipends reduced, and the strain upon all benevolent organisations is for some time likely to remain heavy. The Government has come to the assistance of voluntary associations, which provide benefit for their unemployed members, by means of special emergency grants. These emergency grants are paid by the Board of Trade as an addition to the refunds of one sixth payable under Section 106 of the National Insurance Act. The payment of the emergency grant is also subject to the following conditions :

1. That the Association should be suffering from abnormal unemployment.
2. That the Association should not pay unemployment benefit above a

maximum rate of 17s. per week (including any sum paid by way of State Unemployment Benefit).

3. That the Association should agree while in receipt of the emergency grant to impose levies over and above the ordinary contributions upon those members who remain fully employed.

The amount of the emergency grant (in addition to the refund of one sixth already payable) is either one third or one sixth of the expenditure of the Association on unemployment benefit (exclusive of strike benefit). The rate of the grant is determined by the amount of the levy in accordance with a published scale.

An idea of the scope of the privation resulting from shortage of work and total unemployment is gained from the arrangements made to cope with it. At the end of November the total number of statutory committees for dealing with distress under the Unemployed Workmen Act, whose registers were open, was 82, compared with 40 at the end of August and with 53 for November 1913. The total number of persons who thus received unemployment relief during November was 8000 (against 777 for November 1913), with average earnings of 26s. 3d. against 46s. 1d. The returns of pauperism show that on one day in November the number of paupers relieved in 35 principal urban districts corresponded to a rate of 190 per 10,000. Compared with August, the total number of paupers relieved increased by 4652, and the rate per 10,000 by 2. The number of indoor paupers increased by 2192, and the number of outdoor paupers by 2460. Manchester, Bolton, Oldham, East London, Leicester, and Hull have been the districts most severely affected at one time or other. Compared with November 1913, the rate per 10,000 increased by 3.

There is a class of unemployed yet to be mentioned that does not figure in any returns, but is nevertheless considerable. Actors, artists, musicians, entertainers, literary folk, *et hoc genus omne*, have found employment difficult to get. Many of them have been unable to get it at all. Most people hesitate about buying pictures in these days, and there are many who have no surplus money to spend on amusements. The newspaper world has been affected by the higher cost of paper and the timidity (for a time) of advertisers, with the result that the outside contributor, unless a war specialist, has almost disappeared, and the regular staffs have in some cases been put on reduced pay. Although journalists, actors, and singers are hardly thought of when the subject of unemployment is discussed, they help, all the same, to swell the number of those whose cases call for sympathy. It will be fortunate indeed if the area of unobtrusive and often unsuspected poverty does not become larger before the War is over.

For it is obvious that the duration and, to some degree, the extent of excessive unemployment must depend very much upon the duration and fortunes of the War. As long as it lasts the trade in all kinds of luxuries and the activities of the artistic professions are bound to be limited. Many departments of industry must be interfered with, if not crippled, by the loss of Continental markets and the arrested inflow of materials of purely Continental origin. But so long as we keep the command of the seas—and there is no reason to anticipate that we shall ever lose it—it may be hoped that the conditions, instead of getting worse, will continue to improve. What is lost in one direction should be regained in another. Our enemies are much worse off than we are, and their disability is our opportunity. So far as trade and the employment dependent upon it are concerned, although anything like a strong revival is not to be looked for at present, a slow and sure improvement due to the capture of new markets and the relaxation of a bounty-fed competition seems to be well within the bounds of probability. That should result in more hands being required and in full work instead of short time in some of our important manufacturing industries, and although one cannot but deplore the economic waste which has turned the ploughshare into the sword, there is some compensation in the fact that the expenditure on our military and naval forces gives work to thousands of artisans who would otherwise be idle, and circulates big amounts in wages which are most helpful in the emergency. We shall have to pay the bill for all this inevitable outlay, and that will lessen by so much the spending power of the community on useful and productive enterprise hereafter; but in the meantime the keen edge of privation is being blunted by the timely interposition of War contracts and their stimulus to employment.

Meanwhile the old proverb holds good: Prevention is better than Cure. The great thing—so far as it is possible—is to ‘keep going.’ No one is foolish enough to clamour for ‘keeping going’ in conditions that would involve employers in a heavy loss. In that case the only effect of the remedy, in the long run, would be to aggravate the disease. Output must of necessity be regulated by demand, and where the demand has fallen off considerably production at the old rate would be disastrous. We cannot expect manufacturers to keep their works on full time when there are no buyers for their goods. But between that impossible policy and the other extreme of over-timidity there is a wide gap. Many trades are being held in restraint by an ultra-conservative estimate of the situation. Others are hindered from improvement by the disposition of a large section of the public to practise an over-zealous economy which, so far

as it is not really necessary, does no good to themselves or to their country. It is a very blind policy to restrict ordinary expenditure when such expenditure may mean all the difference between employment and unemployment for a large number of workpeople. To go without new clothes in order to dispense the money in poor-rates cannot be described as thrift, especially when the purchase of the new clothes, or whatever it may be, will keep a certain number of people in employment. Trade is a chain of many links, and if one of these is broken or made ineffective the continuity of the whole is weakened. If the purchasing power is feeble the industrial power is starved. What we all have to do, then, is to carry on as nearly on normal lines as we can. By so doing we shall ameliorate the effect of those external conditions which have disturbed the balance of employment.

It would be idle to speculate on the ultimate results to the British working-man when things get back once more into the normal groove, but as far as commercial foresight can go there ought—unless the purchasing power of the world is exhausted—to be flourishing times, busy mills and factories, and better wages all round. When those times do come it may be hoped that the dawn of a new prosperity will be welcomed both by masters and men, with a common determination to make the best of the opportunity by working cordially together in a spirit of conciliation and mutual goodwill. The losses and deprivations so patriotically endured in the present must not be forgotten when the 'war drums throb no longer and the battle flags are furled.'

H. J. JENNINGS.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE WAR

So far as the United States is concerned the chief effect of the War is to be looked for in the tremendous shock it has administered not so much to commerce and finance as to American thought. For the first time in their history Americans have ceased to look upon affairs in Europe with a merely spectacular and impersonal interest. They have been compelled to recognise in them a very direct bearing on their own fortunes. They have learned how illusory, after all, was that happy or harmful isolation which appeared to have relieved them for all time from the effects, at once complicating and fortifying, of a constant external pressure.

For what, before the War and in the eyes of the 'man in the cars,' was the position of the United States? Alone among the Great Powers she was not menaced. Her size and strength and the accident of her geographical situation and surroundings had combined to shield her in an almost untroubled tranquillity. Nothing could be said to endanger her national security. If strife is indeed a law of international life, then in America's case it seemed to be virtually suspended. Of all that follows when two Powers of nearly equal strength and of possibly conflicting interests live within striking distance of one another, she has known next to nothing. A diplomatic dispute with another Power, conducted by either side on the implication of force, has been of all experiences the one most foreign to the normal routine of American existence. The United States of yesterday had no visible enemies to guard against, no definite or even probable crisis of any real magnitude to prepare for, no opposing standard by which to measure her naval and military equipment. It is true that being a high-spirited, volatile, emotional, and on the whole rather bellicose people, the Americans, under the spur of their temperament and in obedience to the combative instinct, have done what they could to fill the vacuum by manufacturing the regulation number of 'scares,' by labelling this Power or that 'the enemy,' and by endeavouring to make international mountains out of molehills. But these diversions were in themselves sufficient proof of their unique national immunity from

the serious realities of Weltpolitik. It is hardly, indeed, too much to say that the average, busy, complacent American, living in an atmosphere of extraordinary simplicity and self-absorption, had no vital interest in any external affairs that lay beyond the range of the Monroe Doctrine. Being spared the fierce juxtapositions and imminent contentions that are the lot of the ordinary European, and convinced of the unassailable might of the United States, he was apt to regard the wars and diplomatic disputes of the Old World with an almost frivolous detachment as a sort of drama provided for his distraction. The idea that the United States had one set of interests and the rest of the world another was still up to last August the common American idea. Americans agreed in general with St. Paul that it is only the fool whose eyes are on the end of the earth. International politics had little genuine meaning for them; they were a hermit nation, eminently self-centred, incurious, and unsuspecting, surveying the outer world with a comical pity as an institution whose main office of utility was to serve as a foil to the singular blessedness of American conditions.

It is true that the events of the past decade and a half have transformed the American Republic into an Empire, established her as an Asiatic Power, and brought her at more than one point into somewhat hazardous contact with the nations of the Orient and Occident alike. But there has been very little mental expansion to correspond; the old instinctive attitude of provincialism and disdain, while somewhat weakened, has been very far from destroyed. Up to the very outbreak of the War the average American newspaper continued to treat international politics in a spirit of mingled levity and sensationalism, and the average American citizen was without any adequate understanding of the first elements of Weltpolitik. He felt no need to study them; such education as he absorbed from the Press was meagre and intermittent in amount and extremely unsatisfactory in quality; and it scarcely occurred to him that there could be any vital connexion between American welfare and policies and the issue of some European dispute, thousands of miles from the American continent.

The War, then, came upon the United States with the flashing force of a revelation. In an instant the scales fell from American eyes, the old belief in the sufficiency, and even in the possibility, of isolation was shattered, and a series of shocks brought it unescapably home that the United States was, after all, but part of a whole, and linked to the rest of the world by indissoluble chains of action and reaction. It will, of course, take time before this consciousness becomes powerful enough to affect the play of domestic politics. The November elections, at

which the whole of a new House of Representatives and one third of the Senate were chosen, showed very few signs of being influenced by the War. To all appearances the Americans proceeded to discuss their local affairs as though the outside world were non-existent, and to settle them without the smallest reference to what was happening in Europe. With half the Universe in flames they elected a national Legislature on purely American issues—the tariff, the cost of living, the democratic attitude towards ‘big business,’ and what not. They even felt justified in administering to the President a severe rebuff by reducing his majority in the popular Chamber from slightly under 150 to just over twenty. The War, so far as one could judge from this side of the Atlantic, hardly occurred to them as a reason for strengthening his hands. This diagnosis, I admit, is not concurred in by all commentators on the spot. One of the shrewdest of them, the Editor of the *North American Review*, observed in the December issue of his periodical :

It is a common saying that ‘The war saved Wilson,’ and to this extent the saying is true, namely, that if, in the last month of the campaign, thousands of patriotic citizens who otherwise would not have voted at all had not responded to the appeal to uphold the President before the world, Congress would have been lost to the Democrats.

That, it will be noticed, is not saying much. The War on this showing rallied to President Wilson a portion of that intelligent but exiguous minority of Americans who are interested in foreign affairs but find their domestic politics, from one reason or another, so unattractive that they rarely even take the trouble to vote. But even so, adds the Editor I have quoted, ‘it is by no means certain that the general effect of an uncontrollable situation, which not only made war taxes necessary but also intensified the common depression, did not more than offset any political gain from higher motives.’ In other words, the effect of the War on the voting was practically nil. Nothing could have demonstrated more clearly, first, the confidence of the American people in their ability to remain neutral, and secondly, the gulf that separates their realisation of a broad fact from specific action based upon it and from an understanding of the consequences it entails.

It was, naturally enough, in the sphere of trade and economics that the War first made manifest to Americans the character and the extent of their dependence upon Europe. Following the lead of London, and to stop the withdrawal of gold which began to flow out at the rate of over 10,000,000*l.* a week, the New York Stock Exchange closed on the 31st of July, not to open again till the second week in December. The insurance on cargoes bound for Europe went up to ten per cent. of their

value; the pound sterling rose from 4.89 dols. to 5 dols., and even—an absolutely unprecedented figure—to 7 dols.; the wheat market, under the combination of a surplus stock of some 250,000,000 bushels, an urgent European demand, and an almost complete lack of transit, was violently convulsed. The huge cotton crop, about two thirds of which is annually sent abroad, lay useless in the warehouses; steel and copper exports fell to almost nothing; the price of sugar doubled; ferro-manganese ore jumped from 6*l.* to 20*l.* the ton; the position of the railways, long critical, grew suddenly desperate; vast industries were forced to shut down through the cessation of their accustomed imports of raw material, of potash, silk, chemicals and dyes in particular; and Americans who last year dealt with the belligerent nations to the amount of some 370,000,000*l.* found the whole of this trade dislocated and jeopardised. Not an interest or section of the country but was instantly made aware that the European conflagration had its direct and immediate effect on American business. The effect was not always unfavourable. The first week of the struggle, it was estimated, added 100,000,000*l.* to the value of the wheat crop. But in general the reflex influence of the War took the inevitable form of an acute financial and industrial crisis. The United States Government, which for the past decade has spent its best energies in badgering business, was now compelled to come to its rescue. It met the call promptly, and its activities were ably seconded by those of Wall Street. The New York bankers and financiers, and the Committee of the New York Stock Exchange, have, indeed, faced the situation with an unwonted efficiency and largeness of view. Their resolute action stopped a panic that would have thrown all other panics into the shade, and their resort to Clearing House certificates and the prompt establishment of a provisional fund of 20,000,000*l.* to liquidate foreign indebtedness raised the reputation of American financial statesmanship to a higher point than it had ever reached before. There are some American optimists who believe that when the War is over New York will displace London as the financial centre of the world. More than one American bank, indeed, has recently notified its clients that in future it will issue letters of credit on importations from the Far East and South America in dollars and cents on New York. The supremacy of London is not likely to be easily shaken, but if its sceptre is ever to be wrested from it the events of the past five months have shown that it might readily fall into less competent hands than those of New York.

It is more interesting, however, to note the unexampled responsibilities which were thrown upon the Government. It had first of all to meet the financial necessities of the 100,000

American citizens whom the War had left stranded in Europe, and who bore the discomforts of their plight with admirable fortitude. It had next to meet a falling-off of revenues reckoned at 2,000,000*l.* a month. It dealt with this problem both by practising an economy without parallel in modern American history, and by imposing stamp duties and increasing the taxes on beer and wine. It then proceeded to consider the state of the cotton industry, which, in the United States as in Great Britain, is the only industry of the first class that the War has brought to an almost complete standstill. It is an old and a tolerably accurate saying that America pays her debts in cotton, and that anything accordingly which reduces the value of that product reduces also the national debt-paying power. Moreover, as the crop is raised almost wholly on borrowed money, it was imperative that the Southern States should be saved from the financial prostration that must have followed on the loss of exports that for the past five years have averaged over 110,000,000*l.* annually. After many conferences with the interests concerned, the Secretary of the Treasury announced that he would accept warehouse receipts for cotton and tobacco as a basis for the issue of currency through the national banks. The effect of this has been to tide the planters over the worst of the crisis; but the industry as a whole cannot be restored to anything like normal conditions unless the British and American Governments succeed, as they are now trying to do, in devising a plan that will be equitable to both Lancashire and the South. The main preoccupation, however, of the authorities at Washington during the first few weeks of the War was the shipping question. Americans saw, or thought they saw, an opportunity which it would have been ridiculous not to snatch at, for building up the American mercantile marine. Hitherto no ship has been allowed to fly the American flag unless it was built in the United States. Congress swept away that hampering restriction, the quintessence of Protectionist folly, by admitting foreign-built ships to the American registry. At the same time a war risk insurance bureau was established with a fund of 1,000,000*l.*, and a Bill was introduced authorising the President to spend 6,000,000*l.* on buying or building naval auxiliaries for use as merchantmen. The purpose of this measure was to enable the United States Government to purchase the German liners, especially those of the Hamburg-Amerika Company, that were lying in the harbours of New York and Boston. Nothing, however, has so far come of the project, though it is worth noting that President Wilson, in his message to Congress on the 8th of December, again, and very strongly, pressed home its urgency. Most Americans, however, still seem to regard it as both a doubtful experiment in Govern-

ment ownership, and hardly compatible with the obligations of neutrality. Nor did the admission of foreign-built ships to the American registry prove much more productive. Very few owners availed themselves of the privilege, although the Navigation Laws, which add anywhere from twenty-five to forty per cent. to the cost of operating a vessel under the American flag, were suspended for two years. The fact that the British Admiralty was quickly able to announce the security of the Atlantic trade route made most of the American endeavours in this direction both superfluous and inoperative.

Perhaps the chief result of the War on the commercial aspirations of the American people is to have revealed to them the importance of foreign trade and the necessity of capturing as much of it as possible. When peace is restored they will be the only great industrial nation whose wealth has not been squandered, nor whose strength exhausted. An unexampled chance lies open before them, and they are already laying their plans to turn it to the fullest account. They are doing so, let me hasten to add, in an entirely creditable spirit, with no vulgar gloatings over opportunities that have come to them at the expense of others, but with a sharply intensified recognition that the foreign market is fast becoming as indispensable to their manufacturers as it long has been to their farmers, and with a quiet determination to repair abroad the damage which the War has done their trade at home. What especially attracts them is South America, where, in spite of the fact that their imports and exports have risen by nearly one hundred per cent. in the past seven years—from 90,000,000*l.* to 170,000,000*l.*—the great bulk of the trade, practically, indeed, two thirds of it, still lies with Europe. The total commerce of South America amounts to some 600,000,000*l.* a year. It is a tempting prize, but one may doubt whether this is quite the time or whether the Americans are quite the people to carry it off. They are not at present by any means well equipped for building up a large foreign trade. They have neither studied nor cultivated the field as carefully as the Germans and ourselves have been obliged to study and cultivate it. Their tendency has rather been to regard foreign trade as a sort of overflow from the home trade, a way to dispose of the surplus. It is a very natural tendency. Their imports and exports combined cannot, I should say, be much more than a tenth of their internal commerce; and of these exports agricultural produce and the products of mines, forests and fisheries represent over seventy per cent., and finished manufactures less than thirty per cent. Speaking broadly, America still owes the place she has taken among the trading nations more to the bounty of Nature than to the skill of man.

Americans have not yet shown that they can establish in a land of foreign speech and ways a trade of anything like the extent and variety that British and German merchants and manufacturers have compassed. Very possibly that is chiefly because they have not yet seriously grappled with the problem. Their capitalists hitherto have not been greatly attracted by what seem to them the rather meagre returns of the ocean carrying trade, of banking, and of industrial investments in South America when compared with the profits of home enterprises or of exports through long-established and convenient channels to the more remunerative markets of Europe. They have not been satisfied to give the long credits extended by Europeans, or to manufacture for the special requirements of perhaps a small and uncertain market, or to go to the trouble of packing their goods to suit climatic conditions or local peculiarities of transport. Of course it is merely a question of time before they overcome deficiencies that for the most part are the offspring of sheer indifference and carelessness. But South America has been very hard hit by the War and by its own extravagances; there are few openings for business development in those regions at present; and when peace comes Americans will probably find it much more difficult than they imagine to-day to oust either Great Britain or Germany from the top of the table. We have behind us experience, a sort of habit of financial dominance and a turn for speculative enterprise that will undoubtedly draw new life from the tremendous stir of the present strife; and as for the Germans, I am persuaded there is no royal road to their commercial any more than there is to their military conquest. Neither we nor the Americans can hope to beat them in any neutral market except by adopting and improving upon their methods—by becoming, that is, more exact, more patient, more assiduously scientific, more skilled in foreign tongues, and more attentive to the needs and whims of their customers than they are themselves.

Meanwhile enormous orders have poured in upon the manufacturers of the United States from most of the belligerents and from many neutral lands. The exports of foodstuffs have broken all previous records. Wheat has been shipped to the amount of 10,000,000 bushels a week. Powder, cartridges, shrapnel cases, torpedoes, canteens, wagons, boots, motor trucks, harness and saddles, horses, shirts, blankets, oilcake, barbed wire, tinned meat, cotton duck, knit goods, aeroplanes, railway ties, overcoats—for all these commodities and for many others there has been a demand that already is estimated by the jubilant American Press to exceed 60,000,000*l*. At one of the water-front terminals in New York in the first week of December nearly 150 car-loads of 'war goods' were awaiting shipment. The naval

situation being what it is, they were destined, of course, for the Allies. But this fact that Germany cannot, while we and our friends can, draw supplies from the United States is one of many facets. It gives point to the contention of the Teutonic apologists in America that the United States is not really neutral, and if there is anything to which President Wilson seems just now to be exceptionally sensitive it is any reflection on the complete dispassionateness of American action. Within the last few weeks Bills have been introduced into both Houses of Congress forbidding the export of arms and ammunition to any warring nation with which the United States itself is at peace; and though the Administration, already under popular suspicion as a hindrance to prosperity, will be very loth to check the trade that is going on in naval and military equipment and accessories—at this moment the only healthy industry there is in the United States—still we must be prepared for a more or less continuous agitation of the subject in Germany's interests. This holds good also for our treatment of neutral trade; every effort will be made to persuade the American people that they have a grievance against us. One may take it for granted that neither the citizens nor the Government of the United States desire to place factitious obstacles in the way of the effective economic exercise of British sea-power, any more than we in the United Kingdom desire to hamper American trade unnecessarily. But within the scope of this general agreement there is room for a good deal of difference of opinion and not a little friction over particular instances, and it is probable that at least 150 cases of seized ships and detained cargoes have been discussed between the two Governments since the War began. We cannot, even to mollify American opinion, afford to relax for a moment our pressure on Germany's industrial windpipe. But it might be possible, if the facts in each case were made more quickly available—communications between the Admiralty and the Foreign Office appear at present to be excessively dilatory—and if a freer use were made of the frank publicity that especially appeals to the American people, to smooth down much of the irritation which is being stirred up in the United States, less by our policy than by our manner of enforcing it. If the unofficial agreement arrived at between London and Washington on the 16th of December proves workable, and an inspection of cargoes before sailing by the British Consular authorities turns out to be as efficacious as searching them on the high seas, it will be a development equally welcome on both sides of the Atlantic. In any event we should see to it that our handling of the whole contraband problem is not such as to justify the suspicion that we are favouring British at the expense of American trade, or depriving Transatlantic merchants and

manufacturers of any opening that can be turned to account without harm to our own or our Allies' interests.

But if the commercial imagination of the American people has thus been touched by the vision of boundless possibilities, their political consciousness has leaped with equal boldness towards a new horizon. Never in their history have they been in such close and vital communion of spirit and sympathies with the peoples of Europe. Never, too, have they had better reason to thank their stars that they are immune from the rivalries and detonating hates, the dynastic ambitions, and the curse of armaments that have brought the Old World to its present pass. America is nothing if not idealist and humanitarian, and the American people have been almost incredibly moved by the mere fact of war on this unparalleled scale of horror and destruction. They feel and are revolted by the sheer brutality of the thing more perhaps than any of the actual belligerents, who amid all the agony and waste keep clear in their hearts and minds the sense of glorious compensations. For Americans the question that presents itself with a deepening insistence is how to end not only this War but all wars. The persuasion spreads that there is reserved for the United States a rôle that will test, as it has never been tested before, the capacity of American statesmanship. President Wilson's offer of mediation, made in the first week of the War, was put forward, one may assume, without much hope of its being accepted. It was a proposal formulated for the purpose of having it definitely on the record that the United States was neutral, was benevolent, and when the warring nations were in the mood for peace would gladly do what it could to bring them together. In most Americans' opinion the time will come when a blood-soaked and exhausted Europe will turn to the President's intervention with gratitude and relief. When that hour strikes they believe that the future not only of Old World civilisation but of all mankind may depend, beyond everything else, on the vision that the American mediators bring to their task. American influence, American example, American disinterestedness, backed by a clear purpose and by the conserved strength of 100,000,000 people, will, they think, be the factors that more than any other factors will determine whether this War of the Giants is to be ended merely to be renewed later on, or whether it is to usher in a veritable reign of peace; whether the gospel of force and the armed doctrine of militarism are to continue to oppress the world, or whether civilisation can be started on a new path; whether the nations are to be released from, or are to be thrust back once more in subjection to, the fatuous ambitions and searing burdens, the mad welter of jealousies and attack and counter-attack, that have hitherto been their lot.

This is the object or the mirage that inspires the best American minds to-day. Meanwhile the United States remains not merely neutral but more guardedly so than any nation perhaps has ever been. President Wilson has expanded the obligations of neutrality to include not alone acts but also the expression of opinion. When the Belgian mission laid before him an account of the wrongs and sufferings of their country he replied to them in words of moving and exquisite sympathy, but with a careful avoidance of even the appearance of passing judgment on their case. When the Kaiser protested against the use of dum-dum bullets by the Allies he noted the protest, but declined in all friendliness to express any opinion on the merits of the allegation. When the French and Austrian Governments were sounding the New York bankers as to the possibilities of a loan, he officially intimated that financial assistance to any of the belligerents was 'inconsistent with the true spirit of neutrality.' That in itself is a development which, if it can be elevated into a rule of international practice, must go a long way towards discouraging warfare. Since then he has virtually forbidden American ship-builders to manufacture submarines for any of the belligerents. But the President went further still in inculcating his conception of what neutrality demands. In an address to the American people he pleaded for an equal impartiality in the speech and conduct of the citizens as individuals. He warned them against 'that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides.' He affirmed

the earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action; a nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels, and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world.

So far as the neutrality of the American Government is concerned not a voice has been raised anywhere, in the United States or out of it, in criticism of the President's position, except that a good many Americans would have welcomed an official protest in their behalf against Germany's treatment of Belgium and her manifold violations of the Hague Conventions. It was the wise and obvious course, and the emergency is hardly conceivable that would necessitate any deflection from it. Like almost all the rest of the world, the United States has been, and will continue to be, troubled by the knotty problems of international law that are bound to arise when countries with a world-

wide commerce and ships on every ocean go to war. But with a man of the quality of President Wilson at the head of affairs none of these problems, not even the inevitable awkwardnesses that, as I have said, must be expected over the difficult and many-sided questions of contraband, are likely to reach or even to approach the danger line. They will be decided with a fairness, an absence of the controversial and still more conspicuously of the higgling spirit, and a steady recognition of the realities and not merely the appearances of justice—with all the qualities, in short, that have made Mr. Wilson's Presidency an essay, and a very successful one, in the higher ethics of international relations. The United States stirred uneasily, but only for a moment, when the intervention of Japan brought the War in near proximity to her own possessions in the Pacific. But the disquietude passed when it was realised that the scope of the Japanese action was in conformity with and limited by the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and that it did not imply the permanent establishment of our Allies either at Kiaochau or in any of the German islands that lie between America and the Philippines. The assurances that were forthcoming on these points had the unwonted merit of really reassuring, and the better-informed Americans were quick to see that, since nothing could have prevented Japan from avenging the affront put upon her by Germany over twenty years ago, it was decidedly to their interests that her operations should be governed by the provisions of the Anglo-Japanese compact. Americans had only to ask themselves whether they would have preferred to see Japan waging an unrestrained war upon Germany or acting, as she is acting, in loyal agreement with a Power whose friendliness towards the United States is axiomatic, to perceive that the alliance between Great Britain and Japan, once the object of a certain amount of American suspicion, is in reality a safeguard of American interests. With the Japanese question and the question of contraband out of the way, there is only one contingency—an exceedingly remote one, to which I shall refer later on—that could possibly induce Americans even to debate the expediency of remaining neutral.

With American opinion, however, outside the circles of officialdom the case has been far otherwise. The President's counsel of perfection proved too arduous an ideal for a people pre-eminently used to forming and expressing their own judgments. It is not an American habit to walk on the eggshells of a dispassionate mentality. They have, beyond most other peoples, the gift of a virile partisanship, and no admonitions from the White House could prevent them from exercising it. We in Great Britain have certainly little reason to complain of the form

assumed by their disobedience to the President's injunction. While eagerly and thoroughly exploring all the aspects of the various cases submitted for their verdict, the overwhelming bulk of the American people have found themselves constrained by conscience and conviction to return a whole-hearted judgment in favour of the Allied cause. No one with any knowledge of their instinctive ways of looking at things could have doubted that, given the circumstances, an appeal to the tribunal of American opinion could and would lead to this and no other issue. It has not been a question of 'racial' sympathy or any particular affection for Great Britain. It has been first and foremost a question of morality, of right and wrong, of what is best not only for America but for the welfare of mankind and the progress and security of civilisation. Germany's efforts to win over American goodwill have betrayed the psychological obtuseness which everybody now recognises as one of the least pleasing by-products of militarism. There has been nothing quite like the sedulous courting of the United States by Teutonic emissaries since the elephant in *Paradise Lost* 'wreathed his lithe proboscis' to plant himself in the good graces of Adam and Eve. The German wooing has been both elephantine and regimental. It has been an official bombardment of cajolery, protestations, denials and lies—the climax to a long and futile campaign of importunate blandishments, princely visits, imperial gifts, falsified history and obtrusive compliments which Americans have long ago rated at their proper value. They see through the game and the exaggerated zeal of those who are playing it. The Kaiser's coquetries move them no more than the blaze of American slang in which Prince Henry traversed their country—or move them only to ridicule and mistrust. There are probably in the United States 3,000,000 Americans of German birth, and some 18,000,000 of German descent. They are enrolled in innumerable societies; the German Ambassador, the former German Colonial Secretary, German-American bankers, professors, journalists and politicians have all taken a hand in influencing American opinion; but the net result of their efforts is to leave the predominant sentiment of the country not merely unconvinced and unreconciled but scornful and hostile.

The truth is that in spite of the admirable qualities of the German immigrant, of the heavy debt which America in particular owes to the example of German educationalists, and of the generous respect which Americans are ever anxious to pay to learning and intellect, there exists between the genius of the two countries a very real conflict of ideas and aspirations. There are two instincts derived from their past which have struck firm roots in the national character and outlook of the American

people. One is their dislike of autocracy; the other is their dislike of bureaucracy and militarism. Germany offends against both instincts. Whereas Americans believe they detect in our form of government the veritable rule of the people, by the people, for the people, operating behind the veil of a constitutional monarchy, in Germany they are persuaded that Parliamentary institutions serve merely as trappings for something little less than an effective and ubiquitous absolutism—an absolutism all the more offensive to their way of thinking in that it rests on a military, aristocratic, and reactionary caste. The whole system which the Kaiser personifies, his whole conception of the State and of the respective parts that the Sovereign, the Army, and the people should play in it, revolt not merely the opinions but the political conscience of the American people, and rasp unceasingly on their sincere and exalted sense of the worth and dignity of the individual and of the moral efficacy of 'free institutions.' This gulf of spiritual antipathy between the two peoples has long been evident; and many events during the past decade and a half have served to widen it, and to fill the American mind with a vague but irrepressible suspicion of the aims of German policy and of the uses to which the Kaiser might one day turn the naval and military power he was swiftly accumulating. A few years ago this suspicion was not less than a national prepossession. Recently it has died down, but Americans have never quite dismissed from their minds the idea that Germany had designs upon South America and that her ambitions might one day bring her athwart the Monroe Doctrine.

It was only, however, with the advent of the present war that Americans came to see Germany and her rulers in their true light. The spectacle has frankly horrified them. The detestable act of treachery committed against Belgium moved them to a universal and spontaneous condemnation, and the atrocious acts by which it has been followed up convinced them that Germany had transformed herself into an enemy of the human race. 'Necessity knows no law' is not a maxim of American statecraft. The violation of treaties and pledges and of the rights of smaller nations is not a proceeding they applaud. They have it firmly fixed in their minds who brought on the war and who went to the uttermost limits to avert it, on which side it is a war of conquest and on which a war in defence of civilisation. They have appraised the German ideal and found it the negation of everything that Americans most passionately cherish. It is not the ideal of democracy or of peace. They see in it nothing but the doctrine of force, the conception that the ruling factor in human affairs is the sheer mass of organised strength, the belief that soldiers belong to a higher caste of

humanity than civilians, the persuasion that 'the people' are unworthy of consideration except as the raw material for the drill-sergeant. In American eyes the Germany that has been revealed by the war is the incarnation of despotism and aggressiveness and the foe of popular freedom, of self-government, and of the appeal to reason. They find themselves without a single shred of sympathy for such a monstrosity, and every fresh depredation it commits adds to the profundity of their repulsion. Moreover, they are beginning to ask themselves how American interests would be affected if Germany were to succeed in dominating Europe and achieving the command of the seas. They know that they can trust us. Our naval power gives them not a moment's anxiety on behalf of a single one of their possessions or policies. They feel no confidence that Germany's maritime supremacy would be equally innocuous. They understand and appreciate our fiscal policy; they are wondering whether, if Germany were to rise to our place, she would be equally liberal. Some of them are beginning to see that, next to the security and well-being of their own country, there is no higher American interest than the preservation of the British Empire on its present footing, and that a Germany bestriding Europe like a jack-booted Colossus would eventually menace the policies and fortunes of the United States in the Pacific and South America. That is why Americans are at last beginning to examine their own naval and military organisation and resources with unclouded eyes. That also is why they wish the Allies well. And, finally, that is why American neutrality may be said to be only beyond discussion so long as Germany does not win.

SIDNEY BROOKS

AN AMERICAN'S VIEW OF AMERICAN NEUTRALITY

THE opinion expressed, in a private letter recently quoted in the Press, by the late Admiral Mahan, of the United States Navy, that 'if Germany wins by a big margin she is likely to be nasty to us' (that is to the United States), must have a profound influence in intensifying the sympathies of his countrymen in the cause of Germany's opponents. Admiral Mahan was not only a great naval strategist, but occupied towards his own country much the same position of acknowledged authority upon all questions of national defence as Lord Roberts held in Great Britain. Of both, too, it may be said that if their advice was not always taken, it rankled in the mind of the most sceptical or indifferent hearer. However reluctant the mind may be to accept an unwelcome truth, if it comes as the judgment of proved capacity joined to unquestioned patriotism the uneasy suspicion will remain that the warning voice may be right and ought not to be denied.

Englishmen are, no doubt, by this time convinced that the great body of opinion in the United States upon the right and wrong of the War coincides with their own, and that America's sympathies as a whole are with the Allies opposed to Germany and Austria. But the attitude of President Wilson's administration is another matter. After making every allowance for the position of strict neutrality which Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bryan regard as imperative upon the Government, their construction of the Government's duty seems strangely and needlessly remote from the general body of opinion and sentiment throughout that country. Does strict neutrality preclude any protest against the cynical violaters of the Hague Conventions, to which the United States is a party? Does strict neutrality justify the President in enjoining upon his countrymen absolute silence upon the topic of the European War, on the ground that the expression of a private opinion is a violation of that neutrality? He has, for the same reason, we hear, forbidden the West Point Cadets to sing 'It's a long way to Tipperary,' so it may be assumed that for American military bands to play the 'Marseillaise' or 'Die Wacht am Rhein' would be an infringement of neutrality! Perhaps even

'America' is taboo since, the air being the same as 'God Save the King,' its performance might be construed as an expression of sympathy! President Wilson must lack a sense of humour as well as a sense of proportion; but, that apart, his attitude has undoubtedly occasioned no little surprise, and the surprise deepens as we come to perceive more and more clearly how strongly Americans generally regard the justice of Great Britain's cause, and trust in the success of her arms and the arms of her Allies.

'If Germany wins by a big margin,' wrote Admiral Mahan, 'she is likely to be nasty to' the United States. At this stage in the War it is quite safe to say that if Germany wins at all it will be by a big margin. So resolute are the Allies to make an end of her pretensions that they will fight to exhaustion if need be, and Germany cannot win without destroying the armies of Russia, France, and Britain, and the British Fleet. When all that happens she will be absolute mistress in Europe, and then, says Admiral Mahan, 'likely to be nasty' in America; what German 'nastiness' means all the world knows by this time.

If, then, that forecast is sound or if the prophet who uttered it has the prestige of a prophet in his own country, it must quicken, if not the Wilson administration, at least the public pressure that will be brought to bear upon it.

There are two influences at work to direct the current of America's sympathy in favour of Great Britain—pure sentiment and her sense of justice.

Amongst the great mass of Americans, those with Anglo-Saxon blood in their veins, sentiment counts for as much and as little as it does amongst the British—that is to say, like suppressed measles, it works the more virulently from being concealed. I know from personal experience that deep in the heart of the dominant race in the United States exists an almost passionate affection for England. A personal reminiscence may be cited as bearing on that statement. The writer, when a schoolboy surfeited with his country's history, said to his father on one occasion 'Why do you seem so much more fond of England than France? When England fought us France helped us, but everybody seems to forget that.' His answer was terse but sufficient. 'My boy,' said he, 'England is home.' As my English ancestors emigrated to the American Colony of New England in 1632 it cannot be said that my father's 'home' tie was a very personal one, but that tie is rooted deep enough in the Anglo-Saxon-American soul to have survived nearly three centuries of separation and all the normal family bickerings as well. Americans may love to conceal their love as an Englishman cannot help keeping his emotions on ice, but I know that both will shed tears in the dark over an emotional play and be equally ashamed of it.

It is just as positive that if England were in difficulties President Wilson's neutrality fit would be cured by such an explosion of national sentiment that he would have no difficulty in discovering that the honour of the United States was deeply concerned in opposing Germany's Weltpolitik.

And in the same dominant class, which is well represented by Mr. Roosevelt's attitude on most public, social, and economic questions, the sense of justice, or rather of righteousness, to use the more comprehensive term, is inborn and of robust temper. To outsiders it is not so obvious as the extravagant frivolities of the very rich, not so notorious as the tricks of finance or the juggernaut course of competition, not so conspicuous as political chicanery and 'graft,' but it is a real and an invincible force when roused to action. It ended human slavery; it fought the doctrine of State secession to a finish in a civil war of four years' duration, and, though it often moves slowly, it achieves the triumph of the right in the end; and in spite of almost superhuman efforts to win America's sympathies for Germany, her keen sense of justice marches with her sentiment of affection with equal step in support of Britain's cause. To these two factors must be added a growing consciousness of where her self-interest lies, and to this influence Admiral Mahan's dictum comes as a welcome reinforcement.

For if by any chance—by crippling Great Britain's fleet, or eluding it, or by any unexpected serious reverses to the Allies in the land campaigns—the door were opened to an invasion of England, America will realise all the more acutely from Admiral Mahan's warning that Germany's road to the United States lies through Great Britain; and what it means for Germany to traverse any road let Belgium and North-East France supply the answer. Germany had no occasion of enmity—no worthy grudge even against Belgium, for no fair fighter—no one possessing the least claim to be called a sportsman—could feel anything but admiration for little Belgium's plucky defence of her neutrality. And yet has Germany been 'nasty' to Belgium or not? And if she gets to England is she 'likely to be nasty to us' also or not? Those who write for her and speak for her are sufficiently outspoken indeed. That they do not mean to be nice to England is quite clear. They have described the country as they will leave it when they have marched over this road to a world-empire. The details are impressive. No existing monument of our greatness in history, literature or the arts is to be left for a future generation to see. Oxford shall be razed to the earth; Shakespeare's dust shall be scattered to the winds; and there is a vast deal more of it, for the German hate has imagination.

And after England Germany 'is likely to be nasty to us,' wrote

Admiral Mahan. Americans are 'likely' to reflect upon that judgment. It is terse and homely, and strikes fire. To thousands of minds halting in opinion it will bring conviction—conviction that nothing but the success of England and her Allies stands between the United States and the 'nasty' course of Germany's advance to other Continents than Europe.

When that conviction is driven home in the American mind—when American politicians and statesmen realise what it would mean to have their policy dictated by Germany—when their financial and commercial and industrial interests perceive they may be made subservient to German expansion—when they look forward to being compelled to allow themselves to be swamped by German emigration fostered and exploited by the Fatherland—when Germany has made herself supreme and invulnerable in Europe (*Deutschland über alles*) it will be seen that she cannot in the nature of things resist the impulse to be 'nasty' everywhere else. Impulse! It will be no longer an impulse merely, but a profound conviction of her divinely ordained mission to spread German Kultur over the face of the whole earth, by fire and sword if need be.

And when that fact is realised by the most powerful, the most self-reliant and the proudest people who still remain neutral in this World-war, what then? Will their pride permit them to look on while England and France, Russia and Japan fight the battle for them? Will their self-reliance save them if perchance Germany should win through in this War? Will their power avail them with a German colony all along the three thousand miles of their northern frontier and ten million German-speaking inhabitants in their own land? These tentative forecasts may to-day sound grotesque, but forecasts much more inconceivable have come to pass in the whirl of history, and it is incontestable that German ambition prefigures just such ends as her inevitable destiny.

The United States is doubtless convinced that under any hazard of circumstances she can defend herself, but has she counted the cost between throwing her moral support into the balance now, and the call upon her resources if Germany should win through? In that contingency, with England's naval power wiped out, she would be compelled to take up that rivalry in the creation of a vast sea power in which Great Britain has hitherto engaged with Germany. Has she considered the cost of a fleet of four or five hundred ships of war—of creating and maintaining in the highest efficiency an army of five million men? They would be needed if Germany, having made herself arbiter in Europe, proceeded to make herself, in Admiral Mahan's phrase, 'nasty' to the Western Republic.


Does any sane person doubt that, if Germany wins, having annexed Belgium and a large slice of French territory along the English Channel, and having ravaged Great Britain, she would in her own time invade Canada? And who is to stop her? No country that is destitute of a huge navy and a vast army will stop her, and huge navies and vast armies require years to build, organise, and train for service. Would America trust to treaties and conventions to stay the progress of an ambition for universal empire fed by success after success? Germany has avowed that treaties are mere 'scraps of paper,' and shown that conventions have no meaning for her.

All that has been written above is no more than a widening commentary on Admiral Mahan's warning of Germany's will, under certain conditions, to be 'nasty' to the United States. What I have written is no more a travesty than his words are a travesty. These things are on the knees of the Gods—they may come to pass. But the pregnant matter is this: If they may come to pass, what a tremendous risk America is running, in not throwing at least all her moral influence into the scale with the Allies, who are engaged in the herculean task of curbing German ambition for world-empire! That conflict, as every day makes clearer, has only just begun. Scarcely a shot has been fired as yet on German territory, and the hardest part of the struggle will come when Germany is at bay on her own soil. The Allies, whatever they feel they have a right to expect, are not soliciting America's moral support. I write as an American, not as an Englishman. But they would welcome that moral support. Only to be worth anything it should not be too long withheld.

OSCAR PARKER.

*The Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY cannot undertake
to return unaccepted MSS.*

THE
NINETEENTH
CENTURY
AND AFTER



No. CCCCLVI—FEBRUARY 1915

*THE RAPE OF BELGIUM—AND THE
'PLAN' THAT FAILED*

I CALL this article 'The rape of Belgium' because, when the German authorities failed in their attempt to obtain Belgium's consent to a breach of her bond, they forced the unwilling victim of their solicitations and committed on her the vilest conceivable act of international immorality.

The assimilation is not far-fetched. Nor can the charge be regarded as excessive.

No reader of my articles on the War in this Review can say that I have been carried away by any undue patriotic fervour. I have endeavoured by confining myself to uncontested evidence to avoid even excusable bias, and if I have started this article with what might be its conclusion, it is again with a view to anticipating any idea that the cold-blooded discussion of the crime in question implies the remotest condonation of its commission.

My object is to enable the reader to base his judgment of it upon facts and not upon sentiment, to see it in its nakedness without allowing any frankness of confession to palliate its enormity.

I

To understand the full meaning of the violation of Belgium's neutrality we must first examine the object, nature, and binding character of that neutrality.

The Kingdom of Belgium as such is of recent origin. It is a part of what at one time was known as the Spanish Netherlands or Low Countries. In 1557, however, Holland, Zeeland, Friesland, Guelders, Utrecht, Groningen, and Over-Issel rose against the Spanish domination, and after a struggle which lasted sixty-two years obtained recognition by Spain as the 'United Provinces.' The rest of the 'Low Countries' remained under Spanish dominion, but they succeeded in obtaining those local liberties and that independence which down to the present day give Belgian institutions a distinctive character.

By the Peace of Rastadt in 1714 they were transferred to the House of Austria and became the Austrian Netherlands. In 1789 the Austrian yoke was thrown off and the Belgian Netherlands became the 'United States of Belgium.' This lasted a year, and then the Austrian Government recovered possession till the wars of 1792 and 1794 terminated it and added the Austrian Netherlands to France. The Bishopric of Liège, which had formed part of the Holy Roman Empire, was included in the nine new departments. The French domination lasted till 1814. During these twenty years French influence implanted itself firmly without seriously interfering with the old local spirit of independence, and the burgomasters of Belgium with their aldermen remained typical of a country which during ages of central tyranny had learnt to prize its local liberties as the greatest of its public treasures. Hence the tradition which produces men of the type of M. Max, the burgomaster of Brussels, who recently defied the German invaders and risked his life and liberty in defence of the city over which he presided.

Thus Belgium as at present geographically defined owes its origin as a distinct entity to the French Revolution. The Treaty of Vienna in 1815 re-annexed it to the United Provinces, and Belgium then became a part of the newly founded Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The two parts of the Netherlands, however, had meanwhile developed in different directions. Twenty years of union with France, of association with her progressive polity and brilliant and daring intellect, had made association with Dutch Puritanism unbearable.

The July revolution of 1830 in Paris could not but affect a people who looked back regretfully on the old elastic connexion with France, and the wave of political energy which, starting from

Paris, swept over Continental Europe, caught up the quondam French departments of the Netherlands and resulted in their renouncing the Dutch allegiance, in the holding of a National Council, and in placing the Prince of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, an uncle of the Princess who was to become Queen Victoria of England, on the throne.

Hostilities between the Dutch and Belgians ensued and at length the Powers intervened, with the result that a Treaty was signed in 1831 proclaiming Belgium's independence as a separate member of the community of nations. To secure it against the possible ambitions of surrounding and more powerful States, they agreed to a self-denying clause by which they proclaimed it to be neutralised. Its neutralisation was not granted as a benefit but imposed as an obligation. After a number of vicissitudes it was reaffirmed in 1839 by another Treaty, which is still the charter of Belgian independence. It re-enacted that 'Belgium . . . shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State,' adding that it 'shall be bound to observe that neutrality towards all other States.' The signatories of this solemn pact which imposed perpetual neutrality on Belgium as a duty to be observed by the Belgian people—viz. Great Britain, France, Holland, Russia, Prussia (now Germany), and Austria—furthermore in the same Treaty specifically contracted with one another to 'guarantee' the strict observance of all its provisions.

Germany has never denounced the Treaties of 1831 and 1839. She has allowed Belgium to suppose that she regarded the obligation she had entered into and the guarantee she had given as still binding on her. She had led the other guarantors of Belgium's neutrality to suppose that she would respect that neutrality. She had entered into and ratified a special Convention, signed at the Hague in 1907, Article 1 of which states that 'Neutral territory is inviolable,' and Article 2 of which states that 'belligerents are forbidden to send troops or convoys either of munitions of war or of provisions through the territory of a neutral State,' and another that 'the act by a neutral State of resisting any violation of its neutrality, even by force of arms, cannot be regarded as an act of hostility.' Article 1 was inserted at the special request of the Belgian delegation, in order to provoke an expression of opinion if any qualification to this absolute proposition should be entertained by either Germany or France. Germany might have warned Belgium and the other contracting Powers on that occasion that she no longer considered herself bound by so unqualified an obligation. On the contrary, she professed to respect it.

In order further to allay suspicion a report was published in May 1913 by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, which is the acknowledged semi-official organ of the German Government,

of declarations made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of War at a sitting on the 29th of April 1913 of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag. A member of the Social-Democratic party had called attention to Belgian apprehensions concerning a possible violation of Belgium's neutrality in case of war between Germany and France. Herr von Jagow, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, replied: 'Belgian neutrality is provided for by international conventions which Germany intends to respect.' On further inquiry by Herr von Heeringen, another Social-Democratic member, this reply was emphasised by the Minister of War, who said: 'Belgium plays no part in the causes which justify the proposed reorganisation of the German military system. . . . Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international Treaty.'

Thus, instead of taking an opportunity of showing that Germany no longer considered her guarantee of Belgium's neutrality to be binding, her Government, through the two Ministers responsible in the matter, deliberately took an opportunity of declaring the contrary, and, in doing so, deliberately cheated Belgium and her co-guarantors.

II

When General von Bernhardi's book, *Germany and the Next War*, appeared in English,¹ there was a universal feeling of horror at the cynicism with which a distinguished German general officer treated war as an ordinary and indispensable method of promoting Germany's material interests abroad. The MS. was completed, he tells us in his Preface, in October 1911, after the crisis in the summer of that year. That crisis had produced 'a deep rift between the feeling of the nation and the diplomatic action of the Government.' German public opinion had been 'clearly in favour of Germany asserting herself.' To make 'the goals to be aimed at, the difficulties to be surmounted, and the sacrifices to be suffered clear' and 'stripped of all diplomatic disguise' was the task he had set himself. War, he insisted, moreover, was not a curse but 'the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power.'

In his greater book, *Vom heutigen Kriege*, of which a condensed English translation has appeared under the title of *How Germany makes War*,² the same distinguished General discusses the method by which Germany should deal with her enemies, in case she entered upon the great war which in the other volume he advises the German people to welcome as a solution of the problem of obtaining sufficient colonies and

¹ Published by Edward Arnold. London 1914.

² Hodder and Stoughton and Hugh Rees, Limited. London 1914.

adequate markets for their overflowing population, industry, and trade.

In this book he contemplates the probability that France, Russia, and England will be simultaneously opposed to the German forces. Not that he regards the oncoming war as one of defence against the aggressions of these nations; he frankly contemplates aggression by Germany against them. 'We may have,' he says, 'to face all these enemies single-handed. The Triple Alliance exists for defensive purposes only. . . . Austria and Italy . . . have no interest in Germany's world-politics. . . . We must . . . therefore be prepared to have to depend on ourselves alone. . . .' As regards England, he says elsewhere in the same book: 'It may be anticipated that the offensive of the combined French and English forces will be effected through Belgium and Holland. . . . The violent opposition of France and England to the fortification of Flushing is evidence that this is their plan of operation.' And he adds the following significant remark: 'An Anglo-French attack of this kind would involve such vital issues for Germany . . . that she is warranted in disregarding all other considerations and in devoting herself to the parrying of this offensive.' And elsewhere again he reverts to this dominant thought: 'In political strategy the law of initiative prevails,' and 'the issue of the next war depends on the efficacy of the offensive; only that Power will reap all its advantages which is *successful in initiating the war . . . under favourable conditions for the military action.* . . .'

General von Bernhardi did not disguise that the obstacle to carrying out his policy of getting his blow in first was Belgium's neutrality.

To set his mind at rest on this subject, however, he argued that when Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one contemplated that she would claim a vast and valuable region of Africa. Its very acquisition might be regarded as a breach of neutrality, for a State which—theoretically speaking, at least—had been placed beyond danger of war, had no right to enter into political competition with other States.

In General von Bernhardi's exposition of Germany's goals, ideals, and methods we had something so utterly devoid of human pity, kindness and sympathy that those of his readers who did not know a better side of Germany could only draw one conclusion. It was that New Germany had drifted away from all that gives modern culture its character, and had reverted to an earlier stage in human development—a stage in which there is no generous or intellectual margin, and the spirit of material acquisition absorbs all men's vital energies.

III

General von Bernhardi's exposition of German policy and military strategy has now been carried out, and carried out with all the ruthlessness recommended by the *Kriegsbrauch im Land-kriege*, which was the subject of my third article.³

I have now before me a document which purports to be a translation into French of the German 'plan of campaign.' It gives effect to General von Bernhardi's views so completely that it might have been prepared under his direction.

Put shortly, as we have seen, the General's argument was that, the violation of Belgium's neutrality being a necessary part of Anglo-French strategy, Germany's necessary counter-strategy was to anticipate the enemy, and invade and occupy Belgium before England and France had had time to do so.

How the document in question came into the possession of its owner I am asked not to inquire. It reads as if it had been rapidly dictated by a translator in too great a hurry to formulate his expressions with care, and passages are omitted as if there had not been time to get down the whole text of the original. I believe it to be an explanatory memorandum drawn up to accompany more precise instructions. As its contents were known in France over a year ago and it mentions the French 'Three Years' Service Act,' it was probably drawn up about the time when the German Minister of War made the above-quoted statement in the Reichstag. I quote it on good authority as authentic, and leave it to the reader to judge whether its mode of dealing with the matters discussed warrants my so quoting it.

'As regards the invasion of the Belgian Luxemburg,' it observes, 'there is every reason in favour of our losing no time in proceeding to the occupation of the right bank of the Meuse. This is necessary for the purpose of regulating with certainty the coincidence of our turning manœuvre with our frontal attack, and of our becoming at once masters of the railways. It may also have the effect of disconcerting the Belgian Government by disturbing the mobilisation of an important part of its forces, and may drive it into the simple acceptance of *faits accomplis*, subject to our having to promise a territorial or pecuniary indemnity in proportion to the service rendered. . . . It is therefore proposed to enter the Grand Duchy of and the Belgian Luxemburg on the third day. . . . On that day our representative at Brussels will hand the Belgian Government a carefully worded note excusing the imperative necessity of our using the railways and roads situated south of the Meuse. The note will state what we

³ 'Ruthless Warfare and Forbidden Methods,' *Nineteenth Century*, December 1914.

require and will contain a clear reference to the compensation which Belgium will derive from assuming an attitude, friendly or even unfriendly, provided it be passive.'

Elsewhere the document explains why the invasion of Belgium is preferable to that of Switzerland, and the necessity of it as a matter of military strategy.

'In 1870,' it says, 'Marshal von Moltke was obliged to concentrate his three armies along all the line comprised between Landau and Trier. They numbered less than 400,000 men. Now they amount to three or four times as many. We cannot deploy the million men composing our first-class troops on a line which is less than 300 kilometres—i.e. between Belfort and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, especially considering that certain regions are badly adapted to operations by large forces, such as the Vosges and the marshes near the town of Dieuze. These alone occupy half the available ground. Our concentration front must therefore extend beyond the Franco-German frontier. The French are confronted with the same problem, and we need have no illusion as to the solution they intend to give it. . . . The question then arises whether we should prolong our zone of action southwards or northwards. On the south we could only concentrate north of the Rhine behind the front of the river extending from the Lake of Constance to Bâle. That would oblige us to invade Switzerland with a view to penetrating into France by the Jura. But without considering that the Swiss army on our left flank would be a serious danger, which we should only be able to neutralise by opposing it with a force so large that it would endanger our numerical superiority against France, it would involve us in difficult ground without railways adapted for our supplies and far from the heart of France. For similar reasons we have nothing to fear on that side from France.

'Hence, we are forced into the alternative of prolonging our line northwards, that is to say, between Trier and Aachen, along the frontiers of the two Luxemburgs. Such a concentration of our right necessarily implies ultimate violation of the neutrality of these two territories; but this consideration can no more stop us than it can our adversary. If victory is only obtainable at the cost of violating treaties, treaties will weigh but little in the balance and victory can restore them. Moreover, the Great Powers all being involved in the conflict, the violation of Belgian neutrality would only bring us into conflict with Belgium herself. The resistance of the Belgian forces on our right wing will not bear comparison with that which the Swiss could offer us on our left. Besides, Luxemburg provides us with a region well supplied with railways, some of which are already under the management of Germans on whom we can depend. From there our

right wing would abut on the French frontier at the point nearest Paris, i.e. the heart of France. . . .

‘It is no part of our plan to invade Belgium beyond the requirements of certainty that our right wing will extend beyond the French left. Occupation of the right bank of the Meuse, between Givet and Liège, would assure us of this.

‘It is possible that, without promising any accretion of territory on the conclusion of peace, reassuring promises to the Belgian Government given, say, the very day of entry on its territory would lead to concentration of the Belgian army at Antwerp, or even to its merely being kept on the left bank of the Meuse in a strictly defensive attitude. In this case we should not attack it and all would go well for us. Nevertheless, we must not count on such a fortunate circumstance, and as the Belgian army, with the garrisons at Liège, Namur, and Antwerp, seems capable of bringing something less than 100,000 into line, this is the force we must in prudence be prepared to meet. As we do not wish to detach from our main purpose any active unit (except in the case of an English landing in Belgium), we should have to devote five Reserve and two Landwehr divisions, viz. 112,000 men, to checking the Belgians in case of need during the crossing of the Belgian Luxemburg . . .’

The five Reserve and two Landwehr divisions are what are called in the document the ‘Army of Observation on the Belgian frontier.’ This army was to be and was concentrated at the entrenched camp of Elsenborn behind Malmedy, a camp created some years ago for no other apparent purpose than that which the above plan ascribes to it. The direction of this army at the time of occupying Belgian Luxemburg, it prescribes, would be Durbuy, with vanguards facing Liège, Huy, and Namur.

It proceeds :

‘The army of observation on the Belgian frontier can only play the part attributed to it provided it is concentrated before the beginning of the mobilisation. As soon as the political situation shows that an armed conflict is possible, the Reserve and Landwehr divisions will have to be summoned to Malmedy. The great periodical gatherings of Reserve elements which we have been practising for some time back are partly intended to furnish a satisfactory answer to interpretations given abroad to such gatherings in time of political tension. As the army of observation on the Belgian frontier will leave on the third day, the camp of Malmedy and environs will be free at that date for other Reserve troops, which can then advance in the direction of Stavelot, Rochefort, etc., and if we have possession of the railway and Stavelot, Durbuy, Marche, etc., the debarkment of the first

group of the Reserve divisions can progress at the same time as the elements forming the movement by road.'

This plan, as we know, was altered. The successful trials of the new siege gun were the probable reason for the change, the rapid silencing of the forts of Liège and Namur being counted upon to enable the German Staff to avoid the more difficult ground of the Ardennes, and to send their main forces along better roads by a shorter route towards the goal—i.e. Paris.

If the document I have quoted is authentic, as I believe it to be, the German military authorities had provided for the invasion of France through Belgium as an indefeasible part of the standing scheme of operations to be carried out as soon as any European war became a possibility. Against France and England they estimated that Germany would have a superiority of 400,000 men, and that, in the second week, before England had made up her mind or Russia had begun to move, the German forces would have attained such advantages over those of France as to have determined her ultimate fate. The German Staff miscalculated. The Belgians, instead of assuming a passive attitude, fought the German troops, England was in the breach before they had reached French territory, their superiority in numbers was wasted in carnage, and Russia got time to put her armies in the field before any serious advantage over the French forces could be achieved.

IV

The only honourable course for a State which wishes to be released from a treaty is to 'denounce' it—that is, to give notice to that effect. The tacit clause of *sic rebus non stantibus* only applies to treaties which have fallen into abeyance or become obsolete. Some German newspaper writers have tried to justify the German violation of Belgium's neutrality by affecting to regard the treaties guaranteeing it as obsolete, and they give as a ground that Belgium had a standing army and fortified places for possible defence. This, they argue, shows that she no longer relied on her neutralisation and the treaties guaranteeing it.

If she no longer relied on her neutralisation alone, it was not for Germany, who had planted a permanent camp within a few miles from her border, to accuse her of relinquishing her neutralised status!

Nor was England likely to agree to any such change.

In 1870 the British Government demanded and obtained from both belligerents an assurance that Belgium's neutrality would be respected. At the time of the Franco-German crisis of 1875,

however, Germany made considerable fuss about some incidents of minor importance and seemed to be picking a quarrel. The Belgians then, for the first time, openly began to doubt whether Belgian neutrality would be respected, and they revised their military arrangements with a view to self-defence on both the French and the German frontiers. It was not, however, till some ten years later, when the rumour reached Brussels that German engineers were making studies for the creation of a permanent camp behind Malmedy, that Belgian politicians began to wonder if neutrality did not imply some obligation to defend it in case of need.

In connexion with the Luxemburg Treaty of May 11, 1867, which forbade the erection of any defences on the territory of the Grand Duchy, the subscribing Powers tacked on a declaration that nothing in its terms forbade other neutral Powers from preserving and, if need be, improving their fortresses and other means of defence. There could therefore be no doubt as to Belgium's right to take such military measures and build such forts and fortifications as she deemed necessary to ensure her independence.

By 1893 the German camp was in full process of installation at Elsenborn, the plateau behind Malmedy, to which I have referred above.

A well-informed writer in the *Indépendance Belge*, who was described as specially qualified to criticise the military policy of Belgium's neighbours and its possible consequences, on the subject of the immense manœuvring camp which Germany was establishing on the Belgian frontier, pointed out in December 1893 the dangers which the establishment of this camp would involve for Belgian neutrality in the event of a Franco-German conflict, owing to the temptation for Germany to avail herself of the enormous advantages offered by the railways leading from Malmedy through Belgium for a descent on the Belgian frontier of France. In the remainder of his letter the writer dwelt especially on the probability of France replying to Germany by establishing a similar camp on her side of Belgium, the site for which would most probably be Givet, owing to the ease with which an advance could thence be made on Namur. It was urged that these considerations not only justified the increase of the Belgian army, but made it a matter of paramount importance.

It seemed obvious that the object of the camp at Elsenborn was to be at all times ready to dash across the Belgian frontier, seize Liège and Namur, the keys of Belgian defence, and secure the direct road for the invasion of France.

The German frontier camp now became the chief leverage for the improvement of Belgian defences, though the Belgian Govern-

ment required to be constantly egged on by the two champions of adequate measures, Senators Danrez and Sam Wiener.

At length came the crisis of 1911. At a debate on the adequacy of Belgian defences on the 25th of July, M. Wiener had vigorously criticised the unsatisfactory character of the military organisation. General Hellebaut, Minister for War, had replied in an optimistic vein that every element of defence was in perfect and complete order! M. Wiener told me that he now regarded it as certain that in case of war Germany would violate Belgian neutrality, and that England would regard such violation as a *casus belli*. England, however, expected the Belgian Government to put the defences in such order that English help would suffice. Thenceforward drastic measures were adopted to place the Belgian army on the footing of efficiency the danger just passed warranted.

It is seen that if Germany misled Europe, she did not conceal the preparations she was making to break her word. Even among those who ought to be *au courant* of the national obligations and the eventualities which might arise out of having to fulfil them, this question of the camp at Elsenborn, the prolongation of the railway from Malmédy to Stavelot, and other cognate matters were treated as negligible, if not altogether ignored. The only interest abroad in Belgian affairs of late years has been the private life of the late King and the Congo. Even among Belgian politicians themselves an obvious danger was treated with almost criminal indifference.

But leaving the door unlocked does not palliate the guilt of the burglar. The ease with which it is committed is no excuse for the crime. The invasion of Belgium can never be forgiven or forgotten. It seems destined to remain a black spot in history, which no apology or casuistry can efface. Seeds of retribution are sown by such crimes themselves. That retribution may come with its greatest force from the awakening conscience of a people which has not yet realised all that the loss of trust in Germany's word may mean for Germany's future.

THOMAS BARCLAY.

THE SOURCE OF GERMANY'S MIGHT

The papers ought to put things as they are—viz. that we are up against a brave, determined, and ferocious enemy, who use their brains and are without any very nice scruples; that it takes the French, Russians, and ourselves (I leave out Belgians, Serbians, and Montenegrins) all our time to match them, and that we want more men and highly trained men—especially highly trained men—and every ingenious device and method that can be suggested, to defeat them.—*Extract from a letter from a Field Officer, R.F.A., serving in France, dated late in December 1914.*

IF we are to be honest with ourselves, as the candid Pepys used to be when he wrote up his diary in the last days of each expiring year, we shall, on striking our balance for 1914, be forced to admit the truth of the remarks of the outspoken Gunner which are taken as the text of this article.

Whether we are thus honest or not, the historian of the future, if he writes with calm detachment and impartiality, will have to admit that the outstanding feature at the end of last year was the tremendous power exhibited by Germany in the Titanic struggle which convulsed Europe in the latter half of the year 1914. He will have to record the fact that, after five months of fighting, Germany, with very little help from Austria, was holding up the vast armies of Russia with one hand and those of France and Great Britain with the other; that the German eagle held the whole of Belgium in one cruel talon, while the other one was plunged deep in the heart of Russian Poland, and that the sacred soil of the Fatherland remained practically untouched.

The whole world knows that all the pleadings of Lord Roberts failed to induce this country to face the truth of Germany's preparations and the resolve of her leaders to force on a war at such time as would suit them best; but now that events have proved the truth of his warnings, let us 'put things as they are,' let us boldly face the facts of the situation and set resolutely to work to put things right.

After admitting the might of Germany—a might which, to use a favourite expression with Germans, may well be described as 'colossal'—the first thing we have to do is to probe the secret of that stupendous power which, in our view, is being so mis-

chievously applied. Mr. Asquith told us at the Guildhall Banquet that

We shall never sheathe the sword . . . until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed.

It will surely, then, repay us to study the source of that military power which is now holding three great empires at bay.

To conduct this study properly we must go back to the early years of the nineteenth century, and review the events which forced Prussia to adopt her present system of military service.

During the years 1804 and 1805 Napoleon had been making vast preparations for the invasion of England; 150,000 soldiers had been collected and carefully trained for this purpose, and elaborate plans made for combining the French and Spanish fleets, raising the blockade of the French ports, and conveying across the Channel the vast fleet of transports in which the great army of invasion was to be carried. When, in the autumn of 1805, these plans miscarried, Napoleon directed towards the Danube the whole of the carefully trained army which he had prepared for the invasion of England. The victories of Ulm and Austerlitz followed in quick succession, and in July 1806 Napoleon succeeded in forming the Confederation of the Rhine. By the Act of Confederation Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and other smaller German States were severed from the Germanic Empire and formed into a League under the protection of Napoleon. Hanover, which Napoleon had at first given to Prussia as the price of her subserviency, was offered to Great Britain. This indignity aroused bitter feelings in Berlin, and while public opinion was thus excited Palm, a bookseller of Nuremberg, was shot by order of a French court-martial on the charge of having published books hostile to the French. Prussia dashed headlong into war; the King took the field with all the troops he could collect, amounting to 120,000 men, and left Berlin amid shouts and songs of joy and anticipated triumph.

Their exultation was short-lived; the Duke of Brunswick, Commander-in-Chief of the Prussian forces, was an old man, and, though bold in conception of strategy, he failed in resolution of execution. He took the offensive, intending to march through Eisenach to the valley of the Maine, thus threatening the communications of Napoleon with France. But he had a bold and skilful antagonist; and no sooner did Napoleon penetrate his design than he resolved to retaliate. The French troops were at once set in motion from Bavaria towards Saxony, marching straight on the Prussian magazines. Thus outmanœuvred, the Duke of Brunswick countermanded his advance and moved towards Erfurt and Weimar. On the 14th of October 1806 Napoleon defeated the Prussians at the great battle of Jena

and pushed the pursuit to Weimar, a distance of eighteen miles. On the same day his Marshal, Davoût, overthrew another Prussian army under the King at Auerstadt.

After these disasters the whole of the Prussian army seems to have gone to pieces. The victorious French gave them no rest, and day after day fresh disasters overtook the unfortunate vanquished. Erfurt fell on the 16th of October; the general reserves of the Prussian army were overwhelmed at Halle on the 17th by Bernadotte; the great fortress of Magdeburg, distant one hundred miles from Jena, was abandoned by the retreating Prussians on the 23rd; on the 28th the remnants of their main army surrendered at Prenzlau, nearly two hundred miles from the fatal field of Jena. Meanwhile the fortresses of Spandau, near Berlin, and of Stettin and Custrin on the Oder were given up without any resistance, and so vigorous and determined was the French pursuit that by the 23rd of November the light troops of Davoût were at Posen, in Prussian Poland, having covered in twenty-one days a distance of two hundred and fifty miles, measured as the crow flies.

History can hardly reveal so complete a collapse, for it was estimated that the total strength of the Prussian army in the year 1806 was close upon 250,000 men; this was the army which Frederick the Great had led so often to victory, and the great leader had hardly been twenty years in his grave.

How are we to account for a *débâcle* so great and so unexpected? The causes require examination and explanation. Frederick the Great had found it necessary to keep up an army large in proportion to the population of his kingdom. Compulsion was applied, but it was not applied universally, for the King was anxious that trade and industry should be interfered with as little as possible, and the professional, urban and citizen classes were given wholesale exemption from military service. Thus the burden of service, so far as the ranks of the army were concerned, fell entirely upon the agricultural and rural population, who at that time were serfs, and thus possessed neither civil rights nor property to defend.

Again, as has been already said, the population of Prussia was small; it became necessary, therefore, to retain for long periods with the colours those who were impressed into the ranks; the period of service was indeed as long as twenty years.

The ranks of the Prussian army were thus filled with the poorest and the least intelligent of the Prussian people, and men who, seeing others excused, served unwillingly; desertions were frequent, and the King had to resort to all kinds of expedients for keeping up the number of soldiers required. Contracts were therefore made with the colonels for the recruiting

of whole regiments of foreigners, and these regiments were kept full by getting prisoners of war to enlist in the place of those who died or deserted. It is estimated that out of 160,000 men in his army, Frederick the Great had 90,000 foreigners and only 70,000 Prussians.

The soldiers of this army, composed, as we have seen, of discontented and oppressed Prussians, of renegades, desperate and broken foreigners, were kept under the command of officers who came entirely from the aristocratic classes, accustomed to rule with harshness over the serfs of the rural population. This natural and inherited harshness was no doubt accentuated by the desperate character of many of the men who served in this unfortunate army; we know, at any rate, that the most brutal and degrading punishments were inflicted constantly upon the Prussian soldiers at that time.

It must not, however, be assumed that harshness and brutality were the only characteristics of the men of high rank who were the officers of the old Prussian army. Harsh and brutal punishments were, indeed, far too prevalent in the British army both before and after the time with which we are dealing, and, like our own officers, those of the Prussian army were generally distinguished for loyalty, courage, and devotion. In the days of Frederick the Great, though the men were treated with severity, yet the officers had strict injunctions to see that the creature comforts of the soldiers were well looked after, and that they were not cheated of their small perquisites. The soldiers were consoled also by the pomp and glory of successful wars, and by the booty which often fell to their lot.

But these wars ceased almost entirely after 1763, and the Prussian army enjoyed a long interval of peace, during which the officers appear to have become rusty; attention was concentrated almost entirely on the barrack-square drill and the appearance and turn-out of the soldiers. Even before the battle of Jena the men deserted in large numbers, and when corps and battalions were once broken up in the retreat which followed the disasters of that fatal day they simply melted away.

What else could be expected from an army formed on such a system as has been described, a system, as Professor Seeley says, 'which rested on ignorance and terror'?

What could be worse tyranny [he asks] than to seize upon the peasant and subject him for twenty years to a brutal discipline and to the risks of war, in order that he might defend a country to which he owed scarcely anything, while those who owed comfort and happiness to the State were not called upon to risk anything for it?

This, then, was the army system which broke down so

completely on the day of trial, and enabled Napoleon to heap insult and oppression on the luckless Prussians.

For though Mr. Norman Angell has proved to his own satisfaction, and to that of many other worthy folk, that war brings little or no advantage to the conqueror, yet, in the years which followed Jena, the Prussians were to realise in full the bitter truth of the old cry '*Vae Victis!*'

Napoleon demanded of Prussia an indemnity of 40,000,000*l.*, and, knowing well that she could not pay this enormous fine, decreed that until it was discharged Prussia should maintain 40,000 French troops whom he quartered upon the unhappy country.

Foreign trade was rendered practically impossible, for Prussia was forbidden to trade with England, and England controlled all the seas and would allow no dealings with any other country.

The King of Prussia, whose army had numbered a quarter of a million, was forbidden to keep up more than 42,000 soldiers. The price of food was high, but as trade was nearly dead the wages of labour were very low, and so terrible was the poverty among the peasants that in 1808 the Prussian Government published a list of roots and herbs that would maintain life. Prussian territory was so reduced that the population fell from ten millions to five.

Such was the desperate condition of the country when the great reformers, Stein and Scharnhorst, set to work.

Stein abolished serfdom in Prussia. Up to his time the Prussian peasant was little more than a slave; he could not move freely from place to place or change his occupation; he belonged to the soil, and was forced to perform menial services for the lord of the manor. Stein not only set the peasants free, but he induced the King to sign measures which were the beginning of civil liberty in Germany, and he was preparing the way for a national constitution in Prussia when he was dismissed under orders issued by Napoleon.

But it was Scharnhorst who, aided by men like Blücher and Gneisenau, introduced the army reforms with which we are most concerned in this article.

Napoleon, as we have seen, limited the numbers of the Prussian army to 42,000 men, but Scharnhorst got round this difficulty by discharging a few men from each company as soon as they were trained, and filling their places with others. The men who were discharged were not lost sight of; they were looked after in their homes by officers who were nominally retired, but who really received small salaries on the understanding that they should drill these reserve soldiers from time to time. But the greatest change of all was that the former

exemptions were abolished and the principle was established that everyone who was not serving the State in any other capacity was bound to render effective military service. In conjunction with this great reform, two very important changes were introduced : first, the abolition of the privileges under which the nobles alone could hold commissions as officers ; secondly, the abolition of flogging. As regards the first, it was pointed out by Scharnhorst and his supporters that the richer and more cultivated classes could hardly be expected to submit to compulsory service unless they had the hope of rising to the higher positions in the army, and that the competition thus set up between the noble and the citizen class would give rise to wholesome emulation. As for the second, Scharnhorst reasoned in the following forcible terms :

If the nation is to regard itself as the defender of the country, it must not in this new quality be threatened with the most degrading punishments. But if we want to have back the foreigners, the vagabonds, sots, thieves, rogues, and other criminals out of all Germany, who ruin the nation and make the Army hateful to the citizen, and then desert as soon as the march begins, then, no doubt, we shall not be able to do without the old punishments. For infamous fellows we shall want infamous punishments.

Finally, as men were now to be had in sufficient numbers, owing to the abolition of exemptions, it was decreed that service with the colours should be limited to six years.

Let us recapitulate the reforms which differentiated the army of Prussia which went to pieces in the campaign of 1806 from the armies which marched to Paris in 1814 and 1815, and again in 1870.

Liability to service was made universal instead of partial, and exemptions were abolished.

Short service was introduced.

Promotion was thrown open to all who could establish a claim for it.

Degrading punishments were abolished.

Briefly stated thus, how simple do these measures sound, but they were founded on great moral principles, and proved to be the basis of all the army reforms which enabled Germany to throw off the French yoke in 1813, and to maintain herself for a hundred years as the leading military nation of the world.

Simultaneously with these reforms, which granted freedom to the people and introduced just and liberal principles to the army, there came a great uplifting of the spirit of the Prussian people. Jahn, the 'father' of German gymnastics, combined training in love of country with his lessons in physical culture ; Fichte and other professors wrote and lectured on patriotism ; Arndt and

Körner wrote and sang the songs of German liberty and freedom, and when the call to arms came in 1813 it found the Prussian people not only trained to arms but braced in spirit and in body for the great struggle.

The call to arms which was made by the King of Prussia in February 1813 was addressed not to his army but to his people—'An mein Volk'—and nobly did the people respond.

The Prussian army furnished a contingent of some 100,000 men, but the Landwehr or national militia supplied 135,000 infantry and over 13,500 cavalry; there were also a few volunteer corps in addition.

Behind the Landwehr came the Landsturm, or 'Levée en Masse' of the people. Every citizen who was not already enrolled in the army or the militia was to join the Landsturm when ordered. In each district landowners were to select a local defence committee, which was to decide on the measures by which the district could be most effectively defended, but the great duty of this levy of the people was to harass the enemy, if the country was invaded, to drive away cattle, remove food, lay waste the country, capture the enemy's hospitals, carry out night surprises—in short, to worry the enemy, rob him of his sleep, destroy him piecemeal, wherever a chance offered.

Peasants who had burned down their houses or their mills were to have their losses made good to them, but no one was to be indemnified for cattle seized by the enemy.

Such was the spirit and determination of the Prussian people in 1813, and what a contrast does it offer to the abject terror displayed by the Prussian army and the people in 1806, when large garrisons, full of soldiers and well supplied with provisions and ammunition, were surrendered one after the other to the French, and the conquerors were welcomed with effusion by the people in many of the towns.

Ill-clad and ill-supplied as they were, the men of the Prussian Landwehr, dressed, many of them, in uniforms sent hurriedly over from England, marched through wet and cold to the outskirts of Paris; and the gallantry and devotion of these militia volunteers in this campaign is a striking instance of the spirit which can be aroused in a people which has been taught, by the rendering of universal military service, that the first duty of a citizen is to be trained for the service of his country in the hour of danger.

If only Englishmen would study the grand struggle for liberty which Prussia made just a hundred years ago and compare her position after Jena with that which she held when the present War broke out!

In 1807, says Alison, the Prussian nobles were straitened in

their fortunes by French requisitions and exposed to insults from French officers; the merchants reduced to despair by the entire stoppage of foreign commerce; the peasants ground to the dust by merciless exactions, supported by military force. The population had shrunk till it numbered barely five million people.

In 1914 Prussia stood at the head of the great German Empire, which has a population of sixty-five millions, and could call, in the last resort, five million trained soldiers to her colours. Her export trade was the second greatest in the whole world, and her voice second to none in the councils of the nations. She had within the passing of a few years launched upon the waters of the North Sea a fleet so large that Britain, once proud mistress in every sea, had had to call in her ships from distant stations, as Rome of old called in her legions. And all the strength of Prussia rests upon this: that after the great War of Liberation was ended her rulers had the wisdom to retain the strong, sane, and simple system of universal military service which had come into being under the pressure of Napoleon's grinding tyranny.

As was said early in this article, the people of Great Britain believe that Germany is making but an evil use of the great weapon which, under the leadership of Prussia, she has forged. But we must in honesty admit that the weapon is a fine one, and that it was forged originally for a noble purpose. And it is useless for us to squeal against the use to which German power is being put; the only protest that will be of any avail will be the victory that we must gain by force of arms.

The task before us was described in glowing words by Mr. Asquith in the speech to which we have already referred:

We shall never sheathe the sword [said the Prime Minister] until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed; until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression; until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation; until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed.

Proud as we are of the skill, devotion, and courage of French's 'contemptible little army,' we cannot fail to see that the task sketched out for us by Mr. Asquith has not even begun yet. Belgium is absolutely at the mercy of her conquerors, who are now demanding from her a heavy indemnity; a large portion of France is held by German forces; Serbia has, indeed, by strenuous fighting, freed her soil from the invader, but the rights of Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg rest upon a very insecure foundation, and the military power of Prussia shows but little sign of being crushed.

On the contrary, from figures carefully compiled by the

Military Correspondent of *The Times*, there is reason to believe that Germany has still at her disposal some four million men who were untrained at the beginning of the War, but who may be expected to be ready for the field in the spring of the present year.

It is true, as the same authority tells us, that we need not fear a war of masses, 'because the population of the Allies is double that of the enemy, their resources much greater, and their spirit at least equal.' But, as he also says, 'Victory in the field does not necessarily arise on account of the possession of masses of men or money,' but depends, among other things, 'upon the timely arrangement of appropriate military measures.'

Let us then examine such of the military measures as the military authorities have found it practicable to reveal to us.

We started the War with a Regular establishment, exclusive of the British troops in India and of the Army Reserve, of 186,000 men. On the 6th of August Mr. Asquith asked Parliament for half a million more men; on the 9th of September he asked for a second half million, and on the 16th of November Parliament voted an additional million, bringing the total number voted for the Regular Army up to 2,186,000 men. This was exclusive of the Territorial Force, which, with its Reserve units, absorbs over 600,000 men. If we add the numbers required for the Navy, the total numbers needed for the fighting forces are seen to be approximately three million men. Another quarter of a million men are needed for the Mercantile Marine, the ships of which bring us the food for our people and the raw material for our industries. We need, then, well over three million men, of a high standard of physical efficiency, for absolutely indispensable work, and most of these must be between the ages of nineteen and thirty-five. What are our resources in men of these ages? The census of 1911 shows that there are in the British Isles over six million men between those ages, but as many of these are not up to the high physical standard required, it may be safely said that, according to the Estimate passed by the House of Commons on the 16th of November last, the services of every able-bodied man of suitable age will be required before the War is over.

But, it may be asked, is it really necessary for Great Britain to place so many soldiers in the field? The reply to this question is to be found in the despatch of the Eye-Witness with Sir John French's Headquarters, published in the morning papers of the 4th of December:

It is well [he says] that the services of those who died on the slopes and in the woods along the Franco-Belgian frontier should be realised. . . . Theirs it has been to defend against tremendous odds a line that could only be maintained if they were prepared to undergo great sacrifices.

And this they have done. But . . . the same task lies before the British Army—of maintaining its share in the struggle until the nation in arms shall come to our support.

And the same despatch ends with the words :

This war is going to be one of exhaustion ; and after the regular armies of the belligerents have done their work it will be upon the measures taken to prepare and utilise the raw material of the manhood of the countries concerned that final success will depend. This implies trained men—hundreds of thousands of trained and disciplined men.

An Army Order issued on New Year's Day tells us that such of the trained and disciplined men as are ready are to be distributed in six Armies, commanded by Sir Douglas Haig, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, Sir Archibald Hunter, Sir Ian Hamilton, Sir Leslie Rundle, and Sir Bruce Hamilton respectively. All these are soldiers of tried experience in the field, and we may be sure that the troops they lead will be well handled. But it seems also certain that if these six Armies, composed, as the Army Order says they will be, of three Army Corps each, are to be maintained in the field, then the whole of the two million men voted by Parliament will be needed—and needed soon.

'Eye-Witness,' writing on the last day of the Old Year, warns us that the Germans believe that Russia has been beaten ; that France is exhausted and ready to ask for peace, and finally,

that England is decadent, and that her people are engrossed in football matches. This idea [he adds] is due, apparently, to the fact that we are still relying on what appears to them a half-measure, such as voluntary service, and are not, like other nations, enrolling the whole of our manhood for the prosecution of the war.

To sum up : four of the five great nations now engaged in this tremendous struggle are relying on universal service, while England continues to rely on voluntary enrolment. Never have the people of the British Isles had a finer chance of proving the superiority of the voluntary system. Will they avail themselves of it?

A. KEENE.

NATIONAL OR VOLUNTARY SERVICE?

(I)

'THE MIDDLE WAY': A REPLY TO COLONEL MAUDE
AND A PROPOSAL

WHATEVER Colonel Maude writes on military subjects is entitled to respect. But I feel, nevertheless, compelled to differ from his conclusions with regard to the respective merits of Compulsory and Voluntary service. His article in the January *Nineteenth Century* is an extremely interesting one; but it fails—as was inevitable from the intrinsic merits of the case—to convince us that the present Voluntary system is capable of meeting the great needs of this War. He makes, to begin with, some statements which are, I think, open to doubt, and in one important particular he has fallen into a grave and unaccountable error. He states that the 'total male population' of this country 'between the ages of 19 and 35 (according to the Census), in round figures,' is '4,600,000 only!' and that the total between the ages of 19 and 40 is only 5,800,000.

The true figure in the latter case, as I shall show later, is, approximately, $7\frac{1}{4}$ millions, so that, even if we accept all his figures for deductions, Colonel Maude has under-estimated the total available fighting strength of this country by nearly $1\frac{1}{2}$ millions, a fact which, of course, vitiates the whole of his conclusions.

But, before we go into figures and join issue on the main question, I would like to refer to some of the subsidiary points raised by Colonel Maude. He begins with the assumption that 'the question of Voluntary *versus* Compulsory service has divided the country on party lines.' I sincerely hope that Colonel Maude is mistaken. Men's convictions on a great question like this cannot follow the lines of party. It would be a libel on the nation to contend otherwise. It is true that, in the past, some sections of the Press have appeared to treat the question as a party one; but, since the beginning of the War, their attitude has completely altered, and the whole Press has patriotically recognised that this question must be decided on its merits alone, solely in the interests of the country. It may

be said, indeed, that there has been on this and kindred questions, since the War began, a new birth of the Press: 'Then none was for a Party; then all were for the State.'

Colonel Maude also refers in his opening sentences to 'the distortion of facts by which some advocates of compulsion are seeking to bolster up their case.' But he does not say what these distorted facts are. On the other hand I have followed, with some care, all references in the public Press to this question, and although I do not agree with the opinions of some of the advocates of compulsion, I have never noticed any 'distortion of facts' on their part; and certainly, since the War began, advocates of all forms of compulsion appear to have taken particular care to be scrupulously accurate.

There is much, of course, in what Colonel Maude has written with which every student of military problems must agree. But he seems at times to jump to somewhat arbitrary conclusions. Thus he says that he watched in Germany in the early 'nineties the disappearance of the spirit which had animated the troops after 1870, and the triumph of 'the letter of forms and exact prescription.' 'You can lead conscripts forward almost up to the muzzles of an enemy's rifles, but they will not fight like the men who war of their own free will.' From all one can gather the German conscripts—if conscripts they can be called—fight in this War as well as Germans have ever fought, and that is well enough. There is nothing to show that they would, or could, have fought better, had they warred 'of their own free will.' But this is by the way, and I will return to this point later.

Colonel Maude goes on to say: 'When I returned to England,' after his experience of the deterioration of German military spirit, 'I had lost all confidence both in the economic and military value of the universal service about which I had previously written so much.' But this, as an argument against obligatory National Service, is no more convincing than if Colonel Maude, after an experience, in Belgium, of the deterioration of the German spirit of civilisation, were to return to England and say he had 'lost all confidence in the value of civilisation'! It does not follow, because the men who ruled Germany failed to perceive the influence on the German spirit of harsh and mistaken military methods, that the men who rule England would fall into a similar error. In fact, German methods are so alien to the spirit of our own people that no rulers, however misguided, would be ever likely to attempt to imitate them here.

There is only one other point to which I need now refer, and that is the claim made by Colonel Maude for confidence

in the Voluntary system on account of 'the great superiority in composition that we could give to our battalions, owing to our being able to combine men of different ages in just the right proportions.' That is, undoubtedly, a difficulty in Continental Compulsory systems, but it is less so in the case of any Compulsory system I have seen advocated for us; and in the case of the scheme for obligatory National Training, combined with Voluntary enlistment for service abroad, which I shall presently submit for consideration, it is absent altogether.

So far it will be seen that Colonel Maude's defence of the present Voluntary system is based on general principles, and does not touch the vital question—our present need of men. From this point of view he rests his case on two main contentions:

(a) That the volunteer fights better than the 'conscript.'

(b) That we are getting by the present Voluntary system all the men we could get by any form of Compulsory service.

With regard to (a) Colonel Maude naturally does not press this point anything like as far as men with less military knowledge have pressed it: men, for instance, like Sir John Simon, who never tired of declaring, at the beginning of the War, that 'one volunteer was worth three pressed men.' Still, Colonel Maude does make a point of it; and it is, to a limited extent, undoubtedly true *under conditions*. But these conditions would be absent in any form of Compulsory service introduced in this country. No one that I know of has ever proposed any system of conscription for us. In fact the term 'conscription' can no longer be properly applied even to the forms of national obligatory service, without substitutes, in force to-day on the Continent; and any form hitherto advocated for this country is far less drastic than these. The term 'conscript' is obsolete; but we need not quarrel about words. What Colonel Maude means is plain enough, that the man who wars 'of his own free will' fights better than the man who is compelled to serve.

Now there are for us, broadly speaking, two kinds of wars in which we might be engaged:

(1) Minor Wars, and

(2) National Wars in which our existence is involved.

As regards (1), no system of compulsion that I have ever seen advocated contemplates our using any but voluntarily enlisted men for Minor Wars. When we come to (2), National Wars, it seems to me to matter little what system British soldiers are serving under provided that system will produce, in the requisite time, the number of trained men required; and in one case—viz. defence against invasion—there can be no pretence what-

ever that men would fight better or worse according to the system of enlistment. There remains, therefore, only one kind of war—i.e. a great National War, such as the present War on the Continent—in which the respective merits of volunteers and obligatorily enlisted men can possibly be in dispute.

History is full of instances where, in such a war, 'conscripts' have fought like paladins. Still there would always be a *primâ facie* presumption that the volunteer recognises the justice of his cause and the great issues at stake, while the man obliged to serve may not; and that, therefore, on the principle that 'thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just,' the former would fight better than the latter. But can anyone who seriously considers the question unreservedly admit this? The 'compelled' man may after all believe as strongly in the justice of his cause as the volunteer, and be really a volunteer at heart, while the volunteer may have possibly enlisted for quite other reasons than the justice of his cause or the issues at stake, and be really a 'compelled' man. Apart from this we all know, who have ever served, that once a man joins a regiment and enters a camp or a barrack-room he becomes one of a band of brothers. The soldier accepts his fate. Whatever were the terms of enlistment, they are and would be forgotten; and the British soldier fights, and would always fight, well and gallantly, not only for his cause and country, but for the honour of his regiment and the approbation of his comrades. I will not press this point further, but I need hardly remind Colonel Maude that every soldier who is fighting to-day, with us or against us, is a 'conscript,' and that these 'conscripts' have fought stubbornly and splendidly—even as men 'who war of their own free will.'

With regard to (b), 'That we are getting by the Voluntary system all the men we could get by any form of Compulsory service'—this is really the crux of the whole burning question. If it be true there is no more to be said. But it is not true. This is the rock on which Colonel Maude's whole case is wrecked. He quotes figures to prove his contention. But his conclusions cannot be accepted because his figures are inaccurate. He bases his calculations, as I have said, on the statement that the 'total male population between the ages of 19 and 35 (according to the Census)' is, 'in round figures, 4,600,000 only!' But according to the Census of 1911 the total between these ages, both inclusive, is, for England and Wales alone, 4,923,676! Colonel Maude may have intended to exclude the particular ages 19 and 35—although there is no reason why he should—and only to include the ages 20 to 34 between them. Even then the figure reaches 4,334,307; and allowing for the annual increase of population since 1911, at the approximate

rate of 1 per cent. per annum, it would now be, in round numbers, for England and Wales, 4,500,000.

Again, he says that raising the age limit to 40—i.e. a clear additional five years, from 35 to 39, both years inclusive, 'gives us only an additional 1,200,000 men.' But the figure for England and Wales alone for these five years is, according to the 1911 Census, 1,261,432 and would now be about 1,300,000. The total male population, therefore, between the ages of 19 and 40, both ages exclusive, is, for England and Wales alone, 5,800,000, the exact figure Colonel Maude gives for the whole of the United Kingdom. Can it be that his calculations were erroneously based on the Census for England and Wales only? The true figure, including Scotland and Ireland, is approximately $7\frac{1}{4}$ millions. Allowing all his other figures—although I think he has over-estimated some of them, especially that of the total men enrolled to date, which he gives as $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions¹—the total number of men available and unenrolled to-day stands, not at 2,300,000, but at 3,750,000. A striking commentary, after five months' trial, on the efficacy of Voluntary enlistment!

All the eloquence, energy, and persuasive powers, of patriotic men and women, in high places and in lowly, have been expended since last August in a mighty effort to stimulate recruiting, and the result at present is a 'steady flow' of 30,000 recruits a week! That is to say, that the extra million still needed may be produced in seven or eight months, if the 'steady flow' continues; and that, allowing for six months' training, we may expect this much needed million—much needed *now*—to be ready by the end of the year! by which time we all hope the War may be over. If the War be prolonged it will still be only for want of men, because they will not voluntarily enlist *now* in sufficient numbers. It may be true that we have so far got all the men we need, because we are unable to arm or equip more; because, as a nation, we were unable to foresee the pass to which deficiency in reserves of arms, clothing and equipment, might bring us, and so neglected to provide any organised means for expansion, on a great scale, in time of war. All this may be true, but the manufacturing resources of this country are being vigorously utilised to the fullest extent, and must very quickly now overtake the needs of the present supply of recruits. Where shall we be then? Shall we be able to produce men, and still more men, as fast as they can be armed and clothed and trained, until

¹ The recruiting figures up to November 4 quoted by Lord Midleton in the House of Lords (January 8) seem to show that, even with a 'steady flow' since that date of 30,000 a week, the first million of the New Armies has only now been reached.

our steadfast purpose—the complete restoration of Belgium, the security of France against aggression, and the final annihilation of Prussian militarism—is accomplished? Who can answer definitely in the affirmative? And who can deny that any delay in the supply of men as they are needed, and can be dealt with, may critically affect the success of the Allied arms?²

It is the bounden duty of every Allied Power to act now as if the speedy success of the Allied cause depended entirely on its own individual effort. To end the War quickly, as well as victoriously, should be, for our own sakes, as well as for the sake of the Allies we were pledged to defend or support, the sole aim of our Government to-day. A prolonged war will mean suffering, and bloodshed, and economic exhaustion in an ever-increasing ratio. A war of eighteen months will work not three times but ten times the evil of a war of six. Are, then, the Government content that they are doing, or are prepared to do, all that can possibly be done? If there is a single man short when Lord Kitchener is ready for him, the answer must be in the negative.

Colonel Maude reminds us that he was once himself an admirer of universal service, but only as 'made in Germany' and not for use in this country. It is not easy to follow his reasons for discrimination, except as they seem to be summed up in the word 'environment.' I have never been a believer in Universal service, on the German model, even for Germany. It may have become for her, after many years, an evil necessity, owing chiefly to the vicious circle in which German activities have been moving. But for Germany it was always evil, in spite of apparent economic progress. Universal service should always remain, as in France during the last forty years, a purely defensive measure. The moment aggression rears its head, as it was bound to do in the case of a proud, strong, arrogant people like the Germans, with vast ambitions unfulfilled, the whole military system becomes a curse to the country itself and a menace to the peace of the world. Signs were never wanting that this was so, and the Morocco crises pointed the moral.

I remember many years ago, about the time Colonel Maude was being disillusioned with regard to German Universal Service, meeting in Switzerland a young German who opened my eyes on this aspect of the question. He knew little of England, but more of his own country and her aims than I had ever

² Lord Lucas is reported to have said in the House of Lords (January 8), 'The War Office is perfectly prepared to receive all the recruits it can get. . . . We hope recruiting will be able to follow the rate at which equipment is being provided.' This reads as if things were even worse than they appeared, and as if the supply of war material had already outstripped recruiting!

dreamed of in my philosophy. His ideas of Germany's importance and of her mission and power to put right all that was wrong with this imperfect world gave my insular prejudices a shock. It seemed to me, I suppose, that all that sort of thing was the time-honoured prerogative of the free-born Briton!

That in the captain's but a choleric word
Which in the soldier is flat blasphemy.

However, we are all wiser now, and we shall be wiser still after this War. We have, as a nation, misjudged not only Germany's power and Germany's intentions but our own condition of preparedness to meet our honourable obligations. We are no doubt doing now all that—and more than—we could ever have been expected by our Allies to do. They took us for better or worse *as we stood*, and there was no room for doubt as to our standing. If they do not yet fully appreciate the great silent work of our Navy—the wonderful and world-wide manifestation of British sea supremacy—we need have no fear that justice will not be done to us, on this score, in the end. With regard also to the assistance we have rendered on land, France knows well, and appreciates, what that has been, and in her wildest dreams could never have expected more. Belgium alone may have been at first dissatisfied. But that is not probable. Belgium knew well what we could do, and knows that we did it. She knows, too, now that, without our help, she might have been to-day, and have for ever remained, a German province, and that our help was given as quickly, freely and fully as it was humanly possible to give it.

But are we satisfied ourselves? Do we not feel that, with a fuller grasp, ten years ago, of the real need of such a war as this, the portents of which were then evident to many civilians and to nearly all soldiers and sailors, we could, with a very small annual expenditure, have placed this country in a magnificent position on the outbreak of war? We might not have averted war altogether. War, I think, was bound to come. But we could have shortened it and limited its scope, its waste, and its horrors. Can anyone believe that if Lord Roberts had, ten years ago, been given a free hand, the condition of things in the Western theatre of war would now be what it is? The chances are that, even if we could not have saved Belgium from the first ravages of the German Huns, we might, at least, have saved Antwerp, and driven the Germans back, by now, to the Ourthe and the Moselle; with the hope of presently driving the remnants of their Western armies over the Rhine.

I have been much surprised that Colonel Maude, as a soldier, should seem so satisfied with the present Voluntary system as

applied to this War; and that he has no word of regret for the state of unreadiness to meet our obligations in which we were found on the outbreak of hostilities. It may be true that we were better prepared than we have ever been before. But that was not enough to meet what all men knew must prove a crisis in our fate. Referring to the strain imposed upon our troops in France and Belgium by the fewness of their numbers, Colonel Maude wrote in the January number of this Review :

We know that our men—the immortal 7th Division, for instance—have often been exposed to extreme risks, which they have most gloriously sustained and surmounted, but we know nothing of the causes that compelled their leaders to make this supreme demand on them.

But what of the men of the immortal 2nd Army Corps who saved our own Army and the French left from annihilation by their heroic exertions on that glorious but terrible day the 26th of August, between Cambrai and Le Cateau? Do we really know nothing of the causes which compelled Sir John French 'to make this supreme demand on them'? Can anyone read of their desperate plight that day, 'the most critical day of all,' when, as Sir John French wrote in his despatch, 'it was impossible for me to send him [Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien] any support,' without wondering what we had left undone that that support was not forthcoming? Does Lord Haldane believe that the country is really to be congratulated on the completeness of our preparations for war? Does he not rather feel that if we had shown greater foresight, if we had only listened to that wise counsellor, Lord Roberts, who warned us, we might have been able, on the outbreak of war, to place six full divisions in the field, and so have, at least, eased the strain of that fateful 26th of August when we were saved from catastrophe only by the skill, coolness and resolution of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and the valour and tenacity of his men? 'Humanum est errare.' But at least the error should be acknowledged. For much of what Lord Haldane did do, which was mostly what his predecessors had left undone, he undoubtedly deserves the thanks of the nation. But no one can doubt that, if a great soldier and statesman like Lord Roberts, or Lord Kitchener, had been Minister for War during the last ten years, we should have entered on the present struggle better prepared to meet it. I wish to do Lord Haldane no injustice. He was a good, indeed a great, War Minister, as civilian War Ministers go. He created the Territorial Force and so instilled new life and vigour into the old Volunteers. He gave us the Special Reserve—a valuable asset. But he failed to grasp the true nature, and the vast needs, of the situation with which this country would be faced on the outbreak of a great National

War such as this. He did not realise, as the South African Government have done, that invasion may be prevented 'by dealing with the enemy beyond the borders.' He is, on the subject of our preparedness to meet this War, not always fortunate in his apologists. The competency to discuss military matters of the writer of the articles 'Lord Haldane and the Army' in the *Daily Chronicle* (January 5 and 6) is not, I hope, to be judged from his statement that the Expeditionary Force of six divisions amounted to 170,000 men, and, further, that this same Force (of 170,000 men) 'was sent out of the country thoroughly well equipped and with great celerity' on the outbreak of war. There is no doubt about the celerity, or about the equipment of the Force that was sent. But 170,000! Would that it had been true! There would have been a different tale to tell between Cambrai and Le Cateau on the 26th of August.

Lord Haldane might well say 'Save me from my friends!' But whatever case may be made for the reduction of the Regular Army, which enabled him to find the money—was there no other way?—required to consolidate and render more efficient what was left, no one is, I think, more likely, now, than he to realise the character of that fatal mistake—his uncompromising opposition to Lord Roberts' scheme of National Service for Home Defence.

Colonel Maude submits that 'we, the public, have absolutely no facts before us to justify the conclusion that mere numbers could have helped us' in this War. But I think most soldiers would agree with Lord Curzon (January 6) that 'this War is tending to be largely a question of men . . . it is the numerical factor that will decide.' Colonel Maude may refer to the past; but then no one ever contended that mere numbers, without training, would have helped us at any time.

On the other hand, let Colonel Maude consider for a moment what the course of events might have been if the outbreak of war had found this country with a system of National Service fully established. We should have had at least the same Fleet—we are all agreed as to that—and, at least, the same Regular Army with its Expeditionary Force—they might possibly both have been stronger; while we should have had a Territorial Force of double the strength and treble the training, with abundance of well-trained officers and non-commissioned officers; and behind that Force immense reserves, over 2,000,000 trained men of military age; trained for Home Defence only, it is true, and not yet fit to meet first-line Continental soldiers, but available as a magnificent recruiting field when the great need came. The moral effect alone would have been incalculable. War might have been avoided altogether. Britain, powerful but

unaggressive, with interests that cry aloud only for peace, would then have been in a position to hold the balance of power in Europe and, in effect, to preserve the peace of the world. And all this could have been effected for a very few millions per annum; fewer millions, probably, than we are now spending per week in this monstrous War.

But if, as I believe, war with Germany was bound to come, then National Service would have materially shortened it, and so saved us thousands of precious lives and hundreds of millions of money, while sparing our Allies, France and Belgium, untold misery and suffering. It would, moreover, in conjunction with our supremacy at sea, have placed England, when peace came, in a predominating position to secure the liberties of nations and to see that the scales of justice were evenly held.

It may be [as I have already written in the *Saturday Review* (October 3)] that, thanks to Lord Kitchener, we may yet attain, before peace is signed, that much-to-be-desired commanding military position. I hope so, and I believe so. But I am now only concerned to show what we have lost by our own most grievous fault in not having adopted some scheme of National Service. The country is responding nobly to Lord Kitchener's call; but every gallant fellow who now joins the King's New Armies must long in his heart for those precious months of training which National Service would have given him, and which he has been denied.

It is too soon, perhaps, to talk of the lessons of this War, or of what drastic changes must be made in our state of military preparedness. But one lesson will surely have been learnt—the folly of leaving, until the outbreak of war, not only the war training, but the very raising and creation of armies. The genius of one man, Lord Kitchener, may now save us from some of the consequences of our folly. The genius of another man, Lord Roberts, would have averted those consequences altogether had the Government and the country listened years ago to his wise words of warning.

Meanwhile, the War is upon us, a greater burden than we have ever been called upon to bear, and we are now solely concerned with measures to meet it. We must have men, and still more men, another million at least. Where are they to come from? It is not the spirit of our people which is at fault but the system. The response to Lord Kitchener's call for recruits has been more generous than we could have ever dreamed: more generous than any such response in history; and we were told on the 7th of January that, in addition, the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee had registered the names of over 218,000 men willing to serve. But that is not a million, and we may need more. We may want, before this War is over, to put every man fit to serve into the field, to create a veritable 'nation in arms,' and you cannot do that by voluntary enlistment. No country has ever even attempted it until America did so, and failed, fifty years ago. There are always categories of

men in every country who will not or cannot respond to a voluntary call. I need not enumerate them all. Here are a few :

(1) Men who are pulled two ways—by duty and inclination. They cannot make up their minds, but would be glad to have their minds made up for them.

(2) Men who have got a good job they do not like to leave. Perhaps they see other men who have not volunteered ready to step into their shoes.

(3) Men who are subjected to private pressure of some kind—honourable enough in itself—but of which they would be glad to be relieved.

(4) Men who lack imagination or who are what is called 'non-receptive.' These prefer to 'wait and see.' They are unable to appreciate the urgent need of the country, and believe that, if they are really wanted, the powers that be will 'come and fetch them.'

(5) Men who hang back through diffidence or through distrust of their own qualities and powers. They fear they could not stand the test. But the 'liberal education' of regimental life would soon work wonders. It would make men of them in one month, and soldiers in six.

(6) Men who, like the Dutch-speaking burghers in South Africa, object to 'volunteering' on principle, and consider that, in a time of national emergency, they should be 'commandeered.'

All these classes would gladly welcome some form of compulsion. But what is that form of compulsion to be? Mr. George A. B. Dewar proposes—in the January *Nineteenth Century*—a short Act to compel men to serve in the New Armies ; but though I entirely agree with his able and searching diagnosis of our recruiting difficulties, I think his remedy too drastic. He claims that 'no invidious and hostile distinctions, under such an Act, will arise as between those who go to the War and those who stay at home.' But, surely, in avoiding Scylla we may fall into Charybdis. Any Compulsory Act of this kind, passed now, would produce similar unfortunate distinctions. There would be a great gulf fixed for ever between those who had joined voluntarily and those who were compelled to serve. If a Compulsory Act were to have been passed at all, it should have been passed at the beginning of the War.

This Compulsory Act will not do—not yet at any rate ; and Voluntary enlistment will not do. What, then, is the remedy? The middle way. *In medio tutissimus ibis*. My proposal is, practically, to graft Voluntary enlistment for service abroad upon obligatory National Service for defence at home. It may be outlined shortly as follows :

(1) Bring in forthwith a scheme of National Service for Home Defence on the lines laid down by Lord Roberts, but with special provision for the needs of this gigantic War.

(2) Let the volunteers for the New Armies be then recruited from the men under training.

The first result of such a scheme would be that all recruiting difficulties would vanish. There would be an end of all unseemly bargaining for enlistment and appealing for recruits. All

recruiting would take place, quietly and unostentatiously, among men under training in Territorial centres. There need be no hurry, for no time would have been lost. Training and recruiting would go hand in hand. The vital need—training—would no longer be delayed; and no one can doubt that willing recruits for the New Armies would be forthcoming as required. Every soldier will appreciate the difference of the conditions under which recruiting would take place. There would be no ill-feeling engendered as in the case of a Compulsory Act, and no 'invidious or hostile distinctions' of any kind. Every man who fought in France or Flanders would be a volunteer.

It has been said, even by advocates of the principle of National Service, that no scheme of the kind can be introduced 'in the midst of a war.' But there would, I think, be no practical difficulty whatever. The procedure might be roughly as follows:

(1) It would be enacted that on and after a fixed date, say the 15th of February 1915, Universal National Training for Home Defence would be obligatory throughout the British Isles.

(2) The details of the scheme for times of peace would not be worked out now, but would remain in abeyance until the end of the War, when we should be able to profit by our experience.

(3) For the present all men between certain prescribed ages, say between 19 and 40, would be rendered liable for Training, although they would not necessarily be all called up.

(4) The War Office would form an estimate, which need not be divulged, and would be subject to revision, of the numbers of fresh men still required to finish the War. Let this estimate be, for example, 1,000,000.

(5) Then, after exemptions have been made, by ballot, out of the, say, 3,000,000 unenlisted able-bodied men of military age—a fair estimate¹—every third man—i.e. one-third of the men available—would be taken for National Training, leaving 2,000,000 able-bodied men, apart from those specially exempted, to carry on the ordinary business of the country. There would be no need to shut down any of the factories supplying war *matériel* either to ourselves or to our Allies. Preferential treatment might be given to certain categories of married men.

(6) Each man called up could, if he so desired, enlist straightway into the New Armies. Otherwise—and this might be the better course—he would, in the ordinary way, be passed for training into one of the Territorial Reserve Battalions, from which the New Armies would recruit by Voluntary enlistment.

There can be no doubt, as I have already said, that 'willing

¹ Colonel Maude's estimate of unenrolled men is 3,300,000; and I have shown that this figure should be 4,750,000. So that I have allowed 1,750,000 for exemptions, including all the categories of railwaymen, merchant seamen, police, and skilled workers connected with the supply of war *matériel*, which Colonel Maude estimates at 1,000,000. This leaves 750,000 for further exemptions, including 'doctors, Civil Servants, clergy, and the sick, crippled, and blind.'

recruits would be forthcoming as required'—i.e. as fast as the War Office could deal with them.

By this scheme :

(a) The principle of Obligatory National Training to arms for Home Defence would be established.

(b) The Voluntary principle, so far as service abroad is concerned, would be preserved.

(c) The dislocation of national trade would be minimised.

(d) The ill-feeling engendered by the present system of enlistment for this War would be eliminated.

(e) The urgent recruiting needs of the New Armies would be met; and

(f) The process of recruiting would be rendered consonant with our national dignity.

Without going into complicated details, that is my proposal. The Englishman likes to feel that he is fighting of his own free will; and with that sound, wholesome, and democratic feeling I have every sympathy. It lies, of course, at the root of all desire for a purely Voluntary system. But no Englishman—or Irishman for the matter of that—can any longer, after the experience of this War, contend that he has not duties as well as rights. He must now see that his first duty to his country and his home is to be prepared to defend them in case of need : in other words, to be trained to arms, and to see that his sons are so trained. Almost every other country in the world has now recognised not only that it is a man's duty to defend his country, but that it is his *right* to be trained to arms, so that he can efficiently perform that duty. Belgium and South Africa have recently set us an example; and both are now fighting for their lives. Belgium, to her sorrow, realised her state of unpreparedness too late, heroically as she is now striving to repair her error. South Africa, in spite of a blind and treacherous blow aimed at her heart by some of her own sons, has been more fortunate. The Government there have just introduced a system of Obligatory service, because they 'consider that the burden of this effort'—i.e. 'to ward off the danger which threatens every citizen of the Union'—'should not be borne entirely by those who volunteered their services.' And the spirit of the country is shown by the attitude of the Dutch-speaking burghers who object to 'volunteering' and consider it their *right* to be called upon to defend their country. Here is a telegram sent from Johannesburg on the 4th of January :

The burghers are readily responding to the Government's commandeering order, which has been well received in the country. . . . The women-folk are cheerfully rising to the occasion, and the hope is expressed that every possible man will rally to the Colours to help to bring about an early settlement.

That is the proper spirit, with which all men should respond to their country's call; and it is in that spirit that Britons would

accept whatever measures their rulers feel are needed for national defence, honour and security, at this present hour.

Is Colonel Maude still unconvinced? Does he still believe in all that difference between the volunteer and the 'conscript' when they are defending, even as the Germans believe they are defending, their own homes? The 'amazing bravery'—to use Lord Curzon's words—of the German 'conscripts' in this War 'must give us pause.' But even if Colonel Maude's original contention were true, and even if we were forced to apply compulsion, pure and simple, in this country, surely 'half a loaf is better than no bread.' Even 'conscripts' would be better than no men at all, and we still want a million men. But there is no question yet of conscription or even of compulsion. Only—we want men; and I would now ask Colonel Maude whether he still believes we can get all the men we want by our present Voluntary system? Let me put it in this way :

(1) Does he admit that Britain should be prepared, before the War is over, to put every man fit for service into the field? If so, as I presume he does,

(2) Does he consider that this can be done by Voluntary enlistment on present lines? I presume he does not.

(3) Then does he not agree that, under these circumstances, some form of compulsion may be needed?

If he does agree, then should we not look ahead and prepare for probabilities? There is no time to lose. Should we not, in Lord Selborne's words, at once arrange 'for the study in all its details of the problem of the best organisation of our national resources'?

Like Mr. Dewar, I am an individualist, and, therefore, against compulsion, on principle. But I think, with him, that in this crisis some form of compulsion has become necessary. Like Colonel Maude, I am in favour of the Voluntary principle, and I hope we may yet agree that, in a national emergency like this, some modification is required in the application of that principle. I cling, in sentiment, to the tradition of our Voluntary Army; and I feel that no Government could now introduce any system of Compulsory foreign service until every other method had been tried and found wanting. But I feel also that we must have the men—every man fit to serve when Lord Kitchener is ready for him—and that we can never get them under the present Voluntary system. It is for these reasons that I have ventured to submit my scheme for consideration, in the hope that, upon the lines I have suggested, may be found a way to meet the urgent need of recruiting for the New Armies—to get the million men, or more, still required to finish this War—without impairing the tradition of our Voluntary Army.

T. A. CREGAN, *Colonel.*

U 2

NATIONAL OR VOLUNTARY SERVICE?

(II)

RIGHT AND WRONG METHODS OF RECRUITING

LORD KITCHENER'S admirers seem disposed to become his critics. Left to itself, the Government would probably have preferred to place a civilian at the War Office. But the country was unanimous in demanding the strong, silent man who took counsel only with himself. Either because the Prime Minister was himself of the same opinion, or because he recognised that the popular pressure was too strong to be wisely resisted, he did what was required of him. For a time everyone was content. We had the best of possible War Ministers, and if he did not at once do all that was expected of him it was set down to the shackles of precedent from which he could not at once set himself free. But though the public had got its way it remained the same public. It had been accustomed to have its questions answered and its natural curiosity gratified, and it found it hard to put up with the complete absence of news which followed upon the declaration of war. In the first instance it occupied itself in finding fault with the Press Bureau, and, at starting, this hastily extemporised department gave much opportunity for quite reasonable complaint. But when the Lords met last month for a little session of their own the speeches of the Opposition Front Bench and the newspaper articles that followed showed a notable change of tone. Lord Curzon began, indeed, with the customary declaration that he desired to say and do nothing that could 'in the smallest degree embarrass, impede, or hamper the Government in the discharge of the overwhelming task that is laid upon them.' But towards the close of his speech he made a suggestion which certainly bordered on a disregard of his own canon. 'I feel clear,' he said, 'that the Home Defence Army ought to be a stable force under a single Commander, and ought not to be a force which is continually to be called upon to supply generals, officers, and men to the army serving abroad.' Now, of all the questions which come up to the War Office for decision, the supply of rein-

forcements to the army in the field seems to be the one which most needs to be left in Lord Kitchener's hands. The situation at the Front may be changing from day to day, and at times everything may hang on the immediate despatch of fresh troops from home. If the Home Defence Army contains the very material that is wanted for this purpose, will anything be gained by hampering the War Minister with all the delays incident to drawing the officers and men he is in search of from a separate force under a single commander, who may not be inclined to make the bleeding of his own army an easy process? Whatever may be the merits of the suggestion, its adoption ought to be left to the unfettered discretion of Lord Kitchener. This, however, is by the way. I only mention it as an example of the growing disposition to find fault with the silent man for the exercise of the very quality which is supposed to have recommended him to the confidence of the nation.

Another matter which has been the subject of more discussion is the refusal of the Government to give any figures as to the progress of recruiting. Lord Kitchener has told us something, indeed, but it is not very much. Recruiting, he says, 'has proceeded on normal lines, and the anticipated decrease of numbers in Christmas week has given way to a rise which has almost restored the weekly return of recruits to the former satisfactory level'—this satisfactory level being explained later on by Lord Crewe to mean the normal level not of peace but of the most strenuous weeks of recruiting. Over and above this, the Householders' Register has given the names of 218,000 men who are willing to serve when called upon. These figures do not include those furnished by the large towns and cities from which a return was only asked for just before Christmas. But Lord Kitchener did not mention the precise number of men actually enlisted, and Lord Lucas, who spoke two days later, declared that he was absolutely unable to give any figures and that nothing would draw them from him. His reason for this refusal was that, as it would be of the highest military importance to ourselves to know the numbers of the new troops which Germany is now raising, it might be of similar value to the German Staff to know how recruiting is going on in Great Britain. Lord Crewe, who wound up the discussion, gave it as the opinion of the War Office authorities that there are many items of information which, though they are harmless if taken singly, would, if cleverly put together, give valuable information to the enemy. This, again, is a matter which must be left to the judgment of Lord Kitchener. An Opposition which insisted upon dragging from the War Minister figures which he thinks should be withheld would hardly be observing the neutrality of which we hear so often.

Mr. Belloc, in *Land and Water* of the 9th of January, reckons that over and above the men actually in arms at home and at the Front we have an available reserve of volunteers amounting to two millions. More than half but not two thirds of this number have already enlisted, so that we have about another million to find. It is obvious that this reserve of a million of volunteers can only become available if they volunteer, and at the point at which recruiting now stands there is some uncertainty whether they will do so in sufficient numbers or with sufficient speed. If there is failure in either of these respects there is no question as to the course to be followed. The men must be found, and if they do not come forward of their own free will they must be taken against their will. Lord Haldane, speaking as the mouthpiece of the Cabinet, has left us in no doubt upon this point.

We are fighting [he said in the House of Lords on the 8th of last month] for nothing less than our life as a nation. We are fighting under circumstances which make it the duty of every Englishman to put everything he possesses in the world, everything he values dearest, into the scale. . . . By the common law of this country it is the duty of every subject of the realm to assist the Sovereign in repelling the invasion of its shores and in defence of the realm. That is a duty which rests on no statute but is inherent in our Constitution. Compulsory service is not foreign to the Constitution of the country and in a great national emergency it might be necessary to resort to it.

But though there is no question either as to the duty or the intention of the Government in the event of voluntary enlistment failing to give us the soldiers we must have, there are at least three reasons why every Englishman should hope and pray that this necessity may not arise. The first is that to introduce conscription now would be a confession to all the world that the primary duty of every English subject has not been recognised by the nation as a whole. I can imagine nothing that would make the reading of the German news so repulsive to every Englishman, nothing that would give our enemies so much pleasure, or make the contempt in which they now profess to hold us appear so genuine and so well founded. The second reason is that the voluntary system gives us—in Lord Haldane's words—'men who are, to a certain extent, picked men. They come because of their enthusiasm, and they are better than the dead level produced by compulsory service.' If there is no more of this enthusiasm left, we shall be forced to put up with the dead level, but there is no need to go to meet disgrace before we know that it is on the road. The third reason I take from the article by Mr. Belloc from which I have already quoted :

It is worth pointing out that this country is the one belligerent country in Europe which still manufactures freely, that its industry is largely

supplying the Alliance, and that a voluntary system fits, in an exact and elastic manner, the demand for labour. Under the alternative system of compulsion you would have to arrange, arbitrarily and mechanically, what men were to be drawn for service and what were to be left behind for industry—let alone for shipbuilding and communications, for mining and agriculture, for commerce and for seamanship, mercantile and naval.

To meet all these wants and to allot to each its just proportion in the list of the nation's necessities would take a great deal of time just when time was hardest to come by. There would be delays in enlistment, delays in equipment, delays in calculating the number of men who ought to be kept back for service in the mine or in the factory; and all these unfamiliar requirements would have to be gone into just when the War Office was grappling with the double task of maintaining the army at the Front at its full strength and in complete efficiency, and getting an absolutely new and possibly unpopular machinery into working order over the whole of the three kingdoms.

If, then, national service ought only to be resorted to when voluntary service has failed to give England the army of which she is in such urgent need, are there any ways in which the public can help on recruiting? There are several, and the first among them is a complete revision of the methods hitherto adopted. During the autumn and early winter too much reliance has been placed on a process not easily distinguished from bullying. The appeals which are to be seen on every blank wall are largely addressed not to the patriotism of the reader but to a low form of self-interest. 'What will your neighbours think of you when the War is over if you have meanly kept out of it? What chance will you stand with a girl you want to marry by the side of a man who has lain for weeks in the trenches and risked life and limb for his country? Will not the very children in the streets cry shame on the coward who has never so much as put on khaki?' Pressure of this kind has the initial vice that it takes no note of difference of cases. It assumes not merely that the country requires the services of every healthy man within the prescribed limits of age, but also that these services can only be rendered by soldiers or sailors. It ignores the existence of urgent military and naval needs which only a large reserve of civilian labour can supply. If the miner, or the factory hand, or the agricultural labourer is working his hardest to keep the Army or the Fleet constantly efficient, he is as much serving his country as if he were at the Front or on board a Dreadnought. To set him down as a shirker is merely to confuse the public mind. These general censures only enable the real sinners to escape notice. Not every man who is not already in uniform is altogether careless of the needs of his country. There are too many, it may be, to whom

this description does apply. But there is a much larger number who are influenced by genuine misapprehension of the real facts—misapprehension which can only be removed by slow degrees and by better information. The men from whom our Army is taken may not be heroes, but this does not mean that they cannot be fired by the spectacle of a great national need if once that need can be brought home to them. A young man may be quite ready to do his duty by his country and yet be honestly uncertain whether that duty calls him to enlist at once, or even to enlist at all.

Hesitation of the former kind may sometimes be caused by unavoidable delays in providing recruits with their proper equipment. The spectacle of large bodies of men at drill, some of whom are in their ordinary clothes, while others are armed only with walking-sticks or umbrellas, is not inspiring. No doubt in the first months of the War only a small percentage could be armed and clothed at once, and if men had waited until these necessities had been provided much time would have been lost which, in fact, was spent—not quite uselessly—in mastering the rudiments of drill. Happily this state of things is pretty well at an end. At the beginning of the War there may have been some natural inability to realise that the present conflict is unlike any other in which we have been engaged. In the first instance it may have been held sufficient to give indeed greatly increased orders for war material, but to give them only to the same firms which had executed them in the past. Thousands of rifles or uniforms sprang into millions on paper, and the inevitable discovery followed that what the present War needs is the co-operation not of a few selected traders but of whole trades and areas of industry. With the introduction of civilian advisers at the War Office new sources of supply have been opened up. Our supplies to-day, Lord Haldane assures us, whether of explosives, shells, or rifles, are in a very much better position than was the case a little time ago. The Committee of Imperial Defence has extended its operations to the organisation of the industries producing materials of war. One serious obstacle to recruiting is thus being removed, and the men who enlist will no longer be made to feel that they might almost as well have remained at home a month or two longer.

But if the arguments hitherto employed to stimulate enlistment ought to give place to others of a different character, what should be the nature of the change?

In the first place, it must no longer be taken for granted that the origin and purpose of the War are matters of universal knowledge. We have been accustomed to credit every man with the conviction that he is morally bound to enlist. The speakers at

the numerous meetings that have been held with the object of gaining recruits have argued as though the obligations arising out of the War were known to everyone in the room; if a young man of military age does not go to the nearest recruiting office the moment the meeting is over it must be because he prefers ease to duty. I believe that this conclusion has been arrived at on very insufficient grounds. No proper allowance has been made for the profound ignorance of the affairs of other countries in which the great mass of every nation lives. Probably the British working-man has never heard of that 'splendid isolation' which not so long ago was the fetish of an important school of English politicians. But though the phrase may have been forgotten, the temper it expresses has remained with us till a very recent day. It lay at the root of most of the arguments in favour of British neutrality in the present War which were urged so persistently down to the opening days of last August. The English poor, from whom the rank and file of the Army is most largely drawn, are greatly given to 'keeping themselves to themselves,' and for a generation at least this homely maxim—couched in more decorative language—has been the staple of pacifist oratory. Those of us who have any acquaintance with public affairs have been rudely roused from this delusion, but is there any ground for thinking that this awakening has been universal?

Before this question can be answered to any purpose we must know how far the revolution which has taken place in the mutual relations of the Great Powers has been made intelligible to the people of Great Britain. That is a matter as to which very little is yet clear. The Labour members showed little sympathy with France, and still less with Russia, so long as the intentions of our own Government remained unknown; and though the great majority of them behaved admirably when the storm broke, it does not follow that they have been able to inspire their followers with the conviction, not merely that the Government has taken the right step, but that to take it was indispensable to the continuance of our freedom and independence. And even if this view of the situation is universal in industrial England, that does not give us the right to infer that it has been equally universal in agricultural England. I do not mean that the labourer is naturally or necessarily less intelligent than the artisan. But he does not mix so much with his fellows, and consequently is not so much influenced by their opinions. I believe, therefore, that in this class almost certainly, and in the industrial class most probably, there is still a great deal of work to be done. If, instead of coming forward as teachers, the speakers at recruiting meetings would consent to be learners; if, instead of waiting to be heckled, they would themselves

become the hecklers; if they would patiently try to arrive at the true motives which make so many of those they address indifferent to their most impassioned exhortations, they would go home with much useful material by which to profit on future occasions.

It is this inability to grasp what Germany is really fighting for that most stands in the way of recruiting. The majority of the British people know that we are at war with the Kaiser, but they have no clear idea why we are at war with him. They hear of the vast forces which our Allies have brought into the field, but they do not take in how infinitely greater our stake in the War is than that of either France or Russia. Many of them seem to think that we have sent out Sir John French and his army rather as a token of our good will than to take their place in a conflict which is really ours in a different sense from that in which it belongs to either of our Allies. Germany sees this plainly enough. The end she has nearest her heart is the destruction of England—first of her Army and Navy, next of her commerce and her Colonial Empire, finally of her position as an independent and sovereign State. William the Second would probably make peace with France and Russia to-morrow if they would but consent to leave England to his mercy. The world is large enough, he thinks, to hold Germany and the other members of the Triple Entente. It is not large enough to hold both Germany and England. The rank reserved for us is that of an additional planet in the German solar system. To how much of the three kingdoms has this vital fact been brought home? Only, I fear, to a small portion. Articles and pamphlets without number have set it out in the clearest possible terms, but before articles or pamphlets can leave their mark they must be read and understood. The work has been done for educated England; it has still to be done for the England which is not educated. The newspapers which the people I have in view read do not supply this want. They deal, necessarily and naturally, with what is happening at the Front each day or each week, and the familiarity with antecedent facts which is indispensable, if this kind of information is to be of any value in forming opinion, is assumed to have been got already. In most cases, unfortunately, it has not been got, and the chance that it ever will be grows fainter as the events that ushered in the War are further removed.

How is it to be brought home to the mass of our countrymen what the German purpose is, and why its defeat is to Englishmen a matter of life and death? I can only answer: By the simplest arts of speech. In most villages, probably, there is someone who knows what is really at stake well enough to

explain, in the plainest words he can find, why it is the duty of every man of military age that can be spared from other duties of equal importance to join either the Territorials or the New Army. He can at least tell his neighbours something of the unexampled demand which the War is making on the nation. He can make them realise in some small degree the tremendous cost which we are every day incurring, and bring it home to them that every penny of that cost must in the end be paid either by the taxpayer or by the consumer. In one or other of these classes every man he addresses will be included, and every day that the War goes on makes the ultimate burden greater. If it is objected that the best way to guard against this is to make peace promptly, he can show that, if we do this on terms dictated by a victorious Germany, the demand made on us will change its name but not its amount. We shall have to submit to the same taxes and pay the same prices as if the War was going on—with the difference that the money raised will be paid as an indemnity after military and naval defeat, instead of as part of the cost of victory. Here is a brief that might inspire the dullest imagination and the most stammering tongue, and if homely talks of this kind could be multiplied by tens of thousands, as they might easily be if everyone of any local influence would do his part in making the facts known, one of two things would happen. Either the Army would in a very short time be brought up to its full strength, or the authorities would be driven to have immediate recourse to universal service.

It would not, of course, be necessary to confine these exercises in local eloquence to the origin and object of the War. The same lesson might be conveyed in many forms and might often be drawn from what is actually going on at the various Fronts. Anything that encourages interest in this gigantic conflict, or enables its progress to be more intelligently followed, does something to further the same great purpose. Maps are easily come by now, and a competent Elementary Schoolmaster will usually be able to reproduce portions of them on the school black-board on a larger scale, and with only the important names inserted. Passages from important despatches illustrated in this way will come home to an audience with fresh force and go some way to give real meaning to the news they read at other times. I do not suppose that the most capable talker will be able to make the course of a conflict stretching over three continents perfectly plain to the company that meets at a village hall. But he may at least hope to lift each listener a little above the state of mind which conceives the War only as 'a deal of fighting' going on he does not exactly know where.

There is another field in which valuable work might be done.

Nothing was more remarkable at the outset of the War than the coldness with which every reference to Russian co-operation was received by many intelligent working-men. They had been brought up to regard Russia as the sworn enemy of Democracy, the pattern of all that was most hostile to freedom in every shape, the one country in Europe that had successfully, and to all appearance permanently, suppressed a beneficent Revolution. There are whole districts in England and Scotland in which the War would have been more easily made popular if the Czar had been an enemy instead of an Ally. It must be borne in mind that in the first instance our knowledge of Russia was mostly gained from the works of a single great novelist, and though Turgeniev's 'incomparable art' gave us a wonderful picture of one side of Russian life and character, it was of one side only, and that a side which we now see to have been both limited and transitory. The Russian people is not a mass of anarchists. Its view of the future is not that of an exiled Russian Professor who told me many years ago, 'The French Reign of Terror will be as nothing by the side of Ours—when it comes.' Russian institutions are not perfect—I do not know what country can claim such a possession—but those who know most of the nation which has grown up under them have most to say in its praise. Any one who wishes to make this change of view intelligible to English listeners need not go far for his materials. Mr. Maurice Baring's *The Mainsprings of Russia* and Mr. Stephen Graham's *Undiscovered Russia* will furnish him with all he wants, and in so far as he makes these books understood by his hearers he will have done something to consolidate the Triple Entente.

So far I have been speaking only of the discouragement to enlisting which arises from ignorance of the urgent need there is for it. There is another cause with which it will often be more difficult to deal. A young man may remain deaf to the recruiting sergeant, whether professional or amateur, from an honest inability to decide between conflicting obligations. To one difficulty of this kind I have already referred. It is the case of a man employed in supplying the everyday needs of the armies or the fleets. Soldiers and sailors alike want food and clothing to keep them in health, weapons and ammunition to make them efficient, new ships, guns, and aircraft to fill the places of those that have been destroyed, and every one of these objects makes a definite demand upon human labour. Is it right for a young man already employed in one of these ways to enlist as a soldier or sailor? In many cases I suppose this question answers itself. There is a man who is unfitted for active service, either by age or by physical defects, and yet is able and ready to take the recruit's place in the field or workshop. In the absence of such

a substitute the decision properly belongs to the authorities of the War Office or the Admiralty. It is for them to say whether employers who are furnishing them with war material shall have their staff interfered with by the recruiting officer, unless the work can be done by others. In the first instance, the man who now wishes to enlist was free to choose in what way he would serve his country, but, having made his choice, he has no longer a right to change his mind at the cost of causing inconvenience to the State. A far more difficult problem presents itself in the case of those who have others dependent on them. As between married and unmarried men there is a broad distinction. But it is not a universal distinction. Marriage no doubt creates new responsibilities, but there are unmarried men whose labour is just as necessary to the support of a family as if they were married. Who is to decide to which of these divisions a man belongs? The writer of a weighty article in the *Round Table* for December holds that 'the greatest single impediment to the continued success of voluntary recruiting is the doubt in the mind of the individual as to whether he personally ought to enlist or not,' and that this is a doubt 'which it is practically impossible for him to resolve for himself.' There are cases, of course, to which this statement applies. But I am sure that it is not true of every case, and I doubt whether it is true of very many. A man may be very uncertain about his own real wishes, and as he inclines now to joining the Army and now to staying at home his estimate of his duty will vary. But if he keeps his personal feelings out of the calculation I suspect that in most instances his duty will stand out fairly clear. The same writer further suggests that if he is still uncertain 'the Government may be able to take that responsibility [of coming to a decision in particular cases] on its own shoulders without going as far as adopting compulsory enlistment for the War.' But to look for such intervention seems to me hopeless. The Government can say that all capable men are wanted, but all that it can usefully add to this is the further intimation that after a certain day all capable men will be taken. Compulsory enlistment is not a measure to be resorted to by halves.

For my own part I doubt whether the writer just quoted takes sufficient account of that element of ignorance of which I have spoken. So far as that element is really present among us, it must operate injuriously on recruiting. A young man may not set a very high value on his life, and yet wish to understand clearly why he is asked to risk it. If he knows no better reason than that England has somehow got herself mixed up with a quarrel between France and Russia on the one side and Germany on the other, he may fail to see that it is his personal

duty to join in it. But it ought not to be impossible to make him see it. The cause for which the Allies are fighting is so just; the attacks they are resisting in three continents are so unprovoked; the consequences of allowing judgment to go against us by our own default are so tremendous and so irreparable—that the dullest men must see their duty writ large if the film is once removed from their eyes; the men who have the knowledge required to remove it are to be found in all parts of the country. If the conclusion following upon these premises is not plain, no words of mine can make it so.

D. C. LATHBURY.

AN INTERRUPTED SKETCHING TOUR IN BAVARIA

BEFORE embarking on the diary of my War experiences it is as well that I should explain how they ever came to be mine. Certainly it is the unexpected that happens. When I went with my friend Miss X. to Italy in the autumn of 1913, I little thought that in less than a year's time I should be caught in the meshes of a European war.

We went to Italy with the intention of going on to Serbia to offer ourselves as 'bottle washers' to the brave little Servians in the Balkan War. Our plans, however, fell through owing to the illness of my companion, and we got no further than the Italian Riviera. Our hotel was a German one, and some very charming and distinguished German people were staying there; among others, General Baron and Baroness von Frankenberg and Admiral Bertram and his wife were particularly kind to me. Baron and Baroness von Frankenberg are well known in the German Court. As I was much alone, they often asked me to join them, and we made delightful trips to Portofino and many other places of historical interest, during which I learnt a great deal about German ideas on 'militarist' and 'Kultur' lines, and was much impressed by them; while Admiral Bertram told me interesting, if innocent, facts about the German Navy. All this fired me with a desire to see the 'Vaterland' for myself. That was how I went to Munich; and when I got there the cupboard *wasn't* bare—it was so full of interest, I couldn't tear myself away. I spent my time studying 'Kultur' in the shape of painting at Herr von Knirr's famous school in Schellingstrasse, and worshipping at the shrine of the immortal Wagner. The Pension Quisisana, at which I stayed, a very large one, was patronised by people of all nationalities—Russians, French, Poles, Armenians, Roumanians, Italians, Spaniards, Japanese, Greeks, and Americans. It was with the two last that I had most to do. One of my particular friends was Mrs. Wheeler, of the U.S.A., who has a daughter married to a distinguished Roumanian official in Bucharest. I also met many Canadians, who showed me great kindnesses in the hospitable manner of

that country—and it is with much pleasure that I acknowledge my gratitude to Dr. and Mrs. A. Mussen, of Montreal, to whose help I owe the fact that I am here to tell my tale.

The trip to Chiemsee, which landed me in such difficulties, was the result of my desire to join Herr Professor Eisengraber's famous summer sketching class, and at the same time explore the beautiful Highlands of Bavaria, so well known in connexion with that romantic and tragic personality, poor mad King Ludwig.

Munich, Sunday, June 28th 1914.—Mrs. Wheeler and I went to the English church this morning, and on our return we were horrified to hear of the assassination of the Austrian Archduke and his wife at Serajewo by a Servian anarchist. We all rushed out to see the telegrams, which were posted at every corner—very little news, but Austria seems furious. Roumanians and Greeks seemed most moved. Wild conjectures as to the reason for the crime, and the fate of the assassin.

30th, Tuesday.—German papers have long leaders about Austrian Crown Prince and his wife, the beautiful and charming Duchess Sophie Chotec, and many possible and impossible reasons for the crime, but the newspapers here all agree that it was a political one, and was deliberately hatched by the authorities in the Servian capital. Firstly, the Grand Duke was in league with a party antagonistic to Slavonic Bosnia; secondly, there was every reason to suppose the Grand Duke would raise the Duchess Sophie to the rank of Empress on his own accession, though the old Emperor Franz Joseph had forced him to take an oath not to do this on his morganatic marriage to the beautiful Countess, who was a lady-in-waiting to his aunt.

There can be no doubt that the plot was a big one, in spite of the assassin's refusal to admit this, as more than one attempt was made. Poor old Emperor Franz Joseph is said to be prostrated with grief.¹ The victims of this fearful crime leave three young children.

July 31st, Friday.—Austria is furious with Servia, and not at all pacified by any of her explanations; has sent a 'Mandat' of terms to Belgrade which, if not answered to Austria's satisfaction by eight o'clock to-morrow night, means war. No one for one moment really believes it will come to that.

Aug. 1st, Saturday.—It is war.—Austria's terms were so harsh, it was impossible for Servia to accept them. Everyone

¹ As a matter of fact, the Archduke was *not* a favourite with his illustrious relation.

is aghast; we all go to see the telegrams—huge crowds. Everyone asking will Germany be brought in?

Aug. 2nd, Sunday.—*Tonhalle*—ends with National Anthem and 'Wacht am Rhein'; huge demonstrations, crowds of students parade streets, deputations wait outside old King Ludwig's palace, singing and cheering—replacing each other all night. We join huge crowds and go round to all the embassies. Italian Ambassador *not* so amiable as the Austrian—tells 'people to return in half an hour,' arrogance of crowd whose *valuable* time cannot be wasted. Our party finds it has had quite enough—we go home.

Aug. 3rd, Monday.—Spirit still very warlike, but we hear that Great Britain is making great efforts to form Conference of Powers and make peace. Everyone thinks that trouble will be confined to Servia and the Austrian frontier. Even if Germany *does* help Austria, Great Britain will certainly remain neutral.

Monday evening.—Great hopes of peace.

Aug. 4th, Tuesday.—Go to Seebruck. Am a little afraid of going in this state of unrest, but, as Mrs. C—, of Montreal, says, Seebruck is so close, and there can be no difficulty in getting back; also she will let me know should any complications arise; so, unwittingly for both of us, I fall into the war trap.

Aug. 5th, Wednesday.—Every view is a picture. Seebruck is a most beautiful place. I live with the postmistress—a dear woman, her name is Mittermeier. She has a shop and a farm—delicious milk, purest thickest cream and butter—and only charges 20 marks a week, besides being the sweetest and kindest woman. She also possesses a pretty little daughter with long golden plaits, and an obliging husband. The post-woman clerk is also a good capable strong person.

Professor Eisengraber and Frau are very agreeable; the former, a typical German, with clear blue eyes and a round comfortable figure and sturdy personality, is yet a wonderful artist—his colours are magnificent. His English nil!!! His wife is a nice little true Hausfrau, whose soul is in cooking and household matters, but she has a kind heart and boundless admiration for her gifted husband.

The village is all ups and downs, and very prosperous. Each pretty house has its own orchard. Cows and great piles of wood abound—the cows and hay are sheltered under the same roof as the proprietor. Nice sunburned peasants, but I notice that there is the same resentful bourgeois spirit against the higher classes that one finds in Britain amongst the Socialists. Chiemsee is lovely, with many pretty paths and splendid pine forests. Not far off are the Frauen and Herren Insels—the first noted for its

old Monastery, the second for mad King Ludwig's Versailles Palace.

The Professor gives me my first lesson in landscape painting.

Several more German visitors are *en ville*; some artists—one very quaint woman in my house dresses *à la* peasant, but in queer colours, tartans of blue and red, yellow and green, or huge spots. Her pictures match her dresses; so does her complexion!

My journey over was interesting, and I *ought* to have been warned, for a very intelligent Austrian, who sat opposite to me, told me *he* had been sketching in the Tyrol, and was just sent for to go to mobilise in Vienna. I remember he and a young priest discussed the situation with me at some length. They were not very hopeful about the war being short, but scoffed at the idea of Britain being pulled in. They seemed to think Germany was to blame. That Servia was a mere tool, though of course the crime was frightful. I am afraid that nice man has long ago been killed.

There was another Austrian family I noticed—a father and mother, one son of about twenty, a boy of sixteen, and quite a little boy. The father looked very military and distinguished; the mother also looked very well bred, and the two younger boys, but it was the youth of twenty who struck me. He had such a clever cultured face, and above all such a winning manner and delightful smile. I felt quite fascinated by him. Curiously enough, the Reverence at Seebruck had the same wonderful charm and courtesy of manner, though a far older man and a distinguished scholar. I shall never forget; the Eisengraber and I lunched at the inn, and a very bad one too, but we saw 'The Reverence,' and I was at once attracted to him. Two days later I was walking past the Trautschheim motor-'bus, on which was seated in the driver's place a very small boy of three years old—it was so funny I laughed, and, looking across, found the Reverence laughing too. So we made acquaintance, and I found I had not been mistaken, for he was a great scholar and a charming man.

Aug. 6th, Thursday.—Passed very peacefully, also Friday—painting and walking about, through the beautiful woods, or in the cornfields, or again by the lake.

War and rumours of war seemed an absurd delusion, and we were all certain Britain *had* been successful in making peace! *But*

Aug. 8th, Saturday.—In the morning we painted; in the afternoon strolled round. Professor and Frau Eisengraber had gone to their supper when I saw Frau Mittermeier go to post up a tiny notice on the village hall door. I ran up to look at it, and saw to my amazement an order from the Kaiser to King Ludwig

to mobilise all his men! Before I had time to grasp what this meant, Frau Mittermeier returned and stuck up a huge printed notice. I saw 'Articles of War,' and flew for Professor and Frau Eisengraber. They ran down with me, *very* much disturbed. It was the Proclamation of War by Germany, as an ally of Austria, against Serbia, *but* did this mean the beginning of a general European War?

My German, and the Eisengrabers' English were equally weak. However, I understood the main points. All men between twenty and thirty-five to mobilise—to take their farm horses. No private letters, or any kind of communication, signalling, lights, etc., etc., to be allowed—headed by a long article on the reasons for war—i.e. Serbia's abominable crime against Austria, and failure to satisfy Emperor Franz Joseph, who, though deeply grieved, etc., etc., was forced for the honour of his beloved people, etc., to remain firm against Serbia's treachery, and so on. Also a paragraph referring to broken treaties of 1912, and ending with something about his 'serene conscience.' Naturally there is great consternation amongst the people. The postmistress seems to be driven half crazy, she has so much to do.

The older men seem to take the news with a kind of sullen indifference.

Am still blindly hoping that Britain will *somehow* yet make peace.

Aug. 9th, Sunday.—Go to the quaint little parish church; the service is so simple and beautiful.

In the afternoon Frau Eisengraber and I discuss the situation, and I say perhaps it would be better to telegraph home for money in case of emergencies. We go to the post office, and are informed that all communication is cut off—no telegrams may be sent out of or in Germany, as every wire is needed for Government alone. I feel rather bad. Frau Eisengraber loses her head, and prophesies every kind of horror, but the Professor takes it all very cheerfully and coolly. The only consolation I can get is 'New War Articles *may* improve matters.'

Monday.—Get a letter from Mrs. C——, also a *Daily Mail*, but both date from Friday. However, her letter says 'Don't worry, and *no* need to come back. I will let you know the first moment there is any danger or trouble.' As Mrs. C—— is an exceptionally sensible and nice woman, I feel very greatly relieved, and tell Frau Eisengraber there's nothing to bother about. Lots of young men go off wearing buttonholes and smoking cigars—parting gifts from the women. New Articles come: Russia and France have declared war. Situation is

growing more and more tense. Old Reverence looks very grave and occupied.

Tuesday.—All the older men go, with their splendid horses, huge cart horses, all ticketed. They (the men) look very sullen, and are so untidy, even dirty, as they slouch along beside their horses, which doesn't say much for their wives.

I go up the road, but am afraid to stay on it, as every few minutes grey war motors dash past filled with officers—so smart with their swords stacked behind. One waved to me, and I thought I recognised Herr Lieut. X—.

Begin to think I'd better go to Munich, as a telegram I receive from a friend in Berlin, Charlotte Fleishmann, suggests. No steamer—perhaps to-morrow there will be one. I can go and see the British Consul, and return next day. A little Brazilian man I knew in Paris and his little wife arrive, greatly to the surprise of us all.

Munich, Aug. 14th, Friday.—I must write what happened yesterday. One thing is certain, I can't go back, nor would I for untold gold. I still feel shaky all over after my awful time last night.

On Wednesday morning I got up at six o'clock, so as to have time to get a pass from the burgomeister, but couldn't find him, so I got one from the postmistress, saying who I was and that I was going to Munich to see the English Consul, and returning next day. Went to meet boat at 8 A.M. Professor Eisengraber came after me on his bicycle to see me off, and gave me a written notice from himself to the same effect.

The boat never came. However, at 12 P.M. it did arrive, and I departed with cheerful *au revoirs* from Professor and Frau Eisengraber, whom I never saw again. The only passenger is myself and a fat friendly cheery old man. At Frau Insel I had to change and wait for a bigger boat. I had, of course, no luggage, only my valise. Tea at the hotel under beautiful chestnut trees, so peaceful. I almost persuaded myself 'I'd dreamt all this nightmare about war.' I went to see Monastery church, which is very old, and famous for its stone carvings, its old statues, and wonderful stained windows, stone font, and manuscripts. Four o'clock boat arrives, and takes me and three or four other passengers to Stock. There ought to have been, but there was not, a small electric train to Prien. Other passengers disappear, and I, not knowing my way, go and inquire at a small grocery shop, where I find a kind talkative old woman with a small spoilt granddaughter. I buy a packet of milk chocolate, and am asked if I am 'Américaine,' and told that this little girl's *Papachen* has gone to the War, and so on. Two youths appear and offer to show me the way to Prien, and politely carry my case. It is

a beautiful walk, nearly all the way under chestnut trees. The young men are very agreeable. I ask to be shown a nice hotel to have tea. We find one with steps leading up to a garden and overlooking the station. Am told I must wait two more hours for the train. Order coffee and rolls. Many people are at the other small tables drinking beer, and talking hard. The proprietress then comes up and says something about Americans and hovers round, but I don't encourage her, as I want to think about my visit to the Consul, etc. Presently I notice an official-looking man in green uniform with a very red face, and think how unbecoming to wear a bright red face with a bright green uniform. To my surprise he comes up the steps and, making straight for my table, sits down. How impertinent, I think, when he says 'I must trouble you for your passport, Fräulein.' I at once hand it to him, and also the passes from the postmistress and Professor Eisengraber. He examines them very carefully, and then says 'Please come with me to the station.' I explain I haven't paid for my coffee, to which he says 'You can settle that if you please afterwards.' I follow him to station bureau, where two other clerks examine my passport and passes, and also my valise! I anxiously wait; am first told 'Fräulein, it is not possible that you leave to-day—the train is for the soldiers alone. There will be no room.' I, however, beg to be allowed to go. 'It is of the utmost importance I see my Consul, etc., etc.' Official and clerks relent, and I am allowed to have my ticket, which they give me—third class. They politely bow me out, and I return to the hotel, and after paying I sit down in the verandah. It is a *very* third-class hotel, and the people correspond. The proprietress comes up with a pretty girl she says is her niece, and can speak English; also her small nephew and another niece—all are in deep mourning. Pretty niece's English is nil, but the other one can say four words. Small boy has an intelligent face. He departs, and I notice in a vague sort of way that he often comes up the steps with people, who gaze at me, but I don't think anything of it.

Hotel proprietress is called away. I say to niece in a careless sort of way 'I don't really know much German, but what is the latest news?' She hands me a *Zeitung*. I haven't time to look at it when a very disagreeable-looking man comes up and snatches it out of my hands. I look surprised. Niece murmurs 'Very rude,' and apologises for the man's behaviour. She says he is her uncle, but they all detest him, he is so disagreeable. She then asks a woman at the next table to give me a paper. The woman point-blank refuses, and says something I don't understand. The girl apologises to me again, and shrugs her shoulders expressively. Very soon I get up, and say I will look

at the town and the shops and church. Very little in town to see, but the church, like all Catholic churches, is beautiful. I leave the church and go into the market place, and for the first time I notice rather a crowd of people all staring at *me*. I move down the street, they follow. Still, I think 'it is nothing; the War makes everyone leave their work to gossip.' I go down another street, the crowd still follows. Then two more officials in green appear, one carrying a dispatch bag and wheeling a bicycle. They make straight for me, and ask 'my business here.' I reply that I have already shown my passport to another official, who is *quite* satisfied. This apparently doesn't satisfy *them*! Still another official comes up. The crowd has by now grown enormous, and has closed all round me like a wall. Two very sour-faced women suddenly appear at my elbow, and one says: 'Fräulein, we are asked to *demand* of you your business *here*.' I reply as before, adding that I am quite willing to show my passport, etc., but decline to do so in this public street surrounded by a mob, declaring my intention of going to the station when those officials can satisfy them that my passport, etc., is all right. They let me pass, but the mob follows.

We reach the station and make for the clerk's office. They are very polite, and tell officials my passports *are* sufficient. They offer me a chair, and pull down the blinds. I sink down relieved, but my peace doesn't endure very long. In five minutes the door opens again. Two more officials enter, and whisper something to the clerks. One then comes up to me, and requests me to follow him. Crowd still outside shouts when it sees me, and some one tries to pull my coat. Am taken into a big empty waiting-room. How well I can see it now! It has the usual table and stuffy horsehair chairs, pictures of German railway scenes, a dingy stove in a corner, and six windows, with no blinds, of course. Am left here in charge of a policeman, and locked in! The crowd climbs one on the other's shoulders to see in, and screams and hisses, so that I feel as if I were in a hideous nightmare. Policeman, however, tries to cheer me up and says something about 'espionage.' He shows me a card with his photograph, name, description of himself, etc., etc. At last the door opens and in come the three officials with four policemen, a nice-looking young woman dressed like a dairy maid, who I am afterwards informed is Baroness C——, a horrid mean-looking little man, and a few more people. My passport and passes are again demanded. The police examine them, but apparently don't understand enough English to read my Scotch-British passport. They hand it to the horrid little man, who I now see is a detective, and who speaks a mongrel and laboured kind of English, and evidently also feels himself to be a *very* important

person. He reads my passport very, very slowly, as it seems to me. Suddenly he stops, and, going up to the other men, whispers something! He sidles up to me and says '*What was your business in Serbia?*' For one awful moment I feel lost, for I have 'Italy and Serbia' on my passport, and remember that my travelling companion had commented upon that fact and said it was a blunder. My business in Serbia, although I never went in the end, had been the *intention* to help the Servians in their war! How thankful I was that circumstances had prevented my carrying out my plans I need hardly say. I saw, luckily, how very careful I must be in my answer, and said 'Sir, I intended to go for a trip to Serbia with a friend, but as a matter of fact I didn't get further than Italy, and, as you can see by the date, there was no question of war with Germany then.' This appeared to satisfy them, and I breathed more freely. Then the little worm asked: '*Who were the two young men you were seen speaking to at half-past four?*' Who *were* they? How did I know? Luckily for me at that moment the door opened and the little proprietress of the hotel came up to me, and as the worm repeated the question she answered for me: '*Ach so, they are two boy friends of mine.*' How grateful I felt to her! She beamed at me and said 'Fräulein, I will help you.' Dear little woman. Of course, the 'two strange young men' were the boys of sixteen and eighteen who had shown me from Stock to Prien, but I'd quite forgotten. My next ordeal was to open my case. I begged that a woman might search it, so they sent for the waitress. She was a pretty girl with a sweet kind face, and wore big gold gypsy earrings, and evidently was a general favourite, for when she declared my case was innocent they *apparently* believed her. It was now the Baroness's turn. She asked for my passes and where I lived at Munich, and could I give any names. I gave Ober-Leut. Wachinger's name, as he was a kind old thing and brother-in-law of Fräulein Baer, my pension proprietress. I was next asked to empty my pockets. I had two French Government papers. The police pounced on these. I am sure they didn't know one word of French, but luckily the Baroness did, and she explained, at the same time apologising very nicely to me.

The little worm then came up again and said 'Fräulein, we are telephoning to Munich and to Seebruck to ask if you are what you say you are! Until we get an answer you must be detained here, and if the answer is *not* right you will go to prison as a spy.' I bowed, but my feelings may be more easily imagined than described, for my name isn't an easy one for foreigners to catch, and *supposing* the telephone gave it wrong! Here was I in a strange town all alone. I might be shot! Baron von

Frankenberg, my 'General' friend, could help me out, but where was he? The Baroness came up again: 'Fräulein, I am sure you are a very nice lady, but these people believe you to be a boy dressed up as a woman, and, as you know, this is "War," so we cannot be too vigilant. Already many spies have been caught, and only to-day two were caught in an aeroplane; one was a man dressed as a woman, therefore you understand.' I said I did. During this time the crowd still bombarded the windows, and even pushed open the door to come in and stare at me. However, they were soon pushed out again by the police. After what seemed to me eternity, the worm returned and said 'Our telephone communication is satisfactory, and now if you will let me look through your pocket-book you may go.' My pocket-book had some of the War Articles I had put down to translate. But Fate was kind, as the worm passed them over without comment; and now the Baroness and the others all came up to me and wrung my hands, and complimented me on the way I had taken it, in fact overwhelmed me with apologies—all, that is, *except* the little worm, who looked meaner and slyer than ever. I knew he'd tried hard to catch me, but I shook hands with him too, and noticed he didn't look me in the face.

My kind little proprietress and the pretty waitress got me some ham sandwiches and soda water. I was advised to wait till the train came in, because of the crowd outside. At last the train did come, and it was full of soldiers. My protectors escorted me to my carriage—a long wagon half full of soldiers. They all shook hands again and off we went, the whole station full of people cheering and waving handkerchiefs, not only in the station but all along the line.

However, my adventures were not over yet. No sooner had I sat down than a young soldier came up and with a bow sat down opposite. I saw at once he was a gentleman. He wore a grey flannel suit, no collar or cuffs, and had a charming, refined, earnest face. He said he could not speak English, and my German not being very good we conversed in French. 'But, Mademoiselle,' said he, 'do you know that you are doing a very dangerous thing travelling like this at such a time?' 'Yes,' I said, 'but it is imperative I go to Munich to see my Consul about going home.' 'Excuse me, Mademoiselle,' he replied, 'you will not find that so easy a matter. Tell me *how* do you propose to get out of Germany? Every port is closed. You cannot cross the border into France. We should not allow that, even if there were any trains.' 'Surely by Switzerland then,' I murmured. He gave a shrug and a laugh. 'Switzerland also is mobilising. Italy is mobilising. Indeed, Mademoiselle, it is true what I say, though I am very sorry for you.' He then

began to talk about the effect of the War upon Germany. His outlook did not seem very bright. 'It will not last more than a few months,' I suggested. Again he laughed. 'A few months! Do you think we are going through the expense of all this mobilisation for nothing? Do you suppose our country will pay for it? No, we will fight and we will win, and our enemies shall pay'—this last with great energy. At this point up came a fat man with a horrid face and an extremely rude manner. Without any 'by your leave,' he said to me, also in French, 'What are you doing here? Have you a passport?' I replied very stupidly, as I see now: 'Monsieur, I thank you, mais ce n'est pas votre affaire.' Giving me a scowl, he departed. My soldier friend murmured an apology that 'Some men were bears, but they were all comrades.' He was plainly of good family, and had joined as a volunteer.

The next incident was the entrance of a very unprepossessing little man—evidently a railway servant, with a dirty face, curiously like the worm.² He came in and spoke to the men. I noticed the fat man whispering to him and looking across towards me, for by this time my senses were well on the alert. It must have been between nine and ten o'clock. The train was very badly lit, and the middle light had gone quite out. We had passed and stopped at little stations every five minutes or so, always full of excited people screaming and cheering, and waving flags and handkerchiefs, whilst all along the line sentries paced up and down with loaded rifles. I felt dreadfully tired and forlorn, and it was pouring with rain. The little man fidgeted about with the light, but couldn't light it. He went out and presently returned with an adjuster, and succeeded in producing a feeble light. At the next station a lot of soldiers got in and entirely filled the carriage. They were poorly dressed, rough-looking men, farmers and peasants, but they had kind faces. I only just had room in my corner after the confusion of their getting in and settling down. I saw that one of the men opposite me looked like a student, with a pale scholarly face and a charm of manner contrasting oddly with the rough, blunt good nature of his peasant comrades. In the opposite corner to me was another student, a nice cheerful little man who joked and laughed all the time. They took off their collars and cuffs—to keep them clean I suppose—and put them in their bundles, either knapsacks or queer little cardboard boxes. At this moment the queer little dirty man returned and went round to every soldier, telling them to hold out their hands. He gave each some black powder out of a funny shaped flask, which was snuff. He came up to me and thrust it into my face. On my

² Was he the detective?

refusing it he roared with laughter, and said something about *Damen*. Directly after this the train slowly crept into Rosenheim—a big garrison town, the last before the Austrian frontier. The station was brilliantly lit, all the platforms covered with men in uniform, and two very grand-looking officials were walking up and down. They had glittering helmets with plumes, and the light caught their swords and some magnificent orders they wore. I was just thinking that the old one looked like Prince Ferdinand Ludwig, whom Mrs. Gilbert^{*} and I met at Nymphenburg, when the train stopped with a jerk, and that instant an official entered my carriage, also magnificent but less so than the two others. He was followed by three more in khaki with covered helmets. He came straight up to me, and signed to me to follow him and bring my case. I stumbled out on to the brilliantly lit platform, which dazzled my eyes after the dark carriage. The instant I got down the biggest official—he was a very big man—made a sign. I was surrounded by soldiers and escorted in the wake of the two magnificent beings—down stairs and along passages, up more stairs into a huge military bureau. No one offered to carry my case—perhaps they were afraid it contained bombs. On entering, the door was locked and guarded by the soldiers, who saluted very respectfully.

My state of mind was hard to describe. I was too tired to be frightened, yet I noticed everything in the most curious way. The huge room was most luxurious, beautifully furnished, huge gilt mirrors, plants, crimson velvet sofas and chairs, a great clock—the time, I noticed, was ten o'clock—green-baize tables, a huge business-looking desk, all lit up by globes of electric light which made it lighter than day. All the subordinates were in service uniform, and their helmets were covered, with the exception of one man, who was clothed in white canvas.

Everyone looked very grave. My case I was told to put down on a green-baize table and open. The third man then came and turned out all my things. He opened my powder pots, sniffed at the eau-de-Cologne, felt the lining of my handkerchief sachet, opened my little travelling clock, even peered inside the works—perhaps he thought *that* was a bomb. Next he demanded my passes and passport. To my relief he said nothing about Servia. Then he came right close up to me, and looking straight into my eyes, told me to remove my hat, felt my hair, made me take off my gloves and looked very intently at my hands, first the backs, then the palms. Then he made a sign to the man in white canvas, who blew a whistle, and I was bundled into a kind of ante-chamber to the right side of this huge room.

^{*} Mrs. Gilbert was an American friend staying with me at Pension Quisana—she and I made a lot of delightful trips together, that to Nymphenburg being one of them.

Suddenly a woman appeared. She was a short, very strongly made female, with a horrid, hard, cruel face. I understood in a flash that she was to undress me.

The open space was guarded by the soldiers, and the alcove was lighted from the brilliantly lit room, but there was one corner which was rather dark and had a spring mattress covered with a grey blanket. Into this corner I crept. The woman followed and simply tore off my things and hit me all over. I can hardly write it even now. I know I screamed. I couldn't do up my dress, and she had to help me. She had a black moustache, and I thought in my agony she was a man, but I don't think she was really. I have a faint recollection of stumbling into the big room, of being told to pack up my case (the things were all tumbled about), and of being bowed out.

At the barrier they refused to let me pass, so I had to go back and ask an official to help me. This he did, and took me to the train. All the soldiers were looking out of the carriages. They came and helped me in—they were so nice and tactful. They patted my arm and shook my hand and cheered me; but I felt too upset to speak, so they let me alone, opened the window for me, and by degrees I recovered. If they hadn't been so nice I should have broken down. And afterwards they offered me lemonade and brought out photographs of their wives and children, some of them so tiny! They showed them to me and told me about their homes. I had the milk chocolate, and we all had some.

We got into Munich about 12.30 A.M. How glad I was! The station was full of soldiers—lying about all over the place, with their knapsacks for pillows. A huge crowd of people took up any room to spare. I had telegraphed to Mrs. C—— that I'd arrive late, and what was my joy to see her daughter Mary and a friend flattening their noses against the outside glass doors of the station. I just waved and somehow struggled through. Their first words were, 'Don't speak a word of English—Britain has *just* declared war against Germany.'

They had a motor, and in we got. I was glad I'd left my box behind, as it would *never* have got through. They'd got me a room for the night with a friend of Mrs. C——.

And now here I am in a room opposite Quisisana, in the flat of a nice old thing, Herr Dinzel, 'Professor of dancing.' Well, I've been having a different kind of dance, and it's not over yet either! Everyone at Quisisana is in a huge fright. Poor Fräulein Baer, the proprietress, is quite ill, and (her sister) Frau W.'s only son has gone to the Front. Frau W.'s husband, dear old Herr Obers,⁴ is doing Red Cross work at their

⁴ Ober-Leutnant. 'Herr Obers' is a courtesy seldom used by the Germans.

home. Dear wise Mrs. Wheeler gave me a charming embrace, but seems very vexed that I hadn't left the country. She says she told Mary to tell her mother to telegraph to me, but that's no use at all, for father cannot get any money through to me now, which Mrs. Wheeler says is terrible—to be stranded like a kind of shipwrecked mariner at such a time is too dreadful. This is echoed by Mrs. C——. Mrs. C—— is really frightened. I found her in the hall talking to some Americans, all with faces a mile long. After embracing me, Mrs. C—— said 'For Heaven's sake, Jessica, go back to your room and stay there. Don't be seen on the street or say one word of English. It's not safe, my dear.' The Americans said 'Wear the American flag'; but that is quite impossible, for I'm British, and never more proud of it than at this moment. What are they all doing at home, I wonder!

On coming back here old Herr Dinzel came and, with prancing steps and a great air of deportment, showed me over his house himself, quite ignoring his nice little wife, whom I should greatly have preferred. They think me American, and I won't undeceive them.

Baronin Lumarska⁵ has vanished in a great fright, likewise the two Roumanians. As for the Greeks who are staying in the pension, they are all mad with fear, that is with the exception of Mme. C. of Alexandria—such a pretty little mixture of a Parisian-Egyptian-Greek, with a nice, big, strong, good-looking husband like my cousin Jack, and three little monkeys of boys. Mme. C. was arrested for a Russian spy and held up three hours, she tells me, on her journey from Berlin to Munich.

The Greek mother and daughter Oeconomedes got into trouble at a shop through 'Lola's' losing her temper and throwing a parcel at the shopman. It was really the mother's fault, as she said something in Greek, and as the people think every foreigner is a spy, the shopman pricked up his ears and asked them where they came from. Lola's hot blood did the rest. It's a blessing they got back safe.

Old Frau Kusel, the Franco-German widow of a big steel manufacturer, is here. She had to motor back from Innsbruck, and spent, she said, a fortune. Americans have a warning put up in their Legation commanding all U.S. subjects to wear their flag and *not* to speak English in the streets. C. Zalocosta was roughly handled outside the Austrian Legation, as he was taken for an Englishman—his father, the Greek Secretary of State, and the Ambassador had to come to his rescue.

Heaps of Americans at the pension all caught in this trap, and fighting against the bars, vainly at present and for at least

⁵ The widow of a Russian Admiral.

two weeks, as troops alone can travel now. Everyone thinks it a miracle how I ever got through.

Munich is full of troops. All the theatres and concert halls and big public buildings are made into barracks. Every moment you hear a loud 'toot toot,' and large and small grey war motors dash past, full of soldiers and guns. Every German wears the flag, and the Americans wear their Stars and Stripes and the Bavarian badge—they tell the Germans, as a compliment, but really as a safeguard.

There is a family of German-American Jews in Quisisana from New York—a pretty spoilt dark-haired daughter, the sweetest little boy with blue-black hair and black eyes, and a very dressy nurse. Poppa is the owner of huge stores for ladies' underwear. Another trio, grandmamma, mamma, and a young girl of nineteen, so pretty and daintily dressed—her name is Dorothy. She and Beatrice, the little Jewess, spend their time in speeding parting guests and weeping on their necks. Beatrice took me to see her clothes, marvellous underwear, all silk and lace—'Poppa's business.' Momma is very pretty, too, in a typically Jewish way.

Mrs. Wheeler is as distinguished as ever, and one of the few who have *not* lost their heads. The American Library is overflowing with Americans and stray people of every nationality. The American *Munich Notes* are not complimentary to us British, and have a strong German flavour.

Saturday.—The Germans seem to be very victorious. They have already taken Liège in Belgium and sunk one of our war-ships—they say in the mouth of the Thames.

They are simply furious with Britain for declaring war and betraying them as they call it, and vent most of their spite on Sir E. Grey—pictures of him all over the place as that unmentionable person, the Devil, whilst the Kaiser figures as a Heaven-born Avenger—a Lohengrin or a Parsifal. All studios shut, of course. Our only dissipation is walking in Englischen Garten or going to the American Library. I can dream of returning to Seebruck, and have written to dear Frau Mittermeier. She and her nice husband did offer to keep me for nothing, but that was out of the question. I was the *only* English person, and they are not well off. I have asked her to try and send me some of my things.

August 16th, Sunday.—Mrs. C—— gave me Dr. Mussen's address, and I went to call. I found him and his little German wife in. He is a delightful sporting kind of man, and she is a sweet little thing. They seem to think matters are very grave, but are quite cheerful. I had tea with them, and walked in the Park. Their police dog is a very weird animal, and fascinates me—just like a wolf.

Monday.—More panic. Nothing to be got from American Consul except 'Madame, I am sorry, but we have received no instructions.'

Tuesday.—I am advised to go to the American Legation at once for a safety pass. I go and get one, but can get no satisfaction as to *any* way of getting out.

Wednesday morning.—The C——s tell me they have decided to go to Switzerland with some friends on Friday or Saturday, and Mrs. C—— will telegraph to father from Lucerne for money for me to go home. Can only go if I have a deposit of 10*l.* or 15*l.* in the Swiss Bank, which, of course, I have not.

Thursday.—Have just said good-bye to dear Mrs. C—— and Mary, as they found that the best train left to-day. Feel very sad, but glad they've got off.

Friday.—No help from American Legation. I hear that trains are being arranged for U.S. citizens only.

Saturday.—Special meeting for British. Of course *nothing done*—a great deal of talking, writing down names, and *no* result.

Very warm, and we all sit in the garden most of the time. Mrs. Wheeler has received a letter from her daughter at Bucharest, saying there is a rumour that the French have blown up the old Pinakothek, twenty yards from our pension! Rumour here that Servian King Peter is dead and Servia crushed. Germans victorious all the way, etc. Frau Dinzl shows me a card from her brother on the French battlefield—they are only allowed to say if they are well or ill, if good or bad weather, and when they heard last from their friends. Little Herr Dinzl appears. I think he has been wounded, but it is only his moustache curler. What a fussy old thing he is. He meddles and pokes his nose into everything, but has a kind little heart withal.

August 23rd, Sunday.—Nice plump American man and pale sweet-faced wife arrive. All the Americans are very smart, and have any amount of good sense and wholesome broad-mindedness, but are as helpless as I am and cannot get their cheques honoured.

I go over to Dr. Mussen, who says two ladies, the Bunsens, mother and daughter, are going and will arrive here to-morrow, when he will lend me money to go over to Britain with them. Get rather an alarming letter from Miss B——, plainly showing she is afraid about her mother's breaking down, and naturally doesn't care about having more responsibilities in the shape of me. Am also called on by Frau Graetz, who says she has heard from Charlotte in Berlin, and will help me.

Monday.—Call on Frau Prof. Graetz in their charming house. See Prof. Graetz—both are very nice. They fear they will not be able to spare enough money to take me back, but the kind

old Professor finally says he will lend me 6*l.* if I can borrow the rest.

I get a yellow War Post Office card saying a letter has come for me, and is at General Post Office; also that I must be photographed and get certificate of birth. However, I get my letter with the help of my passport alone.

Tuesday and Wednesday spent in trying to get off. Finally find we can go on Friday morning. The proprietress of the pension is in a great way, as I've been warned out by the police. She said she told the police I wasn't there, which was a great mistake, but she said her pension would be closed if it were known she had any English.

Dr. and Mrs. M. and I go to the Swiss Consul to get a pass. We meet Baron and Baroness de la Ferté Goncer, whom I knew in Paris. We are told no one can pass the frontier, and I get a letter from Charlotte to the same effect—great consternation. I fly down to Nymphenburg to try and get a pass from the Dutch Consul. He is very nice and a great sportsman. He shows me his splendid collection of stuffed animals, birds and horns, tusks, etc., bison, hippopotamus and elephant tusks, crocodile skins, antelope horns; also a fine show of weapons from Sumatra.

Wednesday.—Dr. M. goes to the Chief of the Police, and is told we *can* get out. We have tea at Rumpelmeier's.

Good-byes to everybody. Many embraces. Finis Quisisana.

Thursday.—Get up at 5 A.M. Kind little Frau Dinzl brings me hot water and hot milk. She and her little dancing Herr see me off—much waving of pocket handkerchiefs. Meet Bunsen family at the station. Kindest good-byes—.

We start—off at last. Lovely carriage all to ourselves. Old Mrs. B. radiant, and gives Miss B. and myself lectures on ancient history, geographical sketch of 10,000 years ago. I am very much amused, but doubt if it is strictly accurate. I notice the sentries pacing the line, and the warning notices in the train about bombs: 'Don't put your head out of the windows,' 'Don't walk on the platforms,' 'Don't keep the windows open at tunnels or going past bridges.' Many bombs have been thrown from the trains. I see the source of the Rhine. We arrive at Oberhausen about 2 P.M. Here we have our first change. The station is full of soldiers in khaki, with khaki-covered helmets.* We do a little discreet walking round, and have tea, starting again at 4 P.M. Our carriage is saloon. In it we find a pale German governess with whom Miss B. makes friends, and who wants to go to London. She gives the Bunsens much advice, which they don't take. We part at 12, when we stay and she goes on.

* Exactly like the khaki our own soldiers wear, only their buttons are painted.

Friday.—We have to leave by slow train about noon. Train is very, very slow—about five miles an hour. We arrive at Nürnberg about 7 P.M., and change again, and decide to push on to Aschaffenburg and stay the rest of the night. Two nice Americans, Italian Jews, delightfully vulgar, explain they are going to try and board special American train at Aschaffenburg. The woman, who is just like a gollywog doll, is struck by my likeness to 'Sam's wife.' She is evidently fond of 'Sam's wife' and 'Sam' too, and makes herself sweet to me in consequence; but I am so tired I can only answer her with difficulty. We arrive at Aschaffenburg about 1 A.M., say good-bye to jolly Amurricans, who have told us many alarming tales of sentries, spies, etc.

Saturday.—We go to hotel, leaving at 6 A.M. next morning. We mysteriously run into the German governess again. Kind proprietor at Aschaffenburg has tried to help us to get the American special train, but it is no good. They won't let any English board it.

At Frankfurt, which is the next stop, a bomb brings down a French aeroplane with a terrific crash; then Mainz, where we stay six hours, and a kind guard escorts us round the town. Poor man! he had only lost his wife one month before; his children are too small to work, so he has to stop at home every morning to cook and wash for them. We gave him apples and biscuits. He showed us the Cathedral and the Rhine. A man, beery and round and fat, with a red face, dogged me round the town. Luckily old Mrs. B. didn't notice, but Miss B. did, and was very much annoyed in consequence. At the station the ticket man stares at me hard, causing more palpitations. We have supper of coffee and stale cakes in a tea shop. I am frightfully tired. We get a nice carriage, but a woman and two children get in and make a fuss about the window being open. At one stop, at apparently no town, they catch a Russian spy underneath the train and shoot him. We stop every ten minutes or so, changing at a place I forget, where we arrive about 12, and have to wait $4\frac{1}{2}$ dismal hours—sentries everywhere—dreary, ill-lit little station, and pouring rain. I go on the platform, and am followed up and down by an armed sentry. I go inside, and am watched by another man, but am too worn out to care. We get another train about 4.30. We feel 'bucked up' a bit by glorious views of the Rhine and the famous old castles. Lorelei's rock is magnificent. Change again at Coblenz, 6 A.M. We have breakfast and go round the town feeling more dead than alive. Still we are determined to push on to Köln, so on we go. At Bonn some very nasty people get in, evidently quite mad against the British; they try to make a row about the Bunsens' baggage. They say horrid things directed at us.

Trains of French prisoners pass us; also trains laden with Belgian spoils, motor cars decorated with shrubs and flowers and captured flags.

We arrive at Köln at last about 4 P.M., when I collapse. Strange to say, old Mrs. B. seems none the worse, but she is very plucky.

August 31st, Monday.—A night in bed makes all the difference to me. I go down to find Mrs. and Miss B. in the hotel garden talking to two men. One looks like a military governor. Am introduced, and find one is a Baron von K., who is waiting to be sent as Governor to ——. The other is an interpreter, who acts for the Government. Both are very nice, and tell me they will do everything in their power to help us out. The Baron is extremely polished. He kindly orders whisky and soda as a compliment to me—though I won't take any—and drinks our health. Herr Scholtz, though quite a simple man, is equally nice if more laboured in his politeness. As he is very anxious to send a letter to his wife and family in London—it appears he is a draper and wants his wife to get out his money and come over to Germany—he will do anything on earth to get us over to England. We are told, however, that it is impossible to leave by train.

Baron von K. tells me many interesting points, which I will try to write down. He also draws a plan¹ for a joke, and signs his initials. He talks about 44 years' preparation for this War. He tells me widows' hats are already being made by enterprising firms; that 400 men from Köln have been killed already. He says Canada's present of flour to Britain is safely reposing in Hamburg; that the Russian army gives itself up, and so poor are they that they sell their horses at 20 mks. Their clothes are pinned together with safety pins; one English prisoner here in Köln is raving mad, etc., etc. We hear that the English church is offered as a hospital.

September 2nd, Wednesday.—All last night huge searchlights swept the sky, about six, one over another, and made it as light as day. A sentry is always on the roof of our hotel to keep watch over the Rhein. This Hôtel du Nord—now that France is an enemy the *du* has been painted out—should be overflowing at this season, with at least 200 Americans and English and French, and behold only six, counting the Baron. This afternoon the Baron brought his son, a nice youth in white uniform with green facings. The Baron showed me his button topped by a crown, and explained that our King George the Fifth was Colonel of their regiment.

We all had tea in the garden. Baron von K. told us more

¹ This he afterwards made me tear up.

German points of view, plans, etc., which Miss B. afterwards informed me Herr Scholtz said he had no business to do.

The Baron declared Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith, etc., had misled King George, and made him play Germany false, Germany having no choice but to go through Belgium to get to France. Russia also he blamed, declaring she had mobilised first, and Germany only did so in self-defence. He was absolutely confident about Germany's success, thanks to her vast and magnificently organised army; also her extraordinarily clever army of spies which enabled them to know every paper and dispatch drawn up between Britain, France, and Russia. He vowed Paris would be taken within two months from this date, but said that the conquest of Russia would take longer. Warned me *not* to stay in London, as Germany's plans were all laid and in one night an aeroplane army would sweep over and utterly destroy our capital. He commented on the cleverness with which the *Königin Luise* had laid the mines and sunk the *Amphion* at the very mouth of the Thames—finally ending after a lot more to the same effect, such as our fleet were in hiding, and couldn't be found—England was on strike, etc.—that after the War he would come over and marry a British girl. I felt very cross, and said we weren't conquered *quite* so easily, and that I—this on being told I should stay in Köln as the best and safest spot in Europe—preferred to be in my own country and stand or fall with it, which is true.

At last we got up to go, and said farewell with many bows, and the Baron made Mrs. B., who is a dear old thing of 73, a beautiful bow, and laying his hand on his heart said 'This, Madam, has been the happiest day of my life'; as I dare say it had, if he really thought we believed all he said about his country's powers. I forgot that he also spoke of the spoil Germany would pay herself back by, the huge sums she would get from France and Belgium; and I presume Britain, though he was too polite or perhaps too diplomatic to say so. Russia was too poor. He, and in fact all the other Germans I met, affected huge contempt for the Russian and French armies; as for our British Army it was nothing, nothing at all.

Then, of course, the Germans accused the Belgians of frightful acts of atrocity, and he (the Baron) said a nephew of his own had been wounded in his heel—the Belgians took him prisoner and cut off his hands and feet and nose, and burnt out his eyes. They also did frightful things to any Germans they could find in Belgium, not even sparing the women and children. 'And what do *you* do to the French and Belgian women and children?' I ventured to ask. 'Ach, gnädiges Fräulein—how can you ask me?—to us your sex and the helpless little ones are sacred'—which sounded very nice.

I went into the glorious church, though outlanders were *not* allowed. Many people in black were saying mass, poor things. Bells were always tolling, but that was for the victories, which seemed to be every minute.

I saw a lot of prisoners, and was told they were English; 'we have so many,' said the Baron, 'we don't know where to put them.'

The great equestrian statue is opposite my window. King Wilhelm the First looking over the Rhine.

There is a great difference of fashions between the north and south of the Fatherland. The south is much smarter, being so near Vienna. In the north, huge antiquated hats are worn by very dowdy-looking women.

Herr Scholtz arrived with a very concerned face to say a final order has been given that *no* English subject may cross the frontier. We have all to go to the American Consul as a last hope. We did go and found him most kind. He took our passports and wrote a very nice letter to the Police Governor and the Military Governor, so we can only wait and hope.

Later—it's all right, the Military Governor has given leave, and we go at 11 A.M. to-morrow. It seems too good to be true. Still we aren't on board yet.

Thursday Evening.—Here we are—actually *on* the boat, but still we don't feel quite safe, for our pass was made out by the Governor without mention of our nationality. We got to the dock and found the entrance to the boat blocked by four sentries. Miss B. gave the passport—my name is put with theirs. The man was looking at it when old Mrs. B. ran up to him with a wildly anxious expression and screamed 'from the Governor.' The man turned round sharply and I thought 'We are done for now,' but apparently the Governor's signature was too important, so he reluctantly let us pass. Two other English women, coming directly after us, were stopped. The boat is quite nice, but has very few berths—of course, all taken. A buffet, however, is something. The boat seems to be crammed with people of every nationality. Lots of Americans—it is an 'American boat'—or for neutral countries. We passed down the Rhine under the huge bridges, great boats pass laden with foodstuffs for the War—even this little passenger boat is loaded with sacks of flour, apples, and grain. An enormous herd of cows are feeding by the water, waiting to be killed and sent to the Front, poor things. Further on, a great flock of sheep, also war victims.

You may be sure every one had plenty to say. The Americans on the boat, far from being in sympathy with Germany, were wild with rage against her. They had all had a struggle, and said 10,000 had gone in the last week, but quite 20,000 more were

trying to get out. A rather fine-looking old man, his equally fine-looking wife and daughter, were particularly indignant, and by the way they talked about the frightful position of the 'buyers' in Gay Paree, I came to the conclusion they must have a large dress store in New York.

One very odd-looking little man was dressed in clerical attire, but his clothes seemed at least one size too large. He sat in out-of-the-way corners, and at any big town the boat stopped at he donned black spectacles. I somehow thought he was a spy, but may have been wrong.

Had a long conversation with the bright American girl. 'Poppa' then came up and began to make jokes. He said his wife was very fond of poking about dusting her china, and 'One day I told her, Now, Eliza, when I order your fine tombstone I shall put on it "dust to dust"—what did she say? She hasn't stopped saying it yet.' The girl told me how smart they were in New York, and about Yellowstone Park and their trip over the Rockies! 'Indeed,' said Poppa, 'you'll have nowhere else to go now, unless you go over to Japan, for you don't catch *me* going into Europe again in a hurry.'

Rotterdam, Sept. 5, Saturday.—Not a trace of my box to be found. I have been to the English Consul, who says he will try to find it for me, and send it home if I give address.

Sept. 6, Sunday.—We arrived in London last night, after rather a nice trip over. Quaint little Dutch doctor, who is going to help the Red Cross at the Front, talked music, art, cubism, and then war. He gave me his theories. He is not a friend to us. He says we are greedy and don't fight fair, that we want too much, but that no one can hurt his own beloved Netherlands, for they will open their sluices and 'behold, where are our enemies?' He got so excited, the purser came up and warned him in Dutch 'to take care what he said.' This made him furious. He shook back his mane of hair, and, bowing to me, said 'Ha—ah, h'exca-use me, Mlle., but I will go and talk wid dat ma-an.' He came back calmer, and apparently 'dat ma-an' had done most of the talking to some effect, for he spoke again in a subdued way, still, however, about the War. He said the Germans could not be crushed—that is, their army—'but commercially, yes!' That they had made a huge blunder in going into France through Belgium, and committing such crimes there. He said he would send me a war card if he was not killed. Poor little man. He also added 'I know, but I cannot tell what I know.'

Our first cheering sight was a torpedo-boat destroyer! Oh, how we cheered; and it was only then I really felt safe. God save the King!

JESSICA COSSAR EWART.

CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE AMERICAN NOTE

THE American Note is of little intrinsic importance; it is of importance only in so far as it is a symptom. The anxiety of all the English newspapers, and of many of the American newspapers, to emphasise the 'friendly' character of the Note is natural enough; but this undue stress which is being laid on the disinterestedness of the United States will not deceive anybody who is acquainted with the economic and political conditions there. The Note does not even represent what the governing classes in the United States are actually thinking about the War; it does not, except vaguely, hint at their ultimate intentions. If we judge the Note not merely as an isolated official document but as the expression of American anger which has found its first vent in this form, we shall be much better able to understand its significance than if we considered it merely at its face value.

Why, ostensibly, are the Americans annoyed? On this point the Note is sufficiently clear. It is complained that we have laid down certain regulations with regard to contraband, that we have not consistently followed our own rules, and that in consequence hundreds of American exporters are in doubt whether or no to ship to neutral countries the goods which have been ordered from them. It is admitted that only seven or eight vessels—about one per cent. of the total number searched—have been brought before a Prize Court; but it is asserted, though on vague enough evidence, that more than 800 ships have been detained for 'unreasonable' periods on the high seas while their cargoes were being examined. Unofficially these American complaints had been heard before they were embodied in a formal Note; and, unofficially again, answers had been made to them. It was pointed out that one or two vessels from America with cargoes of cotton were found to be smuggling contraband goods concealed in the apparently innocent cargo; and it was further pointed out that the American exports of certain articles to neutral countries such as Denmark and Holland, especially copper, had greatly increased since August last. Figures were quoted in the official interim Reply which proved this point beyond a doubt. The value of American exports to Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Italy, for

example, was in November 1913 558,000 dols., 377,000 dols., 477,000 dols., and 2,971,000 dols. respectively. The corresponding figures for 1914 were 7,101,000 dols., 2,858,000 dols., 2,318,000 dols., and 4,781,000 dols. There is something to be said for the American contention that these neutral countries are now purchasing from the United States articles which they formerly purchased from one or more of the belligerent countries; but this does not at all explain the huge increase in the figures. It is perfectly well known to everyone, including the officials in the State Department at Washington, that Germany and Austria are importing as much as they possibly can through the medium of neutral countries; and we all know the dazzlingly high profits to be made by smuggling contraband. The enemy countries want wheat, leather, foodstuffs, and, above all, copper; and they are prepared to pay high prices.

Indeed, if the search for contraband had not threatened to interfere very greatly with the American cotton and copper exports, there would probably have been no need to present the Note at all. As it was, the Note was a precaution rather than a protest, for the copper interests, which had most to lose, had not done so badly since the declarations of war. As the English Reply points out, Italy, to quote only one instance, imported 15,202,000 lb. of copper in the first three weeks of December 1913, and 36,285,000 lb. in the same period of 1914. Is it a matter for wonder that the Italian Government only a few weeks ago traced the existence of a syndicate which was making enormous profits by sending copper to Germany, although the export of copper had been strictly prohibited? The justice of the English Reply had, in fact, been admitted in advance to such an extent that the American newspapers preferred to emphasise our 'inconsistency' rather than our perfectly legitimate exercise of the right of search. So well did the Americans realise that the fault was not all on one side that they themselves took steps to check unscrupulous exporters. On the 2nd of January—i.e. after the despatch of the Note and before the receipt of the interim Reply—the Department of Commerce issued a notice to American shippers about the importance of making out complete and accurate manifests. The notice laid stress on the necessity of not confusing contraband with non-contraband goods, and went on to call attention to the English Government's complaints of incomplete manifests and smuggling. There had been a previous order issued by the Secretary to the Treasury, Mr. McAdoo, to the effect that manifests were not to be made public until thirty days after the vessels to which they related had sailed, as 'it was unfair for British agents to discover the shipment of contraband cargoes.' This order was, of course, cancelled by the subsequent

Government notification—its absurdity was so obvious that it was ridiculed even in the United States.

The efforts of the American Government to carry its theoretically correct diplomatic attitude into effect did not stop here. On the 5th of January it followed up this communication with the announcement that shippers could, if they wished, obtain a Government certificate as to the nature of the cargo carried after an inspection of their vessels by United States Customs authorities. This scheme is purely voluntary, and an exporter who is willing to take the risk of shipping contraband is not called upon to trouble about it.

From the comments in the American Press early in January, however, it became clear that, although the Government Note dealt only with the subject of contraband, there were many other matters in the minds of the men who represented American commercial 'interests.' It will be recollected that the United States Government, at an early stage in the War, had proposed to purchase several interned German liners, with a view to the building up of a new American mercantile marine. Realising what a great advantage this would give to German-Americans, who control almost the entire copper trade of the United States, the English Government promptly declared that it would not recognise any such purchases. Thanks to the efforts of the American shipping interests, and of the other commercial interests which were likely to benefit by the existence of an American mercantile marine; a financial group was formed and was authorised to buy a small vessel belonging to the Hamburg-Amerika Line (the notorious *Dacia*). Since then a Bill has even been introduced into the Senate to provide for the Government purchase of German ships. This measure is unofficial, and is not likely, as yet, to attract to itself the support of the Government; but the mere fact that it could be introduced at all shows what powerful groups are at work in opposition to British interests and to the strict American neutrality for which President Wilson has pleaded.

There have been significantly few German complaints about the strictness of America's neutrality; and there was little need for them. Neutrality may be infringed passively as well as actively; and it is a tribute to the German influence at Washington that America's passive violation of neutrality, like her active violation in the form of contraband running, should have been directed against this country. The United States, more than any other nation, has always urged the importance of peace, of arbitration, and of respect for international law. So long as these things were merely abstract doctrines they found no more seductive advocates, no more powerful defenders, than the men who are most prominent in American public life, including

Mr. Wilson, Mr. W. J. Bryan, Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Taft, and Mr. Philander Knox. Practically every member of the last three Administrations of the United States raised his voice at one time or another on behalf of international treaties and conventions. Two events in the last two years brought these abstractions suddenly to earth and compelled their American advocates to try to apply their views practically. The result in each case was failure and collapse. One event was the present War; and the same influences will be seen to have affected the other.

The Germans have admittedly broken several clauses of The Hague and Geneva Conventions in the course of the autumn campaign. Many of the political philosophers of Prussia, many of the leaders of the German Army, have openly given it as their opinion that Conventions of this kind do not hold good in war time; and, to do them justice, they have applied their principles consistently. Mines have been laid in neutral waters, on the high seas; hostages have been shot; villages have been deliberately burnt for the purpose of terrorising the civil population; undefended towns have been bombarded. American travellers, American journalists, American consuls even, have borne witness to the brutality of the invaders in Belgium. Indignant protests have been made, now and then reprisals have been threatened; and in consequence the desire to terrorise merely for the sake of terrorising seems to have been checked by the German General Staff. But in all these protests the American Government took no official part. They were not encouraged by the President, who deprecated interference of any kind. The most cherished principles of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bryan have been openly scouted; yet Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bryan have remained silent. It was only Mr. Roosevelt who made a strong protest on behalf of the sanctity of international law as represented by The Hague Convention. The Germans cannot, in strict justice, be blamed for doing what they have always threatened to do—for carrying their theories into practice. But what are we to think of the present American Administration, the members of which have worked hard to negotiate arbitration treaties with half the countries in the world? How are we to secure proselytes for this new international religion if its priests are seized with dumb devils as soon as it is attacked?

A time did come when the American Government thought it necessary to interfere. Its abstract doctrines of justice and humanity had been shattered one by one, as such doctrines, at moments of peril, always are when they are supported by nothing stronger than the mere wish which is father to the principle. The spiritual mirage of the American people had disappeared, and nobody felt a whit the worse; but strong action had to be

taken when material interests were threatened. In spite of the waspish comments of pro-German writers in the American Press, England had gradually cleared the Atlantic trade routes as she had cleared the North Sea; and the more the English and French cruisers engaged 'rounded up' the German warships which were menacing our commerce, the more strict did the search for contraband become. It is clear from the figures quoted in Sir Edward Grey's interim Note that the Americans were not really concerned with the safety of their current trade; they were much more concerned with the safety of the trade they expected still to do. Four powerful groups, representing cotton, copper, shipping, and finance, were led by their 'interests'—not by their respect for international law or for The Hague Convention—to adopt what was, in effect, a pro-German attitude; and no one who is familiar with American politics will hesitate for an instant to declare that it was at the behest of these groups, or rather of their political representatives, that the Note of the 28th of December was drawn up and delivered.

It has frequently been urged in our Press since the American Note was handed in that the 'interests' just specified are under the control of Trusts, and that, as the Democratic party now in power is opposed to Trusts, President Wilson cannot be accused of having drawn up the Note at the instigation of financial interests. This explanation will not hold. Nearly every history of Trusts in America, apart from the evidence given by Trust officials before governmental boards of inquiry, shows that large industries in the United States are almost entirely in the hands of Trusts, and that the Trusts in their turn control the political parties. In 1897 the Sugar Trust had become so powerful as to bring about a senatorial investigation, and Mr. Havemeyer, president of the company, acknowledged that it was the practice of his Trust to contribute to Republican funds in Republican States and to Democratic funds in Democratic States. 'We get a good deal of protection from our contributions,' he remarked in the course of evidence which has become classic.

Place 300 or 400 Republicans or Democrats of approved honesty in Congress [says Mr. Franklin Pierce (*Political Morality in the Making of Trusts*)], continue them there for a few years under the temptation of such an alliance of public power with private business, and a considerable proportion of their number will yield to the temptation to make money out of tariff legislation.

A score of other books might be quoted to the same effect. It is well known that not even Mr. Roosevelt himself could have started his 'Progressive' group if it had not been for the financial assistance rendered to his new party's exchequer by influential

Trust magnates. It is stupid for American sympathisers, of whom there are far too many among us, to pretend that the present Democratic régime does not represent the Trusts; for it does unquestionably represent several of the most important Trusts in the country.

Why, then, should these four specified groups of 'interests' adopt the attitude they have shown? It is easy enough to understand the position of the copper and cotton shippers. Their trade has been disorganised; their profits, although they have increased, are threatened; their pockets are likely to be touched. Cotton has suffered more than copper. But why should the shipping and financial interests also, in most cases, show themselves anti-British?

Reference has been made to two events which applied the test of practical experience to American ideals and found them wanting. One was the present War; the other was the Panama Canal Treaty. In the former case America did not protest when her principles were violated; in the latter case, which dates from 1912, she violated her own principles with equanimity, and expressed great surprise that her action should have been questioned. When we speak of scraps of paper, let us remember that the United States—the staunch upholder of international law only so long as it is on her side—treated the Hay-Pauncefote Agreement of 1901 as a scrap of paper two years before the German Chancellor uttered his celebrated phrase; two years before the real American view was concisely summarised by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg. By this Agreement, which regulates the attitude of the United States and England towards the Panama Canal, and is strictly known as the Isthmian Canal Convention, it was provided (Clause III., subs. 1) that :

The Canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing these rules on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any such nation or its citizens or subjects in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic or otherwise. Such conditions and charges of traffic shall be just and equitable.

Eleven years after the signing of this document the United States, even in the opinion of American legal authorities, deliberately overrode this clause by arrogating to herself the right to give preferential treatment to her own coastwise traffic, on the specious and ridiculous plea that the expression 'all nations' meant simply all foreign nations and did not include the United States. The fierce disputes over the clause in 1912 and 1913, which followed this decision of Congress, may be within the memory of some of us. One section of American opinion, including all the legal authori-

ties of note, most of the leaders of the Democratic party, and President Wilson himself, insisted that the American Government was not justified in giving American shippers preferential treatment, while another section urged that the Government could do what it liked with 'its own' canal—a truly Prussian attitude. 'The Canal is ours, and we'll do what we like with it,' and 'To hell with the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty!' were arguments frequently heard in the lobbies of Congress, and faithfully recorded in the British and American Press at the time.

Need it be added that every American shipping interest was enthusiastic over the proposal that special terms should be given to American-owned vessels, flying the American flag? It was suggested that the preferential treatment should be for 'coastwise' traffic; but this expression was interpreted in a very liberal spirit indeed. 'Coastwise traffic,' in the opinion of American shippers, meant traffic from a port in one American possession to a port in another American possession, so that a vessel could sail from New York to the Philippines, calling at any number of ports on the way, and still be entitled to the benefits of the preferential scheme. As President Wilson eventually—but only with much difficulty—carried his point in 1913, thereby equalising the Canal tolls for all nations, including the United States, the American shipping interests were never satisfied, and it is fully recognised by all parties in America that the political representatives of the shipping interests intend to raise the question of preferential tolls again as soon as an opportunity presents itself. It was in connexion with this bitter dispute that the smallness of the American mercantile marine was pointed out, and ever since shipowners have been seeking an opportunity of adding to their trading fleets. It was because the purchase scheme at the beginning of the War provided for a means of doing this without complying with the strict requirements of the normal law (which demands that vessels flying the American flag shall be built in American yards) that shipowners were so anxious to see the interned German liners purchased by the Government. That this purchase scheme had to be abandoned because of the English Government's opposition to it did not sweeten the tempers of American shipowners or soften their feelings towards us. It should be recollected that nearly every American coastal shipping company is controlled, if not completely owned, by one or more of the large railways; and the influence of American railroad syndicates on Republican and Democratic Congresses alike is notorious.

The feelings of American financiers may be judged from a Reuter telegram published in the London papers a day or two

after the text of the Note was made known. Having referred to other aspects of the Note, the correspondent added :

All the Central and South American nations have been invited to send representatives to Washington early in the spring to discuss with the Treasury Department and American financiers the various financial and commercial problems arising out of the War, and also the means of bringing these nations into closer commercial relations with the United States. Officials of the State Treasury and Commerce Departments express the view that in the Pan-American movement lies the chief hope of the South American States to secure financial independence of Europe, and they suggest the possibility of New York becoming a serious competitor of London for supremacy as the world's financial centre. Officials who have heard the plans for the Conference discussed expect it to result in the establishment of many connexions between business houses in North and South America, and also the formation of international banks. They argue that there are millions of American money lying idle which might well be invested south of the equator, replacing English capital, now so much in demand at home.

As American financiers know quite well, South America is not indebted to 'Europe' for capital, but to England, so the reference to 'financial independence of Europe' is superfluous. The English financial interest in Central and South America is estimated at 1,200,000,000*l.*; and no other country has invested money in South America in anything like this proportion. It is questionable whether the amount of United States capital now directly invested in the southern half of the Continent is more than a sixth of this sum. All the money available in the United States up to the latter part of the nineteenth century, and a very fair amount of European money as well, was utilised in developing the United States and the few outlying American possessions. It is only within the last ten years or so that American financiers have ventured to extend the scope of their operations to South America and China. These foreign operations were greatly hampered by the American banking and currency system, which had been the direct means of causing several financial panics between the termination of the Civil War and the end of the century; and the assistance of London, as the financial capital of the world, had usually to be invoked. This dependence on London was not at all to the taste of American financiers; but before extending the scope of their foreign operations a preliminary move was made with the object of setting their own financial house in order. The Glass Bill of 1913, more commonly known as the Currency Law, is of much more than local interest; for it is the first step towards achieving the ambitious American design of forging powerful economic links between the United States and the southern republics.

The currency system of the United States had not changed,

essentially, since the National Bank Act of 1863. This was frankly an emergency measure, and was devised with the object of giving the United States a market for Government securities. It made absolutely no provision for the development of foreign commerce or for the unwieldy banking system which has long outgrown it. Up to the passing of the Glass Law—which has not yet come into effective operation, and will not necessarily be a successful measure—there were some 25,000 banks in the United States. More than 7000 of these were 'National' banks—i.e. they were licensed under the Bank Act—while the remainder were chartered companies (practically Trust companies) licensed by the various States. The National Banks alone could issue notes and be depositories for Government funds. It was always an easy matter to found a National Bank; for, if the promoters could prove to the satisfaction of the authorities at Washington that there was 'local need,' the authorisation was forthcoming if the minimum amount of capital (5000*l.*) had been subscribed. To render this peculiar system of decentralisation still more complete branch banking was forbidden. No provision whatever was made for a central banking institution corresponding to the Bank of England, the Bank of France, or the Reichsbank. Even the National Banks were linked together only by the authority of the Comptroller of the Currency.

It has been urged in favour of this system that it provides a sound market for Government bonds, that it ensures a safe currency, and enables every community to organise its own banking facilities. In its disfavour is the fact that, whatever else it might ensure, it never ensured leadership; it never enabled the bankers of the United States to co-operate. In view of the co-operation which is so necessary when foreign loans are under consideration this is a very important point. One consequence of the old American system was that it led to a period of tension every year when the time came to finance the crop movement; and at times of financial dislocation, of course, the whole financial fabric of the country threatened to fall. These reactions were felt beyond the borders of the United States, and bankers all the world over frequently emphasised the need of a strong central financial reservoir at Washington.

It thus happens that in the United States there is no discount rate, no market for commercial paper, no re-discounting facilities. It follows that when American merchants are engaging in foreign trade they find it easier to make their financial arrangements with bankers outside the United States—which means that London is able to levy tribute, to use the expression of New York financial experts, on American exports. It was inevitable that, with the extension of America's foreign trade, the whole

question of international banking should be discussed, though even now critics like Mr. Vanderlip hold that the Glass Law does not go far enough in the direction of that centralisation which is so necessary. The new measure is described as a Bill 'to provide for the establishment of Federal reserve banks, for furnishing an elastic currency, affording means for re-discounting paper, and to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes.' The details applicable to the United States, although they are of considerable interest, need not concern us. The banks of the country are now to be organised into districts, with a local bankers' bank in each district. Each of these local central banks (Federal reserve banks) will have a minimum capital of 1,000,000*l.*, and the whole system will be under the supervision of the Federal Reserve Board at Washington.

The scope of foreign operations allowed to the Federal reserve banks is of the greatest interest to us at the present time. The permission given them to discount acceptances based upon the exportation or importation of goods, maturing in not more than ninety days, and to accept drafts or bills of exchange having not more than six months' sight to run and growing out of a transaction involving the exportation of goods, is a direct blow aimed at the London banks. Further, these Federal reserve banks are empowered 'to purchase and sell in the open market, either for or to domestic or foreign banks or individuals, bankers' bills, cable transfers, and bills of exchange,' to deal in gold coin and bullion at home and abroad, to invest in the bonds and short-time obligations of other countries than the United States, to establish as often as necessary a minimum rate of discount to accommodate commerce, and to maintain banking accounts in foreign countries.

This new Currency Law, it is hardly too much to say, is not yet completely understood even in the United States, and the Home Rule controversy last year prevented our own statesmen from giving as much attention to it as they should have done. Now, however, as is evident from the telegrams which have come to hand during the last few weeks, the highest banking abilities in the United States are proceeding to take advantage of the measure in such a way as to tighten the grasp of the northern upon the southern republics. In other words, when the War is over, and every European country emerges from it financially weakened—an inevitable result—we in particular will find ourselves confronted with a serious rival on the other side of the Atlantic. Whatever else happened, it was felt that our banking system was safe from attack. We had such large surpluses of years past that we were enabled to finance the development of

our own oversea possessions and of many foreign countries. We shall not be able to resume these operations, at least on the former scale, for a few years. Our foreign investments are now estimated to be 4,000,000,000*l.* bringing us interest every year to the amount of 200,000,000*l.* We are not now adding to these large investments.

These are a few of the economic circumstances which have produced the American Note. Some of the political and social factors which have not been without their influence on it also deserve to be mentioned. It is not sufficiently realised in England that the sentimental references which we so often make to our 'cousins' across the sea are seldom reciprocated. The American nation as a whole does not love us; and why should we expect it to do so? Of the population of nearly 92,000,000 shown by the last census nearly 14,000,000 were foreign-born. Only some 50,000,000 Americans were native-born, of native parentage; the remainder were children born in America of foreign-born parents. Of the 'natives' 10,000,000 were negroes and Indians, who can hardly be expected to understand the ramifications of international politics; and large unrecorded numbers were the descendants of Irish and German settlers, who, whatever they may think of the present War, are not necessarily friendly to this country. It need not be supposed that the 'foreign' population of the United States is sympathetic to us, for it consists for the most part of Germans, Austrians, Swedes, Hungarians, and Russian and Polish Jews. Of the 92,000,000 of people inhabiting the United States perhaps one third, but almost certainly not more, are of Anglo-Saxon descent.

It will not be denied that the Anglo-Saxon Americans, if they are not very numerous, are influential. In the Eastern States, and even more in the Southern States, old families are held in respect; and the social power of the old English and Dutch families cannot be disregarded. It is among these classes that the best Americans are to be found. It is these classes that provide the United States with its most upright judges and men of business, with its gifted scholars, with politicians who respect the interests of their town, their State, or their country before their own. The feelings of these classes, the nearest approach to an aristocracy that America can show, were admirably indicated in a short article contributed to the January issue of this Review by Mr. Oscar Parker, himself an American. One incident mentioned by Mr. Parker is well worth recalling. His English ancestors settled in New England in 1632, yet his father, despite seven or eight generations of American ancestry, could still feel the dominance of the original parent country so much as to say to his son 'My boy, England is home.' There are such

men in America, and the visitor may meet them with pleasure and profit; but they are rare.

Whatever we may think of the machinations of the numerous groups of pro-Germans and 'Gaels,' we ought to be pleased to know that the sympathies of the best classes in the United States are, on the whole, on our side. It should be made clear, nevertheless, that large sections of the Americans, taking them generally and not subdividing them into this or that class, are antagonistic to us because we have disturbed their trade. The cotton States and the copper States are very angry indeed; and the Pacific States have never overcome their repugnance to our alliance with Japan. Take these circumstances into consideration and add to them the economic factors already mentioned. If it be suggested that we should look to Mr. Roosevelt and his party for sympathy, let the internal situation in the United States be remembered. Mr. Roosevelt is a potential candidate for the presidency. The whole nation approves the terms of Mr. Wilson's 'strong' Note—it delights the average American to think that effete Europe is taking notice of him. Can Mr. Roosevelt, whatever his views may be, afford to declare publicly that the Note should not have been written? It is not likely; and the statement, even if it were made, would have no effect. No; we have a powerful and unsympathetic rival in the United States of America, and the sooner we realise the fact without sentimentality the better.

J. M. KENNEDY.

THE PROBLEM OF THE NEAR EAST

A PRELIMINARY SURVEY

HIGH hopes are founded upon the issue of the present War. It is destined, we would fain believe, to untie many historical knots; to solve many political problems; to determine many questions which have baffled the skill of many generations of statesmen and diplomatists. Some may be tempted to suggest that the soldiers and sailors, unhampered by politics and diplomacy, would have cut the knots long ago, and such critics can point to the effective intervention of Codrington at Navarino. But this is a parenthesis which it is unnecessary to pursue. Certain it is that among the difficulties which remain to be solved there is none more intricate or tangled, and none the solution of which is more eagerly or more confidently anticipated, than the problem of the Near East.

Among the great problems of our age [wrote Dr. Dollinger, towards the end of the last century] none is more fitted to occupy the thoughts, not only of the professional statesman but of every keen-sighted individual who takes an interest in politics, than the so-called Eastern Question. It is the pivot upon which the general politics of the century now drawing to an end are turning, and it will be so for the coming century also. . . . It is not a question which has disturbed the peace of Europe only yesterday: it is not even a product of this century. It has exercised a powerful influence upon the course of the world's history for above 500 years.

Is it indeed the case that in this matter we are nearing the end of our perplexities? Is the confident hope of a speedy and a lasting solution of this historic problem well founded? If so, in what direction may we look for it?

Before these questions can be answered, before even they can be intelligently approached, it is essential to understand how the 'Eastern Question' arose; to apprehend quite clearly what is involved in the hackneyed phrase; and to explain why it has defied, throughout the ages, repeated attempts to solve it.

I

Our first business is to define our terms. 'What,' asked Disraeli, 'is the Irish Question?' 'One said it was a physical question, another a spiritual; now it was the absence of the

aristocracy, then the absence of railways. It was the Pope one day, potatoes the next.' Not less chameleon-like in character has been the 'Eastern Question.' In one sense there has always been a problem, acute and apparently insoluble, arising from the clash of Western ideas with those of the immemorial East. But this is an aspect of the matter too abstruse and intangible to be permitted to detain us. We are concerned with concrete manifestations of the phenomenon. Of these manifestations the first was the rivalry between the Greeks and the Persians, a rivalry which recalls the heroic memories of Marathon, Thermopylae and Salamis. The last is commemorated, in lines which ought to be familiar, by the greatest of Greek tragedians :

The Greeks rang out
 Their holy, resolute, exulting chant,
 Like men come forth to dare and do and die.
 And to our ears there came a burst of sound,
 A clamour manifold, 'On, Sons of Greece!
 On, for your country's freedom! Strike to save
 Wives, children, temples of ancestral gods,
 Graves of your fathers! now is all at stake.'¹

To the Roman the 'Eastern Question' centred in the struggle with the giant power of Macedon. To the men of the early Middle Ages the problem was represented by the fight between the forces of Christianity and those of Islam—a fight which reached its climax, for the time, in the great battle of Tours (732). The chivalry of Western Europe renewed the contest, some centuries later, in the Crusades. The motives of that movement were curiously mixed, but essentially it represented the historic struggle between the Cross and the Crescent, and that is an aspect of the 'Eastern Question' which has never since been wholly obliterated²; except, perhaps, in the eighteenth century, when the 'Eastern Question' was identified by diplomatists with the affairs of Poland. But with none of these remoter aspects of the question are we at present concerned. Not, seemingly, until the second decade of the nineteenth century did the phrase with which we are so familiar first become current in the jargon of diplomacy.

What was its precise connotation? An authoritative writer has explained it thus: 'The Near Eastern Question may be defined as the problem of filling up the vacuum created by the gradual disappearance of the Turkish Empire from Europe.'³

¹ A Persian speaks. Cf. Aeschylus, *Persae*. I quote Mr. E. D. A. Morshead's spirited rendering.

² Thus M. Edouard Driault, in his brilliant essay on the Eastern Question, defines it as: *Le problème de la ruine de la puissance politique de l'Islam*.

³ Miller, *Ottoman Empire*, p. 1.

This is unexceptionable as far as it goes. But neither this definition, nor any other known to me, covers all the multifarious aspects under which the question presents itself to modern diplomacy. Excluding such an essential ingredient as that of Egypt; excluding also the many difficult problems connected with the position of the Turks in Asia; still more rigorously excluding the questions of the Farther and Farthest East, the phrase may for our present purpose be held to include :

Firstly, and primarily, the position of the Turks in Europe;

Secondly, the problem of the Black Sea; ingress thereto; egress therefrom; the fortification of its shores; above all the capital problem as to the possession of Constantinople;

Thirdly, the position of the loosely designated 'Balkan States,' which, like Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Roumania, have re-emerged as the waters of the Ottoman flood have gradually subsided; or, like Montenegro, have never been submerged; or, like Bosnia, the Herzegovina, Transylvania and Bukovina, have been annexed to the Habsburg Empire;

Fourthly, the position of Russia in Europe, and her relation to any or all of the above questions; and more particularly her connexion with the Greek Christians in the Peninsula, and her ambitions in reference to the Black Sea and to Constantinople;

Fifthly, the position of the Habsburg Empire in South-Eastern Europe, and in particular its relations with the Southern Slavs in the annexed provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, as well as in the adjacent kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, and with the Roumanian folk in Transylvania and Bukovina;

Finally, the phrase must also include the attitude of the Powers in general to any or all of the questions enumerated above.

It will be obvious that to discuss in detail a tithe of the above questions would be impossible within the limits of a single article. I shall attempt in the following pages only a concise conspectus of the problem.

II

The primary and essential factor in the problem is the presence in Europe of the Ottoman Turks. As M. Albert Sorel puts it in a phrase characteristically crisp: 'Dès qu'il y eut des Turcs en Europe, il y eut une question d'Orient, et dès que la Russie fut une puissance européenne, elle prétendit résoudre cette question à son profit.' For more than five hundred years Europe has been haunted by the presence, embedded in its body politic, of a substance entirely alien to itself: alien in race, in creed, in language; alien in political outlook and tradition. How to deal with this alien substance has been for centuries the essence and core of the problem of the Near East.

Many contradictory attributes have been predicated of the Turk by friends and enemies; but on one point all are agreed:

the Turk never changes. What he was when he first effected a lodgment in Europe in the middle of the fourteenth century he remains in the second decade of the twentieth. From first to last the Turk has been a fighting man and a nomad. On this point—indispensable to an understanding of the position of the Turk—authorities so wide apart (in some respects) as Professor Bury and Sir Charles Eliot are at one. 'The Turks,' writes the latter, 'never outgrew their ancestral character of predacious nomads; they take much and give little.' 'In the perpetual struggle,' writes Professor Bury, 'between the herdsmen and the tillers of the soil, which has been waged from remote ages on the Continents of Europe and Asia, the advance of the Ottomans was a decisive victory for the children of the Steppes. This feature of their conquest is of no less fundamental importance than its victory for Islam.' Thus the Turk has always presented to close observers the aspect of a stranger and a sojourner in European lands. 'Here,' he has seemed to say, 'we have no abiding city. I am here to-day; I shall be gone to-morrow.' Europe has taken him literally at his word. And this fundamental characteristic of the Turk explains others. The nomad may be a huckster and love a bargain, but he does not take to organised trade. Consequently he has always left commercial enterprise to the inferior races over whom he has ruled. Nor has he ever shown aptitude for agriculture. He has been from the first a herdsman—a breeder of stock, and a warrior. There is an oft-quoted proverb in the East: where the Turk plants his foot the grass never grows again. This, like other proverbs, is capable of more than one interpretation. But all interpretations are consonant with the view that the Turk is not, in the Western sense, an 'economic man.' Still less is he in the Aristotelian sense a 'political animal.' All that he asks of life is to be allowed to fight, to conquer, and, having fought valiantly, to enjoy in repose the fruits of successful war. Government to him has always resolved itself into the collection of tribute or of taxes; towards administration he has never shown the slightest inclination. All these troublesome and unimportant matters have from the first been left in the hands of the subject races, primarily in the hands of Greeks, and in some cases even of Armenians.

The political instinct seems, indeed, to have been lacking. The Turkish Empire has been described, *ad nauseam*, under the metaphor of 'an army of occupation in a conquered country.' But the figure is more than metaphorical; it represents a literal fact. The only law known to the Turk is the primitive right of conquest. The idea of assimilating the conquered population has never, therefore, come within the horizon of his imagination. Serbians, Albanians, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Roumanians are

to-day as distinct from each other, and all are as distinct from the Turk, as on the day when Constantinople fell before the assault of Mohammed.

Les Turcs [writes M. Gabriel Monod] se sont montrés incapables de former une seule nation des populations musulmanes et chrétiennes qui sont juxtaposées dans l'empire ottoman, incapables aussi de leur assurer une bonne administration, la sécurité de leurs personnes et de leurs biens, incapables de leur appliquer un autre système de police que la spoliation et les massacres.

The absence of the true political instinct, the incapacity for administrative organisation, explains another marked feature of Turkish government. The Turks have been wont to leave to the subject peoples a considerable measure of local autonomy. This feature was most clearly discernible among the Wallachian peoples in the north-eastern provinces of the Empire. Both Wallachia and Moldavia accepted the suzerainty of the Sultan, and paid tribute to Constantinople, but both exercised many independent rights. Under a Treaty concluded with the Turks in 1513 Moldavia retained the privilege of electing its own princes, and no Turk was permitted to settle in the country. The mountaineers of Montenegro enjoyed an even greater measure of independence; but their political organisation was so slight that it would be straining language to describe them as constituting—until recent days—an independent State. Even the Greeks, throughout long centuries of oppression, retained some degree of local autonomy, in the exercise of which they were consistently encouraged by the lower clergy, to whose devoted and patriotic labours the Hellenic revival in the nineteenth century was largely due.

Mention of the Greek clergy recalls another striking feature of the government of the Ottomans: their half-shrewd and half-contemptuous attitude towards the 'Orthodox' Church. Among the many reasons which contributed to the profound cleavage between conquerors and conquered in the Balkans great stress is justly laid upon the religious factor. Had the Turks been pagans, analogy teaches us to surmise that they would in time have accepted the religion of the conquered peoples. As it was, they brought with them a highly developed creed which virtually forbade any assimilation. Under the strict injunctions of the Koran the infidel must either embrace Islamism, or suffer death, or purchase, by the payment of tribute, a right to the enjoyment of life and property. Only in Albania was there any general acceptance of the Moslem creed among the masses of the population. In Bosnia and in a less degree in Bulgaria the larger landowners purchased immunity by conversion, but, generally speaking, the third of the alternatives enjoined by the Koran was

the one actually adopted. Christianity consequently survived in most parts of the Turkish Empire. And the Turk shrewdly turned its survival to his own advantage. The Sultan, it must be remembered, was not only (after 1512) Caliph and, as such, successor to the Prophet, but he also inherited, in some sort, the ecclesiastical position of the Byzantine Emperors of Constantinople. It was part of the deliberate policy of the conqueror of Constantinople to encourage the Byzantine Church to look to him as its protector against the rival Rome. The Greek Patriarch, therefore, received at his hands what can only be described as extraordinary privileges. He became, in effect, the Pope of the Eastern Church; he was permitted to summon periodical Church Synods, to hold ecclesiastical courts, and to enforce the sentences of the court by spiritual penalties. More than that: the Patriarch was accepted by the Sultans as the representative not merely of the Greek Church but of the Greek community; he became, in fact, 'the recognised intermediary between them and the Ottoman Government, a chief empowered to settle all disputes and other business matters arising between Christians, provided no Moslem was concerned.'⁴ How far this privileged position contributed either to the ultimate well-being of Christianity in the dominions of the Turk, or to the better government of the Greek population, is a question which must be reserved for subsequent discussion. To ignore the relations which from the first subsisted between the Mohammedan conquerors and the Greek Patriarch would be egregiously to falsify our conception of Ottoman rule in Europe.

It is time, however, to trace briefly the main stages by which that rule was established, and to explain the reasons for its initial success and its subsequent decadence.

III

The early records of the Turkish tribe, subsequently known as the Ottomans, are exceedingly obscure, but they emerge into the realm of tolerably authentic history in the thirteenth century. Some two centuries earlier the Seljukian Turks had established a great Empire in Asia Minor with its capital at Nicaea. By assuming the designation of Sultans of Roum, these Seljuk potentates flung down a challenge to the lords of the new Rome on the Bosphorus, and of this challenge the crusading movement was a direct consequence. From Nicaea the Seljuks were driven back to Iconium, which may yet become the capital of their Ottoman cousins. The latter, driven from their original home in the Farther East by the pressure of the Moguls, settled in Anatolia,

⁴ Cf. Sir C. Eliot, *Turkey in Europe* (p. 243), a brilliant work to which I wish to acknowledge my obligations.

under the protection of the Seljuks, in the early years of the thirteenth century. Under Osman or Othman⁵ these migrant herdsmen gradually supplanted their protectors as the dominant power in the hinterland of Asia Minor. Under Othman's son, Orkhan (1326-1359), a notable advance was registered. Broussa, Nicaea, Nicomedia, and the greater part of the Byzantine Empire in Asia fell into their hands and, still more significant, a lodgment was effected upon the European shore of the Hellespont. The capture of Gallipoli in 1356 may indeed be regarded as the real starting point in the history of the Ottoman dominion in South-Eastern Europe.

What was the condition of those lands over which he was destined to bear rule, at the moment when the Turk planted his foot in Europe?

The Greek Empire was in the last stage of emasculate decay. Territorially it had shrunk to its narrowest limits. The Palaeologi bore sway only over Constantinople itself, a few Thracian towns, Thessalonica, Nauplia, and part of the Morea. In the Balkans proper the Slavonic States had been for more than a century firmly established. The territory comprised in the kingdom of Bulgaria corresponded almost precisely with that assigned to it by the Treaty of Berlin (1878). The Empire of Serbia, then at the zenith of its greatness under Stephen Dushan (1331-1355), extended from Belgrade to the northern shore of the Gulf of Corinth. It had a coast line on the Adriatic and another on the Aegean. Further north, Lewis the Great ruled over Hungary, Transylvania, Croatia, Bosnia, and Wallachia. Venice held the Dalmatian coast, with Corfu, Mothone, Crete, and Euboea. The island of Rhodes was in possession of the Knights of St. John, while the Franks still ruled over Cyprus, the principality of Achaia, the Duchy of Athens, and various islands in the Aegean.

Within two hundred years almost the whole of these varied and widely distributed dominions—to say nothing of extra-European lands—had been swept into the net of the Ottoman Empire.

Adrianople was snatched from the feeble hands of the Byzantine Emperor in 1361, and thenceforward until 1453 was the European capital of the Turkish Emir. The Bulgarians had to surrender Philippopolis in 1363, Sophia in 1382, while the destruction of Tirnovo, in 1393, marked the extinction for nearly five hundred years of Bulgarian independence. Meanwhile, a crushing defeat had been inflicted upon a great Slavonic combination. The historic battle fought upon the plain of Kossovo (1389)

⁵ 1288-1326. Hence, of course, the distinctive designation of Osmanlis or Ottomans.

meant more than the overthrow of the Serbian Empire; it meant the political effacement, for many long years, of the Southern Slavs.* By this time Christendom was awakening to the gravity of the Ottoman peril. Still greater was the alarm when in 1396 Sigismond of Hungary, at the head of a Western Crusade, was overthrown in the battle of Nicopolis. But the seat of Empire was still untaken, and in the early years of the fifteenth century it seemed not impossible that the final disaster might yet be averted, that Constantine's city might yet be saved from the grip of the Moslem.

The attention of the Turkish conquerors was temporarily averted, first by the advance of Timour the Tartar—the famous Tamerlane—and a little later by the brilliant exploits of George Castriotes, better known as Iskender Bey or Scanderbeg and better still as 'the Dragon of Albania.' For nearly a quarter of a century Scanderbeg carried on guerilla warfare against the Turks; in 1461 the independence of Albania was acknowledged and the 'Dragon' was recognised as lord of Albania and Thessaly.⁷ But the onward rush of Ottoman waters was not really arrested by this memorable episode. In 1453 the Imperial city had fallen before the assault of Mohammed, and the Greek Empire was at an end.

Whether regard be paid to historical sentiment or to political, economic, intellectual, and spiritual consequences, the capture of Constantinople by the Ottomans must assuredly be counted as one of the most significant events in the history of the world. The final extinction of the older Roman Empire; the blocking of the ancient paths of commerce⁸; the diversion of trade, and, with trade, of political importance from the Mediterranean lands; the discovery of America and the Cape route to the East; the emergence of England from the economic sloth and obscurity of the Middle Ages; the new birth of humanism; the impulse to religious questionings; the development of national polities and national Churches—all these results and others may be attributed indirectly, and many of them directly, to the Turkish conquest of the city of Constantine.

IV

For two hundred and fifty years after the capture of Constantinople the Turks continued to be a terror to Europe. For many years they waged successful wars with Venice and with Hungary;

* Serbia was at once reduced to the position of a tributary principality, and was annexed to the Ottoman Empire in 1459. Bosnia was annexed in 1465.

⁷ After Scanderbeg's death (1467) Albania was annexed to the Ottoman Empire.

⁸ The subsequent conquest of Syria and Egypt blocked the Southern, as that of Constantinople had blocked the Northern routes.

early in the sixteenth century they extended their sway over Syria, Egypt, Arabia, and northern Mesopotamia; Rhodes was captured in 1522, and Hungary, except for a narrow strip left to the Habsburgs, was annexed to their Empire as the Pashalik of Buda (1526); the Roumans of Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia were reduced to vassaldom. Turkish power reached its zenith during the reign of Solyman 'the Magnificent' (1520-1566). The Turkish 'Emirs' had long ago exchanged the title for that of Sultan, and to the Sultanate Solyman's predecessor had added the Caliphate. Successor to the Prophet; spiritual father of the whole Moslem world; Solyman ruled as temporal lord from Buda to Basra, from the Danube to the Persian Gulf.

On the north [says Finlay] their frontiers were guarded against the Poles by the fortress of Kamenietz, and against the Russians by the walls of Azof; while to the south the rock of Aden secured their authority over the southern coast of Arabia, invested them with power in the Indian Ocean, and gave them the complete command of the Red Sea. To the east, the Sultan ruled the shores of the Caspian, from the Kour to the Tenek; and his dominions stretched westward along the southern coast of the Mediterranean, where the farthest limit of the regency of Algiers, beyond Oran, meets the frontiers of the empire of Morocco. By rapid steps the Ottomans completed the conquest of the Seljouk sultans in Asia Minor, of the Mamlouk sultans of Syria and Egypt, of the fierce corsairs of Northern Africa, expelled the Venetians from Cyprus, Crete, and the Archipelago, and drove the knights of St. John of Jerusalem from the Levant, to find a shelter at Malta. It was no vain boast of the Ottoman Sultan that he was the master of many kingdoms, the ruler of three continents and the lord of two seas.

The achievement was indeed stupendous, but its brilliance was evanescent. The seeds of decay were already germinating even amid the splendours of the reign of Solyman. The astonishing success of the Ottoman invaders was due partly to conditions external to themselves, partly to their own characteristics and institutions. The irrecoverable decrepitude of the Greek Empire; the proverbial lack of political cohesion among the Slav peoples; the jealousy and antagonism of the Christian Powers; the high military prowess and shrewd statesmanship of many of the earlier Sultans—all these things contributed to the amazing rapidity with which the Ottomans overran South-Eastern Europe. But unquestionably the most potent instrument of conquest was forged in the institution of Christian child-tribute, the formation of the famous Corps of Janissaries.

After the middle of the sixteenth century the Janissaries lost some of their original characteristics. In 1566 members of the Corps were permitted to marry, and in time to enrol their sons. They began, therefore, to look with jealousy upon the admission of the tribute-children, and before the end of the

seventeenth century the tribute ceased to be levied. Corruption, meanwhile, was eating into the vitals of Ottoman government, alike in the capital and in the provinces. Worse still, the soldiers of the Crescent continued to fight, but no longer to conquer. The only permanent conquests effected by the Turk after 1566 were those of Cyprus and Crete. Ceasing to advance, the Turkish power rapidly receded. Success in arms was essential to vigour of domestic administration, and both depended upon the personal qualities of the rulers.

After Solymán there was hardly one man of mark among the Sultans until the accession of Mahmoud the Second in 1808. When absolutism ceases to be efficient, decadence is necessarily rapid. In the case of the Turks, it was temporarily arrested by the emergence of a remarkable Albanian family, the Kiu-prilis, who supplied the Porte with a succession of Viziers during the latter half of the seventeenth century. In the first half of the century the Thirty Years' War had given the Ottomans a magnificent chance of destroying the last bulwark of Western Christendom. The earlier Sultans would never have missed it; but Othman the Second, Mustapha the First, and Ibrahim were not the men to seize it, and Amurath the Fourth was otherwise occupied. Such a chance never recurs. In 1683 the Vizier Kara Mustapha carried the victorious arms of Turkey to the very gates of Vienna; but the Habsburgs were saved by John Sobieski of Poland, and in the last years of the century they inflicted a series of crushing defeats upon the Turk.

The tide had clearly turned. The naval defeat at Lepanto (1571) was, perhaps, a premature indication; after Montecuculi's victory at St. Gothard (1664), and Prince Eugene's at Zenta (1697), men could no longer doubt it. The diplomatic system was also crumbling. Louis the Fourteenth followed as best he could the evil example of Francis the First; but alliance with the Kiuprilis was not the same thing as friendship with Solymán; the Turk was too hopelessly decadent to be an effective factor in French diplomacy. The Venetian conquest of the Morea, the resounding victories of the Habsburgs, above all the entrance of Russia on to the stage of European politics, announced the opening of a new chapter in the history of the Eastern Question.

V

In the eighteenth century a remarkable change is observable in the conditions of the problem. Hitherto the Turk had terrified Christendom by the rapidity of his irresistible advance. During the next two centuries he was to perplex Christendom by the equally rapid multiplication of symptoms of decay. Sir

Thomas Roe, James the First's English Ambassador to the Porte, had shrewdly diagnosed the situation a century earlier, when he declared that the Turkish power had 'become, like an old body, crazed through many vices which remain when the youth and strength is decayed. . . . This is the true estate of this so much feared greatness.'

The decrepitude of the Turk was now manifest to all men. Equally manifest was the appearance of a dangerous rival to the Turk in South-Eastern Europe. Hitherto, the Habsburg Monarchy and the Venetian Republic had shared the responsibility of warding off from Christendom the Moslem attack. But Venice had long since passed her prime, and the conquest of the Morea was the expiring flicker of the old spirit. In the House of Romanoff Europe discovered a new champion of the Faith. By the conquest of Azov (1696) Peter the Great 'opened a window to the South.' It was closed again as a result of the capitulation of the Pruth; but the set-back was temporary, and by the Treaty of Belgrade (1739) Azov was restored in permanence to Russia.

The occupation of Azov was the first breach in the continuity of Ottoman territory round the shores of the Black Sea. Hitherto that sea had been a Turkish lake. But though Russia now touched its shores, no firm grip upon it was obtained until the war which was ended by the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji (1774).

Of all the many treaties concluded between Russia and Turkey this was the most momentous. The Turkish frontier on the north-east was driven back to the Boug; the Tartars to the east of that river were declared independent of the Porte, except in ecclesiastical affairs; important points on the seaboard passed to Russia, and the latter obtained the right of free commercial navigation in the Black Sea. More than this: the Danubian principalities and the islands of the Aegean Archipelago were restored to the Porte, only on condition of better government, and Russia reserved to herself the right of remonstrance if that condition was not observed. Most significant of all: Russia stipulated for certain privileges to be accorded to the Christian subjects of the Porte. To say that thenceforward Russia was the 'protector' of the Greek Christians in the Balkan Peninsula would be technically unwarrantable; but certain it is that the ground was prepared for the assertion of claims which in 1854 occasioned the Crimean War.

The Treaty of Kainardji was the first of many milestones marking the journey of the Romanoffs towards the Bosphorus. Jassy (1792) was the next; Bucharest followed (1812), and then came (1829) the famous Treaty of Adrianople.

Lack of space compels us to ignore the interesting parenthesis

supplied by the Eastern policy of Napoleon. The Gargantuan partition arranged at Tilsit between the Emperor and the Czar provided for the acquisition of Northern Bulgaria and the Danubian principalities by Russia. Failure to obtain specific performance was inadequately compensated by the annexation, in 1812, of Bessarabia, and by this time a new factor of high significance had entered into the complex problem of the Near East.

VI

For over four hundred years the peoples of the peninsula had been entirely submerged beneath the Turkish flood: the mountaineers of Montenegro never acknowledged the lordship of Stamboul; no government can cope successfully with the irrepressible Albanians; the Roumans in the Danubian principalities retained throughout, except in the eighteenth century, a considerable measure of autonomy, but of the Greek 'nation,' of the Southern Slavs, or of the Bulgarians there is no real political record from the end of the fourteenth century to the nineteenth. Yet the tradition of former greatness survived: nourished among the Serbian peasants by ballads and folk-literature; among the Greeks by persistence of language and the memories of Hellenic culture; among all the subject peoples by the devoted labours of their parish priests. While the Ottoman Empire was at its zenith the lot of the conquered peoples was far from being unendurable. So long as the Sultans were provided with child-tribute and with ample revenue they did not worry about the details of local administration. Thus the peasants of Serbia, the territorial aristocracy of Bosnia, the Bulgarian towns, and the Greek merchants enjoyed a considerable measure of local autonomy. With the decay of Ottoman efficiency things got worse for the provinces. Individual Greeks and even other provincials might and did play a prominent part in central administration, but as military discipline slackened, as government became more corrupt, as Turkish arms encountered reverses, as the borders of the empire began to contract, the subject races were exposed to grievous oppression. In the eighteenth century hope revived. The Southern Slavs began to look to Austria, the Bulgarians to Russia for deliverance from the Turkish yoke. The Treaty of Kainardji, as we have seen, gave some promise of protection to all the Orthodox Christians. The Greek mariners had long been conspicuous for efficiency; the Greek merchants were making money; the Greek language regained something of its primitive purity, a taste for classical literature revived. But not until the nineteenth century is any real political movement discernible. To this movement the French Revolution may have

contributed. At any rate, it is certain that after the Revolution ideas of liberty and even of nationality began to penetrate the Balkan Peninsula. Memories of a sometime greatness, sedulously preserved throughout the ages, once more stirred the hearts of Slavs and Greeks. The workings of the new spirit are first perceptible among the Serbians. A rising directed in the first instance not against the Porte, but against the insubordinate Janissaries in Serbia, was initiated, in 1804, by a peasant leader, George Petrovich, better known as Kara George. Appeals for protection addressed successively to Austria and Russia were declined, but by the Treaty of Bucharest the Turks agreed to leave to the Serbs 'the management of their internal affairs.' A year later the country was reconquered by Mahmoud the Second, but in 1817 it was again in revolt, this time under the leadership of Kara George's rival, Milosh Obrenovich. The latter extorted from the Sultan a certain measure of local autonomy, but not until after the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) did Serbia enjoy anything approaching to real self-government. This Treaty was not, however, primarily concerned with Serbia. By that time yet another phase had opened in the history of the Eastern Question.

VII

Thus far the 'Eastern Question' had failed to attract more than passing attention from English statesmen. They had observed with equal unconcern the decrepitude of Turkey and the advance of Russia. Pitt, indeed, with singular prescience had perceived the significance of both developments, and had attempted in 1790 to arouse the attention of his country; but with conspicuous lack of success. Not until after 1821 did English diplomacy seriously concern itself with South-Eastern Europe. The reasons for this attitude are interesting, but cannot, in this sketch, be canvassed. English apathy was completely dissipated, however, by the Greek insurrection of 1821, and the stirring events which followed thereon. In March 1821 Prince Alexander Hypsilanti raised the standard of insurrection in Moldavia; but the Roumanian peasants were suspicious of the Greeks; the Czar Alexander, on whose sympathy Hypsilanti had confidently counted, frowned upon the enterprise, and the rising ignominiously collapsed. Far different was the fate of the insurrection in the Morea and in the Aegean islands. There, too, there were bitter internal feuds, and the history of the movement offers, in Mr. Gladstone's words, 'a chequered picture of patriotism and corruption, desperate valour and weak irresolution, honour and treachery.' Nevertheless, the Greek rising is, for three reasons, profoundly significant. It marks, in the first place, the real beginning of the new 'nationality' move-

ment in the Ottoman Empire. Secondly, it evoked enthusiastic sympathy in Europe, and particularly in Western Europe; and, thirdly, it revealed, for the first time, a feeling of rivalry, if not of antagonism, between Russia and Great Britain in Eastern Europe. As far as England is concerned, the Greek insurrection inaugurated an 'Eastern Question.'

Castlereagh and Canning were equally alive to its significance; but the former died in 1822, the latter in 1827. Not, however, before he had achieved two things. He had made Russia clearly understand that the Western Powers, and England in particular, claimed the right to participate in the settlement of affairs in the Near East, and he had rendered certain the ultimate emancipation of the Greeks from the Ottoman yoke. Unfortunately, his successors in office played the game so badly that Russia, and Russia alone, reaped the credit and the advantage of Canning's diplomacy. After Navarino, which coincided with Canning's death, the Sultan hardened his heart; Russia put forth her strength against the Porte, and after two years' hard fighting dictated the famous Treaty of Adrianople.

The Duke of Wellington declared that Treaty to be 'the death-blow to the independence of the Ottoman Porte, and the forerunner of the dissolution and extinction of its power.' The end was not yet; but the Treaty did contain seeds which have since come to fruition. It marked a notable advance on the part of Russia; it secured independence for Greece, and virtual autonomy for Serbia and the Danubian principalities.

Canning, it has been said, emphasised England's vital interest in the Eastern Question. That interest, it should be added, was fully and indeed generously acknowledged by the Czar Nicholas when he visited England in 1844, and again on the eve of the Crimean War. But Lord Palmerston, chagrined by the triumph of Russian diplomacy at Unkiar Skelessi (1833), was profoundly mistrustful of the Czar's good faith. That mistrust was largely responsible for the Crimean War, and it inspired also the policy of Lord Beaconsfield, on whose shoulders Palmerston's mantle fell.

The Treaties of Paris (1856) and Berlin (1878) represent the triumph of the policy of Palmerston and Beaconsfield. That they retarded effectually the advance of Russia, so extraordinarily rapid and consistent between 1739 and 1833, is a fact not open to dispute. But it has now become fashionable to affirm that the policy was erroneous and the triumph meretricious. Such criticism is apt to ignore one point of fundamental significance. It is quite true that the earlier Treaty disappointed the immediate hopes of the Roumanians, and that the later similarly disappointed the Bulgarians. But neither Roumania

nor Bulgaria had to wait very long ; and the interval—particularly in the case of Bulgaria—was employed to admirable purpose. Had the pro-Russian policy of Lord Aberdeen carried the day in 1854 ; had Mr. Gladstone prevailed in 1876-78, should we to-day be in cordial alliance with Russia, and would a Balkan Confederation be within the bounds of political possibility ?

Such questions may legitimately be proposed ; they cannot, with certainty, be answered. But this much is indisputable. Since 1856 the new nations of the Balkans have found their feet. For their independence they are indebted to no single Power ; they are under no exclusive protection ; each is free to shape its own political destiny in consonance with its peculiar genius.

Many difficult problems remain. The German-Magyar alliance for the suppression of the Southern Slavs and the retention of the Roumanian populations of Transylvania and Bukovina ; the Albanian fiasco now patent to the world ; the jealousy between Serbian and Bulgarian, and between Bulgarian and Greek ; the unfulfilled ambitions of Roumania ; the partially realised hopes of Greece ; the existence of an Italy still unredeemed ; above all, the survival of a remnant of the Ottoman Empire, still entrenched, however precariously, in the ancient capital with its incomparable position and its ineffaceable prestige—these are problems the solution of which will demand the most delicate diplomacy and the highest statesmanship. Even to outline a possible solution would carry me far beyond the generous limits of this paper. It must suffice, for the moment, to have analysed the origins and indicated the prolegomena of the problem. As I write these words, the portents are more than favourable, at least to a partial solution ; before they can be read the sword may have cut many knots.

J. A. R. MARBIOTT.

THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION

FROM THE GREEK POINT OF VIEW

At a time when the map of Europe seems likely to be redrawn so as to be more in accord with the wishes of the inhabitants, I should like to bring before the British public the more salient points in the Macedonian Question as it appears to a Greek. This is the more necessary as it has been recently suggested that Greece might give up portions of Greek Macedonia in order to satisfy Bulgaria and so produce a lasting peace. Such suggestions—it is true—emanate only from amateur diplomats belonging to the class which M. Thiers ironically styled *des personnalités sans mandat*. But it is not altogether useless to show that should this suggestion be carried out a grave injustice will be done. I hope to be able to prove to the satisfaction of every fair-minded person that no compromise of the kind suggested can be acceptable to Greece, that it would result in an impossible frontier, and that a fresh war for the possession of Salonica would only be a matter of a few years.

M. Radoslavoff, the Bulgarian Premier, has recently declared to the *Daily Chronicle's* special correspondent, Sir Alfred Sharpe, that 'Bulgaria wants from Greece Kavalla, Serres, and Drama,'¹ that is to say, all South-Eastern Macedonia. Sometimes Kavalla only has been mentioned in English papers, but a study of the map will show that this town cannot be separated from Serres, and still less from Drama.

The objections advanced by Greece against this concession are based on ethnological, on economic, and on strategical grounds.

The ethnological objections are very easily stated. It will be remembered that from 1904 to 1909 an attempt was made by the six Great Powers to introduce reforms into Macedonia, and in consequence European officers commanded the gendarmerie. In 1905 a census was taken in the presence of these officers, who were British in the district of Drama-Kavalla. In this district the total number of inhabitants is given as 148,807, of whom 2120 (or less than 1½ per cent.) were Bulgarian; a truly infinitesimal proportion. At Drama the Turkish element predominated,

¹ *Daily Chronicle*, December 21, 1914.

while at Kavalla the Greeks were in a majority.² Since the Balkan Wars the Bulgarians are relatively fewer, owing to the immigration of 75,000 Greeks from Western Thrace and other parts taken over by the Bulgarians under the treaty of Bucharest. This immigration is an additional argument against any fresh cession of territory peopled largely by Greeks. Were Kavalla and Drama to be given up to Bulgaria, Greece must be prepared to instal at Salonica some 200,000 refugees. England is now, unfortunately, in a position to appreciate this argument. Greece, ever since its liberation in 1830, has been in a chronic state of housing refugees.

We must now turn to the economic arguments against the cession of this district to Bulgaria. Many parts of Western and Central Macedonia may become rich and productive. At the present moment they are not, for several reasons. In the first place, as there is no control over the rivers, some of the richest plains are for eight months of the year mere marshes. Then nearly all the landed property is in the hands of Turkish beys, descendants of the ancient *spahis* (feudatory chiefs); these owners, fatalists by religion, ignorant and lazy from choice, neglect the land as far as they are able, while the Christian cultivator has little interest in its betterment. Finally, the means of communication are very rudimentary. For all these reasons Western and Central Macedonia is in a miserable state, and will require large sums for its improvement. It will thus be for many years a source of serious expense to the Greek Government. The Drama-Kavalla district is, on the other hand, very prosperous, and may without exaggeration be called one of the richest countries in Europe. This good fortune it owes to the monopoly it practically possesses of supplying the best tobaccos. The cigarettes *de luxe*, not only in the East (including Egypt), but in the whole world, are all made with tobacco coming from this district. It has been calculated that a properly organised fiscal system will be able to extract from this gold mine over a million sterling a year. It is true that up to now the amount obtained has been less than that just given. This, however, is due to the faulty monopoly regime in force, a regime which has had two deplorable results: the one, the limitation of land under cultivation (this had to be accorded to the monopoly company to induce it to accept the obligation of buying up all the tobacco produced); the other, stagnation in the industry of cigarette-

² In the *sandjak* of Serres the population was found in 1905 to be in great majority Greek in the south and Bulgarian in the north; but all the northern *casas*, including the picturesque Byzantine town of Mélénikon, were handed over to Bulgaria after the treaty of Bucharet. As for the town of Serres itself, its completely Greek character was testified to by the sad events of July 1913.

making; in fact, only the Ottoman Regie possessed the right to prepare cigarettes from tobacco; in consequence, the prosperous factories that existed before the creation of the monopoly have all emigrated to Cairo. Now, by a piece of good luck that must seem providential to the Greek Minister of Finance, the concession to the Ottoman Regie expired last June. Greece is, therefore, in a position to offer an admirable guarantee for the large loan that will be required for the improvements already mentioned in the poorer parts of Macedonia; similar works will be required for the development of Epirus; further, land will have to be bought from the Turkish beys to be given to the peasants and immigrant refugees; and lastly, for the full exploitation of the country, two main railway lines will have to be built as soon as possible, an east and west one from Santi Quaranta to Salonica, and a north and south one from Larissa to Monastir for eventual shorter connexion with the European system.

We must now glance for a moment at the military position round Kavalla. At the present moment Greece can effect its mobilisation for the defence of Salonica in plains admirably suited for defending the road from Sofia, and blocking the railway line from Xanthi-Dede-Agach. If, however, Bulgaria is in possession of Kavalla and Drama, the route to Serres is open. That means that the Greek concentration will have to take place to the west of the Struma River. A glance at the map will show that as the result of a small check, or simply of a sudden attack, Salonica will be in danger. Greek military circles are profoundly convinced that the Bulgarians intend carrying out such an attack; hence their anxiety to possess this portion of Macedonia.

Attention must also be drawn to the position of the island of Thasos in front of Kavalla. The possessor of the latter will certainly require the former. You can no more separate the two than you can imagine Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight being in different hands. With their warships hiding in the Kavalla-Thasos channel and ready to emerge at any convenient opportunity, the Bulgarians would be able seriously to menace the entrance of the Dardanelles as well as the communications in the Archipelago. The importance of the point will not escape British readers.

It is indeed true that some people lay great stress on the commercial importance for Bulgaria of the harbour of Kavalla; this argument will only appeal to those little versed in Balkan geography. At a short distance from Kavalla lies the harbour of Porto-Lago. Now a line from the latter to Chaskeui (the preliminary studies of this line are already terminated) possesses several advantages over a possible Kavalla-Tatar-Bazarjik line. It is shorter (105 as against 160 miles), the ground it passes over is less mountainous, and it leads more directly to the centre of

Bulgaria. We must remember, too, that Kavalla is an open roadstead. A French company that has just lately studied the project calculates that it will require 2,000,000*l.* to construct a port at Kavalla. Half this sum will suffice for Porto-Lago. It is of some interest to point out that the arguments tending to prove that Kavalla as a *harbour* is of no importance to Bulgaria were developed most exhaustively by the Bulgarians themselves between the dates October 1912 and July 1913. In October 1912 Admiral Coundourioti, after taking Thasos, advised his Government that the occupation of Kavalla would be a simple matter. The Greek Government preferred in a spirit of conciliation to leave this to the Bulgarian armies. As soon as the Bulgarians took Kavalla they demanded Salonica, which they actually attacked in July 1913. I must again repeat that Greek military circles are convinced that Bulgaria is at the present moment asking for the south-eastern portion of Macedonia only for the facilities it provides for an attack on Salonica. But it is not the Greeks alone who believe this. All those who know the East well are of the same opinion. Dr. Dillon in his articles on 'Europe in 1914' says (*Daily Telegraph*, January 2, 1915): 'Kavalla is a Greek district. Its population has grown enormously since the Balkan War, and its value to the nation is considerable. No motive worth weighing can be adduced why Greece should hand over her own people and territory to a foreign and nowise friendly State to be annexed and assimilated. Lastly, it must be admitted that the only consideration that might tell with a statesman, the hope that the concession demanded would be final and sufficient, must be set aside as worthless. *For Bulgaria would not be sated by Kavalla. She would seize Salonica after that at the first favourable occasion, and would do her best to create one*' (the italics are my own).

We must now turn our attention for a moment to Western Macedonia, as some people, recognising the impossibility of the abandonment of S.E. Macedonia, have suggested concessions in the Edessa-Yennitsa region. This presupposes Serbian concessions, in favour of Bulgaria, extending beyond the western bank of the Axios (the Vardar). The district affected is, thanks to its plains and waterfalls, the richest in Macedonia after Kavalla. The Greeks predominate. The census of 1905 gives for the population of Edessa or Vodena (the first capital of ancient Macedonia) 14,149 Greeks, as against 5770 Bulgarians; for Yennitsa 14,107 and 3482 respectively. But when we study the question from the military point of view it becomes immediately apparent that the abandonment to Bulgaria of these districts (or even of one of them only) would be equivalent to national suicide for Greece. The Bulgarians would be in a position to lay their

hands on the railway line from Salonica to Athens at any moment, and so cut off Macedonia from the rest of Greece. We need only to remember that last December a few comitadjis blew up in Serbian territory the great railway bridge over the Vardar to prevent supplies reaching Serbia from Salonica. Moreover, on the western side of Macedonia and to the south of Edessa a large plain extends beyond Cozani right up to the Pass of Sarantaporos (near the ancient Pydna). Should the Bulgarians make a sudden attack in this direction and seize this famous defile, Hellenism would be shut in within the narrow borders assigned to Greece by the Treaty of Berlin. This danger of a sudden attack is not a chimerical one. The occupation of Eastern Roumelia in 1885, of Krushovon in 1903, the Salonica affair of July 1913, and other events prove convincingly that this method of warfare has become the traditional policy of the Bulgarians. Competent observers are convinced, as we have seen, that they will resort to it again. I may add that the Bulgarians themselves have never stated that they will be contented with only a part of Macedonia. They ask for the whole. The proof of this statement can be found in the illuminating letter from Sofia written by M. Charles Rivet, and published in the *Temps* of November 27, 1914. This writer is very friendly to the Bulgarians. His whole correspondence, based on declarations of responsible Bulgarian statesmen, will well repay study.

I have referred incidentally to the territorial claims of Bulgaria on Serbia. It has been advanced in several quarters that Greece was opposed in principle to any such concessions by Serbia. This is not the case. She does not wish in any way to restrict the action of her ally except in regard to two points on which she must for her own safety make certain reserves. These two points are : First, if Bulgarian territory extends to the west of the river Vardar, Greece must claim back the small enclave of Doiran ; and secondly, Bulgarian territory must not include the district of Monastir. I shall say a word or two about both these points.

Doiran is situated in the district lying between the rivers Struma and Vardar, and separates the chain of the Belès mountains from the latter river. It is only some forty miles distant from Salonica as the crow flies, and is on the direct road to this town, the road followed by the railway from Constantinople. Thus, although its economic importance is nil, its strategic significance is great. When the first Serbo-Greek convention was signed at Salonica (May 13, 1913), Doiran was adjudged to Greece ; at the definitive convention (Belgrade, June 1913) it was handed over to Serbia. Greece, in fact, could not refuse this mark of confidence to its ally, Serbia, to whom she had already

granted commercial privileges at Salonica. The matter is on quite a different footing if the nation to whom Doiran is to be conceded styles Salonica the *Mecca of the Bulgarians*.³ An English authority supports this contention. A leading article in the *Morning Post* (December 18, 1914), attributed by common report to an excellent judge in military matters, says: 'The fighting in the last Greco-Bulgarian War showed that the defences of Salonica are the hills above Kavalla and at the gorge where the Vardar passes the last defile. These positions, therefore, Greece needs for its own safety.' The last defile of the Vardar, commonly known as the Demir-Kapou (the Iron Gates), is a little to the north of Doiran. Need I add anything further?

Greece wishes the Serbians to possess Monastir in preference to the Bulgarians; for we must remember that the Greeks hold an overwhelming position in this town. A writer whom the Bulgarians often quote says 'A Monastir les Grecs tiennent le haut du pavé' (*La Macédoine*, by Victor Bérard, Paris, 1897). Monastir supplies the best instructors, male and especially female, for the Greek schools in Macedonia. In the same way the best doctors, lawyers, and merchants come from here. What would happen if the Bulgarians took possession of Monastir? We have only to recollect the complete destruction by fire of Anchialos in 1906, and of Serres in 1913.

The frontier, too, separating Serbia and Greece, was set up in this neighbourhood not as a strategic frontier but as a line of division between friends, just a few posts in the middle of an immense plain. The road to Sarantaporos would thus be open to the Bulgarians, as already indicated. Should Monastir be allotted to Bulgaria, Greece would have no point of contact with Serbia, and, in addition, the shortest road from Athens to Europe would be controlled at this point. The importance of these considerations is obvious. The Albanian Question must also not be lost sight of. For five centuries the Turks have used the Albanian people as their instrument for terrorising both Serbians and Greeks, and creating unrest on the frontiers. This power the Bulgarians at Monastir would possess. Events occurring at the present moment dispense me from labouring this point.

The Serbians, even those most anxious to come to some permanent agreement with Bulgaria, are in complete accord with the Greeks on these matters.

When the safety of their present possessions is not in jeopardy, the Greeks are quite ready to make concessions, even

³ This was the actual phrase used by King Ferdinand of Bulgaria when speaking to Queen Olga of Greece at a dinner given by the late King George to his host and ally at Salonica (December 1912), and yet in this Mecca the number of the faithful amounts to barely more than half per cent. of the population.

in districts in which the Greek element preponderates largely over the Bulgarian. Thus the Greek Government has stated that it will make no claims with regard to Adrianople and the Enos-Midia line. It is true that quite lately the Bulgarians have begun to say that they take no interest in these districts owing to the large Greek population, and this in spite of the fact that their committees founded in Sofia were entitled Macedono-Adrianopolitan Committees. It is really difficult to see the consistency of their attitude. How can they have any claim to Drama-Kavalla and to Salonica, once you admit the principle that the majority determine the nationality? But in truth their policy is obvious. The important point for them is to push back the Greek and the Serb. Once this is done, the Turk can be dealt with at their leisure.

But now another argument makes its appearance. Since Greece is ready to renounce territory peopled largely by Greeks, why cannot she give up in addition other districts for the sake of forming a powerful Balkan Confederation? I have already dealt with the main reasons, reasons that are overwhelmingly strong, and I must emphasise the fact that at Bucharest Greece ceded all that it was strategically possible for her to cede. After the heaviest sacrifices in men and money, Greece was in military occupation of territories situated in Northern Macedonia and in Western Thrace; she gave up to Serbia Yevgheli, Doiran, and Petsovo; while to Bulgaria she restored all Western Thrace from Xanthi to Dede-Agach, and in addition Central and North-Eastern Macedonia, viz. the districts of Stroumnitsa, Petritsi, Kresna, Djoumaya, Mélénikon, and Nevrokop. At the Conference of Bucharest M. Venizélos wished at first to retain for Greece the Xanthi-Dede-Agach littoral, where the Greeks are much wealthier and infinitely more numerous than the Bulgarians; but he finally gave way in view of the necessity for the Bulgarians to have a port on the Aegean Sea (the same argument is now made use of to justify a claim to Kavalla). And what was the result of this proof of Greek moderation? From the territories ceded to Bulgaria, nearly 100,000 Greeks were deprived of their belongings and driven forth like lepers. Further sacrifices will always entail the same results; they will be taken as a proof of Greek weakness, and Bulgaria will continue to demand a wider 'place in the sun.' I venture to say that the accusation of Greek rapacity is a myth. I hope it will not be thought presuming on my part to suggest that if Bulgaria must have compensation, this can come most advantageously from Serbia and Roumania, both of which countries can be easily and *justly* indemnified from the spoils of Austria-Hungary. It has been said that Greece can increase in two directions: in Southern Albania and in Asia Minor. But what is Southern Albania with-

out Valona? Merely the Dodecanese without Rhodes, and besides there is the question of governing the Albanians. As for the coast of Asia Minor, which contains $1\frac{1}{2}$ millions of Hellenic inhabitants, Greece could only accept it on one condition, viz. not to be forced to give up her strategic frontier bordering on Bulgaria, otherwise she will be at the mercy of a coalition of Bulgaria and the Power holding the interior of Asia Minor. As an Athenian newspaper put it in a somewhat florid style: To offer Smyrna to Greece on condition that she gives up Edessa-Yennitsa or Kavalla-Drama is to offer poison in a golden cup.

I may be allowed to draw attention to the peculiar position of Greece. There are in all at least some 8 million Greeks in the world. The free kingdom of Greece included before the late wars less than *one third* of these, and at the present moment a little more than *one half* inhabit this country. The disproportion is great, and almost without parallel in the history of modern Europe. On the final settlement after the present War Greece must be ready, as has often occurred before, to deal with a large immigration from those parts that will be left practically without hope of ever being united to the mother country. It is only fair that enough territory should be conceded to her to enable her adequately to establish these immigrants. Greece will certainly strain every nerve to secure just treatment for those who have for so many centuries, and in the face of the greatest oppression, upheld her language, her traditions, and her civilisation.

There is one other point I should like to touch on before concluding. Why should Bulgaria claim favourable treatment (at the expense of others) from the Powers forming the Triple Entente?

Is it for services rendered? Of what nature were these services? How does she explain her menaces to Serbia, forcing the latter to withdraw troops from the Austrian front? or her soldiers masquerading as comitadjis whose mission was to cut up the railway lines to Greece and Roumania, the only means of communication left to the Serbians? And what about the officers, guns, munitions, and gold sent through Bulgaria to Constantinople to decide the Turks on war? And yet Bulgaria claims compensation from Greece, which has, without stint and without bargaining, rendered signal services to some of the Allies.

Or is it because some Sofia papers have suggested that the Bulgarian army should be thrown into the scale against the Serbians? But everybody knows that Bulgaria can with difficulty keep under arms 90,000 to 100,000 men, while Greece has at the present moment 123,000 men with the Colours. On a war footing the numbers would be about equal, but Greece has the prestige of victory, a better staff, and a good frontier. And that is

why the 'Prussians of the Balkans,' as they used to style themselves, have not dared, and will not dare, to move against Serbia. They have of course also to take into account the easy invasion of their territory by Roumania.

One aspect of the question is sometimes lost sight of, and that is that the final victory of Austria and Turkey would spell disaster for Bulgaria. Let me quote the Sofia correspondent of *The Times*, who is, as is well known, by no means unsympathetic to the Bulgarians: 'Bulgaria clearly has little to hope for from the success of the Central Powers. Turkey, in the event of their being victorious, would demand the restitution of a portion of her former European dominions, while Austria, after absorbing Serbia, would seize the long-coveted route to Salonica, excluding Bulgaria from all Western Macedonia' (December 9, 1914). The *Paris Temps* in a leader comes to the same conclusion: 'On ne peut douter que l'Autriche victorieuse s'installerait elle-même sur la route de Salonique, et qu'elle donnerait à son alliée turque des compensations du côté de la Thrace, cette Thrace pour laquelle la Bulgarie paraît aujourd'hui professer un dédain singulier' (November 28, 1914).

I have attempted to examine the Macedonian Question from the Greek point of view as fairly as I can. I trust I have convinced the reader that Greece deserves to be left in full possession of all the territory she at present occupies. I must add that Greece remains as anxious as ever to renew the Balkan confederation, which has been the dream of Tricoupis as well as of Venizélos, and should the Government of King Ferdinand abandon its present policy, Greece would not raise objection to even greater territorial acquisitions by Bulgaria than those she can herself hope for.

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POSTSCRIPT.—The desire of limiting myself to as little space as possible has obliged me to leave on one side perhaps one of the best arguments in favour of the Greek cause. In March 1912, before the Balkan Wars, a formal treaty on the question of the proportion of each nationality to be represented in the Turkish Parliament, then about to be elected, was entered into between the Greek and Bulgar political chiefs at Constantinople. According to this treaty, which from the very beginning was made public, eighteen seats were allotted to the Greeks in the provinces of Adrianople, Salonica, and Monastir, as against only six to the Bulgars. This proves more clearly than anything else that the proportion of the two elements in the contested districts was admitted to be *three to one*.

SCIENCE AND LOGIC

A RECENT article by a logician in the *Quarterly Review* is entitled 'The Logic of Thought and the Logic of Science.' It is always risky to assume that a logician means what he says, for one effect of the study of logic on the student is to deprive him of the ability to express his meaning with accuracy, but, taken in the ordinary meaning of the words, this title indicates that in the opinion of this logician there are two different logics, one of Thought and another of Science, and that thought is something apart from science, and science something apart from thought. This view is supported by the whole trend of the essay, though it is true that there are passages in which he seems to hedge, as when he says 'There is a sense in which there can be no special logic of science. So far as we reason, in science as elsewhere, our reasoning comes within the sphere of ordinary logic. But the fact still remains,' etc. Notwithstanding this admission, the rest of the essay insists on the importance of a logic of science distinct from the logic of thought, and even gives to the former a special title, that of methodology, in order to emphasise the distinction.

Now, it is quite true that there are different modes or processes of reasoning, and that each mode has its appropriate field; but to suppose that science can be pursued without thought, or that there is any special process of reasoning peculiar to science, is such a crazy notion, and shows such ignorance of what science is and of what thought is, as could hardly exist in the mind of anyone but a logician.

Setting aside certain special views, such as that of Professor Karl Pearson, that science means statistics, the prevalent view, both of the man who devotes himself to science and of the man of business or of politics who does not, is that science is something apart from common knowledge, more certain, more accurate, less fallible, and superior in every way. They would both consider that the knowledge that it is raining is common knowledge, and the knowledge that the sun is in Capricorn is scientific knowledge; that knowledge that comes to us unsought, by commerce with the world around us, is common knowledge; and knowledge that is gained by looking down a microscope or mixing

liquids in a test-tube is science; that knowledge that is expressed in common words, such as spirit of salt, is common knowledge, and knowledge that is expressed in uncommon words, such as hydrogen chloride, is science. This is all rubbish.

A chess-player who is reckless of his pieces will turn the box upside down on the table, so that the men are in a disorderly heap. He then sets each piece in its proper place upon the board. The men are the very same men, but from being in a chaotic heap, without order or arrangement, they are now arranged in an orderly disposition, each bearing a definite relation towards its immediate fellows and towards all the rest. They form a system. They are no longer higgledy-piggledy, but are organised. Substitute facts for the chessmen, and the difference is very much the same as the difference between science and common knowledge. Apart from making them ready to play, the orderly arrangement of the chessmen has many advantages. It enables us to find, easily and instantly, any piece we want. To find any one man in the heap we should have to turn the whole heap over: now we can put our hand on a piece in a moment. To count the men in the heap would be comparatively slow and laborious and uncertain, but, now they are arranged in order, it is easy to count them rapidly and with accuracy. Eight men in a row, four rows—thirty-two. When they were in an unorganised heap it was quite impossible to tell, without careful and comparatively prolonged search, whether all were there or not, and if not, what piece was missing; whether all belonged to the same set; whether any piece was redundant; how many pieces there were of each colour and of each shape, and so forth. Now that they are arranged on an orderly system, each item of information can be ascertained at a glance. In short, by organising our pieces into a system we not only gain time, labour, and exactitude, but our attention is immediately called to things that without this organisation we should never have seen at all.

This is very much the difference between common knowledge and science. Common knowledge is not, indeed, an entirely unorganised heap of facts. Without some organisation there can be no knowledge at all, but the difference between common knowledge and science is that common knowledge is loosely and crudely organised, on a plan that is often vague, and that groups facts together according to superficial resemblances, and separates them according to differences that are conspicuous though they may be unimportant; while science aims at a precise arrangement, upon a fixed principle that shall take account of fundamental resemblances beneath superficial difference, and fundamental differences beneath superficial resemblance. It is a mistake to suppose that science, or scientific knowledge, is neces-

sarily more certain or more accurate than common knowledge. Men of science, if they are worthy of the name, certainly do strive after certainty and exactness, but they must be the first to admit that they frequently fail to attain either. Astronomy is by common admission the most certain and the most exact of the natural sciences, but astronomers were in doubt for years, and for aught I know may still be in doubt, whether there are or are not rectilinear markings on the surface of Mars; and as to exactness, they cannot determine within ten thousand miles the distance of the earth from the sun. It is the same in other sciences. Whether acquired qualities are or are not inherited has been keenly debated by biologists for years. Ethnologists cannot fix within ten thousand years the date at which a flint weapon was chipped out by the maker; and the same uncertainty and want of exactness prevail in all other sciences. But such common knowledge as who reigns at this moment in England, or where Paris is situated, is quite certain; and such common knowledge as the number of days in the week, or the number of months in the year, is quite exact. The knowledge that it is raining may be common knowledge, or, if it fits into a system, if it is taken in connexion with the contact of a body of warm, moist air with a stratum of cold air, it may be scientific knowledge. The man who accumulates knowledge of recondite matters, such as fossil elephants or fungous plants, is usually called a scientific man; but if he heaps up his facts without order or arrangement, as many men who are called scientific do, he is much less scientific than the grocer round the corner, who keeps his books on a good system, and has all his facts of stock and price so arranged that he can lay his hand on any one of them at a moment's notice. Science, in short, is order and arrangement, systematisation and organisation; and that knowledge is most scientific, not which is labelled with the longest and strangest titles, not which is gained by the use of the microscope or the telescope, not which is gained by experiment, not which is the subject of statistical treatment, but which is organised and arranged upon the best system—on the system that is best and most appropriate for the purpose in view.

It is not that common knowledge is not organised at all. It is organised. It must be, for it is the organisation of experiences that converts them into knowledge. An experience that cannot be relegated to its place in the system of knowledge is not knowledge in any proper sense of the word. It is the incorporation of a new fact into the system of facts already known that constitutes knowledge of that fact. That is what knowledge consists in. That is the nature of knowledge. To know a thing is not to attach a name to it, but to refer it to its place in the system of knowledge that we have already

organised. When I was a boy at school I took to my master a pebble that I had picked up, and asked him what it was. He was something of a humorist, and replied that it was 'common jasper.' I was quite satisfied, and thought I now knew what the stone was. Of course, I was mistaken, but I shared with many of my elders the delusion that when I had attached a name to a thing I knew more about it than I did before. I did not; but if I had had in my mind a classification of stones, in which one class was the class of jaspers, I should have gained a real addition to my knowledge; for now the new fact would have fitted into its place in the system of my previous knowledge. The systematisation of knowledge begins with the dawn of intelligence. When a child drops its bottle on to the floor, and breaks it, the child has a new experience, an experience which is not yet knowledge, for there is as yet no system of knowledge into which it can fit. Presently the child bangs its toy against the side of its crib, and breaks the toy. Now there are materials for knowledge. This experience of breakage can be compared and assimilated to the previous instance. The child, if it could speak, might say 'Hullo! things break: when they get a bang, things break.' He has begun to organise his experiences, to arrange his facts, to form a system of knowledge. In short, he has begun to be incipiently or rudimentarily scientific.

The main difference between the organisation of facts into common knowledge and their organisation into science is, besides the differences already stated, that the assimilation and differentiation of facts which constitutes common knowledge is done without deliberation, without attention to the doing, almost without intention. It is, as it were, instinctive, or automatic. The organisation of facts into science, on the other hand, is effected deliberately and intentionally, with care and conscious effort, with consideration and solicitude to discover the best system for the purpose in hand. The likenesses and differences that immediately present themselves are not necessarily accepted. We search for those which are fundamental and important, and erect our system accordingly.

When the chessmen are arranged on a formal system, it is immediately apparent whether all are there, and, if not, which is missing; and when our knowledge is arranged upon a formal system, it is at once apparent whether there are gaps in it. The appreciation that our knowledge is defective in any particular at once sets us to supply the defect, and as scientific knowledge is always defective, it follows that search for knowledge, or investigation, becomes inseparable from science, so that, to many people, science means investigation, and nothing else. The very fact that these gaps in our knowledge exist shows that the missing knowledge is more recondite, less easily attained, than

the knowledge we possess ; and that it needs pains, and perhaps specially devised means, to secure it. This is why science is associated with the microscope and other instruments, with the laboratory, and with the special means of investigation that we call experiment. But though investigation is necessary to the advance and improvement of science, it is no necessary part of science. It is quite possible to reorganise our knowledge as it stands, and this reorganisation into a system constitutes it science.

It will be seen from this explanation of the nature of science, and of its relation to common knowledge, that to speak of the logic of thought as a thing apart from the logic of science is sheer nonsense. Science is knowledge ; knowledge is the result of thought acting on experience. Science is organised knowledge, and knowledge cannot be organised except by thought. A logic which is a logic of the one must be a logic of the other, and the notion that there can be a separate logic of each can only arise from confusion and ignorance of the nature of science on the one hand, and the nature of thought on the other.

What science is has been explained. It is now necessary to show what logic is. It is remarkable, and it is little to the credit of logicians, that though they have studied logic for two thousand years, they don't know what it is. Logicians are all agreed that one of the important tasks of logic is to teach the art of definition, and every text-book of logic contains a chapter on this subject : yet in two thousand years logicians have not succeeded in defining logic ! It is necessary, therefore, to take the task out of their hands ; and there is no difficulty about it.

Logic is the science and art of reasoning. As a science, it should discover and explain how reasoning is conducted ; it should set forth systematically the nature of the reasoning processes ; and, as preparatory and ancillary to this task, it should discover and explain the preparatory and ancillary processes of assertion and denial, of generalisation, classification, definition, and so forth. As an art, logic should first teach how statements ought to be made—that is, how to assert and how to deny, how to avoid the faults of assertion and denial, such as obscurity, confusion, unintelligibility, self-contradiction, equivocation, bivocation, uncertainty, and so forth. Next, it should teach the art of reasoning in all three of its processes. It should teach, in Deduction, all that may be inferred from a given postulate, and how these inferences are to be attained—in short, the rules or canons of inference. In Induction it should teach how to proceed to new knowledge from knowledge already acquired, how to choose a datum, how to find a premiss, and the differences between fact, hypothesis, conjecture, and surmise. In Analogy, it should

teach the comparison of relations. Epistemology is not, properly speaking, a part of logic, but it is so intimately connected with induction that a chapter on what we may legitimately accept as true, on probability, likelihood, and so forth, would not be out of place in a book on logic; nor would it be irrelevant to discuss the true nature of cause and effect. Logic, as at present taught, does not do any of these things; and at long length its incompetence is at last begun to be recognised. The logic of tradition is being attacked on all sides, and has practically no defenders. It is high time, indeed, that there should be a new logic, but the new logic will not be a logic of science exclusively or specially. A competent logic will suffice to regulate the statements and reasonings of science as well as those of common knowledge. Such a logic is sorely needed in both domains.

Some years ago logic was a compulsory subject in the examination for the M.D. of London University, and I think for other higher degrees there, but it has long been rejected from the curriculum. It was included, no doubt, because the authorities recognised how important it is that a physician should be able to make clear statements and to reason aright: it was rejected, no doubt, because it was found that logic, as taught, did not help him to do either the one or the other. There is, indeed, a crying need of a knowledge of logic by physicians, especially physicians for mental diseases, and by other men of science; but when I speak of a knowledge of logic, I do not mean, as logicians mean, by logic a description of the methods by which men of science attain their results. I mean a knowledge and a practice of clear statement and of valid reasoning. How great is the need of such knowledge and practice a few examples will show.

I do not think that any Society of Engineers would accept, as a subject of discussion, the problem of the impact of an irresistible force upon an immovable body, and I doubt whether any Physical Society would permit a discussion upon immaterial matter. Even if the title were altered to unsubstantial matter, most likely some member of the Council would be shrewd enough to see that a contradiction in terms is not any less a contradiction in terms for being half concealed behind a bivocation. In Psychical Societies we are more liberal—or less discerning. No qualms assailed the Council of the British Medical Association when it was proposed to discuss, at the annual meeting of 1914, the subject of unconscious consciousness. It is true that this was not the actual title of the paper. It was called 'The Unconscious' merely, but no one supposed that it referred to stocks and stones, planets or ions, houses or furniture, attraction or repulsion, or other unconscious things. What was meant, what

was understood, what was explicitly avowed in the course of the discussion, was the Unconscious Mind, or Unconscious Consciousness. One speaker defined the unconscious as 'those mental processes not accompanied by awareness,' and evidently thought he had successfully hidden the contradiction in terms of 'conscious processes not accompanied by consciousness' behind the bivocation. Another triumphantly proposed that conscious consciousness and unconscious consciousness should be united under the name 'psyche,' and considered that the difficulty of conceiving unconscious consciousness would thus be surmounted. If either the writer of the paper, or the speakers to it, or any member of the Council of the Section, had had an elementary knowledge of a competent logic, such a paper could not have been permitted, could not have been discussed, could not have been read, could not have been written. As it is, the discussion took place, and is recorded at length in the unashamed pages of the *British Medical Journal*. The dodge of playing upon words and faking new discoveries by attaching new names to familiar things is a favourite one with the Germans, and for want of a little logic our alienists accept these pseudo-discoveries with enthusiasm. It was a German Swiss who read this paper, but whether or not his tongue was in his cheek I do not know.

Another instance of energy wasted and effort misdirected for want of a little logic is seen in the surmise of the Mendelians, which, for want of logic, they state as a fact, that feeble-mindedness is due to the absence of a 'unit character.' Feeble-mindedness is defect of mind, and defect of mind may exist in any degree, from the merely dull man, who is a little below the average standard, to the degraded idiot who cannot learn to walk, and has not sense enough to feed himself; so that if it is due to absence of a 'unit character,' there must be, not one unit character, but an infinite number, one corresponding with each grade of defect. Professor Karl Pearson gravely proves by statistics that the Mendelians are wrong, but no statistics are needed, and no disproof is needed. The onus of proving such an astonishing assertion is on those who make it, and until some evidence is brought forward we need not waste time in considering it. Up to now, not a rag of evidence has been adduced. It needs but little logic to recognise this, but when had a Mendelian any logic?

Professor Karl Pearson delights in exposing the pretensions of the Mendelians, and the task is both inviting and easy, but in his own armour there are gaping deficiencies which a little logic would supply. In a soaring flight of prophecy he predicts the time when 'the category of cause and effect' shall be abolished, and he looks forward to this time as the culmination

and apotheosis of science. He does not seem to know that in this prediction he has been forestalled by a poet with a much sounder logic, as well as a more picturesque mode of expression, who prophesies that :

Cause and Effect shall from their thrones be hurled,
And universal chaos whelm the ruined world,

or words to that effect; and there is no doubt that the poet's foresight is much more accurate than the professor's. Logic shows clearly enough that if cause and effect could be dethroned, or if their category could be abolished, which I take it is much the same thing, the universe, or at any rate our appreciation of it, would be reduced to chaos. However, fortunately for the universe, and for cause and effect, the human mind is so constituted that it cannot do without this category, and chaos is postponed.

A few years ago there was a discussion at the Medico-Psychological Association, which is named on the same principle as the black beetle, upon the justifiability, in certain cases, of punishing lunatics. I pointed out that lunatics in asylums are constantly punished in various ways, by stopping their pocket money, their tobacco, their leave on parole, their attendance at amusements and revels, and so forth, but I was shouted down by a chorus of denial. 'Punishments! Nonsense! These are merely withdrawals of privileges. We dare not call them punishments, and therefore they are not punishments.' Another instance of the power of the fallacy of bivocation to blind the mind's eye to plain facts.

In 1911 Dr. McDougall, one of the ablest of English psychologists, published a large book, representing many months of labour, on the relation between Mind and Body, and summarised therein the views on the same subject of many predecessors. A knowledge of a competent logic would have taught him and them that the problem is insoluble, and is in psychology what squaring the circle is in mathematics. Nay, it is still more completely insoluble, for we can square the circle to any degree of approximation that we choose, but we cannot approximate in the least the gap between Mind and Body.

It is in logic itself, however, that the want of logic is felt most severely. The riot of illogicality in books on logic is quite amazing. Logicians enumerate nine or ten 'quantities' in propositions, and declare that there are only two. They say there is only one mode of reasoning, and they employ many, but they never employ the one mode that they say is the only one. They say they cannot frame a proposition with any other verb than 'is' or 'are,' and in the very proposition in which they make

the assertion they use the verbs 'cannot' and 'frame.' They write chapters on definition, but they cannot define logic, nor any of its principal terms. They warn the student against ambiguity, and they admit and proclaim that the model proposition of logic—All men are mortal—is ambiguous; and though the ambiguity is easily removed, they never attempt to rectify it. They lay down certain rules for reasoning, and describe certain fallacies in reasoning, and their fallacies are not breaches of their own rules, so that it is easy to commit the most glaring fallacy without infringing a single rule of logic. In short, the logic of the text-books and of the University classrooms is the most illogical scheme that ever was conceived outside of Bedlam.

Time was when logic was the most important of the three subjects that alone entered into a liberal education. For centuries it was the chief and almost the only subject of discussion among learned men, until one fine day Francis Bacon showed learned men that for centuries they had been marking time with immense exertion, and had not advanced one step. He implored them to cast away the study of logic and betake themselves to subjects more fruitful; and the world followed his advice, and built up the stupendous fabric of science that we now so much admire. But although the logic of Aristotle and the Schools was never anything but a shackle and a drag upon the progress of knowledge, knowledge cannot progress without logic. The wonderful advance of science is due to the employment of a logic that men of science have undeliberately and almost unwittingly invented for themselves as they went along. But this logic has never become a science. Whewell and Mill tried to organise it into a system, but they failed. Novices pick it up by seeing it practised by others, and by practising it themselves, just as nurses in the old days picked up nursing, and physicians and surgeons, in older days still, picked up their knowledge of their professions by seeing others practise, and without ever being formally taught.

But the time is coming when logic will have to be taught. Not the trash that goes by the name of logic in the Universities and the text-books, but the real science and art of statement and reasoning as they should be carried out in practice, as well in business, in politics, in the common affairs of every-day life, as in science—in short, in every field in which clear statement and valid reasoning are required, and where are they not? The old logic of Aristotle and the Schools is in its death-agony. Its professors still expound its futilities and absurdities in their classrooms and text-books, but no one except their dwindling classes pays any heed to them. They make no attempt to defend it from the attacks that are now being made upon it from all sides, and for a good reason. They cannot defend it, because it is indefen-

sible. They cannot answer the attacks, because they are unanswerable ; and before long the whole ramshackle structure will be pulled down and swept away, and a new and competent logic will be erected on the site.

When such a logic is taught, the time of learned Societies will not be wasted in discussing contradictions in terms ; the assertions of German professors will need to be supported by some attempt at evidence before they are accepted and lauded to the skies ; such fallacies as contradiction in terms and bivocation will be detected at sight ; it will no longer be possible to violate all the accepted rules of reasoning and yet produce a perfectly valid argument, nor to perpetrate transparent fallacies that infringe no canon of reasoning ; and grave professors who set themselves up as *censores scientiarum* will no longer make themselves ridiculous by proposing to abolish the ' category ' of cause and effect, or by speaking of a logic of thought distinct from the logic of science.

CHAS. A. MERCIER.

THE 'NEW POLICY' OF LICENSING REFORM

(I)

A REPLY FROM A BREWER

LORD GREY in his enthusiastic foreword to the article on Licensing Reform in the January number of this Review commends the 'new policy' described in it by Mr. Part to the serious consideration of readers. Any commendation from Lord Grey deserves attention, and perhaps, as he and Mr. Part can scarcely claim to represent 'disinterested management' in the affairs of the Public-House Trust, whose merits they extol, and whose organisation is the suggested instrument of the 'new policy,' some remarks on the whole subject from one who is equally 'interested' in licensing questions may be admissible. The views of a brewer will of course not find favour with members of the United Kingdom Alliance for the Total and Immediate Suppression of the Liquor Traffic. They are not addressed to them. It would be waste of time. But moderate men may find some food for reflection in statements too seldom made in view of the printed activity of the teetotallers and the numerous Temperance Leagues and Societies.

Probably the time is opportune for a clear realisation of the facts in regard to which licensing reform may or may not be required. With Lord Grey we all look for a 'New Unity in our National Life' which shall continue. We all must surely hope and desire that the New Unity should find expression in better temperance in all things, in greater liberty, in less interference one with another, in an upholding and support of the remarkable manifestation of character and independence and the better use of freedom which we are witnessing at this moment in the manhood of our race.

It is time to consider whether the evils of drunkenness, 'the despair of every patriot' in Lord Grey's estimation, can be dealt with by patriots who insist on legislating, and in a repressive manner, against matters which cannot be effectively touched by legislation at all.

The desire or the weakness which results in drunkenness are themselves beyond the reach of the law. They are only to be

touched by quite different influences, with some of which Mr. Part deals : and here the failure of legal measures is indeed one of 'the standing proofs of the helplessness of party politicians.' The question of the prevention of drunkenness does not lend itself to settlement by party dispute. It was a deplorable pity that Sir William Harcourt allowed this and licensing questions to become party questions at all, tempted as politicians, if not statesmen, invariably are by the promise of votes. The spectacle of a Teetotal Party in the House of Commons is not really an edifying one, and its disgraceful bargain with the Government and with the Irish Party (in whose country intemperance is a much more crying evil than it is in England) over the licensing clauses of the notorious Budget of 1909-10 is a standing shame to it. A wider view and a freer sympathy are required for the solution of the question of intemperance than can be taken in the Party Whips' room.

One word more on Lord Grey's paragraphs. He writes of the 'unproductive' expenditure of one hundred and sixty million pounds annually in alcoholic drink. I believe this one hundred and sixty million is a figure arrived at by the teetotalers and constantly quoted in order to shock the consciences of other people. They will have, if the Chancellor of the Exchequer whose politics they support is correct in his estimates, a much higher figure to name in the future. But is the expenditure—correctly or incorrectly stated—unproductive? As regards beer alone, over fifty-two million bushels of malt and over sixty-two million pounds of hops used in one year in its manufacture surely represent some productiveness. And over 13,000,000*l.* added to the revenue is the produce of the beer duty—to be now very much increased—ignoring the licence duties altogether. In neither connexion can the expenditure be looked upon as 'unproductive.' And if alcohol in any form restores the tired energies of the worker and invigorates his frame, then the expenditure is productive in perhaps the highest sense of all.

Further, the expenditure of money in alcoholic drinks is, in Lord Grey's estimation, 'tending to the deterioration of our national manhood and to the impoverishment of our national resources which, depleted by war, it is more than ever necessary we should vigilantly conserve.' Surely Lord Grey will admit that it is not the general expenditure under this head which could tend to such deterioration—even if there were a tendency, due to any cause, in that direction, which I dispute—but (as I readily agree with him) merely the over-expenditure by certain very few persons, whose self-control is insufficient, that tends to their individual deterioration and to the impoverishment of their individual resources. If it were otherwise, would Lord Grey be a party to the expenditure of the one hundred and sixty

million pounds by so much as being Founder of a Public-House Trust? Even 'disinterested management,' if such can exist in conjunction with five-per-cent. dividends, would not absolve him.

I feel sure he wrote that sentence without full consideration, and I am confident he agrees with me that alcohol is a great and valuable national asset, that beer at any rate is an important portion of the food of the people of this country—just as I agree with him that the misuse and abuse of these commodities are disgusting and criminal.

We can probably thus stand on common ground while considering Mr. Part's arguments and their startling conclusion.

Mr. Part sees the impossibility of endeavouring to insist on prohibition: he agrees that what he calls 'pure malt and hop beer' has valuable dietetic properties. And he estimates the wealth, power, and influence of the Trade in language which fairly takes away the breath of its astonished members. It is impossible to resist the feeling that, were he correct, the Trade would have escaped all the crushing blows which the Cocoa interest and the Teetotal Party have been able to deliver through the agency of a Radical Government. In the 'true and permanent interest' of the Trade he says that licensing reform is necessary, and that the 'revolting conditions under which most of the drink of the country is purveyed are evidence of the urgency of the matter.'

Traders at any rate might differ from him in thinking that if their influence, power, wealth, and organisation are really so great, reform of the system which upheld them is necessary. And sober men who have acquaintance with the facts will not allow that the licensed houses of the country are 'most' of them, or even many of them, 'revolting' in their conditions.

But even if one granted that Mr. Part was right and that the power of the Trade is as great as he declares and the public-houses belonging to them as 'revolting,' the question would be, first, whether these things created in people the desire or the weakness for over-indulgence in drink; and, secondly, whether Mr. Part's suggestions for destroying these vast powers of the Trade by revolutionising the holding of licensed property would lessen the desire, strengthen the weakness, and incidentally improve the conditions existing in the public-houses. He is surely correct in saying that the powers of the Bench have, when exercised harshly and unsympathetically, discouraged the better class of man from entering the licensed Trade, and he makes a plea for more liberty and discretion being accorded to the publican, or at any rate to the Public-House Trust. The Legislature is largely responsible. By passing such measures as the clauses of the Children Act relating to licensed houses, a most

insulting and discouraging disability was thrust upon licensed victuallers. The strongest feeling was aroused amongst them by it. In my own personal knowledge cases occurred of men of high character and of means leaving the Trade, in which their families had for generations been respected and contented, in disgust at the slight put upon its members. The sort of prying supervision exercised in connexion with recent enactments and magisterial rules is indeed dear to the Radical politician, but not to liberal-minded men or to people of character and substance carrying on trade in practical partnership with the Revenue. And the immense taxation imposed on the Trade has undoubtedly driven men of capital to look elsewhere for investment.

It has long been recognised by the Trade and by many Benches of magistrates—perhaps one can really say by all—that not disinterested management, but, on the contrary, interested management, is the best in every sense.

Benches of magistrates, even those where teetotal principles are prominently represented, constantly insist on real responsibility, on a real monetary stake—in fact, an 'interest'—on the part of the licensee, in the business, even when they desire to place the utmost restriction and to exercise the maximum of magisterial and police control and interference. The two things are inconsistent. If men with real responsibility are wanted to invest their money in public-house management they must be trusted and left free from irritating supervision. In reality, disinterested management is unattainable. Even the Public-house Trust managers have to be given an 'interest.' They are paid a commission on the non-alcoholic takings. It has been known to have induced them to add to their 'interest' by entering spirituous liquors as mineral waters in their customers' bills—to the surprise and the amusement of the customers. In its broader aspect it has been an acknowledged failure. In Norway and Sweden the system has many critics, and Mr. Part's airy assumption of its infallibility and universal acceptance in those countries is not in accordance with the facts. The strongest diversities of opinion in regard to it prevail, and extend even to temperance reformers. In Norway the Samlag surplus profits were held to be much better applied than the Bolag profits in Gothenburg. The Norwegians said the Swedes were tempted to drink harder in order to pay their local rates through the pleasant medium of their own intoxication. In Norway the surplus profits were devoted to objects which the local authorities were not bound by law to support. But, if these were necessary objects and the money had to be found, one can hardly say the objection did not equally apply. And when the Norwegian Legislature interfered and diverted the profits to the State, it was because the

Samslag 'disinterested' managers were extending the drinking hours in order to pay for objects of 'public utility' which the Norwegians, like the Swedes, preferred to do convivially. And conversion to the State merely gives the 'interest' another character.

Mr. Part's want of knowledge of both the Bolags and the Samlags is about level with that of most of his countrymen, and I commend him to the chapter on 'Interested Disinterestedness' in Mr. Edwin Pratt's able and independent *Survey of the Licensed Trade*, published in 1908.

There he will learn some facts as to the limited range of the companies in Norway and Sweden, the absurdities that have arisen in connexion with their working, and the amazingly high percentage of convictions for drunkenness as compared with this country, which nevertheless prevail where the companies operate and elsewhere. In fact, the prevention of drunkenness is not a matter that lends itself in the least degree to treatment by these methods.

The Samlags and Bolags were able to change the method of distribution of spirits. The bar sales declined. The bottle sales of 'off' traders increased. The Samlag directors calculated that for their sales of 410,000 litres of spirits in Christiania, the trade done by other retailers was 2,000,000 litres. And beer is not controlled by the Samlags.

In Denmark, where practically no restrictions are attempted, a very much better condition of sobriety prevails than in either Sweden or Norway. In statistics before me, the convictions for drunkenness in Copenhagen are sixteen per thousand, as against fifty-two in Gothenburg.

But Mr. Part is not really satisfied with the Public-House Trust as at present organised. He wants a complete and far-reaching change. It is no less than that the shareholders should be replaced by the State, who is also to take over the 'monopoly' (of the necessity for which he is certain in one paragraph, and of the frightful danger of which he is convinced in other portions of the article), now acquired by the brewers of the country and the existing Public-House Trust Companies. And the Public-House Trusts are to manage all the houses for the State.

Figures have been named by various bold guessers of the value of the licensed houses of the country. The Government is also engaged on these figures at present, and has, in four years, made a little progress that will now want revision. Sir Thomas Whittaker said that in 1904 the value of the on-licences in England and Wales only was 125,000,000*l.*, and it was to be increased, either he or his friends 'calculated,' to 600,000,000*l.*

after the Act of 1904 passed. It did pass. And whether this silly 'calculation' was right, or Sir Thomas Whittaker, or neither of them, it is at any rate certain that the value of the licensed houses of the country, whether an Irish Parliament would throw in theirs or not, represents a very startling sum for any Chancellor to ask for with a view to the purchase, even if he could persuade the House of Commons that 'disinterested State management' was thereby to be secured, or that disinterested management was either possible or desirable.

Mr. Part has a much better way than State purchase to suggest—merely that the present owners should pay for their houses themselves over again, and then hand them to the State. After all, it is not a 'new policy.' It is our old friend the 'Time Limit'—fourteen years he suggests—which Parliament, with the full approval of the country, emphatically rejected in 1908 because of its gross and palpable injustice.

As far as the Trade is concerned, it is, financially, an impossibility. If out of the surplus profits now said to be devoted to unnamed 'objects of public utility,' the Home Counties Public-House Trust can find the whole value of its properties in fourteen years, that would indeed be a proof of its financial success. One has only to look at its accounts to see that it cannot.

And let us look at the specimens of disinterested management as exhibited by the Public-House Trust. Do they offer us any dazzling example that would impel a licensed victualler to do anything in an attempt to rival them? Do these houses attract enthusiastic crowds of customers away from the 'revolting' places into which Mr. Part sees the brewers forcing an unwilling custom?

I do not think they do. Their houses differ in no material respect from those of the Trade. 'Flowers, pictures, and good taste in decoration' are just as frequent in the houses belonging to 'the Trade'; and, what is more important, cleanliness, attention, and good liquor and food.

His claim for the superior character of the Public-House Trust management requires examination, and his suggestion that no single employee of the Public-House Trust has ever been convicted of any breach of the Licensing Acts, or in respect of any other offence, was surely made in forgetfulness of a well-known and often quoted case of one of their own houses. This case as reported was only another reminder that managers had better be interested rather than disinterested in the conduct of their houses—and if I recollect rightly the temperance papers had some very scathing things to say about the Trust, possibly embittered by jealousy of the difference of its method from their method of inculcating sobriety.

A cry dear to the heart of the teetotaler and the Public-House Trust is that the ordinary publican's aim is to 'push the sale of drink' till his customers have had enough to intoxicate them, while refusing them the food they ask for.

Let us be a little sensible in considering this question. Let us realise that the publican wants to do nothing of the kind. He wants to sell the beer, wine, and spirits that he is licensed to sell, to sober, regular customers, who will come day by day and bring their friends to his house for their daily supplies.

Let us realise that it is these sober, regular people that he must please if he is to secure their custom and his own living. They will not tolerate drunkenness, nor will the police. As to the publican, his licence and livelihood are endangered at once if it occurs.

If there is a demand for food and refreshments the 'interested' publican will at once provide it, because it is profitable. In the majority of public-houses it is always obtainable at convenient hours, and a large percentage of working people take advantage of it. But when the temperance advocates demand that there should be meals served in every licensed house, it is asking for the unnecessary. Labouring men, earning average labouring men's wages, cannot afford to buy food in this way, and do not ask for it. A publican would cook and prepare it in vain. The wife, mother, or landlady prepares the food that working-men take for dinner if they work too far from home to return to the family meal. They carry it with them, and either eat it in the public-house where they get their drink, or eat it outside and go for their drink afterwards. If they dine at home, they either bring in their drink or go for it on their way to work again.

If they spend the evening away from home in a public-house, a practice less general now than thirty years ago, when poor homes were less comfortable, it is after the evening meal is over and no food is required. A pipe and a glass are only what most people think reasonable after work.

Above all, let us be reasonable and treat other people as reasonable beings, and not as evil-disposed children. Let us improve our system, but let the improvement be based on reason and liberty.

I do not say that everything in the present system is perfect. And in regard to the public-houses resulting from the present system, I will freely admit there are many where the conditions, when their customers are assembled, would be 'revolting' to persons of education and good breeding. We have the very poor, living in dirt and squalor; we have people working at unsavoury trades; and we have criminal classes. These all form part of

the public for whom public-houses are licensed, and they have their right to share in the facilities afforded by any licensing system. They produce similar 'revolting' conditions quite frequently in third-class railway carriages, and in railway stations, crowded—shall we say?—with hop-pickers. But it would be foolish to condemn the railway system and to clamour for the abolition of railway stations and third-class carriages. If the poor can be more effectually helped to become richer and cleaner, the rough and coarse to be more careful in manner and speech—all of which things are gradually and very slowly coming to pass—the public-house will automatically lose its 'revolting' character. Then Bishops and their wives may go and take tea in places which they now peep into and condemn, quite unjustly, as dens of drunkenness and iniquity; and the change will be to the advantage of all concerned, including the Bishops and their wives.

Let politicians keep clear of dubious bargains over licensing matters for the sake of votes. Real reform will be easier. Let the benches of magistrates take a wider and more liberal view of their powers than some few of them—not the majority—are inclined to do. They are right in asking for interested management. Let them get it and then give it their confidence in every reasonable way. It is their duty to license houses for the public convenience. Let them strive to make them convenient and comfortable to the public. They can do so by agreeing to plans for alteration of inconvenient houses to more convenient arrangement—by sanctioning the addition of rooms for better service and better comfort. Music is not criminal where it does not disturb the neighbours. Games are not demoralising. Yet they are sternly repressed when they should be encouraged. If they are sanctioned to the Public-House Trust as Mr. Part suggests, why not to other owners? American, and probably other teetotallers, clamour to do away with bars; and, when bars are done away with and chairs and tables make people comfortable, they clamour for bars again and insist on the customers all standing up to drink.

Is it not far better to leave these points to settle themselves amicably between publican and customer?

Mr. Part passes the strongest condemnation on the 'complexity, ineptness, inefficiency and artificiality' of our licensing system. He says it is probably unrivalled. He nevertheless wishes to add complications and conditions which would in no respect make it simpler, and in many respects would accentuate the complexity and artificiality, if not the other disadvantages named. 'Lastly, reform must be constructive and not merely restrictive,' he says, and 'must be gradual and voluntary.' Gradual, no doubt; voluntary, certainly; and constructive in the

sense that better standards have to be constructed, not new laws. There is too much law as it is. It cannot in the nature of things do much good; and it will, if made more restrictive, do more harm.

Does anyone—temperance reformer, teetotaler or other—believe that the restrictions that lead to the formation of mere drinking clubs are wise restrictions? Let us have clubs, by all means. But the licensed house is licensed for the very purpose of focussing the sale of drink into supervised places. Make the supervision excessive and over-restrictive, and the purpose is frustrated. Men go elsewhere and make other arrangements, not with 'disinterested' Public-House Trusts, but with interested club proprietors, where they are free from supervision. In many cases no harm is done—but it is notorious that there are very many clubs presenting objectionable features, both as regards sobriety of members and morality of proceedings, that would never have existed but for repressive measures of one kind and another enacted against public-houses. And the political character of 'Temperance Reform' has a good deal to do with the freedom from interference which they enjoy.

Mr. Part cries out for change in the basis of the licence duty, and desires it to be levied on the liquor retailed, and not on the assessment. It would certainly be a juster method as between one trader and another than the present unequal plan. But how on earth an alteration of the licence duty from a basis of rating to a basis of sales is to be 'the greatest single incentive to temperance' is beyond the comprehension of most people, though emphatically stated by Mr. Part. I believe the assessment basis to be unsound, and specially unsound now we have high licence. When low licence prevailed it mattered less; now it penalises unduly the houses standing on expensive ground. But to say that the change would make drunken people sober appears to me to be an unwarrantable conclusion.

And Mr. Part's mention of Middlesex in relation to the 'evil' of the enormous percentage of 'redundant houses' is unfortunate. It has now to be read in the light of the remarks of Mr. Montagu Sharpe, the Chairman of Quarter Sessions of that very Middlesex, three weeks ago. They prove the danger of over-zeal in the pursuit of remedies which are not remedies at all. It may or may not be useful to close public-houses where alteration in surrounding conditions has lessened the need for them. It is evident from Mr. Montagu Sharpe's remarks that the action is not a specific against a rising percentage of convictions for drunkenness. Hundreds of licences have been suppressed in Middlesex since 1904, and now we have an increasing percentage of convictions there at the present time.

Sobriety is an outcome of a habit and frame of mind, and not the result of any system of local arrangement of public-houses or of legal restraint.

Our great-grandfathers drank to excess. It was the fashion, and they had to be in it. It is no longer necessary to drink to excess. You may ask for a glass of milk in public and not be remarkable. Many young men of fashion habitually drink water. No man, young or old, can afford to be drunk in polite circles. His reputation would be gone. And a new and better habit has relieved young men of public-school education from any necessity to drink, and has thereby immensely fortified them against weakness. The same process is going on in the less educated and poorer walks of life, as they become better educated. It is slower there, for education is slow. But look what improvement in forty years! It needs no statistics to show it. Everyone of fifty-five can see it with his eyes.

Let Mr. Part and other reformers leave legislation alone and turn their attention to education—not merely book education but education in its wider sense. Let rich and poor mingle more together. Encourage poor boys to be Scouts and make them into decent fellows. Drill them and drill with them. Teach them to shoot. They will be better citizens afterwards, and soberer. Nor will the brewer and the publican lose trade. And the latter will arrange his house to suit the better standards if the Bench will let him.

Neither he nor the brewer live on other people's drunkenness. Neither of them would know from their sales sheets if every drunken man and woman were sent to an asylum to-morrow and kept there permanently. It would not show in the consumption. Adopt a 'new policy' by all means—but not one of the old discredited ones. Educate men and women to think soberly and reasonably in these matters, and 'then, and not till then, may we reasonably hope' for the happy issue of our weaker brethren from the insobriety which everyone deploras.

C. H. BABINGTON.

THE 'NEW POLICY' OF LICENSING REFORM

II

A REPLY FROM A PROHIBITIONIST

IN the midst of this colossal and all-absorbing War many important topics must fail to secure the attention they deserve, but military exigencies have unexpectedly brought that of the liquor evil into full prominence. The strikingly successful prohibitory measures of Russia, France, and some of the neutral countries, occasioned by this gigantic struggle, and the exploits and endurance of sober as contrasted with the atrocities of drink-inflamed soldiery, have struck the popular imagination. Whatever one's individual views in the drink controversy may be, all admit the appalling waste of our national resources under the existing licensing system, and as most modern campaigns are settled by the last ounce of endurance under strain, the consideration of our licensing policy is in no sense untimely.

When once more a new policy in licensing is announced, and that announcement enjoys not only a very eulogistic foreword from one so highly esteemed as Earl Grey, but is itself written by the managing director of that which claims to be the most successful of the Trust Public House Companies, no temperance reformer can approach its consideration without every respect. The veteran student in the field held by the vexed liquor problem, to whatever camp of opinion he may belong, is not likely to begin his task in too sanguine a frame of mind; seeing that he has been so long accustomed to the appearance in leading organs of public opinion, at frequent if not very regular intervals, of deliverances announcing policies with exclusive claims to be not only new but invariably also sane and scientific, unbiassed and constructive, practical and up to date.

Mr. Part's contribution to the discussion, unexceptionable in tone and commendably distinguished from most of its predecessors, is nevertheless so far typical, that a brief analysis of its contents may serve to test the class of which it is one, and serve the purpose of entering a modest caveat on the part

of those who still have faith in the old principles and abide by the old lines.

The old reformer neither makes against others nor accepts against himself any accusation of fanaticism. It is all a matter of respective standpoint. Hobbes, a philosopher whose clarity of thought and speech were the wonder of his day, defined 'Temperance as the habit by which we abstain from all things that lead to destruction. As for the common notion that virtue consisteth in mediocrity and vice in extremes, I see no ground for it.' The head of the medical profession in England, Sir Thomas Barlow, has declared: 'Abstinence is not fanaticism or asceticism, but rational self-control in respect to something which is fraught with untold risks.'

If one conscientiously accepts the deliberate and practically unanimous conclusions of the scientists—English, Continental and American alike—who have searchingly experimented with alcohol, that it is a racial protoplasmic poison, which weakens the disease-resisting powers of the body, and is neither stimulant, aid to digestion, nor food in any real meaning of the word, while it fails as an inspiration or help to mental work and gives no increase to muscular activity, can he, seeing everywhere the moral, physical and economic losses resulting from alcoholism, be blamed for hesitating to accept schemes whose avowed aim is to promote temperance by the sale of alcoholic drink? With the belief he holds, be it mistaken or not, blame could only attach to him if he passively allowed that temperance reform, upon which so much hangs, to become diverted from lines indicated by well-tested and unimpeachable experience on to those which have no such vindication at their back.

There may be left on one side the items in respect of which there is agreement with our critic, as, for instance, that the existing liquor monopoly should be ended, a reasonable time-limit enacted, the tied-house system destroyed, the control over clubs strengthened, grocers' licences abolished, the incidence of liquor taxation amended, and the number of public-houses largely reduced.

Never forgetting Huxley's fundamental maxim that we must learn what is true in order to do what is right, we must first satisfy ourselves as to the facts in dispute.

Mr. Part, in precision and fairness, compares most favourably with his predecessors in criticism, but the moment he descends from the general to the particular, hardly one of his paragraphs but is open to correction.

In his prefatory observations Mr. Part asserts that the revenue of the Trade 'exceeds the national income.' As a matter of fact, the accepted total of the entire National Drink

Bill is 166,000,000*l.*, and any standard authority, such as *Whitaker's Almanack*, will give the national revenue as 188,000,000*l.*

As a further example, and as also illustrating his point of view, one may cite the passage dealing with the dietetic properties of pure malt and hop beer, concluding by the statement that 'In many working-class districts hosts of labouring men engaged in the hardest manual labour live very largely upon it.' The veriest tyro in modern food analysis would rub his eyes on reading this, and even the children of our elementary schools would quote against our author the syllabus of our English Education Board.

In common with many of his colleagues, Mr. Part places 'The guarantee of purity of alcoholics' amongst the first aims of the practical temperance reformer. None of the numerous drink superstitions seems harder to kill than the exploded idea that any appreciable alleviation of the liquor evil can be found in higher standards of drink purity. As Mr. Spurgeon wittily put it: 'If you get the best of whiskey, it will get the best of you.' The authoritative findings of the Royal Commission on Whiskey and other potable Spirits, presided over by the late Lord James of Hereford, should for ever lay the ghost of the deleterious spirit bogey. The report said: 'The evidence before us failed to establish that any particular variety of whiskey was specially deleterious. . . . The general tendency of the evidence on these matters was to show that any specially evil effects observed were rather to be attributed to the excessive quantity consumed than to any specially deleterious substance.' As *The Times* well observed in its leading article of the 10th of August 1909 on the Commission Report: 'If anyone finds himself the worse for whiskey drinking he had better face the plain truth that he is imbibing too much ethylic alcohol, and not try to excuse his excess by throwing the blame on the secondary products.' The same conclusions *mutatis mutandis*, based also upon incontrovertible findings, could be recorded as to beer, and it would now be difficult to name an article of common consumption whose ingredients are better disclosed than those of beer wherever and by whomsoever sold.

The tragic picture painted by Mr. Part of many an honest licensee ruined by 'An unwise or over-zealous and tactless constabulary, backed by a harsh and unsympathetic Bench,' moves not to tears but to smiles everyone who, in common with the writer, has had large personal experience in Licensing Courts. That whole compartments of the licensing laws are a dead-letter in many places so far as enforcement against offending liquor-sellers goes, because of a supine police or pro-liquor Bench, has

long been a glaring scandal. Ruskin, no temperance fanatic, in unforgettable words, scourged as assassins those who sell their fellows into drunkenness for the sake of pelf, but the Licensing Statistics make plain every year that the offence of permitting drunkenness, for instance, continues on the vastest scale with almost complete immunity for the offenders. Last year there were in England and Wales 213,188 proceedings instituted for drunkenness, with 188,877 convictions for this offence, both figures representing the merest fraction of those actually made drunk, and yet only 372 persons were punished for permitting drunkenness. In the face of such figures as these, Mr. Part pleads for 'full play and wide discretion' to be given to the publican 'for the exercise of his abilities.'

It seems to be an essential part of the new policy so persuasively preached by Mr. Part to emphasise the evil wrought by the drink-selling club, and his second proposal is to put it on the same footing in regard to taxation as the licensed house.

From time immemorial it has been the practice of each branch of the Trade to shift responsibility on to some other branch. The wholesaler impeaches the retailer, and the retailer points to the tied-house system and the brewery vans and taps. The fully licensed victualler finds the evil in the inferior beer-house; the beer-house keeper finds it in the spirit-selling public-house; the on-licensees find it in the off-licensees and particularly in the grocers' licences, and all the licensees, with one accord, find it in the drink-selling club. The word has gone forth to concentrate the attack upon the club, although it is sometimes organised and financed by the brewer, who himself always furnishes it with liquor, and often on terms more favourable than he gives to his own tied tenants.

The club makes a timely and ideal scape-goat, and the strategic and persistent attack of the Trade has been so far successful that hosts of people have come to believe that for every public-house closed one or more drink-selling clubs spring into being, and that such clubs are much worse than the houses for which they are substituted.

Mr. Part is under this belief, and boldly caps his other assertions by stating that the registered clubs are very largely responsible for increased drinking amongst women, 'compete very severely with the fully-licensed house and undoubtedly create far greater opportunities for secret drinking,' adding to his indictment that the great majority of registered clubs 'rely as much or more than the ordinary public-house upon the sale of drink for their revenue.' Of proof for this assertion our author furnishes not a scrap, but in verification of a further statement he mentions the latest Licensing Statistics, alleging that they

show 'a very large increase in the numbers of registered clubs, and the fact that a high proportion of these have been struck off as not *bona-fide*.'

Turning to the Official Statistics, one finds that in regard to the whole of England and Wales for the eight years 1905 to 1913, while the number of on-licences was diminished by 10,739, the registered clubs for the whole of England and Wales only increased by 1868, and a very large proportion of these, it must be remembered, are golf, cricket, tennis, croquet, athletic, masonic, factory-dining, and seasonal clubs, which only supply liquors to their members, and that in negligible quantities and over very restricted periods of time.

Taking a period of seven years, 96 boroughs showed an actual decrease of 84 clubs, with an accompanying decrease over the same period of 1529 in the number of their on-licences. With few exceptions, drink-selling clubs are thickest where public-houses are most numerous, and quite contrary to a prevalent delusion, illicit drink-selling is commonest where licensed facilities for liquor sale are amplest.

Whatever the demerits of drink-selling clubs may be, and no genuine temperance reformer will minimise them, the outstanding fundamental fact is that, for obvious purposes, the Trade is endeavouring to make them responsible. for a grotesquely disproportionate amount of discredit, whilst many of the advocates of the new policy, with singular inconsistency, seem bent on impressing our public-houses with the most subtly dangerous features of the institutions so much decried. A characteristic of the Trust or company-managed house habitué is that he is all too ready to regard it as his own 'free and easy,' immune from the salutary restrictions of the ordinary licensed house, often its only redeeming aspect.

The instructed temperance reformer who has to choose between the average club and the average public-house will not hesitate for a moment. In most clubs the standard of sobriety is infinitely higher than that of the public-house. Drunkenness is looked at askance. It is a violation of club rules, and what is more important, it is against that *esprit de corps* which counts for much in most institutions worthy of the name of club.

The whole of this carefully engineered obsession as to drink-selling clubs can be best destroyed by giving widest publicity to the fact that all the clubs together are responsible, according to the now definite Government return, for less than 3 per cent. of our National Drink Bill!

Turning to the nearest volume of the many available, containing figures which can be quoted against Mr. Part, one finds in the volume *Our Fifty Years*, recording the history of the

Working Men's Club and Institute Union, that the sum spent in all their 1390 drink-selling clubs only amounted to about one shilling per member a week, constituting an amazing contrast with the expenditure of average public-house customers.

When we find the accuracy of our new critics failing so conspicuously in such test samples as have been taken at random from the beginning of the article by so able an exponent of their views as Mr. Part, we can surely ask that no judgment shall be given against us on the authority of such censors when more vital matters are reached.

Mr. Part asserts that 'Almost the whole of the reason for the existing undesirable condition of most unlicensed houses' can be traced to the tied-house system. Mr. F. E. Smith, in his article in this Review on 'Temperance Reform' of April 1912, stated that the tied-house system had arisen 'solely out of the policy of restriction in the number of public-houses which began about 1869.' Widely prevalent misapprehensions are represented in these statements. The Report of the House of Commons Select Committee, issued as far back as 1818, declared that 'nearly one half of the victualling houses in the Metropolis and more in the country are held by the brewers.'

Mr. Part's first practical remedy is to levy the licence duty, not upon the house but upon the drink, the present system penalising the large houses to the relief of the small ones. The hopes of Mr. Part that this reform will break down the tied-house system seem to have little basis, for the big brewery companies already hold nearly all the small houses as well as the large ones.

Mr. Part's reference to what he calls the Scandinavian system as justifying his policy is diplomatically brief. He omits to mention the application of this system—more correctly named the Gothenburg system—to Finland, and its failure there, described by Dr. Helenius, the famous Finnish publicist, as 'A system for forwarding vice and murdering men.' The Scandinavian countries constitute a veritable monument to the success of permissive prohibition by popular local vote, and that over areas, population, and periods of time incomparably larger than the fractional proportions of those countries ever brought under the Gothenburg system.

The use of local optionary powers and the efforts of the Temperance Societies, which have resulted in making nearly all the female and a prodigious number of the male population into total abstainers, should justly be credited with what is customarily attributed to the Gothenburg system by its English advocates. Its merits are hotly contested, but conceding for argument's sake all that can be conceivably claimed on its behalf,

it has been at best but a comparative failure, necessitating new and amending legislation, and effecting in the matter of spirit consumption (with which it has mainly dealt), in the reduction of licensed premises, and in the diminution generally of the recognised indications of intemperance, very much slower progress than has been achieved without its aid in the rest of Scandinavia and in our own country.

Writing with the testimonies of Scandinavian authorities before one, it is quite safe to say, in respect of Mr. Part's reference to them, that the responsible public men who are now under the Gothenburg system and have to make the best of it, and find it, with all its faults, better than the intolerable auction licence and ubiquitous free distillery system which preceded it, would make a widely different beginning were they only free to start *de novo*; and their temperance leaders uniformly decline to undertake the responsibility of recommending their system, under which the lower orders have been treated largely as children, for adoption amongst the British people, whose history, customs and genius differ so largely from their own.

The chief proposal of Mr. Part, and the one, indeed, to which his other suggestions are all more or less ancillary, is that the State on Gothenburg lines should authorise the formation everywhere of Statutory Companies, to run the public-houses on the basis of the regulations under which the existing Trust public-houses are worked, such authority presumably to operate at the conclusion of the necessary time limit to the present owners. He gives a short history of the Trust movement, from which it would appear that after a quarter of a century's work its supporters are conducting slightly over 300 houses, including those in Scotland and Ireland. On reference to the Licensing Statistics (1913) we find the number of on-licences for England and Wales alone to be 88,608. About one half of the meagre number of houses operated by the new reformers consists of houses purchased from the Trade, some of which their opponents think might have been allowed to die the natural death which otherwise would have overtaken them, as being obviously redundant. The other half consists of houses in respect of which new licences were obtained, many, if not all, of which these same opponents say were needless and ought never to have been applied for.

Accepting everything that Mr. Part urges on behalf of his own company, the fact remains that other Trust company experiments have frequently resulted in failure, marked by gross mismanagement, police prosecutions, drink tragedies, and demoralised localities. One Chief Constable recently testified

in public that he had found the Trust public-house 'not one particle better than the ordinary licensed house.'

The presumed dominant motive of the new policy, all its motives being held in every respect, is to eliminate that 'pushing' of the sale of alcoholics deemed the root of the mischief, the implication being that the main evil lies in greed and rapacity of the retailer. The whole body of experience at our disposal shows, however, that given the facilities this sale pushes itself. The supply, contrary to the usual rule, creates the demand. What pushing there is proceeds from the great brewery and distillery firms, whose advertisements meet the eye wherever one reads or travels, and yet these are the very people whose pushing is left untouched by the new scheme. Content with tackling the poor irresponsible man behind the bar, the new reformers quite forget the far more important man behind the house.

As a matter of fact the vast majority of those who now retail liquor under the existing system are paid by a fixed salary and remunerated by a wage absolutely undetermined by the quantity of alcoholic drinks they sell. Persuasion in choice counts for little. The customer who comes for a nip of brandy will not be put off with a bun.

As the late Lord Randolph Churchill said in one of the frankest of his daring speeches: 'The great obstacle to temperance reform undoubtedly is the wholesale manufacture of alcoholic drink,' and yet that which goes to the very heart of what the Trust promoters have in view, and undisposed of would entirely vitiate any scheme such as Mr. Part adumbrates, he and his friends absolutely ignore.

Mr. Part writes with sublime assurance: 'There is, in fact, no practical obstacle to the adoption of this system upon a national scale.' What imaginable proposal in regard to this controversy is more surely destined to intense and combined opposition? The Trade, because of its implication that their individual love of mammon rather than the inherent dangers of the article they sell is the cause of the mischief, will fight it to the last, resenting far less the views of the men who entertain the intelligible conviction that the Trade, even if carried on by the best of men, ought to be suppressed in the public interest, than the claims of amateurs who say they can carry it on much better themselves. A great body of teetotallers and temperance reformers, supported by the Labour and Socialist parties, will offer it the most strenuous opposition. In illustration of this, perhaps as succinct and authoritative a declaration as can be cited from the wealth of them at hand may be found in a passage from Mr. Philip Snowden's well-known book. He writes: 'If

all the retail trade were under Trust companies there would be a body of interested shareholders as large and as selfish as the present shareholders in liquor companies.' He continues :

The proposal of 'disinterested management' of the character we have been treating cannot be supported as either wise, desirable, or practicable. It is opposed to the whole tendency of democratic government, which is not to relegate public businesses to private associations, however good may be the intentions of the latter. No scheme of control of the retail liquor shops could be disinterested which permitted a few private persons to make profits out of the working of a public monopoly. There never could be a guarantee that the companies would be actuated by a desire to promote Temperance. Once the Trust system was universally established, it would become a huge private interest, opposed to the public welfare. The whole idea of the Trust is opposed to the principle of public responsibility for the treatment of the drink question. To hand over the licences to associations of presumably public-spirited Temperance reformers is an admission by the community of its own incapacity or want of courage. The Trust idea is wrong in its moral and its economic basis.

The only logical conclusion to be drawn from the Trust Public-house Movement literature would seem to be that the liquor trade is too dangerous to be left in any hands other than those of the State, and the State management of the traffic so manifestly beset by patent dangers is too big a subject to be entered upon here. In this regard the company management, whether by private or public capitalist board, is, of all forms, the one which experience most conclusively condemns. Dividing and evading responsibility, without soul to save or body to kick—it ever furnishes signal verification of Mr. Roosevelt's striking phrase : 'Distance disinfects dividends.'

The Trust Movement publications, in common with Mr. Part's article, impress upon the public the increase of non-alcoholic receipts, but in respect of what is infinitely more important, fail to detail and justify their alcoholic sales. The Trust promoters now admit what Messrs. Rowntree and Sherwell from the first pointed out in their standard work on the subject, that without a monopoly in the areas selected by them the new reformers could not possibly achieve the success they looked for because of the cut-throat competition of the existing houses. Hence their demand is now for a statutory monopoly. Nevertheless, and in the face of all this, Mr. Part's own scheme actually proposes to leave hotels and drink-selling restaurants in private hands, the new companies taking over only the pure drink-selling places—if such a collocation of words be not too incongruous for use. Our author would be here attempting a practically impossible differentiation, for any full licence-owner, rather than lose it, will always be ready to bring his house, call it what you may, within the prescribed qualification as to the

provision of meals or whatsoever it may be that is stipulated for. The provision of nominal meals and the rest of it, to secure a technical compliance with the law, is the commonest of farces alike in America and Scandinavia. The efficacy of offering food along with liquor as a panacea for intemperance has long been discounted by those of practical experience, and, indeed, in the United States the resort to the free-lunch counter is the hallmark of the very lowest of saloons.

In the before-mentioned article of Mr. F. E. Smith, he, with much glittering rhetoric, framed the indictment against the abstainer, and the legislator and magistrate supposed to be more or less under his influence, and with a confidence even surpassing that of Mr. Part, stated the case for the brewer and the True Temperance Association. It is comforting for those who are assailed to find their strongest critics on many points diametrically opposed to each other and mutually destructive. Seemingly these two eminent controversialists only agree on two points, of which the first is that someone should have a free hand inside the public-house, with power to make it as large and attractive as possible. Mr. Smith would give that to the benevolent brewer, and Mr. Part would confer it upon the directors of his suggested companies. The second point of agreement is as to what the ideal public-house should be, and as Mr. Part, in the official pamphlet of the Public-house Trust Movement, also duly commended by Earl Grey, accepts Mr. Smith's 'ideal licensed house' as being 'identical with the ideal Trust house,' the joint pens of these two authors may be assumed to set forth the true ideal in full authentic beauty.

Mr. Part attaches the greatest importance to the size of the public-houses, claiming that 'experience has proved' that large houses are 'much less likely to lead to excess, much more easily inspected than small ones.' It would be interesting to know where this astonishing body of experience is to be discovered. Surely a policeman can inspect three or four rooms more easily than a score or more? Surely the worst of all excess-breeding drink shops is crystallised in the one word 'gin-palace,' which, flaring in its mammoth size, Mr. Part himself admits at the end of his article 'has forged the yoke of the working classes, demoralised their mind, lessened their capacity for labour, and affected its quality.' Mr. Part girds at the restrictive policy of the magistrates as to the extension of licensed premises, saying 'that in many divisions temperance seems to be measured by the square yard.' Of course the gifts of the extensions incessantly sought by public-house owners are often equivalent to veritable fortunes, and will vastly increase the sums exacted for compensation when the houses come to be dealt with. The justices

who are not content to travel in what is but a vicious circle will not relax their present policy.

Much of the incidence of the new attack upon the established policy must fall mainly upon the non-abstaining magistrates belonging to the 'moderate' school in licensing matters, who have been responsible for the practice as to the construction and alteration of licensed premises so vehemently assailed.

It is the veteran chairmen of Licensing Committees, such as Sir Thomas Hughes, of Liverpool, and Sir Thomas Shann, of Manchester, against whom the indictment, if truly brought, would lie.

It is no light matter to dismiss as useless and dangerous the labours of a host of able and devoted Licensing Justices, in large majority anti-prohibitionist in theory and Conservative in politics, who have found by long experience what constant opposition to the schemes of public-house owners in dealing with their houses is demanded by the public interest.

Licensing Benches have too often learned to what deadly purposes space extension to brewers can be turned to be likely to favour Mr. Smith's proposals. At one Quarter Sessions in 1904, on an appeal against a structural order to close a back door, a publican stated on oath that the closing of this particular back door meant a reduction of the value of his licence by 5000*l*. He explained that this was the capitalised value of the trade which was done owing to the convenience of this back entrance. The police proved that it was largely used by women. The very day on which the writer first read Mr. Smith's article, Sir William Cobbett, in the Manchester City Licensing Court—perhaps the best-known advocate customarily acting for the brewers in the North of England—plaintively complained to the Bench that taking from one of his clients a back-door entrance had cost him a trade of seven and a half barrels a week. The writer could multiply instances from a personal experience in the Licensing Courts extending over more than a quarter of a century, and can hardly imagine any conceivable proposal more fraught with peril to progress in sobriety than that involved in giving a freer hand to the public-house owners regarding the structural control of their houses.

No wise man will treat with disregard the definite pronouncement which the Royal Commissioners on Licensing were constrained to make against giving to public-house proprietors the liberty for which they now clamour.

A survey of past experience, even confined to what has been ascertained by Scandinavian experiment, does not afford the least encouragement to those who would transform public-houses on Trust Public-house lines. The houses in Scandinavia which

have come nearest to success have been the Samlag houses of Norway. These, without exception, have been as utterly unlike the refined, elevating, and attractive refreshment houses contemplated by our new reformers as anything one can conceive. Dram-shops pure and simple, drink-shops naked and unrelieved, offering no attractions whatsoever, save drink, they have been accurately described in the following words: 'They have no resemblance to bright gin palaces, nor to bright coffee taverns, nor yet to snug public-houses. They are not places of resort for social intercourse. Food is not provided in them, nor newspapers, nor private apartments, nor seats even.' Anything less like the ideal, now prescribed for us, could hardly be imagined. Even if proof could be found from Scandinavia, where has the public-house, established amongst any people with the customs, habits, and proclivities of English folk, ever accomplished what these idealists proclaim that their public-house could achieve? The trials made have been multitudinous. Those who, in common with the writer, have visited our Colonies in turn, and mastered the voluminous records of their infinitely varied licensing experiments, have failed to find such an instance. The Apostle of Space has had every trial, and in some of the Colonies there are prominent vestiges of the movement for spaciousness surviving in great caravanserais of public-houses, with rooms no one ever uses.

Those who sketch the new ideal public-house do it with the implication that it could not be realised without a reversal of the existing law or of the present policy pursued by the Licensing Justices. There is nothing in reality under present conditions to prevent 'the Trade' furnishing nearly everything our idealists mention. The provision of food, of non-alcoholic drink, lighting, warmth, and ventilation, the power to smoke, the supply of newspapers, the ability to call for cards, chess, or dominoes (if not for gambling purposes), or quoits or bowls in the country, can all be provided. Magistrates do not object to these, and if they are not supplied it is the fault of those who conduct the public-houses, be they free, brewery-tied, or Trust public-house managers.

The Archbishop of Canterbury, in the debate on Lord Leamington's Bill—a measure designed to secure what the new reformers advocate—told the promoters of that Bill that the present state of licensed premises was not due to the law, but rather to 'a belief that it paid better to conduct public-houses on the old lines.'

To the things above mentioned, as detailed by Mr. Smith in his ideal sketch, and accepted as correct by Mr. Part, add music and dancing—already provided now in many cases by the leave of

the Justices—with flowers and pictures perhaps thrown in, and you have in substance all the essentials of the transformed public-house, whose contemplation moved Mr. Smith to almost rhapsodical language. He wrote: 'No one would misbehave himself in such surroundings by drinking to excess, or by any other form of disorder; public opinion would make such conduct impossible. Upon young people of the working and lower middle classes such a licence would exercise a positive influence for good. It would improve their manners, and might improve their morals.'

The instructed Temperance reformer cannot share the dream of those who envisage the drink-selling public-house, whether Trust or Tied, as an Academy for Manners, much less as a School for Saints.

Mr. Part yearns after the old English hostelry, viewing it through the roseate hues cast by a long-vanished past.

Can anyone impeach the accuracy of the description given by Mr. John Burns in his Lees and Raper Memorial Lecture: 'The tavern throughout the centuries has been the ante-chamber to the workhouse, the chapel of ease to the asylum, the recruiting station for the hospital, the rendezvous of the gambler, the gathering ground for the gaol?' Is any alteration of its internal arrangements however complete, short of the exclusion of the liquors by which intemperance is created and fostered, capable of effecting such a transformation as Mr. Part and his friends have in their mind?

The promoters of the model public-house would specially make the public-houses more attractive to women and children. In view of that most sinister and tragic feature of our modern life, intemperance amongst women, this would seem the very last course wisdom would suggest.

The policy favoured as to the presence of children in public-houses would involve the repeal of the Children Act, passed as it was with the unanimous consent of the House of Lords, and recording with the approval of all the responsible leaders of opinion in each of the great political parties that the young life of the nation is best kept away from the public-house. Will it benefit the child? In that question lies one of the most searching and crucial tests that can be applied to any proposal as to licensing. Are not those who have trained millions of the youth of the land in the juvenile Temperance Societies entitled to put in a demurrer against the creation on a vast scale of inducements and temptations offered to multitudes of youths and girls who have not yet learned to frequent the public-house? The reformed public-house might be the most dangerous of all places for the young and inexperienced to graduate in.

The prime object of our solicitude should be, not the seasoned soakers, but the new and coming generations.

Mr. Part seemingly wants a freer hand in the matter of games. The restrictions are aimed at gambling, and yet no thoughtful man could desire a recrudescence of the gaming evil, so notorious before the restrictions were imposed. It is almost as hard to gamble moderately as to drink moderately. 'There is such a deep-rooted desire to have something at stake,' says a report of the Licensed Victuallers' Central Board, published in the *Morning Advertiser*, 'if it be only the drinks that are being consumed, that it is practically impossible to allow games without gaming being introduced.' Proposals to increase the contact of the child with public drinking and gambling in drink shops will hardly win commendation from people who think for themselves.

Mr. Part wants more music in the public-house. What marvellous lesson might be learnt by those who desire a 'transformed public-house' from the contemplation of the 'transformed music-hall.' We have been told on the high authority of perhaps the greatest pro-liquor apologist of the day that 'Thirty years ago the music-halls were under a moral cloud. No respectable person thought of going there, and least of all were they considered fit places for ladies and children. Since then their whole tone has changed.' Why? In the old days the music-halls were big public-houses. Intoxicants were sold everywhere, and frequently all over the auditorium; and despite all the equipment with which Mr. Part and his friends would hope to transmute his drink-selling public-house into a Temple of all the Virtues, coarseness, vulgarity, and indelicacy were rampant both on and off the stage. What produced the gratifying change? The writer ventures to quote from a handbook of his own on this subject :

The reformers, though assailed with the bitterest virulence, pressed for the utmost possible restriction of drink in the halls and for its entire exclusion from all those that were newly established. Gradually they won their way. In London, Manchester, Edinburgh, and Dublin they won notable victories. Experiment after experiment proved to a demonstration that where the extraneous attraction of ardent liquors was removed, refinement grew, orderliness gained, and vice was repressed. The scenes where scandals repeatedly occurred were where drink was sold, and none occurred where it was absent or where its sale was stopped.

From first to last this great and brilliantly successful movement for the purification and elevation of the music-halls had as a chief feature the elimination of that without which all Mr. Part's theories fall to the ground.

If upholstered seats, matting and rugs, tiles and glass roofs, or any or all of these things, could mitigate the drink evil, the Temperance party would be the last to oppose any scheme tending in that direction. When have these things ever accomplished the desired end?

The ordinary public-house is in many cases a palace compared with the low dens of a generation ago. Everything that painting, gilding, plate-glass, marble, and carved timber can do has been done to make thousands of our public-houses more attractive, under the theory that it would make them at the same time less harmful, and yet the country is confronted with a monumental failure. Nothing has been more conclusively proved than that the temptation to drink to excess is not cured in this way. As Messrs. Rowntree and Sherwell (keenest critics of the Prohibitionist party and the greatest sponsors of the Disinterested Management schemes) have well put it: 'If the problem of reform be really to break a tyrannous national habit which has grown to disastrous proportions, it would seem self-evident that nothing must be done that would make the attractions of the public-house more seductive. The aim and effect of Temperance reforms should be to draw men away from, rather than attract them to, the public-house.'

To foster the tavern habit, to make the public-house still more the rival of the home, where, as His Majesty the King, who stands outside all of our controversies, has said, the foundations of our national greatness are laid, is the very quintessence of error.

A cardinal fact is that the more the drink-selling public-house is made the place for the things of which our critics would make it a centre, the worse handicapped in the race is the Temperance caterer, and every institution which, but for the rivalry of its privilege-owning and favoured competitor, might provide with success for public requirements.

Mr. Part's article, with all its errors, may serve a most useful purpose if it calls the attention of the public, and particularly of Temperance reformers, to the urgent necessity for recognising on a scale never hitherto attempted the social instincts of the people.

It should be premised, however, that 'the natural desire for social intercourse,' of which one often hears, is not the same as that artificially bred desire for alcoholic beverages which has been produced by centuries of, on the one hand, giving a reckless profusion of drink-shops, and, on the other, failing to make provision for these social instincts.

The late Lord Justice Kennedy, at a recent Conference to dis-

cuss the subject of Municipal Clubs and Common Halls as counter-attractions to the public-house, is reported as saying :

There was no doubt that although there were a great many licensed houses which were admirably conducted, yet those who like him were not in any way pledged to any Temperance scheme, and not themselves teetotallers, fully recognised the very great dangers which necessarily attended the community if there were no places of happy, cheerful, and useful meeting except a public-house for our young men and women. It was impossible not to see that, however well-managed such places might be, they necessarily offered temptation which might end in serious mischief to soul and mind and body.

The eminent Judge but expressed the growing condition of many thoughtful minds.

There would seem to be as strong a case for local authorities providing substitutes for the drink-shop in the form of spacious rooms, well lighted, ventilated, and warmed, as there is for the present provision of parks with shelters and music, which, however, are but of limited utility in the winter and practically useless after sunset. To no better purpose could communal resources well be devoted than towards adequately meeting those social and recreative necessities which must be satisfied, either well or ill.

There is in this direction a vast field of almost unexplored and yet magnificent potentialities for good awaiting development.

The impartial and authoritative declarations of various Parliamentary Committee Reports, Commissions founded too upon an exhaustive examination of evidence from all quarters and all parties, furnish valuable warrant for the foregoing view, particularly those of 1834 and 1854.

One marvels at the absence from such an authoritative exposition of the new policy as is under review, of any reference to practical reforms infinitely easier of attainment and much more pregnant with promise than the things upon which Mr. Part lays such disproportionate stress. A statutory reduction in the hours of sale is probably much more effective, proportionately, than a reduction in the number of public-houses. The raising by law of the age at which young persons can be supplied with liquor, bringing our country into line in this regard with our own Colonies, would do very much to break the back of the liquor problem.

When a little over a year ago the writer of this article sent to one of our leading Magazines a contribution on this subject, citing a mass of authorities in support of his view, he was gratified to receive from every quarter the heartiest response to his proposal, the danger of drink supply to the adolescent being everywhere recognised as responsible for a vast proportion of our

inebriety. The Statistics from the Homes for Inebriates, both at home and abroad, showed that nearly all their inmates had formed the drink habit before the attainment of their majority.

If any principle has vindicated itself the world over in the matter of licensing reform, however opinion may differ as to methods of application, it is the principle of local option, and this the most responsible advocates of the new policy concede must be recognised; but Mr. Part leaves it out entirely, and the State and the Magistracy from their Olympian heights are seemingly to impose this alien import of the Gothenburg system where they like, without regard to those most vitally affected—the people themselves.

When our own overseas Dominions provide us with infinitely more reliable experiments over larger areas and bigger populations of our own race, and that under British laws, it does seem unreasonable to look exclusively to the strongly disputed results of the small experiments confined at most to a fraction of the Norse, Swedish, and Finnish peoples.

The marvellous achievements of Canadian Temperance legislation have owed nothing to anything built upon the foundation principles of the new policy. In New Zealand, no Licensing District, having once adopted the policy of No Licence by its own vote, has ever gone back upon its decision, and such districts now number twelve. But for the handicap which requires a three fifths majority for a liquor-selling exclusion vote to be effective, the entire liquor traffic would three years ago have been voted out of these beautiful islands beneath the Southern Cross, the poll for prohibition—which gave absolute majorities for it even in the four largest cities—amounting to 55.82 per cent. of the whole vote cast. The figures of the last December poll, so far as yet received, indicate that the Prohibitionists, despite unprecedented difficulties arising from the War and other exceptional obstacles, have come within an ace of registering another majority vote.

In the United States, the greatest world laboratory for liquor law experiment, so convinced have the Temperance reformers always remained as to the failure of the Gothenburg system and Trust Public-house and Disinterested Management schemes, that their advocates have failed in every State to obtain any legislative encouragement, while the term 'model saloon' evokes but derisive smiles.

Whatever could be asserted against the policy of No Licence by popular vote in former days, before recent American national legislation gave such policy its first real chance of success by harmonising the State with the Federal laws, a new era has now

opened out for such policy, formerly struggling against the heaviest of handicaps. Whereas in 1907 there were only three States—Maine, Kansas, and North Dakota—enjoying State-wide Prohibition under most defective laws, there are to-day no less than fourteen under an effective exclusion of the traffic. In 1914, Virginia, Arizona, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington determined on liquor-sale suppression, being preceded in the same determination by Georgia, Carolina, and Oklahoma, beyond the three first-named States. There is now in the United States of America a total area of 2,299,164 square miles, comprising a population of 47,516,611 under prohibition, substantially exceeding in size both Great Britain and Ireland with an area of only 121,000 square miles and a population of less than forty-six millions.

Surely the dispassionate inquirer with any sense of proportion seeking the best guidance will know where to seek for amplest testing of the rival propagandas. The supporters of the new policy, in order to make their vision square with reality, will have to use a powerful magnifying glass when they look at the thin fringe of Scandinavian territory under Gothenburg System Management, and have to use the wrong end of a telescope when they come to survey the vast field of the American Continent. Numerous governmental Commissions in various lands, after elaborate investigation into the merits of the Gothenburg system, have found, as did our own Royal Commission on Licensing, nothing justifying its adoption.

Some things do harm because of their accidental features, and a mischief can be avoided without the destruction of the thing itself; but with the liquor-traffic the mischief is not to be found in the drinker, the drink-seller, the drink-shop, or the destination of the profits, but in the alcohol, and no such tinkering with surroundings as is practised by the Trust Companies can remove the evil.

The evils of the trade are inherent in the article sold. The desire for filthy lucre will not explain them away. There are hosts of men in the trade who have done their best, and it would be a monstrous libel to lay the discredit of this ghastly failure at the door of their cupidity. Many houses have been run with no exclusive eye to profit. Hosts of these men are infinitely better than the occupation they follow. The giant demon with whom they have struggled has been too much for them. Let ungrudging testimony be borne to the high character and laudable aims of those who are responsible for the last effort at reform, but Temperance will never be promoted by the sale of strong drink, nor the great problem of the drink curse solved by the methods of

the Public-House Trust promoter, and the sooner the real facts of the case are brought home to the public conscience the better it will be for everyone concerned.

If unrevealed in its true colours, the new movement bids fair to divert the public attention from those schemes of reform which possess the real elements of solid promise, and to give a serious set-back to the various hopeful efforts now before the public for securing moderate instalments of licensing reform.

ROBERT B. BATTY.

TEMPERANCE REFORM IN RUSSIA

DURING the early days of December His Majesty's Ambassador at Petrograd forwarded a despatch to Sir Edward Grey enclosing a 'Memorandum on the subject of the Temperance Measures adopted in Russia since the outbreak of the European War.' This despatch was made public in a White Paper towards the end of January, and it is not the least important among the many important and interesting publications that have been issued by the Government during the last few months.

In order to understand the despatch it is necessary to remember that, since 1899, the Russian Government have made the manufacture of spirit a Government monopoly. This action did not exclude private enterprise. The law of 1894 still allowed even foreigners the right to distil and rectify spirits. The output was restricted, and after rectification the spirit had to be delivered to the Government warehouse, where it was bottled and distributed to wholesale and retail dealers. The retail sale of spirits, that is, in glasses, was only permitted in shops controlled and managed by the Government, or in those of private persons specially licensed for the trade. In the Administration Report for the year 1912, the last report available in England, the number of distilleries throughout the Empire is stated at 2983, an increase of 893, or 42.7 per cent., since the commencement of the monopoly. The number of liquor shops at the end of 1912 was 26,016, or one shop to every 5922 inhabitants. The increase of distilleries is significant. It gives colour to the charge frequently made in Russia that the Government officials, through excess of zeal, pressed the erection of vodka shops to an outrageous extent. Three years ago I was told in Moscow that one official went to the length of threatening a certain large village, that had refused to apply for the opening of one of these Government vodka shops, with quartering upon the inhabitants a company of Cossacks. The village council gave way. I had no means of verifying the truth of this story, which was told me by a high official. I give it now, with every reserve, simply to illustrate the charges made against the Government monopoly of the drink trade.

Before the War there had been a growing agitation in favour of Temperance Reform. The peasant deputies in the Duma had urged consistently that there should be a yearly decrease in the output of alcohol and an extension of local option to every village throughout the Empire. One or two resolutions of a very drastic character were passed in the Duma. One resolution, in addition to asserting the rights of local options, demanded that *all private dealing in liquor should be forbidden, and only one bottle containing less than half a pint of spirit should be sold to any one individual on the same day*. In the second resolution the Government were called upon to reduce the vodka shops by one half in any district where there was a failure of crops. Where the failure had been very great the sale of liquor should be suppressed for a period not exceeding five years. These and similar resolutions were embodied in a Bill in 1913, and were sent to the Upper Chamber with certain amendments. The Government objected upon grounds that have a familiar ring in this country—the people would not stand any trifling with their vodka, the cost to the country in revenue and the loss to subsidiary industries would be prohibitive, and so on. Nevertheless the Government, at the commencement of last year, to the surprise of all, actually favoured reforms of a drastic character. These primarily concerned the admission of the principle of local option, and, *inter alia*, allowed women to vote in these matters in the village councils. This latter concession, if the experience of New Zealand is any guide, would have assured the application of wide-reaching reform, if not of prohibition. The War came before the Bill embodying these reforms became law.

It is at this point that Sir George Buchanan's despatch becomes illuminating.

With the publication of the order for a general mobilisation of the land and sea forces of the Empire, all wine shops, beer saloons, and Government vodka shops were closed, and the sale of all intoxicants absolutely prohibited except in first-class restaurants and hotels until the completion of the War.

This order, with varying modifications, remained in force at the date of the ambassadorial despatch. The chief modification, and that a highly important one, was published on the 3rd (16th) of September. It was then notified that his Imperial Majesty had been pleased 'to prohibit the sale of spirits and vodka *until the end of the War*.' Captain Rowland Smith, whose Memorandum upon the subject forms the chief part of Sir George Buchanan's despatch, writes: 'The sale of all spirits is absolutely forbidden. Vodka is unobtainable, and the existing monopoly for its manufacture and sale is to cease.' The latter

part of the second sentence is worthy of note. If it is taken literally, in connexion with what is declared elsewhere as to the temporary character of the reform, it means, at the end of the War, that a return to private enterprise in the distillation of alcohol is contemplated.

The sale of wine and beer has not been prohibited 'except in places under martial law, or in a state of siege, or within the sphere of military operations.' The sale has been placed at the discretion of the local bodies. 'The Press daily report from all parts of the country the closure by local option of wine shops, beer saloons, etc. In many cases the prohibition is for all time, but in the majority of cases provisionally until the end of the War.' The Municipal Council of Petrograd is cited as an instance in point. There the sale of wine and beer is restricted to forty-nine first-class hotels and restaurants, and there is a rumour that this number may be shortly reduced by half. Light wine (16 per cent. strength) may be sold between 10 A.M. and 6 P.M. except on Saturdays and on the Eves of Festivals. On Sundays and Festivals the sale of all intoxicants (except in the forty-nine hotels) is forbidden. The shops must remain shut. The closing hours for hotels and restaurants on all days is 11 P.M.

The punishment for illegal sale of alcoholic liquor is a fine of 3000 roubles, or imprisonment, the closing of the licensed house, and the perpetual disqualification of the licensee. All liquors purchased in an hotel or restaurant must be consumed on the premises. No drink must be supplied to any customer in an evident state of insobriety, under the extreme penalty referred to above; while any intoxicated person at large in the streets or public places is liable to a 'fine of 100 roubles, or, in default, three weeks' arrest.'

The excise duty on beer has been increased from 1 rouble 70 cents (about 2s. 9d.) per 'pood' (36.11 lb.) of malt extract to 6 roubles (about 12s.), and the percentage of alcohol has been reduced from 9 per cent. to 3.7 per cent. The extreme penalty for the preparation or sale of beer of greater strength than above stated is six months' imprisonment.

The other temperance measures which have been adopted are as follows :

Numbers of beer saloons and third-class eating and drinking houses in the towns of Russia have been compulsorily closed by order of local public bodies, with the sanction of the Government, and the number of streets in which the opening of such establishments is prohibited has been increased. The sale of all liquors has been forbidden in the vicinity of barracks, camps, military training areas, public market-places, and of all categories of educational establishments. The sale of intoxicants in third-class railway restaurants, except where there are second- and first-class restaurants also, is forbidden, and in all classes of railway restaurants

the sale of beer or wine is limited to a specified period previous to the arrival and subsequent to the departure of a train. The same regulations apply to restaurants on wharves and to the bars on steamers during their stay at any point of call. Licences for music and other entertainments in popular restaurants and beer saloons will be granted with extreme caution and in restricted numbers. The sale of beer in public baths will no longer be allowed. On all occasions of public assembly (elections, fair days, sittings of the local courts or boards) the sale of beer or wine in the village or township concerned will be prohibited.

From the Russian experiment there emerge several interesting facts bearing upon the British phase of the problem of Temperance Reform. The first fact concerns the Chancellor of the Exchequer. A first-class nation has been found ready to shoulder a huge loss of revenue in order to break down the drink evil. That in Russia the State was the monopolist producer, and the main distributor of alcohol, does not affect materially the situation. The financial sacrifice in any case is made by the people themselves. How great that sacrifice was in Russia may be gathered from the following figures: In the year 1912 the spirit monopoly showed as gross receipts 823,985,828 roubles—about the same as the gross receipts from the Government railways. Deducting working expenses, the net revenue to the State was 626,408,464 roubles (about 70,000,000*l.*). These figures work out at 3.93 roubles (8*s.* 4*d.*) net revenue per head of population, or about one fifth of the ordinary revenue of the Empire. Seventy millions is a sum that might stagger any Ministry of Finance in a time of peace. To find such a sum in war-time appears almost as hopeless as one of the tasks laid by some bad fairy in Grimm's *Fairy Tales* upon a worthy but hapless prince. And even those figures do not represent the whole financial problem involved. Industries dependent upon the manufacture of alcohol—the production of rye, potatoes, and such-like—must suffer. It might open a wide field for dispute, in which the main issue would be lost, to attempt to compare in detail the relative taxable character of the British and the Russian Empire. Allowing for variations as great as it is possible to conceive, the relative problem of raising 70,000,000*l.* for a social reform would not be greatly dissimilar in either country. The stupendous fact is that one of the great nations of the world has considered it worth while to make the sacrifice.

Another fact emerging from the Russian action is that the State exploitation of the drink traffic rendered immediate reform more easy. It has been seen that this exploitation opened the way to abuses not less serious than those connected with private ownership, but is it conceivable that it would have been possible in this country, for instance, where private ownership prevails, to have effected a similar reform with similar speed and completeness? It is conceivable that the British people, if deeply

moved, would not be deterred by 'the Trade,' nor would boggle at the price of reform. But the fact remains that the Russian people were stirred, and they found it easier to act with promptitude under conditions of State ownership than we should do with our system of private enterprise.

The part taken by the Russian peasantry in the Temperance Reform movement is another salient fact in the situation. It is not easy for an Englishman to assess the quality or quantity of the popular voice in a country where the conditions of life are so different from those with which he is familiar. It is often far too readily assumed that the Russian peasantry have no voice whatever in public affairs. A few days ago one of the leading Northern papers, commenting upon the subject of this article, ventured upon this enthusiastic statement: 'By one word the Czar, who has always been a firm and earnest advocate of temperance, decreed that never more should the unrestricted sale of drink take place in his vast Empire.' This is something approaching nonsense. Before the War, in Russia, there were restrictions enough of a sort upon the sale of strong drink, and the prohibition of the sale of spirits and vodka, if the White Paper is to be taken as a reliable guide, ceases to be operative at the end of the War. The truth is, the British public are not yet seized with the fact that the Russian form of government is much more primitive than that of any other European nation. The Russian people look behind every political organisation and power in their country to the person of their Monarch, and their personal support of their Monarch in the present movement seems to argue that they possess a far more potent voice than was previously supposed in this country. The Czar is indeed a good friend of temperance. The strongest thing he did for temperance was not in signing the decree on the 22nd of August (the 4th of September), but in sending a fine rescript upon the subject some months earlier to Monsieur Barck, the new Minister for Finance.¹ The rescript met with a phenomenal response throughout the Empire. The peasants rose as a man to follow their 'Little Father.' From every village council there came resolutions in favour of closing the Government vodka shops. This action strengthened the hands of the Czar, affected the Governmental attitude towards reform, and thus prepared the way for the prohibition decree at the commencement of this War. A noteworthy example of the power of the people in effecting a reform of staggering diffi-

¹ 'I have come to the firm conviction that the duty lies upon me, before God and Russia, to introduce into the management of the State finances and of the economic problems of the country fundamental reforms for the welfare of my beloved people. It is not meet that the welfare of the Exchequer should be dependent upon the ruin of the spiritual and productive energies of numbers of my loyal subjects.'—*Times* Russian Supplement, April 1914.

culty has thus been provided by Russia. It throws a significant light upon the latent power of the people, and upon their readiness to respond to a moral appeal from the Throne. If this is Russian autocracy, it is something very different from what many in Europe have supposed.

Making every allowance for divergent political and social conditions, the action of the Russian peasantry is an indication of the manner in which drastic reform may be expected to come in Great Britain. It may be that there is growing up amongst us a lasting political unity. This War has shown us that there is a finer thing than Government through party strife. It may be, on the other hand, that we shall revert to our old conditions, but if this be the case we must reckon with a phenomenal increase of the popular voice. If the political development runs along lines of unity, then there must come drastic temperance reform in the interests of the labourer. If, and it is far from improbable, the lines laid down in the democratic Dominions are followed, the Labour Party in Parliament will increase rapidly. It may be a long way to the day when a Labour Government rules in London as it has done in Wellington and does to-day in Sydney. But so soon as the working-men find themselves to be a great political power they will most certainly raise their voices in an urgent demand for temperance reform. If manhood suffrage comes, the volume of that voice will be materially increased. If the wives of the working-men receive votes, then they will not be said 'Nay' in this matter. A great deal has been said about the disinclination of the working-man to lose his beer. Much the same was said in the Russian Duma, when the peasant deputies appealed for local option. I am not tempted to disregard the legitimate claims of the moderate drinker, but I do not remember meeting one prominent Labour leader in this country who was not impressed with the deadly injury to the working-classes under the existing system or lack of system. Any social reformer must feel in the same way. Up to the present the obstacles have appeared insurmountable. Russia has shown that such appearances are deceptive. She has also displayed the latent power of the people under circumstances far from favourable—at least to all appearances. The Russian people simply disregarded the obstacles in their path. And when the people move in England it will daunt even a second Mrs. Partington to withstand the entry of reform. It will be as resistless as the sea—and the tide has already turned.

One curious feature in the popular movement in Russia has been noted. When the village councils petitioned for the compulsory closing of Government vodka shops their requests were granted. But in certain instances, after a trial of several weeks, the villagers apparently came to the conclusion that they could

stand compulsory abstinence no longer. They began to send in further petitions that the vodka shops should be reopened! This *volte-face* may have been partly due to a physical craving on the part of those who had given way to alcoholism. But all the village magnates are not likely to have been suffering from this insidious disease. Another reason must be sought. It lies in the desolating ennui of life in the remoter parts of the country, especially during the long, hard winters. The monotony of the winter life of a Russian peasant confounds the imagination. I have had experience of the deadly dullness of the little inland townships of Tropical Australia, stuck away on the plains or among the broken mountain ranges far from a railway. Men drink under such circumstances because there is nothing else to do, or because any kind of temporary exaltation or oblivion seems to them a desirable thing. Moreover, I know, because I have tried, how difficult it is to provide interests which do not appear jejune to those whose mental outlook has been cramped by narrow environments. The public-house was the one place where other interests might have prepared the way to temperance, if not to total abstinence. Alas! the bush hotel was only too frequently a hideous iron building, hot as a Dutch oven by day, and as cold as charity by night—at least in winter. The one aim of the proprietor appeared to be to make money at any cost, and he usually made it under these grim conditions. There were notable exceptions, and I should be both ungrateful and unjust if I failed to acknowledge the warm hearts and general kindness of some of the 'hotel' keepers in the 'Never-never.' But even in such cases the system was against them.

It is at this point where a real danger to the permanent character of Russian Temperance Reform asserts itself. The War has given a great external interest to the Russian peasantry. There is not a village throughout the Empire that has not some direct connexion with a contest they regard as holy because it aims at the liberation of fellow Slavs. In the strength of this interest the Russians have become, at least temporarily, a nation of total abstainers. The temporary character of the reform, from the point of view of the villages, must be insisted upon. The majority of the village resolutions definitely contemplate that fact. What will be done at the end of the War when village life becomes irksome—perhaps more irksome than before? A similar question may be asked with regard to the towns. A recent visitor to Russia has remarked that in the Russian towns, which have become strictly prohibitionist for the time being, café life has disappeared. In Petrograd, where the few hotels licensed close at 11 P.M., the night life, so characteristic of Russia, has also disappeared. To those Englishmen whose experience of Russian social life has been confined to hotels this may not appear

altogether deplorable. But even such Englishmen will allow that a wholesale depression of the gaiety of a nation is a serious matter, and may result in many unfortunate and deplorable directions if it is continued when the War is done. This is particularly the case with a highly strung, emotional people such as the Russians themselves claim to be. But—and this is my main point—it is a factor which must be considered by every Temperance Reformer. The power that, at the country's call, expressed itself with such complete abandon to total abstinence and stern restriction of 'music and other entertainments in public restaurants,' may easily tilt the balance on another side, when the sound of battle has died away, and the heavy burden of war taxation continues to vex and depress the soul.

In the last number of the *Nineteenth Century and After* Mr. Alexander F. Part made an appeal for a certain licensing reform. He claimed to speak in the interests both of the 'Trade' and of the 'public well-being.' None the less he is likely to find himself in a similar uncomfortable position to that Mr. Pickwick occupied between the two rival editors. The supporters of 'tied houses' are not going to have vested interests disturbed without a struggle. On the other hand, the upholders of total abstinence will make a strong case on behalf of their own exclusive theories of reform. These protagonists of divergent interests probably can say nothing that has not already been said over and over again. And yet the great problem remains unsolved!

Something must be done. Great Britain, like Russia, has dealt temporarily with the drink evil. 'The Intoxicating Liquor (temporary restriction) Act, 1914,' is a far less drastic measure than the 'Order of the Council of Ministers' published last September in Petrograd. But will it be less deplorable in England than it would be in Russia, if we revert to former unsatisfactory conditions at the end of the War? Is it conceivable that such will be the case? Is it not far more likely that the country will use what it has gained as a standpoint from which to attack an evil which up to now, as Lord Grey has well said in this Review, 'has been the despair of every patriot and the standing proof of the helplessness of party politicians'? Russia has done a fine thing. She has shown how a great nation can act at a great crisis with regard to a great national danger. Whether she will remain abolitionist when the crisis has passed is a matter that primarily concerns herself. It is inconceivable that having vindicated her freedom from the domination of the drink disease she will ever endanger that freedom again as she undoubtedly did before the War nerved her for a glorious moral effort.

GEORGE H. FRODSHAM, *Bishop.*

LE COMTE DE MUN

LORSQUE, le 7 octobre, la France apprit la mort du comte Albert de Mun, il y eut dans tout le pays une émotion vive et profonde. Cette émotion fut assez forte pour persister, parmi toutes celles que produisait la guerre étrangère, sur le sol envahi. Une semaine de deuil consacrée à un homme tandis que, depuis deux mois, le deuil frappait quotidiennement des centaines de familles, voilà un rare exemple de prestige.

C'est que la tragédie qui bouleverse l'Europe avait, dans la personne de M. de Mun, un interprète d'une valeur exceptionnelle. La plume en main, chaque jour, il traduisait la pensée, l'énergie, la volonté de la France au combat. Il avait pris possession d'un immense public, dont il entretenait l'ardeur. Il exhortait les âmes; et il les soutenait d'autant mieux qu'il les remplissait de consolation et de fierté; prodiguant généreusement ses forces physiques, qu'il voyait s'épuiser un peu sous le poids de l'âge et beaucoup sous les atteintes de la maladie.

Ce grand journaliste offrait la particularité d'avoir d'abord conquis la renommée par une longue et très brillante carrière oratoire. On ne compte pas les éclatants succès de tribune que, depuis 1876, M. de Mun remporta devant la Chambre. Il eut même plusieurs fois l'extraordinaire bonheur de voir les enthousiastes applaudissements de ses adversaires et de ses amis se confondre dans l'unanimité qui constitue le plus grand triomphe de l'orateur. Mais, il y a dix ans, les rapides progrès d'une maladie de cœur l'obligèrent à s'interdire de prendre part aux discussions publiques. De l'ironique et douloureuse épreuve il sortit victorieux—en se faisant journaliste! Dans ce nouveau métier, adopté par lui à 60 ans passés, il déploya bientôt des qualités égales à celles qui lui avaient valu son grand rôle précédent.

Il avait exercé, dès la jeunesse, une autre profession, dont il se souvint et se ressentit toujours : la profession des armes. Il portait l'uniforme militaire lorsqu'en 1872, dans des réunions provoquées par l'apostolat religieux et social, il s'exerçait aux séduisantes difficultés de l'art oratoire. Physiquement et moralement, le comte de Mun était l'un des types les plus brillants de l'officier français. Il rappelait encore ce type à l'âge de 73 ans, parmi les agitations de la guerre, alors que, après une ardente

campagne d'un an en faveur de l'augmentation de l'armée, il employait ses dernières forces à exciter quotidiennement le patriotisme et la confiance du pays. Tel il avait été à ses débuts dans la vie, tel il apparut toujours, jusqu'au moment suprême.

Sa mort a été suivie d'une véritable apothéose. Pendant huit jours, dans la presse et ailleurs, malgré l'émotion produite par les batailles qui se livraient sans répit, l'hommage fut continu, général, empressé.

L'Académie française, à laquelle M. de Mun appartenait, lui offrit un extraordinaire tribut d'éloges.

Ainsi, M. René Bazin a écrit : ' Il ne s'est point souvenu de son âge, si ce n'est pour se hâter d'être encore brave, avant que ce fût fini. Le mot d'intrépidité convient à cette vieillesse. . . . Aucun éloge pour moi ne dépasse celui-là : s'en aller en pleine action, en pleine lumière, n'ayant d'ennemis que ceux de la vérité et ceux de la patrie, fidèle aux disciplines par lesquelles on a grandi.'

M. Maurice Barrès : ' Il y a une poésie des assemblées. Durant de longues années, il fut donné à Albert de Mun d'être un des hommes en qui cette poésie prenait une forme et une voix. Il a exprimé et fait reconnaître comme émouvantes et nobles, aux yeux de ceux-là mêmes qui croient la détester, des parties importantes de la tradition française. . . . Celui qui n'a pas entendu Albert de Mun à la tribune ignorera toujours le chant, la flamme d'une âme éblouie de servir Dieu et préparée à la fois dans les grâces mondaines et, le matin même, à la table de l'eucharistie. Il nous remplissait de sérieux par la noblesse de son attitude, l'élévation de sa pensée, son émotion.'

M. Paul Bourget : ' Il avait commencé par être un officier de tout premier ordre ; et sa fière prestance, son mâle et beau visage, le je ne sais quoi de martial répandu sur toute sa personne rappelaient, jusque dans la vieillesse, le fringant capitaine de cuirassiers qui galopait, la tête droite, sous la mitraille, dans l'état-major de Gallifet, voici quarante quatre ans. . . . Chez Albert de Mun, la sérénité d'une existence vécue pleinement se reconnaissait à la bonne grâce, à l'aménité qu'il savait conserver à travers tous les désaccords. . . . Quel ambassadeur eût fait un Albert de Mun, avec les dons de finesse qu'il avait aussi, avec ses façons de grand seigneur aimable, sa bonhomie courtoise et sa séduction faite de grâce, de tact et de fermeté !'

M. Frédéric Masson : ' Partout où il passa, dans l'armée comme à la Chambre et à l'Académie, dans les réunions ouvrières dont il fut l'âme, dans les œuvres dont il fut le bienfaiteur, dans son collège électoral de Morlaix où, depuis

vingt ans, il fut constamment réélu, partout il traîna les cœurs après lui, comme le butin de sa conquérante et prestigieuse nature.'

M. Denys Cochin : ' Il a fini sa carrière comme il l'avait commencée. Ses écrits résonnaient dans les cœurs comme des appels de clairon.'

M. René Doumic : ' Il avait de l'orateur tous les moyens et toutes les ressources, l'imagination, l'abondance, la splendeur du verbe. . . . Mais de l'orateur ce qu'il avait par dessus tout, c'était l'âme. La parole, chez lui, jaillissait de la source intérieure. . . . On était entraîné par ce mouvement, soulevé par cette passion généreuse, emporté vers les hauteurs de la pensée et du sentiment.'

M. Gabriel Hanotaux : ' Albert de Mun était l'un des plus parfaits exemplaires du gentilhomme français que notre temps, et je dirai notre pays, ait connus : il a transmis les traditions de la vraie France à la génération de soldats et d'hommes d'action qui se bat maintenant et qui gouvernera demain. Sa nature était si nettement contraire à toute vulgarité que, dans des temps médiocres et parmi le grossier étalage des appétits bas, sa présence seule était un jugement.'

Ce sont, je le répète, des Académiciens qui ont apprécié ainsi le grand orateur, grand journaliste. Eux-mêmes, à son exemple, se sont faits journalistes depuis plus ou moins longtemps.

La presse, de n'importe quelle nuance, y compris la presse socialiste, a fait écho à leurs paroles. Ainsi le *Temps*, qui, au point de vue religieux, politique et social, fut toujours en complet désaccord avec M. de Mun et qui bien souvent le critiqua non sans vivacité, s'est plu à le louer sans réserve.

Le glorieux défunt eut même l'honneur de mettre pour un moment d'accord des hommes aussi opposés l'un à l'autre que MM. Drumont et Clemenceau. Paroles de M. Drumont : ' Pour moi, Albert de Mun a été surtout un des rares hommes de cette époque qui aient essayé de faire quelque chose. Il était riche, brillant cavalier, porteur d'un beau nom ; il n'avait qu'à se laisser vivre : il a préféré utiliser les dons de combativité et le talent qui lui étaient dévolus pour essayer de faire vivre cette société qui renferme tant de germes de discorde. Il a usé ses forces en prononçant les plus admirables discours et en écrivant de très belles pages pour la défense de nos libertés religieuses et pour la sauvegarde de la Patrie. Albert de Mun fut un des meilleurs de notre temps, un de ceux qui honorent la race humaine.' Paroles de M. Clemenceau : ' Le parti catholique perd, dans la personne de M. Albert de Mun, l'un de ses chefs les plus respectés. Notre éminent adversaire, frappé dans le combat, tombe en pleine possession de son double talent d'orateur et d'écrivain, qui honora

également la tribune et la presse française. Sa mort inattendue suscitera, dans tous les camps, d'unanimes regrets. Il fut noblement l'homme d'une idée; et cette idée il la défendit, d'une ardeur indéfectible, avec une hauteur de vues à laquelle ses adversaires n'ont cessé de rendre hommage. Toute question politique écartée, M. Albert de Mun aura été un beau défenseur de la cause française. Il sera salué, dans la mort, sans distinction de parti, par tous les Français épris de grandeur.'

Aux yeux du grand orateur-journaliste, les intérêts de la France étaient inséparables de la doctrine et de la tradition catholiques. Pour lui, le patriotisme et l'œuvre de réforme sociale comportaient essentiellement l'affirmation et la défense de la foi dogmatique ainsi que des droits de l'Eglise. A cette œuvre, pendant plus de quarante années, il s'est consacré avec autant de zèle que de talent.

Assurément, il apprit dans sa famille à honorer les croyances religieuses; mais cependant il avait un certain ancêtre qui fut célèbre par des écrits, du moins par un livre où se manifeste un esprit d'un genre tout autre. L'esprit, c'est justement le titre du livre en question. Je parle du philosophe Helvétius, une des notabilités du XVIII^e siècle et auteur de l'ouvrage intitulé *De l'Esprit*. On sait que cet ouvrage fit scandale, par l'étalage d'un matérialisme à la fois audacieux et naïf. Helvétius eut deux filles, qui devinrent, l'une, comtesse de Mun, l'autre, comtesse d'Andlau. L'apôtre laïque catholique qui vient de mourir descendait de la première, et il épousa une descendante de la seconde.

Par sa mère, née Eugénie de La Ferronnays, fille du comte Auguste de La Ferronnays, ambassadeur et ministre des affaires étrangères de Louis XVIII et de Charles X, le comte de Mun était neveu de Madame Craven, auteur de livres très élevés et très émouvants (notamment le *Récit d'une Sœur*), et femme d'un écrivain anglais distingué, M. Augustus Craven.

L'Angleterre, M. de Mun l'a toujours jugée en homme éclairé, avec considération et avec sympathie. L'année dernière, dans une revue anglaise, il annonçait, comme heureuse et nécessaire, l'alliance de l'Angleterre et de la France, unies aujourd'hui dans un effort gigantesque où rayonnent leur courage et leur fierté. Au commencement de la guerre (6 août) il écrivait :

Je ne me suis pas trompé : et c'est un grand, un émouvant spectacle que cette rencontre qui s'apprête, dans les plaines flamandes, aux approches du centenaire de Waterloo, entre les fils des grenadiers de Blücher, et les soldats de la France, unis aux descendants des soldats de Wellington, pendant qu'à l'Orient la nation d'Alexandre I^{er} descend dans les champs de la Germanie pour écraser ceux qui, aux jours de Leipzig, trahirent la fortune de Napoléon. Dieu est grand et ses desseins sont magnifiques.

Ce sont les défaites de la France en 1870 et les horreurs de la Commune qui le déterminèrent à se faire le champion de la cause catholique et sociale. Il était alors lieutenant de cavalerie, ayant toutes les chances d'arriver à une haute situation militaire. Devenu prisonnier avec l'armée de Metz et interné à Aix-la-Chapelle pendant plusieurs mois, en compagnie du capitaine marquis de La Tour-du-Pin, il s'absorba dans la méditation des épreuves qui accablaient la France. Il voulait éclaircir l'origine de telles épreuves, afin de découvrir le remède qu'elles réclamaient. Lui et le marquis de La Tour-du-Pin travaillaient ensemble sans relâche, non-seulement pour se distraire et pour se consoler mais aussi, et surtout, pour devenir capables de guérir les maux dont leur pays et eux-mêmes se trouvaient victimes. Cette période de labeur angoissant et assidu a été racontée par M. de Mun dans un volume publié il y a six ans, intitulé *Ma vocation sociale*¹ et dont les divers chapitres sont un modèle de narration scrupuleuse, délicate et ferme, simple et des plus élevées. Là, il n'y a pas une phrase ni un mot à effet ; et cependant le récit, empreint d'ailleurs de sincérité et de distinction, a, sous une forme modeste et recueillie, un accent pénétrant et une rare noblesse. 'Le relâchement ancien de l'esprit militaire (dit M. de Mun), l'abandon des vertus traditionnelles et l'affaiblissement des liens sociaux nous apparaissaient comme les causes véritables de nos désastres ; ce n'était plus uniquement un espoir de revanche qui nous agitait, mais un rêve de régénération ; ce n'était plus un relèvement purement militaire, mais une réforme des mœurs et des idées qui commençait à tenter nos ambitions. Une question désormais dominait nos esprits : où était la source du mal ? où serait celle de la guérison ?'

Au cours de leurs nouvelles études, MM. de Mun et de La Tour-du-Pin se trouvèrent en rapports avec plusieurs personnalités du monde catholique allemand, surtout avec le P. Eck, Jésuite, et avec le docteur Lingens, celui-ci, plus tard, membre important du parti parlementaire appelé le 'Centre.' Aux deux prisonniers d'Aix-la-Chapelle, le docteur Lingens exposait le mouvement catholique et populaire inauguré depuis 1848 par quelques hommes dont, pour la première fois, ils entendaient les noms : Mallinckrodt, l'orateur catholique de Berlin ; Lieber, le futur Chef du Centre ; et surtout Guillaume-Emmanuel de Ketteler, l'ancien fonctionnaire prussien, devenu évêque de Mayence et initiateur du catholicisme social.

'Ces récits nous exaltaient,' dit M. de Mun. 'L'amour de l'Eglise grandissait en nous avec l'amour de la patrie accru par ses malheurs : un ardent désir nous venait de servir à la fois

¹ Paris, Lethielloux.

l'une et l'autre, en nous dévouant au peuple ; et, déjà, dans nos cœurs, se formait l'image d'une France régénérée, rendue à la tradition catholique, détournée de la Révolution et redressée dans sa gloire renouvelée.' Telle fut la conclusion pratique de l'enseignement récolté par les deux officiers prisonniers sur la terre allemande.

Dès qu'ils recouvrirent leur liberté et dès qu'ils regagnèrent Paris, ils se trouvèrent témoins d'une autre crise terrible, qui manifestait au suprême degré la désorganisation sociale dont ils gémissaient. La guerre civile (la Commune) et l'inévitable rigueur de la répression ne pouvaient que fortifier en eux la conviction acquise et le ferme propos formé dans leur captivité.

Le moyen adopté pour l'exercice du nouvel apostolat religieux et social fut la fondation de *Cercles catholiques d'ouvriers*. Cette œuvre se développa rapidement, d'une manière brillante, avec le concours de personnalités nombreuses et diverses, parmi lesquelles figuraient un groupe considérable d'officiers, les uns liés d'amitié avec M. de Mun, d'autres séduits par son exemple. De 1872 à 1876, les progrès furent ininterrompus. Constamment, sur un point quelconque de la France, se tenaient d'imposantes assemblées, composées de gens du monde, d'officiers, d'industriels, de délégués ouvriers. Là, M. de Mun exposait l'idée générale d'une organisation professionnelle, plus ou moins semblable, techniquement, aux corporations ouvrières d'autrefois et animée, comme celles-ci, de l'esprit de justice et de charité qui découle de la foi et de la morale religieuses.

Ces discours, très fréquents, le propagandiste réformateur les prononçait en portant le costume militaire, qui lui convenait à merveille. Les académiciens dont j'ai cité le témoignage ont presque tous fait allusion aux avantages physiques dont M. de Mun était doué, avantages précieux chez un orateur : Une haute taille ; un ensemble admirablement proportionné où se réalisait on ne peut mieux l'harmonie de la force et de l'élégance ; un noble visage empreint de vive intelligence, de fière droiture et d'amabilité parfois distante mais bien souvent enjouée ; une voix mâle et sonore, au timbre grave et pénétrant ; la simplicité et l'ampleur du geste ; une attitude à la fois imposante et fort aisée, qui représentait le comble de la distinction naturelle. Ces avantages extérieurs étaient encore rehaussés par le brillant uniforme d'officier de cavalerie (dragon, puis cuirassier), embelli des 'aiguillettes,' insigne du service d'état-major. Bref, les dehors les plus séduisants.

L'éloquence qui s'épanchait sous ces dehors était tout-à-fait digne d'eux. Je n'ai pas à la décrire, puisque, au début de cet article, j'ai cité là-dessus l'appréciation des juges les plus compétents. D'où lui était venu un talent si supérieur ? Il

le possédait de naissance, quoique, assez longtemps, il ignorât qu'il en était favorisé. Il a raconté lui-même que jusqu'à l'approche de l'âge de trente ans il ne soupçonnait pas qu'il eût en lui de véritables facultés oratoires. Il a dit : ' Si je m'étais senti parfois, dans des réunions de camarades, quelque facilité de parole ; si j'avais, aux heures de rêverie de la vie africaine, découvert, tout au fond de mon âme, de vagues ambitions politiques, je ne me croyais en aucune façon un orateur. Même, j'avais gardé un fâcheux souvenir d'une certaine arrivée à la campagne après mon mariage et de la gaucherie avec laquelle j'avais, sans trouver un mot à répondre, écouté les compliments de bienvenue des vieux serviteurs.'²

C'est en commençant son œuvre de propagande (vers les derniers jours de 1871) qu'il se révéla, non-seulement au public, mais aussi à lui-même. Il parlait fréquemment dans des associations catholiques ouvrières appelées 'patronages.' Avec le premier succès, l'assurance lui vint, favorisant un talent qui prit très vite l'ampleur et l'éclat. Les succès se multiplièrent et le mirent de plus en plus en évidence.

Ce rapide et continuuel accroissement de renommée ne pouvait pas manquer de provoquer les critiques du parti anti-religieux, qui avait dès lors adopté le plan de combat destiné à être appliqué, et toujours aggravé, jusqu'à ces derniers temps. L'heure vint où, dans les journaux et même à la tribune, on déclara que c'était une chose intolérable de voir un officier en activité de service exercer un tel rôle. Alors M. de Mun se trouva amené par les circonstances à choisir entre sa carrière militaire et son apostolat religieux et social. Il lui fallait abandonner l'une ou l'autre. Quoiqu'il aimât beaucoup l'armée, il se résigna à la quitter, pour disposer de la nécessaire liberté d'action.

De divers côtés, des amis et des admirateurs s'occupaient de lui ouvrir le chemin de la tribune parlementaire. On le pressait de se munir d'un mandat politique. Il céda à cet appel et accepta ce concours.

Au mois de février 1876, redevenu simple particulier selon la loi, mais de plus en plus personnage célèbre, M. de Mun posait en Bretagne, dans la circonscription de Pontivy, sa candidature à la Chambre des députés. Il arborait un programme qui n'avait guère de nuance politique mais qui était catholique essentiellement et résolument. La lutte fut très vive. Pour combattre l'ancien officier, le gouvernement et le parti libre-penseur allèrent jusqu'à lui opposer un prêtre de la région. Il fut élu néanmoins et vint prendre place à la Chambre. Cette place qu'il venait de conquérir, on voulut la lui enlever aussitôt ; et la majorité, prétextant une abusive influence du clergé, annula l'élection qui

² *Ma vocation sociale*, page 64.

venait d'avoir lieu. Comme on le devine, M. de Mun s'était défendu. Il avait parlé avec une éloquence telle que Gambetta lui-même avait jugé nécessaire d'intervenir pour notifier au nouveau député, dont il admirait tout haut le talent et le caractère, une sorte d'ostracisme électoral. Invalidé après une longue et retentissante discussion, M. de Mun recommença la lutte et en sortit encore triomphant, comme il devait l'être désormais maintes fois, durant une longue suite d'années.

Les souvenirs de cette entrée en scène revivent dans un important ouvrage publié par un vénérable témoin, M. de Marcère, qui, de 1876 à 1881, fut plusieurs fois ministre. L'un des volumes de l'ouvrage auquel je fais allusion et où, parmi de graves considérations politiques et religieuses, se rencontre toute une galerie de 'portraits' tracés avec une finesse exquise et un art littéraire supérieur, l'un de ces volumes rappelle l'impression produite alors par M. de Mun et si souvent renouvelée depuis : 'M. de Mun à la tribune se montra, dès le premier moment, un maître. Il était jeune alors, avec la tournure cavalière, une attitude fière sans hauteur déplacée, une voix bien timbrée et sonore, le geste sobre et noble, une langue correcte et abondante sans verbosité ni vaine ampleur de rhétorique, bref, un orateur de haute lignée, que tous, de quelque bord qu'ils fussent, se plaisaient à entendre. C'est une joie pour tout public français que d'écouter un beau langage ; et M. de Mun, quelque hostilité que ses opinions pussent rencontrer, s'imposait. Il *surprit* et *charma* la Chambre. A la différence d'autres orateurs dont j'ai vu souvent le talent s'éclipser après un brillant début, le talent oratoire de M. de Mun n'a fait que s'accroître et s'élever, aussi longtemps qu'il a pu occuper la tribune. Il aura été un des grands orateurs de notre temps qui auront honoré la tribune française.'

Les deux mots *surprendre* et *charmer*, dont M. de Marcère s'est très heureusement servi pour indiquer l'effet produit par les débuts de M. de Mun, ont gardé jusqu'à la fin leur entière justesse. Trente ans plus tard, M. de Mun continuait de charmer la Chambre et aussi de l'étonner. On peut même dire que cette dernière impression alla en s'augmentant presque toujours. Car, durant trente années, l'hostilité anti-religieuse du monde parlementaire se manifestait avec une ardeur croissante, que stupéfiait d'autant plus l'intransigeance de l'orateur catholique.

J'ai dit qu'il avait un programme social conçu d'après les principes de sa foi. A ce programme il a toujours été fidèle ;

* M. de Marcère, *Histoire de la République*. Première partie, pages 105-106. Librairie Plon, Paris.

et il l'a soutenu en mainte occasion, souvent dans des discussions prolongées et agitées.

Il voulait rétablir la paix sociale. Pour atteindre un tel résultat, il réclamait un ensemble de lois destinées à donner au monde ouvrier des garanties et des avantages considérables, en harmonie avec la justice naturelle et avec les conseils et les préceptes de la foi chrétienne.

Autour de lui s'étaient groupés de bonne heure des hommes très distingués, voués à l'étude du même problème et à la propagande des mêmes solutions. Parmi eux figurait notamment, et à la première place, le colonel marquis de La Tour-du-Pin, représentant des grandes traditions féodales. Le groupe devint une école et peu à peu constitua une doctrine qui tendait à faire renaître l'esprit des corporations d'autrefois, combiné avec les besoins et les usages de notre époque.

Dans cet effort, la part des questions théoriques et doctrinales était importante. Il n'est pas difficile d'en définir le principal caractère, qui n'a jamais été dissimulé et que M. de Mun lui-même a exposé cent fois, si ce n'est davantage.

Le grand orateur et ses amis ont voulu combattre l'esprit de rivalité et de haine qui existe entre les classes sociales. Ce désordre provient de la Révolution. La Révolution a détruit en France la fraternité chrétienne ; elle a brisé l'organisation qui autrefois, dans des rapports de confiance, d'attachement et de dévouement réciproques, unissait les ouvriers et les patrons, les cultivateurs et les propriétaires. Elle traite le travail comme une simple marchandise, après la vente et le paiement de laquelle le patron et l'ouvrier n'ont plus entre eux aucun lien et deviennent positivement étrangers l'un à l'autre, jusqu'à ce que l'intérêt et la nécessité les mettent de nouveau en contact comme des rivaux et des ennemis. C'est l'individualisme.

M. de Mun a été l'infatigable adversaire de cet individualisme anti-chrétien et inhumain. Voici, par exemple, ce que disait devant la Chambre le grand orateur, à la date du 13 juin 1883 : ' On n'a pas songé que, nécessairement, dans un état social ainsi défini, qui fait du monde un vaste marché où règne souverainement la loi de l'offre et de la demande, il doit s'établir une lutte formidable, dont, pour beaucoup, la vie humaine est l'enjeu ; dont, pour tous, l'intérêt est la règle, et qui oblige les uns et les autres à prendre tous les moyens en leur pouvoir pour sortir vainqueurs d'un combat où le dernier mot doit être l'écrasement du plus faible par le plus fort. La question ouvrière est née de l'état de choses nouveau qui a tout-à-coup soumis l'ouvrier et sa famille à toutes les fluctuations du marché : la question sociale est née de la brusque rupture des liens qui unissaient entre eux les membres de la famille professionnelle, et de l'antagonisme

où ils se trouvaient placés. L'isolement des travailleurs et l'opposition de leurs intérêts sont ainsi devenus les causes de la division profonde qui s'est établie entre eux et qui a mis d'un côté ceux qui achètent le travail, c'est-à-dire les patrons, et de l'autre ceux qui le vendent, c'est-à-dire les ouvriers : situation toute nouvelle et qui n'existait pas autrefois. Il y avait une organisation de travail qu'on a détruite, sans rien mettre à la place. Il en est résulté un état de souffrance prolongée qui se traduit par des luttes violentes entre le capital et le travail.'

C'est à propos de la première loi autorisant les syndicats ouvriers que M. de Mun parlait ainsi, comme d'ailleurs il parlait depuis plus de dix ans et comme il devait continuer à parler jusqu'à la fin. Cette loi, destinée à être votée bientôt et appliquée, le grand orateur catholique la combattait ; mais cependant il n'était nullement l'adversaire des syndicats en général ; même, au contraire, il réclamait, pour les ouvriers, comme pour les patrons, le droit de s'unir et de s'associer. Pourquoi donc se montrait-il opposé à la première tentative d'organisation syndicale ? Parce qu'il la jugeait mal conçue et mal combinée. Il prévoyait que ces syndicats, tels qu'on les préparait, auraient surtout le caractère de groupements propres à rendre plus violente encore la lutte entre les patrons et les ouvriers. Il voulait la paix sociale, et il voyait fabriquer une grande machine de guerre !

Il voulait, lui, un système d'associations mixtes, formées de manière à adoucir et à résoudre les conflits. Dans ce but, M. de Mun et ses amis réclamaient l'établissement de Conseils ou de Chambres d'Arbitrage, auxquelles auraient été soumises les réclamations présentées par les syndicats d'ouvriers et par les syndicats de patrons.

Cette organisation supplémentaire ne fut pas adoptée alors, mais, dix ans plus tard et plusieurs fois encore ensuite, elle a conquis un grand nombre d'esprits et dans divers milieux. Même, le jour vint où un ministre d'origine socialiste, comme M. Millerand, présenta tout un ensemble de projets élaborés pour créer un système d'arbitrage permanent et général. L'entreprise n'a pas encore abouti, ou, du moins, elle n'a pas encore atteint son développement ; mais elle fait des progrès continuels. On peut croire qu'elle sera un jour acceptée, pour ainsi dire, par tout le monde, et que, à cet égard, les socialistes et les conservateurs se mettront d'accord.

D'autres réformes du même genre, qui, celles-là, sont appliquées, ont été soutenues par l'éloquence du comte de Mun. Ainsi, la loi sur les accidents professionnels ; la loi sur le travail des femmes ; la loi garantissant la protection de l'enfant, etc., amenèrent à la tribune l'orateur catholique, dont la parole retentissait comme l'appel de la justice et de la charité sociales.

Pourtant, M. de Mun n'était pas et ne voulut jamais être rangé parmi les socialistes. Maintes fois, et avec la plus grande énergie, il a réprouvé les abus du droit de l'état et les attaques dirigées contre la propriété individuelle. Cependant, il n'a pas évité d'être assez souvent critiqué par les conservateurs, qui lui reprochaient de s'abandonner à des aspirations imprudentes. Le monde aristocratique et le monde bourgeois se sont parfois montrés, envers ce catholique, plus hostiles que les divers partis socialistes. M. de Mun ne s'est pas découragé. L'effort qu'il a déployé n'a pas été perdu et garde toutes les chances d'atteindre à un aboutissement fructueux.

Sur le terrain politique, M. de Mun a eu une attitude moins unie et moins stable. Jusqu'à la mort du Comte de Chambord (1883) il resta attaché au parti royaliste actif; deux ans plus tôt, il avait, à Vannes, prononcé un retentissant discours, qui était la plus complète affirmation de la doctrine monarchique. Mais peu à peu, la force des choses et surtout le soin des intérêts religieux et sociaux le décidèrent à laisser au second plan la question monarchique. En 1892, lorsque le Pape Léon XIII prescrivit aux catholiques français de placer leur activité publique sur le terrain de la constitution républicaine, M. de Mun se conforma scrupuleusement à cette règle de conduite.

Ce serait superflu, et ce serait aussi bien long, d'énumérer les principaux débats d'ordre religieux auxquels M. de Mun prit part dans le cours d'une carrière parlementaire très active qui a duré plus de trente ans. Depuis la première laïcisation des écoles communales (1881) jusqu'à la rupture du Concordat et jusqu'à la destruction complète des congrégations, il a prononcé des discours dont l'ensemble remplit une dizaine de volumes. Ces discours qui, souvent, produisirent une impression extrêmement vive, avaient tous une éloquence conforme aux règles formulées par les maîtres : *pulchre et ornate, et ad persuadendum apte dicere, pro dignitate rerum, cum voluptate audientium*. Quand une grave maladie de cœur lui interdit de parler, il se fit journaliste : et dans ce nouveau rôle, de même qu'au début de sa carrière oratoire, il produisit l'impression si bien notée par M. de Marcère : 'il surprit et il charma.' Au bout de huit ans, lors du tragique débat sur les affaires du Maroc et du Congo (janvier 1912) l'orateur, bravant la défense des médecins, remonta à la tribune. Sa seule apparition provoqua d'extraordinaires et unanimes applaudissements, qui se répétèrent à de nombreux endroits et à la fin du discours. Les auditeurs, libres-penseurs ou catholiques, conservateurs ou socialistes, libéraux modérés ou farouches révolutionnaires, tous voulaient rendre au champion de la foi religieuse et de l'apostolat social l'hommage qu'ils sentaient mérité par autant de droiture et de courage que de dis-

tion et d'éloquence. Tous voulaient dédommager leur collègue du silence douloureux auquel la maladie l'avait si longtemps condamné. Tous voulaient témoigner qu'ils comprenaient la valeur d'un tel sacrifice supporté sans amertume et sans découragement. Quelques jours plus tard, à l'Académie, où les circonstances et le règlement lui imposaient la charge de recevoir un nouvel élu, ce fut la même éclatante manifestation. Dans cette séance, par suite des idées différentes que représentaient l'académicien défunt (M. de Vogüé) et l'académicien nouveau (M. Henri de Régnier), M. de Mun saisit l'occasion suprême d'exprimer sa foi religieuse. Parlant des besoins intellectuels et moraux de tous les peuples, il désigna, sous le nom de 'ferment' la force fournie par la prédication évangélique pour vivifier les meilleures aspirations humaines. 'Ce ferment religieux, s'écria-t-il, n'agit pas seulement par les lois, par les institutions, par l'armature extérieure de la société qu'il suscite et qu'il cimente, souvent à l'insu de ceux qui construisent l'édifice. C'est l'un de ses effets et l'un des plus frappants. Ce n'est pas le seul ni le principal. Il agit sur les hommes et sur leur temps par quelque chose de bien plus profond, de bien plus efficace, faute de quoi les lois sont stériles, les institutions caduques et l'armature fragile : il agit par l'amour, c'est-à-dire par le don de soi-même ; car l'amour est dans l'immolation, non dans la jouissance.'

On a souvent reproché au comte de Mun un excès d'attachement à sa foi religieuse, comme aussi un excès d'intransigeance dans la conception et dans l'expression de cette foi. Pourtant, les trente années pendant lesquelles il a lutté publiquement attestent qu'il n'exagérait pas l'importance de la lutte religieuse, si longtemps à l'ordre du jour. De degré en degré, l'incrédulité, en France, était devenue l'athéisme administratif et pédagogique, public et officiel.

Je dis 'était' devenu ; car l'évènement formidable qui, depuis six mois, secoue l'Europe, a soudain arraché l'âme française aux étreintes de l'athéisme. Le péril national, l'enseignement du sacrifice, la présence de vingt mille prêtres dans les rangs des combattants ont rétabli le contact entre la foule et le clergé. On a tout lieu d'espérer que la victoire militaire sera renforcée par une victoire morale. M. de Mun, en épuisant le reste de ses forces comme journaliste quotidien, saluait ce double bienfait. Lorsqu'il était sur le point de mourir, il écrivait : 'Ce soir, après avoir tracé ces dernières lignes, je me coucherai avec l'espoir au cœur. Quand on les lira, puissé-je me réveiller dans l'enthousiasme !' Mort le lendemain, il a eu à Bordeaux et à Paris une apothéose qui a semblé le présage du complet relèvement de la France.

EUGÈNE TAVERNIER.

NIETZSCHE AND DARWINISM

It is discouraging, though not unexpected, to find that the spirit manifested by Germany in the present War is being exploited by certain obscurantists to discredit views and teachings which happen to hail from that country, and which are distasteful to themselves. The method employed is simple, and so far enjoys a mark of profundity. It proceeds thus. This or that German thinker holds and propounds such-and-such views on some critical or scientific problem. But Germany is palpitating with a war spirit which leads to deplorable excesses. Therefore the critical or scientific views in question are false. To brand any opinion or teaching as 'Made in Germany' is as effective as tomes of reasoning—the thrust can so easily be given, and is so generally effectual.

These things being so, we cannot wonder that the evolution hypothesis, popularly known as Darwinism, is being submitted to this convincing mode of refutation, because there is an admirable sorites which forces itself on our attention. Germany is inoculated with the teachings of Treitschke : Treitschke derives his ethical theory from Nietzsche : Nietzsche's philosophy is based on Darwinism : therefore Darwinism is to blame for the moral attitude of Germany.

I do not propose to discuss the merits or demerits of any particular form which Darwinism may have assumed in its later developments. My object here is to show that Nietzsche's version of it (shared, alas ! by many !) is distorted and hopelessly unfair. Zarathustra's dithyrambs, demanding the reversal of all morals and the transvaluation of all values, may be marvellous as literature, a monument of what imagination can accomplish when the reins are thrown on the backs of the steeds ; but as essays in science or morals they are destitute of authority. Those who, like myself, have for long embraced the broad conclusions at which Darwin arrived, must feel that much is at stake. For if Nietzsche be right, what follows ? We should have to recognise that the process of organic development on our planet is in hopeless antagonism to the promptings of our higher nature, and

shatters our noblest ideals. A harrowing dualism would stand revealed, escape from which could only be found in a tragic and pessimistic scepticism, or in a transcendentalist absolutism which flings aside its problems in dubbing them illusions.

The masses of material thus presented for examination are deep and wide. I can but try, prospector-like, to drive a tunnel here and there so as to test their general character and contents. I shall assume a sufficient acquaintance with the bearing of the well-worn terms, 'struggle for life,' 'survival of the fittest,' and 'natural selection.' The substance and trend of Nietzsche's writings is now matter of common knowledge, and does not call for lengthy exposition. Its outstanding feature, for my present purpose, is its stress on the Darwinian terms just mentioned, and its unsparing condemnation of all that does not square with the natural process they describe. Away, he cries, with sympathy, with philanthropy, science, and the State. For these things are against Nature; they put limits to the struggle and defeat the process of natural selection.

Let him speak for himself. 'To demand of strength that it should *not* manifest itself as strength, that it should not be athirst for enemies, resistance and triumph, is as absurd as to demand of weakness that it should manifest itself as strength.' Of sympathy he says that it 'stands in antithesis to the tonic passions which elevate the energy of the feeling of life.' Accordingly he looks for the emergence of a breed of strong, despotic men, who will be restrained by no promptings of sympathy or mercy, and who will relentlessly obey the behests of the primitive impulse to violent self-assertion. Truly any nation inoculated with such teaching will be apt to adopt a policy of 'frightfulness' in dealing with those who stand in its sunshine. But the question remains, Does Darwinism afford ground and warrant for Nietzsche's gospel?

There is a widespread suspicion that the case against Darwinism is a strong one—some would say that it is foreclosed by the very term which sums up its most characteristic features, 'struggle for life.' And it cannot be denied that evolutionists have unfortunately laid such stress upon the factor of conflict that they themselves have been tempted to accord it a lonely throne. Even Huxley, though he was far from being deluded to so disastrous a degree, allowed himself, in his famous Romanes Lecture, to speak of man's social and moral activities as though they constituted a definite 'reversal of the cosmic process.' Removed by a whole heaven from a Nietzsche, an ardent lover of his kind, an advanced philanthropist, he was nevertheless led, by a desire for simplification, to spread and intensify the existing misunderstanding. Potent antidotes have since appeared

such as Kropotkin's book on *Mutual Aid* and Novikow's *Darwinism*; but the mischief is not easily eradicated.

Needless to say, I have no idea of rushing to an opposite extreme by unduly minimising the evil aspect of the cosmic process. Still less am I prepared in this regard to attempt a theodicy, or come to grips with the problem of evil. The mystery is dense and dark, and seems to grow with the growth of knowledge. But I would venture to urge that we may wax too anthropomorphic in our judgments about the kind and degree of suffering which the process demands. There is at least one sense in which man's mind is not the measure of all things; and we must beware lest, in showering such epithets as pitiless, brutal, despairing, we are not reading too much of ourselves into the phenomena we would interpret.

I concede, then, the mysterious prominence of the factor of self-assertive violence in the process of natural selection, and I also lament the undue emphasis which has been laid upon it. Nietzsche is not without excuse for his lack of focus. Indeed, on certain points we may approve his teaching. For example, there are thinkers (of whom, with reservations, Herbert Spencer may be taken as a type) who base their moral and social philosophy on the evolution hypothesis, and who thence evolve ideals just as colourless and insipid as Nietzsche's are lurid and distraught. For them the cosmic process is to culminate in a State which will cover the world. Its citizens are to be perfectly adapted to their environment through the continued action of natural selection, since those will have survived who are best adapted to lead the average life of an average citizen. Their actions will have become almost wholly reflex and automatic, and will fit them to enjoy an endless afternoon tea-party. In such a community there could be no place for the man of marked individuality or strong initiative, for such aberrations would have been eliminated in the common interest. There would be no struggle, but neither would there be any triumph; there would be nothing base, but neither would there be anything exalted; there would be no strong passion, but neither would there be any strong love. Nietzsche's contempt for such an ideal may win for him a certain measure of sympathy, in spite of his fierceness. For man must retain a spice of wayward vigour and adventurous daring if the salt of life is to keep its savour. But whether we agree with Nietzsche or not on this subject, at least let us note carefully that, on the same basis of Darwinism, there have been constructed two systems which are so diametrically opposed.

Again, Nietzsche may claim a measure of sympathy in his diatribes against unrestrained multiplication of the unfit. Many simply shrink from and ignore the problem. But are there not

signs that the moral feeling of the day is less and less on the side of those who, in this regard, are *laissez-faire* or unequivocally obstructive? We have long agreed that the murderer should be suppressed, and that to touch private property is a terribly sacrilegious act, worthy of swift and condign punishment. But what of those who, by handing on an evil inheritance of disease, slay their thousands where murderers but slay their tens, and bring untold confusion and tragedy into every department of human life? Nietzsche's excesses would not have been wholly unfruitful if they served to arouse in us a sense of our danger from an over-sentimental interference with Nature's selection of the fit. It is possible to look too much to the temporary whim or impulse of an unfit individual and lose sight of the permanent benefit of the race. True, the methods of a humanitarian Eugenics would be indefinitely removed from those which Nietzsche contemplates. They would call for the finest strain of human sympathy and be guided by the most prescient and enlightened regard for the complex issues involved; they would aim at the development, not of superior despots, but of a superior race. Nevertheless, they would keep in view, on the plane of reason and moral action, the principle of elimination so arrestingly manifested in the process of natural selection.

Let it be clear, however, that this strictly conditioned defence of one side of Nietzsche's teaching by no means justifies a glorification of war. Whatever may have been the case in the earlier stages of civilisation, it is abundantly certain that in the modern world war is out of place. It brings about what has been well called an 'inverted selection.' Apart from the economic waste perpetrated, apart from the welter of misery and suffering it causes, it condemns a community to a diminution of its soundest stock, and favours the survival of the weakest. It thus burns the candle at both ends, and inevitably lowers the vital force of the next generation. Neither the modern war-lord nor the professional champion of the war spirit can hope to shelter under the aegis of Darwinian selection.

So much by way of comment on Nietzsche's impassioned plea for the self-assertive factor in the cosmic process. I now turn to what is my main contention. I desire to secure full recognition for the existence and function of a co-ordinate and correlative factor, present in germ from the very first, and destined to continued increase in dominance and significance. I refer, of course, to the factor of self-sacrifice—using the term 'self-sacrifice' in its fullest connotation, as including all forms of social co-operation, sympathy, and love. I call it 'co-ordinate and correlative,' not merely on the ground of historical fact, but because without it there could have been no 'struggle' at all.

Unadulterated self-assertion would have wrecked its own existence and have rendered the whole course of biological evolution impossible. How and in what degree the two factors may be co-ordinated is, as regards the past, a matter for historical investigation; as regards the future, it presents us with our most urgent social problems, as we soon discover when we try to reconcile competition with brotherhood. But that each of the two factors must be reckoned with is an ineluctable condition of life and progress. Was Nietzsche really as blind to this truth as he would have us believe? It is hard to say.

Let me begin by driving a tunnel into a mass of material which seems least promising of all—I refer to those ruthless activities of beasts of prey which moved Blake, in his fine apostrophe to the tiger, to ask with strained, well-nigh indignant wonder :

Did He Who made the lamb make thee?

It is in this material that Nietzsche is most at home. Here is one of his characteristically cynical uses of it :

If the lambs say that the birds of prey are wicked, and that it is good to be as little as possible of a bird of prey, the birds may make rather mocking eyes and say: '*We* do not at all bear a grudge to them, these good lambs, we can love them. Nothing is more delicious than a tender lamb.'

Ghostly, even for Nietzsche! Still the darkness in our tunnel is not so Cimmerian as we might fear. For Darwin himself taught us on evidence that was as novel as it was conclusive, that the beast of prey and his victim are mutually dependent. To take a stock instance, we learn that, in a state of nature, the wolf is as necessary to the flock as the flock is to the wolf. The wolf's dependence needs no exposition, though we must not overlook the fact that, if the wolf consumed all the sheep, he would himself perish. But as concerns the flock, the situation is more subtle. Unless its members were ever on the defensive and under the constant pressure of natural selection, they would cease to develop speed, acuteness of sense, agility, and general fitness. Paradoxical, therefore, as it may appear, the wolf is to them 'a friend in disguise,' and they score by persecution. And this mutual interdependence acts and reacts. The wolf has to become more cunning and swift to capture the improved sheep, and the sheep has again to advance in fitness to escape the improved wolf. There is revealed to us here what proves to be, on detailed examination, an enormously complex system of interdependences which prevails throughout the whole realm of living organisms. There is in nature no such thing as a self-contained individual. The ancient metaphor of all creatures

being bound into a bundle of life was enlightened ; but it fell far short of the truth. We are now being taught to give wider scope to the analogy—so loved of great thinkers in all ages—of the body and its members.

It may be objected that although there exists this universal reciprocity, it is not therefore cleared of the charge of ruthless self-assertion in its method of operation. Its motive power remains the struggle for life. I have already made my concessions to the problem of evil, and do not retract them. But it is a great gain to know that the process, broadly surveyed, is beneficent ; it makes for the greater efficiency and happiness of the creatures which do survive. Moreover, if we are to discuss aright the moral aspect of this phase of our problem, we should use the term 'unmoral' rather than immoral. For if Hobbes made a mistake in thinking of man as a wolf, still greater is the mistake of tending to think of a wolf as a man. I am not one of those who deny to the animal world below us any germ of moral sense ; but I have to acknowledge that its development in man is so peculiar and exceptional that it is, to all practical intents and purposes, a new quality or faculty. When we call a tiger ruthless, then, we must not lose sight of the imaginative projection of ourselves, or we shall be vastly unfair to the tiger, which cannot enter into the feelings of its victim, nor weigh the comparative values of its own impulses. We are thus able to urge on behalf of the tiger an apology which is wholly out of place in the case of those who, with full knowledge of the sufferings inflicted, embrace and carry out a policy of 'frightfulness.' The reflection may be trite, but Nietzsche's version of Darwinism gives it fresh point, and the atrocities in Belgium and Poland invest it with tragic urgency.

We have thus discovered in the method of natural selection a kind of indirect altruism which tempers, though it does not abolish, its violent self-assertion. Let us now drive a tunnel into a mass of far more promising material—I refer to the relations between parents and their offspring. This time we shall penetrate to a vein of ore the quality of which cannot be missed by the most sceptical prospector ; for, in these relations, not only is there an absence of the element of struggle for purely individual welfare, but a positive impulse to self-sacrifice, distinct and independent as its correlative. Darwin devotes a special chapter of his *Descent of Man* to the origin and development of this impulse—so far was he from ignoring it as Nietzsche has done. For a detailed and up-to-date presentment of its grades and kinds I would refer to Schneider's work on *Der Thierische Wille*.

It must be granted, of course, that we are apt to mistake

the true character of appearances of affection in the animal world, and so to commit the same mistake as those who credit the tiger with ruthlessness—that is to say, we may be wrongly anthropomorphic. Doubtless many exhibitions of parental care may be explained as the effects of hereditary response to stimulus. But to allow this is to strengthen my position, for it proves that the evolutionary process is behind the impulse to self-sacrifice in exactly the same sense that it is behind the impulse to self-assertion. Just as this latter, it is implicit in the lower forms of life and declares its true nature when we reach the higher mammals, and acquires its fullest and richest development in the love of a human mother for her child. Claperède, an authority so cautious and scientific that he carries weight in the most critical circles, gives it as his matured opinion that, in the case of the complex reflex actions of a hen looking after her chicks, there is a *combination* of these reflexes which argues the presence of some permanent state corresponding to what we call a mother's love. How much more so, then, must this be true of the animals nearest to man in mental development? When we are told of a monkey—and a male to wit—that after a general stampede it came back to rescue a young one which had been cut off by dogs, the nature of the impulsive emotion is unmistakable. We have to concur in Darwin's adoption of a statement from Whewell: 'Who that reads the touching instances of maternal affection, related so often of the women of all nations, and of the females of all animals, can doubt that the principle of action is the same in the two cases?' And may we not add as a corollary that, if the Superwoman is to be as self-assertive as the Superman, Nietzsche's ideal has no chance of perpetuation?—for the Superman himself cannot be born in full panoply: he must start as a helpless infant.

A third great mass of material presents itself for exploration, not far removed from the last but of much wider extent—the impulses which prompt to social service and foster social solidarity. Here, again, we find that Darwin was fully alive to their significance and function, and that they occupied a large place in the working out of his conclusions. Take a typical passage:

In order that primeval man, or the ape-like progenitors of man, should become social, they must have acquired the same instinctive feelings which impel men to live in a body; and they no doubt exhibited the same general disposition. They would have felt uneasy when separated from their comrades, for whom they would have felt some degree of love; they would have warned each other of danger, and have given mutual aid in attack and defence. All this implies some degree of sympathy, fidelity, and courage. Such social qualities, the paramount importance of which to the lower animals is disputed by no one, were no doubt acquired by

the progenitors of man in a similar manner—namely, through natural selection aided by inherited habit.

We are again face to face with a factor which begins far down in the sphere of the implicit, and works upward and outward until it takes explicitly the form of ardent and enlightened social consciousness.

If we confine our attention more particularly to the human stage of this development, there are several features which call for special mention. Primitive man had not attained to definite concepts of social functions, nor did he order his conduct by any ideal of social progress. As for a concept of social progress, it is truly remarkable how modern it is! The natural process which had built up social instincts and impulses into the nerve and tissue of our prehuman ancestors did not cease with the advent of man, nor has it ceased yet. As Darwin puts it :

A tribe rich in social qualities would spread and be victorious over other tribes; but in the course of time it would, judging from all history, be in its turn overcome by some other tribe still more highly endowed. Thus the social and moral qualities would tend slowly to advance and be diffused throughout the world.

And again :

A tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to aid each other and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over other tribes; and this would be natural selection.

These quotations are given not merely for their sober and luminous expression of Darwin's views, but as proving how far Nietzsche had departed from the facts, as well as the spirit, of the Darwinism he professed.

It is abundantly evident that when conscious purpose seizes on and guides man's social instincts there is wrought an eventful change in his condition. To realise how momentous is the change we have but to compare the social institutions of a modern civilised community with those of an Australian tribe. Huxley was so impressed by the gap that he was induced to overstate his case by using the term 'reversal.' We have seen, however, that there was no essential change of direction nor breach of continuity—the social factor was there from the start. And this remains true when we take into account a distinction often urged in the interests of clear thought on this important phase of our subject. To be conscious of performing an action is one thing; to have in view its remoter consequences is quite another. A bee may be conscious of its activities in building a cell, but

may have no conception whatever of the cell as a means to perpetuate its species. So primitive man took various steps to suppress the unfit, but had no glimmer of a Darwinian science of Eugenics. The distinction is useful. Still, there is no hard line to be drawn. The higher mode of consciousness rises by insensible gradations out of the lower. There is no break of continuity—no introduction of a new factor. Man at his highest, as at his lowest, is a child of the cosmic process.

I have now shown that Darwin, in his almost preternaturally patient study of the drama of organic evolution, fully recognised and lucidly expounded the rôle of sympathy and social feeling. Indeed, when we come to think of it, it could not be otherwise; for sympathy and social feeling are facts, and he had to account for them. Moreover, his treatment of them was that of a man who renders due homage to the noblest qualities in human nature, and who knows at first hand the power and beauty of human friendship and affection. It is passing strange that so many should deem Darwinism to be a sort of synonym for a gospel of violent self-assertion! Stranger that a cultured nation should adopt this one-sided interpretation as a scientific cloak for a spirit of aggression. Strangest of all that a Nietzsche, as one born out of due time, should, in the name of Darwinism, shriek for the elimination of pity from the hearts and lives of men. Or is it even yet more strange that many who believe that God made the world and is immanent in it are heard to declare most loudly that there must be a reversal of its process?

A word or two, before concluding, on pain and on conscience. Pain is regarded as one of the driving forces of organic evolution. In itself, it is a purely individual form of experience, and thus attaches itself to the self-regarding side of the evolutionary process. There is a saying, however, that only those who have suffered can truly sympathise; and this should warn us against indulging a tendency to undue simplification. For it suggests that pain may at least be a condition of sympathy. The results of recent acute investigations warrant us in going further, and in claiming that pain is not a condition only, but also a ground or cause of sympathy. In this regard, some researches made by Professor Hall are of much interest. He issued a question: 'What are the things which in real life arouse the emotion of pity?' He received over two thousand answers, the majority of which named *hunger* as the chief agent—that is to say, an organic sensation begets an altruistic sentiment. He also gathered that, with children, it is principally physical suffering which evokes pity, whereas, with adults, it is rather mental suffering. This conclusion is what we should expect in view

of the physiological basis of pity, for the brain and nerve centres are comparatively undeveloped in children. The fully developed adult, on the contrary, has become somewhat hardened to material things, and attaches less importance to them. Have we not, in the result of this inquiry, a new and significant glimpse into the subtler workings of the cosmic process? If, as Nietzsche declares, Christianity is the 'one great apostasy,' because it encourages pity, it assuredly is not because it sins against the trend of natural selection.

Psychological investigation of pity thus brings to light an intimate connexion between the factors of self-assertion and self-sacrifice. Where superficially viewed there is antagonism, closer search discovers an incipient synthesis. Whether or no we accept the metaphysical applications of Hegel's triad, there is no doubt of its practical use in tracing the actual stages of many developments. An ambitious man gains place and power and thereby proves himself a public benefactor, and any publicly accorded recognition of his services constitutes a not inconsiderable element in his success. Or a man founds a flourishing business, and confers direct and indirect benefits on trade at large. A small change in his angle of vision might easily transform him into a valuable and stirring citizen. Or a man is a born soldier and saves his country at some grave crisis in her fortunes: he is honoured as a national hero. Generalising, we may say that, as in the case of pain, there is some deeply seated synthetising influence at work. Its detection is for the historian, or sociologist, or philosopher. It will become explicit in good time. Meanwhile the community, permeated subconsciously by the spirit of the process, acts on intuitive insight, and deals out admiration and gratitude for qualities and actions which are on the surface merely self-regarding, but which have within them a core of social efficacy. The socialistic movements seething around us may never win concrete embodiment for their cruder aims, but they nevertheless mark a new stage in the development of the social consciousness. They give unmistakable proof that the savage principle of 'might is right' is being brought into wholesome subjection.

Finally, there is the supremely significant phenomenon which we call conscience, or the moral sense. There are many who, while ready to yield the 'natural' origin of every other human quality and faculty, hesitate here. They are at a loss to account for its peculiar authority, and seek for a solution in some super-terrestrial region. I am not one of the number, for I believe that conscience can also be shown to be, in the highest sense, a natural product—the ripest fruit of man's intercourse with

his fellows. That this is Darwin's view is clear from the following passage :

It seems to me in a high degree probable that any animal whatever endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental and filial being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well, developed as in man.

In other words, given man's individual endowments and his social relations, conscience will emerge naturally and inevitably, for it is implicit in the process.

To sum up. We do despite to our universe of time and space, as revealed by science, when we regard it as wholly a scene of ruthless conflict and violent self-assertion. Sympathy, co-operation, fellowship and love are not sad aliens in our mysterious realm of life, nor are they the springs of a 'slave morality' which must be spurned and crushed because they keep the great ones from their rightful heritage. No, they are essential factors in a living whole, big with happy destiny. The Superman is fatally out of the line of evolution, the goal of which is even now discerned to be a full development of the self in and through a perfected social solidarity. For Darwin's world there is the power of an expanding hope. For Nietzsche's world there is nought but ruin and ravin. Nature with her ten thousand tongues repudiates the abortion.

J. EDWARD MERCER, *Bishop.*

London.

*THE IMMORALITY OF THE MODERN
BURGLAR STORY AND BURGLAR PLAY*

OF the many reasons that compel a man to go to war, perhaps the most insistent is the safety of his children. Where the danger to the children is physical, most men feel a natural impulse to be up in arms. Where the danger is moral only, the necessity of taking action is not so generally recognised. Nevertheless, in the present War, it would be safe to say that many men fear the moral danger of a German triumph almost more than the physical. If the notion of 'Might makes Right' were to be the notion governing the world, they feel that the world would not be a good place for their children to inhabit.

So, to prevent a perpetual confusion between right and wrong, fathers of families go abroad to fight, and die if need be. Meanwhile, they remain apparently quite unconscious of the subtle attempt which is being made on a wholesale scale at home to corrupt the morals of their children.

The attempt takes the form of an attack, both on the stage and in the pages of our popular magazines, upon the sanctity of the Eighth Commandment: 'Thou shalt not steal.'

We do not suggest that those responsible for the attack are aware of its inevitable consequences. The authors who write the stories and the proprietors of the magazines who publish them, the playwrights who make the plays and the managers and actors who produce and act them, doubtless share in the general solicitude on the child's behalf. They gauge the morality of their work by the extent to which the moral public patronise it. There has been no lack of patronage. The stories sell; the plays attract huge audiences. If the public who have no financial interest in the success or failure of the work are blind to its immorality, how can we expect those who make their living by it to be more keensighted? And yet, the immorality is of such a glaring nature that any thinking moral person must feel astounded that hitherto no protest has been raised. Is the Eighth Commandment of less value than the others in the Decalogue?

The Seventh Commandment counts its champions by thousands. The history of their protests against immorality is

almost as long as the history of English literature and the history of English dramatic art. And on the whole, they have been enormously successful. What chance would there be for a modern Wycherley of getting his plays put upon the stage? And the tide of victory sweeps on. Opinion is divided as to the wisdom shown by the circulating libraries in their recent manifesto. But the mere issue of that manifesto by a body of commercial men shows how strong is the feeling of the public against the preachers and teachers of immorality. Amongst the trades commercially interested in literature and in the drama, the idea now almost universally prevails that immorality does not pay.

Immorality? How curiously circumscribed a meaning they put upon the word. For them a play or story is immoral only if it tends to bring the Seventh Commandment into disregard. To the Eighth Commandment, and to the attacks upon it, our moralists of the theatres and the circulating libraries pay no heed.

The definition of immorality in art is a simple one. A work of art is immoral when it tends to make vice attractive. The reason for this is well stated by Macaulay in his essay on the Comic Dramatists of the Restoration.

'For every person,' he says, 'who has observed the operation of the law of association in his own mind and in the minds of others knows that what is constantly presented to the imagination in connexion with what is attractive will itself become attractive.'

In the old plays of the Restoration the hero, the most attractive figure in the piece, was a libertine who made it his business throughout the play to keep the audience laughing at married respectability. Everyone agrees now—at least, everyone who believes in the sanctity of marriage—that such plays were wholly pernicious. They were wells of poison from which those who went to see them drank at the risk of their moral lives.

At the present time such plays would not be tolerated. The censor would not license them. If he did, the manager of a theatre would not produce them. And even if they were both licensed and produced, they would not draw. The moral public would stop away.

Exactly the same may be said of the magazines. Were an author, however famous, to write a story of the type of one of Guy de Maupassant's more highly flavoured *After Dinner Tales*, he would never find an editor to publish it. If he pleaded his great name and the artistic merits of the story, he would be met by the answer 'My dear sir, the public don't like immorality.'

It is the adult section of the public who arrange what shall

be written, what printed, and what played. If you ask any member of that section why he bans a certain type of play or story, he will tell you that he is not frightened of the ill effect which the play or story may have upon himself. But he fears for the younger generation. He does not wish his children to be taught to admire a libertine, or to think that the habit of breaking the Seventh Commandment is a mark of cleverness. The divorce courts, he says, are quite full enough already.

Are the criminal courts of this country emptying so rapidly that we need to manufacture criminals in order to keep them full?

The suggestion sounds preposterous. Yet, the manufacture of young burglars is one of the most favoured industries of the day. The moral public crowd to the theatres where the burglar-hero dominates the stage, and take their children with them; the moral public rush to buy the magazine where the adventures of the burglar-hero form the chief item of the contents-page, and they give the magazine to their children to read. The moral public are mildly amused by the play or the story. Their children are more than amused; they are inspired.

The full result of the inspiration we cannot expect to see now. The poison acts slowly; and its deadly effect will scarcely be apparent in our time. But already there are signs of how the poison works upon the youthful mind. The police news constantly brings before us the doings of some infant Raffles. The halfpenny papers give his exploits the widest possible notoriety. And the frequency of these cases grows, and will grow until the moral public rises to ban this form of art as an immoral one.

Let us examine the plays and stories of which we make complaint, and see how far they fall within our definition of immorality.

In chronological order, we believe that the first place is due to a collection of short stories, entitled *Raffles, The Amateur Cracksman*. Whether all of these appeared originally in a magazine we do not know, but certainly many of them did. Their popularity may, to some extent, be gauged by the fact that they have since been published in volume form.

The stories are all of one kind; they deal with the adventures of A. J. Raffles, while engaged in the burglary profession. The title 'Amateur Cracksman' is a misnomer. For Raffles does not burgle for mere love; he earns his living by the business. The stories are related by a gentleman called Bunny, who acts as his assistant, and who, in his complete mystification whenever his leader executes a *tour de force*, reminds us of Dr. Watson, the Boswell of Sherlock Holmes.

Here is a picture of the hero, A. J. Raffles, as he appeared to the eyes of his young accomplice :

Again I see him, leaning back in one of the luxurious chairs with which his room was furnished. I see his indolent, athletic figure; his pale, sharp, clean-shaven features; his curly black hair; his strong, unscrupulous mouth. And again I feel the clear beam of his wonderful eye, cold and luminous as a star, shining into my brains—sifting the very secrets of my heart.

With the literary merits of this description we are not concerned. We are dealing solely with the morality of the stories, and with the effect which they are calculated to produce upon the mind of the imaginative youth who reads them. And who will deny that the effect is bound to be one of sympathetic attraction? Here is the strong man, strong alike in mind and body. If Bunny reminds us of Dr. Watson, this picture of A. J. Raffles is equally reminiscent of Sherlock Holmes.

To the above description of Raffles let us add the detail, appearing on an earlier page of the book, that he is clad in 'one of his innumerable cricket blazers.' The detail is important, and throws a light upon the initials 'A. J.' which the author has chosen for his hero. There is probably no boy in England to whom those initials are not familiar as belonging to a famous cricketer; and the character is at once associated in the reader's mind with that of a living person whom all boys admire. It is not surprising, then, to find that the third story in the volume is entitled '*Gentlemen v. Players.*' Raffles, 'a dangerous bat, a brilliant field, and perhaps the very finest slow bowler of his decade,' is playing for the Gentlemen.

What boy has not at some time in his life felt the ambition to become a first-class cricketer? And any youthful aspirant for cricket honours will listen with respect to what a great exponent has to say about the game. Raffles does not decry cricket, but at the same time he points the youthful mind to yet higher aspirations.

Cricket [said Raffles], like everything else, is good enough sport until you discover a better. As a source of excitement it isn't in it with other things you wot of, Bunny, and the involuntary comparison becomes a bore. What's the satisfaction of taking a man's wicket when you want his spoons?

Throughout the book Raffles takes the spoons in one form or another. Sometimes the booty is a picture; sometimes jewels. We do not propose to consider all his robberies in detail. Suffice it to say that in the achievement of his crimes he is almost as invariably successful as Sherlock Holmes in the prevention or detection of them, and that he displays all the skill and resource-

fulness which the most exacting boy could look for in the hero of a story. Nor does he spoil the heroic effect by spasms of remorse. From the time when he committed his first theft from an Australian bank, under circumstances which involved a shameless betrayal of hospitality, he proceeds on his career with entire light-heartedness. The moral aspect is considered for the space only of a single sentence, when Raffles says of his own calling : 'Of course, it's very wrong, but we can't all be moralists, and the distribution of wealth is very wrong to begin with.' To this we should add that his biographer Bunny occasionally introduces a reproving epithet, such as 'nefarious,' 'unscrupulous,' 'felonious,' which he makes haste to bury beneath a load of adulation for his hero's audacity and skill.

After the scant respect shown by the hero and his biographer for the Eighth Commandment, it scarcely comes as a shock to find that Raffles has no great veneration for the Sixth. One story in the book is entitled 'Wilful Murder.' As a matter of fact, the murder is not committed by Raffles, but that is not Raffles' fault. He shows himself quite ready for it. Here is the passage :

'You know very well' (says Bunny) 'that you wouldn't commit a murder, whatever else you might do.'

'I know very well I'm going to commit one to-night!'

He had been leaning back in the saddle-bag chair, watching me with keen eyes sheathed by languid lids; now he started forward, and his eyes leapt to mine like cold steel from the scabbard. They struck home to my slow wits; their meaning was no longer in doubt. I, who knew the man, read murder in his clenched hands, and murder in his locked lips, but a hundred murders in those hard blue eyes.

Does the knowledge of this trait in his friend's heroic character make Bunny waver in his allegiance? Not for a moment. He accompanies Raffles to the house where his intended victim lives. They do not murder him, because they find that someone else has done the job already. They content themselves with helping the actual murderer to flee the country.

Not a word is said in the course of this story to suggest that murder was not the proper heroic course for a strong man to take in order to get himself out of his difficulties.

But Raffles, if represented only as a thief and as a potential murderer, would not be sufficiently attractive. So his sportsmanship must needs be emphasised. We have already referred to the fact of his being a first-class cricketer. Another aspect of his sporting qualities is set forth in the story entitled 'A Jubilee Present.' After half-killing a policeman Raffles removes a famous gold cup from a room in the British Museum. He does not melt it, however. He sends it to Queen Victoria, with the

loyal respects of the thief. Bunny wants to know why, and Raffles thus explains himself :

‘ My dear Bunny, we have been reigned over for sixty years by infinitely the finest monarch the world has ever seen. The world is taking the present opportunity of signifying the fact for all it is worth. Every nation is laying of its best at her royal feet; every class in the community is doing its little level—except ours. All I have done is to remove one reproach from our fraternity.’

At this I came round, was infected with his spirit, called him the sportsman he always was and would be, and shook his dare-devil hand in mine; but at the same time I still had my qualms.

Is this a pang of conscience on the part of Bunny? Not a bit of it.

‘ Supposing they trace it to us? ’ said I.

It is against this association of sportsmanship and patriotism with barefaced theft that we feel it our duty to protest most strongly. There are plenty of youths to read this story who, like Bunny, will be and have been infected with the Raffles spirit.

Patriotism is the keynote to the last story in the book. ‘ The Knees of the Gods ’ takes us to the Boer War, where we find Raffles and his satellite enrolled as Colonial Volunteers. After patriotically capturing and denouncing a spy Raffles and Bunny move forward to the firing line, where Bunny is knocked over by a bullet in the leg.

But it was not a minute before Raffles came to me through the whistling scud, and in another I was on my back behind a shallow rock, with him kneeling over me and unrolling my bandage in the teeth of that murderous fire.

There is a passage to make youth thrill and to long with a great longing to emulate the burglar-hero! Surely the Victoria Cross will reward this act of gallantry? But the author spares us that. Apparently the sporting spirit is too strong for the hero’s prudence. He lifts his head to give the enemy a chance, and the enemy sends a bullet through it.

So much for *Raffles, The Amateur Cracksman*. The book is eight years old; the separate stories considerably older. It may be thought unfair to rake up these past indiscretions against the author. But, alas! the Boer bullet has not ended the literary career of Raffles. In the circulating library, side by side with the well-thumbed volume of *Raffles, The Amateur Cracksman*, is a copy of a work entitled *Mr. Justice Raffles*. This book is a reprint in volume form of a tale which appeared serially in the pages of a popular magazine.

The title would suggest that the hero has acquired a smattering

of morality in the interval. And perhaps some such idea is really in the author's mind. Burglary is to be made the medium of justice between man and man. So the author takes a moneylender as a suitable object on which Raffles may execute his home-made justice. A lovely maiden is introduced, with whom Raffles is in love, and who is engaged to be married to a promising young cricketer of the name of Garland. In order to rescue the cricketer and his father from the moneylender's clutches, and incidentally to display his own quixotic character in making the way easy for the marriage of his innamorata with another man, Raffles embarks on a series of adventures which include the burglarious opening of a safe in a solicitor's office, the forging of a letter for subsequent confusion of mere official justice in a court of law, and the removal of the moneylender, drugged and bound, to an empty house, where he is forced to sign a deed foregoing some thousands of pounds' worth of his claims upon the Garlands, and also to sign a cheque for fifteen hundred guineas as a trifling honorarium to Raffles for his trouble in the matter. The cheque is safely cashed, and pursuit rendered impossible owing to the opportune murder of the moneylender by a character too insignificant to have a name.

The book has been and will be very popular with boys. As in the previous volume, great stress is laid upon Raffles' sportsmanship. For instance, the description of his career at school :

He was the most Admirable Crichton who was ever at the school : captain of the eleven, the fastest man in the fifteen, athletic champion, and an ornament of the Upper Sixth.

And again in this dialogue between him and Bunny :

'It's not the villain I care about,' I answered, meaning every word. 'It's the sportsman behind the villain, as you know perfectly well.'

'I know the villain behind the sportsman rather better,' replied Raffles, laughing when I least expected it. 'But you're by way of forgetting his existence altogether. I shouldn't wonder if some day you wrote me up into a heavy hero, Bunny, and made me turn in my quicklime.'

We fear that other people besides Bunny are in danger of forgetting the existence of the villain altogether. Indeed, for unsophisticated youth it must be a little difficult to detect him beneath his coating of heroic paint.

The heading of one chapter deserves a passing comment. It is 'My Raffles Right or Wrong.' This is the motto not only of the faithful Bunny but also of the lovely heroine, Camilla Belsize. It means presumably that both are prepared to support their hero, whatever he may do. The morality of such a sentiment

is questionable. But we have cited the heading less for its being objectionable in itself than because it reminds us of an objection vital to the whole book. Nowhere does the author distinguish sufficiently clearly between Raffles right and Raffles wrong.

It may be said that the reader ought to draw the distinctions for himself. But, alas! the reader, especially the youthful reader, is apt to look helplessly to the author for guidance in such matters. And what is the reader to make of the chapter 'Trial by Raffles'? Is it not intended to whitewash a vulgar crime?

Here is the speech in which 'Mr. Justice Raffles' seeks to justify his own extortion by setting forth the extortions of his victim :

'Permit me to remind you of a few of your own proven villainies before you take any more shots at mine. Last year you had three of your great bargains set aside by the law as harsh and unconscionable; but every year you have these cases, and at best the terms are always modified in favour of your wretched client. But it's only the exception who will face the music of the law courts and the Press. You prefer people like the Lincolnshire vicar you hounded into an asylum the year before last. You cherish the memory of the seven poor devils that you drove to suicide between 1890 and 1894; that sort pay the uttermost farthing before the debt to Nature! You set great store by the impoverished gentry and nobility who have you to stay with them when the worst comes to the worst, and secure a respite in exchange for introductions to their pals. No fish is too large for your net, and none is too small, from his Highness of Hathipur to that poor little builder at Bromley, who cut the throats——'

'Stop it!' cried Levy, in a lather of impotent rage.

'By all means,' said Raffles, restoring the paper to its envelope. 'It's an ugly little load for one man's soul, I admit; but you must see it was about time somebody beat you at your own beastly game.'

Very successfully does the author raise the reader's indignation against the impious moneylender. 'That poor little builder at Bromley' is an adroit touch, which makes sympathetic youth eager to avenge the moneylender's victim. No fate can be too bad for Levy. And behold, justice is rendered by the hero, Raffles. How should youth regard the extortion of a cheque for fifteen hundred guineas in any other light than that of a meritorious action? The bare-faced robbery, with its tinge of blackmail, perhaps the most dangerous crime known to the criminal law, is successfully depicted as an heroic deed.

If a criminal be allowed to rake up a justification for himself in the evils of his victim's past, there are few crimes which could not be justified. Not that we all feel ourselves as wicked as the moneylender Levy. But the extent of the avenging crime could be proportioned nicely to the extent of the victim's wickedness. The clerk who embezzles ten thousand pounds might justify

himself on the ground that his employer made hundreds of thousands by promoting shady companies. The shop-boy might take a few shillings from his master's till to punish him for speaking crossly.

Can there be any question that a book which inculcates doctrines of this sort is an immoral one? If our definition of immorality be correct, then the book has certainly satisfied it. Throughout, it is a deliberate attempt to confuse vice with virtue.

But we have not yet done with *Raffles*. He has not only burgled in the pages of the magazines, but he also burgles on the stage. The play of *Raffles* was immensely popular on its first production. It has now been revived, and shows every sign of continuing its popularity.

We do not propose to criticise the play at any length. We confess that we have never seen it. It is enough for us that the hero of the play is the same old *Raffles*, the so-called Amateur Cracksman, and that the action of the play is concerned solely with his adventures while thieving.

Whether he be an amateur or professional thief matters little to a question of morality. What does matter is the fact that his thieving is no accidental slip but a deliberate system. He is an habitual criminal. Is his criminal character presented in an attractive or unattractive light? Does it call for imitation or disgust? There can be only one answer to that question. The hero's character is made as attractive as a clever writer and a clever actor can make it; it is the character which every high-spirited, impressionable boy must long to imitate. *Raffles* is given all the talents usually given to the hero of a romantic comedy. He has agility of mind and body, good temper, courage, kindness, and wit; moreover, he is a first-class cricketer. And the sole medium through which the character is revealed to the audience is the business of theft. It is theft which lends distinction to all his talents and to all his virtues. In fine, the play makes the breach of the Eighth Commandment every whit as attractive to the boys of the present generation as the plays of Wycherley and Congreve made the breach of the Seventh Commandment to the young people of their day.

We are all agreed that the plays of Wycherley and Congreve did untold harm. But how infinitely greater would have been that harm if the plays had been suffered to appear without a word of protest, and if the writers of such plays had been allowed to multiply unchecked. Protests, however, were loud and vehement; and in time, the worst form of the evil was stamped

out. There may have been some protest against *Raffles*. We have not heard it; and certainly it has failed in its effect.

The present-day evil is far more widely spread than the evil sown by Wycherley and Congreve. Their plays ran at longest for only a few weeks. The modern burglar-play runs for months or even years. For every boy who had seen or heard of Bellmour and of Careless in Congreve's time, a hundred know all about *Raffles*. The burglar-hero is more democratic in his appeal for admiration than the libertine-hero of Wycherley and Congreve. The apprentice of the seventeenth century could have had little hope of rising to play in real life the part of a gentleman-libertine. But any boy may aspire to be a *Raffles*, whether he be the son of a duke or of a working-man.

We have said a good deal about *Raffles*. But *Raffles* does not stand alone; and the aim of this article is to throw into disfavour not an individual but a school. *Raffles* we have cited more particularly because, from the literary point of view, he is worthier of attention than the ordinary run of heroic criminals, and also because the dramatisation of the character has added vastly to its notoriety. But unhappily *Raffles* is far from being a solitary offender. We have only to glance at our bookstalls and at the windows of our cheap newsvendors to see how generously the youth of England is catered for in this respect. Thousands of penny novelettes, chronicling the doings of Dick Turpin and Claude Duval and of other heroic criminals, real or imaginary, are there; calling on boys to buy, to read, to imitate. If we go a little higher in the literary scale, it is almost impossible at the present day to take up a popular magazine of fiction without finding at least one story in it devoted to the adventures of a murderer, a blackmailer, or a thief, and written so as to make the reader sympathise throughout with the hero's lawlessness. The quality of literary workmanship displayed by these stories is for the most part low; and they give small hint of capacity in their authors for writing anything which would ever be read with pleasure by persons of intelligence. But their immoral influence is none the less on account of their literary worthlessness.

The evil, unless checked, will grow. Unless the present authors be discouraged, scores of others will arise to imitate them. Then it will be time to shut up our criminal courts and to abolish our police system. For the millions annually spent thereon are simply wasted if at the same time we suffer our children to imbibe the notion that burglary is a fine art, that it is a clever and admirable thing to steal, and that the policeman who endeavours to prevent the theft is only an object for ridicule.

When a picture rises up before us of the moral havoc which

the production of these plays and stories, if persisted in, must inevitably produce, we begin to wonder if the words of the prophet, caught up and echoed from century to century by the wisest writers and the most eloquent preachers of their day, have been cried in vain. 'Woe unto them that call evil good and good evil; that put darkness for light and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter.'

Enough has been said for the prosecution. Now let us hear in their defence the authors who write such plays and stories, the managers and publishers who aid in their production, and the public whose demand creates the supply.

In a few words, we can dismiss the man who urges that a work of art must not be judged by the laws of everyday morality. That plea has been heard before in defence of the plays of Wycherley and Congreve; and the conscience of plain men has pronounced against it. Art should not boast of imitating Nature if it wishes to be free from the moral code.

Then there is the man who seeks, not to justify an immoral work of art, but to minimise it. 'My dear sir,' such an one will say, 'you are breaking a butterfly on the wheel. These plays and stories have not really a tittle of the importance which you attribute to them.' And many a parent who deems himself a moral man will laugh to scorn the notion that *Raffles* can inspire his sons to become thieves. He feels secure in the knowledge that his sons have no taste for thieving.

Then, does he believe his sons to have a taste for running off with other people's wives that he objects so strongly to the type of play or story which makes light of the Seventh Commandment? He will indignantly tell you 'No.' He objects to such plays because, despite his belief in the purity of his own children he knows the frailty of human nature, and he will not countenance any weakening of the bulwarks which guard the sanctity of marriage. Though his sons have not that taste, he does not wish them to acquire it. Besides, he must think of other people's children who are weaker than his own.

Why should he put the Seventh Commandment on a different footing from the Eighth? Has the desire to steal been so wholly eradicated from the human mind that we can safely ignore it? If so, why do we not leave our doors unlocked at night? Why do we put shutters on our shop windows?

Again, it will be urged that a boy who is thievishly inclined will steal anyhow, and that it is unfair to blame a popular play because a boy who has been to see it calls himself by the name of the hero of the play and commits a robbery. The answer is the same: if you hold that view, you cannot consistently object

to the plays of Wycherley and Congreve. Moreover, the argument ignores the fact that every deliberate action is the outcome of a conflict between motives. What child has not a longing for admiration? If on the stage or in the pages of a magazine admiration be attached to theft, the child when he leaves the theatre or puts down the book will not effect the dissociation so readily as will his elders. And when the temptation comes to steal he will have an additional motive for yielding: the motive of winning admiration, of appearing as a hero in the public eye. In many cases that additional motive will have just sufficient weight to overbalance the motives which restrain.

It is needless to multiply the arguments which might be brought forward by supporters of these plays and stories. If the supporter be indifferent to the ordinary moral laws, we are not concerned with him. If, on the other hand, he confess his adherence to the Decalogue, he himself has supplied an answer to all his arguments by banning Wycherley and Congreve.

Before we conclude this article we wish to say one word about another group of burglar stories and another burglar play.

Arsène Lupin is an alien of suspicious character who has been admitted to our shores. When we began this article it was our intention to place him side by side with Raffles in the dock. Since then we have read two books, *Arsène Lupin (the Novel of the Play)* and *Arsène Lupin versus Holmlock Shears*, and after very careful consideration we have decided to withdraw the charge of immorality. The very introduction of the name Holmlock Shears is a protection in itself. We think that no boy could be seriously influenced by a book which presents two such characters as Holmlock Shears and his friend Wilson, both admirable burlesques on the characters made famous by Conan Doyle. A thief who pursues his calling by aid of secret passages, which he opens by touching the moulding of a marble mantelpiece, and makes his escape from a body of thirty armed detectives in a lift which shoots right through the ceiling of the top floor of a five-storeyed house, will scarcely call for imitation on the part of the youth of England. His fantastic actions partake more of the nature of a harlequinade or of a fairy story than of real life.

Of Arsène Lupin embodied in the play we have our doubts. A living actor can give reality to actions which in cold print are quite incredible. And both from newspaper criticisms of the play and from accounts given to us by friends who have been to see it we gather that the play is of a less farcical nature than the book. At the same time, we understand that at the end of

the play Arsène Lupin expresses regret for his life of immorality. We are disposed to place that fact to his credit.

On the whole, the evidence against him is insufficient to warrant our proceeding with the charge.

But on Raffles and his like we would have no mercy. We would have them known as the dangerous evil to society which they really are, and as such condemned. It is the plain duty of the moral public to say that they will no longer lend the cloak of their approbation to vulgar thieves masquerading as heroes.

H. R. D. MAY.

ENGLAND'S 'COMMERCIAL WAR' ON GERMANY

A CONVERSATION IN SPAIN

THE conversation here recorded took place in one of the most important seaports in Spain. The occasion was a meeting convened to draw up a programme of lectures for working-men, and after the business of the evening was concluded the talk turned on the War. The speakers were all on the friendliest terms with one another and with the British subject who was 'the chiel amang them takin' notes,' and none of them had the slightest idea that their remarks would be considered worth putting on record for the consideration of English readers. Thus the views here expressed may be accepted as the honest opinions of intellectuals, traders, and wage-earners. It should be explained that every possible effort has been made by the German Secret Service agents here to convince Spain that England began the War in order to injure German commerce. Until recent translations of White Papers were issued from the British Embassy in Madrid the only source of information accessible to the general public was the Spanish Press, and notwithstanding the cordial friendship displayed towards the Allies by the most influential of the Madrid newspapers, Spaniards outside of the capital have been dependant for their means of forming opinion on local publications hampered by financial and political restrictions. Previously to the meeting in question the British subject had distributed a few of the translated White Papers among those who attended, with the noteworthy result that every recipient asked for further copies, on the ground that his had been 'snatched from his hands' (*arrebatado de los manos*) by friends eager to read the authoritative British version of events.

A MASTER-CARPENTER (*Conservative and pro-German*). It seems to me that we can't believe a word we hear. All the belligerents say they are winning, and as they obviously can't all be winning, they must all be telling lies. What I say is, if the Germans are strong enough to fight against the whole world as they are doing, it would have been better for everybody to let

them take what they wanted quietly instead of drowning the earth in blood in a vain effort to oppose them.

A CONTRACTOR (*Liberal and pro-English*). You may find some day soon that not all the belligerents have been telling lies, and that the Germans are not so invincible as their friends here imagine. But let us bring the argument nearer home. If a German soldier proposed to appropriate your house and workshop because he took a fancy to it and was stronger than you, would you stand idle while he walked in?

THE MASTER-CARPENTER (*who measures 6 ft. 4 in. and is muscular in proportion*). I am not sure that he would be stronger than I am; but we needn't discuss that, because, thank God! Spain is neutral, and there won't be any German soldiers coming to my door.

THE CONTRACTOR. Not now, because the Allies are driving them back where they came from. But if the Kaiser had taken France do you really imagine he would have stopped there? Can any Spaniard be optimist enough to suppose Spain's neutrality would have been respected any more than Belgium's, if Germany had conquered France and taken a fancy to invade us?

A PRIEST (*of liberal mind, who lives for art and science*). What I cannot forgive the Germans is their destruction of the Library of Louvain. I read very little War news, for it is too painful to me to read of such horrors, and there are so many contradictory stories told here about the damage done to buildings that I always hope time may prove that even the Cathedral of Rheims has been less injured than has been reported. God pardon the men who have sacrilegiously destroyed His holy house, of whatever nation they may be! But to think of those 15,000 books being burnt brings tears from my soul. It is worse than the sack of the Library of Alexandria, for the Moslems at least fought for their religion, false though it appears to us. But what spiritual ideal can be alleged in this twentieth century by the destroyers of unique and irreplaceable books whose value to all the world was incalculable?

A CURIO DEALER (*under his breath*). Canaille!

THE PRIEST (*anxious to keep the conversation from becoming heated*). We certainly all agree that the injury caused to art by the War is a matter for the deepest grief, whether we be Franco-phil, Germanophil, or Anglophil, and we shall not come to blows over that opinion, as I hear two disputants did last week in the Café Suizo—and that a neutral café!

THE BRITISH SUBJECT. People seem to get more violent over the War here, where no one is personally involved in the conflict, than we do in England, where the rights and the wrongs of it affect us so deeply.

A UNIVERSITY STUDENT (*fresh from school in England*). It's not the right or the wrong we fight about. It's our own pride. One man says one thing and the other says the other, and each considers himself insulted because the other doesn't believe him.

A WORKING JEWELLER (*pro-German and deeply studious, who has been lost in a weekly Review*). There's plenty of that sort of nonsense. We Spaniards are always too easily heated. But apart from art and science and politics, we all know that England began this War with the sole purpose of crushing German commerce, and what is hard to forgive is that the trade of neutral Spain should be dislocated, and Spain's wage-earners reduced to misery, in consequence of England's commercial war.

THE MASTER-CARPENTER. That's right. Even our pro-English contractor here can't pretend that England didn't begin the War for commercial purposes, because from the very beginning she has proclaimed that she means to carry on her own business as usual, which means she doesn't care a damn what suffering her war against German trade inflicts on the neutral nations. From all we hear she represents this endeavour to carry on business as usual as her ideal of the highest patriotism.

THE CONTRACTOR. That's what your Germanophil newspaper says, but you ought to know better than to take it for gospel.

THE BRITISH SUBJECT. I am, as you all know, not a person of business, and I really do not understand how this commercial war we hear so much of is supposed to be waged. But I was under the impression that Spanish trade has been injured not by English but by German competition. Don't the cork-cutters complain that they have been ruined by Germany buying the raw material and selling cut-corks cheaper than Spain can because the German work is less perfect? I seem to have heard that England used to be the best customer for cut-corks before Germany stepped in. But of course that's only one man's opinion. I wish you would tell me in what particular directions you see evidence of England's designs against German commerce in Spain.

THE CONTRACTOR. There's no evidence outside of the Germanophil papers that my friends stuff their heads with. In my business it's all the other way. I want to get British goods and can't, while German are pressed on me at every turn.

A UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR. Where the Germans have got a tremendous pull over the English here is in the language. No German firm thinks of sending a *commis-voyageur* to Spain unless he can talk Spanish, whereas if Englishmen agents come they seldom can do without an interpreter, and a good many business men dislike the idea of transacting private affairs

through a third party. Moreover, it's easy to deceive both sides when they have no language in common. My brother, who has done business for years with England, was completely taken in at the beginning of the War by the information that prohibitive insurances were going to be charged on marine transit. He found out at last that the British Government was guaranteeing ocean traffic and that the insurance rates were hardly higher than in times of peace, but the false impression had been so carefully fostered by interested persons that he was in great straits for his raw materials before he ventured to send an order to London. Unfortunately he doesn't know English and depended on a German clerk in his office for his correspondence or English news, so it was not difficult to trick him.

A PAINTER AND HOUSE-DECORATOR. The Germans have been tricking us in more ways than one. Take my own case. I use a lot of varnish and colours that I can't get in Spain. I used to deal with a British firm, but their terms were pretty high, and I couldn't discuss them because of course I couldn't write in English. But a man who talked Spanish fluently called on me six or seven years ago and said he represented a London firm, and he offered me such facilities and such favourable terms that I have been dealing through him ever since. Well, the other day an English client of mine here sent for me and told me not to use any more of that vile German varnish, which stuck to everything and never dried. I couldn't say much, for lately I've been getting complaints all round about it, but I told the Englishman he was mistaken in calling the varnish German. And, if you'll believe me, he showed me the label on a tin my men were using and pointed out that the name of Schmidt was German and so was the address of the factory, and there was nothing English about it except the office in London which sent me my bills. Of course Messrs. Schmidt can't supply any more goods to Spain now, and what I'm going to do for varnish and colours I don't know. I've written to the London people I used to buy from, but I've had no reply. Now what I say is this : if England is making a commercial war on Germany why can't I get British varnish in Spain, and why did Mr. Schmidt of Germany pretend his goods were made in London?

A DEALER IN LOOKING-GLASSES. The Germans have very nearly ruined *my* business. We've got the richest quicksilver mine in the world and we used to produce all the mirrors we wanted, but the home industry has been crushed by importations of filthy stuff (*porqueria*) made in Germany with our good Spanish quicksilver, and at this moment it has gone up 85 per cent. because the stock is giving out, and we can't get any more. Belgium as well as Germany has been competing to

destroy our industry; but the Belgian glass is at any rate decent, not a disgrace to civilisation like the German. Anything is good enough to ruin Spanish industries with according to the German idea. Talk of England making a commercial war on Germany! I'd never buy another square metre of glass from Germany if I could get into touch with English firms, but I can't get so much as a price-list. I don't know who to write to, and if I did they'd send me their terms in pounds sterling and shillings, which I can't understand. I tell you England isn't making war on German commerce. She's just sitting still at home while the plums ripen, and when communication with Germany is reopened we shall be forced to send bigger orders than before to that country, because England won't condescend to give us facilities for dealing with her.

THE BRITISH SUBJECT. Why depend on either England or Germany? Why in the world doesn't Spain manufacture her own looking-glass as she did in former times, when she has the quicksilver within her own borders?

THE JEWELLER. Spanish capital is very shy and we as a nation have no initiative, so we get exploited by every foreigner who comes along to take the bread out of our mouths.

THE BRITISH SUBJECT. It seems to me England at least should be acquitted of exploiting you, since the general complaint is that she offers no facilities for trade even when Spain wants to buy from her.

A PHOTOGRAPHER. There's a mistaken idea here that we can't buy from England because her prices are higher than the German, but as a matter of fact we *can* buy from England if she gives us the chance, for, although her prices are certainly higher than the German, the quality of her manufactures is so superior that it pays us to deal with her. I can speak from experience, for I found an English house years ago that was willing to correspond in Spanish and quote prices in pesetas, and I have dealt with them ever since.

THE BRITISH SUBJECT. I suppose that is the famous ——— Company, which seems to be known all over the world.

THE PHOTOGRAPHER. Not at all. I wrote to them once and received a beautifully got-up catalogue with all the prices in English money. If it had been French I could have made shift to calculate the prices in pesetas, but pounds and shillings were beyond me. No, my people are in a small way of business but they write to me in Spanish and I've nothing but praise for their goods.

A WOOL MERCHANT. The newspapers say there's a scarcity of wool for uniforms and military blankets in England. Now, I should like very well to export wool, both woven and unwoven,

and I fancy I could do so in quantities sufficient to be of some value even to the British War Office, if it's true they are running short. But how am I to set to work? I went so far as to make inquiries at the British Consulate, but they could not give me any addresses of traders, and I came away too discouraged to do any more. My opinion is that, so far from England making a commercial war on Germany, she wants to hold foreign trade at arms' length, or, at any rate, Spanish trade.

A JOURNEYMAN CARPENTER. She has certainly given us a slap in the face over our sugar. They say the British Government has bought millions and millions of pesetas' worth for the Army, and we could very well have done with an order for a million or two here. But if all they say is true, England preferred to buy of anybody rather than Spain, although we are strictly neutral, and it would have given a fine lift to the people out of work in our sugar factories. I suppose they don't know enough Spanish in England to discover that we make sugar in Spain.

THE CONTRACTOR. It's foolishness to talk about England making a commercial war on German trade. God knows there's enough of it here if she wanted to get it. But whether she's too rich to care for our money or whether she's too idle to stretch out her hand to take it, I don't know. What I do know is that England never began this horrible War for commercial purposes, because it's quite evident that she's got more trade than she cares for already. She's got more money than all the rest of the world put together, and she has so much regard for her own convenience that she won't be bothered so much as to print a trade-list in any language but her own.

THE MASTER-CARPENTER (*thoughtfully*). There's something in that, now you mention it. I wrote months before the War began for a catalogue of tools from England and never got an answer.

THE CONTRACTOR. You wrote in Spanish, I suppose?

THE MASTER-CARPENTER. Naturally, seeing that it's the only language I know.

THE BRITISH SUBJECT. What have you done about your tools in default of the English catalogue?

THE MASTER-CARPENTER. Oh, I've just rubbed along, but I shall be all right when the War's over. The other day I got a fine price-list printed in Spanish from a German firm in Berlin. Dirt cheap their goods are, too.

THE CONTRACTOR. Cheap and nasty I expect you'll find them. But how did a firm in Berlin get your address? I know you're a Germanophil, but have you got friends in Germany?

THE MASTER-CARPENTER. Lord, no. It came wrapped up inside a newspaper posted in Barcelona. Several other men in

my trade have got the same. I enjoy reading it at night when my work's done.

THE BRITISH SUBJECT (*slyly*). Was it wrapped up in the newspaper from which you form your opinion that England started the War in order to appropriate German trade?

THE MASTER-CARPENTER (*with a grin*). Well, no. That one's left at my door in the morning. The catalogue came inside the ———.

THE HOUSE-DECORATOR (*interrupting*). You needn't name the paper; we all know it, and we've all had the same sort of attention paid to us, only in my case the price-list is of colours and varnishes.

THE UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR. I and my colleagues are equally favoured. We are continually receiving translations of articles about German culture wrapped up in newspapers reporting German victories.

THE BRITISH SUBJECT. More of England's war on German commerce, I suppose!

E. M. WHISHAW.

THE BAHAI MOVEMENT:

WITH SOME RECOLLECTIONS OF MEETINGS WITH ABDUL BAHÁ

‘LET your ambition be the achievement on earth of a Heavenly Civilisation.’ ‘May you help those sunk in materiality to realise their divine Sonship and encourage them to arise and be worthy of their birthright; so that by your endeavour the world of humanity may become the kingdom of God and of His elect.’

These are the words of a wonderful teacher coming from the East to give a message to the West, spoken in Paris in the autumn of 1911; he is known both as Abbas Effendi, the title usually given to him in the Orient, and as Abdul Baha, the servant of God, a name which inspires love and devotion all over America, and from which his followers take the name of Bahais, followers of the Light.

Most thinking men and women will admit that a wave of spirituality is at present sweeping through the world, and finding expression in many forms. Modernism in the Church of Rome, New Thought, Christian Science, the New Theology, of which Dr. Campbell is the chief exponent, are parts of it. The immense popularity of a recent book on Christian Mysticism is a sign of it.¹

A modern writer has said² ‘Within two decades enlightened European thought has gone over from intelligent scepticism to intelligent mysticism’; and the same writer affirms ‘Inward spiritual happiness impels men to share their experience with others.’ Thus, then, am I impelled to tell the wonderful story of the Bahai Movement, which has been often ignorantly described as a ‘new religion,’ but is rather the renewal of the Divine Message given by the Old Testament prophets, as well as by Zoroaster and Confucius, Buddha and Mohammed, and embodied for Christians in the Sermon on the Mount.

That truth is stranger than fiction is a truism. Strange indeed, and curiously like the story of the dawn of Christianity, is the story of the first Bahai martyr Mirza Ali Mohammed, who took the name of the Bab or *door*, from which his followers

¹ *The Mystic Way*. By Evelyn Underwood.

² *The Modern Social Religion*. By Horace Holley.

became known as Babis, a name sometimes to-day erroneously given to the Bahais.

The Bab's mission, however, was to the Mohammedans, that of the greater Teacher Baha'o'llah, who followed him, to the whole world.

A Babi was a Mohammedan reformer, a Bahai may be a reformer *in any Church to which he happens to belong*, for Abdul Baha asks none to leave their own religion *but to love it*—to look back through the mists of ages and discern the true spirit of its founder—to cast off dogma and seek reality!

But this is a digression from the fascinating tragic story of the birth of the Bahai Movement and its baptism in blood.

The young man Mirza Ali Mohammed was born at Shiraz in Persia in 1819; the son of a merchant, he received only the ordinary education of young men of his station, but early became known for his wide knowledge and lofty character.

At the age of twenty-four he proclaimed himself as a divine messenger sent to warn the people of the coming of their promised Mahdi foretold by Mohammed. After nineteen years he stated he would be followed by a greater teacher—'He whom God would manifest.'

Mirza Ali Mohammed from this time became known as the Bab, and his first disciples went to different parts of Turkey and Persia proclaiming his advent. He made the pilgrimage to Mecca and there proclaimed himself to more than a hundred thousand Mohammedans who had assembled at the time of the great pilgrimage and who carried the glad tidings with them on their return to their homes in all parts of the Moslem world.

From Mecca reports of the Bab's growing influence reached his native city of Shiraz, and the mullahs became alarmed at his doctrines; for he taught that the *Koran* was not the final revelation, also proclaimed the equality of the sexes and the necessity of direct communication with God without priestly intervention. The Shi'ite doctors played the part of the Pharisees of old in stirring up the authorities, and persuaded the Governor to summon the Bab to a meeting at Shiraz, at which they tried to confound him but signally failed; they then in desperation declared that whoever laid claim to any revelation other than Mohammed must be an infidel, and sentenced him to death. The Governor of Fars joined in the mockery of a trial by insulting and striking him; but the death sentence was not carried out, probably because the Bab alive was worth more to his persecutors than dead, his maternal uncle, a man of property, having found surety for him.

Nevertheless, the Bab was kept in strict seclusion, yet his followers increased in number and in influence, and among them

was the great nobleman Baha'o'llah, who afterwards became the head of the movement.

The story of the persecution of the Bab reads like a chapter of the New Testament or of the story of the early Christian martyrs. Among those who accepted the new teachings was Manu Chehr Khan, the Christian Governor of Isfahan, a town famed as a centre of orthodoxy and learning, in which nevertheless the new doctrines were rapidly promulgated and one of the chief of the Ulemas became a Babi. Once more the clergy clamoured for the Bab's life, and the Christian Governor, wishing to save him, gave orders for another debate which should be reported to the Shah, feeling sure that thus the Bab would be vindicated. The clergy, fearing the same result, refused the conference and privately resolved on the Bab's execution. The death of the Governor aided their plans. First the Bab was ordered to present himself before the Shah, but the Prime Minister, fearing the influence of so wonderful a man might undermine his own, sent orders to stop him on his way and sent him to Teheran; on the journey there at all the towns which the prisoner passed he made converts; finally he was placed in a remote fortress and subjected to a rigorous imprisonment.

Meanwhile the persecution of his followers began. Heretical doctrines were an excuse for plundering and murdering the Babis. Fanatical priests joined hand in hand with rapacious Pashas to wipe out the proscribed people and confiscate their property. The Babis, few in number but valorous to a degree, fought for their lives and homes. The Prime Minister decided to quell the 'revolt' by the death of the leader, but was met by the prompt refusal of the local Governor to murder a descendant of the Prophet who had not been convicted of any crime.

The commander-in-chief of the army, however, proved more complacent, and the last act of the drama was enacted in the market-place at Tabriz. One July day in the year 1850 the persecuted Bab and one of his followers were suspended by ropes from the city wall as a target for the Armenian soldiers, whose shots should sever body and soul. The musketry rang out—the smoke cleared—but only the ropes which bound the prisoners were severed—they stood where their dead bodies should have been—unbound! The soldiers, struck with awe, refused to fire again—men of another regiment were sent for to complete the tragedy—the prisoners were bound once more—once more the musketry rang out—and this time when the smoke cleared two riddled bodies hung lifeless on the wall.

So ended the first chapter of this strange, true story! The remains of the Bab, exposed to the public gaze, after the medieval fashion of striking terror into the hearts of rebels and evil-doers.

were stolen by his followers, and concealed as a bale of goods were first conveyed to Teheran and later to the Bahai headquarters at Haifa. Thus all that was mortal of a very noble soul now rests in a tomb on the peaceful hillside of Mount Carmel, within sight of the window by which I write.

But the seed the martyr sowed lived on and brought forth fruit a hundredfold.

The Bab's crown of martyrdom shone radiantly throughout Persia; the fire he had lit spread far and wide; thousands inspired by his example laid down their lives for their faith; women and children were among them: weak in body but valiant in soul, like the early Christians they went gladly to their death, undaunted by the horrors their executioners devised, smiling through torture incredible, dying with songs of joy on their lips.

Thirty thousand there met their fate—many accused of no worse crime than the possession of a Bahai book or friendship for one of the proscribed people.

They were stoned, they were sawn asunder, were tempted, were slain with the sword: they wandered about in sheepskins and goatskins; being destitute, afflicted, tormented; of whom the world was not worthy (Hebrews xi. 37).

The priests had found a pretext for these wholesale massacres in an attempt on the Shah's life made by a young Babi whose brain had been turned by the execution of his master, and the resistance offered by the Babis to the confiscation of their property. The basest treachery was used to overcome them, of which a signal instance is the slaughter of a little body of three or four hundred men at Mazanduan, who, after holding out for eleven months against an army of 25,000 troops, surrendered to the Persian commander on his guarantee (confirmed by an oath sworn on the *Koran*) that their lives would be spared and each man sent to his own city, as they had come from all over Persia at Baha'o'llah's call. The starving garrison were assembled and food set before them, and while eating they were butchered by order of the man who had sworn to protect them! Similar instances occurred in other parts of the country.

Among those thrown into prison in these persecutions was the son of a noble house the names of whose members are writ large in the annals of Persia, having served their country in the highest offices in the State. Mirza Husain Ali Nuri, now known as Baha'o'llah, was designed for a courtier; he might have been Vizier or Prime Minister; he chose instead a life of privation, imprisonment, and exile, which, commencing with his first four months' incarceration in 1852 in a dungeon where he was chained to four other Babis, ended with his death at Acre in 1892. As

no political conspiracy could be proved against Mirza Ali he was very illogically deprived of his vast property and banished to Baghdad, where numbers of Babis followed him and a little settlement of the refugees was formed. The leader then withdrew to the mountains, where he lived for two years in solitude, broken only by occasional visits from holy men who desired to confer with him on spiritual matters; but returned to Baghdad on the urgent appeal of the Babis to overcome some difficulties that had arisen. The little community became such a centre of influence that the Mohammedan priests once more took fright and brought pressure to bear on the Government to treat for the surrender of Mirza Ali. The Sultan instead summoned him to Constantinople; on the journey there, in the Garden of Rizwan, the religious leader proclaimed himself as the great Teacher foretold by the Bab, 'He whom God should manifest,' and took the title of Baha'o'llah, 'the Glory of God,' commanding his followers no longer to call themselves Babis but Bahais. At the same time he announced the advent of a new era which should witness the end of warfare and the union of the religions of the world. In 1864 the Bahais arrived at Constantinople, strong in faith in their leader, filled with the glow of enthusiasm that works miracles and transforms the world. It seems as if the magic of Baha'o'llah's presence had prepared the way before them; courtesy and not bonds awaited them from the Sultan. Baha'o'llah and his family were given a residence in the city and a new centre of influence formed; but priestly intervention quickly broke up such a state of affairs and resulted in another banishment to Adrianople, the Turkish city most remote from Persia.

Here, in his five years' residence, Baha'o'llah came into touch with European civilisation and Occidental thought. Indeed his residence there corresponds with the calling of the Gentiles in the Bible narrative.

But not all the Babis acknowledged Baha'o'llah as the successor of the Bab. It is written 'In those days a man's foes shall be those of his own household,' and it was Baha'o'llah's own half-brother who, consumed by jealousy, claimed the succession for himself, conspired against him, and treacherously prejudiced the Turkish Government against the Bahai community; so that they were again in danger of their lives and, to the great grief of a large section of the inhabitants of Constantinople, particularly of the Christians, once more banished to Acre, in Palestine, then the worst of the Turkish penal settlements.

Before their departure from Constantinople Baha'o'llah foretold to one of those appointed to carry out the orders of the Porte many events that have subsequently taken place in the

Ottoman Empire, including the deposition of Abdul Hamid and the Turkish revolution. In August 1868 the Bahais reached Acre, that wonderful old city whose first annals are lost in the mists of legend and tradition, but which was ancient when the banners of the Crusading kings and princes floated over its walls. Here the little community of seventy persons were confined for two years in two mean rooms in the Government barracks under the most insanitary conditions. Little wonder that sickness was rife. Acre at that time was reeking with typhoid, its water supply was vile: in short, banishment to the 'Greatest Prison' was a convenient way of getting rid of undesirable prisoners without the formality of a death sentence.

But among the Bahais only six died in those two years, though severe epidemics broke out among them. In this time of greatest trial it is recorded that Abdul Baha, the present head of the Bahai Movement, then a young man, was the mainstay of the community; his sunny spirit cheered all hearts; his skilful nursing saved the lives of many sufferers; his indomitable spirit rose superior to all ills and infected those around him with fresh courage. The sustaining power of a mighty faith and a marvellous love for their leader and each other upheld the Bahais. God had led them to the Holy Land; this they believed was the fulfilment of prophecy, and little by little, as elsewhere, in spite of the rigorous orders as to their captivity, the hearts of their jailors were touched by their uniform gentleness and courtesy towards all with whom they came in contact, and they came to respect and honour their prisoners.

Baha'o'llah was allowed after the first two years to occupy a house in the town, but he was still confined in one room for another seven years, during which he occupied himself in writing his doctrinal works, which, often couched in the symbolic language of prophecy, yet contain the most practical directions for the development of the ideal State and cover every social question of the day. The fame of his wisdom went out far beyond the prison walls, though few were permitted to see him, and in the early days of the imprisonment his devoted followers sometimes journeyed from Persia overland on foot, being months on the way, in order to obtain a glimpse of his face through the barred windows of the prison. At a later date some visitors were admitted to hold intercourse with the Bahais, and they came from all classes, from high official to the poorest of the lower orders, and for help and guidance of all kinds, from things spiritual to mundane. These visitors were nearly always received by Abdul Baha, who with marvellous wisdom, consummate tact, and infinite patience answered their questions and solved their problems; while at the same time he assisted Baha'o'llah in his

writings and protected him from the importunities of those who sought his presence when he was occupied with the writing of the spiritual treatises which were to be the guiding principles of his followers in the future.

The few Europeans who saw Baha'o'llah during his imprisonment at Acre all bore witness to the extraordinary majesty and dignity of his presence, which is inimitably described by Professor Browne, of Cambridge, who obtained special leave from his University to go to Palestine to investigate the Bahai Movement.

The face of him on whom I gazed [he writes] I can never forget, though I cannot describe it. Those piercing eyes seemed to read one's very soul; power and authority sat on that ample brow; while the deep lines on the forehead and face implied an age which the jet black hair and beard flowing down in indistinguishable luxuriance almost to the waist seemed to belie. No need to ask in whose presence I stood, as I bowed myself before one who is the object of devotion and love which Kings might envy and Emperors sigh for in vain!

From the prison at Acre Baha'o'llah sent letters, called in the Baha literature 'Tablets,' to the rulers of Europe, calling upon them to join in a world movement towards the abolition of war and towards religious unity; it is said that Queen Victoria alone answered him.

To Napoleon the Third he foretold the loss of his throne, to the Pope the loss of the temporal power. As a means towards the attainment of 'the Most Great Peace' which should end for ever warfare on earth, he recommended the adoption of an universal language, such as Esperanto, to be learnt by every one in addition to his or her mother tongue. The equality of the sexes is proclaimed for the first time by an Oriental in his writings, and it is a rule of the Bahais to educate their daughters at least as well as their sons, and, should limited means prevent both having equal advantages, to give the better education to the girls as the mothers of the future. The childless are enjoined to educate a child.

Before Baha'o'llah died on the 28th of May 1892, at the age of seventy-five, he had appointed his son Abdul Baha his spiritual successor and instructed him to carry the Bahai teaching to the West by visiting Europe and the American Continent. At the time of Baha'o'llah's death this command seemed impossible of fulfilment, for Abdul Baha was still a prisoner in the fortress of Acre, and, humanly speaking, it seemed probable (as he had steadfastly refused to allow his liberty to be purchased by corruption) that he would continue a prisoner till death released him. In this connexion an interesting story is told of the plots of the Turkish officials to line their pockets with American dollars by setting free the leader of a movement which had, even then, many

adherents in the United States. A wealthy American lady resident in Paris met the then Secretary to the Turkish Embassy at a reception, and, being a devoted Bahai, seized the opportunity to deplore the imprisonment of Abdul Baha. The Secretary, a relative of a former Governor of Syria (who was in Paris at the time of my visit last year and frequently called on Abdul Baha), was equal to the occasion and volunteered the information that for a payment of 3000*l.* the matter could be arranged. The lady at once gladly agreed to find the sum, and the Turkish Secretary wrote to the Governor to that effect, who, overjoyed at the prospect of such a windfall, cabled back to Paris 'It will be done.' The news of the negotiations reached Abdul Baha, however, and another cable from him reached Paris warning the lady not to pay the money. Very sad at heart was the Governor when he found the gold that seemed almost within his reach vanishing before his gaze, and he sent his own son to Acre to represent to the prisoner his desire to set him free—who urged the question with much Oriental diplomacy and flattery, but in vain, though the Governor at that time was so powerful that his reports to the Sultan were laws, and to offend him was well-nigh a sentence of death. To end the matter, Abdul Baha sent a message to the Governor, which must indeed have astonished that great personage by its calm assumption of authority and dignified defiance :

Do not try any more, for you will fail in your secret machinations. There is a destined time for my imprisonment. Before the coming of that time even the Kings of the earth cannot take me out of this prison, and when the appointed time has passed all the Emperors of the world cannot hold me prisoner in Acre. I shall then go out. Rest thou assured of this !

The Molossaf of Acre, to whom Abdul Baha made this emphatic statement, wrote to the Governor advising him to make no further move, 'because Abbas Effendi has learned from the position of the heavenly Constellations the time of his freedom, and no one can hasten it.'

Abdul Baha was born at Teheran in Persia on the 23rd of May 1844, the day on which the Bab declared his divine mission, and which is now a special festival of the Bahais, sacred to the memory of the great forerunner, and at the same time the birthday of their beloved leader. It was my privilege to be in Paris on the 23rd of May last year and to visit and congratulate Abdul Baha very early in the morning, when he and his entourage were drinking their Persian tea after the morning prayer at sunrise, and before the long stream of callers of all nations arrived to do him homage. Well do I remember that May morning—the peace of its early hours, the cordiality of the Master's welcome, the spirituality of the atmosphere. I saw him again later in the

day ; his rooms were filled with the floral offerings of his friends from Orient and Occident ; Persian officials rubbed shoulders with distinguished Frenchmen, Christians with Jews and Mohammedans. America was largely represented, for, to their honour be it said, the Americans were the first of Western nations to listen to the voice of the present-day prophet, and in every city of the United States, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, Abdul Baha was received with open arms, not only by the Bahais but by the ministers of all denominations and the University professors, and especially by the heads of the International Peace Societies, who recognised in him a powerful co-worker. There were English also, and Germans, at Abdul Baha's informal birthday reception, all meeting on a common ground in honouring the Oriental teacher, whose message is 'Forget nationalities, all are equal in the sight of God !' 'Let no man glory that he loves his country, but rather let him glory that he loves his kind !'

A vision rises before me as I write of a transformed world permeated with the message of Abdul Baha ; no burden of armaments would oppress the people, for no international jealousies would exist ; no clash of capital and labour would be there, for no sweated worker would toil for a pittance, but each citizen would emulate not his neighbour's wealth but his good deeds, each would count it his highest privilege to serve others and thus attain to happiness himself. It is the Christian ideal, but alas ! the practice of most 'Christians' falls so far short of it !

Abdul Baha's prophecy to the rapacious Governor was fulfilled. After forty years, at the command of Abdul Hamid (when he re-established the Constitution of 1876 and freed all political prisoners) the prison doors opened and the Bahai leader stepped forth a free man, to proclaim his message of universal peace and brotherhood from East to West.

His visits to England are fresh in the memory of those who were privileged to meet him or to be present on the memorable occasions when he gave the Blessing in St. John's, Westminster, at the request of Archdeacon Wilberforce, and occupied the pulpit at the City Temple at the invitation of Mr. Campbell.

Abdul Baha had been officially invited to the Universal Races Congress of July 1911, but was unable to reach England in time ; in his absence a paper by him was read which, it was afterwards pointed out in the Press, was 'the only one which presented a spiritual solution of racial problems, offering spiritual unity as the greatest human ideal to be attained by using economic and political factors merely as means to that end.'

From London he went to Paris, where it is computed he met more than a hundred and fifty persons daily for two months, besides lecturing before the Theosophical Society, speaking at the

Union des Spiritualistes and at Pasteur Wagner's Church. The addresses in Paris are now published in book form by the Bahai Master,³ and their deep spirituality impresses all who read them, even as it did those fortunate enough to hear them delivered in sonorous Persian, and ably translated into French by his secretary.

After three months in Europe Abdul Baha returned to Egypt in 1911, but four months later this aged man, with a constitution undermined by his long imprisonment and many privations, but sustained by the same undaunted spirit that had made him the ministering angel of the prison at Acre, undertook a long and arduous journey through America, in the course of which he visited all the chief cities from the Atlantic to the Pacific, addressing Jews, Christians, Mormons, and Freethinkers, meeting the points of view of each, winning the hearts of all. The New York Peace Society welcomed with a banquet in his honour the greatest peace worker in the world, and other International Peace Societies wherever he journeyed vied in doing him honour. Those who know that Mr. W. J. Bryan, the present Secretary of State, came under Abdul Baha's influence first at Acre on his journey round the world, and again when the leader of the Bahais returned the visit in America, do not wonder at the beneficial influence he is exerting in the present administration—an influence that extends far beyond his own country and makes for world peace.

But it is not alone among the nations that Abdul Baha is working for unity. Equally is he the apostle of peace between the Churches, and between Science and Religion, which have so long been estranged. 'There is no opposition between Religion and Science,' he declares. 'They are the two wings upon which man's intelligence can soar into the heights; with which the human soul can progress.' This subject he treated at length in a remarkable address to the world of Science delivered at Stanford University in California, and in the same city he addressed a crowded congregation of Jews in one of the chief synagogues on 'The Fundamental Unity of Religious Thought,' establishing the validity of the claims of Jesus Christ and inviting the Jews to believe in Him.

It was at the conclusion of his American tour that it was my privilege and happiness to meet Abdul Baha. Nearly three years ago, when visiting Haifa and Acre to study the ground of the Crusades, I first heard of the Oriental teacher—and turned a deaf ear! For the time that I should recognise his greatness was not yet! An English resident of Haifa at that period spoke of him as a modern Elijah who had founded a second School of the Prophets on Mount Carmel. Someone else in Jerusalem told me that I should write about the Bahai Movement if I wanted a

³ *Talks by Abdul Baha given in Paris.*

new subject, but 'I went my unremembering way,' smiling with English superiority at the statement that Americans were coming to sit at the feet of the new prophet! A year later at Oxford I found, when reading in the Bodleian Library, a book which opened my eyes to the beauty of the Bahai teaching, but much had happened in the year—some study of comparative religions, and particularly of Christian Science, with its message, 'Man is not material, he is spiritual,' and of the power of universal love to heal both mind and body, had prepared me for it.

A few months later, in a London drawing-room I found a portrait of Abdul Baha and recognised it immediately, though I had never seen any portrait of him, by the intuition that comes to some of us in certain crises of life. My hostess, who had been the first to welcome 'the Master' to England, coming into the room immediately afterwards, I eagerly questioned her, and learned that I was standing in the first room Abdul Baha had entered on reaching England, and in the house that had been his English home.

In the following October (1912) I went, consequently upon the outbreak of the Balkan War, on a hastily organised lecturing tour to America, entirely ignorant that Abdul Baha was still in the United States, for a letter inquiring as to his movements had been lost, and in a rush of engagements and preparations I had not given the matter any more thought. Again the hand of Fate led me. By a remarkable coincidence, within a few days of landing I learned that Abdul Baha was in New York and would leave very shortly for England, and that a farewell banquet to him, given by the Bahais of America, who had come from far and near, was even then taking place. This time nothing, I resolved, should prevent me meeting the great man of whom I had heard so much. An exchange of telephone messages with the Great Northern Hotel, where the banquet was taking place, a hasty toilet, a rush through the brilliantly lit streets of New York at a taxi's topmost speed, and I entered a banquetting room where three to four hundred guests were already seated, and saw beyond the long table an upper table at which a venerable figure in Oriental robes was standing, surrounded by a group of more Orientals (among whom I afterwards found was the Persian Chargé d'Affaires from Washington), and addressing the guests in a strange tongue which was translated sentence by sentence into poetic English. I can remember nothing of what he said except that this was a feast differing from all other feasts because it was a feast of love—and divine! Room was made for me, the stranger and late-comer, with true Bahai courtesy, at one of the principal tables, where I could have the best view of the guest of the evening. Later Abdul Baha walked slowly round the ban-

queting-hall followed by his interpreter, stopping from time to time to give a short address and laying his hands in blessing on the head of every guest. Probably I was the only one present who was not a Bahai, and I am well aware I displayed my ignorance of the movement in my conversation, for a New York business man who was my table neighbour seemed surprised by my remarks, while I was vastly impressed by his simple downright 'straight talk' (to use an Americanism) of the practical value of Bahai principles in business life, in promoting harmony with his workmen of various nationalities, because he now regarded them all as brothers instead of, as formerly, Greeks, Armenians, and 'niggers.'

Wonderful days followed, in which I had the privilege of conversing alone (through an interpreter who somehow effaced himself completely and seemed but a living mouthpiece) with the unique personage who impressed those who came within his influence more and more deeply as they became more imbued with his spirit, as well as of being present at his interviews with men and women of various attainments and mental stature, to each of whom he suited himself and by all of whom he was evidently regarded with the deepest veneration. The most interesting of the interviews at which I was privileged to be present were, I think, that which took place when the Secretary of the New York Peace Society called to bid him 'Good-bye' and discussed the International Peace Question; and a private interview to which I accompanied the wife of a diplomat, an American who had lived much in the East and heard of the Persian prophet through her great friend, a high Turkish official, Prince Oslan,* having come under the spell of his spiritual personality and being changed, to use her own words, 'from a brilliant worldling to a spiritually minded man.'

Abdul Baha does not preach—he prefers to teach. Although at the request of the Theosophical and other Societies he addressed some large public meetings, his usual 'talks' are much more informal. It was his custom in America to receive callers from 9 o'clock till noon, and during these hours his ante-room was always thronged with those who desired to meet or consult him, waiting for their turn; and then to come into the general reception room, shake hands with all present, and give a short address of general interest. I have often felt that it is not so much his words as his spirit which carry conviction, and this spirit is reflected among his followers to such a degree that to find oneself at a Bahai assembly, whether in New York or Chicago, London or Paris or Stuttgart (the centre of the movement in Germany), is

* Prince Oslan, a hereditary chief of the Druses and leading spirit among the Turkish Liberals, was assassinated in the counter-revolution.

everywhere to find oneself among friends animated by a real spirit of mutual help and brotherhood. There are, of course, as there have been in every religious movement, some Bahais who are Bahais in name only; but taken as a whole a wonderful spirit of real Christian brotherhood animates the Bahai communities, which is perhaps the more remarkable when one reflects that a large number of those who came into the movement were, before they found it, frankly irreligious. A leading Bahai of New York was pointed out to me with the comment 'There goes a man who was one of the hardest-hearted atheists in this city.' He, by the way, was selected as one of a little band to take the Bahai teachings to India.

I was present at several of the 'feasts' held at different private houses every nineteen days by command of Abdul Baha, and I reflected how much love must go to the preparation of a dinner for thirty or forty people in a private house, where the *ménage* often consists of but one, or at most two, servants, the difficulty of procuring domestic 'help' in America rendering larger establishments out of the question. I have known a feast given in a home where the mistress was the only maid, and her friends all helped her in waiting. No invitations are issued, but all are welcome, so no one knows how many may come to these gatherings, especially as friends of Bahais are often present. At the 'feasts' Bahai news from other centres is read, as well as some of the 'Tablets' (writings of Baha'o'llah).

It has been erroneously stated by some ill-informed or ill-disposed people that the object of Abdul Baha's journey to America was to obtain money from the 'friends' there (the term used by the Quakers has been very fittingly adopted by the Bahais, with whom they have many points of similarity); so far from true is this that Abdul Baha returned the 30,000 dollars collected and sent as a voluntary offering of love for the expenses of his tour, with a message that it should be used for the poor of America, and everywhere he went he gave liberally to charitable institutions, besides privately relieving individual cases of want.

His departure from New York was a remarkable sight, for Bahais had come to that city from far and near, some even from California, to bid him farewell, and when the great modern liner left her moorings the pier was black with people whose eyes were centred on the patriarchal figure with the long grey beard and snowy turban, who looked the embodiment of the Old Testament prophets and presented so remarkable a contrast to his modern surroundings. Few among the onlookers were unmoved, many women were openly weeping, and I saw men whose eyes were dim, while those of Abdul Baha's Persian followers who were left behind were unrestrained in their grief!

'Isn't it sad he is going?' said someone as the great ship slowly moved out to sea. 'Ah! but how glad for those he is going to!' was the reply from one who knew how eagerly people were waiting to welcome Abdul Baha in England and Scotland, as well as in Paris.

Last summer the turn came of Stuttgart, Vienna, and Budapest. In Germany the Bahai literature is being translated, and there are Bahais at Munich and Leipzig, as well as at Stuttgart and Esslingen, but the movement is comparatively new, and the number of its adherents proportionately small, though drawn from the most thoughtful classes of the community. Christian Scientists and Theosophists especially seem to be investigating it. At Vienna the Baroness von Suttner, the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, who had been speaking in America in the Peace interest the previous year but had not then met Abdul Baha, called upon him and conferred with him upon the subject of International Peace, to promote which was their common aim.

In Budapest, where Abdul Baha met with an ovation from both scholars and social reformers, the head of the Peace Society, a high dignitary of the Church of Rome, showed his liberality by extending a warm welcome to the Oriental guest, and appearing with him on the platform at a public meeting at which a renowned Jewish professor stood on his other side, thus typifying the union of religions for which Abdul Baha pleads.

No account of the visit to Budapest would be complete without mention of Abdul Baha's two interviews with Professor Vambéry, the effect of which is shown by the remarkable letter that great scholar and Orientalist addressed to him shortly before his death. The meeting between Vambéry and Abdul Baha took place in April 1913, and the letter was written on the receipt of a gift Abdul Baha sent him on his return to Egypt in the following summer. It has been my privilege to see the original and hear Abdul Baha read it aloud. It is, of course, couched in the Oriental style adopted by the learned to a very great teacher, and the translation is as follows :

Professor Vambéry's Testimony to the Religion of Abdul Baha.

I forward this humble petition to the sanctified and holy presence of Abdul Baha Abbas, who is the centre of knowledge, famous throughout the world, and loved by all mankind. O thou noble friend, who art conferring guidance upon humanity, may my life be a ransom to thee!

The loving epistle which you have condescended to write to this servant, and the rug which you have forwarded, came safely to hand. The time of the meeting with your Excellency, and the memory of the benediction of your presence, recurred to the memory of this servant, and I am longing for the time when I shall meet you again. Although I have travelled through many countries and cities of Islam, yet have I never met so

lofty a character and so exalted a personage as your Excellency, and can bear witness that it is not possible to find such another. On this account I am hoping that the ideals and accomplishments of your Excellency may be crowned with success and yield results under all conditions; because behind these ideals and deeds I easily discern the eternal welfare and prosperity of the world of humanity.

This servant, in order to gain first-hand information and experience, entered into the ranks of various religions—that is, outwardly, I became a Jew, Christian, Mohammedan, and Zoroastrian. I discovered that the devotees of these various religions do nothing else but hate and anathematise each other, that all their religions have become the instruments of tyranny and oppression in the hands of rulers and governors, and that they are the causes of the destruction of the world of humanity.

Considering those evil results, every person is forced by necessity to enlist himself on the side of your Excellency, and accept with joy the prospect of a basis of the religion of God, which is being founded through your efforts.

I have seen the father of your Excellency from afar. I have realised the self-sacrifice and noble courage of his son, and I am lost in admiration.

For the principles and aims of your Excellency I express the utmost respect and devotion, and if God, the Most High, confers long life, I will be able to serve you under all conditions. I pray and supplicate this from the depths of my heart.—Your servant, Mamhenyn,

VAMBÉRY.

After meeting Abdul Baha in New York and Paris, I am now fortunate enough to see him in his native East; not, it is true, in the land of his birth, but in the Holy Land—the Land of the Prophets, to which by spiritual succession he rightfully belongs. India is waiting eagerly for his promised visit, but his strenuous life in America and long journeying have told on his body, though his spirit is never weary. Those who love him hope that he will here, in his own home and among his own family from whom he has so long been separated, take the rest he so sorely needs, although even here it is difficult for him to rest. Over fifty pilgrims from Persia awaited his arrival at Haifa, and his loving spirit cannot send away those who have come so far and at so great a sacrifice without giving them all the spiritual teaching and happiness of his presence that they desire. The Bahai community at Haifa and Acre numbers many wives and children of the martyrs who died for their faith in Persia; all these are more or less depending on the bounty of Abdul Baha and his family, who one and all live only for the Cause, and work unceasingly, by deeds of lovingkindness to those near and far, to promote that oneness of humanity that shall begin the New Era of the Most Great Peace.

MAUDE M. HOLBACH.

Haifa, Palestine.

TIMBER SUPPLIES AND THE WAR

FOR a considerable number of years past the possibility of the occurrence of a wood famine has been discussed—a famine, that is, unprecedented in the history of the world. Many have scouted the idea of such a proposition as a fantastic chimera, pointing to the vast forest resources still existing on the surface of the globe. Others, with a more intimate knowledge, perhaps, of the real position of affairs, have persistently sounded the note of alarm. They have drawn attention to the enormously increased demand for forest produce of all kinds which the past half century has witnessed; to the great destruction of forests which has taken place in the opening out of the countries of the New World during the same period; to the wasteful and extravagant utilisation of these resources largely through fire by an ignorant population allowed to pursue its own way by an apathetic Government; and, finally, to the fact that the markets of the world have for some time been supplied with large quantities of material at a low and more or less fictitious price—material that was easily accessible, that paid, for the most part, a very small royalty or none at all—material, in other words, which had cost man nothing to produce and therefore could undersell in every country a similar article which had been grown by man himself. True, in this country we had our own special troubles. A better class of material than we had produced in the past in our own woods, on soil and in a climate at least as favourable as that from which the imported articles came, easily ousted the home-grown produce, the position being aggravated by the high railway freight rates in force in these islands.

Amongst European States, of course, the importance of the forest received recognition several centuries ago, as soon, in fact, as the pressure and needs of the growing population came to be felt upon the forest lands. These were only saved by closure and the enactment of forest laws protecting both State and privately owned woods. With the increase in population came the timber market, the enhanced value of forest products, and the raising of new crops to take the place of those felled over for sale. But this recognition of the value of forests was

confined to Europe or the more densely populated parts of it. Elsewhere wasteful utilisation held sway. Gradually, however, expert opinion in this matter during the latter part of last century came to receive a certain meed of attention from the Governments of the States of the world. One of the more recent and notable recognitions took place in America under the Roosevelt régime. That great and far-seeing statesman studied the question, became convinced of its importance, and set himself to put a stop to what may be said to have been one of the most notorious instances of wasteful utilisation of forest material in any country. Roosevelt took up the question in his own vigorous fashion, preached the conservation of the natural resources of his own country, helped to create a Bureau of Forestry, and by all the means in his power encouraged a forestry opinion and a forestry knowledge amongst the people. The crusade resulted in the creation of large forest reserves, in large plantings, and the enlistment of the great lumber interests in checking forest fires, which were imperilling the future material prosperity of the nation, and in replanting areas they had felled over.

The energetic action of America in the direction of forestry caught first the imagination and then the attention of the world. Outside Europe, India, long years before, had recognised the importance of conserving her vast forest resources and, under that able administrator, Lord Dalhousie, a permanent policy for forest administration was laid down in 1855; a work which, subsequently to the Mutiny, with its immediate after-result of rapid railway building, was greatly accelerated by the formation of an Imperial Forest Department. But India does not advertise. The officials carry on their work in an almost total obscurity so far as the outer world is concerned, and it was many years before the existence of the fine Indian department was to win recognition throughout the world, or even within the British Isles. Many British Colonies—notably the Cape and Canada—soon followed the Indian and American lead, in many instances borrowing men from India to start their forestry work or advise in the matter. At the present day most of the British Dominions, Colonies, and Protectorates have a forestry department in being or are laying the foundations of one. In other words, the conservation of their natural forest resources in the interests of their present and future populations has become a recognised branch of the administration of all States, although in many cases much remains to be done before such administration can be considered efficient.

Turning now to our own country, the British Isles may be said to be the last to enter the arena of forest production and conservancy. Not that forestry as a science and a source of

revenue had not been pursued for a long period in this country. It had! But the position has been far different from that existing on the Continent of Europe. These islands started, as did many other now densely populated parts of the world, with primeval woods covering the greater part of them. These, with an increasing population, were mostly wantonly wasted by fire and axe, considerable areas formerly covered with pine remaining bare at the present day, witness the Scottish Highlands. The areas still under wood—such as, e.g., the New Forest in Hampshire and the Forest of Dean in Gloucestershire—owe their preservation to the fact that they were maintained as Royal Shooting Forests in the olden days. But forestry, in areas of privately owned woods, was understood in England and dates back a long way. In 1543 a Statute of Woods was enacted. Under this it was decreed that all woods should be enclosed for four, six, or seven years after each cutting over of the coppice for different rotations, and that at least twelve standards per acre should be reserved or left on the area to grow into timber of a certain girth or age. These standards were to be oak, if possible, or elm, ash, aspen, or beech, these being the timbers most in demand, whilst the coppice consisted of chestnut, hazel, ash, oak, willow, birch, etc. The object of this and subsequent enactments was to ensure the maintenance of a supply of suitable timber of the requisite size for shipbuilding, both for the Navy and the merchant-vessel classes. This practice of forestry, which came to be known as British forestry, remained in force for a long period, and supplied the country with the bulk of its requirements in the direction of home-grown timber materials. It was successful as long as, and only as long as, it had its home market. The introduction of the steel vessel, the abolition of the import duties on Colonial timber in 1846, and for all other foreign timber in 1866, sounded the death-knell of British forestry methods as at the time practised. And not only this. These methods unfortunately came to be positively injurious. The requirements of the old shipbuilding trade necessitated the production of large branches, crooks, and curved timber on the trees. In order to produce these it was essential that each tree should be given a great deal of growing space, the result being loss of height growth, short bole and large branches. As soon as these latter no longer found a market for which they were grown, forestry operations resulted in a loss, the only saleable part of the tree being the bole, of greatly curtailed length. This was bad enough, but worse was to follow. Plantations were formed of other species, especially conifers, to which the old principles and methods of thinning were applied, or something having a close resemblance to these old methods. Consequently the new woods

were systematically over-thinned, the trees branched low, the bole was stunted and full of knots, the volume of timber realised per acre was much below what it should have been—all witness to the impracticability of applying a perfectly correct silvicultural system for one class of material to the production of a different one. The results of the past half to three quarters of a century have not been due so much to a decadence of British forestry as to an unfortunate want of knowledge of the methods to be employed to produce the classes of material imported in large quantities from the Continent, classes which have easily and successfully competed with the home-grown article. A golden opportunity would now seem to have arrived to rectify matters.

With this brief summary we will now turn to a survey of the present production of forestry materials (timber, pit-props, and wood-pulp, and so on) and their imports into this country from various parts of the world. It will then be possible to consider the position, so far as forest imports are concerned, in which the sudden incidence of a general European War has placed us. It will be pointed out how, whilst helping to the utmost extent of our resources the mine-owner, builder, and other trades employing wood, an admirable opportunity has arrived for clearing off a number of wrongly formed and badly grown plantations, and starting afresh. A study of the imports for 1913, which will be now proceeded with, will sufficiently support this contention.

II

The United Kingdom buys nearly half the timber exported from all countries, and the prices ruling in British markets affect the world! With a war of the present magnitude on our hands this state of affairs appears worthy of some consideration. An investigation of the Board of Trade Returns for 1913 shows that the value of wood and timber and manufactures thereof imported into this country amounted for that year to 37,300,000*l.*, as against 25,600,000*l.* in 1909. For the same years the values of imported wood-pulp, including millboard and wood-pulp board, was 5,425,000*l.*, as against 4,135,000*l.* The rise in each case over a period of four years only is noteworthy. The chief exporting countries in Europe are Russia, Sweden, Norway, Germany, France, and Austria-Hungary, the three first being the most important. Outside Europe the United States of America and Canada send us large amounts of wood material. The chief supplies of fir (coniferous wood—hewn, sawn, and planed—other than pit-wood) come from Russia, Sweden, Norway, Germany, United States, and Canada, the total values of the imports from these countries for 1913 being 16,000,000*l.* from Europe and 5,500,000*l.* from the United States and Canada.

The Russian imports were 10,330,000*l.*, as against a total of 5,700,000*l.* from Sweden, Norway, and Germany, the totals from the United States and Canada being 2,320,000*l.* and 3,150,000*l.* respectively.

Russia again is the chief pit-prop and pit-wood supplier, 2,400,000*l.* worth of this essential commodity for the mines of the country being imported in 1913 (as against 1,400,000*l.* in 1909, an increase of a million!). The next important supplies came from France, 840,000*l.*; Sweden, 560,000*l.*; Portugal, 280,000*l.*; and Norway, 200,000*l.*; Germany, Spain, and other foreign countries sending together 154,000*l.* No pit-wood came from British Possessions during 1913. The importance of the position revealed by these figures can scarcely be exaggerated.

Wood-pulp, of which a shortage has probably already made itself felt, to judge from the dwindling in size as also in quality of the paper in use by many of the daily papers, is shown in the Board of Trade 1913 Returns under five heads: Chemical dry, bleached and unbleached; chemical wet; mechanical dry and wet. Of the first named, Norway is the largest importer into this country (136,000*l.* in 1913), with 23,000*l.* from Sweden. The largest amounts of unbleached came from Sweden (1,945,000*l.*), Norway (377,000*l.*), Russia (329,000*l.*), and Germany (322,000*l.*). Chemical wet came chiefly from Sweden (37,000*l.*). Mechanical dry from Russia (22,000*l.*), and mechanical wet from Norway (701,000*l.*), Sweden (281,000*l.*), Canada (156,000*l.*), and Newfoundland (123,000*l.*).

The greatest quantities of oak in 1913 were imported from the United States (1,650,000*l.*), Russia (185,000*l.*), Germany and Austria-Hungary (273,000*l.*), and Canada (84,000*l.*). The chief amounts of teak came from India (700,000*l.*), Siam (119,000*l.*), and Java (40,000*l.*). The mahogany came from French West Africa (343,000*l.*), Southern Nigeria (225,000*l.*), Gold Coast (198,000*l.*), British Honduras (131,000*l.*), United States (115,000*l.*), Cuba (72,000*l.*), and German West Africa (52,000*l.*). The largest amount of furniture and cabinet ware came from France (106,000*l.*) and the United States (104,000*l.*), with 60,000*l.* from Germany and 58,000*l.* from Belgium. House-frame fittings and joiners' work came from Sweden (71,000*l.*) and the United States (40,000*l.*). Wood ware and wood turnery from the United States (1,392,000*l.*), Russia (806,000*l.*), Germany (364,000*l.*), Sweden (85,000*l.*), France (70,000*l.*), and Canada (53,000*l.*). The chief imports of staves were sent from Russia (481,000*l.*), United States (266,000*l.*), Sweden (120,000*l.*), Germany (64,000*l.*), Norway (46,000*l.*). Chip boxes to the value of 38,000*l.* were imported from Sweden, and half a million pounds' worth of matches from Russia (21,000*l.*), Sweden (292,000*l.*), Norway (38,000*l.*), Netherlands (22,000*l.*), and

Belgium (134,000*l.*). Cork to the tune of 895,000*l.* was imported from Portugal and Spain.

Turning now to the classification of timbers. In commerce timbers are classified into two chief groups: softwoods and hardwoods—a purely arbitrary classification. The former are practically all conifers, pines (red and yellow deal), spruces, and firs (white deal), and the larches. The timber of these species is comparatively light, strong, and easy to work, and is extensively used by all trades, and generally for building purposes. Coniferous timber is imported as logs, deals (thick planks), and boards. It is logged and sawn up from selected well-grown clean stems, free as possible from knots. Pit-props are cut from thinnings in middle-aged woods, from the tops of older trees which have been logged, and from stunted growth which will yield material of the requisite size. Wood-pulp is preferably made from trees of 4-inch to 8-inch diameter, and is largely used, of course, for the manufacture of the cheaper classes of paper. With the exception of oak and a few other species, the imported hardwoods do not grow in these islands. Even in the case of oak the foreign timber of this species is preferred to the indigenous, as it is less hard and easier to work. The foreign imported hardwoods are used for veneering, panelling, flooring, furniture, and wood turnery, etc. They are usually heavy woods and difficult to work, and consequently more costly.

The imports of wood and timber received into this country may be divided according to the Board of Trade Returns into six divisions, as follows, taking hewn (i.e. logs) and sawn, planed, and dressed coniferous material as one division:

Division	Classification	Value £
1.	Conifers (firs in Board of Trade Returns)—Logs, sawn or split, planed or dressed	22,800,000
2.	Conifers—Pit-prop and pit-wood	4,400,000
3.	Conifers—Wood-pulp	5,425,000
4.	Hardwoods—Oak logs	1,700,000
5.	Wood manufactures—House frames, furniture, joiner's work, staves, turnery	4,600,000
6.	Hardwoods—Teak, mahogany, veneers, and other foreign furniture wood	3,800,000
Total		42,725,000 <i>l.</i>

An analysis of the above six divisions of the imports of wood and timber into this country brings into prominence several important and interesting features. The first four, involving a sum of 34,325,000*l.*, comprise materials obtained from coniferous species and oak, all of which can be grown in this country. For the manufactured articles in division five both conifers and hardwoods are employed, the sixth division being confined to

purely foreign exotic timbers. A second point is the steady rise in the imports under all the divisions during the past four years, the increase for 1913 over 1909 being nearly 12,000,000*l.* From the above rough classification it can be seen that the pinch is likely to be early felt in the imports of pit-wood, wood-pulp, and building timbers. It will be useful, therefore, to tabulate the amounts of materials in our divisions coming from the various countries. These latter may be divided into three distinct categories of States: (I.) European; (II.) Non-European States and Foreign Colonies; (III.) British Possessions, including Protectorates.

VALUES IN STERLING OF IMPORTS UNDER THE DIFFERENT DIVISIONS

Country	Div. 1 Conifers: Logs, Sawn, Split, Planed	Div. 2 Conifers: Pit-props and Pit-wood	Div. 3 Conifers: Wood-pulp	Div. 4 Hard- woods: Oak Logs	Div. 5 Wood Manufac- tures: Furniture, &c.	Div. 6 Foreign Hardwoods
<i>I. Imports from Europe</i>						
	£	£	£	£	£	£
Russia	10,418,000	2,415,000	541,000	186,000	1,299,000	117,000
Sweden	3,810,000	560,000	2,492,000	—	317,000	—
Norway	1,143,000	200,000	1,561,000	—	86,000	—
Germany	680,000	53,000	460,000	134,000	509,000	37,000
Neth-lands	45,000	—	13,000	—	61,000	10,000
Belgium	—	—	—	—	77,000	—
France	55,000	830,000	6,000	—	187,000	55,000
Portugal	—	278,000	15,000	—	—	—
Spain	—	91,000	—	—	31,000	—
Austria-Hungary	5,000	—	—	138,000	57,000	—
<i>II. Non-European States and Foreign Colonies</i>						
German West Africa	—	—	—	—	—	52,000
Java and Dutch Posses- sions	—	—	—	—	—	52,000
French West Africa	—	—	—	—	—	344,000
Siam	—	—	—	—	—	119,000
Japan	—	—	—	57,000	11,000	—
United States	2,637,000	—	29,000	1,134,000	1,802,000	1,019,000
Cuba	—	—	—	—	—	89,000
Nicaragua	—	—	—	—	—	22,000
<i>III. British Possessions (including Protectorates)</i>						
Gold Coast	—	—	—	—	—	198,000
Southern Nigeria	—	—	—	—	—	228,000
India	—	—	—	—	7,000	752,000
Ceylon	—	—	—	—	—	14,000
British North Borneo	—	—	—	—	—	11,000
Australia (including Tas- mania)	—	—	—	—	—	243,000
New Zealand	11,000	—	—	—	—	—
Canada	3,433,000	—	265,000	85,000	71,000	94,000
Newfoundland	2,000	—	123,000	—	—	—
British W. India Islands	—	—	—	—	—	18,000
British Honduras	—	—	—	—	—	135,000
British Guiana	—	—	—	—	—	55,000
Mexico	—	—	—	—	—	9,000
Hayti and San Domingo	—	—	—	—	—	23,000
Totals	22,387,000	4,427,000	5,205,000	1,735,000	4,515,000	3,692,000

N.B.—The slight differences shown here from the lump sums quoted above are due to small additional entries in Board of Trade Returns under 'From Other Countries' unspecified.

Columns 2, 3, and 4 of this form are perhaps of greatest interest at the present juncture, since some important industries are dependent on the materials they deal with being available. Column 2 includes the bulk of the timber in general use by the building and other trades employing wood. Approximately one half of the imports of 1913 are probably closed for the present. In column 3 about three fourths of the pit-wood imported came from Russia and France. Supplies from these countries are unlikely to be available for some months to come, probably at the earliest well over a year, since no fresh fellings are likely to be carried out till the men return from the Colours.¹ About three fifths of the wood-pulp (column 4) comes from Sweden and Norway. Whether this material can be delivered must depend on North Sea naval problems. The United States, Canada, and Newfoundland should, in course of time, be able to help us here. To the United States and Canada we shall have to look for our supplies of oak, unless the trade will be content to use the harder but finer quality oak of these islands. As regards the 4½ million of wood manufactures, the present will be an excellent opportunity to ascertain how many of these articles we can produce in this country. In the foreign hardwoods only one sixteenth comes from Europe. The command of the sea throughout the world should, therefore, enable supplies of these commodities, of which probably teak is the most important, to continue to arrive in our ports; provided always ships are available to carry them. The match producers in this country will not be sorry to secure the half million of money paid for imports of this article to these shores. Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands could, however, maintain or increase their supply with a safe North Sea passage maintained for them.

III

The area under woodlands and plantations in these islands is roughly about 3,300,000 acres, as follows: England, 1,800,000; Scotland, 990,000; Ireland, 310,000; Wales, 200,000. With the favourable conditions of soil and climate of this country these three million odd acres should give an average annual growth or increment of sixty cubic feet of timber per acre, instead of about ten cubic feet, which is roughly the actual present average production per acre. Fifty cubic feet is the estimated average annual growth in Germany. As has been said above, the United Kingdom buys nearly half of the timber exported from all countries, and the prices ruling in British markets affect the world. It has been shown that at least one half

¹ Since this was written the Board of Trade returns for September show that 240,000 tons of pit-wood were imported that month, as against a normal amount of 600,000 tons. The greater part came from France.

of the 1913 imports of conifer logs and sawn and planed coniferous timber are at present closed to these islands, and to all appearances are likely to remain so for a considerable period of time. Also about three fourths of the pit-wood imports (coming from Russia and France) are lost to us. The supply, so far as is possible, of these two classes of wood during the next few months, until more distant countries can come to our help, is the problem before us. That efforts will be made by countries farther afield to take advantage of this decrease in imports in the British market has already been evidenced by the offer of the Government of Newfoundland. It has already intimated its desire and intention to supply the pit-wood market. For this purpose there are, it is understood, considerable areas of scrub and stunted material in the Colony on tracts formerly overrun by fires, which it is expected will be able to furnish considerable supplies of pit-wood of the smaller sizes. America and Canada, who already send us well over a fourth of the imports of coniferous logs and sawn and planed timber, may increase this amount. This may, however, take time. The supply of imported oak timber will also be practically confined to the United States and Canada. It would appear, therefore, that in these three directions there is a great opportunity for home-grown material, material which, owing to a variety of causes, chiefly perhaps the rough knotty nature of the wood grown and the heavy railway freight rates, has not up to now been able to compete in the open market with imported material of the same species and class but of better quality. For the figures of imports already tabulated emphatically prove that colliery-owners and others are no longer in a position allowing them to pick and choose. True, owing to our contracted exports to the countries engaged in war less wood materials may be required in these islands. But our imports are so vast, and the home supplies available so comparatively small, that there is no need to worry on that score. The important point is to get rid of our own inferior material, whilst at the same time giving a much desired support to the market, before more distant fields step in and once again cut out the home-grown. Incidentally the cause of scientific forestry in this country has all to gain by such action. How is this unique opportunity to be taken full advantage of?

It has been shown that all the imported conifers of divisions 1 and 2 can be grown in this country. The chief are Scots pine, spruce, larch, and fir. The first two are the pit-prop woods. (In France and Southern Europe the Maritime pine is used.) Considerable tracts of Scots pine exist in this country. Of spruce, the available supply is, unfortunately, very small owing to the extraordinary neglect which this species has received at the hands of planters up to comparatively recent years. Larch

for colliery purposes is only used in the main galleries owing to its greater cost. We have little fir growing, save as ornamental trees in policies and parks, and so on. With a heavy demand and restricted supply, however, we can reckon on colliery proprietors being prepared to take anything which will serve as a pit-prop, provided it has fair straightness, the necessary strength, and is of the requisite size. There are plenty of scrub areas of oak and other species in the country, in parts of Scotland especially, grown up from the old oak coppice, which will furnish material of pit-wood size. Such areas before the War were worthless, and in many cases would not, or scarcely, cover the cost of felling and replanting. Their opportunity has now arrived. It should prove possible to fell all accessible areas of this nature at a profit, provided the operation is undertaken in the near future and before other more distant supplies are placed upon the market. Thus, broadly speaking, it may be said that almost any area which is fairly accessible and has on it a crop of size and sufficient durability to produce pit-props has at the present a market before it. Areas of older trees can supply logs and sawn and planed timber in addition to pit-wood. Other hardwoods, which will now be taken, are beech, sycamore, birch, elm, chestnut, and alder.

It is possible to differentiate between the different classes of woods which may be utilised in this manner in the service of the nation, and to the advantage of the proprietor.

Taking first the Scots pine woods of Scotland. There are unfortunately considerable tracts of both middle-aged and old woods which were very badly blown out in the great gales of November 1911 and April 1912. Other areas of middle-aged and under have been badly opened out by snow-break and wind. Others, again, planted in unsuitable localities, have never fulfilled the anticipations formed for them, and already before middle age it is seen that they will require a very long rotation to produce timber of sleeper size. The opportunity for all these classes of woods is to hand, and there should be every prospect, if they are dealt with at once, of a profit being obtained from their sale and clearance.

The second class of woods for consideration are those from about thirty-five to fifty years old Scots pine, Scots pine and spruce, or with a few additional larch in mixture. These may have been grown to produce pit-props, as in the instances at Raith (on a forty-year rotation) in Fife, or the original idea may have been to grow them on a longer rotation for large timber. It will be for consideration now whether it will be more profitable, and to the greater interests of the nation, to clear fell these areas and convert the material into pit-wood.

It is unnecessary to consider here at any length the next

class, old mature, or nearly mature, woods. With a good market their removal will be financially desirable.

The next class, from the scientific forester's point of view, is certainly not the least important. This consists of immature woods from about thirty years of age and upwards, in which thinnings can be made. In all accessible woods of any size, these thinnings should provide a considerable amount of pit-wood material. The important point will be that the thinnings should be made with care, the trees to be removed being marked beforehand by a reliable forester well acquainted with the principles of scientific thinning.

Finally, for general purposes there are the few pure spruce, larch woods, and various hardwoods. Of pure spruce there are few in this country. Such as are available will doubtless be marketed at a profit. Little need be said here of larch. The timber always finds a ready market, and there will probably be an upward tendency in prices for this material. For oak high wood—the scrub areas have been already dealt with—in the absence of the nearest supplies which come from Austria-Hungary and Germany there is likely to be a larger demand and a higher price. Birch may be in demand for furniture-making purposes, in addition to pit-props, as also our other useful hardwoods, to take the place of imported manufactures.

As to the size of the wood materials in demand. It will be unnecessary to dwell upon division 1, logs and sawn timber. A few remarks may, however, prove useful on pit-wood. The following is a quotation (abbreviated) for Scots pine and spruce pit-wood drawn up last August by a large colliery proprietor in Scotland.² The classes are four in number—round props, quartered props, crowns, and pit-sleepers; the prices are carriage paid, delivered at the mines.

Round props—3 in. up to 4 ft. in length fetch 3s. 11d. per 100 ft. in $\frac{1}{2}$ in. classes, and varying lengths, to 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ in. up to 8 ft. in length, fetching 10s. 9d. per 100 ft.

Quartered props—Ex. 5 in., 6 in., and 7 in. up to 4 ft. long fetch 2s. 1d., 2s. 9d., and 3s. 7d. per 100 ft. respectively.

Crowns—3 $\frac{1}{2}$ ft. \times 3 in. \times 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ in. fetch 1d. each.

4 ft. \times 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ in. \times 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ in. fetch 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. each.

5 ft. \times 4 in. \times 2 in. fetch 1 $\frac{5}{8}$ d. each.

5 ft. \times 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ in. \times 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ in. fetch 1 $\frac{3}{4}$ d. each.

5 ft. \times 5 in. \times 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ in. fetch 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ d. each.

Pit-sleepers—3 ft. 3 in. \times 5 in. \times 2 in. fetch 15s. 6d. per 100.

The butt ends of trees are usually cut up into quartered wood, pit-sleepers, small crowns, and hutch-boards.

Of the amounts of timber and pit-wood available in these

² The prices have since increased somewhat.

islands to fill the gap made in the imports, it is not at present easy to speak.³ There is no forest law in this country, and therefore no power to compel the felling, in the interests of the nation, of areas of woods in private ownership, as is the case in many Continental countries. Nor is there any evidence that such a law would be necessary in Britain. The difficulty in the past has been to find a good market for the produce of the woods. With a market at the door there can be little doubt of the willingness and patriotic spirit of proprietors to take advantage of it. It has been estimated by one large Scottish colliery proprietor that he would require about 200 acres per annum of fair, well-grown Scots fir, forty to fifty years old, for his needs. And he further estimated the total Scottish colliery requirements at 6000 acres of the same material per annum. It has not been stated whether the calculation is based on Continental methods of growth or on British ones—a matter of some importance, since the British woods as grown in the past carry far less per acre than is the case with the better-grown woods of the Continent. The estimated average annual requirements would thus be probably nearer 8000 acres per annum. And this is for pit-wood alone!

In conclusion, there is one other point which may be briefly touched upon here, for it scarcely comes within the purview of matters herein considered. I allude to the labour supply. To work the woods in Scotland will almost certainly require a supply of imported labour, and provision will have to be made for the housing of such labour. Even so, this labour, or much of it, will not be satisfactory for the present emergency, which demands good and rapid work. At the present moment we probably have as fine a supply of well-trained forest labour as has ever been in existence in this country. It is to be found amongst the German prisoners.⁴ One twelfth of the population of the German Empire is said to be connected in one way or another with the working of the German forests. There must be, accordingly, at the present moment amongst our prisoners men who are first-rate forestry labourers. It would appear possible that in this emergency some use could be made of these men, their services being remunerated. In thinning operations trained hands would be invaluable.

E. P. STEBBING.

³ Recent inquiries by the English Board of Agriculture on the subject of the amounts of pit-wood available in England and Wales estimate 7,900,000 tons standing in the woods, of which 3,800,000 could be exploited by extraordinary fellings. This would supply the demand for one year, the total amount available only supplying the requirements of two years.

⁴ Also to a certain extent the Belgian refugees.

ALSACE-LORRAINE A YEAR AGO:

IMPRESSIONS OF A FRENCH-AMERICAN

UNTIL the summer of 1913 I had never set foot in Alsace-Lorraine. For the men of my generation the very thought of the lost provinces was a pain. We knew that France had suffered a deep wrong in 1871. We were full of ardent sympathy for Poland, Finland, the Boer Republics, Armenia: how could we be indifferent to that other injustice, for which we were partly responsible? The Treaty of Francfort was iniquitous. But there was no immediate means of redress except war, which is hell. The constant thought of war meant militarism—a crushing financial and spiritual burden. Then, strain every nerve as she would, France was outnumbered; she was doomed to failure, or driven to unnatural alliances, whereby the hoard of gold of her democracy bolstered up Muscovite despotism. The reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine, if it could be achieved, implied the siege of Strasbourg and Metz, the further devastation of the blood-drenched and scarred provinces. And Alsatian brothers would have to fight under hostile flags, or be shot as traitors. Last of all, victory is no argument. War settles nothing, and sows the seeds of further war. All this I confess without shame. We did not hate war out of cowardice: we thought there were nobler battles to be fought, against ignorance, disease, and poverty. We were not resigned to injustice: we believed that the slow victories of peace would ultimately set the whole world free—even Junker-ridden Prussia. The Alsace-Lorraine question would vanish in the democratic and socialistic Federation of Western Europe. Dreams, idle dreams, I confess. Were they not better than those of Keim or Bernhardt? Had we worked for them as we have worked for the preparation of slaughter, would they not have come true?

Be this as it may, Alsace-Lorraine was a thorn in the flesh of those who dreamt of peace. We tried to forget. Déroulède and his 'bugle-calls' jarred on our nerves. If we felt a tremor when we passed before the statue of Strasbourg, disfigured with hideous wreaths, we attempted to check it, as a survival of narrow Chauvinism. We turned our backs on Alsace-Lorraine. Some

would affect to rejoice that the cries of the victim had subsided into a moan—a barely audible murmur that would soon pass into silence. But did we forget?

Thus a trip to the lost provinces was an ordeal from which many of us would shrink. Not until I had spent ten years in English-speaking countries did I feel equal to the strain. My allegiance to France had become cultural and no longer political. My deep-rooted cosmopolitanism had assumed an Anglo-Saxon rather than a French tinge. So nothing stood in the way when my dear master and friend, Chancellor David Starr Jordan, invited me to join him in a tour of investigation from Metz to Mulhouse.

Such an investigation was by no means easy. Germany is a wonderful country, rich, learned, progressive, even liberal in many ways. So long as you keep the right step and walk in the right direction, all is well. But you cannot swerve aside, linger, or sprint ahead without becoming conscious of chains—neat, highly polished, efficient chains. ‘What do you think of the question of Alsace-Lorraine?’ All officials were drilled to answer ‘There is no question of Alsace-Lorraine.’ Peasants would shake their heads and refuse to speak a word. Merchants, manufacturers, and priests were blandly, even volubly non-committal. Professors and journalists, even after venting the most orthodox opinions, would stringently request that their names be not mentioned: for merely to discuss the tabooed question savoured of disloyalty. Only a few journalists on the French side were outspoken. Most of them had had a taste of *lèse-majesté* or high treason prosecutions. I remember vividly two objects in Abbé Wetterlé’s study at Colmar: the one was a statuette of a volunteer of the French Revolution—a truly Alsatian touch. The other was a friendly cartoon alluding to that sturdy cleric’s incarceration: a Prussian sentinel was watching the barred window behind which the priest’s profile could be seen, and the inscription ran *Lieb’ Vaterland mag ruhig sein*. Only Alsatian ‘Wackes’¹ are capable of such sacrilegious irony.

The casual visitor would not feel this atmosphere of subtle and relentless terror. There were no ‘atrocities’ of the Bulgarian or Armenian type. Alsace-Lorraine fared better than Russian Poland, and even than Polish Prussia. Those who took too literally the symbols of France’s grief and of Alsace-Lorraine’s unconquerable loyalty might be shocked at finding the ‘martyr provinces’ so prosperous, and, on the whole, so happy. The dramatically draped statue on the Place de la Concorde seemed to have little in common with the real Strasbourg, the quaint old city by the Ill, so strangely attractive with its sleepy canals,

¹ Wackes=hooligans: the epithet that Saverne (Zabern) made world-famous.

its clusters of high-pitched gables—the immemorial haunts of the stork—and the tremendous lacy spire of its red Münster. There was no sign of mourning in the Reichsland. The Alsations, much more than the Lorrainers, are a hearty, merry folk. Then, deliberate efforts have been made to erase every vestige of the French *régime*. In Metz, a few commercial signs in French were still tolerated : in Strasbourg, none could be found, and the outward Germanisation of the city was complete. In these efforts, German thoroughness led to some ludicrous results. A barber was fined for announcing himself as a ‘coiffeur’ : the police compelled him to use the good old German term ‘friseur’ ! The words ‘Liquidation totale’ appeared on a certain shop : the authorities had the obnoxious Gallic phrase translated into its German equivalent ‘Totale Liquidation.’ The pattern of helmets for the local fire brigade was a source of concern to the Pangermanists, for it was too closely modelled after that of the French Pompiers. Certain athletic societies were dissolved because their bugles were accused of having a French sound. Much of the ‘Germanisation’ of Alsace-Lorraine is due to such measures as these. It must be confessed that, in Metz and Strasbourg at least, it has achieved more significant successes. The two capital cities, partly deserted by the French upper classes, have been flooded with immigrants from over the Rhine. In Metz the native population is outnumbered by the newcomers—the ‘Old Germans,’ as they call themselves. Both cities have been extended, and their new districts, with massive public buildings, ambitious villas, and broad boulevards, are of a decidedly Teutonic character. The French of the classical age were masters of city architecture ; Haussmann, with all his shortcomings, was not unworthy of their tradition. But, since 1871, the French have barely kept up to Haussmann’s standard, whereas the Germans have gone right ahead. They mistake mass for majesty, and baroque affectation for elegance ; but the general impression is one of cleanliness and efficiency. A striving for social service and civic beauty is manifest everywhere, clumsy but unconquerable. The progress of Metz and Strasbourg under German rule has not been any more striking than that of Nancy in French Lorraine : but it deserves our full tribute of admiration.

If, in addition, our friend the casual visitor happens to be a German-American ; or if he has studied in a Germanised American University ; if he has never gone beyond the prejudices current twenty years ago, when the ascendancy of the Teutons and the irremediable decadence of the Gauls were held to be incontrovertible facts ; if he has been brought up blindly to worship Bismarck, and no less blindly to despise Napoleon the Third, then

he will interpret everything he sees in a Pro-German light, and he will repeat, with the Prussian officials :

There is no question of Alsace-Lorraine. It exists only in the fancy of French sentimentalists—a noisy but fast-dwindling crew. In the Reichsland it is kept alive by a few survivors of the French *régime*, aided by professional agitators. Half a century is nothing in the life of a nation : with a few more years of firm government the whole trouble will die out. The two provinces, once a part of the Holy Roman Empire, still overwhelmingly Teutonic in stock and speech, were wrenched by main force from Germany, and restored to her in 1871 after a war in which France was technically the aggressor. The Treaty of Francfort has settled the matter once for all.

But stay a while longer ; talk things over, in French, with representatives of the old local *bourgeoisie* ; cast a glance at the local Press ; ask any ' Old German ' if the people of Alsace-Lorraine could safely be trusted with the fullest measures of self-government : and your first impressions will change. You will grow sceptical about the finality of any solution imposed by force. You will realise, as even the most stiff-necked Prussian official is bound to confess after a time, that there is a question of Alsace-Lorraine.

II

The debatable borderlands on the Rhine have been a bone of contention ever since the Treaty of Verdun in 843. Then was created, between France and Germany, a strip of territory called Lotharingia, Lothringen or Lorraine. This huge and inorganic dominion never achieved national unity. It became a part of the loose confederacy known as the Holy Roman Empire. With this arrangement the French Kings were never satisfied. France was none other but Roman Gaul, and her north-eastern boundary should be the Rhine, as in the days of Julius Caesar. The reconquest of her natural and historical frontiers was for centuries a cardinal principle in the foreign policy of France. We are not ready to defend this position on historical grounds : we simply note how potent a factor it was in the national life of France, up to a time within the memory of living men : for as late as 1870 the claims of France to the whole left bank of the Rhine were still openly advocated.

In 1552 Henri II took the three Bishoprics, Metz, Toul, and Verdun, and from that time it may be said that the Duchy of Lorraine lived in the shadow of France. It was not until 1736, however, that the last Duke was superseded by Stanislaus Leszczynski, the father-in-law of Louis XV. Under the nominal government of Stanislaus French rule was but thinly disguised, and on his death in 1766 Lorraine

and Bar became French in name as well as in fact. The two landgraviates of Alsace and its ten free cities were ceded to France in 1648. Strasbourg was annexed in 1681—an act of sheer international robbery which stirred the indignation even of the degraded and disunited Germany of that time. A few enclaves did not become French until the Revolution; and Mulhouse, a free city allied with the Swiss cantons, remained independent until 1797.

Impartiality compels us to acknowledge that the historical title of France to Alsace and Lorraine is not beyond cavil. The assimilation between modern France and ancient Gaul is fanciful, or, at best, shadowy; it cannot even be proved with certainty that the tribes which inhabited the region at the time of the Roman conquest were of Celtic blood and speech. Royal France took Alsace and Lorraine by the right of the sword. But it must be said that no other right was valid in those days. The two provinces were not 'wrested from an organic and conscious nation; they were detached from a loose confederacy of warring States, in which foreign potentates had domains and partisans. Then, although they passed under the rule of the French Kings, their autonomy was not obliterated. The University of Strasbourg remained German until the Revolution; the clergy of Lorraine and of part of Alsace was considered as 'foreign'; the two provinces were not submitted to the same system of taxation as the rest of France, and were not part of the French customs union. Louis XIV ruined his kingdom for the sake of religious unity, by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes; but this disastrous measure was not applied in Alsace. The union of Alsace and France, therefore, was respectful of Alsatian individuality, and the Alsatians could be loyal to their French Kings without being traitors to themselves.

It must be remembered that Alsace became French at the time of France's greatest splendour and of Germany's deepest humiliation. Even in the eighteenth century, when the political prestige of France was eclipsed, her cultural prestige was unimpaired. Every one of the petty sovereigns who swarmed in Germany tried to imitate the etiquette, the fashions, the ideas, the very accent of Versailles. The maker of modern Prussia preferred the language of Voltaire to that of Lessing. The Academy of Berlin was offering a prize for an essay on the universality of the French language. Thus French culture, which had always prevailed in Lorraine, spread throughout Alsace by a sort of contagion, and without any effort on the part of the Government. The Alsatians to this very day retain their implicit belief in the superiority of French civilisation. Thus a liberal policy, and the prestige of French art, French literature,

French philosophy, French society, completed the work of conquest, and gave it the legitimacy of popular assent.

Then came the French Revolution. Alsace, which had ever been a democratic country, hailed with enthusiasm the new gospel of the Rights of Man. It is not through a mere coincidence that the *Marseillaise* was composed at Strasbourg; in the house of the Mayor, Dietrich, Alsace was born anew with the rest of France; she who had been so jealous of her local privileges became the most ardent defender of the indivisible Republic. She had her full share of danger and glory in the epic wars of the Revolution and the Empire. Henceforth, the right of the people to frame their own destiny has been proclaimed, and must prevail. In 1871 not the shadow of a doubt is permissible as to the loyalty of Alsace-Lorraine to France. The two provinces fought heroically to repel the invaders. They protested unanimously against their annexation to Germany. And the last words of the Alsatian Deputies in the National Assembly at Bordeaux can never be forgotten: 'Handed over, in contempt of all justice and by an odious abuse of force, to the domination of the foreigner, we declare once again null and of no effect a compact which disposes of us without our consent.'² This is the crux of the whole problem. The old law of brutal conquest was applied to men who, for nearly a century, had lived under the new dispensation. Citizens of no mean city, they were treated as chattel. This they resented, and resent still. No amount of prosperity and good administration can undo the harm done in 1871; unless and until the Alsatian-Lorrainers are left free to dispose of themselves the wound will not heal.

In 1870 Germany hoped to bring back 'long-lost brothers' to the common home. It was soon realised that the brothers had become attached to another family. Until 1887, all their representatives in the Reichstag were irreconcilably opposed to the Treaty of Francfort. Then the real nature of the conquest became evident. Alsace-Lorraine was not annexed for its own good, or for its own sake; a prize wrested by re-united Germany from the hereditary foe, it was the sign and pledge of German unity at home, of German supremacy in Europe. The 'long-lost brothers' were made to feel that they were pawns in a bigger game. Instead of being admitted into the German Confederation on an equal footing with the other States, Alsace-Lorraine became a Reichsland, a territory held in common by the victors. No semblance of self-government was given her until 1911. The Prussianised bureaucracy undertook to drill her

² Cf. *La Protestation de l'Alsace-Lorraine les 17 Février et 1er Mars 1871 à Bordeaux*. By Henri Welschinger. Paris: Berger-Levrault.

inhabitants into good Germans, with the assistance of Frederick's irresistible cane. 'Those people are Germans, after all; did not our professors of history, anthropology, and philology tell us so? It is out of sheer perversity that they call themselves French. And yet, strange to say, the more we cudgel them the less they seem to like us.'

By 'cudgelling,' we do not mean actual violence. We have already stated that persecution in Alsace-Lorraine assumes more insidious forms. Until the outbreak of War there had been no massacres; the worst affray was that which occurred in Saverne a few months earlier. But there had been an uninterrupted series of vexatious, arbitrary measures, mere pinpricks perhaps, but which irritate beyond endurance. Suppression of newspapers and societies, imprisonment or expulsion of former Alsatians who return for a visit to their old home; preference given to 'Old Germans' for all official positions; interdiction of French lectures and dramatic performances of the most neutral character; this constant nagging made a reconciliation difficult between the two elements of the population. The result was that at the end of forty-three years Alsace-Lorraine had not been morally conquered. In Mulhouse, a lady of the old *bourgeoisie*, who married a German, was immediately ostracised. The ground which was thought to be gained was lost during the last few years. In connexion with the Saverne affair, the damning admission was made in the Reichstag that 'Alsace was a hostile country.'

Apart from the international aspect of the problem, the difficulty in Alsace-Lorraine is two-fold. There is a conflict of culture and a political conflict. Alsace-Lorraine believed in the supremacy of French civilisation. The people spoke their Teutonic dialect, but the upper classes used French among themselves. This was not a mere veneer, as some Germans call it. It was a curious case of double culture, of which bilingualism was merely the symbol. In some of their traditions, the Alsatians were unmistakably Germanic; in their tastes, habits, and principles they were no less clearly French. Now, the conquerors brought with them radically different theories; France was a corrupt and decadent nation; the Germans were the sole heirs and the natural leaders of European civilisation. Our Greco-Roman culture, our Greco-Jewish religion became, according to the doctrine of German professors, the exclusive products of Teutonic genius. Alsace-Lorraine was not prepared for such an 'Umwertung.' The romantic veneration of the Germans for medieval forms and ideals seemed to the conquered provinces, imbued with the classical and rationalistic spirit of France, like

a return to barbarism. To a certain degree the Germans treat the Frenchified Alsatians as we treat the Filipinos or as the French treat the Moors—wards that have to be educated, sternly if need be, up to a higher stage of civilisation; whilst the Alsatians candidly believe that force has brought them under the yoke of a people less advanced than themselves in genuine culture.

We do not mean to say that the Alsatians fail to recognise the scientific, philosophical, and artistic achievements of Germany; it is only the arrogant assumption of racial superiority that they resent, especially on the part of men who are not the worthy successors of Goethe and Schiller. Alsace, and in particular Strasbourg, enjoyed for centuries a unique privilege that the best friends of France and Germany would gladly see restored. It was the point of contact and amicable blending between the two great civilisations. The architecture of the Münster itself is a symbol of this harmonious co-operation. Its University, which Goethe attended, remained German, whilst the Court of its Archbishop spread French culture far and wide. In the nineteenth century it was greatly through its theological faculty, through men like Reuss and Colani, that the results of German research reached the French public. Alsace was a bridge between the Germanic and the Romanic worlds; it has seemed to be the constant endeavour of its new masters to widen the chasm instead of spanning it.

The constitutional difficulty is the natural result of this cultural conflict. The Alsatians have ever been a thoroughly democratic people. Their ten free cities were active little republics in the Middle Ages. Even Louis XIV had to respect their privileges, their language, their religion. They adopted at once and enthusiastically the principles of the Revolution. Under the Second Empire they kept alive, from first to last, their democratic and republican traditions. Such was the people which, after 1871, was to be governed from Berlin by a Prussian or Prussianised bureaucracy. It was not exclusively Germany's fault if all official positions in Alsace-Lorraine had to be filled by 'Old Germans' from over the Rhine; the local *bourgeoisie*, for a long time, refused to co-operate with their conquerors. But it was Germany's mistake to send to Alsace-Lorraine North-Germans and Protestants, stiff, haughty, totally devoid of tact and sympathetic insight, who behaved like so many little Gesslers. The lower positions, in particular, were given to non-commissioned officers used to the harsh discipline of Prussian barracks, rather than to the easy-going way which had hitherto prevailed. Of political liberty in local affairs there was no

question.³ Alsace-Lorraine was practically a 'crown colony,' and its inhabitants called themselves, with bitter irony, 'second-class German citizens.'

Finally, in 1911, Alsace-Lorraine received a constitution and a representation in the Bundesrat, or Federal Council. I am inclined to believe, against the opinion of most of my Alsatian informants, that Germany made a sincere effort to satisfy the Reichsland; and her failure must have embittered her against 'Alsatian ingratitude.' The constitution did not meet the two demands of the population: full equality within the Empire with the other confederates, and genuine self-government. First of all, that constitution was *granted* by the Imperial authorities—Bundesrat and Reichstag—and could be altered, suspended, or withdrawn by them. The people had no voice in framing it. This alone made it invalid in their eyes.

Then the Reichsland had no *local* sovereign; the Emperor, as the representative of the Confederation, was Landesherr. Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg, in all local affairs are governed from their own capitals; Alsace-Lorraine has been governed from Berlin, not from Strasbourg. It is Berlin that has appointed the Statthalter and the members of the Ministerium. It is thus made manifest that Alsace-Lorraine has remained the joint possession of the German States rather than one of them.

Whilst manhood suffrage was adopted for the Lower Chamber—Alsace-Lorraine in this respect is more favoured than Prussia—the sovereign may appoint directly one half of the Upper Chamber, and the other half includes a number of *ex officio* members, who are practically Imperial nominees. Even when the two Chambers concur in passing a law the sovereign can refuse his assent, and there is no way of overriding his veto.

The representation of Alsace-Lorraine in the Bundesrat has been illusory: the three delegates are appointed by the Government; that is to say, by Berlin. They are so obviously in the hand of Prussia that the other confederate States were obliged to take precautions against this increase of Prussian supremacy; the three votes of Alsace-Lorraine may count *against* Prussia, but are held to be void when they alone would give the Prussian side a majority: a curious arrangement, which may explain why most Alsations shrug their shoulders when the Constitution is mentioned.

But by far the most radical fault of this Constitution, in the eyes of the inhabitants, is that it belongs to the German type, in which the executive, although bound to respect the law, is

³ The Landesauschuss, which existed from 1874 to 1911, had no political power.

absolutely independent of the people. In England and France Parliament is supreme; in America the chief executive is an elective officer; throughout Germany the administration is responsible only to the sovereign, who holds his power directly from God. The *Almanach de Gotha* describes Russia, with unconscious irony, as 'a constitutional Empire under an autocratic Tsar'; the description fits Germany just as well. And the Alsatian Secretary of State may say to the Landtag, just as the Imperial Chancellor may say to the Reichstag: 'Criticise and blame as much as you please: as long as I enjoy the confidence of my master the Emperor I shall not alter my course.'

Now this conception has been accepted by modern Germany, because, under Bismarck, it has led the country to unity, victory, and prosperity. Most Germans will confess that it is indefensible on theoretical grounds; but it works, apparently, well. The liberal and democratic sentiment, so strong in 1848, is silenced, although not stamped out. Alsace-Lorraine, in 1870, was as liberal and democratic as Germany had been in 1848; the achievements of Bismarck, of course, did not appeal to her; she still wants what she wanted then: an executive responsible to God, no doubt, but also, in some tangible manner, to the people at large.

In other words, if Alsace-Lorraine were free to frame her constitution her government might be a crowned republic, out of deference to the other members of the confederacy; but, crowned or not, it would certainly be a republic. And as long as the military, pietistic, feudal, and monarchical element is supreme in Germany a republic of Alsace-Lorraine is out of the question. You cannot expect the Emperor to give the Alsatians, whom he has reasons to distrust, rights and privileges which are denied his faithful Prussian subjects. This means that, even with the best intentions in the world, Germany cannot give Alsace-Lorraine what Alsace-Lorraine considers to be the indispensable elements of a free constitution.

Thus far we have always spoken of Alsace-Lorraine as one unit. The events of 1871 have welded together two heterogeneous elements, the greater part of Alsace (minus Belfort) and a fraction of old Lorraine. Before the Revolution, and even in the first seventy years of the last century, the provinces had little in common. Even at present they are still widely different in language, manners, sympathies, and economic possibilities. The Alsace-Lorraine problem is not quite the same in German-speaking Lorraine as in French-speaking Lorraine; in the artificially colonised city of Metz, as in the villages that surround it; in Strasbourg as in the rest of Lower Alsace; in Lower Alsace as in

Upper Alsace (Colmar and Mulhouse). But the essential data of the problem are the same from the frontier of Luxembourg to that of Switzerland. It would be an error to pay too much attention to linguistic differences. Over 200,000 inhabitants of Lorraine use French as their mother tongue. They were annexed for purely strategic reasons, and perhaps against the better opinion of Bismarck himself. But they are not by any means the only or even the worst adversaries of German rule. Lorraine is a conservative province, exclusively and intensely catholic, not particularly industrial until the recent development of its iron mines. Only a portion of it became German; the capital, Nancy, remained French; the aristocracy left the annexed territory almost in a body. Lorraine, therefore, is not in the best position for resisting the encroachments of Germanism. With some tact on the part of its present rulers it is not inconceivable that it might have become reconciled, or at least resigned. It is Alsace, Teutonic but democratic, which is the centre of resistance. Especially in the South—Colmar, Guebweiler, Mulhouse—every one that counts in the intellectual, social, economic fields has remained true to the French tradition. The badge of the French veterans of 1871 is openly, almost defiantly, worn. Alsatian society is almost as rigidly closed to the invaders as forty years ago. There is hardly a family that has not one of its members a volunteer in the French army. Young boys tramp for miles to cross the border and catch a glimpse of 'the red trousers.' On the shops of the main street in Mulhouse we looked in vain for a French name; but when we walked into the Bourse we found two or three hundred men transacting business exclusively in French. The linguistic boundary between French and German in Alsace is not geographical but social. This Frenchification of the upper classes has progressed downward in spite of all German efforts; the lower *bourgeoisie*, the retail dealers, who forty-four years ago used exclusively the Alsatian dialect, at present know French as well, and there is no hostility between the bilingual upper class and the purely Alsatian people: none of that bitter feeling which prevails between Germans and Poles, or Poles and Lithuanians; the classes are not rigid castes, and the whole population is conscious of immemorial kinship.

So the question of Alsace-Lorraine is primarily the question of Alsace. This is well realised in France: the symbol of the lost provinces is invariably an Alsatian girl. It is Strasbourg rather than Metz that the French people regret. Metz, the virgin fortress, Metz, with its splendid, purely French cathedral, and its three centuries of French life, was very very dear to their hearts, but it did not represent anything vital: it was a

city like many other cities. Strasbourg, on the contrary, stood for the Rhine frontier, and for that half-assimilated Teutonic element which was an essential part of modern French culture. Strasbourg was to us a strange jewel, all the more precious because it was strange. It was the French city that made us love Germany, the pledge of possible harmony and collaboration between Teuton and Gallo-Roman.

A year ago Europe was filled with rumours of war. Public opinion in Alsace-Lorraine was almost unanimous in favour of peace. Alsace-Lorraine was fully aware of the enormous military power of Germany; she knew that a war of deliverance, even if by a miracle of diplomacy or strategy it should be successful, would mean an appalling holocaust. Alsace-Lorraine was bound to suffer, in her manhood and in her wealth. And the odds were against France: a parliamentary Republic pitted against a military autocracy is an amateur challenging a professional. We met hot-headed advocates of a return to France, even at the cost of a war. But the majority of responsible people made splendid efforts to avert the catastrophe which even then was threatening to engulf Europe.

Their motto was 'We must think with our heads, and not with our hearts.' They could not break loose from Germany; they could not obtain from imperial Germany the kind and degree of autonomy which they thought indispensable. Their only hope was in the gradual democratisation of Germany. They could not be free without first setting Germany free.

They had a last ray of hope at the time of the Saverne affair. Then the overbearing attitude of the military was condemned by a majority of the German people. It seemed as though the little Alsatian town, which had first risen in defence of the French flag, were going to lead a successful German rebellion against the Prussian war-mongers. But militarism was soon as firm in the saddle as before.

Now War has come, and through no provocation on the part of France. The inconceivable blundering of German diplomacy has arrayed seven nations against Habsburg and Hohenzollern, whilst the third member of the Triple Alliance keeps wisely out of the fray. France has now more than a fighting chance to get even with Germany. Perhaps these pages will have helped my readers to understand certain demonstrations at the beginning of the War which may have struck them as melodramatic and sentimental. The unveiling of the Strasbourg statue, so long buried under mourning wreaths, symbolised such an explosion of passionate hope that no one should dare to smile. The first raid on Altkirch and Mulhouse may have been a tactical blunder:

but it was right to define from the first the aim of the new crusade.

The final triumph of Germany, or even a drawn battle and a compromise accepted through sheer exhaustion, would mean a Europe worse divided than before; a new and madder race for armaments, and a more colossal Armageddon ten or twenty years hence; unless, before that time, a universal revolution sweeps away kings and armies, and much that we cherish in our modern civilisation. The defeat of Bismarckian Germany would mean the liberation of Europe, and the liberation of the noblest member in the European family, the Germany of Schiller and Kant. What would it mean to Alsace-Lorraine?

When we consider the checkered history of those provinces, the constant wars of which they have been the cause or the theatre, their mixed culture, and the intense bitterness which their final loss would leave in the soul of the defeated contestant, it might seem that independence and neutrality of the Swiss or Belgian type would be an ideal solution. A chain of neutral States between France and Germany would be no absolute guarantee that the two countries would war no more: but that compromise, that reconstitution in a simplified form of ancient Lotharingia, might satisfy the two claimants and the object of their quarrel. Alsace-Lorraine, however, may choose to stand by the declaration of its representatives in 1871: 'Your brothers, separated at this moment from the common family, will preserve a loyal affection for France till the day when they shall resume their place at the hearth.'⁴ And how could France refuse to welcome them?

Then there will be a new question of Alsace-Lorraine, unless the situation be handled with generous skill. There will be Germany's thirst for revenge. There will be those of the immigrants from over the Rhine who choose to remain under the French flag. There will be the few Alsatians, who, for reasons not always ignoble, had accepted the German *régime*. There will be the traces of old German culture, refreshed by nearly half a century of union with modern Germany. There will be the divergence in the recent evolution of France and in that of Alsace-Lorraine, especially with regard to their religious policy.

If a policy of Jacobin centralisation be enforced, then little good will have been achieved. Our dream would be to see an Alsace in which French and German cultures would develop unhampered and in friendly rivalry; in which every theatre, every tribunal, and every school, even the University of Strasbourg, would welcome one language just as freely as the other; a vast

⁴ The writer has quoted this declaration in an abridged form.

laboratory of race amalgamation wherein, from Teuton and Gaul, the citizen of the United States of Western Europe would be evolved.

Dreams again! But dreams rule the world. Because Europe had dreamed the wrong dream, the nightmare of racial pride and national exclusiveness, thousands of our French and German brothers lie dead in the trenches of the Aisne.

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*The Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY cannot undertake
to return unaccepted MSS.*

THE
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CENTURY
AND AFTER



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THE FUTURE OF CONSTANTINOPLE

THE Allies have struck with energy in the Near East, and before long changes may take place there which will profoundly affect the course of the War.

Foresight is the essence of statesmanship. From the slow progress of the Allies hitherto it would appear that the War will be long-drawn-out, but the unexpected frequently happens, both in war and in foreign politics. For many reasons the aspect of the War may soon change completely. We may hear either that the Austrian Emperor has asked for a separate peace in order to save his country from the worst and final disaster, or that Roumania and Italy have joined in the War and have attacked Austria-Hungary. In the latter case Austria could not resist for long. Within a short space of time Austria-Hungary may be eliminated, and as it would obviously be suicidal for Germany to continue the War single-handed, for Turkey's support has so far proved worthless, her wisest policy would be to give up the hopeless struggle. In these circumstances it seems opportune to consider without delay some of the greatest and most difficult

problems with which a future Peace Congress will have to deal. This is all the more necessary as some of the questions which will have to be settled may cause differences among the Allies, unless the nations and their statesmen have previously arrived at some understanding as to the great lines on which the settlement should take place. Such a preliminary agreement had unfortunately not been effected when, a hundred years ago, at the Congress of Vienna, the entire map of Europe was recast. Owing to the resulting differences and the return of Napoleon from Elba the assembled diplomats hastily concluded a Treaty which left the greatest and most dangerous problems badly solved or not solved at all. Guided by the principle of legitimacy they considered the claims of the rulers, but disregarded those of the nations. At the Congress of Vienna, Germany and Italy were cut up, notwithstanding the protests of the German and Italian people. Thus the work done in haste and under pressure by the diplomats at Vienna led to a series of avoidable wars, and especially to the Wars of Nationality of 1859, 1866, and 1870-71, by which a united Italy and a united Germany were evolved.

The nations and their rulers seem fairly agreed as to the broad principles on which the map of Europe should be reconstructed at a future Congress. In the first place, territorial rearrangements will be made which will strengthen the peaceful nations, which will make unlikely a war of revenge and should secure the maintenance of peace for a very long time. In the second place, the desires of the various nationalities to be united under a Government of their own are to be fulfilled. In the third place, the nations which have fought and suffered are to receive suitable compensation, while those which have merely looked on will presumably derive little or no advantage from the general recasting of frontiers. Apparently there are only three questions which might lead to serious disagreement among the Allies. These are the question of the future of Russia, the question of Poland, and the question of Constantinople. All three questions are closely interwoven.

Russia is a Power which is viewed by many Englishmen with a good deal of distrust. Many people in this country fear that Russia will become too powerful, if Germany and Austria-Hungary should be defeated, if Germany should suffer great territorial losses, and if the Dual Monarchy should no longer form a single State, but should become dissolved into its component parts in accordance with the principle of nationalities. They wish for a counterpoise to Russia on the Continent. To many Englishmen who have watched with concern the constant and apparently irresistible progress of Russia in Asia, that country

is a dangerous, aggressive Power. They remember that many Russian generals and writers have recommended an expedition against India, that Czar Paul, during his short and tragic reign, actually prepared such a venture, that his successor, Alexander the First, also contemplated an attack on India by land, that more than once Russia has been at war with Great Britain. However, most of those who are thinking of Russia's aggressiveness and her former hostility to England are probably unaware that her hostility was not without cause; that England, fearing that Russia might become too strong, endeavoured, at the bidding of her enemies, to prevent that country's expansion, especially in the direction of Constantinople and of the Far East; that at the time of the Crimean War, not Russia, but England, was apparently in the wrong; that Lord Beaconsfield prevented Russia reaping the fruits of her victory after her last war with Turkey; that, angered by England's attitude and incited by Bismarck and his successors, Russia not unnaturally endeavoured to revenge herself upon this country in the only part where it seemed vulnerable.

The problem of Poland, which was very fully considered by the present writer in the January number of this Review, is less dangerous to the maintenance of good relations among the Allies than is that of Constantinople. Russia is clearly the Power most strongly interested in Poland. She occupies towards that country a special position which must be respected. The Polish question is, after all, practically a Russian domestic question. Poland is a kind of Russian Ireland. The question of Constantinople, on the other hand, has for many decades been considered the most dangerous problem in Europe. Constantinople is supposed to be a point of vital interest not only to Russia but to Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, and this country as well. As the Turks have plunged into the War and have attacked the Allies, the settlement of the problem of Constantinople can no longer be shelved. Therefore, it seems best to consider it frankly, dispassionately, and without prejudice. We have been taught in the past that the possession of Constantinople will decide the fate of the world, that Constantinople dominates the world and that Russia's possession of that position would be fatal to Great Britain's position in India. In these circumstances it seems necessary not only to consider the character of Russia's foreign policy and of the Russian people, but to study the problem of Constantinople in the light of history and with special reference to Russia's future.

Since the time of N apoleon the question of Constantinople has loomed particularly large, and probably unduly large, on the political horizon. Apparently the strategical importance of

Constantinople is at present generally over-estimated, because the last few generations, instead of studying critically and without prejudice the real importance of that city, have been mesmerised by the pronouncements of the great Corsican warrior, and have repeated his celebrated saying that Constantinople is 'the key of the world,' although it is nothing of the kind.

According to many popular historians, Russia has 'always' tried to wrest India from England and to make herself mistress of the world by seizing Constantinople. From some of the most serious historical books, and even from dry diplomatic documents, we learn that Russia's policy of seizing with Constantinople the dominion of the world was initiated by her greatest ruler, Peter the Great, who recommended that policy to his successors in his celebrated political testament. History, as Napoleon has told us, is a *fable convenue*. Napoleon himself has skilfully created a *fable convenue* around the city of Constantinople, and most of the mistaken views as to Russia's world-conquering aims were engendered by that great genius who has mystified England during a whole century, and has been responsible for a century of misunderstandings between this country and Russia. It seems therefore timely and necessary to consider Russia's actions in the direction of Constantinople and of India by means of the most authoritative documents existing, the vast majority of which are not given in English books. They are new to British readers, and they may help in destroying a century-old legend which has served Napoleon's purpose of sowing enmity between Russia and this country.

The political testament of Peter the Great, which plays so great part in historical and diplomatic literature has, so far as I know, not been translated into English. There are several versions of that document. The following passages, which are taken from the combined versions given by Sokolnicki and Lesur, are those which should be of the greatest interest to English readers :

Austria should be induced to assist in driving the Turks out of Europe. Under that pretext a standing army should be maintained and shipyards be established on the shores of the Black Sea. Constantly progressing, the forces should advance towards Constantinople.

A strict alliance should be concluded with England. . . . Predominance in the Baltic and in the Black Sea should be aimed at. That is the most important point. On it depends the rapid success of the plan.

My successors should become convinced of the truth that the trade with India is the world trade, and that he who possesses that trade is in truth the master of Europe. Consequently no opportunity for stirring up war with Persia and hastening its decay should be lost. Russia should

penetrate to the Persian Gulf and endeavour to re-establish the ancient trade with the East.

The influence of religion upon the disunited and Greek dissenters dwelling in Hungary, Turkey, and Southern Poland should be made use of. They should be won over. Russia should become their protector and obtain spiritual supremacy over them. . . .

Soon after opportunities will become precious. Everything should be prepared in secret for the great coup. In the deepest secrecy and the greatest circumspection the court of Versailles and then that of Vienna should be approached with the object of sharing with them the domination of the world.

In the following paragraphs the author recommends that Russia should bring about a world-war ostensibly regarding Turkey, that she should set all the other Great Powers by the ears, and while they are engaged in internecine struggles seize Constantinople, make war upon all her opponents, subdue them, and make herself supreme throughout the world.

Peter the Great died in 1725. He greatly enlarged the Russian frontiers, organised, modernised, and Europeanised the country, and fought hard to give it an outlet on the then Swedish Baltic, creating Petrograd. His successors, guided by Catherine the Second, endeavoured with equal energy to give Russia a second outlet to the sea in the South, at Turkey's cost, and apparently they carried out to the letter the recommendations contained in the political testament of Peter the Great. Prophecies are usually correct if they are made after the event. The famous political testament was apparently written not in Peter the Great's lifetime but a century after, when Russia had succeeded in acquiring the shores of the Black Sea and had become the leader of the Slav nations belonging to the Greek Church. Peter the Great's political testament was first published in a book, *De la Politique et des Progrès de la Puissance Russe*, written by Lesur in 1811, at a time when Napoleon had resolved upon a war with Russia. It was published to influence European, and especially English, opinion against that country. According to Berkholz (*Napoléon I., Auteur du Testament de Pierre le Grand*), Napoleon himself was the author. The abrupt telegraphic style of the composition indeed greatly resembles that of its putative author. The best informed now generally consider the will of Peter the Great to be a forgery. Bismarck, who was on the most intimate terms with Czar Alexander the Second, described it as 'apocryphal' in the fifth chapter of his *Memoirs*. The value of Peter the Great's Will as a document revealing the traditional policy and traditions of Russia is nil.

The desire of Peter the Great's successors to conquer the Turkish territory to the south of Russia, and to acquire for the

country an outlet on the Black Sea, was not unnatural, for at a time when transport by land was almost a physical impossibility in Russia the country could be opened up and developed only by means of her splendid natural waterways and of seaports. As Russia's most fruitful territories are in the south, access to the Black Sea was for her development far more important than an opening on the Baltic. Besides to the deeply religious Russians a war with the Turks has, up to the most recent times, been a Holy War, a kind of crusade. The Empress Catherine succeeded in conquering the shores of the Black Sea, but failed in conquering Constantinople, which she desired to take. With this object in view she proposed the partition of Turkey to Austria in the time of Maria Theresa and of Joseph the Second. According to her historian Castéra, she recommended the Minister of France to advise his Government that France should join Russia for the purpose of partitioning the Turkish Empire. As a reward she offered Egypt to France, believing that the conquest of Egypt would be easy.

Catherine's offer of Egypt to France is significant, and should be carefully noted. For centuries France, guided by a sure instinct of territorial values, had been hankering after the possession of Egypt, seeing in that country a door to the lands of the Far East and one of the most important strategical positions in the world. The great historian Sorel wrote in *Bonaparte et Hoche en 1797* that the possession of Egypt was 'le rêve qui, depuis les croisades, hante les imaginations françaises.'

France hungered after Egypt. Her thinkers had planned the construction of the Suez Canal a century before de Lesseps. After the outbreak of the Revolution her historic ambition seemed likely to be fulfilled. The French Republic was at war with England and Russia. England might be attacked in India by way of Egypt, and Egypt might, at the same time, be made a base of operations for an attack upon Russia in the Black Sea in conjunction with Turkey. While England and Russia were thus being attacked a revolution should be engineered in Ireland to complete England's discomfiture. On the 23rd Germinal of the year VI.—that is on the 12th of April 1798—the Directoire appointed the youthful General Bonaparte commander of the Armée d'Orient, and ordered him to take Egypt, to cut the Suez Canal, and to secure to the French Republic the free and exclusive possession of the Red Sea. The aim and object of that expedition, and of the greater plan of operations of which it was to be a part, is clearly and fully disclosed in a lengthy memorandum on the foreign situation, written by Talleyrand, who at the time was the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and placed by him

before the Directoire on the 10th of July 1798. We read in that most valuable and most interesting document :

Si Bonaparte s'établit en Egypte, quand il aura dirigé une part de ses forces contre les Anglais dans l'Inde, qui empêchera que la flotte française, pénétrant dans la mer Noire et s'unissant à celle des Turcs, aille, pour consolider cette puissance de l'occupation de l'Egypte, l'aider à reconquérir la Crimée qui est pour elle d'un bien autre intérêt que cette région livrée depuis des siècles aux révoltes des beys? Il n'y aura pas toujours dans la Méditerranée une nombreuse flotte anglaise. Attaqués dans l'Inde, menacés sur leurs côtes, frappés au cœur de leur puissance par l'insurrection de l'Irlande, dont les progrès peuvent d'un moment à l'autre désorganiser leur armée navale, ils doivent finir par abandonner la station qu'ils auront établie au fond de la Méditerranée, et dès lors nous pouvons marcher à Constantinople où tout doit être préparé pour que nous soyons bien reçus. La destruction de Cherson et de Sébastopol serait à la fois la plus juste vengeance de l'acharnement insensé des Russes, et le meilleur moyen de négociation avec les Turcs pour en obtenir tout ce qui pourrait consolider notre établissement en Afrique. . . .

L'expédition de Bonaparte, s'il met pied en Egypte, assure la destruction de la puissance britannique dans l'Inde.

Déjà Malte est en notre pouvoir; ce succès miraculeux serait seul un coup terrible pour le commerce de l'Angleterre, et quand notre armement n'obtiendrait pas un autre fruit, celui-là serait suffisant. Mais des attentes encore plus sensibles sont réservées à cette nation, livrée à tous les déchirements intérieurs qu'elle a si longtemps entretenus chez nous. L'insurrection de l'Irlande, cimentée déjà par le sang de quelques victimes célèbres, paraît faire des progrès remarquables. C'est dans cette contrée que doivent aboutir maintenant tous nos efforts. Des armes, des munitions, des hommes; hâtons-nous de les y porter, rendons à l'Angleterre les maux qu'elle nous a faits. Qu'une République s'élève à côté d'elle pour son instruction ou pour son châtiment. . . .

Si nous sommes bientôt en mesure de faire ce que j'ai indiqué en parlant de la Russie, au moins d'en annoncer l'intention, je ne doute pas que la Porte ne sente le prix de ce service et n'associe ses forces aux nôtres pour repousser la Russie loin des bords de la Mer Noire.

The war programme of the French Directoire against England, which included an attack on Egypt, an expedition against India, the support of Turkey, the raising of Ireland in rebellion, and war upon British commerce, bears a curious resemblance to the comprehensive war plans of modern Germany.

Napoleon seized the Government of France and he became the heir of the grandiose world-embracing policy of the Republic. He took up the plan which was designed to destroy simultaneously the power of England and Russia and to make France all-powerful throughout the world. Catherine the Second, the great enemy of the French Revolution, had died in 1796 and had been succeeded by the weak, eccentric, violent, and scarcely sane Czar Paul the First. During the first years of his reign he also was hostile to revolutionary France and had made war upon that

country, but in 1800 he quarrelled with England. Napoleon at once utilised the opportunity and persuaded him to attack England in Asia in conjunction with France. In O'Meara's book *A Voice from St. Helena* we read that Napoleon described to his Irish surgeon the invasion planned in the time of Paul the First as follows :

If Paul had lived you would have lost India before now. An agreement was made between Paul and myself to invade it. I furnished the plan. I was to have sent thirty thousand good troops. He was to send a similar number of the best Russian soldiers and forty thousand Cossacs. I was to subscribe ten millions for the purchase of camels and other requisites for crossing the desert. The King of Prussia was to have been applied to by both of us to grant a passage for my troops through his dominions, which would have been immediately granted. I had at the same time made a demand to the King of Persia for a passage through his country, which would also have been granted, although the negotiations were not entirely concluded, but would have succeeded, as the Persians were desirous of profiting by it themselves. My troops were to have gone to Warsaw, to be joined by the Russians and Cossacs, and to have marched from thence to the Caspian Sea, where they would have either embarked or have proceeded by land, according to circumstances. I was beforehand with you in sending an Ambassador to Persia to make interest there. Since that time your ministers have been imbeciles enough to allow the Russians to get four provinces, which increase their territories beyond the mountains. The first year of war that you will have with the Russians they will take India from you.

It will be noticed that Napoleon did not suggest to Russia an advance upon India by way of Constantinople, but by way of the Caspian Sea, by a route similar to that which she would follow at the present time, when an expedition against India would be carried by the railways running from the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea towards the North-West Frontier of India. That is worth bearing in mind if we wish to inquire whether Russia's occupation of Constantinople would threaten India.

Paul the First was assassinated in 1801 before he could embark upon his fantastic expedition, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Alexander the First. Born in 1777, Alexander came to the throne as a youth of twenty-four. He had been educated by the Swiss philosopher Laharpe in accordance with the principles of Rousseau. The great Polish statesman Prince Adam Czartoryski, an intimate friend of his youth and of his maturer age, drew the following portrait of Alexander in his *Memoirs* :

Young, candid, inoffensive, thinking only of philanthropy and liberalism, passionately desirous of doing good, but often incapable of distinguishing it from evil, he had seen with equal aversion the wars of Catherine and the despotic follies of Paul, and when he ascended the throne he cast aside all the ideas of avarice, astuteness, and grasping ambition which were the soul of the old Russian policy. Peter's vast projects were ignored for a

time, and Alexander devoted himself entirely to internal reforms, with the serious intention of making his Russian and other subjects as happy as they could be in their present condition. Later on he was carried away, almost against his will, into the natural current of Russian policy, but at first he held entirely aloof from it, and this is the reason why he was not really popular in Russia.

Alexander was a good man and a great idealist. His dearest wish was to free the serfs and to make the people happy and prosperous. General Savary, Napoleon's temporary Ambassador in Russia, reported to him on the 4th of November 1807 the following words of the Czar : ' Je veux sortir la nation de cet état de barbarie. Je dis même plus, si la civilisation était assez avancée, j'abolirais cet esclavage, dût-il m'en coûter la tête.' Alexander the First, like the present occupant of the throne Nicholas the Second, was a warm-hearted idealist, a lover of mankind and a friend of peace, anxious to elevate Russia and to introduce the necessary reforms. However, Alexander the First, like Nicholas the Second, was forced into a great war against his will.

In a number of campaigns Napoleon had subdued the Continent, and the French longed for peace. Still Napoleon desired to carry out the great policy of the Directoire, to destroy the power of England and Russia and make France supreme in the world. But as long as the Continent was ready to rise against the French, Napoleon could not safely enter upon a lengthy campaign in far-away Russia. He feared Russia as an opponent as long as Europe was unwilling to bear his yoke. An alliance with Russia would have been invaluable to him. By securing Russia's support he could hope to hold Prussia and Austria in awe and to attack, or at least to threaten, England in India. Russia's support could best be secured by promising to her explicitly, or at least implicitly, the possession of Constantinople and by making her believe that she was not interested in the fate of the other European States, that their enslavement by Napoleon was no concern of hers. In December 1805, while he was at war with Russia, Napoleon significantly said to Prince Dolgoruki, the Czar's aide-de-camp, who had been sent to him, according to the Prince's report of the 23rd of that month published by Tatistcheff :

Que veut-on de moi ? Pourquoi l'empereur Alexandre me fait-il la guerre ? Que lui faut-il ? Il n'a qu'à étendre les frontières de la Russie aux dépens de ses voisins, des Turcs surtout. Sa querelle avec la France tomberait alors d'elle-même. . . . La Russie doit suivre une tout autre politique et ne se préoccuper que de ses propres intérêts.

While, in vague words, Napoleon promised to Alexander the First the possession of Turkey, he endeavoured to raise the Turks

against the Russians. On the 20th of June 1806 Napoleon dictated, in his characteristic abrupt style, the following instruction for the guidance of General Sebastiani, the French Ambassador in Turkey, which will be found in Driault, *La Politique Orientale de Napoléon* :

1. Inspirer confiance et sécurité à la Porte, la France ne veut que la fortifier.

2. Triple Alliance de Moi, Porte et Perse contre Russie. . . .

7. Fermer le Bosphore aux Russes, fermer tous les ports, rendre à la Porte son empire absolu sur la Moldavie et la Valachie.

8. Je ne veux point partager l'Empire de Constantinople, voudrût-on m'en offrir les trois quarts, je n'en veux point. Je veux raffermir et consolider ce grand empire et m'en servir tel quel comme opposition à la Russie.

In 1806 Napoleon made war upon Prussia. In October of that year the Prussians were totally defeated at Jena and Auerstädt. The Russians came to their aid, and Napoleon feared a lengthy campaign far from his base. On the 7th and 8th of February 1807 he defeated the Russians at Eylau. However, the French suffered such fearful losses that Napoleon's position was seriously endangered. Hence he urgently desired to make peace with Russia. Relying upon the youth, the generous enthusiasm, the warm-heartedness, the lack of suspicion, and the inexperience of Alexander the First, Napoleon attempted once more to convert his enemy into a friend and ally and a willing tool. With this object in view he caused articles to be published in the papers advocating a reconciliation of Napoleon and Alexander in the interests of humanity, and recommending joint action by France and Russia against England, the enemy of mankind. Napoleon knew how to convey indirectly to the Czar numerous messages expressing his sorrow at the fearful and needless slaughter, his desire for peace, his goodwill for Russia, and his high esteem for Russia's youthful ruler. Alexander was at once attracted by Napoleon's suggestions, and at last became infatuated by him. He had been fascinated by Napoleon's success. He was keenly aware of the backwardness of Russia. Desiring to advance his country, he wished to learn from his great antagonist the art of government and administration, for it was the organiser in Napoleon that he chiefly admired. On the 14th of June 1807 Napoleon severely defeated the Russians at Friedland, and the Czar, following the advice of his generals, asked Napoleon for peace. A few days later the celebrated meeting of the two monarchs, in a little pavilion erected on a float anchored in the River Niemen, took place. According to Tatistcheff, the Czar's first words to Napoleon were 'Sire, je hais les Anglais autant que vous.' and Napoleon replied 'En ce cas la paix est faite.'

On the Niemen, and at the prolonged meeting of the monarchs at Tilsit which followed, Napoleon unceasingly preached to the Czar the necessity of Franco-Russian co-operation in the interests of peace, and the necessity of breaking the naval tyranny of England. He suggested to Alexander that he should seize Turkey, spoke of the Turks as barbarians, and proposed that the two monarchs, after having destroyed the power of England by an attack upon India, should share between them the dominion of the world. He urged that they should conclude at the same time a treaty of peace and a treaty of alliance which provided for their co-operation throughout the world. Taking advantage of the Czar's easily aroused enthusiasm and of his lack of guile, Napoleon deliberately fooled Alexander the First and tricked him into an alliance with France by which all the advantages fell to Napoleon. How the Czar was treated is described as follows in his *Memoirs* by Talleyrand, who drafted the Treaty of Tilsit :

In the course of the conferences preceding the Treaty of Tilsit the Emperor Napoleon often spoke to the Czar Alexander of Moldavia and Wallachia as provinces destined some day to become Russian. Affecting to be carried away by some irresistible impulse, and to obey the decrees of Providence, he spoke of the division of European Turkey as inevitable. He then indicated, as if inspired, the general basis of the sharing of that empire, a portion of which was to fall to Austria in order to gratify her pride rather than her ambition. A shrewd mind could easily notice the effect produced upon the mind of Alexander by all those fanciful dreams. Napoleon watched him attentively and, as soon as he noticed that the prospects held out allured the Czar's imagination, he informed Alexander that letters from Paris necessitated his immediate return and gave orders for the treaty to be drafted at once. My instructions on the subject of that treaty were that no allusion to a partition of the Ottoman Empire should appear in it, nor even to the future fate of the two provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia. These instructions were strictly carried out. Napoleon thus left Tilsit, having made prospective arrangements which could serve him as he pleased for the accomplishment of his other designs. He had not bound himself at all, whereas, by the prospects he held out, he had allured the Czar Alexander and placed him, in relation to Turkey, in a doubtful position which might enable the Cabinet of the Tuileries to bring forth other pretensions untouched in the treaty.

According to the Treaty of Tilsit, which was signed on the 7th of July 1807, Napoleon and Alexander were to support one another on land and sea with the whole of their armed forces. The alliance was defensive and offensive. The two nations were to act in common in making war and in concluding peace. Russia was to act as mediator between England and France, and to request England to give up to France and her Allies all her conquests made since 1805. If England should refuse to submit, Russia was to make war upon England. Thus the duties of the Czar under the Treaty of Alliance were clearly out-

lined. The corresponding advantages, however, were only vaguely hinted at. Only the last article, Article 8, treated of Turkey, and it was worded as follows :

Pareillement, si par une suite des changements qui viennent de se faire à Constantinople, la Porte n'acceptait pas la médiation de la France, ou si, après qu'elle l'aura acceptée, il arrivait que, dans le délai de trois mois après l'ouverture des négociations, elles n'eussent pas conduit à un résultat satisfaisant, la France fera cause commune avec la Russie contre la Porte Ottomane, et les deux hautes parties contractantes s'entendront pour soustraire toutes les provinces de l'Empire ottoman en Europe, la ville de Constantinople et la province de Romélie exceptées, au joug et aux vexations des Turcs.

In return for making war upon England, Alexander the First received merely the promise that in certain eventualities France and Russia would act together against Turkey, and that in the event of such joint action they would come to an understanding with a view to freeing all the European provinces of Turkey from the Turks. However, Constantinople and the Province of Rumelia were to be reserved, and not to be partitioned by the Allies. In return for valuable service, Alexander the First received merely a vague and worthless promise.

As, in numerous conversations, Napoleon had promised to Alexander all he could desire, and as the Czar implicitly believed in his new friend, he probably did not look too closely into the wording of the one-sided treaty, and left Tilsit full of admiration for the Emperor of the French. Meanwhile Napoleon began a most cynical game with Alexander. Although the Treaty of Tilsit did not provide for the partition of Turkey, Napoleon continued using the partition of Turkey as a bait with which to secure Russia's support against England. He went even so far as to offer her, though only verbally, Constantinople itself. On the 7th of November 1807, Count Tolstoi, the Czar's representative in France, reported to Alexander that Napoleon had offered Constantinople to Russia in the following words :

Il (Napoléon) me dit que lui ne voyait aucun avantage pour la France au démembrement de l'empire ottoman, qu'il ne demandait pas mieux que de garantir son intégrité, qu'il le préférerait même. . . Cependant, que si nous tenions infiniment à la possession de la Moldavie et de la Valachie, il s'y prêterait volontiers et qu'il nous offrait le thalweg du Danube, mais que ce serait à condition qu'il put s'en dédommager ailleurs.

Il consent même à un plus grand partage de l'empire ottoman s'il pouvait entrer dans les plans de la Russie. Il m'autorise à offrir Constantinople, car il m'assure de n'avoir contracté aucun engagement avec le gouvernement turc, et de n'avoir aucune vue sur cette capitale. . . . Dans la troisième supposition qui annoncerait un entier démembrement de la Turquie européenne, il consent à une extension pour la Russie jusqu'à Constantinople, cette capitale y comprise, contre des acquisitions sur lesquelles il ne s'est point expliqué.

Under unspecified circumstances Napoleon verbally agreed to Russia's occupying Constantinople in return for equally unspecified compensations for France.

While, on the 7th of November 1807, Napoleon professed to be completely indifferent to Turkey's fate and expressed his willingness to the Russian Ambassador that Russia should have Constantinople, he sent five days later, on the 12th of November, instructions to M. de Caulaincourt, the French Ambassador in Petrograd, in which he frankly stated that he desired the maintenance of Turkey's integrity, and that he had put the project of partitioning Turkey before Alexander solely for the purpose of attaching him to France with the bonds of hope. In these most important instructions to Caulaincourt we read :

Cette chute de l'Empire ottoman peut être désirée par le cabinet de Pétersbourg; on sait qu'elle est inévitable; mais il n'est point de la politique des deux cours impériales de l'accélérer; elles doivent la reculer jusqu'au moment où le partage de ces vastes débris pourra se faire d'une manière plus avantageuse pour l'une et pour l'autre et où elles n'auront pas à craindre qu'une puissance actuellement leur ennemie s'en approprie, par la possession de l'Egypte et des îles, les plus riches dépouilles. C'est la plus forte objection de l'Empereur contre le partage de l'Empire ottoman.

To these instructions Napoleon added himself the following marginal note, emphasising his desire to preserve the integrity of Turkey :

Ainsi, le véritable désir de l'Empereur dans ce moment est que l'Empire ottoman reste dans son intégrité actuelle, vivant en paix avec la Russie et la France, ayant pour limites le thalweg du Danube, plus les places que la Turquie a sur ce fleuve. . . .

The instructions to M. de Caulaincourt then continued as follows :

Telles sont donc, Monsieur, sur ce point important de politique, les intentions de l'Empereur. Ce qu'il préférerait à tout serait que les Turcs pussent rester en paisible possession de la Valachie et de la Moldavie. . . .

Et enfin, quoique très éloigné du partage de l'Empire turc et regardant cette mesure comme funeste, il ne veut pas qu'en vous expliquant avec l'Empereur Alexandre et son ministre, vous la condamnerez d'une manière absolue; mais il vous prescrit de représenter avec force les motifs qui doivent en faire reculer l'époque. Cet antique projet de l'ambition russe est un lien qui peut attacher la Russie à la France et, sous ce point de vue, il faut se garder de décourager entièrement ses espérances.

After informing his Ambassador that the projected partition of Turkey was nothing but a piece of deception whereby to secure Alexander's support, Napoleon told him in the same instructions that the projected Franco-Russian expedition against India was a sham and that he had put it forward only with the

object of frightening the English into making peace. That most extraordinary and most significant passage runs as follows :

On pourra songer à une expédition dans les Indes ; plus elle paraît chimérique, plus la tentative qui en serait faite (et que ne peuvent la France et la Russie ?) épouvanterait les Anglais. La terreur semée dans les Indes Anglaises répandrait la confusion à Londres, et certainement quarante mille Français auxquels la Porte aurait accordé passage par Constantinople, se joignant à quarante mille Russes venus par le Caucase, suffiraient pour épouvanter l'Asie et pour en faire la conquête. C'est dans de pareilles vues que l'Empereur a laissé l'ambassadeur qu'il avait nommé pour la Perse se rendre à sa destination.

Napoleon's saying, 'The more fantastic an attempt to attack India would be, the more it will frighten the English,' is very amusing. There is some reason in his observation. England is more easily frightened by bogies than by realities, and one of the bogies which has frightened her most frequently during many decades is the bogey of Constantinople which Napoleon set up a century ago.

Being carried away by his enthusiasm and simple trustfulness, Alexander the First, remembering and often repeating the words which Napoleon had uttered at Tilsit, believed that Constantinople was in his grasp. However, he and his advisers doubted that the joint expedition against India projected by Napoleon was easy to carry out. According to Caulaincourt's report of the 31st of December 1807, Alexander the First and his minister received with some reserve the French proposals relating to that expedition. They obviously estimated more correctly the difficulties which such an undertaking would encounter owing to the vast distances and the inhospitability of the route. They did not share the illusions of Paul the First.

The French Ambassador in Russia was in constant and intimate relations with Alexander the First, and he reported his conversations like an accomplished shorthand-writer. According to a conversation with the Czar, which he communicated to Napoleon on the 21st of January 1808, Napoleon himself had admitted at Tilsit the impossibility of striking at India by a march over land. The Ambassador reported :

Alexandre I : L'Empereur (Napoléon) m'en a parlé à Tilsit. Je suis entré là-dessus en détail avec lui. Il m'a paru convaincu comme moi que c'était impossible.

L'Ambassadeur : Les choses impossibles sont ordinairement celles qui réussissent le mieux, parce que ce sont celles aux quelles on s'attend le moins.

Alexandre I : Mais les distances, les subsistances, les déserts ?

L'Ambassadeur : Les troupes de Votre Majesté qui sont venues d'Irkoutsk en Autriche ou en Pologne ont fait plus de chemin qu'il n'y en a des frontières de son empire dans l'Inde. Quant aux subsistances, le biscuit

est si sain et si portatif qu'on peut en emporter beaucoup avec peu de transport. Tout n'est pas désert.

Alexandre I: Mais par où pensez-vous que nos armées devraient passer?

L'Ambassadeur: Il faudrait préalablement des conventions avec la Perse et la Turquie. L'Armée française, par exemple, en ferait une avec la Porte, puisque Constantinople est son chemin naturel. Celle de Votre Majesté passerait par le Caucase, si on n'avait pas les moyens nécessaires pour lui faire traverser la mer Caspienne.

Alexandre I: Mon cher général, c'est un bien grand projet. Mais que de difficultés, pour ne pas dire plus.

While in the time of Paul the First the combined French and Russian armies were to march upon India *via* Warsaw and the Caspian Sea, Napoleon now proposed that the French Army should march *via* Constantinople. He evidently sought for a pretext to control that town and the Straits, and with them the Russian Black Sea. Meanwhile he continued playing with Alexander. On the 2nd of February 1808 he wrote to his Ambassador in Russia that he was on the point of arranging for an expedition to India, combined with the partition of Turkey, that a joint army of twenty to twenty-five thousand Russians, eight to ten thousand Austrians, and thirty to forty thousand Frenchmen, should be set in motion towards India; 'que rien n'est facile comme cette opération; qu'il est certain qu'avant que cette armée soit sur l'Euphrate la terreur sera en Angleterre.' On the 6th of February 1808 Napoleon told the Russian Ambassador, Count Tolstoi, according to the report of the latter, 'Une fois sur l'Euphrate, rien n'empêche d'arriver aux Indes. Ce n'est pas une raison pour échouer dans cette entreprise parce qu'Alexandre et Tamerlan n'y ont pas réussi. Il s'agit de faire mieux qu'eux.'

While Napoleon was amusing Alexander with vain hopes and fantastic proposals, the Czar had begun a very costly war with England in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty of Tilsit. Feeling at last that the question of Turkey was being treated dilatorily and with the greatest vagueness, he pressed for some more definite arrangement and a series of non-official conferences regarding that country took place between the French Ambassador in Russia and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Acting upon his secret instructions given above, Caulaincourt prevaricated and at first refused to consider the position of Constantinople because that position was strategically too important to be rashly disposed of. Being anxious to dispossess the Turks, largely for reasons of humanity, Alexander then proposed to make Constantinople a free town. According to Caulaincourt's report of the 1st of March 1808, the Czar said to the French Ambassador 'Constantinople est un point important, trop loin de vous et que vous regardez peut-être comme

trop important pour nous. J'ai une idée pour que cela ne fasse pas de difficultés, faisons-en une espèce de ville libre.'

The question arose what equivalent could be given to France if Russia should take Constantinople. At the second conference, which took place on the 2nd of March, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested that France should occupy Egypt, stating 'La France a toujours désiré l'Egypte. Sous le règne de l'impératrice Catherine, elle nous avait fait proposer par l'empereur Joseph II de nous laisser aller à Constantinople si nous lui laissions prendre l'Egypte.' The question of Constantinople itself had to be tackled. On the 4th of March the French Ambassador, speaking, of course, without authority, offered Constantinople to Russia, but claimed at the same time the Dardanelles for France. In other words, he suggested that although Russia might possibly be allowed to occupy Constantinople, France ought to dominate that town by the possession of the Dardanelles. Not unnaturally, the Czar, who was apprised of these demands, refused even to consider that suggestion.

In course of time, the real intentions of Napoleon were revealed to Russia. The Alliance was followed by a breach between the two monarchs, by Napoleon's defeat in 1812, and by his downfall.

The most important documents quoted in these pages show conclusively that the Russian expeditions against India prepared or discussed in the time of Napoleon were inspired not by Paul the First and Alexander the First, but by the great Corsican, that Alexander desired to acquire Constantinople chiefly owing to Napoleon's incitement, that the joint Franco-Russian expedition against India was sheer and deliberate humbug to frighten the English. In the words of the great historian Vandal, the author of the best book on Napoleon and Alexander the First :

The idea of partitioning Turkey was rather a Napoleonic than a Russian idea. Napoleon rather intended to make a demonstration than an attack. He thought that if the French troops crossed the Bosphorus, Asia would be trembling, and England's position be shaken to its very foundations; that in view of the menace she would be willing to make peace with France.

The documents given clearly establish that Napoleon neither intended to give Constantinople to Russia, nor to attack England in India, that on the contrary he wanted Constantinople for France, and that he attached greater value to Egypt than to Constantinople. In his instructions to Caulaincourt, Napoleon confessed that his plans could be carried out only if he ruled the sea, that a premature movement on Constantinople would result in England occupying Egypt, the most valuable part of the Turkish empire. Napoleon might conceivably have given Constantinople to Russia for a time, but he would have done so only with the object

of involving Russia in trouble with England. According to Villemain, he said 'J'ai voulu refouler amicalement la Russie en Asie; je lui ai offert Constantinople.' Commenting on these words, Vandal tells us that, in dangling the bait of Constantinople before Russia, Napoleon merely aimed at involving that country in a life-and-death struggle with England.

Rather by his threats of attacking India in company with Russia overland than by any actual attempt at carrying out that mad adventure, did Napoleon create profound suspicion against Russia among the English, and his machinations have been the cause of a century of Anglo-Russian distrust, friction, and misunderstandings. At the Congress of Vienna, Lord Castlereagh opposed Russia's acquisition of Poland, fearing that that country might become dangerously strong. Replying to the expressions of the British representative's fears, Alexander sent Lord Castlereagh, on the 21st of November 1814, a most remarkable memorandum, in which we read :¹

Justice established, as an immutable rule for all the transactions between the coalesced States, that the advantages which each of them should be summoned to reap from the triumph of the common cause should be in proportion to the perseverance of their efforts and to the magnitude of the sacrifices.

The necessity for a political balance in its turn prescribed that there should be given to each State a degree of consistency and of political Conventions in the means which each of them should possess in itself to cause them to be respected.

By invariably acting in accordance with the two principles which have been just stated the Emperor resolved to enter upon the war, to support it alone at its commencement, and to carry it on by means of a coalition up to the single point at which the general pacification of Europe might be based on the solid and immovable foundations of the independence of States and of the sacred rights of nations. The barrier of the Oder once overstepped, Russia fought only for her Allies: in order to increase the power of Prussia and of Austria, to deliver Germany, to save France from the frenzy of a despotism of which she alone bore the entire weight after her reverses.

If the Emperor had based his policy upon combinations of a private and exclusive interest when the army of Napoleon, collected together, so to speak, at the expense of Europe, had found its grave in Russia, His Majesty could have made peace with France; and without exposing himself to the chances of a war the issue of which was so much the more uncertain as it depended on the determination of other Cabinets, without imposing fresh sacrifices on his people, might have contented himself, on the one hand, with the security acquired for his Empire; and, on the other hand, have acquiesced in the conditions which Bonaparte, instructed by a sad experience, would have been eager to propose to him. But the Emperor, in the magnanimous enterprise to which he had applied himself, availed himself of the generous enthusiasm of his people to second the desires of all the

¹ The writer gives the Foreign Office version of this memorandum, some passages of which appear to have suffered in the translation.

nations of Europe. He fought with disinterested views for a cause with which the destinies of the human race were connected. Faithful to his principles, His Majesty has constantly laboured to favour the interests of the Powers which had rallied round the common cause, placing his own interests only in the second rank. He has lavished his resources in order to render their united efforts prosperous under the firm conviction that his Allies, far from finding in a conduct so pure grounds for complaint, would be grateful to him for having made all private consideration subordinate to the success of an enterprise which had the general good for its object.

The Czar spoke truly. He had fought in 1813 and 1814 against Napoleon for purely ideal reasons. After Napoleon's disastrous defeat in Russia in 1812 Russia herself was secure against another attack from France. Had she followed a purely selfish policy, she would have left the Western Powers to their fate. While they were weakened in their struggle against Napoleon the powerful Russian Army might have secured the most far-reaching advantages to the country, and might certainly have taken Constantinople. Alexander obviously joined in the war against Napoleon actuated by the wish of giving at last a durable peace to Europe. How strongly the Czar was inspired by ideal and religious motives may be seen from the Holy Alliance Treaty which he drew up in his own handwriting, and which established that henceforth all rulers should be guided in their policy solely by the dictates of the Christian religion. That little-known document was worded as follows :

In the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity.

Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Russia having in consequence of the great events which have marked the course of the three last years in Europe, and especially of the blessings which it has pleased Divine Providence to shower down upon those States which place their confidence and their hope in it alone, acquired the intimate conviction of the necessity of settling the steps to be observed by the Powers in their reciprocal relations upon the sublime truths which the Holy Religion of our Saviour teaches :

They solemnly declare that the present Act has no other object than to publish, in the face of the whole world, their fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective States and in their political relations with every other Government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of that Holy Religion, namely, the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity, and Peace, which, far from being applicable only to private concerns, must have an immediate influence on the councils of princes, and guide all their steps as being the only means of consolidating human institutions and remedying their imperfections. In consequence their Majesties have agreed to the following Articles :—

Article 1. Conformably to the words of the Holy Scriptures, which command all men to consider each other as brethren, the Three Contracting Monarchs will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity, and considering each other as fellow countrymen they will, on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance, and,

regarding themselves towards their subjects and armies as fathers of families, they will lead them, in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are animated, to protect Religion, Peace, and Justice.

Article 2. In consequence the sole principle of force, whether between the said Governments or between their Subjects, shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service, and of testifying by unalterable good will the mutual affection with which they ought to be animated, to consider themselves all as members of one and the same Christian nation: the three allied Princes looking on themselves as merely delegated by Providence to govern three branches of the one family, namely, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, thus confessing that the Christian world, of which they and their people form a part, has in reality no other Sovereign than Him to whom alone power really belongs, because in Him alone are found all the treasures of love, science, and infinite wisdom, that is to say, God, our Divine Saviour, the Word of the Most High, the Word of Life. Their Majesties consequently recommend to their people, with the most tender solicitude, as the sole means of enjoying that Peace which arises from a good conscience, and which alone is durable, to strengthen themselves every day more and more in the principles and exercise of the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind.

Article 3. All the Powers who shall choose solemnly to avow the sacred principles which have dictated the present Act, and shall acknowledge how important it is for the happiness of nations, too long agitated, that these truths should henceforth exercise over the destinies of mankind all the influence which belongs to them, will be received with equal ardour and affection into this Holy Alliance.

After the Peace of Vienna an era of reaction began, and the hostility shown by the Governments to the people was attributed not to Prince Metternich, who was chiefly responsible for it, but to the Czar and to the Holy Alliance, which was considered to be an instrument of oppression. However, the fact that the Holy Alliance was a purely ideal compact is attested by Prince Metternich himself in his *Memoirs*. After describing its genesis, Metternich wrote :

Voilà l'histoire de la Sainte Alliance, qui même dans l'esprit prévenu de son auteur, ne devait être qu'une manifestation morale, tandis qu'aux yeux des autres signataires de l'acte elle n'avait pas même cette signification ; par conséquent elle ne mérite aucune des interprétations que l'esprit de parti lui a données dans la suite. . . . Ultérieurement il n'a jamais été question, entre les cabinets, de la ' Sainte Alliance,' et jamais il n'aurait pu en être question. Les partis hostiles aux Souverains ont seuls exploité cet acte, et s'en servis comme d'une arme pour calomnier les intentions les plus pures de leurs adversaires. La ' Sainte Alliance ' n'a pas été fondée pour restreindre les droits des peuples ni pour favoriser l'absolutisme et la tyrannie sous n'importe quelle forme. Elle fut uniquement l'expression des sentiments mystiques de l'Empereur Alexandre et l'application des principes du Christianisme à la politique.

Metternich described Alexander's liberal and generous views as ' chimerical, revolutionary and jacobinic ' in his letters to the Austrian Emperor, and in his *Memoirs* and his correspon-

dence he prided himself that he had succeeded in regaining the Czar to reaction. Metternich and other Austrian and German statesmen strove to keep Russia backward and weak by recommending a policy of repression and persecution. Austria and Germany are largely responsible for Russian illiberalism and Russian oppression.

Let us now cast a brief glance at the events which brought about the Crimean War.

During the first half of the nineteenth century Turkey was almost continually in a state of the gravest disorder, and its downfall seemed to be imminent. Alexander the First had died in 1825, and had been succeeded by Nicholas the First. Believing a catastrophe in Turkey inevitable, he appointed, in 1829, a special committee, consisting of the most eminent statesmen, to consider the problem of Turkey. According to de Martens, *Recueil des traités de la Russie*, Count Nesselrode, the Vice-Chancellor of the Empire, stated before that Committee that the preservation of Turkey was rather useful than harmful to the true interests of Russia, that it was in the interest of the country to have for neighbour a weak State such as Turkey. After thorough and lengthy discussion, the following resolutions were adopted at a sitting presided over by the Czar himself :

(1) That the advantages of maintaining Turkey in Europe are greater than the disadvantages;

(2) That consequently the downfall of Turkey would be opposed to Russia's own interests;

(3) That therefore it would be prudent to prevent its fall and to take advantage of the opportunity which might offer for concluding an honourable peace. However, if the last hour of Turkey in Europe should have struck, Russia would be compelled to take the most energetic measures in order to prevent the openings leading to the Black Sea falling into the hands of another Great Power.

During the period preceding the outbreak of the Crimean War Russia's policy was directed by the principles laid down in 1829, and the war itself was obviously due to misunderstandings between England and Russia, and to the prevalence of that distrust of Russia among Englishmen which Napoleon had created in the past. Foreseeing the possibility of Turkey's collapse, the Czar desired to provide for such an event in conjunction with England. With this object in view, he told the British Ambassador, Sir G. H. Seymour, on the 9th of January 1853 :

The affairs of Turkey are in a very disorganised condition; the country itself seems to be falling to pieces; the fall will be a great misfortune, and it is very important that England and Russia should come to a perfectly good understanding upon these affairs and that neither should take any decisive step.

Tenez ; nous avons sur les bras un homme malade—un homme gravement malade ; ce sera, je vous le dis franchement, un grand malheur si, un de ces jours, il devait nous échapper, surtout avant que toutes les dispositions nécessaires fussent prises. Mais enfin ce n'est point le moment de vous parler de cela.

Five days later, on the 14th of January, the Czar disclosed his intentions more clearly to the British Ambassador. Fearing that in case of Turkey's downfall England might seize Constantinople, and desiring to prevent that step in accordance with the principles laid down by the Committee of 1829 and given above, he stated :

Maintenant je désire vous parler en ami et en gentleman ; si nous arrivons à nous entendre sur cette affaire, l'Angleterre et moi, pour le reste, peu m'importe ; il m'est indifférent ce que font ou pensent les autres. Usant donc de franchise, je vous dis nettement, que si l'Angleterre songe à s'établir un de ces jours à Constantinople, je ne le permettrai pas ; je ne vous prête point ces intentions, mais il vaut mieux dans ces occasions parler clairement ; de mon côté, je suis également disposé de prendre l'engagement de ne pas m'y établir, en propriétaire, il s'entend, car en dépositaire je ne dis pas ; il pourrait se faire que les circonstances me misent dans le cas d'occuper Constantinople, si rien ne se trouve prévu, si l'on doit tout laisser aller au hasard.

Commenting upon the Czar's confidential statements, the Ambassador reported that he was 'impressed with the belief that . . . his Majesty is sincerely desirous of acting in harmony with her Majesty's Government.' In a further conversation the Czar told the Ambassador on the 21st of February :

The Turkish Empire is a thing to be tolerated, not to be reconstituted. . . . As to Egypt, I quite understand the importance to England of that territory. I can then only say that if, in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succession upon the fall of the Empire, you should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objections to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia ; that island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an English possession.

The intentions of the Czar, though somewhat vaguely expressed, were perfectly clear. He wished to bring about a peaceful solution of the Turkish problem in case of Turkey's downfall. In accordance with the principles laid down in 1829, he did not desire to see the Dardanelles in the hands of a first-rate Power, and was unwilling to see England established in Constantinople and dominating the Black Sea. He was apparently quite willing that Constantinople and the Straits should be held by some small Power instead of Turkey, or that the position should be internationalised in some form or other in accordance with the ideas expressed by his brother in 1808, so long as he could feel reasonably secure that no foreign Power would seize the openings of the Black Sea and attack Russia in its most vulnerable

quarter. If England should meet him in his desire to regulate the position of Constantinople in a way which would not threaten Russia's security in the Black Sea, he was quite willing that England should occupy Egypt. Possibly the idea that Russia should acquire Constantinople was at the back of his mind, but as Egypt was far more valuable than Constantinople he had offered beforehand the most ample compensation to this country. Unfortunately, the distrust existing against Russia since the time of Napoleon was too deeply rooted. The Czar's proposals were treated almost contemptuously. In replying to the Czar, the British Government, adverting to the sufferings of the Christians living in Turkey upon which Nicholas had dwelt, stated on the 28th of March :

... The treatment of Christians is not harsh, and the toleration exhibited by the Porte towards this portion of its subjects might serve as an example to some Governments who look with contempt upon Turkey as a barbarous Power.

Her Majesty's Government believe that Turkey only requires forbearance on the part of its Allies, and a determination not to press their claims in a manner humiliating to the dignity and independence of the Sultan.

The English Government, being filled with suspicions, did not even make a serious attempt to discover the aims and intentions of the Czar. Vaguely dreading Russia, England supported Turkey against that country. Thus Great Britain has been largely responsible not only for the Crimean War and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, but also for the ill-treatment of the Christians and the massacres which have taken place throughout Turkey during many decades.

What has created England's instinctive fear of Russia? If we look at the map, if we consider size to be a criterion of national strength, then Russia is immensely powerful. However, the Russo-Turkish War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the present War have shown that we need perhaps not have feared Russia's strength so much as her weakness. If Russia had in the past been stronger, if Russia's strength had been in accordance with the views which until lately were generally held here, the present War would not have broken out. German soldiers evidently appraised the military power of Russia far more correctly than did British statesmen. By opposing Russia in the past, England has worked not for her own advantage and for the security of India, but for the benefit of Germany and Austria. England's anti-Russian policy and Russia's anti-British policy were largely inspired first from Paris and then from Berlin and Vienna. That is plain to all who are acquainted with recent diplomatic history.

The century-old antagonism between England and Russia has

been the work of Napoleon, of Bismarck, and of Bismarck's successors. The Russian danger, Russia's aggressiveness, and Russia's constant desire to seize India, are largely figments of the imagination. Russia has little desire to possess India. If she had it she would probably be unable to administer it. The present Czar said to Prince Hohenlohe on the 6th of September 1896: 'Who is to take India from the English? We are not stupid enough to have that plan.' It would be as difficult for Russia to attack India at the present day as it was in the time of the Emperor Paul. It is true Russia has now a couple of railways which run up to the Indian frontier, but India also has railways; these will facilitate the concentration of troops at any point at which that country may be attacked, and with the development of transport by land and sea, and the growing strength of the Empire, the danger of an attack upon India by Russia seems to be decreasing from year to year. In the picturesque language of the late Lord Salisbury, England backed the wrong horse in opposing Russia's policy towards Turkey in the past.

National policy is, as a rule, in accordance with the national character. The Russians are rather dreamers than men of action, rather men of quiet thought than men of ambition. The heroes of Tolstoy and of other great Russian authors are not men of the Nietzsche type but men of peace, idealists, desiring the best, animated by a deep sense of religion. The strong idealist strain in the Russian character has found expression not only in the idealist policy followed by Alexander the First and Nicholas the Second, but in that of other Russian Czars as well. Russia has had a Peter the Great, but she has not had a Napoleon, and she is not likely to have one. Those who believe that Russia aims at dominating the world, at conquering all Asia and invading India, are neither acquainted with the Russian character nor with the resources, the capabilities, and the needs of the country. Russia is a very large State. It is extremely powerful for defence, because it is protected by vast distances, a rigorous climate, and very inferior means of communication. The same circumstances which make Russia exceedingly powerful for defence make her very weak for a war of aggression. That has been seen in all her foreign wars without a single exception. Last, but not least, the Russian people and their rulers have become awakened to the necessity of modernising the country. A new Russia has arisen. Russia has made rapid progress during the last two decades, but her progress has perhaps been slower than that of other nations. Hence Russia is still very poor and backward. She has some railways, but her means of inland transport are totally insufficient. She has scarcely any roads, except a few military ones. France has ten times the mileage of roads possessed by Russia.

We hear frequently of the absence of roads in Poland and of the impossibility of moving troops through a sea of mud. Yet Poland is that district of Russia which is best provided with roads. The peasants throughout Russia use still almost exclusively wooden ploughs with which only the surface can be scratched. By changing their wooden ploughs for iron ones they could plough twice as deeply and double their harvests, but they are too poor to provide modern agricultural implements. In many Russian villages no iron implements, not even iron nails, may be seen, and the methods of Russia's agriculture are still those of the Dark Ages. The manufacturing industries of the country are in their infancy. The vast majority of the people can neither read nor write, and newspapers exist only in the large towns. If we compare the economic and social conditions of Russia with those existing in other countries it becomes clear that the principal need of Russia is not further expansion but internal development, and in view of the poverty of the country the development of the great Russian estate is possible only in time of peace. For her the restriction of armaments is more necessary than it is for any other Great Power. The principal interest of Russia is peace. That has become clear to every thinking Russian and to the whole Russian nation.

When the great Peace Congress assembles the question of Constantinople will come up for settlement, and from interested quarters we shall be told once more that Constantinople is 'the key of the world.' A glance at the map shows that Constantinople is not the key of the world and is not even the key of the Mediterranean, but that it is merely the key of the Black Sea. Prince Bismarck possessed military ability of the highest kind, and being keenly aware that foreign policy and strategy must go hand in hand, he kept constantly in touch with Germany's leading soldiers. He clearly recognised the fallacy of Napoleon's celebrated epigram. Hence, when a member of the Reichstag, referring to the Eastern Question, spoke of the Dardanelles as the key to the dominion of the world, Bismarck smilingly replied 'If the Dardanelles are the key to the dominion of the world it obviously follows that up to now the Sultan has dominated the world.' Constantinople has been possessed by various States, but none of them has so far dominated the world. In Bismarck's words Constantinople has disagreed with all the nations which have possessed it hitherto. Why that has been the case will presently be shown.

So far Constantinople has not given a great accession of strength to the nations which have held it. Far from considering Constantinople in the hands of Russia as a source of strength, Bismarck rather saw in it a source of weakness and of danger.

He wrote in his *Memoirs* : ' I believe that it would be advantageous for Germany if the Russians in one way or another, physically or diplomatically, were to establish themselves at Constantinople and had to defend that position.' Russia is almost invulnerable as long as she can defend herself with her best weapons : her vast distances, her lack of railways and roads, and her rigorous climate. But the same elements become disadvantageous to Russia's defence if a highly vulnerable point near her frontier can be attacked. In the Crimean War Russia almost bled to death because of the difficulty of sending troops to the Crimea. Her failure in Manchuria arose from the same cause. At present Russia possesses only one point of capital importance on the sea, Petrograd, which can comparatively easily be attacked by an army landed in the neighbourhood. If she occupies Constantinople, she must be ready to defend it, and a very large number of troops will be required to protect the shores of the Sea of Marmora and the Straits against an enemy. It is not generally known that the Constantinople position is not circumscribed but very extensive, and that it is not easy to defend it against a mobile and powerful enemy, especially if it is simultaneously attacked by land and sea. The small maps of Turkey are deceptive. It is hardly realised that the distance from the entrance of the Dardanelles to the exit of the Bosphorus is nearly 200 miles. Strategists are agreed that a Power holding Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles must possess territory at least as far inland as the Enos-Midia line—that is, the line from the town of Enos opposite the island of Samothraki to the town of Midia on the Black Sea. A straight line connecting these two towns would be 120 miles long, or exactly as long as the distance which separates London from Cardiff, Paris from Boulogne, or Strasbourg from Coblenz. It is clear that a large army and extensive fortifications are needed to defend so broad a front against a determined attack. In addition, Russia would have to defend the shore of the Gulf of Saros and the sea-coast of the peninsula of Galipoli against a landing. This shore-line extends to about 100 miles. Lastly, she would have to defend the opening of the Dardanelles and to prevent an attack upon the Constantinople position across the narrows from the Asiatic mainland. It would be difficult enough to defend this vulnerable and extensive position if it was organically connected with Russia. It will of course be still more difficult to defend it in view of the fact that Roumania and Bulgaria, two powerful States, separate Russia from Constantinople. Russia cannot reach Constantinople by land unless she should succeed in incorporating Roumania and Bulgaria in some way or other, or unless the entire north of Asia Minor, which is now possessed by Turkey, should fall into Russia's hands,

enabling that country to create a land connexion between her Caucasian provinces and the southern shores of the Sea of Marmora and the two Straits. Both events appear so unlikely that they need scarcely be seriously considered. The Constantinople position, if held by Russia, would be detached from that country. The Russian troops garrisoning it would be cut off from the motherland in case of war. Hence they would have to be prepared for a sudden attack and to be always strong enough to defend the peninsula unaided for a very long time. They would have to be provided with gigantic stores of food and of ammunition. It is therefore clear that Russia would require a very large permanent garrison for securing the integrity of Constantinople. In case of war she would undoubtedly require several hundred thousand men for that purpose. Possibly she would need as many as 500,000 men if a determined attack by land and sea was likely; and herein lies the reason for the opinion of the Commission of 1829 that it would be to Russia's advantage if the *status quo* at Constantinople was not disturbed, if a weak Power was in the possession of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

There are two points of very great strategical importance in the Eastern Mediterranean: the position of Constantinople and Egypt; and Egypt is undoubtedly by far the more important of the two. When in 1797 Napoleon reached the Adriatic he was struck by the incomparable advantages offered by the position of Egypt, and he ear-marked that country for France in case of a partition of Turkey. A year later he headed an expedition to Egypt, not merely in order to strike at England, but largely, if not chiefly, in order to conquer that most important strategical position for France. While the Sea of Marmora and the Straits are merely the connecting links between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, Egypt, especially since the construction of the Suez Canal, is the connecting link of the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, of Europe and Asia, of the most populated continents and the busiest seas. Hence the Suez Canal route is, and will remain for centuries, the most valuable strategical and trade route in the world, and it is of course of particular importance to the nation which possesses India. Bismarck said to Busch:

Egypt is as necessary to England as is her daily bread, because of the Suez Canal, which is the shortest connexion between the Eastern and Western halves of the British Empire. The Suez Canal is like the nerve at the back of the neck which connects the spine with the brain.

Those who believe in Napoleonic epigrams will find several remarkable sayings of his relating to Egypt. The great Corsican said to Montholon 'Si j'étais resté en Egypte, je serais à présent

empereur d'Orient. . . . L'Orient n'attend qu'un homme.' He said to Las Cases 'De l'Egypte j'aurais atteint Constantinople et les Indes; j'eusse changé la face du monde.' He dictated to Gourgaud 'Qui est maître de l'Egypte l'est de l'Inde.' The last maxim should be particularly interesting to Englishmen. How great a value Napoleon attached to Egypt will be seen from his *Memoirs* dictated to Las Cases, Gourgaud, and Montholon at St. Helena, and from many volumes of his *Correspondence*.

If we wish to compare the relative importance of Constantinople and of the Suez Canal we need only assume that another Power possessed Egypt and Great Britain Constantinople. While Constantinople would be useless to Great Britain the occupation of Egypt by a non-British Power would jeopardise Britain's position in India and her Eastern trade. Napoleon, with his keen eye for strategy, told O'Meara :

Egypt once in possession of the French, farewell India to the English. Turkey must soon fall, and it will be impossible to divide it without allotting some portion to France, which will be Egypt. But if you had kept Alexandria, you would have prevented the French from obtaining it, and of ultimately gaining possession of India, which will certainly follow their possession of Egypt.

In the sailing-ship era the position of Constantinople was far more important to England than it is at present. Then Russia, dominating Constantinople, might conceivably have sent a large fleet into the Mediterranean and have seized Malta, Egypt, and Gibraltar before England could have received any news of the sailing of the Russian armada. With the advent of the electric cable, wireless telegraphy, and steam shipping, that danger has disappeared. From the Russian point of view Constantinople is valuable partly for ideal and partly for strategical reasons. The glamour of Constantinople and its incomparable position on the Golden Horn has fascinated men since the earliest times. Constantinople might become the third capital of Russia, and it would, for historical and religious reasons, be a capital worthy of that great Empire. From the strategical point of view Russia desires to possess Constantinople not for aggression but for defence, for protecting the Black Sea shores. Whether, however, she would be wise in accepting Constantinople, even if it were offered to her by all Europe, seems somewhat doubtful. It is true that Constantinople dominates the Black Sea. At the same time Constantinople is dominated by the lands of the Balkan Peninsula. In Talleyrand's words : 'Le centre de gravité du monde n'est ni sur l'Elbe, ni sur l'Adige, il est là-bas aux frontières de l'Europe, sur le Danube.' Similarly Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, one of Napoleon's best generals, said in his *Memoirs* that

Wallachia, Macedonia, and Bulgaria were, in his opinion, the key of the Orient. He thought that the security of Europe was less threatened by Russia possessing Constantinople, supposing the Austrians occupied the countries at the mouth of the Danube, than if Constantinople was held by French and English troops while the Russians were masters of the lower Danube. The reasoning of Talleyrand and Marmont seems faultless. It will probably be confirmed by the British strategists, who ought to be consulted by our statesmen on the strategical value of Constantinople. A demonstration of the Balkan States, especially if it were backed by their Central European supporters, against the 120 miles of the Enos-Midia line would obviously convert the Constantinople position from a strategical asset into a very serious strategical liability. It is true that in the event of a Russian attack upon India England could no longer attack Russia in the Black Sea in conjunction with Turkey. However, as Constantinople is a far more valuable point to Russia than the Crimea or Odessa, and as the Balkan States themselves may desire to possess Constantinople, it is obvious that by occupying it Russia would not increase her power but would merely expose herself to greater dangers than heretofore.

Until recently the possibility of the Dardanelles being closed against Russia preoccupied Russian statesmen only. Now it interests the whole people. The Russian nation is determined that never again shall all its foreign trade be stopped by a hostile Power dominating Constantinople. The Duma session has shown that the nation demands freedom for Russia's Black Sea trade by Russia's control of the narrows.

Various proposals have been made for dealing with Constantinople and the Straits after the expulsion of the Turks. Some have advocated that Constantinople should be given to Russia, some that the position should be given to some small Power, such as Bulgaria, or be divided between two or more Powers, one possessing the southern and the other the northern shore; others have recommended that that much coveted position should be neutralised in some form or other. The importance of Constantinople to Russia lies in this, that it is the door to her house, that he who holds Constantinople is able to attack Russia in the Black Sea. Consequently Russia and Russia's principal opponents would continue to strive for the possession of the narrows, supposing they had been given to some small Power, to several Powers in joint occupation, or had been neutralised. The struggle for Constantinople can obviously end only when the city and the straits are possessed by a first-rate Power. That is the only solution, and the only Power which has a strong claim upon the possession of Constantinople is evidently Russia.

Until recently it seemed possible that Constantinople would become the capital of one of the Balkan States or of a Balkan Confederation. Many years ago Mazzini, addressing the awakening Balkan nations, admonished them : ' Stringetevi in una Confederazione e sia Constantinopoli la vostra città anzifionica, la città dei vostri poteri centrali, aperta a tutti, serva a nessuno.' The internecine war of the Balkan States has destroyed, apparently for ever, the possibility that Constantinople will belong to the Balkan peoples, and perhaps it is better that it is so. Constantinople might have proved as fatal an acquisition to the Balkan peoples as it has been to the Turks, and for all we know it may not prove a blessing to Russia.

Those who fear that Russia might become a danger to Europe in the future, and who would therefore like to see the *status quo* preserved both in Austria-Hungary and at Constantinople—at first sight Austria-Hungary, as at present constituted, appears to be an efficient counterpoise to Russia—seem very short-sighted. I think I have shown that Russia's acquisition of Constantinople, far from increasing Russia's military strength, would greatly increase her vulnerability. Hence the possession of Constantinople should make Russia more cautious and more peaceful. Similarly, the dissolution of Austria-Hungary into its component parts, an event which at present is contemplated with dread by those who fear Russia's power, would apparently not increase Russia's strength or the strength of Slavism, but would more likely be disadvantageous to both. The weakness of Austria-Hungary arises from its disunion. Owing to its disunion the country is militarily and economically weak. If Austria-Hungary should be replaced by a number of self-governing States these will develop much faster. Some of these States will be Slavonic, but it is not likely that they will become Russia's tools. Liberated nations, as Bismarck has told us, are not grateful but exacting. The Balkan nations which Russia has freed from the Turkish yoke, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Roumania, have promptly asserted their independence from Russia and have developed a strong individuality of their own. The Slavonic nationalities of Austria-Hungary also would probably assert their independence. For economic reasons the small and medium-sized nations in the Balkan Peninsula and those within the limits of present-day Austria-Hungary would probably combine, and if they felt threatened by Russia they would naturally form a strong political union. A greater Austria-Hungary, a State on a federal basis, would arise in the place of the present State, and, strengthened by self-government, the power of that confederation would be far greater than that possessed by the Dual Monarchy.

Lastly, the world will as little tolerate a Russian Napoleon as

a French or a German one. Hitherto every nation which has tried to enslave the world by force has been checked by a world combination. The Russians will scarcely be anxious to undertake a policy which has brought about the downfall of Turkey, ancient Spain, Napoleonic France, and modern Germany. Whenever a great danger arises to the liberty of the world the threatened nations combine for mutual protection, and a balance of power, sufficiently strong to restrain it, is automatically established. That has been the lesson of history.

J. ELLIS BARKER.

THE WAR OF PURIFICATION

A DUTCHMAN'S VIEW

MR. STEPHEN GRAHAM, the poet and prophet of Anglo-Russia, writes in one of his delectable letters to *The Times* (October 13) on the 'Holy War' of the great Slav nation. 'This War,' he says, 'is holy to everyone, and its motto is : getting rid of the German spirit in life, getting rid of the sheer materialistic point of view, getting rid of brutality, and the lack of understanding of others. . . . Russia, above all things, is fighting that she may go on being herself.' To be oneself, this end, indeed, is worth any amount of national debt accumulated, any number of lives lost, any quantity, aye, and quality, of art destroyed and treasure spoliated through the vultures of 'Kultur.'

Mr. Graham tells us that, whereas 'Britain is fighting for disarmament and universal peace . . . Russia is fighting to preserve her national life and religion.' But, we would ask, is not Britain, too, fighting for the same end? or, at least, will not this holy war produce for Britain a like result? Does not Britain, too, stand in need of a purifying process? Does not Britain, too, need to fight that she may go on being herself? Has not, of late years, the Germanising spell been cast also over Britain? In certain circles, at least, it has become fashionable to borrow the ideas and ideals of Germany for fear of being considered 'unprogressive' and 'insular.'

When Lord Haldane, for instance, wishes to advocate the cult of 'Higher Nationality,' he finds his ideal in German virtue.

In the English language we have no name for it [he declares], and this is unfortunate, for the lack of a distinctive name has occasioned confusion both of thought and of expression. German writers have, however, marked out the system to which I refer and have given it the name of 'Sittlichkeit.' In his book *Der Zweck im Recht* Rudolph von Jhering, a famous professor at Göttingen, with whose figure I was familiar when I was a student there nearly forty years ago, pointed out, in the part which he devoted to the subject of 'Sittlichkeit,' that it was the merit of the German language to have been the only one to find a really distinctive and scientific expression for it.

When Mr. Lloyd George and other reformers realise the necessity for redress of social deformity, they copy more or less closely the system of Prussian bureaucracy.

And, above all, when the more recent universities in British commercial and industrial centres desire to be up to date, it is the methods of Germany they adapt—if not adopt.

This Germanising trend need not be considered in any partisan spirit. For it is almost general, almost unintentional and unconscious. But this very naturalness and unconsciousness constitute its chief danger.

II

As a Dutchman, the writer of this article fears the Germanising trend. For, as a Dutchman, he can fully apprehend the perils of the process. In the Netherlands the trend has finally developed into the fact of Germanisation. There a once original nationalism lies crushed below the deadweight of 'Kultur.' In the first instance it began at the universities. Here, as is the case in Britain, German learning was at first admired and German methods copied, little by little and increasingly, to the gradual exclusion of the learning and methods of other nations and the evaporation of national distinctiveness.

The process of Germanisation is akin to the process of alcoholisation. The longer the patient indulges in it, the weaker his resisting power to it becomes and the stronger doses of the poison he is able and *forced* to absorb, until finally all proper food comes to be distasteful to him and can no longer be assimilated.

The Dutch universities have practically come to this pass, that unless scholarship in any special branch is of German origin and bears the German hall-mark, it tends to be considered as something very inferior—indeed, barely as scholarship at all.

As Dutch students are good linguists, it rarely pays expense and labour to write special text-books for them or to translate foreign text-books into Dutch. And, of course, the text-books used are almost exclusively German.

In order to bring the result of their investigations before a wider public than that of the Netherlands, Dutch professors often use for their treatises and Dutch students for their theses an international vehicle. And, of course, the language chosen is almost without exception the German language. Fifty years ago French was at least equally favoured.

More phenomenal even than this is the fact that when foreign professors—usually Germans of course—are appointed at Dutch universities, they are wont to lecture at the expense of the Dutch taxpayer, in Dutch lecture-rooms, to Dutch students in—German!

III

It stands to reason that the Germans have not hesitated to exploit this mental disease. Whenever a Dutch scholar promises to rise to more than average celebrity, some prominent German university is sure to hold out to him an often considerable bribe in order to estrange him from his own country and to gain him for the 'Fatherland.' Van 't Hoff, of Berlin, is but one instance out of many.

Another amiable weakness of the 'Kultur'-bringers is to pounce upon any newly hatched Dutch invention or discovery, to alter it slightly, and then through the prolific technical Press of the 'Fatherland' to vaunt it to the world as a new achievement of some incomparable 'Herr Doktor.'

There was a time when the learning of Leyden and Utrecht and the other Dutch universities held its own, when from all countries of Europe students flocked to the Netherlands to hear the teaching of Arminius and Grotius, of Huygens and Boerhave, of Leeuwenhoek and Musschenbroek. That time is past. Dutch learning has not become less. But it has ceased being *distinctive*. Leyden is a lesser Leipzig, Utrecht another Göttingen.

Last spring Dr. Schoemaker, a well-known Hague physician, visited the great Medical Congress in the United States. He was much impressed with the high scientific and scholarly standard of a non-German country like America. 'But tell me,' he said to some of the leading professors to whom he was introduced, 'what opinion have you of our Dutch medical science?' 'Well, none at all!' was the reply the astonished doctor received. 'We do not distinguish between Dutch learning and German. We identify your achievements with those of Germany.' And they were perfectly right. Intellectually Holland, if not yet altogether, has very nearly been annexed by Germany. Intellectually the Dutch are the bondsmen of the Germans, who gain credit at their expense. And such will be the fate of any other nation, be they Russians, be they Scandinavians, be they Swiss, or be they English, who do not, first and foremost of all things, fight that they may go on being themselves.

IV

The very fountainhead of Dutch intellect, aye, and intelligence, having been infected, the virus has not been slow gradually to pervade the entire system of the nation. As a matter of necessity it has been imbibed by all the higher professional and leading circles. Nor would a self-respecting journalist or primary teacher for anything on earth risk the stigma of unscholarliness.

If professors and doctors delight in cramming their libraries with German volumes and in quoting by preference German authority for each most obvious statement, so must they. Indeed, as might be expected, they show at all times a strong tendency to be what the French call *plus royaliste que le roi*.

And so it seems as though through the deadweight of 'Kultur' every vestige of originality must be squeezed out of the Dutch nation. A ponderous clumsiness begins to pervade Dutch lectures and treatises which by nature is not theirs. It is the German sense of involved and voluminous completeness. When a German wishes to explain how the sun is hot on a July morning he will first discuss the notion of time in general, beginning with a preface on the supposed identity of eternity and of the abstraction of time, which he will call 'Time-in-itself,' or 'Pure Time,' thus formulating: 'Pure Time and Pure Non-Time are identical.' In the course of his discussion he will, amongst many other subjects, argue profoundly on the relation of the name July to Julius Caesar and on the functional descent of the Kaiser from the Emperor Augustus, giving, moreover, a great deal of algebraical information on the known and supposed solar systems. This mentality is beginning to be faithfully reflected in modern Dutch literature. As an instance, the political and theological writings of Dr. Kuyper, the late Premier, are recommended to the reader.

Half a century ago Dutch literature used to be moulded on the French and Latin model, and it is scarcely possible to imagine a sadder decay of speech than from the crystalline limpidity of the French to the murky nebulosities of the German language. A Swiss friend of the writer, who has spent a great part of her life in translating German theological works into French, complained to him the other day of the difficulties of her task. 'In French,' she said, 'everything is clear and precise, and to the point and direct. In German the author contents himself with creating an impression through vague hints and suggestions. Often it is well-nigh impossible to content my French readers with the little the German author offers.' And some years ago a German who was studying philosophy at the Sorbonne assured me that many of his fellow-countrymen are in the habit of reading their 'Kant' in a French translation. Only thus did he become intelligible.

May this holy war preserve the English language for ever from the error of the Dutch, which nevertheless a century ago was as well leavened with Latin as English is at present.

Another even more loathsome symptom of the 'Kultur' disease is the unwonted pedantry which is making itself visible

and audible also in Holland, the conviction that life may be best and 'most accurately' learned from a text-book, the conviction that facts ought to and must be considered to conform to theories.

An Edinburgh professor, who gives himself a great deal of trouble in making University life as agreeable and profitable for foreign students as possible, once experienced a ludicrous instance of this result of 'Kultur.' He had prepared a course for initiating his German students into some of the mysteries of the English language, and had written out a number of expressions and common phrases which he knew from experience to be special stumbling-blocks. Over against these he had given their German equivalents. As, however, he did not feel quite sure of his German, he sent them for correction to an acquaintance of his, a schoolmaster in Germany. The manuscript was returned to him one mass of corrections, not only in the German, but *especially in the English column*, with *falsch! falsch!* (wrong! wrong!) all along the line.

At the University of Lausanne there is a German professor who holds a class in English pronunciation. This in itself is remarkable enough, judging from the usual German accent in English. But far more remarkable was it that a British lady who took this class, in order to see what was going on, had her English severely found fault with, as not up to the German's 'scientific' standard!

Scarcely less amusing is the pedantry of the late Professor Franck, of Bonn University. Professor Franck enjoyed considerable reputation as a learned scholar of medieval Dutch. A great number of ancient Dutch epics have been provided by him with weighty and lengthy annotations, some of them very illuminating, others decidedly beside the mark, although to a modern Dutchman of average intelligence the text is perfectly clear. He also has published in German the most complete grammar of medieval Dutch in existence. In the second edition of this book he discusses the letter *d*, and points out that there are two letters *d* in Dutch, the one linguistically corresponding with the English *th*, the other with the English *d*. Moreover, he declares that a modern Dutchman pronounces these two *d*'s with different parts of the mouth. The writer and others have experimented on themselves and on a great number of their fellow-countrymen, but have not yet been fortunate enough to discover a single Dutchman who makes this distinction. The German professor, however, had discovered it from the way in which *he* pronounced Dutch 'scientifically'! That is 'Kultur.'

V

A result of Germanisation ever so much more dangerous than clumsiness or pedantry is that of late years the Dutch have begun to look at the world through German spectacles. And yet, strange to say, the bulk of the Dutch people do not like the Germans. They even dislike them strongly, and feel towards them a certain racial animosity. They call them by the pretty name of 'Mof.' There are few words a German hates more than this particular one. To say it to him has the same effect as driving a pin into his calf.

But all this racial dislike has scarcely stood in the way of Germanisation. Through his educational system a strong admiration, if not veneration, for the thoroughness and grandeur of German 'Kultur' has been so dinned into the modern Dutchman's ears from the cradle upwards that he accepts it as a sort of gospel truth and as a kind of axiom from which he begins his argument. His outlook thus having been Germanised, it is not surprising that he accepts most readily the German way of putting things and the German point of view when it is placed before him in pamphlets and periodicals, and that his Press shows a ready hospitality to 'die deutsche Wahrheit' when it seeks refuge from 'die Weltlügen'—German truth against the lies of the whole world, as we read in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of the 1st of October. To this must be added the powerful prestige of the victor of 1870, which has not failed to impress his small neighbour, as well as a certain financial interest felt by the Rotterdam and Amsterdam exporters of the produce of German industrial enterprise.

VI

Notwithstanding this, there are signs of recrudescent disharmony between the Dutch and the German elements. For one thing, the German lacks the psychological knack of subtle diplomacy. In this respect his 'Kultur' is too clumsily unpleasant. The tone of his Press towards Holland is either brutally imperative or crudely sweet with the sting of saccharin. And, secondly, the German national character, socialistic and thoroughly drilled into subservience, is in its every instinct diametrically opposed to that of the Dutch—i.e. the Frisian nation—which from Caesar's day has been noted for its uncontrolled and uncontrollable individualism, frequently exaggerated to the extreme of anarchy.

The stubborn Frisian, hard-headed and truthful to aggressiveness even under ordinary circumstances, brooks interference as little as an American. Once he becomes aware that he is

being meddled with, he will stop short in his course like a mule who kicks his driver and pony cart alike to fragments.

The only danger is that he will not become aware of it soon enough. For the Dutch have a fatal faculty for living in the past instead of in the present. They glory all too readily in their really stupendous achievements during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. And they chafe to this day under the yoke of French imperial annexation, forgetting that it was cast off more than a century ago. The French imperialism of the past they still popularly feel as a hideous danger. But to Germany's really threatening imperialism of the present they are, popularly at least, purblind.

Still, there are, as has been said, signs, feeble signs of reaction, bright sparks that in favourable circumstances might be fanned into a roaring conflagration.

Years ago Professor Brugmans, the Amsterdam historian, first opened the writer's eyes to the dangers of Germanisation. This professor objects most strongly to the present one-sided cult of 'Kultur.' To his students he prescribes French text-books (Lavisse) rather than German. And he encourages the perusal of English authors. And lately Professor de Savornin Lohman, the Utrecht social economist, expressed to the writer his very strong and positive preference of British to German authors and methods in his special province. And these two instances could be multiplied. In the Dutch Press also there are signs of reaction. A leading daily paper, like the Amsterdam *Telegraaf*, and an important weekly, like the *Groene Amsterdammer*, are at present forbidden fruit in Germany, and not without reason. And likewise anyone who is familiar with Dutch society, in the widest sense of the word, will bear witness to frequent and increasing signs of discontent, diffuse as yet and inarticulate, but which on provocation may unite into a thundering chorus.

VII

There are Dutchmen who trust that this may be brought about with the assistance of Britain. Needless to say, it is not their desire to be Anglicised any more than it is their desire to be Germanised. What they wish is to balance Germanisation by opposing to it another civilisation. They wish to neutralise 'Kultur.' They want the Netherlands to derive the fullest benefit from their central position amongst the leading Powers of the world. They want to practise a cultural eclecticism, in order, if possible, to create a new symphony of civilisation, a new renaissance Dutch in nature, like that Erasmian renaissance which was

the foundation-stone for the glorious structure of seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe.

If, however, Britain herself were to become entangled and eventually caught in the meshes of 'Kultur,' how would she be able to fulfil in Europe her mission as the protagonist of Occidentalism? How would she be able to stem the overflowing tide of Germanisation? This is why, not only from the Russian point of view, and from the Serbian and the Polish, but from the British and Dutch standpoints as well, and from the Swiss, the Italian and the Scandinavian—indeed, from the general standpoint of Europe—this War must be considered as, and shall be, a holy war of purification. For as long as Britain remains 'fighting that she may go on being herself,' the dead weight of 'Kultur' will not subdue the world.

I. I. BRANTS.

CHINA AND THE WAR

POOR China! She has troubles enough and to spare of her own without being compelled to bear the consequences of other nations' quarrels. It is hard on her people, peacefully disposed both by necessity and inclination, that a war which was none of their seeking, which was no concern of theirs, should make alien soldiers their unwelcome guests, should introduce a new husbandry which planted mines in their fields and made Death stalk side by side with the human reapers of their harvest. As a Chinese newspaper pathetically put it, 'These are losses incurred by the Chinese people. Other peoples' battles are fought on our land, and at our very great expense.'

Those who are not versed in Chinese affairs can hardly realise what this War means to China; how it touches her, how wounds her, at every point of her political life. Only those who know how politics have affected her national existence can understand why this world-war should have made battlefields on Chinese soil, and compelled her people to submit to things justified only in belligerent countries by the exigencies of military operations. The new ethics of war which Germany, once an acknowledged leader in the regions of accurate thought, but now prostituting her intelligence by rigmaroles of argument which would disgrace a fourth-form schoolboy, is endeavouring to foist upon the world, declare neutrality to be an idle principle of which necessity knows nothing, and that convenience is a sufficient substitute for necessity if an attack on an enemy is the objective. Of the application of this new ethic Belgium has been made the unhappy sufferer. The neutrality of China has also been made the sport of circumstance; military necessity has governed everything that has happened to her during the last six months; but it is possible to trace 'the causes of causes and their impulsions one of another' in inevitable sequence, till we get back to the prime cause, and that cause is but another manifestation of Germany's ambition to rule the world by force of arms.

People at home talk so glibly, knowing so little, about China, that the mere mention of the serious consequences of a European war to her is sure to provoke the inevitable query—All neutral

nations suffer grave inconvenience from wars which do not directly concern them, why should China's position differ from that of, say, Brazil or Siam? That she should have been sorely let and hindered by the Russo-Japanese War was intelligible, for it was waged on her borders; but a European war . . . ! It is well, therefore, at the outset to realise in what China differs normally from other countries. Mainly in this fundamental fact, that she is not mistress of her own household. Though she is a sovereign State she is not free. When the merchants came from the West knocking at the gates of Peking they made it a condition of their entry, which China reluctantly assented to, that they should bring with them their own laws and establish their own Courts, creating an extraterritorial status for themselves which withdrew them from the jurisdiction of the country wherein they proposed to trade and take up their residence. This peculiar privilege of the foreigner must obviously affect China's neutral position in regard to belligerent nations; but the question is abstruse in the extreme, and in our appreciation of what the War means to China we must eliminate this background of foreign law and foreign Courts, and imagine her simply as a free country in which the alien merchant and financier have found a happy hunting ground. We shall then see why her fortunes have become so inextricably interwoven with those of other countries that the shock of a European war must have far more disastrous consequences than it could have to countries such as Brazil, an absolutely free and independent country, or Siam, where the extraterritorial privileges still linger.¹

Commerce and finance have long since ceased to be national; now it is 'world-commerce' and 'world-finance'; and 'foreign markets' are one of the great motive powers of foreign policy. The colonies of Hong Kong and Singapore are the British trade outposts in the great commercial struggle in the Far East, the citadel of which is China. But the principle of the open-door to which England has been faithful from time immemorial, a faithfulness which Germany has forgotten, though she has availed herself largely of it, has converted these two colonies, Hong Kong especially, into an international base from which commercial operations in China are conducted. How vast those operations are may be judged by the fact that the port of Victoria is second to none in the world for the tonnage which passes through it under the flag of every country whose ships sail upon the Eastern Seas. All the great firms, shipping, banking, trading, that do business in the East have their branches in Hong Kong. But so vast is the trade with China, outwards as well as inwards,

¹ There have been changes in the extraterritorial position in Siam, but this statement is, I believe, accurate.

that, still continuing the military simile with which our minds are too full to-day, a more advanced line of posts is necessary to carry it on, and these have been established in the Chinese ports on the sea-coast and on the Yangtse and the West River. In ordinary circumstances a European or American firm doing business with a foreign country establishes branches or agencies in its ports; but the essential difference between the ports in China and those in other countries is, that whereas in the latter these branches and agencies pass into legal and social communion with the country in which they are, in China they congregate in the Treaty Ports, the 'open ports' as they are called, where there are Concessions or Settlements preserving the national character of the foreign countries which have acquired them, the merchants forming communities separate from the Chinese, and independent of them. Moreover, it is not true to say that these merchants, as in other places, participate in the trade of the country; they have created it. Chinese trade has been made by the foreigner and not by China. But China has long since recognised the advantage of commercial intercourse with the West, and (still keeping the extraterritorial conditions under which it is carried on in the background) she has acquiesced and takes her part in it. Chinese compradores and shroffs are the right and left hands of the foreign merchant; coolies the means whereby the trade is carried on. Nor has China allowed the foreigner to absorb the whole of it; there are Chinese banks and business houses which take an abundant share, and a considerable amount of the coast and river trade is in native hands. This is only one side of the picture, for the activities of the Chinese merchant are by no means limited to China. Not only does the coolie seek his modest fortune abroad, but the Chinese merchant has established flourishing businesses in foreign countries. Hundreds of them have walked in at the open doors of Hong Kong and Singapore, and they prosper greatly.

There has thus been a give-and-take between China and foreign countries, and this, added to what I have already said, has internationalised the trade of the East. So it has come about that while in other countries the foreign merchant is but a sojourner as all his fathers were, in China he has made his home as he did in India. The Anglo-Indian has his exact counterpart in the 'old China hand,' whose fortunes are wrapped up in those of the country of his adopted residence. The break-up of China would mean the ruin of innumerable foreign enterprises, and would spread havoc in many markets in Europe and America. Conversely, the commercial ruin of Europe would carry disaster into almost every corner of China. 'China' has thus ceased to mean merely the home country of the Chinese;

it is the heart of a vast system in which every nation has its share, in whose welfare every nation is directly interested, by whose troubles every nation is affected. This inter-dependence grows year by year; its roots strike back through more than seventy years; its branches spread in ever-growing strength into the future. This alone would have justified the step which Yuan Shi K'ai took in the early days of the War, to which I shall presently refer, to preserve, if it were possible, 'the sanctity of non-Europe.'

Nor is this all. The growth of commerce requires the material development of the country; railways have helped further in the interlocking of China's relations with other countries; the foreign capitalist and the foreign engineer come upon the scene, and with them an enormous extension of trade in 'plates' and 'fittings,' and the advent of the foreign railwayman to carry things on till the adaptable Chinaman is ready to take his place. Then there is the foreign concession-holder, whose position may somewhat complicate the arrangements which will adjust the future. Again, international troubles in the past brought war loans in their train, and laid the foundation of foreign indebtedness from which, in the days of her seclusion, China had been free. And on these liabilities the Boxer troubles heaped the heavy burden of the 'Indemnities,' which, together with the loans, the Republic manfully assumed and still staggers under. Then came the Revolution, which put prosperity into abeyance; and afterwards further borrowing to meet pressing liabilities, from the Quintuple Group, and a host of minor lenders of short-term loans, all of which forged new links in the international chain. And yet again, the establishment of the Customs, which was the condition attached to the admission of foreign trade, required foreign assistance in the management, and an army of foreign employés; after which came the Post Office, and now the Salt Gabelle, both of which need foreign help.

Is it necessary, therefore, to particularise the consequences to China of a European war? Some of them were so obvious that they flashed into the mind at once. It would dam the sources of her loan supply; a large number of the foreigners in her service would be compelled to answer their national call to arms; and the occasion would be too good to be lost for the rebels of which China has not yet been able to rid herself.² As the mind familiarised itself with the idea of war in Europe, other things

² This article is greatly in excess of the normal length. I have, therefore, been obliged to omit any further reference to the activities of the rebels during the War. It seems, however, that they have given the Government a great deal of trouble. Undue length has also compelled me to omit all reference to the financial struggles which the War imposed on China.

as serious claimed attention; trade in the Treaty Ports would disappear, and the spectre of unemployment for the multitude of coolies in the service of the foreign *hongs* reared its head. Then, what would become of exchange? Loss on exchange is a terrible business even at the best of times, but with exchange 'gone to nowhere' remittances for payment of interest on foreign loans and for the Indemnities would be ruinously impossible. And the Indemnities themselves? All the belligerents were China's creditors; would they insist on their *tael* of flesh? Where would the money come from when the pledged Customs revenue was dwindling with vanishing trade? Then there were the railways, profitable alike to China and to the foreign bondholder; many of them were owned by the Powers who were at war; some of them jointly owned. Would they go on working? Ought not China to take over the management and control? Here were puzzles enough in all conscience; and as the mind flitted from point to point, finding in each some pricking danger lurking for China, all the troublesome questions of neutrality surged up tumultuously for consideration; plaguy questions even for a free nation, but for China, tied and bound by the chains of extraterritoriality, simply bristling with difficulties, as she had abundant reason to remember from her experiences of the Russo-Japanese War. One of them, indeed, demanded instant attention in connexion with the railways, directly the mobilisation orders were issued; they might, most certainly would, be used by reservists joining the Colours.

From this point onwards her personal troubles merge into those of the world at large, and she becomes directly interested in the War; her integrity becomes, by force of circumstances over which she had no control, a factor which must be recognised, and all questions springing out of it settled, at the end of it. For behind all her many difficulties, only hinted at, there was a trouble looming in the background, which the mind at first refused to allow to take shape, but which became insistent directly it was known that England had entered the lists, overwhelming when at last it took hold of men's brains: represented by one word—'Tsingtao.' Overwhelming, indeed; for to the Chinese it brought to the front questions which affected the national honour. Would it be possible to prevent the waves of war from lapping over into Chinese territory? Could a violation of her soil be avoided? Poor China! The facts were almost too simple; the conclusion plain and palpable. England and Germany were at war; and England and Japan were in alliance for the express purpose of preserving the peace of the Far East; the fulfilment of this purpose might involve the bombardment of the German port, and then Kiaochow would become a battlefield. In

view of the facts, would it be possible to confine the fighting to the leased territory? or, again with the experience of the Russo-Japanese War behind her, would it be necessary to make the best of a bad bargain and concede to the belligerents a more extended war-zone? And, if China did that, would they keep within it? And then a whole series of problems arose, the like of which for intricacy the Wise Men of the West had never dreamed of when the treaties of lease were entered into. Neutrality by itself was bad enough; but when the belligerents hold leases of neutral China's territory are they permitted to fight out their quarrels there? Would they do so whether or no? And if they did, how would the doctrines of neutrality be applied? Must China fight to protect her neutrality as the text-books teach, as Belgium, indeed, was already doing? And what was to happen afterwards, when, perhaps, the lessee belligerent was worsted? Surely fantastic problems which it was out of China's power either to stave off or to solve. I shall not pretend to solve them, or even to suggest a solution, for the time for their consideration is not yet.³ China must suffer and wait. Such questions could only be touched with great discretion at present, even if we had all the facts. But I think we may, within the limits of discretion, glance at some of the questions which lie on the surface in consequence of the Allies' attack on Tsingtao, and at some of the problems which arise out of China's neutrality.

I venture now to state a truism. The remaking of history by means of war requires two among many other things: an accurate knowledge of geography, and a mastery of the science of transport. The statesman, whose function it is to be the herald of history, cannot begin to put thoughts into the words which shape action without a map before him. One of the most important elements of the situation which made the great struggle between Russia and Japan inevitable was the fact that Fusan, in Korea, was no more than a short night's journey from Shimonoseki. And the Council of War may have many armies at command, but they are useless unless transport for men and material has been organised; and after they have been landed, transport again, and always transport, for more men and more material.

These are really the axioms of a bellicose statecraft; yet there must be added to the long catalogue of Germany's blunders

³ I have seen it stated that the question of the rights and duties of neutrality of a State that had leased a portion of its territory to a State at war was proposed for discussion at the Peace Conference at the Hague in 1907; it appears, however, that it was not taken up because it was too complicated.

a very singular forgetfulness of them in regard to Tsingtao. Hong Kong is, as I have said, our strategical outpost in the commerce-war of the Far East. France had slowly but surely built up her great dependency of Indo-China. Japan was on the spot, Russia near at hand, and the United States newly arrived in the Philippines. Germany, with her unsatisfied longings for 'places in the sun,' could hardly be expected to sit content; and Tsingtao, with the district of Kiaochow, seemed to meet her requirements. Now, if Germany had treated her new territory as we had treated Hong Kong, as a commercial outpost, I cannot say that all would have been well, but certainly history would have shaped itself in somewhat different fashion. Of course there must be forts even in commercial outposts, and there must be attendant ships of war; that is the way of the world. But the forts and fleets, being ostensibly the symbols of the motto 'Defence, not Defiance,' are, or ought to be, merely the harbingers of peace; and if Germany could only have learned to play the game, if she could have acquired even an elementary knowledge of simple facts, the fortifications of Tsingtao would have meant exactly what the fortifications of Hong Kong mean—not exactly, 'saluting batteries,' but very effective means for resisting attack. The simple facts were, first, the enormous distance of Tsingtao from the base, and an absence of sufficient transport to bring up supports for its garrison—her great merchantmen were predestined for other purposes; secondly, the perfection of the English system of transport, which had been demonstrated not so many years ago. But that feverish haste to rush into the first place and dislodge its present occupant impelled her to spend millions on the forts of Tsingtao; she turned it into a stronghold, a place of arms, and with a curious lack of humour she christened it the 'Gibraltar of the East.' And she did it all behind the veil of the 'Yellow Peril.' That very dreadful composition of the Kaiser, wherein he depicted Germania leading the hosts of Christendom against the Dragon, had a political significance hardly recognised at the time; we merely shrugged our shoulders at the bad art of it; but an acute observer has reminded us that he had assumed to place the trident in her brawny arm. Then the dream of becoming a second Attila came to him, the histrionic 'mailed fist' message its first and most futile expression, a 'passage for the horns' in the opening movement of that wearisome cantata 'Deutschland über Alles.' In outward seeming it was directed against China and her barbaric hordes; but the veil was thin enough for us to have seen through if we had chosen. It is obvious, from what we know now, that it was a strategic move, not in the commerce-war at all, but in the great project of spoliation

of the British Colonies, the plan of which was even then in process of development. But that astonishing blindness to things that are, that belief that events must shape themselves according to the Kaiser's wishes, that disregard of the inevitable, which have guided her policy for many years, drove Germany to her fate. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was, as it was intended to be, the governing factor if ever the supremacy of England in the Far East were put to the touch; strategy and policy were as clearly defined in it as words could set them out. British supremacy stood for world-interests, and their preservation was the keynote of all our action and of all dispositions of material force. To challenge them would only bring about further dispositions of stronger forces; and to fortify Tsingtao beyond the immediate needs of a commercial colony was in effect to challenge them. If there were any doubt as to the construction of the Treaty, any question even of the spirit of the Alliance and of its application to a war between England and Germany waged in Europe, the exaggerated fortifications of Tsingtao removed them; and the use of the port as a naval base for raids made the interpretation possible which compelled Japan to come in. There seems to be a question whether the lease permitted this extensive fortification; that is a matter to be discussed by China herself hereafter; but of its supreme folly there can be no question. At the outside, not more than 10,000 men⁴ could be counted on to defend the place, with the reservists in China and Japan added to the garrison. It was certain that Germany could spare no more ships to increase her Far-Eastern squadron, and it would have to face not only the British and French squadrons in those waters, but the whole of the Japanese fleet if she came in. And for the land forces, leaving out of consideration our troops in China and Hong Kong, on the assumption that they would be wanted elsewhere, it was equally certain that once Japan came in, the whole of her armies would, if necessary, be thrown into the scale. It was a foregone conclusion; and it was mere vaingloriousness for the Kaiser to exhort the diminutive garrison not to surrender till the last breath of the last man and the last horse had been expended. From accounts which appear trustworthy, it would seem that there was a certain amount of hard fighting, and that the bravery of the German troops was maintained; but the careful and elaborate dispositions of the Japanese were unnecessary, and the fortress fell without any very strenuous resistance.

⁴ This figure is given by the *Mainichi Shimbun*. The *Times* 'History of the War,' however, puts the number at 6,000, and the *Peking Gazette* also, 2500 of whom were reservists. According to the 'History,' about 4000 surrendered.

But I am looking at the story from a Chinese point of view. Few things pass unnoticed by the Government, and most things that happen are foreseen, though it has always been China's fate to be unprepared because she has not the means at her disposal to make preparations. It seems probable that with Tsingtao heavily fortified the Government realised that, in the event of hostilities between Germany and any European Power with substantial interests in the Far East, Tsingtao would become a centre of at least naval activity; as a theoretical possibility this could not have been ignored. But that any nation would declare war against England, or that England would declare war against any other nation, was as absent from men's minds in China as it was in the rest of the world, including Germany. Even Bernhardt's *Next War*, though it was to be waged against England, is problematical; for Germany was to wait for a fitting moment, and other things had to be accomplished before that moment came; and he puts out of question the possibility of a declaration of war by England. But when the preliminary warnings came through to the East of what was passing in Europe the abstract suddenly became for the Chinese a stern reality. China would be neutral, but it would be neutrality in more than difficult circumstances if Germany and England took to fighting in Chinese waters, or at Tsingtao, or even at Hong Kong. Yuan Shi K'ai's soldier instincts must have told him that the issue was not uncertain unless the high Gods intervened, and that, with Japan true to her alliance, it could not long be delayed. The brood of problems which would then arise for China must have been very clearly before his eyes.

A Chinese writer of ability, Mr. Eugène Ch'en, tackled the question with much acumen in a series of articles in the *Peking Gazette*. English jealousy of Germany was, he said, a fallacy; German trade thrives best in the British Dominions. He dwelt on the danger which arose from Germany having made a stronghold of Tsingtao; she could not say she was conducting defensive operations only, for she had been pouring in reservists in a sensational manner, and the eyes of the East were focussed on that spot. She was forcing the pace of war; the *Emden* should cease from harassing British shipping and intern herself; everything should be done to bring about a peaceful solution. One solution he specially urged, that Germany should voluntarily surrender the lease of Kiaochow to China; it would be a proof of her greatness. To the non-belligerent Chinese, his mind attuned to peace, this suggestion appeared to be fraught with peaceful possibilities. The Japanese had declared their intention of ousting Germany from her foothold in China; the Germans should realise the hopelessness of their position; they should

meet the enemy in the gate, and while there was yet time avoid the unequal struggle; let them return the leased property to the owner and there would be an end of the matter. Poor Germany! First, she had her own words of 'friendly advice,' addressed to Japan in 1905, cast back in her teeth in the Japanese ultimatum; and then she got further advice from a Chinese writer. The East was verily rising against her, and all the vials of her assumed contempt for the 'yellow races' were found to be cracked and empty of all save words. And for those who chose to read there was that troublesome Bernhardt who had nothing but praise for the Japanese: for their splendid military efficiency, their high political wisdom, for their 'culture'! The singular thing is that Germany had already bethought her of this way through her difficulties; negotiations seem to have been started for the surrender of the lease before the War. The possibility of continuing them after the declaration of war appears to have been cut short by an intimation from 'a certain Power,' as the jargon of the East has it, that negotiations of this nature would amount to a breach of neutrality. Obviously to discuss such a question at such a time would be transgressing that limit of discretion in the spirit of which this article is written.

And Yuan Shi K'ai, through the turmoil of the early days of war, seems to have clung to the hope that 'something like an assent, tacit or explicit, might be secured in favour of the sanctity of non-Europe.' But the President must have realised that his wish to act as mediator, if it were possible, and his proposal that something should be done to prevent the War from spreading to the Far East were doomed to disappointment, and that once the floodgates were opened in Europe no power on earth could prevent the swirl spreading all the world over. He could not disguise from himself the fact, when the news came on the 4th of August, that England's efforts for peace had failed and she had declared war against Germany, that Japan would join; and he must have been fully prepared for the answers, received on the 14th, from Japan, that her obligations to Great Britain might prevent her from concurring in any such proposal; and from the United States, that she would willingly help, 'but saw no way of doing so effectively.'

But Germany was intent on getting the sympathy of the Chinese people, and she set about it in the devious way with which we have become too familiar. The Chinese believe in success; therefore Germany must be shown to be victorious. I imagine that of the many problems which will perplex the future historian of the War not the least curious will be the systematic dissemination of false news by Germany throughout the world. It is of course one of the commonplaces of war that

often both sides claim a victory on the same occasion; but to give descriptions of battles that have never occurred, to send frantic cables round the world that you have sunk the greater part of the British Fleet, when as a matter of fact 'the British Fleet you could not see because . . . ' (deletion by the Censor), is sheer childishness, which seems to have as large a share in Teuton composition as a love of 'frightfulness.' The purpose is faintly discernible when British colonies or protectorates are selected for the spreading of fancy news, where there is a large native population. In the Malay Peninsula, for example, there are many Chinese as well as Malays; both are strangely sensitive to defeat, and it is obvious that our prestige would suffer by a heavy reverse early in the War; but it is equally obvious, except apparently to the Germans, that when truth follows hard upon the heels of fiction⁵ the rebound in the native mind will be greater than its first depression, and the loss of prestige will be transferred to the other side. It is also just possible that the mercurial spirit of the native might be so played upon that if it were in a state of unrest already that unrest might be fomented into rebellion; if, however, you have to invent both the unrest and the foment, why then, you lapse again into mere childishness. But to imagine that any good could come from circulating fanciful news in China was to lack understanding. Yuan Shi K'ai had from the first declared that China was in friendly relations with all the belligerents, which it was his desire to preserve; he had expressed his sympathy with all the fighting Powers through their respective Ministers, and had done his best to inculcate the same spirit into the people, prohibiting the circulation of rumours and the discussion of foreign politics in the tea-houses. The outlook for this form of crusade was therefore not very promising. The mystery of motive must remain unsolved, and I shall very briefly note the 'news' which was cooked up for the temporary consumption of the Chinese.

A 'slight reverse' to our Fleet was almost at once reported, followed on the 10th of August by a disaster in the North Sea 'near Leith,' in which four British battleships had been sunk and several damaged, the Germans losing one cruiser and several torpedo-boats. A week later the scene of the disaster was altered to the Humber. So that old story which the village postman brought us with our afternoon letters about the 'North Sea Fight' and our appalling losses was quickly sent to the East (I heard of it also from Kuala Lumpur), with the circumstantial details that the *Iron Duke* had gone down with Admiral Jellicoe on board. But the chronicle of disaster was not ended. The

⁵ Official reports as to the progress of the War were issued by the British Legation.

China Press (an American paper published in Shanghai, of much resource in collecting news, and reputed accurate) reported that two large men-of-war with four funnels had entered Hong Kong after dark in a wrecked condition with wounded on board; probably the *Hampshire* and the *Yarmouth*, afterwards 'reported from Hong Kong' as destroyed by the German squadron. The *Gneisenau* seems to have got herself sunk about this time, which was the only consolation vouchsafed to us.

The Germans profess to be virtuously indignant when they are charged with organising a campaign of lies; it may be interesting therefore to record some of the 'biggest' that were circulated in China. Our call on the Indian troops greatly disturbed their equanimity, although Treitschke had warned them that it was absurd to imagine that where a nation fought it would not use all its resources of men independent of colour; and Bernhardt always calculated that the French would legitimately use her black troops. The German agents in foreign parts wasted much time and energy in spreading ridiculous reports about the Indian Empire and its troops. The regiment at Hong Kong had mutinied on being warned for active service at Tsingtao, and the Governor of the Colony had been wounded. The Bismarck method was brought into full play; thus the German attaché at Stockholm quotes the German Legation at Peking as authority for the statement that the Japanese Government had officially informed China 'that a revolution had broken out in India, that Britain had asked Japan to send troops to help her, and that Japan had agreed in return for a loan of \$200,000,000, "a free hand in China and unrestricted entry of Japanese into the Pacific Colonies."' The seed which grew to so wondrous a flower was a statement in a Chinese paper, made at the instance of a German friend; it was then cabled to Shanghai, and so the marvel grew. Another story, that the Indian troops, instead of going to Europe, were planning a mutiny at home, and that the greatest precautions were being taken, was invented in Shanghai and sent to Manila; it was then returned to Shanghai with a 'Manila' headline, and so, to the intense indignation of the *Manila Times*, circulated through the Far Eastern world. The climax was reached towards the end of October, when the following items of news were issued by the *Ostasiatische Lloyd* as coming from New York:

England's cry for help to Portugal ensued owing to the untenable and chaotic condition in South Africa. The Indian revolt is further increasing. It is reported from Constantinople that England has sent three active battalions from Malta to India. According to the Harbin *Novosti Izn*i of the 14th of October, the unrest in Calcutta is attributed by England to German machinations.

The *Peking Gazette* refused to print such 'stuff and non-sense'; but the agent of the company in all gravity protested, and informed the editor that he must take all of his news or none at all. I believe the latter alternative was chosen. The last fragment had quite the Bismarckian touch; by making the report come from Harbin, the major premiss, that there was unrest in Calcutta, would be assumed to be true; the remainder would follow; if there were unrest it would of course have been fomented by Germany. It must be confessed that if an ordinary and not a super-nation had been reduced to such straits in the conduct of a war, its condition would have been considered desperate.

It is no part of my purpose, nor would it now be possible, to give a connected story of the operations in Kiaochow. It was the conduct of these operations on her territory that so affected China, and I must glance briefly at the principal incidents.

It was the height of the summer season at Tsingtao when, in the first days of August, the premonitory news of trouble came Eastwards. One of those inter-port courtesies which are the special feature of life in the East, a polo match, had been arranged between Shanghai and Tsingtao teams, and was to be played in a few days. But social preparations gave immediate place to preparations for war. Everyone understood the significance of the rumours, and how quickly they might materialise into facts. In the East one lives more than anywhere else in the presence of the elements of war; soldiers and sailors are our everyday companions; guns and warships come regularly into the daily perspective of life. Men are accustomed to dining in mess and ward-room, women to dancing under the muzzles of great guns, their primary use forgotten in the fact that they are an uncommon adornment of a ballroom. The barracks and the warships form the base on which is reared the edifice of social life which enlivens the dull routine of work. But when the flags which grace the quarter-deck flutter the ominous signal on the halyard the edifice crumbles at a boatswain's whistle; men's brains are cleared for action, and they see things as they really are; the guns remain grimly masters of the situation. So, in the twinkling of an eye, the old order changed with the publication of the mobilisation orders of Germany and Austria, and the men at the Clubs split up into their several nationalities; reservists hurried from all parts of China to their allotted posts.

And so at once, as I have already hinted, the Chinese Government was faced with the first problem of its neutrality. There were close on 3000 Germans and Austrians in different ports of China, a third of them being in Shanghai, and about the same

number of French, of which 330 were in Shanghai; at Tientsin there were about 150 of each nationality. A very large proportion of these were naturally reservists. Then there was the relic of the Boxer troubles, a large number of foreign troops, upwards of 9000, in North China, of which 6000 were stationed in Tientsin, and 2000 on special duty as Legation guards in Peking. The general rule is that belligerent troops are not allowed to pass across a neutral country, much less to use its railways. But this gave rise to the question, were the railways which the Germans would use to get to Tsingtao really Chinese? The Tientsin-Pukow railway, which is met at Pukow by a ferry to Nanking on the other bank of the Yangtse, is in two sections, the northern or German section, and the southern or British section; the whole line having been financed by loans raised simultaneously in England and Germany. From Nanking a railway built with British capital runs to Shanghai. So far the problem is only complicated by the fact that these railways have been built with foreign capital; but the Shantung railway, which runs from Tsingtao to Tsinanfu, was not only built with German capital, but is a German concession; for all practical purposes, therefore, it is a German railway. In order to make what follows clearer it should now be noted that this railway is 256 miles long, and that it meets the Tientsin-Pukow railway at Tsinanfu on the German section. The railways give rise to two questions: first, in connexion with the neutrality of China, because both these lines were used by the reservists. The second arises out of the operations of the Allies in Kiaochow, and will be dealt with later.

On the 2nd of August, the greater part of the German residents in Tientsin left for Tsingtao by the Tientsin-Pukow railway, to the martial strains of 'Deutschland über Alles.' The reservists from Shanghai came up by boat, so their proceedings do not come into this question, though they used the inland waters of China. The French reservists left Shanghai by tug, going on board in small parties, for the *Dupleix*, which was lying off Woosung; but they pass out of this narrative, for they joined their regiments in France and took no part in the siege of Tsingtao.

Truly here was a perplexing problem for China, the solution of which it must be confessed was not much assisted by certain provisions of a Neutrality Mandate which the President was advised to issue:

Troops of any of the belligerents, their munitions of war or supplies, are not allowed to cross the territory of China. In the event of a violation the troops shall submit to the Chinese authorities to be disarmed and interned, and the munitions of war and supplies shall be kept in custody until the termination of the war.

And again :

The guards attached to the Legations of the various Powers in Peking and their troops stationed along the route between Peking and Shan-haikuan [on the Peking-Mukden line] shall continue to conduct themselves so as to conform to the Peace Protocol . . . of 1901 [agreed to after the Boxer troubles]. They are not allowed to interfere with the present war. The foreign troops stationed in other parts of China shall act likewise. Those who do not conform to the foregoing provision may be interned and disarmed by China until the termination of the war.

It is difficult to understand why this Mandate was issued. Yet, like the creation of the Bureau of Neutral Affairs, it may legitimately be said to be evidence of an almost nervous anxiety to prove the sincerity of China's desire to preserve the strictest neutrality. But the provisions I have quoted could have no more effect than Canute's exhortation to the waves, and like the waves of the sea reservists continued to pour into Tsingtao by rail and sea. Truly a perplexing problem, because whichever way China turned there would be a belligerent protest, possibly something worse, facing her. If she refused a permission to use the railways, which had not been asked, it would be treated as a hostile act by Germany, and there would have been accusations of giving material aid to the Allies; if she acquiesced the Allies would protest against a breach of neutrality; they would probably do this whether she acquiesced or not, for undoubtedly the use of the railways afforded most material aid to Germany. I do not think I shall be breaking the restraint I have put upon myself if I say this : whether it is the true solution of the problem is another matter—rules of neutrality have been framed to meet the ordinary circumstances which arise in the life of nations, of which fighting is one; they are hardly applicable to abnormal circumstances without modification. The abnormal circumstance in China's case is the simple fact that not only the reservists but also the foreign troops were lawfully in the country *ab origine*; and it seems to me that the question is, Would China have the right suddenly to say that they should not take part in the War? There is clearly a paradox involved. But it is really not a question whether she had the right to do this, but whether she had the power to enforce such a condition of neutrality, supposing it to exist? The reservists, and probably the troops, were off to the railway station at Tientsin singing their songs long before the Chinese authorities would know of it, or knowing could move. When they could move were they to send Chinese soldiers by the next train for disarming and interning purposes, with orders to follow the Germans into Kiaochow, right under the forts of Tsingtao? The puzzle thickens as we pursue the elusive principle, which can only be

answered by-and-by. But even this cursory view of it brings us at once up against that old idea of neutrality, that it is a *quasi-belligerent* duty. On this I shall venture to say a few words presently.

But if the coming and going of troops raised conundrums for the Government, quite apart from the annoyance to citizens desiring to travel peacefully according to the time-tables, the fight for Tsingtao developed a further crop which, for complexity, have rarely been equalled. Even the bare possibility of the attack raised a special one, the use of Chinese coolies for defence work in the fortress, promptly protested against by the Allies. Evidently the War was going to upset the foundations of life in China. The European does no spade-work for himself; when he wants land dug, and the soil carted, or rather 'basketed,' away, whether it be for the building of a house or the making of a tennis-court, the spade-coolie and the earth-coolie are waiting for his orders. Why should this convenient custom be upset by ridiculous questions of neutrality? We want trenches dug, and the coolie is obviously the right man to do it. I am disposed to think that the German statement that they were not compelled to work and were properly paid must be accurate, for the guilds would have seen to that; the object for which the work was done would hardly interest them.

Thus from the outset of the War raised curious and serious problems, which increased in number and intensity as the operations proceeded. They were infinitely varied in detail, but they all had this common factor differentiating them from the problems which ordinarily beset a neutral country: China is not as other nations; the belligerent foreigner was an integral part of the community.

I must pause here to deal with some unexpected developments which specially emphasise China's curious position.

It was announced about the middle of August, in the *Peking Gazette*—an English newspaper which had established a reputation for accuracy—that Chinese troops were guarding the *Hatamen* Gate since the withdrawal of the German soldiers, and were also acting as guards to some of the Legations. It was also said that the offer of 'a certain Minister' of his own men for this purpose had been declined by China, 'considering that the acceptance of the offer would be derogatory to its prestige.'

I am not sure that these items of news convey much to those who do not know China; but to those who do, they are pregnant with meaning. If you would understand their full significance, you must go back to the Boxer troubles and imagine the 'Legation Quarter' in Peking as it then was, an island of houses in which the Foreign Ministers lived, set in a seething ocean

of discontented Chinese, practically defenceless, yet so liable to attack that one wonders why, when the signal was at last given, every foreigner in the place was not exterminated. And then you must picture to yourself the change that has come over the 'Quarter' in these days; still an island, but each Legation with its military guard, and protected from all possibility of attack by a broad *glacis* on three sides, swept clear of Chinese houses and the narrow Peking lanes, serving for the guards as parade-ground, football-ground, polo-ground, and securely resting with its fourth side on the Wall. To complete the picture, you must imagine the Wall, a lofty rampart, some sixty feet high and forty feet broad, whereon the world of Peking walks the year round, looking over the great city hiding under the branches of its ten thousand trees, with the yellow-tiled roofs of the Forbidden City gleaming in the sun, or in the cool of a summer night listening to the music of Sir Robert Bredon's band. On this Wall, at intervals, are the great three-storied structures guarding the gates through which the streams of life pass endlessly. *Hatamen* and *Chienmen* are the limits of that portion of the Wall which forms the base of the 'Quarter,' a mile and a half between them. In the days before the War, the compounds of the German and the United States Legations being next to the Wall, the Germans guarded the eastern half, ending at *Hatamen*, the United States marines the western half, ending at *Chienmen*. These changes were accomplished by the International Protocol of 1901, which imposed the penalties on the Chinese nation for its great misdeed, and were sulkily acquiesced in by the Government with many professions of penitence. It can hardly be said that either the 'Quarter' itself, in which Chinese troops are not allowed, or the presence of 2000 soldiers of different nationalities in its barracks, is regarded with enthusiasm by the Chinese of to-day. For the Government the arrangement contains no redeeming feature, for it believes that the days of Boxer or other anti-foreign risings are gone for ever. Curiously enough, the first suggestion that the Legation guards should be removed came most unexpectedly from the Russian Government not very long ago; some Governments intimated that they were prepared to follow suit, but others hesitated, and at the outbreak of the War the complete removal of the guards had not become an accomplished fact.

That circumstances should have compelled the old restrictions to be withdrawn, and Chinese to replace foreign soldiers on the guards, shows that the War has disturbed other commonplaces of life in China besides the use of the earth-coolie. And other things seem to have happened showing the same trend of events. It was reported that Chinese soldiers were sent to Mongtze to guard the residents of that port after the French troops were

withdrawn. Not the least interesting report relates to the patrol of the great waterways, for the suppression of the pirates which infest them. On the Yangtse and the West River foreign gunboats help in the work. But here was a possible source of trouble; the *Tsingtao* and the *Moorhen* would not be very amiable companions and might come to blows off Wuchow. Trouble had, in fact, been reported from Chungking, some 1500 miles up the Yangtse, between the English, French, and German gunboats; but, apparently at the request of the Chinese authorities, the German had left the port and anchored further down the stream. So far as I can gather, however, the trouble was only potential, for the boats seem to have been dismantled, and the crews sent to their respective fleets. It is interesting to note here, parenthetically, another example of British strength and German weakness. The German gunboat on the West River could not get out without passing through Hong Kong waters; she was, therefore, very humbly dismantled, and her equipment moved into the Customs House. There seems to be no doubt that on the rivers China had no difficulty in performing her neutral duties; but here there was a special obligation to all the foreign Powers. The treaties are very precise on the subject of her duties and liabilities in respect of piracy, and the rivers must be patrolled. Since the Powers were unable to assist, China must do it by herself, and, a Chinese newspaper pointed out, 'she must do the work well in order to recover the permanent right to patrol.'

Following out the same train of thought, the Chinese Government is said to have expressed a desire to make regulations for protecting the foreign Settlements, for the protection of foreigners is a treaty duty. This probably came to nothing, for it certainly must have been vigorously opposed by the Municipal Bodies.

I have said that the consequences of the War touch China literally at a hundred points; in this group of incidents they touch her heart. They show that her thoughts are inevitably turning to the recovery of some part of her national life. The question is too delicate to deal with at any length; but this may be said without indiscretion: it is doubtful whether the relations of China with the Powers can ever be quite the same again. There are not wanting signs that after the peace there must be a reshaping of European policy in the Far East; and I shall show presently some very substantial reasons why this must be so.

It is necessary, however, to say at once that this does not refer to the abolition of extraterritoriality. Turkey has, so she says, 'abolished the Capitulations.' I do not think that China will dream of imitating Turkey. If I appreciate rightly the views of the leaders of Chinese thought, the position they take up is this: it is their dearest wish to free China from her

extritorial chains, but they desire to achieve this in a legitimate manner; they realise that the conditions indicated in the Mackay Treaty must be fulfilled. Nevertheless the Government of the Republic has before it a problem of statecraft; and I will endeavour to state it as clearly as possible.

Before the War there was China on the one side, and over against her were arrayed the inert forces of 'internationalism,' personified to the world by the collective term 'the Powers.' China could do nothing, achieve nothing, if the subjects or citizens of the Powers were affected, without their assent. This means the assent of all the Powers, because each of the eighteen Powers, great and small, is in China of its own independent treaty right; each claims all the rights and privileges that all the others have. There is no vote of the majority in the deliberations of the Diplomatic Body; all must agree. Lord Cromer, in *Modern Egypt*, has very graphically described what this system meant there, how it did not work, and how after many years of strenuous labour the inanition of it was at length overborne. A strong-willed Consul-General could and did fight for Egypt against this static force; there is no one to fight for China, though precisely the same anomaly stands in the way of her progress. China is hampered at every turn, she can only struggle on as best she may. What happened in finance is typical. It was not the vastness of her capacity for borrowing that created first the Quadruple, then the Sextuple, and then again the Quintuple Groups. Invoke the paramount interests of Europe in China if you will; the case is as good as its advocates like to make it; but the good case cannot hide the fact that at bottom it was international jealousy that made these Powers cohere in their insistent demand to be in their collective capacity China's only creditor. It was the extraordinary myth of identical aims, identical interests in China's stability, that bound these Powers together, and kindled their indignation when another lender stepped over the ring-fence with his money-bags. 'Union is strength'; but this does not presuppose that all who come within the union have a common aim; it is often a union of divergent and hostile aims that makes for strength.

What the effect of the War will be on this financial grouping of the Powers it is difficult to foresee; but at least the myth is dispelled, and its disappearance must have the most important consequences for China if she use the occasion discreetly. The rooting out of German influence in China was the professed aim of the operations against Tsingtao, and since Tsingtao has fallen that process may be supposed to have begun, and will be concluded at the peace; but this has broken for ever the solidarity of the nations which up to now has so hemmed China in. She

desires to preserve the most friendly relations with all the belligerent Powers, but she is entitled to say to them now : ' You have by your professions of united interests forced me into a certain path, imposed on me certain obligations ; I assented because I accepted your professions, and recognised how powerful your union made you. But you have fallen out by the way ; I am now free to insist on those things which I deem good for my people. I will no longer be hampered by an assumed unity which has ceased to exist.'

What is the alternative? Again Lord Cromer's experience enables us to foresee what the position after the War will be. It is inevitable that there should be divided counsels among the Powers, and with divided counsels the curse of ' internationalism ' will become rampant. In all those matters which require the assent of the Diplomatic Body there will be a deadlock, and China's position will become tenfold worse than it was before. Even though Germany's foothold in China has been destroyed she will still remain one of the Powers ; she will still have a Minister at Peking, and he, together with his Austrian colleague, will still be members of the Diplomatic Body, and, so far as China is concerned, influential members, for apart from their equal voice in deliberation they are her creditors.

Now let us assume that at the peace Germany purges her great offence and is forgiven ; there is still the human factor to be taken into account. Would it be possible for the Minister of Germany to find himself in agreement in debate with his English, French and Russian colleagues? It is expecting a great deal, a great deal which, even in peace time, was rarely found in Egypt ; which from all accounts has as rarely been found in Tangier. But if, as seems the more probable, Germany lets her mind rankle on the past ; if she should be secretly hoping to retrieve her position in China ; if, in short, human nature is still as ever the governing factor in such debates, antagonism in the counsels of the Diplomatic Body in Peking is inevitable, and the result for China less than nothing. A ' strong and united China ' remains, as it always was, a matter of supreme interest to the world ; but the tables are turned, and now a ' strong and united ' Europe is essential to China's future salvation. She is compelled to deal with the Diplomatic Body as a whole, and she has a right to expect that it should have strong and united nations behind it. It must therefore be the business of the Allies to secure this for her, so to save her from the disaster which anything like weakness or disunion in Europe must bring her. For this reason it is essential that her future position should be assured at the making of peace, because at that time, as probably at no other for many years to come, there will be agreement

between all the Powers. It will be China's opportunity, and it will be for her to put her case forward with courage, with energy, and with wise moderation. I believe she will use the opportunity fairly, and that she may justly aspire to obtain a great improvement in her position on lines which it would take too long here to lay down. And it will be England's opportunity too, unless the principle she is fighting for now, the rights of the weak, is to be let go. I believe that not her Allies only, but the neutral Powers, will follow where England leads.

And there is yet another reason why China must participate in the conditions of peace; which brings me once more to the operations round Tsingtao, as they affected China.

All hopes not merely of saving the country from becoming the scene of war, but also of confining the operations within the leased territory of Kiaochow, having been abandoned, the President proposed to set apart a special war-zone within which fighting was to be limited.* As Viceroy of Chihli, Yuan Shi K'ai had succeeded during the Russo-Japanese War in excluding hostilities from Chinese territory west of the Liao-ho, and he hoped that the belligerents would accept this precedent as binding on them. But almost the first step which the Japanese took dispelled even this hope, for they landed 2000 soldiers at Lungkow, the commercial port of Shantung, on the other side of the peninsula which forms the southern coast of the Gulf of Pechili. There was nothing left for China but protest. A note was addressed to the Diplomatic Body stating that both belligerents had been moving troops within Chinese dominions,

thus constituting extraordinary circumstances, parallel only to the war waged between Japan and Russia in the Liaotung Peninsula in 1904. Following this precedent the Chinese Government cannot but declare that within the area of Lungkow, Laichow, and the district immediately adjoining Kiaochow Bay [a line practically running straight across the peninsula], which is absolutely the minimum area necessary for the passage and operations of the belligerent troops, it cannot undertake the responsibilities of neutrality. Outside these points China will continue to enforce the Regulations respecting neutrality as previously promulgated. But it is still incumbent upon the belligerent Powers to respect the territorial and administrative rights of China and all persons and properties within the area above defined.

Germany would have none of it, and warned the Government that she held China responsible for any damage that resulted to Tsingtao in consequence of China's acquiescence in the use of her territory for the conduct of hostilities; to which China replied

* I have not thought it necessary to refer to the 50-kilometre zone round the Bay of Kiaochow within which the free passage of German troops was permitted under the lease. The special war-zone proposed extended beyond this to 20 kilometres east of Weih sien.

that, forcible resistance being out of the question, her only course was to disclaim responsibility as she had done. But Germany had not been idle; the Shantung railway, stretching over 250 miles into the Shantung Province, served as her line of communications, and she had used it for transport of materials and troops, among whom were some Austrian marines, and this in the opinion of the Allies constituted a breach of China's neutrality. China was indeed between the devil and the deep sea; and the proposition that China was wrong whatever she did, or rather whatever either belligerent chose to do, was neatly put by a Chinese newspaper :

If China were to remain neutral in the way Japan and Great Britain would have it she must be violating neutrality in the eyes of Germany; and if she were to remain neutral in the way Germany would have it she must be equally violating neutrality in the eyes of Germany's enemies.

The same tone was adopted in a Note by China to the Powers; but I think I am right in saying that Germany alone threatened China with the traditional consequences of a violated neutrality. The Notes which came from the Allies were, unless I am mistaken, only justificatory of their own action as being the inevitable consequence of what Germany had done.

On the 2nd of September neutrals were ordered by the Governor to leave Tsingtao, and estimates of property in the colony were requested, as compensation would be granted out of the indemnity to be obtained from the conquered Allies! Compensation was also promised to the Chinese for the villages which had been destroyed. Some days later, however, confidence seems somewhat to have evaporated; the heavy rains had done great damage to the railway, and there had been a wash-out on the line. The Germans declined to repair: 'Why should we build the line for the Japanese?' They preferred to carry on the work nature had begun by blowing up the bridges between Tsingtao and Kiaochow station, on the boundary of the leased territory.

The relations between China and the belligerents continued to be very strained. There seems to have been some attempt on the part of the Government to assume control of the railway outside the fighting zone, and to prevent the belligerents from using it for the conveyance of war material and supplies; and 1500 Chinese soldiers were sent to guard the line. But any action which China could take was ineffective to modify the plans of the Japanese by one hand's-breath. On the 25th and 26th of September a large body of troops appeared at Weih sien on the railway, about 120 miles from the boundary of the leased territory. The object was to commence the investment

of the fortress from the land side. But unfortunately Weih sien is a Chinese city in which a considerable body of Chinese troops is always stationed, and a collision between the Chinese and Japanese soldiers was feared. The news caused general surprise, dismay, and indignation. But more was to follow: the Japanese do not undertake military operations lightly, and about this business they were in grim earnest. The investment of Tsingtao on the land side was essential to the complete success of the undertaking, and a considerable body of troops began to march towards Tsinanfu. The occupation of the whole of the Shantung railway seemed imminent; and the Japanese Minister, in answer to protests from the Waichiaopu, confirmed this fear. China was requested to withdraw all her troops, and it was intimated that a refusal would be regarded as unfriendly to Japan and partial to Germany. This, however, was coupled with conciliatory explanations: the line had been used by Germany for the conveyance of supplies and troops, and might be used for the same purpose again: after the war it would be easy to withdraw the troops, and their present influence would be confined to the railway area, except in regard to obtaining supplies: as few would be employed as possible. The Chinese Government insisted that the railway was not German but Chinese and German; the Japanese replied that it was not neutral property, that it was impossible to separate the railway from its object, and that the seizure was essential to the success of the operations. There was a further intimation that they intended to replace the German administration by Japanese civilian officials who would be appointed as soon as possible, and that the Chinese employes would be continued, but that the proposal of the Government to take over the administration of the railway could not be entertained. The mines along the railway were a source of anxiety to the Chinese; the Germans had flooded them, but there seems to have been no attempt on the part of the Japanese to take possession of them. To further Chinese protests there was returned the invariable answer that the seizure of the railway had formed part of the original military plan, and that as regards the alleged breach of neutrality and its effect on Sino-Japanese friendship, Japan intended to preserve the latter in the future as in the past. A series of alleged violations of China's neutrality by Germany and Austria was forwarded to the Waichiaopu. One further thing was necessary to complete the Japanese preparations. Being at Tsinanfu, the workshops at that place on the Tientsin-Pukow railway were occupied, in order to repair the rolling stock of the Shantung railway. A German protest followed as a matter of course, and a further threat that China would be held responsible. The

Chinese protest was forwarded to the British Minister ; the reply repeated the alleged breaches of neutrality by Germany, adding that she had refused to carry passengers and had discharged Chinese employés, thus revealing the German status of the railway, and that therefore Japan had no alternative.

In order fully to appreciate the position of the Chinese, caught as it were between two fires, with an invading but unhostile army on the one side, with an army of occupation also unhostile but determined to defend itself against the invader on the other, the proclamations issued by the Japanese at Lungkow are instructive ; and I print a few extracts from them.

The first was from the Commander of the Fleet to the Chamber of Commerce at the port :

We are now landing in your country at Lungkow. We do not entertain the least enmity towards the military forces, the farmers, or the merchants and people of your country. Our troops are well disciplined and will not cause the least injury to the autumn crops. I therefore respectfully request that you will cause instructions to be issued to the military forces of your country and to the farmers, merchants, and people, that all should pursue their avocations quietly and not become alarmed and cause disturbances. This is my sincere wish. With compliments.

The second was by the ' Commander of the Imperial Japanese Forces for the Suppression of the Military Forces at Tsingtao ' :

The fortifications erected by Germany at Tsingtao and the activities of the German fleet in Far Eastern waters both constitute a menace of no inconsiderable importance to the peace of Eastern Asia. The Imperial Japanese Government could by no means regard the situation with indifference, and has been forced to call out its armies in the cause of right and justice, to inflict severe punishment, in the hope that peace may be rapidly restored in the Far East and that the territorial rights of the Republic of China may be protected. . . . No one need be alarmed, but all should quietly follow their vocations. It is important that you should all supply the wants of our Army to the utmost of your ability, in order that its movements may be furthered. Should anyone dare to interfere with the activities of our troops he will be immediately arrested and severely punished without mercy. This proclamation must be strictly obeyed by all.

Then followed three others issued by the Post Commandant, intimating that ' all boats, carts, cattle, horses, fuel, grain, and meat required must be at once supplied without delay,' and without hesitation, and that payment would be made at first in military notes, which would afterwards be changed into cash. The depôt for exchange was subsequently established at the Temple of the God of War. The last proclamation was more vigorous :

It is expected that citizens of the Republic of China residing within the area of military operation will afford aid to the Japanese troops in all matters to the utmost of their ability. Anyone daring to disobey a

military order or to injure the members of the Japanese Forces will be at once arrested and severely punished without mercy. This is not an empty threat. All must strictly obey this Proclamation.

This is the briefest outline of the military operations which affected China. She took it all very much to heart and very seriously. Mr. Liang Chi Chao, one of the most enlightened of Chinese, and formerly a prominent member of what was called the Government of All the Talents, formed in 1913, challenged the proceedings by an interpellation in the *Tsan Cheng Yuan*, and reviewed the whole situation in a very bitter speech. I have too great a respect for him not to believe that he felt every word he said; it was manifestly sincere, and it represented the feelings of a very large section of the Chinese people. He is student, philosopher, patriot, and statesman; yet his eyes were dimmed by trouble; he could not see the great inevitableness that governed the actions of the two nations which took this burden of war upon them; nor yet, as I think I see it, the hand of Destiny leading his own nation through suffering to a brighter day. Let me then, if I can, give unto him 'oil of joy for mourning.'

I will first deal with the situation in a most matter-of-fact manner. China was in a cleft stick; whichever way she turned one of the prongs caught her sharply and reminded her forcibly that 'grin and bear it' was the only policy, even though the Germans charged this against her as a breach of neutrality. The unfortunate possessor of a diseased tooth has to submit to much torture at the hands of the inexorable dentist; it is not sufficient that all offending matter must be removed from the crown; the roots which go deep into the jaw must be subjected to the cleansing operation if dental peace is to be preserved. Japan was the far-seeing surgeon; Kiaochow, with its fortified Tsingtao, the diseased crown; the Shantung railway the deep-set fang; the naval base the inflammatory trouble. It must all be got rid of before the leased territory could be handed back to China safe and sound. For the temporary seizure of the Tsinanfu workshops I must go further into dental science; the removal of another tooth is often necessary to complete the cure.

Yet another simile from the affairs of everyday life may illustrate the position in which China the unoffending found herself. When a fire is raging it is often necessary and lawful to sacrifice a neighbouring house in order to prevent the conflagration spreading. Thus often do the innocent suffer with the guilty for the common good.

I now come back to the chain of consequences, inevitable, almost automatic in their impulsions one of another, which caught China in its coils and cast her into the furnace of the War.

I find the cause, as I have said throughout, in the turning of

Tsingtao into a place of arms, and the port into a naval base for raids on the shipping of the Allies. On the 23rd of October it was somewhat triumphantly reported that there had been several 'welcome prizes,' among them the *Riasan* of the Russian Volunteer Fleet, caught after a long chase almost at the gates of Russia, Vladivostock, with bullion on board to the extent of five million roubles; also another Russian steamer with 200 head of cattle and 100 horses, and a British steamer with 'one million yen in gold'! This disturbance of the peace of the Far East made the coming of the Japanese inevitable. Germany's next step on the road to Avernus was equally inevitable, unless Tsingtao was to go by default; the use of the Shantung railway which was in her hands for the transport of men and material, and also for the collection of supplies along the line. But this made it equally certain that the Japanese would seize the railway, for in no other way could the supplies be stopped. Equally inevitable was it that the investment of Tsingtao should be made from the land side, and the Japanese troops landed at the most convenient place along the coast—Lungkow. Further, the presence of considerable bodies of Japanese troops on Chinese territory made it inevitable that military law in some form should be proclaimed, and that it should be applied to the Chinese in the neighbourhood, for a non-hostile civil population was essential, and hostile acts must be repressed; also that they should be required to billet the troops and furnish supplies. Equally inevitable was it that the Chinese Government should protest against the violation of its soil and the infringement of its rights of sovereignty, otherwise they must have acquiesced, thus furnishing aid to the Allies; and, if by chance they failed, China would have to suffer from German retribution, accentuated by all the refinements of *Kultur*. So it came about that in this sequence of the inevitable, the fact that the territory on which war was waged was China, and the people Chinese, was unavoidably left out of consideration. It is a curious riddle, but I think it is easier to deal with if that antiquated doctrine of neutrality, with the *quasi*-belligerent sanction attached to the duty of resistance which it preaches, be left out; it was not framed for circumstances undreamed of in the countries where it originated. The doing of what is unavoidable is justified even to an unoffending person if there is no other alternative. If I have traced the chain of events accurately, it is clear that here there was no other alternative. But this leaves the last link in the chain of inevitable consequence to be forged at leisure, when men have more time to think. That last link is clearly indicated. China has suffered in her national dignity, and there must be reparation. What form it should

take cannot as yet be easily stated. But one thing can be stated. Germany has threatened China with reprisals after the war; to allow her to carry out her threat would be to light the torch of war once more in the Far East. Therefore at the peace, when, as I have already pointed out, Germany must for once be in agreement with her enemies, it is in the interests of the whole world that the peace of China should also be ensured, and the pretensions of Germany against her definitely and under the fullest guarantees swept away.

It is impossible to conclude this Article without referring to some general considerations as to China's neutrality.

This is the second time that the neutrality of China has been seriously in question, and for her powerlessness during the Russo-Japanese war to do the right thing as expounded by the textbooks she has been soundly rated. I remember one learned writer who referred to 'the scandalous way in which China performed her duties of neutrality' during that war. To another it appeared from her action that China had not 'even a rudimentary conception of the somewhat exacting obligations of the modern neutral State.' So she stood condemned by the authorities for her omission to do the things which she ought to have done because other nations chose to go to war. I am not going to plead extenuating circumstances for her sins at that time, were they few or many; but I will venture to say this, that the learned authorities who condemned her were singularly unlearned in the source of her weakness and vacillation then, the chain of extritoriality with which she has been fettered. It certainly was a surprise to the Chinese Government to find that the Family of Nations, which would not admit China to equal rights in ordinary matters, yet in extraordinary matters expected of her the fulfilment of certain duties said by the learned to be imposed upon her by international law. If I may use a homely simile, it was as if a little boy who had been 'stood in the corner' should be expected to join heartily in family prayers. She might, I should have thought, contend with some show of reason that 'without the pale' in the ordinary affairs of life implies 'without the pale' in the extraordinary. Extritorial law being the antithesis to international law, the relations which it imposes would seem to negative those duties which are based upon the *jus inter gentes*, for China is hardly considered as one of the *gentes*, certainly as having no '*placet*' to give in the formation of the *jus*.

I think I am right in saying that no one has been at pains to re-write the law of neutrality by the light of modern happenings. It was declared to apply in all its crudity to China in 1904; she

was limitrophe to the theatre of war both by sea and land ; that was her misfortune, and everything was assumed against her. But the law of neutrality needs recasting, and some of its doctrines bombed out of existence, for it has at last been seen, what the old writers never seem to have realised, that in this, as in every other principle of law, circumstances alter cases ; and the special circumstance in China's case now is that foreign armies have landed and fought upon her soil. The principle of the law of neutrality, which is very present to our minds to-day, is the passage of belligerent troops across neutral territory. This is what a learned writer, Wolsey, still in use in the schools, says of it :

A neutral ought to refuse the transit of belligerent troops even if he were prepared to grant the same to both sides. Neutrals have a right to insist that their territories shall be inviolate and untouched by the operations of war, and their rights of sovereignty uninvaded ; and if violations of their rights are committed, they have a right to punish the offender or to demand redress ; they are bound to do this, because otherwise neutrality is of no avail, and one of the belligerents enjoys the privilege with impunity.

It is possible that the 'modern neutral State' has still further obligations. But this is clear, that the duties of neutrality are often *quasi*-belligerent in their nature, for their breach is assumed to lead to war, offensive as well as defensive. And the feebleness of the neutral State, asserted by the learned to have been a good excuse for Portugal in the case of the *General Armstrong*, was declared by those same learned to be of no avail for China in the case of the *Reshitelni* sheltering in Chifu Harbour.

The word 'neutrality' conjures up now, and will for evermore, the heroic resistance of Belgium against the German armies before Liège ; and the question will be asked in times to come whether that is the standard of duty for every State, however feeble, whose neutrality is placed in jeopardy. If it were possible to add one leaf to her chaplet of laurels, the words of the 'scrap of paper' would furnish it : 'Belgium shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other States.' And she did. There is another little State whose neutrality has also been grievously violated, Luxemburg ; all that could be done the Grand Duchess did when she set her motor car across the road of the advancing German regiments. And now there is China. For the Allies, as I have shown, the inevitable is their justification. But Germany's retaliatory threat to China may be judged by her own misdeeds. She has justified her violation of the neutrality of Belgium by necessity ; therefore, as against her, a far more real and exigent necessity justified the

landing of the Japanese at Lungkow. She has 'chastised' Belgium for obeying the old law of resistance which she now invokes against China; therefore, if China had done what Belgium did, the Allies would have been justified, according to German standards, in so 'chastising' China. To use the expression current among German statesmen, it would have been 'her own fault.' Or, if we take Luxemburg for example, which, according to the Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, was 'really neutral,' she 'suffered' German troops to march across her territory; therefore China was 'really neutral' when she also 'suffered' the Japanese troops to march across the peninsula to Tsinanfu, making only an equally ineffectual protest. *Solvitur risu.*

F. T. PIGGOTT.

SELF-APPOINTED STATESMEN

It may be true, as Mr. George Bernard Shaw so frequently asserts, that Englishmen as a race are muddle-headed and 'that they have never been forced by political adversity to mistrust their tempers and depend on a carefully stated case, as Irishmen have been.' Looking down upon England 'with something of the detachment of a foreigner and perhaps with a certain slightly malicious taste for taking the conceit out of her,' he has, no doubt, good grounds for believing in our intellectual laziness. Indeed, Mr. Shaw and certain other irresponsible comedians on the stage of literature who find themselves free, at such a time as this, to sow the seeds of political dissension in our midst and to give the heathen cause for blaspheming, may well attribute their prosperous impunity to a lack of intelligence in the British people; and more especially so when their pernicious activities take the direction of deliberately attempting to injure Great Britain's moral position in the eyes of neutral States. It is undeniably true that in no other country in Europe would an author be permitted to gratify his insatiate passion for notoriety, or a distorted sense of his own importance, by writings of the kind which Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells have seen fit to publish since the War began. In no other country would the makers of farce and the weavers of phantasy be permitted to utter, in the guise of public opinion, critical denunciations of the motives and actions of the Government, coupled with invitations to neutral nations to intervene, when occasion shall offer, for the purpose of determining the terms of peace.

On the face of it, Mr. Shaw's indictment of intellectual laziness would seem to be justified. No doubt the majority of Englishmen would meet the charge by observing that, in the domain of national politics, the lucubrations of Mr. Shaw and other licensed jesters are but as the crackling of thorns under a pot. So far as this country is concerned, this is generally true. But the fact remains that in America, in Scandinavia, and in Germany the opinions on political matters of Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells are very widely accepted at their face value. Their great achievements in literature and

the drama, their international reputation for audacity and brilliancy, have won for them an enormous circulation in the United States. Their iconoclastic theories appeal naturally to that large section of public opinion in the great Democracy which persists in regarding the political institutions of Europe as obsolete and effete; so that, when they turn from their proper business of entertaining fiction (I class Mr. Wells's romantic flights into Socialism as fiction) to pose as lawgivers and self-appointed arbiters of the future destinies of the civilised world, millions of American citizens are only too ready to receive and discuss their opinions as serious contributions to constructive statesmanship. One has but to study the American Press (and more especially that of the Middle-Western States) to realise how widespread and baneful is the influence of Mr. Shaw's destructive criticism and Mr. Wells's fantastic idealism. It is clear that vast numbers of American Yellow-Press readers gladly accept the Shavian gospel of British muddle-headedness and believe, with him, in the hypocrisy and calculated selfishness of British policy in declaring war against Germany. Has he not told them that he and Mr. Wells (who, he says, 'first hoisted the country's flag') are the heaven-sent 'mouthpieces of many inarticulate citizens,' and that it is their duty 'to bring the whole continent of war-struck lunatics to reason, if we can'? Demos in America, with his primitive love of personalities, accepts Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells at their own valuation, partly because their opinions are nicely calculated to flatter his own self-esteem, and partly because the restless waywardness of these writers appeals to a class of mind accustomed to find its nourishment in sentimental idealism, tempered with police reports.

As far as their effect on the United Kingdom is concerned, Englishmen are, no doubt, justified in treating the political opinions of Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells with contemptuous indifference; but they are not justified in shutting their eyes to the possible effects of these utterances on public opinion abroad, or leaving them to do their pernicious work unchallenged and unrebuked. It is, indeed, significant of the general lack of proportion which characterises many of our political methods and activities, and suggestive of our inability to appreciate relative values, that, on the one hand, we submit to a rigorous Press Censorship for fear of revealing anything that might serve the purposes of the enemy; while, on the other, we allow writers like Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells to undermine our position in the eyes of the world, to vilify the bravest and best members of our Government, and to create in neutral countries a body of opinion calculated to deprive us hereafter of some of the fruits of victory and to prejudice our chances of securing effective terms of peace.

As a nation we have acquiesced in the proceedings of a Press Bureau which carries reticence to heights and depths that pass all human understanding; we profess to regard as a grave menace to the State the possible activities of German barbers and waiters in our midst: yet we view with apparent unconcern the spectacle of Englishmen of international reputation publishing broadcast to the world travesties of vitally important issues, and irresponsible opinions calculated to prejudice many of the ends for which we have entered upon this War. The nation, which has declared by the mouth of its King that it is solidly united to fight for a worthy purpose and that 'we shall not lay down our arms until that purpose has been fully achieved,' allows these influential but wholly irrelevant writers to damage that purpose in the eyes of the world. It is no exaggeration to say that Mr. Shaw's *Common Sense about the War*, and Mr. Wells's hysterical appeals to the American people, are likely to inflict upon the cause for which we are fighting injuries far more permanent and serious than anything that could be accomplished by all the alien enemies in England put together. There is neither sense of proportion nor fitness in a Censorship which mutilates Mr. Hilaire Belloc's retrospective analyses of the military situation, and at the same time permits Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells to sow broadcast the seeds of future trouble. To strain at the military gnat while swallowing the political camel is a policy calculated to cost England dear in the final day of reckoning. The nation at war has spontaneously decided to sink its internal differences and private opinions in whole-hearted support of the Government until victory shall be ours. There is no apparent reason why any licensed jester or earnest visionary in our midst should be exempt from this self-denying ordinance of reticence. The spoiled children who amused us in our theatre-going, novel-reading days should now be seen and not heard.

Turning for a moment from consideration of the individual activities of Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells, it is pertinent to observe that, with a few notable exceptions, our imaginative writers, weighed in the balance of war's stern realities, have generally been found wanting. Their habits of mind and methods of expression have alike proved unequal to the demands of so great a social and spiritual upheaval. The melodious voices to which we listened gratefully in the far-distant days of peace sound strangely thin and unconvincing to-day. Most of them, deserting their wonted business of creative imagination (because the demand for it has suddenly ceased), have hurled themselves, without preparatory training, into the war of words which seeks to justify or explain this War of the nations. Their artist hands have been suddenly called upon to handle the hard materials

of international politics, their soaring minds brought down to the dull level of treaties, law, and diplomacy. And the net result, in nearly every case, has been to strengthen the opinion of the plain citizen that your man of letters is constitutionally incapable of dealing rationally with the stern realities of life. In the midst of a great catastrophe like this there is neither comfort nor counsel to be found in all their multitudinous voices. From their primrose paths of fiction and phantasy they have suddenly emerged into the stony desert of stern realities, and forthwith they are lost; and, being lost, they shout to each other and gesticulate the more feverishly. Misreading the signs of the times, incapable of applying to the nation's needs the simplest lessons of history, they can only comfort themselves, and those who have leisure to listen to them, with memories of dead words, repeating their familiar incantations at the deserted shrines of absent gods. Being idealists, and frequently sentimental idealists, they look forward to finding, with the restoration of peace, a world clean-swept and ready for the millennium of their dreams, a world from which the Junker shall be banished for ever, in which 'the enthronement of the idea of public right will be the governing idea of European politics.' Underlying all their splendid dreams—universal disarmament, a United States of Europe, the neutralisation of the sea, an International Police Force, and so forth—we find evidence of the same perennial delusion, of the idea that legislation is omnipotent, and that things will get done because laws are passed to do them; evidence of the persistent hope that (as Herbert Spencer has said) 'by some means the collective wisdom can be separated from the collective folly and set over it in such a way as to guide it aright.'

Thus we find certain imaginative writers of the Fabian school taking comfort from their belief that their particular form of Socialism will hereafter be able to put an end to all war, oblivious of the fact that two fifths of the German Army to-day are Socialists. Thus we find a writer of the literary distinction of Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson bringing to bear upon the European situation the picturesque idealism of his *Letters of a Chinese Official*, and declaring that peace must henceforth be permanently established 'by the organisation of a league of European States, which are in agreement in desiring the complete prevention of war and *powerful enough* to make such an agreement effective throughout the world.' Then we find Mr. John Galsworthy proclaiming his faith in Democracy, as the only chance of lasting peace in Europe; almost as pathetic a vision of the Promised Land as that of the Religious Society of Friends, who believe that after this War they will have an opportunity of

'reconstructing European culture upon the only possible permanent foundation—mutual trust and goodwill . . . of laying down far-reaching principles for the future of mankind, such as will ensure us for ever against a repetition of this gigantic folly.' Admire as we may this magnificent faith in the magic power of words, history and sociological science alike warn us that it is an imperishable delusion of humanity to believe that it only needs a sudden re-fashioning of the people to make them good and free. These high hopes are part of man's immortal inheritance of protest against the intrusion of the Serpent into the earthly Paradise, against the sorry scheme of things which ordains that, on this planet, all life shall subsist and survive at the cost of other lives. Throughout all its long history of strife, mankind in the valley of Armageddon has heard and rejoiced at the songs of the poets and the visions of the prophets, foretelling the dawn of the millennium on the distant hills—and has then returned, spiritually refreshed, to the fray.

It is interesting to observe how many of our well-known imaginative writers have now yielded to the spell of this vision of a 'new era,' to be attained (as Mr. Dickinson has it) by invoking 'the new spirit of the world, the spirit of co-operation, of reason, of that divine common sense which is the essence of religion.' But the great majority, being patriotic citizens first and transcendentalists afterwards, have been content to announce their visions of the new-world-to-be without endeavouring to hasten its advent by descending themselves into the arena of politics and polemics. While believing in the impending abolition of all future causes of war, they have proclaimed their belief that 'England could not, without dishonour, have refused to take part in the present War,' and they have refrained from diverting attention from the vital business of defeating Germany by any premature discussion of the ways and means to secure permanent peace.

If I have referred briefly to the published opinions of writers like Mr. Galsworthy and Mr. Dickinson on the issues and causes of the War, I have done so in order to illustrate the truth that the highly imaginative order of mind, affected by a tendency to sentimental idealism, is generally incapable of bringing itself suddenly into direct relation with the elemental and brutal realities of the present devastating struggle. Just as the great majority of our delicately reared poets have shown how seriously their Muse has been embarrassed by the War's sudden trumpet-call to simplicity and fervour, so our novelists and romantic writers, with very few exceptions, have shown themselves unable to realise swiftly the truth that, beneath the surface of our complex civilisation, the instinct of nationalism, patriotism in

its highest expression of collective effort, remains the strongest and deepest of all human emotions. Inability or unwillingness to face this truth has invested the recent writings of several of our most distinguished authors with an element of unreality, which even the man in the street instinctively recognises. But the sincerity and sense of responsibility of these writers have not been called in question; and, after all, sincerity is the touchstone by which writers and thinkers must finally be judged, no matter what their opinions. Thus judged, the great majority of the English authors whose views on the causes and probable issues of the War are now circulating in America are entitled to respect for the courage of convictions sincerely stated, even if their practical value be often questionable. *Ne sutor ultra crepidam* is a good saying, but one forgives the artist who forgets it, so long as he sins not from sheer verbosity or love of the limelight or greed of gain; and there is something undeniably engaging in the earnestness with which our essayists and novelists have settled down, in their country's hour of need, to learning (and simultaneously teaching) the dull trades of international politics, map-making, and diplomacy.

This being so, it is all the more to be regretted that the two British authors whose influence is greater than that of any of their contemporaries in America and Germany—Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells—should have rushed into print with such flippant irresponsibility, combining an egregious display of swollen-headed vanity and lack of restraint with contemptuous indifference to the sentiments of the great mass of their countrymen.

Mr. Shaw's pamphlet, *Common Sense about the War*, his chief contribution to the literature of the subject, was originally published as a Special Supplement to the *New Statesman* on the 14th of November, and was reproduced in America by the *New York Times*. Its chief result in England has been to convince the public of Mr. Shaw's callous levity and his unconcealed contempt for the deepest convictions of the nation. Well-meaning visionaries of the Norman Angell school, enrolled in the Union of Democratic Control, and intensely earnest in their plans for the creation of the 'Pacific State,' find Mr. Shaw in sympathy with them against the Junker, and at the same time utterly contemptuous in his ridicule of their 'disarmament delusion.' The very nimbleness of his intellectual acrobatics, the biting malice of his irony, his aloofness and impartial scorn for all concerned, combine to leave him (as no doubt he intended) in splendid isolation, even amongst the 'intellectuals' of the socio-political arena. As for the mass of his countrymen, since the outbreak of war they have had enough serious things to think about and to do, without troubling themselves to digest

the pasquinades of this literary harlequin. To judge from current opinion, most Englishmen regard these eccentricities and excesses of Mr. Shaw's genius much in the same way as they regard the well-advertised Red Cross activities of certain ladies of the theatrical and fashionable world. Without some such eccentric manifestation of activity, Mr. Shaw might have been shut out completely by the stern realities of the War from the limelight that he loves so well.

But in America, where he commands a far wider circle of readers, and where his avowed intention of 'taking the conceit out of England' appeals to a very considerable minority, there can be no doubt that he has rendered services to Germany sufficient to entitle him to the Iron Cross at the hands of the Kaiser. At a time when our Censorship withholds from the American people much information that might enlighten public opinion and stimulate intelligent sympathy with England and her Allies, Mr. Shaw is allowed to pour out the vials of his scorn upon the British Government in general, and Sir Edward Grey in particular, and to support the statements put forward by Germany as her excuse for violating the neutrality of Belgium and precipitating the catastrophe of war. The conditions under which this mud-slinging is done make it certain that some of it will stick to the prejudice hereafter of our national interests in the day of reckoning. It is not for nothing that the German Press Bureau has given wide circulation to his pamphlet, as propaganda literature calculated to strengthen Germany's position in neutral countries.

In the exuberance of his own performance, however, Mr. Shaw has overdone it. Even the little Broadway shopgirl, digesting him through the columns of the *New York Times*, in her diligent pursuit of culture, must experience an uneasy feeling that this idol of the American Press is not to be taken seriously. It is not easy, at a time like this, for the master-cynic to pose successfully, in a minority of one against all Europe, as the sole repository of true wisdom. Even a Bowery comedian must revise his conception of unbounded assurance when confronted with the Shaw model, as set forth, for example, in the following extracts from his 'Open Letter to President Wilson':

' In your clear western atmosphere and in your peculiarly responsible position as the head centre of western democracy, you, when the European situation became threatening three months ago, must have been acutely aware of the fact to which Europe was so fatally blinded—namely, that the simple solution of the difficulty in which the menace of the Franco-Russo-British Entente placed Germany was for the German Emperor to leave his western frontier under the safeguard of the neighbourliness and good faith of American, British, and French democracy, and then await quite calmly any action that Russia might take against his country on the east. . . .

The Kaiser never dreamed of confiding his frontier to you and to the humanity of his neighbours. And the diplomatists of Europe never thought of that easy and right policy, and could not suggest any substitute for it, with the hideous result which is before you.

Or, from the same document, this bright gem of amateur statesmanship :

If Germany maintains her claim to a right of way through Belgium on a matter which she believed (however erroneously) to be one of life or death to her as a nation, nobody, not even China, now pretends that such rights of way have not their place among those common human rights which are superior to the more artificial rights of nationality. I think, for example, that if Russia made a descent on your continent under circumstances which made it essential to the maintenance of your national freedom that you should move an army through Canada, you would ask our leave to do so and take it by force if we did not grant it. You may reasonably suspect, even if all our statesmen raise a shriek of denial, that we should take a similar liberty under similar circumstances in the teeth of all the scraps of paper in our Foreign Office dustbin.

Thus Germany's contempt for treaties is condoned. But when it comes to a critical analysis of England's position *vis à vis* Belgium, we are solemnly told that 'no matter how powerful a State is, it is not above feeling the difference between doing something that nobody condemns and something that everybody condemns except the interested parties.'

It may be that just retribution will overtake Mr. Shaw, even in America, for thus abusing the freedom he enjoys in this country. In Chicago, Milwaukee, and other centres of German beer and kultur, his influence and his royalties may possibly remain undiminished, but in the Eastern States there are indications that public opinion deprecates the display of such mountebank levity at a time when all the world is deeply moved to seriousness. One writer in a New York paper thus summarises *Common Sense about the War* :

Bernard Shaw has written an elaborate thesis to maintain :

1. That Great Britain was abundantly justified in making war with Germany.
2. That the explanation given by the British Government for making war against Germany was stupid, hypocritical, mendacious, and disgraceful.
3. That he alone is capable of interpreting the moral purpose of the British people in undertaking this necessary work of civilisation.
4. That the reason the British Government's justification of the war is so inadequate is because no British Government is ever so clever as Bernard Shaw.
5. That even in the midst of the most horrible calamity known to human history it pays to advertise.

Various patriots have various ways of serving their country. Some go to the firing line to be shot, and others stay at home to be a source of innocent merriment to the survivors.

If the future of international relations depends upon the higher education of the masses in the direction of political morality, it is nothing less than deplorable that a man of Mr. Shaw's eminence should permit himself to write contemptuously as he does of Belgium's rights of neutrality, of 'obsolete treaties,' and the circumstances that alter them. If there were any proof that he himself honestly believed this poisonous nonsense, that he was not writing it simply *pour épater le bourgeois*, with his tongue in his cheek, he might be forgiven. As it is, if the Censor is unable to restrain his pernicious activities, his countrymen should at least discard enough of their 'intellectual laziness' to appreciate Mr. Shaw's form of patriotism and the valuable services which he has rendered to the enemy.

There can be no question as to the sincerity of the frantic appeals which Mr. H. G. Wells has addressed, and continues to address, to Europe and America, to follow him on the road to Utopia. Indeed his deadly earnestness, his childlike faith in his own pet panaceas for the prevention of war, his splendid dreams of world-wide social reconstruction under the guidance of pure 'Liberalism,' are sufficient in themselves to secure for him a large following, and to make his fantastic idealism a force to be reckoned with hereafter, when the sword shall have been sheathed, and diplomacy sets about its work of redrawing the map of Europe. Mr. Wells would save all further trouble in this matter by abolishing diplomacy, after which he, with a few Socialist friends in England and America, would proceed to redraw the map, to abolish the 'individualist capital system,' and establish 'the United States of Europe' upon a Wells *régime* of enlightened Socialism. 'Let us redraw the map of Europe boldly,' he says, 'as we mean it to be redrawn, and let us replan society as we mean it to be reconstructed'; whereupon he proceeds to outline the foundations of a world made Beautiful and Good on the model originally set forth in *Anticipations* and *The Modern Utopia*. Peace hath her swelled heads, no less renowned than war.

To a certain type of mind, by no means uncommon, idealism of this kind carries an almost irresistible appeal. It is a type generally associated with a vague and vicarious morality, which lends itself readily to the support of loose abstractions, and follows gladly anyone who announces a new short cut to Utopia. It scorns precision in matters of detail and the discussion of practical difficulties; it has a firm-rooted faith in the power of 'isms' to overcome human nature and all other obstacles. In America, where public education has been largely in the hands of women, and therefore to some extent subject to sentimental

idealism, the gospel according to Mr. Wells has evoked a response, the strength of which may be estimated in the current opinions of publicists and politicians. Mr. Wells's ideas as to the possibility of a social and political reconstruction of the civilised world, and the confederation and collective disarmament of Europe, coincide at many points with the views of 'intellectuals' and philanthropists in the United States. It is therefore worth while to consider seriously some of the proposals which this gifted romanticist has recently advanced, in all seriousness, as a contribution to constructive statesmanship. I select the following as typical :

From an article on 'The War of the Mind' published in 'The Nation' (August 29) and in the 'New York World' and other American papers.

It rests therefore with us, who outside all formal government represent the national will and intentions, to take this work into our hands. By means of a propaganda of books, newspaper articles, leaflets, tracts in English, French, German, Dutch, Swedish, Norwegian, Italian, Chinese, and Japanese, we have to spread this idea, repeat this idea, and impose upon this war the idea that this war must end war.

(Russia, Austria, Mexico, and Turkey, surely fit subjects for propaganda, appear to have been rather carelessly overlooked.)

From an article in the 'Chicago Tribune' on 'The End of Militarism' (August 19).

It will lie in the power of England, France, Russia, Italy, Japan, and the United States, if Germany and Austria are shattered by this war, to forbid further building of any more ships of war at all ; to persuade—if need be, oblige—the minor Powers to sell their navies ; to refuse the seas to armed ships not under the control of the Federation ; to launch an armed ship can be made an invasion of the common territory of the world.

From 'An Appeal to the American People' (September 5).

For it rests with you to establish and secure, or to refuse to establish and secure, the permanent peace of the world, the final ending of war.

Never were the British people so unanimous. All Ireland is with us. We are not fighting to destroy Germany : it is the firm resolve of England to permit (*sic*) no fresh 'conquered provinces' to darken the future of Europe.

At the end, we do most firmly believe there will be established a new Europe, a Europe riddened of rankling oppressions, with a free Poland, a free Germany, a free Finland, the Balkans settled, the little nations safe, and peace secured.

Engrossed in the congenial task of deciding the destinies of Europe, Mr. Wells displays the true artist's contempt for consistency. What an expectant world needs is his opinion, red-hot from the Press, no matter how foolish and self-contradictory. This 'firm resolve of England' in the matter of conquered provinces sounded well enough in September, but either he was mis-

informed on the subject or he caused the resolve to be modified. For it no longer forms part of his scheme of world salvation. The following interesting passage occurs in an article, suppressed by the Censor in England, but published in the American Press, under the title of 'Holland's Future' (*New York Times*, etc., February 7). Mr. Wells is calmly discussing the advantages which Holland would obtain by taking a hand against Germany :

And by coming in, there is something more than the mere termination of a strain and the vindication of international righteousness to consider. There is the possibility, and not only the possibility but the possible need, that Holland should come out of this world war aggrandised. I want to lay stress upon that, because it may prove a decisive factor in this matter.

The Dutch desire aggrandisement for the sake of aggrandisement as little as any nation in Europe. But what if the path of aggrandisement be also the path of safety?

It is clear that both France and Belgium will demand and receive territorial compensation for these last months of horror. It is ridiculous to suppose that the Germans may fling war in its most atrocious and filthy form over Belgium and some of the sweetest parts of France without paying bitterly and abundantly for the freak.

Quite apart from indemnities, France and Belgium must push forward their boundaries so far that if ever Germany tries another rush she will have to rush for some days through her own lost lands. The only tolerable frontier against Germans is a day's march deep in Germany. Of course, Liège will have to be covered in the future by Belgian annexations in the Aix region and stretching toward Cologne, and France will go to the Rhine. I think Belgium as well as France will be forced to go to the Rhine.

It is no good talking now of buffer States, because the German conscience cannot respect them. Buffer States are just anvil States. At any rate, very considerable annexations of German territory by Belgium and France are now inevitable, and Holland must expect a much larger and stronger Belgium to the south of her, allied firmly to France and England.

Here we have the Junker spirit at its best.

Finally, for the purposes of his 'Pacific State,' he proposes :

1. That every citizen shall give a year or so of his or her life to the State. ('Only in that way is it possible to get that sense of obligation and ownership in the State, that unity of feeling which is one of the great advantages possessed by the modern military State over its rural society.')

2. That the State should secure to all willing men the sense of freedom, continuing interesting work and immunity from the degrading experience of involuntary unemployment.

3. That 'that strange, wild, dangerous thing, the Press, and indeed all our knowledge-giving and idea-spreading organisations, should be brought into much clearer relationship with the educational organisation. . . . A time will come when the Pacific State will be obliged to control the finances of its Press as closely as it controls its banks, and monopolise the advertisement sheets as its own business. Only so will it escape the invasion of its mind.'

Readers of the *Nineteenth Century* may wonder what importance can possibly attach to windy stuff of this kind, and be disposed to ignore it as the extravagance of a highly imaginative mind, reduced to a condition of hysteria by contemplation of the horrors of war. His writing undoubtedly reflects a highly nervous condition; nevertheless, these views, in all their crudity, have been published by journals of wide circulation in England and America as representing the tendencies of a considerable section of English Socialists, and even of English Liberalism. His idea of 'a Peace League that is to control (*sic*) the globe' has its ardent supporters in Great Britain. Its advocates in the United States are many.

It is, unfortunately, true that these irresponsible opinions, uttered ostensibly in the name of English Liberalism by writers whose names are household words on both sides of the Atlantic, have encouraged the belief, already widely prevalent in America, that the United States will eventually be required to act as mediators and arbiters of the terms of peace in Europe. They have certainly created a feeling that (the Monroe Doctrine to the contrary notwithstanding) America has a moral right to be consulted whenever the redrawing of the map of Europe takes place. But, as Sir Oliver Lodge has pointed out in a recent letter to *The Times*, the assertion of such an opinion is greatly to be deprecated, for this War will not end in an arbitration nor by any outside intervention, but only by Germany's complete surrender. A considerable body of public opinion is undoubtedly being misled, by the writings of Shaw, Wells, and other English authors, to place a wrong construction (and a construction embarrassing to the Governments of both countries) upon the British people's evident desire to justify its moral position in the eyes of the greatest of the neutral nations. Dr. Butler, President of Columbia University, for instance, believes that the War will end in the organisation of 'The United States of Europe, modelled after and instructed by the United States of America,' because 'conventional diplomacy and conventional statesmanship have very evidently broken down in Europe. They have made a disastrous failure of the work with which they were entrusted. They did not, and could not, prevent the War, because they knew and used only the old formulas. They had no tools for a job like this.'

These, clearly, are the views of the Shaw and Wells school, transplanted and adapted. Similarly, the reiterated appeals of these writers to the United States as a moral force find their answer in Dr. Butler's expressed belief that because 'America is the first moral Power in the world to-day, we have made good our right to be appealed to on questions of national and inter-

national morality.' These views, says a writer in the *New York Times*, 'must make every American's heart first swell with pride and then thrill with a realisation of responsibility.' Therein lies their mischief and their possible danger.

After all, there may be something to be said for Mr. Wells's idea of a State-controlled Press.

J. O. P. BLAND.

NEUTRALITY VERSUS WAR

NEW CONSIDERATIONS IN AN OLD CAUSE

ANTAGONISM between the neutral and the belligerent attitude arises in every war, and personal or national convictions and principles have very little to do with the subject. The same Power which, as a neutral, may have insisted in lofty language on the unrighteousness of interfering with neutrals in the legitimate pursuit of their affairs, on becoming a belligerent, will insist on the unrighteousness of the neutral doing anything which may enable the enemy to prolong the struggle. The arguments are always more or less the same, and Powers do not even consider it necessary to explain away contradictions between views inherent to the nature of the interests involved.

The objections, for instance, of the British Government in the *Dacia* case to recognising the transfer *flagrante bello* of a German ship to the American flag were put forward in practically the same terms by the American Government during the Hispano-American War of 1898, when State Secretary Day gave the following instructions to the Diplomatic and Consular officers of the United States :

This Government [he said] is in receipt of information that ships carrying the Spanish flag have been or are about to be furnished with British or other neutral papers upon colorable transfers of ownership, made for the purpose of avoiding belligerent capture. It is desired that any such cases coming to your notice should receive immediate attention, and that steps should be taken to prevent the colorable and void transfers of vessels under the Spanish flag to a neutral flag.

In the Declaration of London the Powers represented—viz. Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Spain, the United States, Japan, and Holland—endeavoured to give what seemed a reasonable view of this particular question of belligerent transfers during the war to a neutral flag, by providing that such transfers effected after the outbreak of hostilities were void *unless proved not to have been made in order to evade capture*. The burden of proof, it is seen, is imposed on the transferee, as was held by the United States Court in the *Benito Estenger* case, in which a Spanish ship, a couple of

months after the outbreak of the war of 1898, was transferred to the British flag.

I cite the example of the *Dacia* case on account of its notoriety, but the subject of the present article embraces the interplay of belligerent and neutral rights and duties generally, and the transformation the latter are necessarily undergoing in response to the particular character of the present War.

I

War at all times affects neutrals. Its law and usage are based on the assumption that neutral States agree that the *de facto* situation arising out of war imposes on them certain obligations which it is in their interest, both as actual non-belligerents and as potential belligerents, to observe.

Neutrality is thus the complement of belligerency. War being an effort on the part of the one belligerent to impose its will on the other, any act on the part of a neutral State which conduces to the prolongation of the opposing belligerent's resistance is detrimental to the former. A number of distinctions, however, have grown out of the practice of war which may be summed up as follows¹:

It is the duty of a neutral State to abstain, in its corporate capacity, from all acts which may help the one belligerent to the disadvantage of the other, and to grant impartially to the one or the other belligerent any rights, advantages, or privileges which cannot be regarded as an intervention in the struggle. On the other hand, it is not bound to prevent the exportation by private persons or companies, for the account of either belligerent, of arms, munitions of war, and, in general, of anything which may be useful for an army or a fleet; nor is a loan by a neutral person, company, or bank to one or the other belligerent considered an act committed in favour of one of the belligerents, provided nothing is done officially to prevent the other belligerent from endeavouring to obtain a loan on its side. A neutral State is bound not to permit any violation by either belligerent of its sovereign rights; not even to allow a Prize Court to be constituted by either belligerent on its territory or on a vessel in its waters; and, so far as the means at its disposal permit, not to allow within its jurisdiction the equipment or arming of any vessel which it has any reasonable suspicion may be destined to take part in hostile operations against a Power with which it is at peace.

The consequences of non-observance of neutral obligations are

¹ See more fully thereon Barclay, *Law and Usage of War*, p. 82, *et seq.*, London 1914.

not identical. Let us take, for instance, the case of 'absolute contraband.' Inasmuch as the belligerents cannot carry on hostilities without artillery, projectiles, and the materials necessary for their manufacture, muskets, bayonets, swords, etc., called 'munitions of war,' to supply them to either belligerent is an unneutral act. On the part of a neutral State, as such, to afford such supplies would be equivalent to giving direct collective assistance to one of the belligerents against the other, and would, therefore, be a *casus belli*; while, on the part of its individual citizens, such assistance only exposes those who give it to the penalty of capture and confiscation of the things in question by the opposing belligerent. Out of the universal acquiescence in this latter method of leaving the belligerent himself to deal with forbidden private assistance to the enemy has grown up the law of contraband—that is to say the procedure which the belligerents, in return for being allowed to take the law into their own hands, are bound to observe for the protection of innocent neutral property.

A belligerent right which follows from what I have called the complementary character of neutrality is that entitling the belligerent to close access, even by neutral ships, to any of the enemy's ports, for the purpose of more effectually preventing him from receiving supplies which may enable him to prolong his resistance. In this case, it is seen, even non-contraband property and goods are included in the prohibition, known in the usage of war as 'blockade.' Of blockade, Grotius remarks, war authorises many things which would not otherwise be allowable. Thus, if an enemy cannot be brought to terms without closing access to him of things which can help him to hold out, necessity gives the adversary the right to claim an indemnity for violation of the blockade from him who violates it.*

This right to an indemnity has been worked out in practice

*Grotius justifies his contention in the following quaint passage: 'If the supply sent hinder the execution of my designs and the sender might have known as much, as if I have besieged a town, and blocked up its ports, and thereupon quickly expect a surrender or a Peace, that Sender is obliged to make me satisfaction for the Damage that I suffer upon his Accounts as much as he that shall take a Prisoner out of Custody, that was committed for a just debt, or helps him to make his escape in order to cheat me; and proportionably to my Loss, I may seize on his goods, and take them as my own, till I am fully satisfied. If he did not actually do me any Damage, but only designed it, then have I a right by detaining those supplies, to oblige him to give me security for the future by Pledges, hostages, or the like. But, further, if the wrongs done to me by the enemy be openly unjust, and he by those supplies encourages him in his unjust War, then shall he not only be obliged to repair my Loss, but also be treated as a malefactor, as one that rescues a notorious convict out of the hands of Justice; and in this case, it shall be lawful for me to deal with him agreeable to his Offence, according to those Rules which we have set down for Punishments; and for a just Restitution, we may pillage him too.'

as a right of capture and confiscation by the blockading belligerent of vessels endeavouring, in spite of notice, to enter the blockaded place.

Originally a blockade by sea was probably nothing more than the adaptation to maritime warfare of blockades upon land which are *de facto* blockades, the army investing the blockaded spot and being in actual physical possession of the zone through which it prevents ingress and egress. An attempt to violate such a blockade would be an act of hostility against the investing army. A maritime blockade would also originally be a close blockade undertaken in conjunction with operations on the land side and restricted to the entrance of a port or bay or river. From the first, however, there would be the necessary difference between intercourse by sea and by land, that the cordon round the port on the side of the sea cannot be as effectively enforced, or even as effectively made visible as on the land side. With the growth of recognition of neutral rights, the fact that a ship on its way to the blockaded port was not aware of the blockade would be taken into account, and notification of blockade to neutral States would come into use for the purpose of avoiding complications in such cases. Notification having become an international practice, it is easy to understand how at a time when communications were slow, uncertain, and difficult it would sometimes be given, as a possible measure of belligerent tactics, before the blockade could be carried out or, perhaps, had even been finally decided upon. Treaties between different States then grew up to regulate, as between them, the enforcement of blockades and the protection of the property of either as a neutral where the other might be a belligerent. Every text-book of International Law tells of the abuse to which, later on, the notification of 'paper blockades' lent itself, of the combination of neutrals in self-defence, and how eventually in 1856 the maritime Powers of Europe, returning, as it were, to the starting point of the institution, decreed that for the future, to be binding on neutrals, blockades must be effective.

Writers, following Grotius and seeking for a legal justification of the right of capture and confiscation, have laid it down that blockade is a substitution of the dominion of the blockading State for that of the blockaded one, as it no doubt was originally, and that the blockading State has the same rights of exclusion of aliens and alien vessels as all States possess on their own territory. This view, however, would only account for the right of blockade within the territorial waters of the blockaded State, and would not justify the exercise by a belligerent of rights upon the high sea not recognised in time of peace. Whatever the justifying basis of the right may be, in the course of time it has

become, like the rules of contraband, a substantive right of war owing its existence to a state of belligerency and entailing corresponding duties on neutrality.

A contingent belligerent right arising out of the law of both contraband and blockade is that of visit and search, without which the relative positions of belligerent and neutral, and the responsibilities and privileges of the latter, could not be ascertained. This belligerent right is known as that of 'Right of Search.'³ Here again a procedure has grown up for the protection of innocent neutral traffic, including the immunity confirmed by the Declaration of Paris that, except contraband, enemy goods on board a neutral ship, as well as neutral goods on board an enemy ship, are free from capture.

All these rights and duties on the part of belligerents and neutrals have grown up under a system of warfare which, since the changes produced by the introduction of gunpowder, has remained till the present day essentially the same. Submarine and aerial war, machine and the new siege guns seem to have produced a change equally profound, the effect of which is only beginning to make itself felt. One of their consequences has been to draw into the orbit of war materials and industries never before regarded as serving its purposes. The present feeling on both sides is one of resentment at new methods which are growing up in response to the change, but change there is, and we must examine its consequences with the detachment befitting a new *de facto* situation.

II

I referred above in connexion with the law of contraband to things which are indispensable to warfare. In contradistinction to these are things which are of no use whatsoever in warfare. These are articles which, says Grotius, only serve for pleasure and cannot at any time be classed as contraband. He instanced such things as pictures, embroideries, curiosities, etc. Between *absolute contraband* and absolute non-contraband, so to speak, are all the other products of man's industry which, according to their destination, are contraband or not as the case may be. In the Declaration of London three lists are given corresponding to these divisions. In the case of absolute and conditional contraband any alteration has to be notified to neutral Powers, but in the case of the free list it was forbidden to place any of the articles enumerated on either of the other two lists.

³ The English term of 'Visit and Search' is, I may mention, a misnomer. 'Visite' is the French term for 'search.' How it found its way into our diplomatic terminology is easily surmised. I use the term 'Right of search' as the correct equivalent of 'Droit de visite.'

The Declaration is only six years old. The lists were drawn up in accordance with the then current views on the subject. Yet they are already out of date.

With the increasing complication of warfare, as I have said, a large number of other things besides those enumerated in the Declaration as absolute contraband have become as essential to its conduct as powder and shot.

Thus, among the 'conditional' list of the Declaration of London were aircraft and their component parts, barbed wire, motor vehicles, tyres, and mineral oils. Under the British Order in Council (December 23, 1914) they have been transferred to the 'absolute' list. Under the same Order several of the Free List articles, such as the 'raw materials of the textile industries,' rubber, and hides, have been struck out of this free list as utilisable in warfare, and are now entered in the 'conditional' list. Alterations in the methods of warfare, in fact, necessarily entail corresponding alterations in respect of neutrals. The present War has shown that sandbags and barbed wire are more effective for defence than the strongest masonry. Barbed wire has acquired such importance that, in spite of its civilian uses, it cannot but be classed among articles indispensable in warfare. The same may be said of machinery and implements for the digging of trenches, now as indispensable for defence as artillery for offence; and, as regards petroleum, now classed, as we have seen, as 'absolute' contraband, it is not only the motive power of military waggons, and indispensable for traction in general, but without it aircraft cannot fly. The inclusion in 'absolute contraband' of these articles, however, implies a new definition of the term. It would obviously be wrong to declare any of them to be useless for any other purpose than war. We must, therefore, define 'absolute contraband' as now applying to articles which are in such overwhelming demand in war that the presumption of their destination is 'absolute.'

But the changes to which the new conditions of war are exposing the character of contraband are not confined to the classification of the articles themselves. Articles of conditional contraband consigned to a belligerent country are distinguished according to their destination. Thus the Declaration of London provides that conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces or is consigned to the authorities of the enemy State or a contractor established in the enemy country 'who, as a matter of common knowledge, supplies articles of the kind to the enemy,' or to a fortified place belonging to the enemy or 'other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy.' It is obviously becoming more and more difficult, when all a nation's life is

occupied in the prosecution of a war, to select a place of discharge which would enable a Prize Court to decide that the destination was evidence that the goods, though utilisable for war purposes, would not be so employed. Especially is this so in the densely populated countries of Western Europe, where highly developed networks of railway place the whole country in easy if not direct connexion with military and naval bases.

The adaptation to altered conditions of warfare, of contraband lists, radical as it is, however, is a small matter compared with the difficulty of adapting the law of blockade to the conditions of the present War. The reader must bear in mind that a blockade is not a mere measure for the purpose of worrying the enemy, but is a deliberate and organised method of starving the enemy and forcing him, so far as it operates, to sue for peace.

The seizure and confiscation of contraband on board neutral ships, and the capture of enemy ships, have the same purpose in view, but the neutral trade with the enemy in other respects is entitled to go on, so far as possible, as in time of peace. Blockade is a method of stopping even this innocent trade. As blockade is an exception to the general principle that innocent neutral trade is entitled to immunity from the penalties of war, the exercise of it is surrounded by a number of formalities and obligations which the belligerent is bound to observe. I have quoted above the requirement of the Declaration of Paris (1856). The Declaration of London (1909) has now formulated the conditions generally as a statement of international law which may be regarded as the present usage in reference to the subject. The following is an abridgement of the rules in so far as they relate to the matter under discussion :

A blockade must not extend beyond the ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy (Art. 1).

In accordance with the Declaration of Paris of 1856, a blockade, in order to be binding, must be effective—that is to say, it must be maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy coast-line (Art. 2).

Neutral vessels may not be captured for breach of blockade except within the area of operations of the warships detailed to render the blockade effective (Art. 17).

The blockading forces must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts (Art. 18).

Whatever may be the ulterior destination of a vessel or of her cargo, she cannot be captured for breach of blockade if, at the moment, she is on her way to a non-blockaded port (Art. 19).

A vessel which has broken blockade outwards, or which has attempted to break blockade inwards, is liable to capture so long as she is pursued by a ship of the blockading force. If the pursuit is abandoned, or if the blockade is raised, her capture can no longer be effected (Art. 20).

A vessel found guilty of breach of blockade is liable to condemnation.

The cargo is also condemned, unless it is proved that at the time of the shipment of the goods the shippers neither knew nor could have known of the intention to break the blockade (Art. 21).^f

It is seen, as in fact is obvious, that a blockade cannot extend beyond the seaboard of the enemy, and where neutral territory or a neutral port breaks the continuity of the line of blockade, neutral ships under the existing law can carry on their trade without the belligerent having any right of interference except that of search for and the seizure of contraband destined for the enemy. This right the belligerent possesses in virtue of what is known as the 'doctrine of continuous voyage.' According to this doctrine, if the ultimate destination of contraband goods, though first shipped to a neutral port, is enemy territory, they may be treated, though on board a neutral ship, as if they had been shipped to the enemy territory direct.

The same principle, if applied to blockade, would entitle the belligerent, in cases where a blockade, through the presence of a neutral port within its line, could be evaded, to treat neutral ships bound for this neutral port, if the ultimate destination of their non-contraband cargoes were enemy territory, as if such cargoes had been shipped to the enemy territory direct. For example, if Holland were a part of Germany or joined the enemy, a blockade might be declared of the whole coast from the limit of the German occupation in Belgium to the Danish frontier, and then all goods, whatever the description, contraband and non-contraband, could be excluded from entry into Germany. So long as Holland remains neutral, this cannot be done. Any blockade would be ineffective which did not include Dutch ports, or which, by extension to it of the doctrine of 'continuous voyage,' did not apply to all cargoes shipped to them. In practice, some such qualified extension seems to be already transforming the existing procedure, though the decision to regard Bills of Lading to order as a presumption of enemy destination, sufficient in many cases to deter the consignment of goods to the enemy, obviously cannot prevent a re-sale.

The term 'blockade' has recently been used in quite a different sense from that employed in international usage. While England is endeavouring by expansion of the scope of contraband and by her 'search' for it to prevent Germany from renewing the supplies necessary to her for further prosecution of the War, Germany, on her side, following the example of the blockades of the Napoleonic era, has declared a blockade of the British Islands, which in the present state of her naval impotency seems as much like an act of desperation as was its predecessor in 1806.

On the other hand, as regards the action of England against which it professes to retaliate, war being an effort by the one

belligerent to impose its will on the other, an effective economic 'blockade,' where possible, becomes as important a factor between two belligerents in a state of deadlock as the actual hostilities. A neutral Power which disregarded any such 'blockade' as a belligerent is able to enforce would help to paralyse the only method by which the resistance of the other belligerent can be overcome, and thus prolong the war.

III

There are many other changes in existing practice which may arise out of the present War and affect neutrals as much as belligerents. Thus the arming of merchant vessels for defence against a belligerent which, disregarding the principle and applying the exception, destroys enemy vessels without distinction between neutral and enemy cargoes, or between combatants and non-combatants, or between neutral and enemy persons, and in fact practically carries on war against mankind in general, may entail methods of hindering pursuit on the high seas. This would add not only new risks for neutral ships, but might force them to carry munitions of war for defence against what is virtual piracy, and instead of neutral trade obtaining, with the progress of international usage, greater freedom from molestation, the existing freedom would be seriously curtailed by these new methods of defence.

Thus, again, as regards the bombardment of undefended towns, forbidden in both land and naval warfare, there is the undecided question of the meaning of the word 'undefended.' A town is not 'undefended' in naval warfare if it is protected by floating mines. This is the sense of the reservation made by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan to the section of the Hague Convention No. IX. forbidding belligerents to bombard an undefended port on the sole ground that submarine contact mines are moored in front of it. A port whose entrance is defended by floating mines is unquestionably 'defended.' Yet floating mines are not visible objects, and how is the commander of a hostile vessel to ascertain if it is defended by mines or not?

The subject of bombardments, it is seen, is a complicated one, and the present state of international practice is neither a sufficient protection for the innocent civilian nor a sufficient indication of the scope of his powers to the hostile commander.

In this chaotic condition of the practice generally, what is the position as regards the dropping of bombs from aircraft? I have dealt with this subject in an independent article,⁴ but since its

⁴ See my article in the *Nineteenth Century and After* of November 1914.

publication the pretension has been put forward that even a rifle shot fired at a hostile air-vessel is justification for exercising reprisals by the dropping of bombs on the offending population. This pretension is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole case of dropping bombs on towns, defended or undefended, from isolated aircraft, which are not and can never be in a position to enforce submission.

Crossing neutral territory at a high altitude seems at first sight a matter which can do little harm, but aviation is still only in its infancy as a method of offence. To allow belligerent aircraft to cross neutral territory is to allow those of the adverse belligerent to pursue them into neutral territory. The consequences are too obvious to need amplification, and neutrals will do well to insist on its illegality in the most emphatic terms.

Experience of the present War, in fact, only shows how much wiser were the delegates to the Hague Conference of 1907 than their principals who have not ratified the Convention forbidding this inhuman method of inflicting indiscriminate and useless injury altogether.

To return to the changes in the relations of belligerent and neutral, which the present War seems to be occasioning, the greatest change of all will be entailed by the difficulty, owing to the new methods of warfare, of bringing the War solely by force of arms to a conclusion. If pitched battles are no longer possible and neither belligerent has a chance of defeating the other in the field, the final result can only be determined by exhaustion of the opposing forces. This implies not only the incessant and protracted destruction of life, but also the exhaustion of the supply of every kind of article which is necessary for the manufacture of munitions of war, or which can sustain life, or which can feed the national industries with raw material.

The present War is on too large a scale to endure like past intermittent wars which could last seven, thirty, even a hundred years. In previous articles I have shown the spirit in which the German General Staff conceived it; to be successful, it had to be overwhelming and ruthless. The action of the Allies need be neither, if their more humane methods prevail; but they can only prevail if neutral States, instead of consulting any possible interest they may have in the continuance of the War, abstain from doing anything which can prolong it.

In the work of thus helping to bring the War to an end neutral Powers may take a determining share not the less effective because it is passive. They are the weaker States in the present struggle of gigantic armies, and their future safety depends on the existing balance of European States being maintained and the

ambition of more powerful Governments being made unattainable by recourse to mere brute force.

It is obvious that Germany cannot be ultimately successful against practically the whole of Europe. She has exhausted the advantages she possessed at the outset of the War, and henceforward the disproportion between her available resources and those of the Allies can only become more accentuated. To bring this futile struggle to an honourable conclusion as speedily as possible can but be the wish of even Germany's well-wishers.

Besides, it may well be doubted whether it is desirable that such essential changes of usage as I have endeavoured to foreshadow should find acceptance in the course of a war so exceptional in many respects as the present one. The neutral Powers have an interest in the preservation of usages which have grown up under their fostering influence. A united effort on their part might save the European world not only from further bloodshed but from what is almost as bad : the chaotic defiance of law and order with which we are threatened.

THOMAS BARCLAY.

THE PASSING OF THE CHILD

THERE is no need to emphasise the importance of maintaining the population of these islands so long as weight of numbers is the most potent factor in determining the issue of war. The growing size of the Allies' armies affords good reason for believing that the present struggle will end in a manner satisfactory to the British people, but immediate success alone would be a far from adequate recompense for the terrible cost incurred. To posterity will fall the task of seeing that what is now gained is kept. Optimists say that this War will end war, and though the future may show that to be the case, it would be too dangerous to act on the belief, and not to take all reasonable precautions against the possibility of having at some future time again to meet our present or other foes. International animosities persist for long periods, and nations have displayed astonishing powers of recuperation after defeat. The hatred of England which has arisen in Germany may, if she is beaten, leave a bitter and sullen people filled with a desire some day to wipe out their humiliation. Against this hostility neither battleships nor fortresses are likely to suffice, if there should be marked disparity in numbers. The purpose of this article is to show that changes have occurred, and are still taking place, in our population which point to the conclusion that the population of Germany, already much the greater, will in ensuing decades tend more and more to outstrip ours at an increasingly rapid rate. Unless the most vigorous steps are taken to counteract these changes, the next generation may be confronted with a situation more serious than that we have had to face, and much of our present effort may have been in vain.

The process of forecasting changes in population is not easy, for, before reliable inferences can be drawn from the census returns and annual reports on births and deaths, allowances have to be made and corrections introduced into the figures, the significance and effect of which may not be readily appreciated by those unversed in statistical methods. Before the War we witnessed year by year a steady decline in the birth-rate, but anxiety was allayed by the fact that the death-rate was seen to

be falling simultaneously at an equal or even, in some years, at a greater pace. Thus the comfortable margin between the two rates provided for a substantial yearly increment of population, even after allowance was made for the effect of emigration, and it was apparently assumed that this balance would be maintained indefinitely. But the problem involves much more than a simple subtraction of death-rate from birth-rate. The effect of making corrections in these rates to allow for variations in the proportion of people of different ages and different sexes in the population is much greater than is generally realised. The very ominous figures in the recently published volumes analysing the statistics of the last census have certainly not yet received the public attention they deserve. Read in conjunction with the later Reports of the Registrar-General, they point with a high degree of probability to a further fall in the birth-rate altogether independent of any increase in the practice which is the main cause of the fall, as well as to an automatic rise in the death-rate at no very distant time. It will be shown that the fall in the death-rate has not always been entirely due to improvements in sanitation and other conditions, and that the other causes which have helped to keep it down must operate less and less as time passes.

In order to deal with a complex subject in as simple a manner as possible, I propose first to examine the causes which influence a birth-rate, and to show how the birth-rate in this country, as usually measured, understates the real decline in fertility during recent decades; then to examine the death-rate and the interdependence of death-rates and birth-rates on each other, with a view to indicating how almost inevitable is a rise in the death-rate sooner or later; and finally to compare the corresponding statistics in Germany and certain other countries with those of this country.

THE DECLINE IN FERTILITY

The 'crude' birth-rate of a country is the number of living children born annually in a thousand of the population. It is a useful figure for arriving at the annual natural rate of increment of population, which may be done by subtracting from it the crude death-rate or number of persons in a thousand who die in a year. But when the object is to study the causes which have led to an upward or downward movement in the birth-rate, the extent to which those causes have operated in the past, and the manner in which they are likely to influence the rate in the future, it is necessary to seek other forms of expression in order to allow for variations from year to year, or from country to country, in the proportions of persons of different ages and different sexes.

It is clear, for example, that a population which contains a low proportion of women will, other conditions being the same, have a lower birth-rate than one in which the proportion is high. Similarly a population which contains an excess of persons below the age of 15, or of persons above the age of 45, or both, will tend to have a lower birth-rate than one in which the opposite condition prevails. In order to avoid these difficulties, the Registrar-General for England and Wales has adopted two other methods of measuring fertility—viz. by indicating the birth-rate per thousand of the female population between the ages of 15 and 45, and the legitimate birth-rate per thousand married women between the same ages. The statistics calculated by all three methods are stated in Table 1.

Table 1.—*Birth-rates and Fertility—England and Wales, 1876-1913.*

Year	Birth-rate Calculated on Total Population at all ages		Fertility Calculated on the Female Population aged 15-45 years		Legitimate Fertility Calculated on the Married Female Population aged 15-45 years	
	Rate per 1000	Compared with rate in 1876-80 taken as 100	Rate per 1000	Compared with rate in 1876-80 taken as 100	Rate per 1000	Compared with rate in 1876-80 taken as 100
1876	36.3	102.8	157.5	102.7	304.1	102.6
1878	35.6	100.8	154.5	100.8	298.8	100.8
1880	34.2	96.9	148.3	96.7	287.0	96.9
1882	33.8	95.8	145.8	95.1	283.9	95.8
1884	33.6	95.2	144.2	94.1	283.7	95.7
1886	32.8	92.9	140.2	91.5	278.0	93.8
1888	31.2	88.4	132.3	86.3	265.0	89.4
1890	30.2	85.6	127.6	83.2	258.2	87.1
1892	30.4	86.1	127.3	83.0	259.3	87.5
1894	29.6	83.9	122.4	79.8	249.4	84.2
1896	29.6	83.9	121.5	79.3	247.8	83.6
1898	29.3	83.0	118.9	77.6	243.0	82.0
1900	28.7	81.3	115.6	75.4	236.8	79.9
1902	28.5	80.7	114.4	74.6	234.1	79.0
1904	28.0	79.3	112.3	73.3	228.8	77.2
1906	27.2	77.1	109.2	71.2	221.6	74.8
1908	26.7	75.6	107.3	70.0	217.0	73.2
1909	25.8	73.1	103.6	67.6	208.8	70.5
1910	25.1	71.1	100.6	65.6	202.5	68.3
1911	24.4	69.1	97.8	63.8	196.2	66.2
1912	23.8	67.4	95.6	62.4	191.8	64.7
1913	23.9	—	—	—	—	—

The figures show that since 1877 there has been a heavy and almost uninterrupted fall in the birth-rate by whatever method it is expressed, and that the rate of fall has been accelerated during recent years.¹ Moreover, comparison of the columns

¹ The slight rise in 1913 may have been due to the influence of the Insurance Act leading to the registration of some births which might previously have been regarded as still-births. If so, it is of no significance.

shows that, owing to the increase in the proportion of women aged 15 to 45 in the population, the crude birth-rate appreciably understates the decline in fertility measured in relation to these. Commenting on these rates, Dr. Stevenson says in the Registrar-General's Annual Report for 1912 'If the fertility of married women in proportion to their numbers had been as high in 1912 as in 1876-80, the legitimate births would have numbered 1,290,480 instead of the 835,209 actually recorded, giving a legitimate birth-rate of 35.2.' A loss of more than 400,000 infant lives every year from one disease alone would lead to the most stupendous national efforts being made to check it. To compensate for this loss, the effects of infant clinics and schools for mothers are like saving a boatload from a sinking liner.

The chief cause of the decline in the birth-rate is well known : it is prevention of conception by artificial means.² But two other less generally recognised factors—viz. the decrease in the proportion of married persons in the population, and the postponement of marriage—are also operating to a subsidiary extent. Between 1871 and 1911 the proportion of persons married annually to a thousand marriageable persons—i.e. unmarried and widowed persons over 15 years of age—has fallen from 56.9 to 46.2. The postponement of marriage is shown by the fact that, since 1871, the percentage of married women aged 15 to 45, who are between the ages of 15 and 25, has dropped from 15.2 to 9.9, while the percentage who are between the ages of 25 and 45 has increased from 84.8 to 90.1. Since fertility diminishes with advancing age, this change must have had an appreciable effect in lowering the birth-rate.

In order to estimate the chances of arresting the fall in the birth-rate, in so far as it is due to prevention of conception, it is necessary to examine the extent to which the practice appears to have spread among the population. Although there are no very full figures relating to the point, it is generally believed that the custom of limiting the size of the family was, until recent years, practically restricted to the wealthier classes. But the completion of the census tabulation of occupations has now for the first time made it possible to express birth-rates in relation to the numbers of the parents engaged in various occupations. Table 2, taken from the Registrar-General's Annual Report for 1912, shows the rates for nine large social classes, though, as these classes overlap to some extent, the figures can only be regarded as approximately correct.

² An interesting article by Dr. Whitley in *Public Health* for February 1915 points also to an increase in the practice of procuring abortion.

Table 2.—*Legitimate Birth-rates in Social Classes—England and Wales, 1911.*

Social Class	Per 1000 Males aged 10 Years and over (including Retired)	Per 1000 Married Males aged under 55 Years (including Retired)
Upper and middle class	47	119
Intermediate class (excluding scholars)	46	132
Skilled workmen	73	153
Intermediate class	70	158
Unskilled workmen	90	213
Textile workers	50	125
Miners	107	230
Agricultural labourers	49	161

The most striking feature in this table is the low birth-rate among textile workers, which is very little above that of the upper and middle classes. Since the infant mortality in this group is twice as great as that of the middle classes, its effective fertility is actually the lowest of any in the list. This low rate, as the Registrar-General points out, is very strongly suggestive of purposeful avoidance of conception, since the custom of employing married female labour in the mills provides special economic inducements to this class to restrict its birth-rate. It is difficult to account otherwise for the difference between miners and mill hands, for the two classes are very similarly situated except as regards the employment of their womenfolk. The relative lowness of the rate among workmen of the skilled and intermediate class, as compared with unskilled workmen and miners, may be due to the same cause. The low rate among agricultural labourers is partially due to the low marriage-rate in that class, which may be associated with poorness of wages and inadequacy of housing accommodation. The revelation of the fact that the custom of restricting births has now reached the working-classes is one of the greatest significance. An extension of the practice among the huge groups which appear still to be unaffected would cause a further heavy fall in the general birth-rate.

A full discussion of the motives which have led to the custom of restricting births, or of the moral aspects of the question, would occupy too much space, but it seems probable that the causes are too deep-seated to justify hope that changes in social or economic conditions will alter them. Denunciations of 'selfishness' or the 'pursuit of pleasure' are, in my opinion, futile, and to a large extent unjustified. Selfishness may prevent some men from marrying, but in the vast majority of cases it is not selfishness which leads parents to limit their families. It is rather an added, if mistaken, sense of responsibility, a

strengthening of the 'family instinct' arising from the knowledge that they can better educate and provide for a few children than for a large family, even though this may be at the expense of the national interest. At present the miner and the unskilled labourer contribute year by year to the population, with heedless prodigality, children for the great majority of whom the future has only in store a life of toil from an early age. But the growth of education and the establishment of better conditions of life will almost certainly awaken among the masses the desire to improve the lot of their children which the wealthier classes have evinced. Even such steps as maternity benefit and instruction of mothers, by showing to what extent wise expenditure can improve the condition of the child, will probably accelerate the process. It must be remembered, also, that many social workers, as well as societies formed for the purpose, are from well-meaning motives actively propagating neomalthusianism among the working classes. We see here a conflict between the family instinct and the 'herd' or social instinct which is of singular interest from the biological point of view.

So far we have only examined the causes of the fall in the birth-rate which have been directly due to individual action, such as restriction of the family, or abstention from or postponement of marriage. But, in addition, the birth-rate is indirectly affected in a complex manner by changes in the age constitution, or proportions of persons of different ages in the population, which changes are in their turn associated with changes in the birth-rate, the death-rate, and the emigration rate. The effect these influences have had on the British population in the past, and are likely to have still more in the future, will perhaps be more readily understood if their consideration is deferred until the factors which influence a death-rate have been examined.

THE PROBABLE RISE IN THE DEATH-RATE

Apart from any real decline in mortality following improvement in conditions, or from a rise due to exceptional prevalence of disease, the three main factors which influence a death-rate are: (1) the proportion in the population of infants and young children; (2) the proportion of persons past middle life; and (3) the proportion of females. The way in which these factors operate may be best demonstrated by taking the actual death-rates* in England and Wales according to sex and age in the year 1912 (Table 3).

* These rates have been standardised to the year 1901, but for the purposes of the argument this does not affect their value.

Table 3.—*Death-rates at Twelve Groups of Ages—England and Wales, 1912.*

Ages	Males	Females	Persons
0- 5	35.4	29.4	32.4
5-10	3.1	3.0	3.1
10-15	1.8	2.0	1.9
15-20	2.8	2.7	2.8
20-25	3.5	3.1	3.3
25-35	4.7	3.9	4.3
35-45	8.0	6.4	7.2
45-55	14.7	11.2	12.9
55-65	29.9	22.7	26.1
65-75	63.9	51.7	57.1
75-85	138.1	118.9	126.7
85 and upwards	266.0	245.6	252.9
All ages	13.8	12.1	12.9

The infant-mortality rate, that is the deaths of infants per thousand births, was, in 1912, for males 106, for females 84, and for the two together 95.

(1) It will be noticed that the death-rate during the first five years of life is high, and is not exceeded in the following age-groups until the age 65-75 is reached. Moreover, if the figures for the first quinquennium were further analysed, it would be found that the highest death-rate is in the first year. It is clear, therefore, that an excess of infants and very young children in the population tends to increase the death-rate for the whole community.

(2) After the first quinquennium the death-rate remains low until the age 35-45 is reached, when an appreciable rise occurs, and thereafter it increases rapidly at each age-group. Accordingly, the greater the proportion of elderly persons in the population, the higher the death-rate.

(3) Except at the age 10-15, when the rate for females is slightly the less favourable, the mortality of males is appreciably higher at all age-groups than that of females. An excess of males, therefore, tends to raise the death-rate.

In consequence of these influences, before reliable inferences can be drawn from comparison of the crude death-rates in two years or two countries, it is necessary to 'standardise' them, that is to calculate what the death-rate in one year or one country would have been if the sex and age distribution of the population had been the same as in the other year or other country.

An interesting example of the way in which a crude death-rate may be misleading if not read in conjunction with the age constitution of a population is afforded by Ireland. The death-rate in that country, in 1912, was 16.5 per thousand, which is 3.2 per thousand above the English rate for the same period. At first sight this might suggest that Ireland is not so healthy a

country as England, though the opposite is probably the case. It is unfortunate that, although the Registrar-General for England quotes in his annual report the crude death-rate for Ireland, and the Registrar-General for Ireland quotes the crude rate for England, neither standardises his figures in terms of the other, since this would enable a comparison to be made between the two rates, in which differences arising from differences in the constitution of the populations had been eliminated. The rates would then be largely a test of conditions, and it is quite possible that the Irish rate would be the lower. There are, however, indirect ways of gauging the healthiness of a country which, when applied to Ireland, justify the belief that it is more favourable to human life than England, in spite of its higher death-rate. In the first place, the Irish infant-mortality rate is the lowest in Europe, with the exception of those in Norway and Sweden, and it compares remarkably well with the rate in either England or Scotland. Since 1881 it has only twice reached 110 per thousand births, and since 1904 it has been below 100. In 1912 it was 86. These rates may be contrasted with the figures for England and Wales given in Table 4. It will be seen that the latter have often been above 130 or more, and in 1912 the rate was 95. The low rate of infant mortality in Ireland must be attributed chiefly to the fact that the rural population bears a much larger proportion to the total population than is the case in England and Wales. Another rough index of conditions is afforded by the frequency and extent of infectious diseases, particularly enteric fever, and in these respects the Irish returns are, on the whole, as satisfactory as the English.

The chief reason why the death-rate is higher in Ireland than in England is the fact that for many years emigration has been draining away the younger members of the community, and, in consequence, the proportion of persons beyond middle life is considerably higher in Ireland than in England. The same reason accounts for the low birth-rate, 23.0 in 1912, owing to the comparatively low proportion of married women in the population; for the steadiness of the rate, which has scarcely changed at all during the last thirty years, gives good ground for believing that the practice of preventing conception has not reached Ireland. In backward countries, and in large towns, where masses of people are living under unsatisfactory conditions, it is generally the case that a high birth-rate and a high death-rate go together; but Ireland affords an instance of a country where a low birth-rate is associated with a relatively high death-rate, the explanation of which is to be found in the higher average age of the population. In this country we have, in

addition to emigration, another powerful influence, the falling birth-rate, reducing the proportion of young people, and these will ultimately have the same effect, with the added disadvantage that the natural mortality here is probably higher than in Ireland.

It is now necessary to examine the death-rate in England and Wales in the light of what has been said regarding influence of age. Table 4 sets out the crude and standardised death-rates and infant mortality rate since 1877.

Table 4.—*Death-rates and Infants Mortality—England and Wales, 1877–1913.*

Year	Crude Rates per 1000 living	Rates Standardised to year 1901	Deaths of Infants under One Year per 1000 Births	Year	Crude Rates per 1000 Living	Rates Standardised to Year 1901	Deaths of Infants under One Year per 1000 Births
1877	20.3	19.4	136	1896	17.1	16.9	148
1878	21.6	20.5	152	1897	17.4	17.3	156
1879	20.7	19.9	135	1898	17.5	17.4	160
1880	20.5	19.5	153	1899	18.2	18.2	163
1881	18.9	18.2	130	1900	18.2	18.2	154
1882	19.6	18.8	141	1901	16.9	16.9	151
1883	19.6	19.0	137	1902	16.3	16.2	133
1884	19.7	19.0	147	1903	15.5	15.4	132
1885	19.2	18.7	138	1904	16.3	16.2	145
1886	19.5	19.0	149	1905	15.3	15.2	128
1887	19.1	18.6	145	1906	15.5	15.3	132
1888	18.1	17.7	136	1907	15.1	14.9	118
1889	18.2	17.9	144	1908	14.8	14.5	120
1890	19.5	19.3	151	1909	14.6	14.3	109
1891	20.2	20.0	149	1910	13.5	13.2	105
1892	19.0	18.8	148	1911	14.6	14.3	130
1893	19.2	18.9	159	1912	13.3	12.9	95
1894	16.6	16.4	137	1913	13.7	13.4	109
1895	18.7	18.5	161				

These figures show that there has been a considerable fall in the death-rate and, particularly in recent years, in the infant mortality rate, the great bulk of which must be attributed to progress in sanitation and improved conditions. But while the fall provides gratifying evidence of the value of the efforts that have been made, it also shows that the time when this influence must reach its natural limit has been brought perceptibly nearer. There have been, however, since 1877 substantial changes in the age constitution of the population, owing to the fall in the birth-rate, the decline in infant mortality, the decline in the general death-rate, and the effect of emigration. In order to appreciate the influences these changes have had on the death-rate in the past, and to estimate the effect they are likely to have in the future, it is necessary to see clearly what these changes have been. Table 5 shows the proportion of persons in five-yearly groups of ages in a million of the population at each census since 1851.

Table 5.—Persons at Quinquennial Groups of Ages in a Million at each Census, 1851 to 1911, England and Wales.

Ages	1851	1861	1871	1881	1891	1901	1911
Under 5 yrs.	130,977	134,594	135,225	135,551	122,523	114,262	106,857
5-10	116,712	116,816	119,166	121,173	117,065	107,209	102,488
10-15	106,727	104,912	106,737	107,811	111,148	102,735	97,023
15-20	98,016	96,313	96,002	98,067	101,745	99,796	92,502
20-25	92,963	91,173	88,268	89,635	91,248	95,946	88,042
25-30	82,024	78,198	78,398	78,847	81,036	86,833	85,362
30-35	71,182	69,110	68,685	67,199	69,907	74,746	79,765
35-40	60,720	61,026	59,058	59,343	61,435	65,956	72,449
40-45	54,029	56,519	54,147	53,874	53,341	56,893	61,896
45-50	44,568	46,389	46,364	44,327	46,094	48,365	53,384
50-55	39,537	40,195	41,594	39,349	39,998	40,857	44,432
55-60	29,356	30,599	31,620	31,049	30,484	32,359	35,443
60-65	26,847	27,720	27,416	28,013	26,649	27,382	28,276
65-70	18,269	18,766	19,428	19,345	19,720	19,358	22,368
70-75	13,954	14,021	14,264	13,473	14,410	13,722	15,347
75-80	8,149	8,005	8,013	7,790	8,045	8,131	8,593
80-85	4,119	3,970	3,955	3,686	3,644	3,959	3,997
85 & upwards	1,851	1,674	1,660	1,468	1,508	1,491	1,776

The startling feature in this table is the decrease in the proportion of infants and young children since 1881. Up to that year the number in a million of the population showed a slight tendency to increase, but the fall in the birth-rate has now lowered the number below five years of age from 135,551 to 106,857 in 1911. Falls of only slightly less magnitude have occurred in the succeeding quinquennia, while for every age-group above 20-25 there has been an increase. The effect of the fall was naturally at first most felt at early ages, and the reduction in the proportion of infants and young children, among whom as was shown mortality is high, was so great as to bring down the general death-rate for the whole community. As Dr. Stevenson has pointed out, this effect continued up to about the year 1901, but since that year the favourable influence upon the general death-rate of reduction in the proportion of infants has been outweighed by the adverse effect of reduction in the proportion of children and youths and increase in that of elderly persons. It must constantly be borne in mind that although the numbers of persons in the higher age-groups are relatively small, the much higher death-rate in them compensates for this deficiency in its effect on the general death-rate. The rise in the death-rate, however, which would have occurred in consequence of the increase in the number of elderly persons, has been masked by the real decline in mortality resulting from improved conditions, an effect which must become progressively less.

It should be noticed (and the importance of this will be seen when we come to consider Germany) that since a generation has

not yet passed, the full effect of the reduction in children has yet to be felt. The survivors of those who were in the first age-group in 1881 are only in the seventh group in 1911. It is not until they have reached the last group that the full effect of the decline in 1881-86 will be exhausted. But since 1881 there have been further declines in each year, the effect of which is more and more postponed. Thus the drop in the first quinquennium in recent years is still actually exerting a favourable influence on the general death-rate owing to the high rate of infant and child mortality, and its adverse effect will not be felt for another twenty years or more.

The way in which the immediate effect is postponed may perhaps be rendered clearer by another observation. If the columns for 1881 and 1891 be compared, it will be seen that the decrease is limited to the first two quinquennia. That means that all the sixteen succeeding age-groups are available in which to make good the deficiency in the million. But comparing 1891 and 1901, a drop occurs in the first four quinquennia, and increase is now limited to the fourteen higher age-groups. Between 1901 and 1911, the decline extends to six quinquennia, and still greater compensation must occur in the remaining twelve age-groups. Even if the practice responsible for the fall in the birth-rate were at once arrested we cannot escape having yet to pay the full penalty for the restriction of earlier years.

There is, of course, room for a considerable fall in the infant mortality rate, which is still appallingly high in many of our large cities. The figures for 1913, however, are not so encouraging as might be wished, and tremendous efforts will be necessary in order to secure a substantial decline. But it must be remembered that as the proportion of the population upon which this favourable influence acts becomes steadily less, the reduction it effects in the general death-rate will become progressively less marked. In any case the outlook is not bright. If conditions of life are substantially improved, acceleration of the preventive movement is likely to occur; if they are left as they are, or become worse, there is little hope for reduction of infant mortality.

The question of increase or decrease of population is further complicated by the effects of emigration and immigration. It is not possible to estimate the extent of these movements in the future from the experience of the past, since the numbers who leave our shores for permanent residence abroad fluctuate considerably from year to year, in accordance with the demand for labour in the colonies and foreign countries, the conditions of trade at home, and other factors. But, on the whole, emigration has very considerably increased in recent years, and in 1913 the

number of emigrants from the United Kingdom was 388,813. There was an inward movement of 86,758, hence the net loss on balance was 302,055, a number which was more than three quarters of the natural increment of population in England and Wales, due to excess of births over deaths in 1913.⁴ But while there is uncertainty as to numbers the general effect is well known. The great bulk of emigrants consist of young unmarried persons or married couples with their families, and the result of this steady drain from our population is still further to raise the average age of those who are left, and thereby lower the birth-rate and raise the death-rate. Nor can consolation be derived from the belief that our loss is entirely our colonies' gain, for out of the net loss of 302,055 in 1913, over 77,000 went to the United States. It is impossible yet to predict how emigration will be affected by the War. The necessity of repairing the waste may lead to a period of activity in trade in this country which will check emigration for a considerable time. On the other hand, the lessened demand for luxuries of all sorts may more than counterbalance this, while the opportunities America now has of building up industries may give rise to a great demand for labour in that country.

The ultimate effect of these processes, if they continue unchecked, must be to bring about a rise in the death-rate. It may be useful to show that this conclusion can be reached by another line of reasoning.

We have been dealing with changes in population which extend over considerable periods of years, and may require as much as a generation before their full effect is reached. To measure these changes and estimate their complete effects, an *annual* death-rate is a fallacious guide. Just as a weekly death-rate which varies with climatic changes, or seasonal fluctuations in population, or epidemics, is no criterion of the death-rate for the year, so an annual death-rate may have little relation to the death-rate extending over decades or generations, and that is what we are concerned with here. An illustration may make this clear. Let us imagine a population of a thousand school children who throughout life are kept together. During the early years the death-rate may be zero. As they grow up, the annual death-rate gradually and continually rises from one per thousand when the first child dies, until, perhaps, the last two or three members of the community die in extreme old age in the same year, when the annual death-rate would be a thousand per thousand. Now, the average annual death-rate is a figure intermediate between these two. This is equally true if we imagine the thousand children scattered through the general

⁴ The births in England and Wales in 1913 were 872,737, and the deaths 486,939.

population. In other words, an exceptionally low death-rate in a population which is not being continually recruited by young members (save such part as can be directly attributed to permanent improvement in conditions) must be compensated for, either by an exceptionally high death-rate in the same area at a later period, or by a higher death-rate in another area or areas contemporaneously. It is only necessary to look at some local annual death-rates in order to see that this must be true. The crude death-rates in Eastbourne, Southend-on-Sea, St. Albans, Woking, Watford, and Cromer were all below 10 per thousand living in 1912. Now, if it be realised that a death-rate of 10 per thousand, if continuous in the same population, would mean everybody born living to a hundred years, it becomes evident that in these localities some factors, such as an excess of women or young persons, or a low proportion of infants, must be operating to keep the death-rates down. Yet these influences may produce a similar and prolonged effect in a population so large that it can scarcely be described as 'local.' In Australia the death-rate since 1900 has not exceeded 12.5 per thousand, and for many years before that date it was only a point or two higher. This means an average life of eighty years for everyone born. Such a rate can only be maintained indefinitely by a continual addition of young people to the population, either in consequence of a high birth-rate or by immigration, and that this has occurred in Australia is shown by the great increase in the annual number of marriages. The following figures are most instructive :

Table 6.—*Vital Statistics in Australia, 1893-1912.*

Year	Estimated Population in middle of each Year	Persons Married	Proportion per 1000 of the Population			Deaths under One Year of Age per 1000 Births
			Persons Married	Births	Deaths	
1893	3,333,825	41,262	12.4	32.8	13.7	115
1894	3,394,328	41,250	12.2	30.8	12.7	103
1895	3,459,192	43,128	12.5	30.4	12.5	101
1896	3,522,362	46,136	13.1	28.4	12.8	113
1897	3,585,442	47,878	13.4	28.2	12.1	105
1898	3,641,251	48,944	13.4	27.2	14.1	127
1899	3,690,353	51,916	14.1	27.3	12.9	117
1900	3,740,665	54,202	14.5	27.3	11.8	100
1901	3,790,710	55,506	14.6	27.2	12.2	104
1902	3,847,998	55,852	14.5	26.7	12.5	107
1903	3,893,329	51,954	13.3	25.3	12.2	111
1904	3,942,730	55,364	14.0	26.4	11.1	82
1905	4,001,117	58,008	14.5	26.2	10.9	82
1906	4,060,324	60,820	15.0	26.6	10.9	83
1907	4,123,729	64,940	15.7	26.8	11.0	81
1908	4,194,410	65,102	15.5	26.6	11.1	78
1909	4,274,617	67,550	15.8	26.7	10.3	72
1910	4,370,185	73,184	16.7	26.7	10.4	75
1911	4,490,366	78,964	17.6	27.2	10.7	68
1912	4,644,852	84,294	18.1	28.7	11.2	72

It should be noticed that while, during a period of twenty years, the population has increased by rather more than a quarter, the number of persons married in the year has more than doubled.

In England and Wales, in 1912 (the latest year for which detailed figures are available), the death-rate was 13.3, which, if continuous in a stationary population, would mean an average life of seventy-five years for everyone born. But, while in Australia the death-rate has been kept low by the continual influx of young people into the population, in this country precisely the opposite influence is working. We are continually lessening our proportion of young people, both by limitation of the family and by emigration, and there is, in addition, the temporary effect of the War. Despite further reduction of mortality from improvements in conditions, it is impossible not to come to the conclusion that sooner or later the death-rate will rise. In the evolutionary process Australia affords an example of a country at one end of the scale, and France and Ireland examples at the other end. If we wish to guess at what the death-rate in this country will ultimately be, we must turn to the death-rates in those countries, which were 17.5 and 16.5 respectively in 1912. The practical point is how soon will the rise begin, and in this connexion the figures for the last few years are significant. If reference be made to Table 4, it will be seen that, although infant mortality has been low, in two out of the three years succeeding 1910 the death-rate was higher than in 1910, and that there was only a difference of .2 in 1912, the year in which it was lower. It would almost appear as though we had already reached the bottom of the wave.

The returns for other countries of the Empire are equally ominous. In Scotland, in 1912, the excess of births over deaths amounted to 48,404, but the loss by migration was 58,459. Hence, for the first time since 1855, when the present system of registration began, the population of Scotland showed a decrease, which amounted to 10,055. It is significant of the rate at which rural depopulation continues in that country, that the loss was almost entirely confined to the country districts and smaller towns, for the larger burghs, in the aggregate, actually showed an increase.

In Ireland, the population in 1851, the first census year after the great famine, was 6,574,278. Since that year it has fallen almost without intermission to 4,384,710 in 1912, chiefly owing to emigration to the United States. Recent years, however, afford ground for hoping that the process has now been checked, for there was a slight rise in 1910, and again in 1912.

In Australia the births in 1893 numbered 109,322; in 1912

they had only increased to 133,088, although by that year the annual number of persons married had more than doubled. As shown in Table 6, the marriage-rate increased by nearly fifty per cent., but the birth-rate fell from 32.8 to 28.7. In New Zealand, the marriage-rate increased from 12.4 in 1893, to 17.6 in 1912, but during the same period the birth-rate fell from 27.5 to 26.5. In Ontario, the marriage-rate has risen from 13.4 in 1893, to 22.2 in 1912; the birth-rate, 19.7 in 1893, increased up to 1908, when it was 25.6, but since that year it has fallen continuously to 22.4, in 1912. As previously shown, in the absence of knowledge regarding sex and age constitution, the crude birth-rate is not a satisfactory measure of fertility. But the figures for all these Colonies strongly suggest that restriction of births is practised in them.

To sum up, then, we are confronted with the following exceedingly probable developments :

(1) A further continuous fall in the birth-rate, owing to the spread of the practice of preventing conception, and possibly also to the further diminution in the proportion of married persons, and to the increased postponement of marriage. In addition, the fall will be increased by the rise in the average age of the population, brought about by the heavy fall which has already occurred, but has not yet produced its full effect, the ultimate effect of the further fall which may be anticipated, and the probable continuance of emigration of young persons.

(2) A diminution in the rate of fall of the death-rate, followed by a period during which the rate will remain more or less constant and which may already have been reached, and then a steady rise. These changes will be produced by the rise in the average age of the population again, as in (1), due to the decline of the birth-rate in the past, and the further decline which may be expected in the future. They may be masked for a time by a real decline in mortality owing to improved conditions, but the effect of this will become less and less as its natural limit is approached. On the other hand, they may be accelerated by increased emigration.

The margin between the birth-rate and the death-rate is now 10.2. It may be highly rash to predict when this will disappear, but if the figures should approximate at an average rate of .5 per annum (and this is only about what the average fall in the birth-rate alone has been during recent years), twenty years will see a stationary population in this country.

THE COMPARISON WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Birth- and death-rates in European countries show considerable range of variation. Roughly they are an index of social

conditions, and for this purpose perhaps the infant mortality rate is the most useful. Owing, however, to incompleteness of information as to age and sex constitutions, detailed comparisons are limited. Table 7 shows the movements of population in some of the chief European countries,⁵ and the birth- and death-rates since 1893.

Table 7.—Vital Statistics in European Countries, 1893, 1903 and 1912.

Country	Year	Population, estimated to Middle of each Year	Births per 1000 of the Population	Deaths per 1000 of the Population	Deaths of Infants under One Year to 1000 Births ^a
Austria . .	1893	24,152,635	38.2	27.3	232
	1903	26,780,035	35.3	23.8	215
	1912	28,879,295	31.3	20.5	180
Belgium . .	1893	6,262,272	29.5	20.3	165
	1903	6,985,219	27.5	17.0	155
	1912	7,571,387	22.9 ⁷	16.4 ⁷	167 ⁷
France . .	1893	38,380,000	22.8	22.5	173
	1903	39,124,000	21.1	19.2	137
	1912	39,660,000	19.0	17.5	78
Hungary . .	1893	17,779,476	42.6	31.2	239
	1903	19,669,177	36.9	26.2	212
	1912	21,134,862	36.3	23.3	186
Italy . .	1893	30,875,678	36.5	25.2	180
	1903	32,839,509	31.7	22.4	168
	1912	35,026,486	32.4	18.2	153 ⁷
The Netherlands	1893	4,701,243	33.8	19.2	164
	1903	5,389,066	31.6	15.6	135
	1912	6,068,389	28.1	12.3	87
Norway . .	1893	2,021,400	30.6	16.3	89
	1903	2,265,900	28.8	14.7	79
	1912	2,393,300	25.4	13.4	65 ⁷
Roumania . .	1893	5,485,739	40.5	30.8	217
	1903	6,292,032	40.1	24.8	201
	1912	7,230,418	43.4	22.9	186
Russia ^a . .	1893	93,292,955 ⁹	47.0	33.1	252
	1903	103,423,601	48.1	30.0	256
	1912	122,550,700	44.0 ¹⁰	28.9 ¹⁰	248 ¹⁰
Spain . .	1893	17,996,000	35.6	29.7	—
	1903	18,853,000	36.3	25.0	162
	1912	19,562,568	32.6	21.8	—
Sweden . .	1893	4,815,508	27.4	16.8	101
	1903	5,210,022	25.7	15.1	93
	1912	5,582,996	23.7	14.2	72 ⁷

The highest birth-rate in any European country is in Russia. A tendency to fall began in 1902, when the highest rate, 49.1, was reached; but it is likely to be many years before the decline approaches that manifested in more progressive Western Europe. Russia's enormous population is advancing at a greater

^a Exclusive of Germany and the United Kingdom, which are dealt with in Tables 8 and 9.

⁷ Exclusive of still-births. ⁹ 1911. ¹⁰ European (fifty Governments, excluding Finland and Provinces of the Vistula and of the Caucasus). ¹⁰ 1894.
¹⁰ 1909.

rate than that of any other European country, and if she should succeed in reducing her death-rate, which already shows a perceptible decline, her numbers must more and more outstrip those of other nations. Very similar figures are shown by Roumania, Servia, and Bulgaria. Peering into the distant future, we may eventually see the Slav races increased relatively in such enormous proportion that they may come to dominate all Europe, but this is a flight of fancy which has little practical importance at present.

Between the conditions in Russia and in France no contrast could be greater. It was in the latter country that restriction of births originated, and its tragic effects are now abundantly clear. During the ten years 1902 to 1912, while Russia added nearly twenty-one millions to her population—one fifth of the total in 1902—France increased hers by little more than half a million. Though in 1912 France succeeded in reducing her infant mortality rate to 78—a remarkable achievement—her general death-rate still remained at 17.5. This is a measure of what ours may eventually be.

Among the smaller countries the rapid decline in the birth-rate in Belgium may be noted.

It is, however, the comparison between Germany and the United Kingdom which is of the greatest interest at present, and for this purpose it is desirable to set out the statistics more fully than they have been given for other countries.

Table 8.—United Kingdom.

Year	Population, estimated to middle of each Year	Births per 1000 of the Population	Deaths per 1000 of the Population	Deaths of Infants under One Year per 1000 Births
1883	35,449,721	32.0	19.6	131
1893	38,490,333	29.8	19.0	151
1894	38,859,067	28.8	16.8	131
1895	39,221,109	29.4	18.7	152
1896	39,599,072	29.0	16.9	139
1897	39,987,294	28.9	17.6	150
1898	40,380,792	28.7	17.7	153
1899	40,774,296	28.5	18.2	154
1900	41,154,646	28.2	18.4	147
1901	41,538,211	28.0	17.1	144
1902	41,892,680	28.0	16.5	128
1903	42,246,591	28.0	15.8	127
1904	42,611,375	27.7	16.6	139
1905	42,980,788	27.1	15.6	124
1906	43,361,077	27.0	15.7	127
1907	43,737,834	26.3	15.5	114
1908	44,123,819	26.5	15.3	118
1909	44,519,454	25.7	15.0	107
1910	44,915,934	25.0	14.0	105
1911	45,298,573	24.4	14.8	125
1912	45,662,646	23.9	13.8	—

Table 9.—German Empire.

Year	Population estimated to middle of each Year	Births per 1000 of the Population	Deaths per 1000 of the Population	Deaths of Infants under One Year per 1000 Births
1883	46,013,927	36.6	25.9	—
1893	50,756,521	36.8	24.8	—
1894	51,339,492	35.9	22.3	—
1895	52,001,060	36.1	22.1	—
1896	52,753,455	36.3	20.8	—
1897	53,569,271	36.0	21.3	—
1898	54,406,277	36.1	20.5	—
1899	55,248,225	35.8	21.5	—
1900	56,045,886	35.6	22.1	—
1901	56,861,612	35.7	20.7	207
1902	57,709,213	35.1	19.5	183
1903	58,575,463	33.9	20.0	204
1904	59,430,283	34.1	19.6	196
1905	60,285,103	33.0	19.8	205
1906	61,139,923	33.1	18.2	185
1907	61,994,743	32.3	18.0	176
1908	62,849,563	32.1	18.1	178
1909	63,695,875	31.1	17.2	170
1910	64,568,951	29.8	16.2	162
1911	65,425,851	28.6	17.3	192

In 1911 the population of Germany exceeded that of the United Kingdom by more than twenty millions. For many years its rate of increase has been the greater. Between 1901 and 1911, while the United Kingdom added 3,760,362 to its population, an increase of 9 per cent., Germany added 8,564,239, an increase of 15 per cent. The birth-rate in Germany in 1911 was 4.2 per thousand higher than that in the United Kingdom. It has fallen from the fairly constant neighbourhood of 36 during the later years of the last century, but it is of the greatest importance to notice that the fall in Germany did not begin until about 1902, and has only become considerable during quite recent years. As already explained, the full effect of the fall on the population is not felt for a considerable time. In this country the decline began about 1877. It is quite possible that Germany may eventually reach the static condition which has almost been reached in France, and which this country appears to be approaching, but now, in 1915, Germany is only where we were in 1890. As regards the immediate future Germany starts with an advantage over us of twenty-five years.

The death-rate in Germany in 1911 was 2.5 higher than that in the United Kingdom, and the infant mortality rate was 192 as compared with 125. There is therefore much more scope for reduction of the death-rate in Germany, and especially of the infant mortality rate, than in the United Kingdom.

Taking all the factors into consideration, therefore, there seems to be good reason for believing that if Germany does not

lose an appreciable part of her population as a result of the War, her numbers relatively to ours will increase very largely during the next twenty or thirty years. We cannot tell yet what internal effects the War will have in that country. It may be that a period of terrible depression must be gone through which will send up the death-rate, check efforts at social reform, and encourage emigration. There is also the actual loss of life in the field to be remembered, but the effect of this will not be so great as a diminution of population which included women. On the other hand, the intense national consciousness of the Germans may, if they are beaten, engender a desire for revenge in the future which might be more effective in arresting the decline of the birth-rate than anything we can hope to do in this country.

We may justly entertain the belief that the friendship established between the Allies will be lasting, but we cannot always expect to receive Russia's active assistance. If that country should gain, as a result of the War, an entry into the Mediterranean, an ice-free port in the Baltic, and a strip of new territory, she is not likely to want more for many a long year. That she should go to war from purely altruistic motives is to say the least doubtful. Nor would it be in accordance with British traditions to rely continually upon another Power. France in the matter of population is even in a worse position than we are.

The importance of giving the profoundest consideration to the future growth of populations, when the terms of peace are discussed, becomes obvious, if it be realised that the populations of East Prussia and Alsace-Lorraine, the territories which general opinion seems to agree a defeated Germany should lose, are together less than four millions. Even if the province of West Prussia be included the addition is less than two millions.

The artificial restriction of the family is a new feature in the history of mankind which has not so far received the attention from the detached, biological point of view that it deserves. Yet it may have effects ultimately more stupendous and far-reaching than any of those great movements of the past—migrations, conquests, epidemics, religious changes—which, beginning in prehistoric times, have so profoundly influenced human development. In this country, with one exception, the process began earlier and has gone further than among any other people. Unless we can—and quickly too—reduce our infant mortality to an extent hitherto un hoped for, can improve conditions of life so that our young people no longer seek for happiness or opportunity abroad, and can awaken the national conscience on the question of births, the future of our nation is grave.

WILLIAM A. BREND.

*THE PROFESSIONAL CLASSES,
THE WAR, AND THE BIRTH-RATE*

It is perhaps early days to discuss what is to happen after the War, but to those who love their England the question is already paramount, as to what they can do for their country when she emerges torn and bleeding, but, as we hope and believe, victorious from that terrible conflict.

Some will, no doubt, say that we have given our own life-blood and that of our nearest and dearest, also in a great measure of our wealth and labour voluntarily, and that the Government will see to it that we pay for the War by increased taxation. All this is true, and doubly true, but I think what the Spirit of Britain, if she could speak, would say, at least to the younger married members of the community, is 'Give me sons and daughters—sons to take the place of the gallant dead, daughters to bear and train the coming generations for their country's good.'

If, as we are told, War is a great purifier and simplifier of life, then it seems to me that one of the chief signs of England's decadence, the serious decline in her birth-rate, ought after the War to be one of the first things to right itself, and we should once more become a virile, prolific nation, ready to people our own land and our Colonies with healthy sons and daughters. Now this demand can be met easily, with perhaps some self-sacrifice and a little inconvenience, by the upper and moneyed classes—also by the working-man with his insurances, his free education, free hospitals, etc., etc. It is met too freely already by the improvident poor, who cast their offspring heedlessly on an indulgent and 'grandmotherly' State: but what of the middle classes—the 'backbone of England,' especially the upper middle and professional classes (of whom alone I speak with real inside knowledge)? An increased birth-rate is, and will be, to them a counsel of perfection, unless and until the burden of living is lifted in some measure from their shoulders, as for the last fifty years it has in ever-increasing measure been lifted from the shoulders of the lower classes.

I here put out of count altogether the eugenist plea for quality instead of quantity, as it has been abundantly proved that many of the world's greatest men have been younger members of large families; and, of the few large families still met with, the younger members are by no means the least gifted, either mentally or physically.

That these large families are few and far between, especially in the upper and upper middle classes, is shown by the number of only sons among the officers' names in the present casualty lists. That I myself can claim to be the mother of (for these days) an unusually large family is proved by the fact that when I went to consult a well-known lady's doctor in London and replied 'nine' to his question of how many children I had had, he seemed utterly amazed, and said that in all his experience he had never had a patient with more than five children, and that number even was most uncommon.

I must certainly confess that the stamina of the present generation of women does not seem to allow of the yearly baby spoken of so calmly in old Dr. Chavasse's *Advice to a Wife*, in which he says 'Some ladies breed every twelve months.' I found this out to my cost, as four children in as many years led to the loss of two of them in early infancy through malnutrition. Now, with a personal experience of the mental and physical strain, toil and suffering entailed on both parents by the production and rearing of such a large family on a small income, I should be the last to blame my own relations, friends, and equals for deliberately limiting the number of their family.

This is not as it should be, or as it was in the time of our grandparents, and one longs for the day when a great statesman may arise who will have the welfare of the *middle* classes at heart, and make it possible for them to increase their family every two or three years to the total of at least five or six, in health, comfort, and security for their future.

Of course everything 'middle' tends to be dull and uninteresting—middle age, mid-Victorian, Middle Ages (synonym for ignorance and sloth), and in legislating for the staid, respectable, uncomplaining, easily reckoned-up middle classes, there is nothing of the glamour of the fight for the Lords, with their long line of historic and hereditary rule, or of the swaying of the new democracy, with its elusive, unexpected, 'what will you give me to put you in power?' popular vote.

And so the 'backbone of England' is left to decay—the 'learned' class, which has for centuries supplied the bulk of the great men of England—statesmen, lawyers, soldiers, ecclesiastics, scholars, scientists, artists (that is, interpreters of all the Arts).

Now, to go back to the beginning of the question, the birth-rate itself, I most emphatically deny that this is low in the professional class from any motives of self-indulgence, love of pleasure, or shrinking from pain or trouble to themselves. Of all classes of the community, they are perhaps the one which shows the most devotion, love, and care for their children, and it is these very characteristics that make them shrink from bringing into the world young lives, to whom for lack of means they cannot afford to give the best that life has to offer.

To them, remember, in these modern days, comfortable conditions of living, a good education, a circle of congenial friends, Art, travel, up-to-date amusements, are not luxuries, but as much necessities of life as the working-man's 'meat' dinner, gossip at the street corners, public-house, and football match; and to have to deny these to their children is as bitter as it is to the working-man to see his children ill-clad and ill-fed. (I am, of course, here comparing the best of both classes.)

Now, let us take a typical case of an ordinary professional man—say a doctor or solicitor in a country town or growing provincial town, with an income of from 500*l.* to 1000*l.* a year, never likely to increase much, and earned by constant toil and diligence, with but little time for rest or recreation.

I am not here considering the case of the clergy, with their often pitifully small incomes, for which reason (*and* others) one sometimes longs for a celibate Anglican priesthood, despite the fact that many great men have been reared in English vicarages. Still, they have some alleviations in reduction of fees for education and other purposes, and in generous gifts and benefactions.

With the advent of the first baby expenses begin—doctor's and nurse's fees (larger than formerly), increase in household staff, increased cost of living.

With 'number three' baby comes the difficulty with modern servants, who 'really could not come to such a large family,' must have wages increased to stay, could not dream of taking a baby at night! (Poor brain-weary father, and anxious, tired mother!) It perhaps also entails a move into a larger house, where upkeep, rates, rent and taxes are all increased. Meanwhile, the subscription list is almost daily lengthening, and the visiting list must be kept up and added to for the children's sake, both entailing increased expenditure.

The minor childish ailments safely over, including probably one or two small operations such as for adenoids, which did not appear to trouble our forebears, also the stopping of first teeth only recently proved necessary, the question of education begins. *N.B.*: All these things are now supplied free to the working-man, and by maternity benefit his children are even born free,

while ours are 'bought' from the very beginning. I once remarked half-jokingly to a dentist that he ought to 'make a reduction on taking a quantity,' in reference to the bills for my large family, but he replied that, on the contrary, he ought to charge *double*, as children were so much more trouble than adults.

As to education, a moderately good governess or a small day school may suffice for a beginning for the boys, but what after that? Many people will say 'Why not be content with the local Grammar or High School, or even Secondary School, all designed for the "sons of gentlemen"?' Yes; but unfortunately they are not entirely filled by the 'sons of gentlemen,' and the parents dread the lack of refinement in speech, manners, and companionship, and even the loss of caste from which their boys will suffer there. Call them 'snobs' if you will—but that will only be, O Censorious One! if you have enough money to educate your own son well, or do not desire 'The Best' for him!

Probably the father himself, and the mother's relations, have been at Public Schools, and shall they do less well for their own sons? For, criticise the Public School system as they may and do, the English upper classes are still convinced that it is the only possible education for a gentleman. So with much saving and economy, sacrifice of precious capital, or even alas! in some cases debts or loans to be refunded later on—the boys are sent—first in all probability to an expensive Preparatory School—and then to their father's beloved old Public School—there to spend, no doubt, the four happiest years of all their lives. For some there is, of course, the great relief of Scholarships, but these benefit the minority of brilliant or fortunate boys, not the majority of ordinary ones.

As illustrating the practical utility of a boy's Public School education, in answer to the detractors' plea of useless expenditure for the professional classes, I will quote one concrete example.

A boy whom I know left his Public School at eighteen, and almost immediately got a commission in his local Territorial regiment. A few months later a senior officer remarked to the boy's sister 'Your brother has a wonderful way with the men, they will do anything for him.' Now, I ask, would this have been the case if that boy had been educated at the local Grammar School among these men themselves, or their relatives and intimates, who had attained to it by exhibitions or County Council Scholarships? No, I think not! Now, the bulk of our Territorial officers and a large number of those in the Regular Forces are drawn from the professional classes, and this War has already abundantly proved that the prestige of our officers, their unique combination of friendliness with unquestioned authority over their

men, is a great factor in the success of our arms, and hence a national asset. Nowhere is this faculty of leading men acquired so naturally as at our great Public Schools, and this, in fact, has been already acknowledged by other nations.

In this War, where all are so gallant, it seems invidious to apportion special praise to certain regiments, but I certainly think the Territorial units at the Front deserve all they have been given. The nation must remember that, whereas the Regular Forces have adopted the Services *as their career*, the Territorials and New Army are in many cases sacrificing their career as civilians entirely to the cause. The financial loss to the wives and children of professional men will certainly be great, especially as taxation always falls heaviest on the middle classes, and the Income Tax heaviest of all on those who earn their living, literally, by the 'sweat of their brow' in strenuous brain-work. The Death Duties also form a great burden to the middle classes, and I know of cases where a much 'looked-forward-to' bequest from a distant relative or friend has diminished, through recent taxation, by at least one third of its original value.

But now to return to our professional man's family.

With regard to the girls—even with a good governess the lack of advantages in a small town, as to outside tuition in special subjects, also the difficulty of their forming suitable friendships, is such as to discountenance an entirely 'Home' education; while the mother dare not face the moral and physical dangers of a daily train journey to and from school in a neighbouring large town.

There is, therefore, no alternative except a good boarding school with all its expenses, for at least the last three years of the girls' school life.

The children having been educated, they then have to be put out into the world, girls as well as boys, as there is rarely enough capital to provide more than a mere pittance, in case of need, for the widow. If the sons decide to take up their father's or any other ordinary profession, the training will probably cost close upon 1000*l.*, take possibly five years to complete, and even then they will be barely self-supporting, and it will be at least another five years before they can afford to marry and rear a family of their own. Here we touch another cause of the decreased birth-rate being more noticeable in the middle class than any other, owing to the parents being older before they are able to marry than was formerly the case in England. The girls, too, have to undergo an expensive training, and if out working in the world are undoubtedly less likely to marry well or early, than their equals in comfortable homes, with every social and financial advantage.

As to illness, too, if the professional man, or his wife, or any of his family, have, during the years of stress and strain, a serious illness, involving a lengthy treatment or an operation, the expense is almost overwhelming.

Those who have had dealings with trained nurses, Nursing Homes, and specialists' fees will bear me out in this—in spite of the many generous doctors and nurses who reduce their charges for special cases. Why is it that in London and the large towns there are still no places (or so few as to be a negligible quantity), between the ruinously expensive Nursing Homes and the ordinary free hospitals, where gentle-people can be inexpensively treated and cured in comfort and peace—with no stigma of poverty or meanness? The carking care and anxiety of the years during which their family is growing up ages the parents long before their time and renders them an easy prey to disease or nervous trouble. Happy are they who survive to see their children grown-up and in a secure financial position before they have to leave them.

Many will say this is a morbid picture, but I maintain that it is quite a typical one, and, this being so, can anyone blame the professional classes for limiting their families to the two or three children to whom alone they feel they can do full justice?

No, England will have to devise some means of financial relief, if she wishes her middle classes to continue to exist as a leavening mass between the rising Democracy and the Aristocracy of both wealth and birth.

I hope that nothing I have said will be taken as meaning to decry the working or poorer classes, among whom I have many friends, and to whom I in no way grudge the increased facilities of living. That even they sometimes realise the burdens carried by the middle classes is obvious from the remark made to me by a quite poor working woman: 'The "likes" of us are better off than you are, as you have so much to do with your money.'

In conclusion, as the daughter, wife, mother, sister, sister-in-law, and cousin of professional men, I think I may describe myself as 'One who knows.'

A. M. RICHARDSON.

'WHEN IGNORANCE WAS BLISS'

JULY AND AUGUST IN NORTH CENTRAL SIBERIA

DURING the last ten years there has been a growing interest in Russia, its art, literature, and people. Exhibitions of Russian pictorial art and handicrafts are frequently open; few concerts are held where one or more of the compositions of Tschaikowsky are not included in the programme; the works of Stravinsky, Glinka the founder of modern Russian music, Borodin, Moussorgsky the composer of 'Boris Godounov' and 'Khovanstchina,' and Rimsky-Korsakov are widely appreciated, and Russian choreographic art has become the fashion. The annual number of translations of the great Slavonic authors and dramatists is double that of ten or fifteen years ago, and owing to the excellent studies of Russian life and character by Maurice Baring, Sir D. Mackenzie Wallace and others too numerous to mention, the qualities of the Slavonic people are more widely understood and appreciated. And lastly, there is the factor of the national interest in our great Ally, created by the present European War. This interest, appealing to that large section of the English nation who, hitherto being unconcerned with art in any form, have looked upon the Russians with distrust and thinly veiled antipathy, has led to a sincere desire to overcome an insular and unreasonable prejudice.

I do not venture to embark on an exposition of Russian character, but to set down some personal observations of Siberia, thinking that an account of the conditions of life in a portion of that Empire may not be inappropriate at this time, or to those who watch the Slavonic development, for the destiny of Russia is irrevocably linked with that of her great eastern territory.

Before I begin the narrative of my Siberian experiences perhaps a brief summary of the prevailing geographical and economic conditions of the country is admissible. The vast district of Siberia, covering some 150,000,000 square miles, or one and a half times as large as Europe, can be roughly divided into three regions. In the south are the scorched and arid deserts traversed by the nomadic tribes and the camel. Included

in the second region are the undulating plains covered with harsh grass, called 'steppes,' inhabited by the Cossacks, and the famous black soil of great agricultural value. The third region contains the 'taiga' or virgin forest, which, extending for more than 3700 miles, from the Ural Mountains in the west to the Pacific in the east, with a breadth of 1200 miles from north to south, stretches north of the steppes; and lastly, in the extreme north, is the 'tundra,' an immense frozen marsh extending from Russian Lapland in the west to the Behring Straits and the Sea of Okhotsk in the east, its northerly coast bordered by the Arctic Ocean.

Comprised in this area are agricultural and mineral riches of incalculable value. It is necessary to refer to but a small portion of these varied sources of wealth, so far but little exploited, in order to arrive at a rough estimate of the importance Siberia will eventually command as one of the greatest granaries and mineral treasuries of the world. The Ural Mountains are renowned not only for precious stones, but for their gold and silver mines; in addition to these are the gold-producing regions of the Irkutsk, of the Trans-Baikalia, and Amur and Ussuri districts. The precious metal has also been found in profusion on the Anadyr River in Kamchatka. Iron, copper, and lead are abundant in many parts, and there is a sufficiency of coalfields on the island of Sakhalin, lying east of Nikolayevsk (only the northern portion of the island belongs to Russia, the southern being restored to Japan in 1905 by the Treaty of Portsmouth), to supply the entire Pacific navigation. This same island also possesses rich oil-wells. These form but one section of the inexhaustible resources of Siberia, and not the least of them is the land, of which it has been truly said, 'the gold of Siberia lies in its black soil.' In spite of inefficient farming, the fecundity of the earth is such that the moujik need only score the surface with his primitive plough and scatter a few seeds for the crops to spring up as if by magic. That Siberia will become one of the great butter-producers of the world is a foregone conclusion. We need only compare the statistics of 1898, when 149,000 poods¹ of butter were manufactured, with the increase of 8,600,000 poods (or 140,870 tons) of the year 1909,² the bulk of the output going on the English markets. In addition to these is the important fur trade, the wealth of timber contained in the tracts of forest, and the valuable fisheries. Much of this is potential wealth, and so far there is lacking the perfected organisation which will open up industrial centres, combine and systematise the widespread interests and isolated activities into one homogeneous force. The distances to be covered are great, and the difficul-

¹ One pood is equivalent to about forty English pounds.

² Nansen, *Through Siberia*, p. 293.

ties of communication (except by the rivers and railways, which are still inadequate for the growing needs of the country) are problems that can only be solved by the greatest ability and patient perseverance.

The rivers of Siberia, until recent years, have only been used for inland commerce, and their value as an outlet for her products has been neglected,³ but in 1913 the Siberian Trading and Steamship Company successfully carried out their project of opening up a regular trading route between Europe and Central Siberia, by the Kara Sea and the waterways of the Obi and the Yenisei. Again, in 1914 two cargo boats of 2400 tons, bringing four small steamers bought by the Russian Government for the Siberian river traffic, accomplished the voyage. Of this latter expedition I can speak from experience, and will return to later, as I was privileged to be on board one of the steamers for the return voyage. Owing to the ice in the Kara Sea, however, this route is only open during the months of August and September. These are the small beginnings from which evolve great commercial enterprises, such as the Hudson Bay Company, and in the future the Kara Sea route will prove an important outlet for the unrivalled resources of Siberia.

The peoples of Siberia are as varied as her products, for her population of 13,000,000 souls includes Russians, Cossacks, Tartars, Mongols, Kirghis, Voguls, and those aboriginal tribes who inhabit the northern wastes, the Samoyeds, Ostiaks of the Obi (a distinct race from those of the Yenisei), the Tungus, Yuraks, and the Dolgans of north-western and north-central Siberia, and the Chukchis, Koryaks, and Yakuts of north-eastern Siberia.

This is, as I have said, but a rough estimate of the potentialities of Siberia, and that many of them so far lack exploitation will be remedied in the future. The undeniable fact remains that, with these inexhaustible and varied possibilities, Siberia, if her population prove themselves not only capable of utilising them, but of an imperial spirit, will be a great world-force. 'It is in Asia once again that will be decided the destinies of the world.'⁴

My previous experience of Siberia had been limited to the fleeting glimpses seen through the windows of the International

³ To the enterprise of Captain Joseph Wiggins is owing the credit of being the first to open up the trade route between Europe and the mouths of the Obi and Yenisei, and of bringing the first Russian Government river steamer to the latter river. He accomplished his first voyage in 1874, and subsequently crossed the Kara Sea nine times in all. Baron Nordenskiöld also followed the same route in the years 1875-76. But these individual enterprises lapsed on the death of their originators, and since the last voyage of Captain Wiggins, in 1895, the route was unused till 1911.

⁴ Lord Ronaldshay.

Express on a journey to China in 1910. In the spring of 1914, however, I accompanied Miss M. A. Czaplicka, a Polish anthropologist, and leader of an expedition sent from Oxford for the purpose of studying some of the aboriginal tribes of north-central Siberia.

Our destination was Golchicka, a small settlement on the estuary of the Yenisei River, lying about latitude 72 degrees, half way between longitudes 80 degrees and 90 degrees, and five hundred miles within the Arctic Circle.

On the outward journey we travelled by the ordinary express to Moscow, and from thence by the Trans-Siberian Railway to Krasnoiarsk, the junction of the River Yenisei and the railroad, arriving there on the 6th of June. We were met by Mr. Gunnar Christensen, the manager for the Siberian Trading and Steamship Company in Krasnoiarsk, with whom Miss Czaplicka had been in communication. This gentleman had purchased stores for the expedition, booked our passages on board the first steamer to leave for the north after the river-ice had broken up, and showed us every kindness and consideration. We embarked on the steamer next day at noon for the second stage of our journey. The steamer, once the *Glenmore*, but now rechristened the *Oriol* (*Eagle*), is a small paddle-boat, and was built in Newcastle-on-Tyne. She had come through the Kara Sea in 1905, carrying rails for the Trans-Siberian Railway. The *Oriol* towed a roofed-in barge, like a Noah's Ark, of twice her size and tonnage for the accommodation of the fishing people, and attached to this in succession were two other barges, the first containing empty barrels, and a horse and half a dozen cows, used for barter in exchange for furs, etc., occupied the third barge.

The Yenisei, the Obi, and the Lena are the chief means of communication between the northern and southern parts of Siberia. The Yenisei is the fifth largest river in the world, with a length of 3000 miles, and is navigable with its tributaries for a distance of 5000 miles. It begins to freeze towards the end of September, and from thence onwards the river is unavailable as a means of transit, and the towns and settlements along its banks are practically isolated, for the traffic carried on by means of sledging on the old post roads is unimportant when compared with the facilities offered by the river. During May the thaw sets in, and the huge blocks of ice go tumbling down stream to be emptied into the Kara Sea, but its waters are not navigable till the beginning of June, when the river-steamers begin to ply up and down. Not only are the Yenisei and its sister-rivers used as waterways, but they give employment to a large section of the population. These people embark on the steamers and travel northwards, landing in parties at

different points. Their equipment is simple, and consists of boats and fishing-nets, empty barrels and bags of salt, for containing and preserving their catch, and a few household necessities tied up in bundles, a bag or two of flour, an axe, spade, and a saw for the purpose of building a hut, as many of them land in deserted spots devoid of any protection. Here they remain during the six or seven weeks of the summer, the men employed in catching the fish and the women and children in cleaning, salting, and placing it in barrels; but when autumn comes they pack up their goods and travel homewards by the steamers returning south, and during the winter months their harvest is sold to the townsfolk.

The fisheries constitute one of the important factors of Siberian life, for the rivers are teeming with fish which migrate from the Arctic Ocean to spawn in the river beds. The varieties most commonly met with, and principally used for salting, are the omel, yielding an excellent red caviare, the maxun, a variety of herring, and the nyelma or white salmon. The latter often attains a considerable size; one caught at Golchicka measured four feet ten inches in length. But the fish most highly prized, both for its caviare and flesh, is the ostrena, or sturgeon. The nyelma and ostrena begin their journey up the river at the end of May and beginning of June, the omel and maxun soon follow, and by the middle of the latter month the fishing is in full swing. In a good season great quantities of fish are caught, and it only seems necessary to drop the nets into the water to obtain a good haul. We were told by Madame Nieratova, a trader who employs two Dolgan families, that each person during the season catches on an average 600 lbs. of fish, and at Nosonovsky a party of fisherfolk secured 700 poods of fish in six weeks, one net alone accounting for 100 poods in one day.

It is to be regretted that so far the fisheries are totally lacking in organisation, and an industry which would considerably add to the prosperity of Siberia is carried on independently and with great waste by the fishermen. Fish refuse, for instance, is an invaluable manure, but it is thrown into the river. Salting is the only preservative method used, and all pickled and conserved fish is imported into Siberia from Russia, whereas the prolific Siberian fisheries could not only supply the western part of the Empire with this produce, but place the overflow on the European markets.

The river voyage from Krasnoiarsk to Golchicka, a distance of 1404 miles, takes from twenty to twenty-five days, according to the weather encountered, for the river is liable to sudden and violent gales—in a few minutes the calm surface of the water is goaded into waves of a considerable size—and at these times,

as the *Oriol* was encumbered with three heavy barges, progress was not only dangerous, but impossible, and she was forced to drop anchor in the shelter of an island till the storm had blown over. As wood is mostly burnt for fuel, frequent stoppages are made at the forest depots *en route*, and this, combined with the disembarkation of the parties of fishermen, makes progress slow; but the river life is of great interest, and, as a halt will sometimes extend for several hours, we were able to observe the Russian settlements or wander in some primeval forest.

At this time of the year, the Siberian early spring, the winter snows still linger in drifts as deep as the shoulders of a man, but in contrast to this white severity is the forest undergrowth, where little birds, whose twitters and shrill cries fill the air, are busy nesting. The crisp crimson buds of wild rhubarb press their way through the moss, and threading an intricate course between the hummocks are tiny rivulets running from the melting snow. The austere trunks of pine and cedar taper upwards like the pillars of a cathedral, and, as you penetrate still deeper into the forest, the bird-calls die away, for they only seem to congregate in the more open spaces near the river, and you are hemmed in by a deep silence. There is something oppressive in this hushed immensity and endless multiplication of tree upon tree, clothing the middle Asiatic zone from the Urals to the Pacific with a uniform profound forest, only broken by the waters of vast sluggish rivers. At other times a smoky haze, the charred stumps of trees, and the acrid smell of burning wood testified to the passage of one of the great forest fires which rage sometimes for weeks on end.

The works of man are in contradiction to the natural beauties of Siberia, for the settlements are a dreary miscellany of dun-coloured huts built of rough logs, dovetailed at the corners, with moss stuffed into the interstices. Glass is a luxury, and, partly for this reason and because of the extreme severity of the winter months, windows are small, far between, and invariably sealed up. There are no roads, and sanitary observances are non-existent, for the street of the village is the communal dustbin, and serves as a hunting-ground for the dogs, pigs, and fowls who roost amongst the heaps of garbage. In the summer months the track is ankle-deep in fine dust, but a shower of rain converts it into an expanse of liquid mud, where walking becomes an impossibility, except in the larger towns, where a few rough planks are placed on the sidewalks. It is astonishing that, living under these conditions, outbreaks of fever are not more prevalent. The Russian, being an habitual tea-drinker, which necessitates the boiling of water, is probably saved from epidemics of this nature.

The country on either side of the Yenisei varies but little for several days, the forest stretches mile after mile along the river banks, but as the steamer proceeds further north a difference is perceptible, both in the dwindling vegetation and in the climatic conditions, which are reversed, the warmth of early spring returning to the bleakness of an English February day. The luxurious forest declines into a spare coppice, till at Dudinka, a settlement lying some 1153 miles north of Krasnoiarsk, hardly a vestige of woodland remains, and though the month was June great ice-floes lined the river banks and drifted tumultuously down stream. The nights begin to pale, till only a ghostly twilight prevails during the midnight hours. The sky, the river banks, and vast stretches of placid water are illuminated by an unearthly blue radiance, a colour so subtle and magical that it seems like an unreal region, or the landscape of a dream. Then in a week or so comes the transition, when the sun no longer sinks below the horizon, and midnight is no darker than a summer's afternoon.

We first came into direct contact with the political exile at Dudinka. On our way down, when the *Oriol* stopped at a settlement where any of these unfortunates were stationed, we noticed the gangway was guarded by gendarmes in order to prevent any attempt at escape. We landed from the steamer and walked to the village where we had some purchases to make, a distance of three versts.⁵ Outside the little shop, the only one Dudinka possesses, a young man was standing, and, hearing us make inquiries about some natives who were reported to be in the neighbourhood, he came forward and spoke to us, accompanied us through the settlement, and later on asked us to his lodging—two bare rooms in the house of a merchant who does not live in the settlement. He told us he came from White Russia—a portion of the Empire north-east of Poland, that his name was A. M. Avramenok, and that he was a political exile. His parents, he said, were of the peasant class, but had given him a good education, and this he had used to further the revolutionary cause. A man of these qualities, who understands the peasant, for by birth he is of their class and the conditions of their life are known to him, is the type of revolutionary leader most to be feared by the Government. His status of birth creates a basis of sympathy between him and those whose forces he directs, and his higher mental qualities enable him to sway those forces at his discretion; whereas the peasant distrusts the aristocrat with advanced theories. The traditions and training of the nobility are such that a mutual understanding between two such divergent types is so rare as to be virtually non-existent. Moreover, the

⁵ Three versts are equal to two miles.

gulf fixed between the moujik and the aristocrat in Russia is not bridged, or bridged only to an unimportant extent, by a middle class. Therefore a revolutionary leader with the qualities of Avramenok is at once the most efficient and powerful. His offence, that of spreading revolutionary ideas amongst the soldiery, is regarded as one of the gravest political crimes, and the delinquent, if caught in the act, suffers the severest penalty of the law, that of death. He was judged by a court-martial, the procedure followed for all military offences, but the sentence was commuted to banishment for life, as he was only engaged in printing the propaganda when arrested, with twenty-one of his comrades, two of them being women. But though all were similarly punished, each exile was deported to a different station.

Politicals sentenced by this court are not entitled to any Government allowance; those arrested for less grave offences and tried by an administrative court receive fifteen roubles a month (1*l.* 11*s.* 8*d.*), but if the exile, by any means whatsoever, adds to this sum by his own activities, even by the earning of half a rouble, the grant is withdrawn. In any case, to earn a living without experience in these wilds is a difficult matter. All politicals are forbidden the possession of firearms, and the trading in furs to be obtained by shooting wild animals is denied them. Trapping foxes, etc., could be resorted to, but to what purpose if not for sale? Agriculture is impossible where three feet below the surface the ground is perpetually frozen. The exile in these regions lacks all means of distraction. The life-sentence exile, even though having no Government allowance, is yet not allowed to earn money, and has no choice but to depend on the donations of friends and relations, or if these fail him, or are too poor to contribute to his support, he is forced to rely upon the charity of the settlers. The system is pernicious. It is an encouragement to indolence and pauperism, for it denies what is of vital necessity and the inalienable right of the individual—namely, that of being able to exercise the mental and physical powers; for these, if allowed to fall into disuse, inevitably end not only in sloth of body, but in mental deterioration. This is, I believe, one of the chief complaints of the political exile nowadays. Incidentally it is an unfair tax upon the settlers, who must support the life-sentenced politicals or see them starve. The case of the political subject to less severe restrictions, who wishes to pursue some activity, is beset with difficulties, and much depends on the character and goodwill of the administrator of the province where he is stationed. He may apply for permission to use a camera, or to make anthropological investigations among the native tribes. His petition is sent in, and one administration

will refer him to another, and the process may be prolonged indefinitely until his term of exile expires before he receives his permit to pursue his studies.

In spite of all these obstructions, the bulk of all museum work, scientific and medical investigation, in Siberia is done by political exiles, and all credit is due to those who carry out this valuable work in the face of opposition and discouragement. The case of Avramenok is an exception, for he had been appointed by the Government of Education to the Meteorological Station lately set up at Dudinka, where the climatic conditions are of great interest. In the winter the thermometer can fall to 57° below zero Centigrade, and the velocity of the wind has been registered at eighty-nine and ninety miles an hour. Though condemned by one section of the Government to forfeit all civil rights and allowance, he is appointed by another department to a responsible scientific post, and receives 30 roubles a month for his services—a paradoxical situation! Politicals have only been sent to this part of Siberia, the province of Yeniseisk, since the revolution of 1905; previously to that date they were deported to the penal settlements further east.

The first Slavonic people to penetrate into Siberia were the Cossacks, in 1581, under the leadership of Yermak, an adventurer and freebooter. Following in his footsteps came the explorers and traders, until the Sea of Okhotsk was reached in the year 1646, and owing to the fortitude of these people 5,000,000 square miles were added to the kingdom of the Czar. In the seventeenth century Russia first used Siberia as a means of disposing of her convicted criminals, and at the same time of working the Siberian mines at the lowest expense. Later on the Government awoke to the growing importance of Asiatic Russia, and a number of 'ukases' were issued substituting the sentence of life-long banishment to Siberia for the death penalty. Between 1823 and 1898 an army of 700,000 exiles of all classes, accompanied by 216,000 of those who voluntarily chose to share their banishment, were sent to Siberia, and in 1913 the existing number of political and criminal exiles in Siberia was about 40,000.* In addition to the hosts of compulsory exiles, there also came large numbers of Poles, Jews, and those who dissented from the Orthodox Faith, or who found the restrictions of Russian life unbearable. In later years the Government, in its anxiety to colonise Siberia, has offered every inducement to the peasants to come and settle on the new land. At the present day the moujik is transported free of charge from his own home to a distributing centre, from whence he is taken under charge of officials to his allotted portion of land. Each male is given forty-one and a half acres, sufficient

* Wright and Digby, *Siberia*, p. 101.

wood to build his house and farm buildings, and a grant for the farming expenses of one year. If he is without means agricultural implements are provided on the instalment system. We were told by a young Siberian named Yosiphe Gerasimivitch Prokopchuk that the provinces of Trukhansk and the districts of the Lena and the Ob are exempt from military service in order to encourage colonisation and ensure the land from being depopulated. Great pressure has been used to induce the Trans-Baikal Cossacks to settle in the Amur and Ussuri districts of Eastern Siberia, with the double motive of opening up the new country and affording a garrison and line of defence.

These are the means Russia has employed to colonise Siberia, and it will be seen that the imported population is composed of the descendants of pioneer Cossacks, political and criminal exiles, and religious malcontents, supplemented by the ever-increasing flood of immigrant peasants.

Golchicka was reached on the 27th of June, and we seemed to have reverted to the conditions of winter. Ice-floes encumbered the river, and extended in rough heaps along the shore. The few huts of the settlement lay in a dreary waste of melting snow, and the only variation to the level sky-line in the north were the pyramidal stacks of drift wood. The country round Golchicka is typical Siberian tundra, an undulating marshy waste. No tree can grow in these latitudes, as from Dudinka northwards the ground below the surface is eternally frostbound, and the stunted willows, covered with grey-green catkins, are no taller than the grass they grow between. When the snow melts patches of bronze-green moss appear, interwoven with the many varieties of fleshy lichen on which the reindeer feed, and as the season advances the purple and pale green shoots of small flowering plants come struggling upwards to the sun; but in the declivities of the low hills the snow remains until far into August. Behind these uplands lie frozen lakes, where the Asiatic golden plover courts his mate, and countless wading birds, called by the Russians 'Peytushuk' (little cocks), congregate before they migrate southwards. For a few short weeks the tundra wakes up to a new life, and is transformed by a galaxy of flowers. It is a most wonderful sight, this short Arctic summer, when as if clothed in a garment of many colours the tundra lies bathed in the golden light of the midnight sun. The swamps are fringed round with forget-me-nots and marsh marigolds, saxifrages, campanulas, mingled with lemon-coloured Iceland poppies and many varieties of rattle and purple vetch are studded over the prairie; but this pageant is short-lived, in a little time the flowers are withered by a frost, and the tundra is once again a soft and sombre brown. As the season advances with rapid strides in these northern

latitudes, very soon a dry and powdery snow begins to fall, and when that falls winter is at hand—a nine months' winter, sunless and dark for three of these months, a winter of scourging storms and snow, and yet more snow, until the land is shrouded in a uniform white mantle.

We arrived a week before the fishing season begins. Two traders only live here for the whole year round, and the population is supplemented in the summer by a family or two of Russian fishing folk and the natives who come here for the fishing season. We took up our quarters in a 'balagan,' or wooden hut, originally built for a bath-house, and made this our base for excursions up and down the river and into the tundra. Golchicka is beyond all postal and telegraphic communication, for Trukhansk, the most northerly post station, lies 532 miles south of Golchicka. A service of monthly post boats, sometimes drawn by dogs, takes letters and parcels beyond Trukhansk, but even these do not penetrate as far north as Golchicka, so our life in that northerly region, without a means of communication with the outer world, was one of complete isolation.

About seven days after our arrival the natives began to come in from the tundra, travelling by reindeer sledges, and pitched their 'chooms' or tents on the banks of the river. The tribes who inhabit the central Siberian tundra, and with whom we principally came into connexion, were the Samoyeds, Yuraks, and the Dolgans.

Before the investigations of the Finnish philologist, Alexander Castrén, who came to the Yenisei district in 1842 and 1843, little was known of the origin of the Siberian aborigines. In later years researches have been carried on by Professor Kai Donner and other renowned philologists, and as certain of these tribes are numerically decreasing it is imperative that records should be made before they become extinct. Alexander Castrén was the first to come to the conclusion that, from a philological point of view, the Samoyedic peoples are akin to the Finnish race. The dialects of the former tribe, though they have undergone a great modification, owing to their contact with other languages, still have much in common with the language of the Finns. For example, the words Oja, Yoga, Kolba, names of waters in the Yenisei basin, in Finnish and Lapp are interpreted as brook, water, and fishing water, and the rivers Kemi and Kymi in the Finn districts have a corresponding Kem in Siberia, the name of the upper source of the Yenisei.' There are also other indications of relationship too numerous to mention in an article which makes no claim to a scientific point of view.

' Oscar Peschel, *The Races of Man and their Geographical Distribution*, p. 387.

The present distribution of the Samoyeds covers a vast tract of land from the White Sea in European Russia to Khatanga Bay on the east side of the Taimyr Peninsula. These people are the least civilised of all Polar races; next in order come the Chukchis of north-east Siberia. In direct contrast to these primitives are the reindeer Lapps of Russia and Scandinavia, who possess a high order of Arctic culture.

In appearance the Samoyeds are typical degenerates. The eyes are small, the cheek bones abnormally prominent, and the whole face expresses a low order of development. Their stature is below the average, especially amongst the women, many of whom are dwarfish, and a man of five feet towers above his fellows. All natives, but particularly the Samoyeds, have feet so small that they appear quite inadequate for the support of the body, but they possess a very rare beauty in their hands, which are as near the perfection of form as the hands of a high-class Chinese lady. One must say that they are personally unclean, and, owing to their debilitated condition, are less capable of resisting the attacks of disease or of holding their own against the Russian trader than the more efficient and cleaner tribes. There is another tribe, the Ostiaks of the Yenisei, who are even more retrogressive than the Samoyedic people, but we only came into contact with them in the middle course of the Yenisei River, for their boundaries extend no further north than the region near Trukhansk.

The Samoyed dress is most interesting, for the materials used are entirely composed of natural products, and strictly limited by their environment. Both women and men wear trousers and boots made in one, of reindeer hide. The shape of this garment is curious, as there is no difference in the width from the tip of the foot upwards to the waist. Perhaps the best way to describe it would be by saying that it is as shapeless as the leg of a mammoth, from which, as we were told by an old Samoyed (though this statement must be taken with some reservation), the form first originated. Over this is worn a tunic of deerskin reaching half-way to the knees, with the lower edge cut into narrow shreds to form a fringe. Covering the tunic is a jacket, also of deerskin, decorated with strips of coloured cloth following the edge of the jacket, and on the hem, and about four inches higher up, are borders of dog fur. A hood edged with fox or dog fur, according to the means of the native, is worn on the head. Some of the women hang rows of brass crescent-shaped ornaments over the breast. These are suspended one above the other by means of leather thongs, and are engraved with a pattern of half moons and fine lines. The men have a similar dress, with modifications. The outer gar-

ment, or 'sakuy,' with the fur on the outside, is closed from neck to hem like a smock, and attached to this is a hood, which rises in a peak on the top. Many of the Samoyeds still use flint and steel, and for this purpose a steel implement is suspended from the waist by a chain of brass and steel links. The tinder used is dried lichen. The other more sophisticated tribes use Russian matches.

The Yuraks are a branch of the Samoyedic race, though they speak another dialect and inhabit a region not extending so far east and north as the Taimyr Peninsula, and running parallel with the southern borders of the Samoyed area; but as there is much intermarriage between these peoples, the boundaries and characteristics of the Yuraks are less definitely marked than those of the other tribes. The Yurak costume differs in many respects from that of the Samoyeds, and much of the materials for its composition are of Russian manufacture. The woman's dress consists of a brightly coloured felt robe reaching to the ankles. Appliquéd on this are bands of cloth in a contrasting colour to the dress, which terminates with a border of white fur round the neck. The men also wear cloth tunics edged with fur.

The Dolgans are very distinctive from the two former peoples, being typically Mongolian, with yellowish brown skins, stiff black hair and oblique eyes. They are supposed to have migrated from the district near the River Lena in the east, and now occupy an area extending from the Yenisei in the west to the south-eastern shores of Khatanga Bay. The long jacket of the Dolgan woman is elaborately embroidered with beadwork and bands of bright-coloured cloth, and the men, owing to their predilection for rows of brass buttons on their blue coats, have a semi-military appearance. Both sexes of these tribes wear the Samoyed trousers, or 'pimmies,' with the difference that the Dolgans and Yuraks shape them to follow the line of the foot and leg, and in the case of the Dolgans the 'pimmies' are decorated with their characteristic beadwork. All these tribes are nomadic, cultivate the reindeer, and live by hunting and fishing.

Though many of the natives are nominally Christians, are baptised, and receive Russian names, at heart they still adhere to their ancient nature-worship, when alone use their native patronymics one to the other, and practise shamanism in secret. This cult includes the curing of disease, predicting the future, spiritualism, and magic practices. The shaman, or priest, of the north Asiatic races has much in common with the medicine man of the North American Indian. The former uses a magic drum, and the latter a rattle, and both wear decorated cloaks when

officiating at a ceremony. Indeed, much of their ritual bears so close a resemblance that many people attribute the birthplace of the ancient races of the North American Continent to the regions of northern Asia.⁸ I made drawings of several Samoyeds who were identical in type with a North American 'brave.' The Siberian native still sacrifices to his gods.⁹ In the summer of this year I heard from far off the beating of the magic drum, and saw the head of a sacrificial reindeer impaled on a stake after a ceremony held over a sick boy. But the natives scattered on our approach, and refused to admit they had been shamanising. The Orthodox Greek Faith has not taken root amongst these people, and the ikons they carry about and place in their 'chooms' (tents) are regarded as of little account. We asked a Yurak man if he had an ikon in his 'choom,' and he answered 'Yes, we have a Russian "shaitan" (god), but we do not give him anything.' An old Samoyed told us that some years ago, after an outbreak of smallpox and measles among the natives, a medical expedition was sent to Golchicka to inquire into the reasons of the epidemic. (Incidentally the expedition was recalled, as the doctors and nurses, instead of attending to the suffering natives, spent their time in carousing with the traders.) While they were at Golchicka, however, the eldest son of this Samoyed fell ill, and the father hurried to the doctor for aid. He found the latter drunk, and, though the old man called several times afterwards, the physician for one reason or other failed to come. Thereupon the native put his ikon outside his 'choom' and called in a shaman.

The possessions of the departed are placed around his tomb for the use of the shade in the spiritual world. Beside the bones of the sacrificial reindeer lies the sledge, the goad, the fishing net, and wooden drinking bowl. A woman's tomb, or 'lead,' can be recognised by the bread trough, pothook, and kettle lying near by. The natives have a pretty custom of hanging bells upon the uprights of a child's grave.

The reasons given for the numerical decrease of the native tribes are many. The root of the evil lies in those scourges which civilisation invariably brings to the primitive people with whom it comes into contact. The chief and most pernicious is syphilis, which eats like a cancer throughout the entire population of Siberia, affecting both Russians and aborigines alike.¹⁰

⁸ Oscar Peschel, *op. cit.* p. 263.

⁹ Captain Frederic Jackson in *The Great Frozen Land* (p. 89) remarks in his book that only a few years previous to 1895 a young girl was immolated by a Samoyed of Nova Zemlya, but though it is possible the natives offered up human sacrifices to propitiate their gods, the practice has not been followed for many years.

¹⁰ Wright and Digby, *Siberia*, p. 171. 'The leading physician at Omsk stated that 80 per cent. of the people of that city were syphilitic, and that in

Its chief victims are to be found among the Tartar races of Central Siberia, where the number of affected persons in many villages is as much as one hundred per cent. The other most prevalent diseases among the natives are tubercular ailments, and black smallpox. The latter, a very malignant type of the disease, has been known to destroy whole tribes. Lastly, one of the primal causes of their degeneration is the curse transmitted by the Russians, running in their veins like a fatal taint, the almost insane craving for vodka.

The sale of vodka has been prohibited throughout the empire since the beginning of the War, so the following instances only extend to the time of my departure from Siberia on the 19th of September 1914. Before this time, to my knowledge, its prohibition was confined to certain localities. The areas I knew of were the northern parts of the provinces of the Lena and Yeniseisk, while in the southern portions the sale of the spirit was allowed. In the northern regions Government officials were empowered to enter and search every dwelling or steamboat for any form of the spirit, and frequent confiscations were the result of these investigations. In August of this year 240 bottles of pure spirit, from which vodka is made, were found on the premises of a trader living in Yenisei settlement. The situation is not without complexity. All natives, with hardly an exception, refuse to trade unless a glass or two of vodka is the precursor of a transaction. If the trader, from conscientious scruples, refuses to observe this custom, he finds his business declines, and that he is hopelessly outclassed by his trade rivals who have no compunction in gratifying the weakness of the native. The less scrupulous type of trader is also in a quandary, for keeping vodka on his premises lays him open to its confiscation and the resulting financial loss, so if he wishes to maintain his custom he must run this risk and re-buy more spirit if the law is enforced and his stock seized. This led to a paradoxical situation, for the Government, who held the spirit monopoly and prohibited its sale, by these means indirectly gained a double profit. The price of vodka naturally rose, and at Dudinka, within the prohibited area, where the inhabitants numbered two officials, two priests, fifteen merchants, nine exiles, and a few women and children, the average consumption of vodka for one year was 100 barrels, and a bottle of the spirit, usually costing 50 kopeks, could only be bought for the sum of 15 roubles. These advanced prices acted as an incentive to smuggling, and

consequence the insane asylums were overcrowded with unfortunates. Physicians in Irkutsk gave a rate for that city of not much lower percentage. In the Gymnasium for girls at Blagowestchensk there were 700 pupils enrolled in 1911. Of these over fifteen years of age 35 per cent. were suffering from the same disease.'

this was principally carried on by the river steamers. A Yeniseisk trader, and owner of a steamer, who went by the title of the 'Alcohol King,' was universally known to have grown rich on the enormous profits he obtained by smuggling the contraband. Some little time ago the steamer of this trader was stopped near Vorogovo, on the Yenisei, and the contraband, consisting of 1500 barrels of pure spirit, distributed amongst the crew as part of their baggage, was confiscated. But the zealous officials had been a little too previous. The trader brought an action against the Government, and could prove that he was some ten versts outside the prohibited area. He won his case, and the Government was not only forced to pay a fine but to return the confiscated spirit. The scenes in a settlement after the departure of one of these steamers baffles description. Round about their 'chooms' the natives would be lying prone upon the ground in a state of hopeless intoxication, like dead flies near a saucer of poison, or drifting down stream in their boats, incapable of either rowing or directing their course. But the Russian in liquor becomes quarrelsome, and fights, not infrequently ending in murder, were the result of these periodical orgies.

Reindeer are a factor of great importance in native life, for not only are these animals the sole means of transit in the tundra life,¹¹ but the chief food of the native is reindeer meat. The native clothing and the cover of the 'choom' is made of deer-hide sewn with thread made from sinews of the leg, and the antlers are used for such purposes as snuff boxes, powder horns, portions of the harness, and so on.

We were enabled during July to make an excursion by reindeer sledges and to stay for several days in the 'choom' of a family of Dolgans, who lived some forty-five versts away in the tundra. The native possesses only three tools—a borer, an axe, and a knife—but he constructs with these a sledge of marvellous utility and endurance.

Our *cortège* consisted of the four members of the expedition, our hosts, two native youths who drove, twenty-seven reindeer, and six sledges, one sledge for each person. The first team of reindeer were harnessed five abreast, and drew a sledge where sat the driver. Tied on to this, and drawing a second sledge,

¹¹ Teams of dogs (nine dogs to a team) are harnessed to sledges and used by some Russian settlers, but only in the winter time. We were told by Mihiu Petrovitch Antonoff, one of the Golchicka traders, that his dog team can cover a distance of fifty miles in three hours. The reindeer, however, have greater endurance, and can be used both for summer sledging on the grassy tundra and for travelling on the snow in winter. Frederic Jackson, the Arctic explorer, drove a team of three deer for a distance of 120 versts, and accomplished the journey within twelve hours. In spite of the fact that they were not fed during this time they arrived quite game at the end.

carrying a member of our party, were four deer, and the same procedure was followed for the third sledge. The remaining three sledges were attached and driven in a similar way. Only one rein is used for driving, which passes along the near side to the deer who is the leader. A strong pull on the rein turns the whole team to the near side; if, however, a turn to the off side is necessary, the rein is jerked lightly and sharply. A long wooden goad, tipped with a circular piece of horn or ivory, is employed for prodding the hind quarters of the recalcitrant deer. The third and last sledge is perhaps the most interesting point of view, for you are so encompassed by a forest of tossing antlers that you can only catch occasional glimpses of your companions in front.

We filed off over the tundra in a long procession, bumping from one hillock to another, where the sledge acted like a vicious horse who means to throw his rider, diving into streams and out again and gliding over tracks of snow, the reindeer scooping up large mouthfuls of this as they ran, 'speeding on towards the top of the world.' So we continued, with intervals for rest, till after about seven hours' travelling we came to the banks of a shallow river, not very broad or imposing, but with a swift current. Here we descended from the sledges and were paddled across the river one by one in a small canoe, the reindeer swimming in our wake, still harnessed to the sledges. The Dolgan 'choom' lay at the head of a valley some five versts beyond the river. A 'choom' resembles a North American wigwam, and is constructed of stakes fifteen feet in length, meeting together at the top. The bases of the stakes are planted on the ground in a circle, from ten to fifteen feet across. The choom covering, with an aperture left at the top for the smoke to escape, varies according to the season and its owner's environment. With some tribes, the Ostiaks of the Yenisei, for instance, birch bark sewn together in strips is employed, but reindeer hide is the material in use among the Samoyeds, Yuraks, and Dolgans who inhabit the treeless tundra. The interior is bare but for a few essentials. Suspended on a parallel bar and supported by the construction stakes are a pot for cooking and a kettle for boiling water. There are no chairs, as the natives sit cross-legged on the ground, but a small table is sometimes included, about one foot in height, on which the meal is served. If you add to this sleeping bags and rugs of reindeer skin for each person, and a box for holding teacups, food, and a miscellany of odds and ends, the catalogue of accessories is complete. Fire is made in the middle of the floor, but as all wood, other than the scrub growing in the neighbourhood, has to be brought from Golchicka, where there is a limitless supply of driftwood,

this was only lit for cooking purposes. Many Samoyeds still eat their fish and meat in the raw state, but the Dolgans with whom we shared food and lodging lived on black bread, bought from the Russian trader—who cuts it into small pieces and dries it in the oven as a precaution against mould—fish, and reindeer meat, supplemented by a few wild geese; but as the season is very short for these birds they form an inappreciable asset to the native food supply. Tea, bought from the Russians in hard cakes, is drunk without milk, and the sugar is eaten instead of being put into the cups.

Our hosts, the Dolgan family, consisted of three young men and their widowed mother. This race are considered to be the cleanest and most industrious of native tribes, and their custom is to undress completely and retire to sleep in bags of reindeer and wolf skin, made with the fur on the inside. Their ablutions are curious. In the morning the mother rose first, as she was also the last to go to bed, and fetched water from the river side. She scooped this up from the pail with a dipper, and proffered it to each young man in turn, who sucked it up into his mouth, held it there till the chill had gone, and then ejected it on to the closed palms of his hands, and, before the water had time to trickle through, rapidly rubbed his face with the water so retained. Much to our amusement, however, on the second morning after our arrival, we found one of the Dolgans, a youth named Nikolai, indulging in the sincerest form of flattery, and having an 'angleski' ablution in the cold waters of the river.

We found the 'choom' life exceedingly agreeable, with the exception that when it rained a certain quantity of water found an entrance through the hole in the top, and not only made the centre of the floor very wet, but ran down the stake supports and dripped upon the sleepers who lay underneath. But the free and open life, and the gay spirits of our hosts, who did not scruple to call out 'Enotuy tuyok' ('You sleep,' or 'Go to sleep') when our conversation disturbed their slumbers, far outweighed the disadvantages. After spending some days with the Dolgans, during which time we accompanied them on several hunting excursions after wild geese, we returned to Golchicka.

About the end of August the fishing season waned, and the restless nomadic natives began their winter migration. They returned to the tundra so quickly and so quietly that it was only by the daily decrease in the row of 'chooms' along the river bank that you would notice they had gone. The silent waste absorbed them one by one, and the sole indications of their passing were the tracks of the sledges crossing over the yielding moss. Under the sullen sky V-shaped flocks of wild geese flew southwards. Day by day these flocks increased in number, and,

though many of them were so high up in the zenith as to be invisible, their raucous cackle could be plainly heard. There was still a little colour to be found. Here and there we came across patches of the red and yellow leaves of a creeping shrub called 'tálnik,' and the soft white balls of cotton grass were dotted over the marsh lands; but otherwise the tundra was the exemplification of that dreary mid-season when winter is overstepping the autumn boundary. We also began to make preparations for leaving, and packed our trunks in readiness for embarking once more on the *Oriol*. She was due to arrive at Golchicka about the 24th of August. This would be her last journey before the ice began to form on the river, when navigation is suspended for nine months.

My intention from the first had been to return to England, if possible, by the Kara Sea. But the project was always a doubtful one. The 'Angleski parahods' (English steamers), as they are called in Golchicka, are cargo-boats not built for passenger accommodation, so a berth can only be secured by favour.

On the 26th of August Mr. Christensen arrived at Golchicka on board the *Yeniseisk*. This boat, together with the steamer *Ob* and nine lighters laden with Siberian cargo for the English steamers, had been hired by the Siberian Trading and Steamship Company from the Russian Government, for the purpose of bringing gendarmes,¹² fishery experts, and the Custom House officials who were to supervise the cargo of the English steamers. The latter were due to arrive at Golchicka, *via* the Kara Sea, on or about the 26th or the 28th of August, but as the anchorage here is unsatisfactory they have to proceed some eighty versts further south, to Nosonovsky, and at this place the *Ob* and the lighters were already waiting.

When we were leaving Krasnoiarsk, Mr. Christensen had told us of his projected journey to Golchicka, and offered to bring all our letters with him. These, for want of a postal address, were to be directed to Krasnoiarsk (Golchicka, as I have previously explained, lies outside the postal area). We were naturally anxious to hear from friends and relations, as, since leaving England, we had been living in an isolation as complete as that of the Polar regions, and had received no news at all.

When the *Yeniseisk* dropped anchor, we immediately set out in our small rowing boat for the steamer, but Mr. Christensen forestalled us and came to shore in the *Yeniseisk's* dinghy. That meeting I shall never forget. Almost the first words he said were 'All Europe is at war; Russia, France, England, and

¹² The gendarmes are to prevent the escape of any exiles. I believe some years ago several politicals managed to evade the police and escaped to Europe by the steamers.

Belgium are fighting the German and Austrian armies.' The further details that he gave us we afterwards grasped were from tainted German sources, but at the time we were not in a position to sift truth from falsehood, and had no option but to believe these pessimistic reports. The situation seemed not only monstrous but incredible, for there had been no preliminary warnings of this holocaust previous to our departure from England. We were also told that the Trans-Siberian Railway was seriously congested, owing to the rapid Russian mobilisation, and the necessity for returning by the Kara Sea became increasingly urgent, as the ordinary route through Germany was now closed.

For the next week we kept an anxious watch for the English steamers. That week of inactive waiting was a week of windstorms as unquiet as were our spirits. Many times during those days we climbed on to the roof of our little balagan and searched the vast horizon of the Yenisei, but the straight line between the river and the dome of the sky stretched always in an unbroken uniformity.

On the 3rd of September the *Oriol* arrived, and we went on board to book our passages for Nosonovsky. Towards the evening of the same day, against a blood-red sunset, we sighted the masts and smoke-stacks of the English steamers, now some days overdue, and they passed us early next morning, hulls low down over the horizon, steaming south for Nosonovsky, but the *Oriol* did not reach there for some days, owing to the prevalent gales.

At Nosonovsky the river is twenty-three nautical miles wide, but lying close to the western shore, and divided from one another by narrow channels, are many flat and deserted islands, constituting a delta. Behind these islands the west bank of the river is invisible. Normally this reach of the Yenisei is a dreary prospect, but on the 6th of September, when the *Oriol* steamed up, the waterway was full of life and colour. At anchor in mid-stream were two large steamers of 2400 tons each, the *Ragna* and the *Sküle*, and lying near, like a brood of chickens round a mother hen, were the nine lighters, and three smaller cargo steamers, brought out from Hamburg only twenty-four hours before the German declaration of war, but now the property of the Russian Government; and lying a little further up the stream were the *Yeniseisk* and the *Ob*. All the boats, even to the lighters, were decked out with fluttering pennants, and after the secluded life we had been leading this display seemed as gay and imposing as a naval review.

Mr. Jonas Lied, the managing director of the Company, was on board the *Ragna*, and, when we had explained the obstacles to our returning home by the railroad, kindly allowed us to come on board. But I fear the problem of finding us a cabin caused

a serious disorganisation in the steamer's sleeping accommodation. Only two of us were leaving for England; Miss Czaplicka and the fourth member of the expedition decided to keep to their original plan of remaining in Siberia for the winter months, in order to make further investigations among the natives. For thirteen days discharging and taking in cargo¹³ was carried on without intermission, and on the 19th of September the *Ragna* and *Sküle* weighed anchor and steamed to the north, down the estuary of the Yenisei, in a blinding snowstorm. During the last seven days much snow had fallen—not soft flakes as in England, where the atmosphere is moist, but dry, fine crystals, characteristic of extreme cold. The tundra on the eastern shore, and the low-lying islands to the west, were now a white desolation. During these few months we had witnessed an almost complete cycle of the seasons. We arrived while the winter snows were still melting, then spring had unfolded to the matchless pageant of the summer, when the midnight sun hangs in the northern hemisphere, this in its turn declined to autumn, and now once again the waste lay muffled in a shroud of snow.

Dickson Island, situated at the extreme mouth of the Yenisei, was hemmed in by a belt of ice, and great ice-floes were drifting slowly southwards from the Kara Sea towards the river mouth. We watched the Siberian coast receding until it was like a bank of mist, almost transparent against the light of the sky, a mere shadow or emanation; then in a breathing-space it had gone, and round about us spread the cold and gloomy waters of the Kara Sea, littered with fantastically shaped ice-floes.

With our experiences of the ice in the Kara Sea, our journey to Tromsø, from Tromsø to Bergen, and thence to England by the North Sea, there is no room to deal, neither would it be relevant to an article concerning Siberia alone.

Siberia is a country of violent contrasts—climatic, economic, and social. Here you find embraced in one vast tract an equatorial heat and an extreme cold, as great as, if not greater than, that of the Polar regions; the wealth of the mining and agricultural districts, in contrast to the unproductive, sterile tundra. Her population is one of the most heterogeneous that the world has ever seen: the convicted thief, murderer, and aboriginal mingled with the advanced thinker and student. The reactionary and primitive forces lie cheek by jowl with the highest development of social life; and the many religions of these peoples are as conflicting as their classes and social characteristics. Siberia, even at this date, is a name of ill-omen, for associated with it are tales of oppression and of brutal

¹³ This cargo consisted of 400 poods of butter, Siberian cedar, hides and tow, the whole consignment being worth about 130,000*l*.

injustices which cry aloud for redress. This side of the shield has been sedulously held before the public to the exclusion of the more important side; but I feel that the destinies of countries are of greater urgency than their former lapses, as the future of the individual must take precedence, and in no way be hampered by past errors of judgment.

For the conquest of this continent—for continent it is—great courage and heroism was exacted; but to govern it wisely, to conquer it in spirit as well as in deed, to abolish religious and political despotism, to institute better educational methods, and to organise the resources of the country, will require greater courage. It will require the greatest form of courage—the courage not to take, but to give.

The War has already proved that the Russian Government and people are capable of great sacrifices. This spirit of self-abnegation has indeed been shown not only by the Slavonic races, but in a marked degree by the peoples of each country now locked in this terrific death struggle. It is the one justification of war.

That the next great world force will not be French, German, or English, but Slavonic, is beyond all doubt. The real ordeal of Russia, when she will prove her force to be for good and a humanitarian principle, or for evil and a continuation of corrupt and reactionary methods, will follow the cessation of hostilities. In her inward reorganisation, in the concessions she will grant to Poland and Finland, in her religious and political reforms, will come her trial by fire and the veritable testing of her heroism.

DORA CURTIS.

POETRY PROPHECY AND THE WAR

VOICES crying in the wilderness were theirs who announced the War that surprised its prophets when it came. More correct, perhaps, would it be to say that both prophets and unbelievers were only half surprised when the grave alarum at length rang out. I have not space now to attempt a fascinated groping amid the general mind—precarious groping amid vital intangibilities; but it would not be impossibly difficult to show how subtly, in the mind of people of diverse classes and thoughts, spite of disavowal and protestation, there persisted a conviction of the inevitability of the great War, a conviction of which the secret growing strength was only admitted when all hope of its error was gone. The prophets were right, but unhappily they were not persuasive, least of all when they proceeded from admonition to advice. It is not because of an aversion from truth that truth cries so often unregarded: it is rather that the heralds appear ungracious, are shrill, passionate, arrogant, when it were better that they should be cool, patient, and reasonable.

With one magnificent exception they have confined their warnings to prose. The poet thus distinguished is Mr. Charles Doughty, sole modern master of epic narrative, poet of England in her cradle and prophet of her present strife. In two quasi-dramatic poems, *The Cliffs* and *The Clouds*, he has anticipated the German attack, and divined the militant workings of the German psychology, with singularly clear sight. For those to whom his writings are unfamiliar let it be said for introduction that his first was also his single prose work, *Wanderings in Arabia*, a book which has slowly come to be known as the greatest travel book in our language—greatest, that is, in its record of adventurousness, in its extension of a powerful personality, in its understanding of a wild, alien people, and simply unique in its mastery of prose. Years after, Mr. Doughty began to issue the six volumes of *The Dawn in Britain*, an epic narrative of the interlinked history of Rome and Britain during the five hundred years that had ended with the death of Caractacus and the taking of Rome by the Gauls. The singular affectionateness of his

regard for the Britain of that brave period, for her people, chiefs, cities, religion, her flowers, birds, and very soil—this promises and secures the greater intensity of his passion for the England of our own day as he knows it and imagines it. That passion is confined rather than amply contained in *The Cliffs*, published in 1909, and *The Clouds*, published in 1912.

The Cliffs opens with John Hobbe, coastguard and Crimea veteran, watching an East Anglian heath-cliff. Recalling his own violent youth spent in England's fight, he murmurs as he looks for the moon to shine out again :

I would these clouds were brushed
Once from her bayonet-bright, high-burnished face.
I'm wont to perilous ways and doubtful nights:
There's many I've in them trenches wrought and watched.
Ah Lord of Glory! Thou that all beholdest
From starry heavens' yonder mighty steep,
Beseech Thee, I yet some soldier's deed might work.

Shadow and sound approach of an airship, and in the darkness Hobbe, puzzled and suspicious, crouches watching, listening. 'Two foreign *militaires*' and their mechanic alight and make fast their craft. Theirs is a reconnoitring journey, and for an hour or two they sit waiting for the first light. Talking serenely, one of them, an ingenious German Baron, expatiates to his lieutenant on the German view of England, of English slothfulness, ease, incompetence, speaking in pretty close harmony with those vigorous misconceptions with which the last few months have amazed and amused us all. Petticoat Island is his designation of England, with a people slow of heart, merely island-bred, evil-counselled. Parliament is a pack of loose-brained demagogues, and the rulers of the State pennywise, foolhardy mandarins. And what can be expected, since the English tongue is 'a native fog of misbegotten language—a speech wherein none can think clearly.' Elsewhere Englishmen's words are 'disloyal, sordid, forged, pernicious argot.' He will not have it that there has been but a late and hasty degeneration; he blows away whatever glory hangs over English history, recalls the Dutch ships in the Thames and explains Waterloo by Napoleon's stomach-ache and Blücher. 'Thus holds our General Staff.' To some of these airy nothings the lieutenant demurs; his mother was an Englishwoman. What cause has Germany against the English? The candid answer is that England has too much, Germany not enough, and force is God's law of nations. Anticipating with remarkable accuracy the harangue of the German Imperial Chancellor and his 'scrap of paper,' the Baron declares that if but their power be great they need not spare for any 'dusty treaties'; and thus Germany's shall be the prize of our vast possessions,

now held only by her long-sufferance. England herself shall sink into an island province of Germany, for 'it plainly appertains to our Imperial Crown by antique right.' The plan is by craft to sink the British Fleet, since it rides the sea so carelessly at night without protection 'gainst sudden offence of enemy submarines'; ports are to be sealed by mines, until the abject multitude clamour for bread and England bleed to death. Her own arms are vain, for what has since become so famous as our 'contemptible little army' is deemed by the Baron to be a diseased Lilliputian force scattered round the globe. With an eye to India, Turkey is to be beguiled:

It costs no more to us
Than promises; and that's only paper breath.

One inevitably recalls the 'strong bid' made by the German Chancellor for British neutrality by agreement between the two nations. From another view the lieutenant replies:

How with men-rocks,
Harder than granite, souls that fear no death,
Should we contend; whose only dread in death
Is to be found less than their fathers' spirits
In warlike worth! . . .

What is there, can be matched with their true worth!
Where were swash-buckler brags, big bully-strut,
Mustachios at full cock, tall beer-steeped flesh,
Brave clink of sabres, spurs, in Linden street,
Or warlike fripperies; whereat the World laughs?

The Baron laughs at him, 'Herr Balaam'; but the lieutenant has a fear (which time even yet may prove to be true) lest

The natural piety should revolt
Of our peace-loving homely honest folk.

His fear is indeed more solemn, and as yet unechoed in our ears to-day:

If there's an Eye in heaven, if there's an Ear,
I dread must fall one day a Nemesis
For all this on us.

All which touches the Baron not at all. The preachers shall preach:

Nay, if any lack persuasion they'll protest,
And hammer out an hundred godly texts,
And loudly asseverate, all those make up for us!
Methinks, their white be-banded vulpine throats
I see above their tubs; and heavenward lifted,
Their feminine hands bless our war-enterprises!

And already we have seen theologians, professors, artists, and publicists hastily marshalling their texts and crying out their

asseverations for the benefit of neutrals; and twenty-two German universities have sent to foreign universities a pained protest against the accusation of the German soldiery, the most docile in the world. The answer to these evasive protests, it will be remembered, has been merely to print the German proclamations ordering the soldiers to do what they are accused of having done; and the preachers preach in vain.

Typically cynical, the Baron speaks of the 'new school of thought' which holds that even religion is in abeyance, when

A man's in doing of a thing
To his advancement. When that's done and past
And may not be undone, he can repent,
And fall to whining contrite penitence.

'For all the wrong which we are thus doing,' said the German Chancellor, in defending the invasion of Belgium, 'we will make reparation as soon as our military object is attained'—that is 'when that's done and may not be undone.' Christian precepts and all superstitious fears they will despise. Ah, remonstrates the lieutenant, there is a piety of our common flesh amongst all of human voice and understanding: humanity that cannot cease; but this the Baron waves aside. When all has been achieved they will get some 'upstart professor' to justify their ways to man:

And with his new tin trumpet din the World!

Returning to his favourite theme, this cynical spy does not hesitate to reproach our puritan hearts with 'a creeping vein of impotent cynicism.' Our theatre is emasculate and meretricious (yes, spite of Reinhardt and the Berlin zest for Mr. Shaw), our literature putrid and withering—voice of hunchback spirits. Phrase after phrase, it will be observed, can be matched to-day. More happily correct has proved the testimony of the lieutenant, who has travelled in India, and does not believe that the branches will fall from the tree at the first violent gust:

Her rajahs would, I am persuaded,
Whet loyal sabres, and lead forth proud armies,
To maintain Britain's cause!

Even as to the English themselves he seeks to mitigate the Baron's contempt—they are as the sea-waves, all one beneath.'

So they talk, crouched on the wild cliff, meditating treason against mankind's happiness, Crimea Hobbe listening and half-understanding, the silent heavens bristling with unregarded stars, as the air of years and years had tingled with unregarded warnings. Their errand is to reconnoitre; the great fleet comes between two banks of mines; it is time to fly back and guide

the rest of the aircraft. They rise to release theirs, and Hobbe stoutly interposing is slain by the Baron, who (prefiguring Zabern) deplores that his sword is smutched with clown's blood.

For a book written before 1909 and published in that year, the importance to be attached to aircraft in connexion with a raid on England is acutely foreseen, more especially when it is remembered how, both then and much later, the inadequacy of our own strength in this direction was unrecognised. More striking, however, than any such anticipation is the general previsionary apprehension of that which is and has been (as we now admit) the real peril—I mean the peculiar misconception under which Germany has been striding forward so many years, both as regards her own powers, needs and aspirations, and the rights of all the non-Teutonic world. The first part of *The Cliffs* revealed for the mere lover of poetry what the last few months have proclaimed bitterly to the whole world. Then comes a curious change. Mr. Doughty, who has read thus surely the minds of the German mandarins (to use his own word again), aims strangely awry in his forecast of the English Government. He sees supineness, ministers scattered hither and thither for long week-ends, the public offices 'shut like tombs,' so that Coastguard Commander Pakenham, confronted with intelligence of the enemy's vast designs, cannot even get an answer to telegraph messages but after excruciating delay. Our fleet, hastily recalled from distant manœuvres, may reach the Channel in three days; but the German fleet, with scores of transports, has already been sighted. Dull and nerveless has been the head, and so the whole body is slack and wanting in warlike skill.

Ha, Sir! had Englishmen been bred to arms
They'd not now care whether by land it were,
Or sea, they met with Britain's enemies.

Unready, unready is his sombre indictment of a 'parricide Parliament,' for he has the purely aristocratic, intellectual contempt for 'democratic government,' and would possibly scorn even the phrase as meaningless. Pleasant is it to read, nevertheless, of the prompt and sweet courage of the country people, ready to do anything and everything; of the 'boy-defenders of the Isle,' with radiant looks; more pleasant still to us at the moment the tribute to the 'London Scottish,' and a swart-eyed band to whom:

Jews, born Englishmen,
Shouted commandment in strange Hebrew tongue,
Men faithful to the State wherein they dwell;
Those in whose hearts antique war-fury burns
Marched to do battle at the foster-shore.

Nothing in the imagined blackness of a democratic Government's neglect can make Mr. Doughty forget his native pride in Britain; and this pride is expressed in his invention of a great national organisation, apparently unofficial, called The Sacred Band; men enrolled father with son, even grandfather with grandson, and keeping green their hearts through trivial tasks for 'the day':

Day when shall they contend to the last man,
A living bulwark, warding Britain's Coast,
Over all whose corse must her Enemies pass.

Nor only in England does he find—what we have now so fortunately found—prompt loyalty of devotion among the people; in daughter-lands and far-off isles is

Felt mighty pulse of Britain's Mother-heart,
Man's message under weight of infinite flood. . . .
Went up great cry: the haunts of merchandise
Were shut. With burning hearts in haste assembled
Then citizen-throngs, in hundred market-places,
To hear the words of whoso best could speak.

Proudly does he write of the response from the oversea provinces. He sees their ships running forth, packed with stern, eager hearts, setting out with much the same vivid and various effect of pageantry as he has portrayed in *The Dawn in Britain*, when the longships came to our shores.

As I write, the newspapers teem with talk of Germany's avowed imperial piracy, her threat to destroy indiscriminately whatever shipping wanders foolishly into European waters. There is mingled surprise and contempt, but Mr. Doughty at least is not among the surprised; for in *The Cliffs* he writes of four great submarines that lay beyond the Needles (be it remembered that no declaration of war had preceded this act) and

Waylaid our ships; where not in sight from land.
They took their crews and passengers out, 'mongst whom
Some women were and children; and them set
On pontoon rafts, borne on the English ships,
Adrift. He thought they'd tow them out an hour,
To sea, leaving one boat, that few in her
Might row, towards Catherine's light, for help to save
Their cast-away, spoiled, naked, weary lives;
Drifting in jeopardy, on the dim night-waves.

Were the German strategists conceivably lacking in unholy devices, it might be thought that they had read Mr. Doughty's poetry with enthusiasm.

What of the end of this raid? The deep-laid plans miscarry. The German fleet in their manœuvrings stumble on their own mines; two capital ships and three transports are lost; a land-

ing in Yorkshire is repelled, and an air fleet wrecked in a storm. Mr. Doughty had as little fear of Zeppelins in 1909 as we have to-day in considering their fitness for fight; there is something oddly humorous in his picture :

Cast were many away in squall and tempest
At sea ; which could not stem the windy gusts.
Some other fought, that topt the English Cliffs,
With windmills, lightning rods, and weathercocks'
Sharp beaks; and most-whiles had the worst. Some bounced
On trees; and fell down loads of enemies, like as
At bed-time, cockchafers do. Some hanged themselves
On telegraph wires.

The aeroplanes, however, 'that went like rocketing pheasants,' escape by rising against the wind. 'An arrow of the Almighty,' says Mr. Doughty, has 'attained' the Royal plotter, and England is spared the Island struggle by much the same super-mundane intervention as sent that other Armada broken and empty away.

In one thing has Mr. Doughty been hopelessly and magnificently wrong—in his conception of the indifference, the profound somnolence of the Government of the day. Upon this it would be idle to enlarge. In another, who among our people would not say he has spoken magnificently aright?

All Europe's Chancelleries know full well,
Were this our mighty Ship of Britain's State
To founder under us; should rise such waves,
Redound, reverberate, through all the World,
Beat back, from shore to shore, an hundred years:
And still breed wars, and those beget new wars:
That to forecast the event, must far surpass
The exercise of any mortal wit.

II

The Clouds carries the German plans a stage further, though the development of the poem is obscure, and gives place (as, indeed, does *The Cliffs*) to idyllic interludes in the Elizabethan manner, if a manner which is so purely and so potently an author's own can be called by another's name. In *The Clouds* Mr. Doughty has become, indeed, more wholly Mr. Doughty, in his manner, his music, his union of strength and sweetness, his half-sad, half-confident but wholly filial regard for England. The 'Proeme' breathes melancholy and pride; England is still a land of slumbering, trembling, sighing, a land undone; and in 'The Muse's Garden' a 'Vates' sits, to whom the Muse in vision unfolds the future.

The first scene so unfolded is 'Easthampton Burned,' and is placed beyond what was once Easthampton. A workman's

family crouches over the hedge-fire, the children for lack of food huddled to their mother's bosom. Carpenter, the sometime lodger, a land agent, joins them as they talk of children burned in hospital beds, of the sorrows before them, and of the uncomprehended attack that has ruined them all. They talk on, not uncheerfully, though the heavy boom of guns is still heard. From the interrogation of the Mayor by an Intelligence Officer, the reader learns how, on a night of hazy moon, pontoon boats suddenly landed German pioneers at Easthampton Strand, who at once cut the telephone wires, surrounded the few cottages, and threatened death to all. Throughout the calm night foot and horse soldiers and 'muffle-wheeled field guns' disembarked and moved inland. They must needs pass a camp of English recruits; challenged, the invaders fire, and the few dazed recruits that are not soon killed are secured. Easthampton reached, the undreaming town is waked by a gunshot and summoned to surrender, provide horses, carriage, and victual, and pay 30,000*l*.

The Germans take possession of the town, and then their commandant rides in with a strong guard :

In old crooked narrow street,
Where hardly wain might pass, stood many thronging
The foot pavement to look on. Risen in his stirrups
He gave the word. *Ride down the Englishers!*
Sudden over men's heads rang out a shot
From chamber window of an antique house.

Killed by the ramrod of a mere blunderbuss, 'that arrogant' falls from his horse. The shot had been fired by an old widow, 'moaning her dead son's only son' killed that morning by the Germans. The unhappy woman is seized, tried by court-martial, tied to a lamp post, and shot, men rushing to save her being bayoneted. Her yet living body is flung back into the house, which is fired. A tempest of live shells is rained upon the burning town, for example's sake; and in a few hours a place of twelve thousand families becomes a funereal waste of smoke and flame.

Strange! yet not so strange. For Easthampton read Aerschot, Louvain, Visé, Malines, these in Belgium; or the all but innumerable places in France which the French Commission on the Violations of International Law have named in their Report. Near Louvain, at Sempst, says the Belgian Commission :

were found the bodies of two men, partially carbonised. One of them had his legs cut off at the knees; the other had the arms and legs cut off. A workman, whose burnt body has been seen by several witnesses, had been struck several times with bayonets, and then, while still alive, the Germans had poured petroleum over him, and thrown him into a house to which they set fire. A woman who came out of her house was killed in the same way.

At Senlis, declares the French Commission :

The Germans entered Senlis, where they were greeted by rifle fire from African troops. Alleging that they had been fired on by civilians, they set fire to two quarters of the town. One hundred and five houses were burned in the following manner: The Germans marched along the streets in a column; at a whistle from an officer some of them fell out and proceeded to break in the doors of the houses and the shop fronts; then others came along and lit the fire with grenades and rockets; patrols who followed them fired incendiary bullets with their rifles into those houses in which the fire was not taking hold fast enough.

To multiply instances would be at once easy and tedious. For us the point of the English poet's words is that the fulfilment of his prophecy is found not in England but in Belgium and France. The difference is merely accidental—if the escape from such blind havoc can ever be conceived by the human imagination as merely accidental.

Carpenter, witness of all this, journeys northwards by road and footpath to his mother. Reaching Ely, he joins the crowd that press for safety into the Cathedral, his ears still holding echoes of the heavy distant guns. In the great nave is made public distribution of bread, and at night the floor is parcelled out among the fugitive men and women. He leaves Ely with many more, since a third of all strangers must remove for lack of bread; and the fear is uttered that the next day may require the departure of another third. On the way to Stamford Carpenter meets young men 'from college halls':

Untaught, unexercised to patriot arms . . .
Nor of that shame ashamed.

From Stamford to Dove Valley he journeys on, learning by gossip (since letters and newspapers are scarce) of the sealing of the Medway and Thames, the occupation of the Isle of Wight, and the investment of Portsmouth. In the Valley of the Dove he meets a placid fisherman who carries always with him, and most affectionately now, *The Compleat Angler*, and talks lyrically with that sweet savour of life which Walton himself communicated. Strange and welcome this distraction of talk between Carpenter and Piscator, with the pious ghost of old Izaak hovering near. Piscator :

Still studying to conform my spirit to his;
Which was conformed to Christ and His first saints.
With him, I joy to hear chant of all birds;
And this small teeming wavering infinite hum,
In the sheen air, and thymy web of grass,
Of silver-winged flies, and derne creeping things:
All children of Life's Breath, on my Dove's brinks.

And all the while around their childlike spirits creep nearing echoes of war and death. Yet not in indifference do they talk, for Piscator's house has been burned by the Germans, and his home now is with many homeless ones in a cave-camp, refuge of Britons, Saxons, and Angles from their earlier foes, now the shelter of men newly forlorn. This delicious interlude is surely as right in its vision of character as the view of the Government's invariable weakness is wrong; for even to-day do not men go about their business, peasants dig and sow under screaming shells, committees sit and scholars lecture upon the discovery of early sites—and all as if the world were peaceful still? Piscator, fishing and talking, becomes a type of that quiet brightness of spirit which we in England witness everywhere moving with a natural and happy ease. Other such interludes occur in the poem, curiously gentle and beautiful, but of these I do not speak now. Carpenter continues his journey homewards, and it is this journey by high road and footpath, mostly avoiding towns, but coming here and there upon offenceless, idle groups—men awakened, but ignorant to despair of all that is happening—it is this that gives Mr. Doughty his great opportunity of an imaginative outline of the effect of these ills upon the people of England. One tells Carpenter :

Where the Eastlanders occupy any manor-house,
They put therein to the most abject uses
What thing they find, without regard of aught.
He had known them, mongst the armour and stags' heads
To stall their horses, in historic halls.
He had known them, priceless heirlooms to break up
To kindle fires, under their cooking pots.
He had known, where Eastlander officer's evening pastime
Was, with revolvers, to shoot out the eyes
Of a great Northern lord's ancestral pictures!

Does it not remind us of the lessons in Kultur which have been so diligently taught by German trooper and general alike? Witness (one for many) the Château of Baye or of Beaumont, referred to in the French Commissioners' Report. Piece by piece the story is gathered up, from here a fragment, from there a hint, until the whole 'doing' and 'being' are comprehensively seen. The German plan was to effect five simultaneous landings, of which four were successful, the British Fleet having been lured afar by feints. But one of these attempts is foiled, three German war-ships foundering; the rest are chased and taken. Captured, too, are most of the transports :

Some tempting, midst the fight, their cables slipped,
To make an offing; holed by English shot
Sunk within sight of land. Others, which dragged,
Wind-driven, their anchors, fell on a lee shore.

There long-shore fisherfolk run down boldly, amidst
The flying spume, from surge's seething foam,
Snatched, staggering, at lives' risk, from death, their enemies.

The story of these almost superhumane rescues has been matched many times already by British generosity in the present War! And are not these things for boasting, if ever boast be justified?

The German fleets convoy five army corps, supplemented by air raids everywhere. London and the South Coast, the Midlands, and Lancashire are in the same moment attacked; Portsmouth is bombarded and the *Victory* driven off between two cruisers; communications are cut, and wireless messages corrupted by counter-contrivance; and the armies of our Allies are prevented from assisting us by strong fleets containing their fleets. From a wounded naval officer (whose destroyer has been struck by one of the mines laid, before war had been declared, by disguised German ships) Carpenter hears how in a single sudden attack by night, when all the world but one nation slept at peace, Britain's naval predominance is lost; and amid such tales of disaster one thing only is reported for encouragement—that the English airmen easily excel all airy foes, losing their own lives freely to cast away their enemies by using against the fleet a new explosive.

Who is there, would not for his Nation's Life
Hazard himself, yield willingly his own life,
For England? Never have intrepid spirits
Been here found wanting: Britain's soil breeds such.
For every hardy, adventurous, desperate enterprise
A thousand volunteers.

This of the misfortunes of war. More minutely has Mr. Doughty pictured the state of England in this bewilderment. The seizure by the invaders of all food, wanted or unwanted by themselves; the deliberate effort to strangle by hunger and terrorise by violence, so that the unwarlike crowds shall themselves compel peace; bands of native marauders, grown fierce with hunger, making all roads unsafe; sudden commercial collapse, with expectation of a general moratorium; children taught in cave-schools, as in Rheims are children taught to-day in cellars; and everywhere men, lovers of their motherland, looking darkly forward to massacre, expatriation, or slavery, and blaming bitterly the rulers of their choice—these things and more, broadly or in careful detail, are set before you, lightened only with fortunate glimpses of the brave good-will of man to man. Reading of them now, you reflect how all these might be but the description (the horror softened) of the sufferings of France or Belgium.

With a lovely tenderness of affection, Carpenter (upon whom

all these rays of intelligence are focussed) looks sharply for every least sign of alteration as he approaches his mother's house.

Dark is my path, 'twixt holly hedges. Here
Should be our elder tree. It is! (I it know
By the heavy smell.) This then smooth laurel bough
I feel: the ruffling hazel-leaves, that hang over
Our gate hear now. Thank God! my journey is ended.

He finds his mother fled, Germans occupying the house, and himself apprehended. Questioned, he tells what he knows of the erasure of Easthampton from its site, and hears the significant comment :

' My major, you remember its bombarding,'
Another quoth, ' hath served for precedent
In this campaign.'

For a contemptuous look and phrase his old acquaintance the blacksmith had been shot at his own door; but Carpenter himself is not ill-treated, and is permitted to journey on to his mother in Wales. The last two books of this strange poem tell us no more of Carpenter, but in a touch here and a word there is revealed the abyss into which England's richness is cast. The German 'watchword' is 'Tame England by Famine'; and Famine tames her so quickly that the invaders are 'compelled by the world's voice' to establish doles of food; all that the British Parliament can do is to destroy the finger-posts on all roads, so that the task of feeding the multitude shall not be increased by their dispersion. Follows riot, 'carnival of unreason,' dismay of civil strife, until London is tardily avenged by our 'aeroplane destroyers' casting 'hadesite' bombs—fitly so called, since each bomb is the death of a thousand Germans. The last book has the title 'Help from Overseas,' and though Mr. Doughty is vexingly inexplicit, he assists you to believe that England will yet be England again and a better England, purged of all that has unmanned her :

Mother of Nations, hearken and take heart!
Know, that those great communities of thy sons,
(Defenders of the rock of the five Britains)
Be, as the living chords, of one great harp;
Sounding in unison, in vast accord,
O'er main-sea deeps, from all Britannic shores.

Possibly we shall never know how near England has been to the experience thus minutely imagined and so cruelly realised in Belgium and France. Poets, says Shelley, are the unacknowledged legislators of the world, and Mr. Doughty's clearness of vision—so far, at any rate, as German ideas and intentions are concerned—suggests the value of poets as acknowledged legis-

lators. Some things he could not foresee, for a man's prescience is perforce confined within the limits of his character. He foresaw in England much of the agony which has wrung the vitals of Belgium and France, even as he forecast the very cynicism, the intrepid mendacity, the corruption of national ideas, with which German apologists have familiarised us. But there are things which he has not hinted at because it was not within his character, as it is not within the English character itself, to imagine them. The German principle of deliberate terrorisation he did indeed divine, but the particularities were unimaginable. He could not conceive of the destruction of an unimportant town like Termonde,¹ the drenching of the hospital with petroleum and then the burning, with a poor epileptic within. He could not foresee that in places like Termonde and its neighbours² scores of inhabitants would be shot or bayoneted, their eyes put out, and at last their corpses mutilated, and all because of the resistance of a belligerent force; or that a German army, advancing upon a fortress, such as Liège, would protect itself by a line of hostages driven in front, with a larger number in reserve; or that some of these hostages would be stationed (with frightened nuns) all night upon a bridge, to prevent bombardment; or that when men and women should be thus seized for hostages a proportion of the men would invariably be set aside for immediate shooting; or that at this or that small village the male inhabitants, fathers and sons together, would be shot in a body before the streaming eyes of wives and children. Nor did he foresee how often the tragic 'case of Madame X.' or 'case of Mdlle X.' would recur in the methodical reports of Commissions following upon the track of these late exponents of German Romance; nor how in English villages to-day young refugee girls should hide, shrinking from their burden, waiting despairingly for the passage of the months—he did not foresee what no Englishman could foresee. But what he did apprehend was the German mind in which these things all lay unborn, the envious, arrogant temper which has swept so vehemently over the mental territory of the German people, turning its strength and wisdom to an acrid flame. He divined this when to many of us it was but a mere uneasy suspicion, when we would not believe what we were unwillingly beginning to believe. Was there not something naïve in the deliberate cheerfulness with which occasional warnings were received? For beneath that cheerfulness there was always a sombre anxiety that could not be starved or silenced. Mr. Doughty only saw more

¹ Dendermonde, in the history of that stainlessly gallant gentleman, Captain Shandy, and Corporal Trim.

² Read, for the real names given in the Belgian Commissioners' Report, Snettisham, Wells, or a thousand small places anywhere in England.

clearly and candidly what most saw obscurely and unadmittingly. These strange, grave poems, the largest body of purely 'patriotic' literature which we have, gain greatly in significance when they are viewed in the growing light poured by the War upon our national psychology, as well as on that of the German people.

III

More briefly must the poetry of Mr. Thomas Hardy be considered now, especially since its interest is mainly retrospective so far as England and her fortunes are concerned. It is his great, curious 'drama of the Napoleonic wars, in three parts, nineteen acts, and one hundred and thirty scenes'—*The Dynasts*—which is chiefly significant at this moment. Published more than ten years ago, when Mr. Hardy had already secured his position in English prose literature, this singular work confirmed the opinion of those who were beginning to think that his achievement as a poet would outweigh his achievement as a novelist: an opinion which subsequent poems were continually to strengthen. And now this enormous and continental work has been boldly cabined within the two hours' traffic of the stage, brightening many a winter afternoon and evening at the Kingsway Theatre—a success no less delightful than unlikely.

Mr. Hardy says that his drama is concerned with the great historical clash of peoples artificially brought about some hundred years ago; but his own view is rather that the Napoleonic upheaval was far from artificial—was indeed the result of blind forces, sinister inscrutabilities, antipathies, 'the Immanent Will with its inexplicable artistries,' just such dark, vital abstractions as have released rather than artificially brought about the present conflict of peoples. Mr. Hardy's poem does not depend upon a single interest for its great power and splendour. It has the interest of historical interpretation, the no less profound interest of its author's philosophical view of human life and destiny, and the intense, quickening interest of noble poetry. The choice of the subject was due, he tells us, mainly to accidents of locality—but who knows how human choice is determined? At any rate, these felicitous 'accidents' resulted in the creation of a poem, of the subject of which Mr. Hardy was of all living writers the most sensitive to feel the influences.

The historical interest has, of course, two aspects, the one purely insular, the other European, more varied and hardly less vivid. The author of the Wessex tales has enriched English literature with many a simple, intimate country scene, possessing beyond their historical value (highly as that may be reckoned) a social and psychological value, since these novels reveal not only

the peasant's ways and condition, but also his mind, his native attitude in face of questions of life and death. But nothing to be found in the stories shows this double value more clearly than passages from *The Dynasts*, passages such as :

First Spectator.

And you've come to see the sight, like the King and myself? Well, one fool makes many. What a mampus o' folk it is here to-day. And what a time we do live in, between wars and wassailings, the ghost o' Boney and King George in flesh and blood! . . . Everybody was fairly galled this week when the King went out yachting, meaning to be back for the theatre; and the time passed, and it got dark, and the play couldn't begin, and eight or nine o'clock came, and never a sign of him. I don't know when 'a did land, but 'twas said by all that it was a foolhardy pleasure to take.

Fourth Spectator.

He's a very obstinate and comical old gentleman, and by all account 'a wouldn't make port when asked to.

Second Spectator.

Lard, Lard, if 'a were nabbed, it wouldn't make a deal of difference! We should have nobody to zing to, and play single-stick to, and grin at through horse-collars, that's true. And nobody to sign our few documents. But we should rub along some way, goodnow.

Always has Mr. Hardy been fascinated by a red coat. His country folk are people who have served on land or sea, or whose sons or husbands have served; his very imagery is of martial matters. He has written songs that are indeed noble English airs :

In the wild October night-time when the wind raved round the land,
And the Back-sea met the Front-sea, and our doors were blocked with sand,
And we heard the drub of Dead-man's Bay, where bones of thousands are,
We knew not what the day had done for us at Trafalgar.

Had done,
Had done,
For us at Trafalgar!

Merely to turn the familiar pages again, for the first time since the present War began, is to find passages that greet you with a new, ironic significance :

Five hundred thousand active men in arms
Shall strike, supported by Britannic aid
In vessels, men and money subsidies,
To free North Germany and Hanover
From trampling foes; deliver Switzerland,
Unbind the galled republic of the Dutch,
Rethrone in Piedmont the Sardinian King,
Make Naples sword-proof.

Or note this of Berlin, when Napoleon is approaching and a lady of the Court cries through her tears :

The kingdom late of Prussia, can it be
That thus it disappears?—a patriot-cry,
A battle, bravery, ruin; and no more?

And now, too, when the figure of the Kaiser is so continually thrust before us, and the soberest sees it as at best but tragicomic, it is with fresher interest that we turn back a moment to Napoleon in *The Dynasts*. In all that astonishing rise and fall Mr. Hardy sees nothing trivial or comic, but only the errancy of genius uncontrolled; and there is a pure tragic note in the last scene when Napoleon, entering listlessly the Wood of Bossu, is 'stung by spectral questionings,' knowing he has lived too long for his own greatness :

I came too late in time
To assume the prophet or the demi-god,
A part past playing now.

The present time illuminates the phrase afresh. 'The Spirit of the Years,' accosting Napoleon as he broods, reminds him that his glory was that of the Dresden days, when well-nigh every monarch bent before him :

Saving always England's —
Rightly dost say 'well-nigh.' Not England's,—she
Whose tough, enisled, self-centered, kindless craft
Has tracked me, springed me, thumbled me by the throat,
And made herself the means of mangling me!

Luminous again the words of Wellington at Waterloo :

Manœuvring does not seem to animate
Napoleon's methods here. Forward he comes,
And pounds away on us in the ancient style,
Till he is driven back in the ancient style,
And so the see-saw sways!

The large, proud moments of our history are splendidly preserved in *The Dynasts*—Trafalgar, Nelson's death, the brilliant figure of the great Admiral clear as a star in Mr. Hardy's sharp and weighty verse. . . . Pathetic beyond almost anything in the novels is that other scene of the poor King of delinquent wits, lying at Windsor and told of Albuera. 'You have achieved a victory.'

He says I have won a battle? But I thought
I was a poor afflicted captive here,
In darkness lingering out my lonely days,
Beset with terror of these myrmidons
That suck my blood like vampires! Ay, ay, ay!

No aims left to me but to quicken death
To quicklier please my son! And yet he says
That I have won a battle!

The Dynasts is a rare if it be not a unique instance of a great creative work conceived in or touched by an ironic spirit. Unseen 'ironies' form some of the 'phantasmal intelligences' sitting in judgment upon the procession of events in this long drama; for Mr. Hardy, far from content with simply chronicling, must perforce strive to interpret. He cannot believe that there is no meaning and no end in all this strife but the aggrandisement of a soldier or the founding of a dynasty; and hence the purely philosophical interest of the poem is as acute as the purely national interest. Here, however, it must be left aside, with this sole note for the consolation of those who, in the present more than Napoleonic struggle, are compelled to questions which are more often and more easily asked than answered:

Yet is it but Napoleon who has failed.
The pale pathetic peoples still plod on
Through hoodwinkings to light.

Is that hard to believe? Looking abroad to-day one is conscious of eclipse, and in the obscurity it is difficult to discover aught but one huge interlocking of furious armies and peoples. It needs no impossible faith, however, to believe that one forest of hoodwinkings may soon be passed through, and that even a few years (a short time in the life of nations) will see the European peoples on the fringe of clear and simple light. When that light is grown it may be time for the chronicler of the War to begin his musings; sooner it cannot profitably be. The Napoleonic wars have waited a hundred years for a man of genius to understand as well as judge, to interpret as well as record, to revive and recall as well as celebrate. In *The Dynasts*, and in a score of poems from other volumes, Mr. Hardy has applied the superb powers of a great imagination to a subject which only a great imagination could enkindle again; and the result is a contribution not only to history, but also to that spirit which is born in the blood and bred in the bones of the British people, and nursed upon traditions that are native, unwritten history—the spirit by which the end of the present War has long been pre-determined. The very greatness of England's victory a hundred years ago is a guarantee that by the same national spirit will the same issue be attained in this vaster conflict of peoples.

JOHN FREEMAN.

OUR NEW ARMIES:

A STUDY AND A FORECAST

It is a study which may be made almost anywhere in Great Britain. Scarcely a country town but its pavements are thronged with figures in peaked cap and khaki tunic. It is, moreover, an unique study, the like of which has never hitherto been afforded us. The Volunteer movement of Napoleonic times, although with points of resemblance, is totally dissimilar in this, that here you have the sudden blazing forth of the martial spirit among a people so ostentatiously devoted to the maintenance of peace, that their supposed unwillingness to fight was undoubtedly a contributory cause of the outbreak of War; a people, moreover, who for a hundred years had regarded war as a matter of distant frontiers, not a menace to the heart of their Empire—a matter, therefore, to be left to the professional fighter, backed up by the national resources, not a call to the citizen, as such, to take up arms. Of course to large numbers of people it has not yet appeared in this light, but our success in raising our new armies is a fair test of the extent to which it has done so. A new phenomenon, such as this, must have about it features worth studying, both in themselves, and as indicating lines of future development in national character and international relationships. Unsuspected elements of thought and feeling have come to the surface. They will not subside and leave uninfluenced the character in which they have betrayed their presence, nor the relationship in which that character will henceforth stand to the larger humanity of which it is a part.

At the commencement of the struggle this was not the case. The nation was stirred to its core by indignation, which it believed to be righteous; it was also profoundly solemnised by the thought of conflict with an enemy of so terrific a military reputation. But the citizen, as such, did not immediately feel himself touched by the call to arms. The first recruits to the new army were largely of the ordinary type, that with which we were familiar during the Boer War, men out of employment, seeking a livelihood, or adventurous spirits on the outlook for

exciting experiences. As the evidence of what we regarded as German perfidy and cruelty accumulated; as we became conscious of the passion of hatred aroused against us; as the certainty that the War would be costly both in lives and treasure, and the probability that it would be long was realised, a change crept over the spirit of the nation, which was reflected in the character of the recruits. Not since the days of the Crusades, perhaps, has so strong a conviction that we are engaged in a Holy War permeated the nation, with its corollary that to bear arms is not merely a useful occupation for those who like soldiering, but a duty incumbent even upon those who do not. This introduces into the new armies a touch of the 'Ironsides' spirit.

Of course, among the officers there are many who belong to what may soon be regarded as the 'old school,' the name now often applied to a hard-swearing, hard-drinking set of vanished days. The men to whom I refer are indeed superior to these. Sport-loving, clean-living, duty-doing, in many cases they only just fall short of the highest possibilities open to a soldier. The spiritual is the touch lacking. Given that, they would be indeed Gabriels, 'God's heroes.' If 'playing the game' demands death, they will die. Still, it will be only 'playing the game.' They are very hard to convince that their adversaries are not doing the same. 'The Germans are very keen to win, and perhaps not always as scrupulous as they might be about the means they use' is the severest judgment you are likely to get from them. With the memory of the slanders poured out on themselves during the Boer War, this mildness is not altogether to be wondered at. But the man who goes to war in that spirit is inferior as a striking force to him whose heart is afire with the possession of God's commission to right the wrong. And he is apt to discourage in others the spirit of religious devotion to the work in hand, to the meaning and value of which he is a stranger. No one has such power to create an 'atmosphere' as the commanding officer of a company or troop. The writer had good evidence of this when forming a Confirmation class among the soldiers quartered in his parish. Out of twenty members, ten came from two companies, the commanding officers of which were keen Churchmen. The motives of those who offered themselves varied from the feeling that an effort must be made to satisfy the wishes of loved ones at such a time, to the personal desire to be spiritually, as well as physically, fit to meet the contingencies awaiting them across the sea. In all, as far as could be judged, there was a distinct expectation of spiritual blessing, and an utter absence of mechanical compliance with custom, which one has often too much reason to suspect, and in consequence it was a most stimulating class to conduct.

The moral issues involved in this conflict appear to have affected all parts of the army, but the ranks more than the others. To innumerable country towns it has been a novel and exciting experience to be transformed from sleepy agricultural marketing places into smart military centres. The strange thing has been, not that the evils incident to garrison towns have cropped up and scandalised quiet folk unaccustomed to such doings, but that they have not reached anything like the dimensions which in ordinary times would be prophesied. No doubt they vary in various localities, and the first army was more on the level which might have been expected than subsequent ones. In this parish the amount of drunkenness is not much above normal. On the other hand, the khaki-worship of young girls, mostly fifteen or sixteen years old, has been tremendously pronounced, nor can the praiseworthy efforts made to confine it within the limits safe for them be said to be very successful as yet. If our soldier lads do not emerge from their training with very 'swelled heads,' it will not be the fault of the civilian population. Soldiers are admitted at half price to the picture shows, there are special 'military' nights at the theatre, when they are allowed to behave very much as they please; and it says a good deal for them that nothing more objectionable than noise has resulted.

The impulse urging our people to give a good time while they can to the men who are going forth, perhaps to die for them, is natural, and creditable. That the unwisdom of some of the means employed is not more productive of harm is because such an unusual proportion of recruits have joined the ranks from the very highest motives, and, in consequence, the percentage of those of superior social and educational status who have enlisted is much larger than usual. Our Universities, and even our Theological Colleges, where the vocation of the students might be regarded as fixed, are more than half depleted. This means the entry into the soldier's calling of men whose whole outlook on life is from the religious point of view. A month or two ago the writer asked a Bishop whether his list of ordination candidates was not dangerously reduced. 'Greatly, but not dangerously,' was his reply; 'we shall get them all back again with interest.' It seems, indeed, reasonable to expect that many of those who have felt the thrill of response to the call of a high service, and in obedience to it have given up careers chosen from selfish motives, when the War is over will respond to another high call—that of the Church in need of men to minister at her altars, especially in the poor and crowded centres of population. And possibly those who have added to the usual preparation for Holy Orders the training of the camp and battlefield, will find that

it will give them just the sort of power which is needed in days when all Christian bodies in the country are lamenting the absence of men from their services. Within the writer's knowledge one young theological student, the son of a country clergyman, is already finding his Christian manhood put to a severe test in a reserve battalion of Territorials, where the tone is perhaps not quite up to the average. Under such circumstances some will fall, doubtless, but some will come out as 'gold tried in the fire.'

The War is bound to stir, more deeply as it goes on, the religious feelings and convictions of the nation; will it bring our men back to loyalty to some form of organised Christianity? Never before has the need of thorough organisation, if success is to be won, been demonstrated on such a stupendous scale. Those who have given themselves to form part of the great fighting machine, because they hoped thereby to aid a cause which appealed to every fibre of their being, are not likely to be content with the *franc-tireur* method, or rather want of method, in any other great cause to which they may give themselves in the future. They will be much more likely to attach themselves to what they believe to be the best organisation for carrying it out; they will study the rules, and try to do their part in making the wheels go round. And there is no doubt that, to many such, religion will be the cause making the great appeal. I have in my desk a letter from the Front, from an officer in high command, in which he states how in the dark and glorious days of the retreat from Mons the power of prayer and the reality of answers to prayer were brought home to him as never before. Given a larger proportion of men than usual joining the Army from high and chivalrous motives; given a large number of sensitive consciences, who, lovers of peace though they were, could not in honour shirk the questions of the recent house-to-house inquiry, and you have the material ready to hand from which a great religious revival might be expected to arise, a revival moreover on the lines of organised Christianity.

A consideration urged by the Headmaster of Eton in the last number of the *Hibbert Journal* tells in the same direction. He points out that, while in Prussia the State is organised down to the smallest detail, Christianity has rested, ever since the Reformation, on an individualistic basis. No witness for morals is forthcoming from the Church in that country in the face of the omnipotent State. Had the Church, as an organisation, been stronger, the moral downfall of the German people could not have been compassed by the militarist faction dominant in the State. If this view be correct, it is certain that men who have organised for the settlement of great international moral

issues, and in doing so have attained to a spiritual enthusiasm to which they have hitherto been strangers, will, on coming home, seek earnestly for that organisation which will best effect moral and spiritual advance at home, and will not consent, as hitherto, to be merely nominal adherents of whatever organisation their parents happened to belong to. We may therefore expect a revival, not only of religious feeling, but of organised Christianity, as a result of the experiences through which we are passing.

Against this, the extraordinary mixture of religious faiths in the allied ranks might be supposed to tend towards the obliteration, not merely of distinctions between Church and Church, but even between Faith and Faith. My Anglican friend, resting for a few days behind the trenches in a little French village, finds the village church at his service for prayer and meditation; the hearts of all English Christians go out to Cardinal Mercier, the patriot Archbishop of Malines; the French soldiers, we are glad to learn, have been impressed by the religious tone they have observed among our English troops, and they are likely to be still more impressed as the new armies come to the Front; Belgians, French, and English look with sympathy and admiration on the stubborn fight waged against the common foe by Russian Churchmen on the eastern front, and incidentally learn attractive things about Russian Christianity of which the Western world hitherto was in ignorance; nay, more: Hindoos and Mahomedans are having the Victoria Cross pinned to their breast, which by its very form suggests a recognition of Christian courage, while the Japanese convey to King Albert of the Belgians their appreciation of his Christian heroism in the gift of a jewelled sword. Does not all this go to support an attitude of indifference to the points of distinction between creeds?

For Modes of Faith let graceless zealots fight,
His can't be wrong whose life is in the right.

On the other hand, we may be sure that as we get to know our foes better, more examples of Christian chivalry, such as that of the captain of the *Emden*, will come to light even among the Germans, and we shall learn that it is possible for a man's private life to be in the right, while through the system to which he is attached—in this case political, though it might equally be ecclesiastical—he is involved in the grossest wrong. Thus one hopes that we shall learn that, although the best of men may be found in almost every organisation, and even outside of every organisation, the most effective work for the good of all can only be done through that organisation which is best adapted for the application of the highest truth to human life.

We Christians believe that in the Church of Christ such an organisation exists. Surely the circumstances of mutual brotherhood into which the War has thrown members of various branches of the Church must tend toward the breaking down of the walls of partition between them, and towards the establishment of some bond of outward union which will preserve 'In necessariis unitas, in non necessariis libertas, in omnibus caritas.' What would not such an outward and visible witness to moral and spiritual truth do for the settlement of the problems which Europe will present to a distracted diplomacy, when the great 'Cease fire!' is sounded?

C. E. SCOTT MONCRIEFF.

THE ALIEN ENEMY WITHIN OUR GATES

APHORISMS made in Germany are not as a rule approved by us at the present juncture, but von Hindenburg's saying, or reputed saying, concerning the supreme value of strong nerves to a nation at war is not displeasing to English ears.

If there is one thing we are confident about, it is that our nerves will stand any strain that the country will have to endure, and that we bear suspense, reverses, and disaster, both as individuals and as a nation with strong heart and a stiff upper lip. Strength of nerve is a quality which has been bred in the bone for centuries past in this nation of ours, nor has this War disproved the claim. In the trenches or the North Sea, in the homes grown suddenly dark and still when the dreaded War Office letter came, in the seaside town where little children have been crushed by shell or bomb, the steadfastness of character which, in spite of all our faults, has made us what we are—a nation holding the greatest Empire on the earth in trust—has not failed us, and we know it never will.

Then there is our love of fair play. 'Fair play is a jewel,' we say. We claim to be pre-eminently a nation of good sportsmen who play the game.

As a rule we have done so; but in this crisis there has been one unfortunate exception—the attitude of a section of Englishmen towards those Germans and Austrians who are domiciled in this country.

This attitude has been unworthy of a strong-nerved people, and conspicuously lacking in fair play.

This in itself would not be of very great importance, for allowance must always be made for some nerves to go to pieces in such a time as the present, had not the Government shown signs on one occasion of yielding to the clamour, while the majority of the nation and the Press have made little effort to set forth the facts and appeal to fair play and common sense.

This official weakness and national indifference have already resulted in grave injustice, the widespread suffering of innocent persons, and the creation of intense bitterness and sense of undeserved injury on the part of thousands of well-intentioned,

perfectly harmless German and Austrian residents here. If it is repeated, and the agitation against men of German blood simply because they are Germans gains force and impetus, it will end in a condition of affairs which can only be described as a moral disaster to the British race.

The position has been stated bluntly, but this is no time for mincing words. The enemy outside our gates is desperate, and at any moment the 'frightfulness' of his methods of waging war may be brought home to the people in these islands more severely than it has been yet. If this happens, and the present spirit manifested by many responsible Englishmen towards Germans living here is maintained, the treatment to which these folk who are wholly in our power may be subjected is not pleasant to contemplate.

Let the issue be quite clear. No complaint is advanced against the criticisms of the authorities which have appeared when some person has been found to have abused the freedom of the subject which we give to citizens of this country, even though they have been of German nationality. Still less should we carp at any warning to the Government, however emphatic, or to the people of this country, to be firm and circumspect in dealings with alien enemies here, no matter how innocent they may appear, nor how long they may have made England their home. We are at war with an enemy whose long-felt hatred for us under a cloak of friendship has been disclosed so plainly that it would be positively blameworthy not to be strict and watchful, and to fail to treat with stern justice and short shrift any person suggesting lax methods of dealing with espionage or the dangers of incendiarism.

But when measures are urged which must deprive thousands of persons with whom their bitterest enemy could find no fault, and the large majority of whom have English-born wives and children, of their whole livelihood, reducing them to hopeless penury and misery—then it is time to call a halt, and consider whether the interests of any nation, least of all our own free land, are to be advanced by a policy which, cloak it as we may, has become one of harrying and persecuting people simply because they belong to the nation which we hate.

This policy began when the Government were urged to take up every German and Austrian subject, of whatever age and rank, and thrust him into prison. No one was to be spared. No exception was to be made. Because there was evidence that information had reached Germany of the disposition of our Fleet, and other matters, and that somewhere in our midst were a number of spies, the safety of the realm demanded that tens of thousands of persons whose interests lay wholly

in the opposite direction, and who, as the police in whose books they were registered knew full well, were innocent of evil intent, should be torn from their families and their employment, and incarcerated in camps until the War was over.

Nothing more senseless or more cruel could be imagined, and the Government knew it. But they yielded to a certain extent, and for a little while internment took place wholesale of all sorts and conditions of Germans and Austrians between the ages of sixteen and forty-five. It did not last long. The extreme difficulty of finding accommodation for such prisoners, and perhaps quiet pressure from officials who had not lost their heads, soon began to tell, and very shortly the numbers began to fall off, and, apart from suspects and the cases of destitute single men, and any person who was found wandering about without a home, arrests ceased, and matters fell into their former groove.

But great harm had been done. In the first place, the agitators had gained a victory over officialdom. In the second place, a great number of families were rendered destitute, and the heads of those families, from being quiet and for the most part neutral-minded people, were rendered bitterly antagonistic to British sentiment and British rule.

In the meantime through enlistment of able-bodied men, and the great need for industrial workers to supply the requirements of the Army, opportunities of employment soon began to open for Germans and Austrians who had been discharged when the War began, or who had been taken into camps. As a natural consequence, employers, who knew the quality of the men they had been forced to relinquish in deference to popular prejudice, began to take back old hands; while prisoners in camp asked for their discharge, so that they might once more maintain their families, who were either subsisting upon savings, or the selling of such little property or goods as they possessed, or being supported by the charity of wealthier countrymen or members of the British public still capable of compassion for one of an enemy's race.

With the view of eliminating those who might safely be at liberty, a large number of inquiries were, under the direction of the military authorities, made by the police, and those who were satisfactorily vouched for by British subjects and could properly maintain themselves were released.

At once the storm arose again. The police were accused of acting as agents to procure work for 'enemies' to the detriment of honest British Labour, and bitter questions were put in Parliament. This time, however, the Government stood firm, and so far the latest attempt to harry the German has had no effect, though it remains to be seen whether employers of Germans will be persecuted in their turn, and fresh efforts made, especially in

the event of more air-raids or coast town attacks, to rouse the popular mind to hit again the man who is down.

Now, what is at the back of all this persecution? I believe it is wholly, and solely, ignorance and fear. I do not believe that the most violent advocate for universal internment of alien enemies is conscious of the wrong that he is doing to innocent persons and to his country's honour. He is simply possessed with the conviction that, unless he does harry and persecute and lay by the heels every German who can be laid hands upon, England is in danger. He has lost confidence, if he ever had any, in the power of the police to cope with the situation if any Germans are loose. He considers the Home Office to be a feeble satellite of the War Office, without courage, without knowledge, and without strength—a poor, anaemic, palsied department, with expediency written all over it, and principle—nowhere.

What are the facts?

The present writer, who has no more official connexion with the Home Secretary and his officials than the most stalwart of their critics, has taken some trouble to ascertain these facts, and, moreover, has, in a purely voluntary way, been closely associated with work undertaken for many years past for foreigners in distress in London of all nationalities. He ventures to submit the result for the consideration of the readers of this Review, in the hope that, whether or not fiction may still appeal to those who have been nourishing themselves upon it to such purpose, yet in the end the truth will reach the ears of those who are still able to give it a hearing, and through them, and the sense of justice and of right which all Englishmen cherish at the bottom of their hearts, ultimately prevail.

The facts are as follows: No sooner was war declared than the Home Office and War Office authorities met, and thrashed out in all its bearings the problem of how to detect and crush as far as possible espionage by Germans and Austrians and others on these shores; how to guard against incendiarism, and to prevent with a heavy hand the least danger of a rising of the enemy within our gates in the event of an invasion.

The first problem was the toughest proposition of all—indeed, the only one worth mentioning, as things have turned out, for inquiries entered into at the time, and pursued carefully ever since, have shown that no organisation exists which could produce incendiarism. As for a rising upon invasion, those who know most tell us that the worst inclined of our alien enemies here—even the ubiquitous German waiter himself—when he is not a hungry and harmless servant of the eating public, which he generally is—is possessed with only one determination—namely that if his throat is not cut within an hour or so after the

Germans have reached, we will say, Parliament Hill or Bromley in Kent—and he is pretty certain it will be—he will on the instant betake himself to the nearest and darkest cellar he can find, and there remain surrounded by solitude and coal-dust until *der Tag* is over for good and all.

But the spy—he was a different person altogether, and all the energy, knowledge, and force at the disposal of the Criminal Investigation Department at Scotland Yard, working in closest co-operation with the whole of the service throughout the country, were concentrated upon that gentleman and all his wiles and possible activities.

It would not be desirable for obvious reasons to describe, or even indicate in the most general terms, the measures taken, first to discover and test the power of the espionage agencies at work among us, and then to circumvent them. Some day the story may be published. It will make good reading. All that can be said now is that the necessary measures were being taken many months before the outbreak of war, and that emergency legislation since the outbreak has greatly strengthened the hands of the Executive in dealing with the danger. This does not mean that all espionage was stopped, or that it does not go on still; indeed, it will presumably continue to do so to a certain extent while the War lasts. But it does mean that the supply of information reaching the enemy from registered Germans and Austrians is now practically negligible. It never was very great, and the eager spy-hunters in their hue and cry after the alien enemy have been following the wrong hare.

The real danger, there is reason to believe, lies in certain naturalised Germans, whose English citizenship preserves them from police control. And it is suggested that if it were possible to pass a law for such naturalised persons to be denaturalised during the period of the War, the police could grasp by the neck such espionage as still goes on and break its back. This must not be construed into a general accusation against naturalised Germans as a class. They are as a rule as loyal citizens as we have in this country. But there are a few who should be deprived of their citizenship at all costs, if espionage is to be stopped, and brought under the direct control and supervision of the police.

As to incendiarism, it has, I think, been stated by the Home Secretary in Parliament that no case has occurred of an alien enemy being found with a bomb or other weapon of like character in his possession. Nevertheless, as we all know, thanks largely to Sir Edward Ward and his Special Constables, public buildings, bridges, railway stations, centres of electrical supply, gasworks, reservoirs, etc., are guarded day and night, while the

utmost care is exercised to keep watch upon the movements of alien enemies, or naturalised ones for that matter, who for any cause show a disposition to congregate together.

The consideration of our police for the alien enemy, however, has not been limited to the detection of espionage and the prevention of incendiarism. In London the congregation of such persons is so enormous that to have examined every individual through the organisation of the police alone would have been practically impossible—at least within any reasonable time. Yet it had to be done, not only to protect the public but for the protection of the majority of the alien enemies themselves.

The difficulty was surmounted by an expedient at once effective and humane. It was known that large numbers of these 'alien enemies'—though technically German and Austrian subjects—were in feeling as antagonistic to German rule as the Allies themselves. Among them were Serbs, Alsations, Greeks, Poles, Polish Jews, Czechs, Armenians, and Italians. The Commissioner of Police appointed for each of these races a responsible person or committee of compatriots, who, acting for him, conducted all necessary investigations. This system has proved successful. Every suspicious case was tracked out and dealt with, and the rest insured immunity from police interference subject to continuance of good behaviour.

The security of the country having been provided for as far as possible against espionage and incendiarism from ill-disposed alien enemies, the Government turned its attention to the other side of the problem—a side which the public in general, and our 'eave 'arf a briek at 'im' gentlemen in particular, do not appear to have considered at all.

This was to arrange for relieving the distress and ameliorating as far as possible the sufferings of the innocent alien enemy brought to ruin by the War—and who, if he were driven to desperation by the sight of his starving family, would obviously become a menace and danger far greater than the professional spy to the community which had callously visited the sins of his brethren upon his unfortunate head.

The condition of these people has been truly pitiable, and it would only be necessary for those writers in the Press who exhaust so much good ink and English in diatribes against the Government and the police for their 'criminal leniency to German rats,' to make personal investigation among the homes of the 'rats'—for such writers are naturally as kind-hearted and fair-minded Englishmen as ever lived—to feel a compassion for these victims of the War, and when they take up their pens again to tell quite another story.

I repeat, and must do so *ad nauseam*, that the root of all the misunderstanding which has grown up over this matter is ignorance—plain, naked ignorance of facts.

But the Government knew the facts and so did those who had been dealing with distressed foreigners for years before the War; and while, through popular prejudice and the Press campaign which followed it, great and undeserved injury has been done to thousands of well-behaved and well-intentioned German and Austrian residents in England, no alien enemy has been reduced to starvation or beggary. This has been prevented by the exertions of private philanthropic agencies, though working under difficulties which are strange indeed in this land of charity, and the German and Austrian Governments acting through the American Embassy, and, when private resources began to fail, by the British Government itself.

The Government, however, though it took no action to provide directly for relief of the distressed families of German subjects until November, formed soon after war was declared what was called 'The Destitute Aliens Committee.' This Committee was appointed by the Home Secretary for the following purposes :

- (i) To arrange for the repatriation of destitute aliens, especially alien enemies, not being persons fit for military service, or suspects.
- (ii) To co-operate with charitable societies relieving destitute aliens and to guide and control their operations.
- (iii) To organise (in co-operation with the authorities concerned) any special arrangements which may be necessary for the accommodation and maintenance of destitute aliens.
- (iv) Generally to deal with questions arising from time to time as to the relief and assistance of destitute aliens, which may be referred to them by the Home Office, War Office, or Local Government Board.

The members of the Committee are the following :

Sir William Byrne, K.C.V.O., C.B. (Chairman).
John Pedder, Esq., C.B., Assistant Secretary, Home Office.
A. B. Lowry, Esq., Chief Inspector, Local Government Board.
The Hon. F. T. Bigham, Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police.
Major Horwood, War Office.
Edgar Seligman, Esq.
R. S. Meiklejohn, Esq., C.B., The Treasury.
John Lamb, Esq., Assistant Under Secretary, Scottish Office.
E. Sebag-Montefiore, Esq.

The formation of a body so powerfully representative, and presided over by so distinguished a public servant as Sir William Byrne, to 'deal with questions arising from time to time as to the relief and assistance of destitute aliens' showed that our Government and the Minister responsible for home affairs fully grasped the need for a humane and consistent policy on the part

of the nation to be pursued in regard to all aliens, regardless of nationality, suffering through the War. No report of the work that has been accomplished by the Committee has yet been published, but all who have been directly concerned with the relief of distress among foreigners since August have had free access to its officials, and received wise counsel and unswerving sympathy.

The functions of the Committee are primarily of an advisory character; but as a means of direct communication between unofficial agencies and the executive authorities, a centre of information and consultation, and a powerful lever in bringing about co-ordination and united effort among the legion of separate forces at work on behalf of the infinite variety and confusion of aliens in our midst, it has a part to play second to none in importance in assuring peace, order—and safety also—within the shores of this country, which, it must not be forgotten, has been an asylum for generations of the poorer class of alien races.

We have now to review that side of our subject to which we would draw the particular attention of the band of patriots who helped to force the hand of the authorities, and succeeded in cutting off the livelihood of a great number of alien enemies furthest removed from anything resembling a spy or an incendiary.

It must be a very brief review for reasons of space, and no attempt can be made to do justice to the service and self-sacrifice which, without sympathy or support from the public Press, and even under comments which are the reverse of encouraging or complimentary, is being given untiringly not only by English men and women, side by side with Germans and Austrians eager to help their distressed compatriots, but by French and Russians, Italians and Scandinavians, united together and with the full knowledge and countenance of the Government, the military, and the police, succouring aliens in distress without distinction of race, creed, or nationality.

The work began in August. On the 21st of that month, while the armies of the Allies were coming to grips with Germany and Austria, a number of people, each representative in a distinctive way of one of the belligerent nations, and of nearly all the neutrals in Europe, met at the invitation of the Society of Friends of Foreigners in Distress at the Society's office, 68 Finsbury Pavement, E.C. This conference entered into a solemn covenant to form a 'Central Council of United Alien Relief Societies,' to procure and administer funds upon a plan approved by the Home Office 'by which aliens of every nationality, class, and creed will be dealt with impartially and according

to their need by those who know them best, and under the superintendence of a joint representative Committee to be responsible for the expenditure.'

The joint representative Committee elected as Chairman an Englishman, Sir Frederick Robertson, and another Englishman as Vice-Chairman, and appointed the staff of the Society of Friends of Foreigners—all English men and women—to be responsible under the Committee for the administration of the funds. The Committee itself is representative of all the nations involved in the War.

An appeal to the public on behalf of the Council received instant response, and up to this date the sum of 16,000*l.* has been expended. The responsibility of the Council was national to commence with, as no other organised movement had been set on foot; but, through relief given by the American Embassy on behalf of the German Government, and action by our own Government in relief of English wives and families of interned Germans, it is now chiefly metropolitan. The applications at the office from alien enemies averaged at first some 200 a day, and the staff, though rapidly augmented by a large number of capable volunteers, worked literally day and night to register, sift, and investigate the claims. The needs of the French, Russian, Italian, and other nationalities were not overlooked. There were National Societies established to help distressed foreigners of these nations, each of which received substantial grants from the fund to aid their work.

But the distress of Germans and Austrians has been, and still remains, the chief concern of the Council, and from German firms, and wealthy German families, comes the bulk of the money needed for the work. What this work involves may be realised when it is stated that the average weekly relief bill for some months past has been 700*l.* to 1000*l.*, and that fifty-seven voluntary visitors and workers, in addition to an efficient paid staff, are engaged in dealing with the 1500 families who are now receiving weekly subsistence.

The point which needs emphasis here, if the full significance of this movement is to be realised by the public in this and in other countries, is that the administration, as already stated, is in British hands, and that the Committee and Council responsible for the whole undertaking are cosmopolitan in the widest sense. Among the directors who actively assist the Chairman and Vice-Chairman in examination of 'cases' and the details of management, are the representatives of the Russian, the French, and the Italian Societies.

There is nothing new under the sun. This War, and every-

thing pertaining to it, is upon a scale more gigantic than has been known in history; but the same salient features which are present now were to be found, if we seek for them, a hundred years ago, when we, the Germans, and the Russians stood shoulder to shoulder against Napoleon.

This fact is brought home to all who are taking part in relieving the distress of alien enemies to-day. The Society of Friends of Foreigners in Distress, which instituted this 'Central Council of United Alien Relief Societies,' and has given all its strength to make this great union of forces a success, came into existence in 1806; and, supported by Royalty, and the greatest in the land, its first President a Prince of the Blood, its second the Duke of Wellington, had become before Waterloo was won a fully established British institution.

The tale contains a moral. The records of the S.F.F.D. were kept from the beginning with great care, and it is clear that all through those early years, when the country was exhausted by a great war, and the strain was at its height, and bitterness against the French unspeakable, the British public of that day, led by King George the Third, contributed freely to funds which, as the Minutes show, afterwards signed by the Duke himself, were most frequently used in relieving the necessities of French merchants who had lost their all at the hands of English privateers.

A French mariner 'of excellent character' was saved from starvation, and set up in business. Mark that! Three French Catholic priests were pensioned. Where was our patriotic Press? And how sadly wanting in discrimination were those potentates of Europe: the Emperor of Russia, who gave the Society 1000*l.*; the King of Prussia, who gave 500*l.*; not to mention persons of note, such as Talleyrand and Marshal Blücher, whose names are to be seen inscribed in the Society's Autograph Book in 1814.

The Central Council of United Alien Relief Societies can claim no such patronage, and its cases are less romantic than merchants and mariners robbed by sea pirates, but the same spirit is there, and it may not be amiss to quote one or two of the cases helped to-day:

(A) A widow, German, sixty-two years old, forty-two years in England; four sons serving in the British Army. Her work all lost through the war.

(B) A cabman. German by nationality, but came to England at twelve months old forty-five years ago. Wife and five children in the greatest destitution.

NOTE.—The man could not even speak German, yet his licence had been withdrawn and no one would employ him.

Incidentally, also, the Council has been of service in quite another fashion. C. was a person who represented himself to

be one of the innocent and unfortunate. Investigation proved him to have been in receipt of monthly remittances from Germany, to have a great fondness for our naval dockyards, and a character which was the reverse of satisfactory. He is now in camp.

The Central Council of United Alien Relief Societies is not the only Society engaged in work among alien enemies. But space has been given to its operations, as it is the largest, and the doings of the lesser bodies are much of the same character.

These include 'the Emergency Committee for the Assistance of Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians in Distress' (convened by the Religious Society of Friends) and the National Societies, French, Russian, Italian, Scandinavian, German, and Austrian, represented upon the Central Council and working with it in close co-operation.

The Council has also representatives from the Jewish Board of Guardians, the German Farm Colony, the International Women's Relief Committee—from which Society a large number of its visitors and voluntary workers are drawn—the Young Women's Christian Association, and the Charity Organisation Society. The Central Bureau of Foreign Benevolent Societies (a central agency for inquiry and registration of aliens in distress), which was initiated in 1903 by the Social Welfare Association for London (then the City Council for Organisation of Charity) also has a place on the Council. The King Edward the Seventh British German Foundation, besides being represented, gives generous assistance by making itself responsible for aiding Germans of superior class who have fallen into indigence owing to the War.

Thus through this Council, apart from all Government action, a united movement is in being, where no 'alien enemies' are known, but only persons who are of foreign birth or nationality and needing aid, and where all who have money or time to serve join together—English and German, French and Austrian, side by side, and hand to hand, to see that all is done aright and in good order.

It remains only to mention the work of the American Embassy, and our own relief authorities. The former has received funds from both the German and Austrian Governments, with which, acting through the German Society of Benevolence on the one hand, and the Austro-Hungarian Emergency Committee on the other, it relieves (a) the wives and families in England of Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians fighting for their country; (b) the German or Austrian wives and families of men interned in British concentration camps. The Central Council of United Alien Relief Societies has by arrangement

made itself responsible for the relief of destitute or distressed Germans who are not interned, and their wives and families.

The British Government has, since November, instructed the Boards of Guardians to relieve, on a special scale and quite separately from ordinary cases of destitute English persons, all necessitous British-born wives and children of interned Germans and Austrians.

The volume of assistance available for alien enemies reduced to distress or rendered destitute by the War is now considerable, and while, as has been already stated, the greater part of the money has been contributed by wealthy Germans and Austrians here, or those who are naturalised British subjects only, yet since the personal service is mostly English, and the responsibility of administration wholly theirs, this country may claim that in action, if not always in speech, it has done some justice to the distressed enemy within its gates. What is needed to secure full justice, and to enable our country to show all neutral nations and posterity that in the end it will do its duty towards enemies within its shores, in spite of unprecedented provocation and strain from without, is that the unworthy agitation against employment of Germans and Austrians where they may work without harm to others shall cease; and that in war, as in peace time, all men on British ground who live soberly, honestly, and inoffensively, shall pursue their avocations unmolested, no matter what their nationality may be, assured of the fair treatment which has never before been withheld from any man living under the protection of the British flag.

ARTHUR PATERSON.

*GERMANY IN PEACE AND IN WAR:**A GLIMPSE FROM WITHIN*

THE best-hated man in Germany to-day is not Mr. Asquith or Sir Edward Grey. It is our late wise and patriotic sovereign, King Edward. One notices the animosity of tone with which even temperate and broad-minded persons speak of 'der Eduard.' The advent of the present war is attributed to his policy. A personal antipathy on his part towards the Kaiser is generally believed to have existed. As a natural consequence of the imperfect conception of constitutionalism which exists in Germany there is generally a tendency amongst Germans somewhat to exaggerate the power of the Sovereign in other countries.

All who have followed even slightly the course of German politics in recent years will have noticed occasions on which marked protest has been made in the Reichstag against instances of autocratic action by the Kaiser. Such protests have generally not prevented a large section of Germans from heartily approving and supporting the Kaiser's conduct. Amongst that large class in Germany whose sympathies are conservative there are a very great number who really prefer personal government by the Emperor to any strict regard to constitutionalism.

Such a disposition seems to the inhabitants of many modern States reactionary. But for a large part of the German nation it is merely a survival of the conception of the 'Fürsten,' or heads of the smaller German States, which existed in such great numbers and varying sizes down to almost microscopic diminutiveness till many years after the beginning of last century. It is a kind of feeling which we cannot understand in England, and the repeated display of it by Germans can scarcely fail to excite in many of us more democratic Britons a sense of irritation. There are still so many States, each with its little idol, including even Schaumburg-Lippe, which is not quite half the size of Huntingdonshire. That the present Emperor himself, as King of Prussia, has a conception of the office of Constitutional Sovereign very different from that which has long prevailed here is shown if only by many of his numerous speeches, which teem with the words 'I' and 'my grandfather.' To the personal

virtue of these personalities or their forebears are attributed all the benefits which have been attained, and if statesmen had any part in their attainment they had it, as all perfect statesmen must realise, not by any authorship of their own, but as the instruments of their Sovereign.

The German has two separate forms of allegiance, that to his State and that to the Empire. Evidently the feeling for the State used, not very many years ago, to be even greater than it is, because Bismarck emphatically expressed a conviction that, with the individual German, State allegiance was a much stronger personal feeling than the common German allegiance. Probably many would hesitate to assert this now. One may have often puzzled one's self over the question as to which feeling is stronger, and have put it to Germans, only to receive the tantalising answer 'We have both feelings.' Anyhow, the feeling towards the Prince of the State is still strong, and great part of what it may have lost since the establishment of the Empire is carried over into much the same kind of personal feeling towards the Emperor.

Striking, too, is the manner in which the essential idea of an empire has revived in Germany amongst the Princes themselves and all the scions of the princely families with greater vigour and cohesion than it possessed in the centuries of its historic period as 'the Empire.' This War has shown amongst them a complete loyalty to the Imperial leadership, a feeling which the present Emperor is not prevented by any confusion of modesty from constantly emphasising. A young scion of the reigning family of Saxe-Meiningen was killed at the battle of Maubeuge, upon whom were found written words of appreciation of the fact of dying for 'his Emperor.' The example of the reigning houses, which are so influential in their own dominions, excites the feelings of their subjects in the same direction.

Since Germany made war the Emperor appears to enjoy a measure of universal popularity such as he had never enjoyed before. This seems to be so not only in all the States but also amongst all the political parties throughout the Empire. In the early days of the war the Emperor followed up his words to the Reichstag, that 'He knew no longer any parties but only Germans,' by an appeal to representatives of each party to display their loyal support by coming forward and putting their hands in his.

The Social Democrats seem to have abstained from this particular display of loyalty. A statement that they had taken part in it, which was made as a charge against them at an International Socialist Congress held in Italy in September, was strenuously denied by a Social Democratic deputy. The latter

had appeared before the Congress in order to defend the conduct of his party, but their action in supporting a war which was, amidst other condemnations of it, denounced as the 'torturing' of Belgium, was unanimously censured.

The solidarity of all parties, including the Social Democrats, in support of the War caused general satisfaction throughout Germany, just as the solidarity of parties here caused dissatisfaction and disappointment there. Inasmuch as there was no crisis in Germany at the time the instantaneous display of union here was so much the more admirable than that displayed there, just as it was also the frustration of certain calculations made by the Emperor and his Government in originating the War.

One finds occasionally here expressions of an opinion that, when the German nation comes to understand aright the causation of the War, there will be a reversion of national feeling gravely prejudicial to the German arms. The answer seems to be that as long as the War lasts, and probably for, at least, a long time afterwards, the nation will not come to perceive aright the causation of the War. The belief that they have been forced into war by wicked aggressors and conspirators has been so cleverly instilled into the minds of the nation by the Government, the Press, and the multiform war party, and, their patriotism being thus challenged, national feeling has sunk so deep, that no attempt at their enlightenment by impartial statement or disclosure of suppressed documents carries with it the remotest prospect of success. The Emperor is regarded as the champion of German national existence and the spokesman of present national feeling, and the nation never seemed in less danger of a revolution.

One can never foretell what may be the effect of some calamitous defeat upon any nation at war. But to the opinion sometimes expressed here that the realisation of defeat, when it can no longer be prevented, will probably bring about a revolution in Germany, the answer seems to be the same as that to the first opinion. As the German people have been convinced that they are fighting a great defensive war in preservation of their national existence, no knowledge of defeat is likely to lead them to anticipate their own destruction by the suicidal act of revolution. Only subjugation itself, strenuous as the task must be, can achieve the end which Germany herself has rendered essential to her adversaries if they are to live securely, and if Europe is to have some chance of a long spell of peace. To stop short of such a conclusion would seem a pitiable waste of heroic effort, suffering, and death.

In order to attain this conclusion it would not seem to be necessary that united Germany should be undone. To divide

again and to keep divided a populous nation so intent on union would be an impossible task even if it were desirable. But it might well be desirable, if it should be found to be enforceable, that the leadership of united Germany should be removed from the kingdom of Prussia. Such a measure would be sure to meet with fierce opposition not only in Prussia herself but also in other parts of Germany. There is no other German State at all comparable with Prussia in position, power, or territory. But, on the other hand, there is none so imbued with ambition and with an aggressive spirit of superiority, prompting to general domination. Prussia is the fountain-head of all in Germany that is offensive and menacing to other nationalities, and it is an unfortunate thing that the arrogant spirit of the Prussian people fits in so closely with the overweening arrogance of their reigning house.

Prussia would have to be shorn first not only of Posen but of other provinces, including, most probably, Westphalia and the Rhine Province, where certain proportions of the population, especially after the exhaustion of a long war, would probably show little opposition to a separation from Prussia.

One may venture to anticipate a like condition amongst certain proportions in Hanover. Though the bulk of the present population there would probably be opposed to separation from Prussia, there is still a Guelph party which has some few adherents and returns a handful of deputies to the Reichstag. The Duke of Cumberland, the son of the late King of Hanover, who was dispossessed on account of having sided with Austria in the war of 1866 between that country and Prussia, when Prussia also annexed the kingdom, has not renounced his rights. His sole surviving son married the Emperor's only daughter in 1913, and later in the same year the Duchy of Brunswick, the right of succession to which had in 1884 fallen to his father, who was prevented by his claim to Hanover from assuming possession, was handed over to him. Meanwhile, the Chauvinistic German Crown Prince had entered a protest on the ground that his brother-in-law had not renounced his claim of succession to the Kingdom of Hanover. The latter has never formally renounced that claim. But having, on the occasion of his reconciliation with Prussia, exchanged from the Bavarian into the Prussian Army, he wrote a letter, subsequently made public, to the German Chancellor, in which he referred to that fact as also to the fact that he had in like time taken the oath of loyalty. Before his official entry into Brunswick he signed a patent agreeing to observe the constitution of the Duchy and to 'stand in unshakeable loyalty to the Empire and its august head.' Thus he seems to be considered to have impliedly re-

nounced his rights in respect of Hanover, and the Crown Prince desisted from his objection.

Save, perhaps, for the last-mentioned circumstance, assuming that the Imperial Crown were to be transferred from Prussia to some other German State, possibly the most suitable candidate for it would be a restored King of Hanover. By the fact of his position of protest towards Prussia having remained quite outside the German Empire and its affairs, residing in Austria, the Duke of Cumberland personally would not be open to the invidiousness which might attach to the acceptance of the Imperial Crown by the Sovereign of any German State which had in 1871 subscribed to the constitution of the German Empire under a Hohenzollern King of Prussia as Emperor. His position, too, as a son and successor of a German King who had reigned in Hanover would be a better qualification than that of a Sovereign whose position was below that of King. Moreover, he and his family are Protestant, and Hanover also is preponderatingly Protestant. As about two thirds of the population of the Empire are Protestant, the Imperial Crown could scarcely be conferred on a Catholic Sovereign. Of the three actual Kings within the Empire other than the King of Prussia, two—the King of Bavaria and the King of Saxony—are Catholics; while, on the death of the third, the King of Würtemberg, who is already an old man, his Kingdom passes to a Catholic heir belonging to a Catholic line.

But these last observations belong to the category of highly speculative reflexions. Anticipating, as we must, the most abundant measure of victory for the Allies, yet the re-casting of Germany from outside would be to-day a far more prodigious task than it was even in the days of Napoleon.

Of all the States in the Empire, distinctly the most individual is Bavaria. Though its population is only about one sixth of that of Prussia, it is the next largest after the latter in both population and territory. It is the only one which has kept its own post-office, and even in the military sphere it has preserved a larger measure of apartness. It is the only State where both the reigning house and the majority of the inhabitants are Roman Catholic. Both entertain feelings of kindly fellowship towards Austria. But, notwithstanding their lack of sympathy with the North German character, the Bavarians are whole-hearted constituents of the Empire.

Amongst the majority of the Bavarian peasantry the sense of dynastic loyalty is entirely to their own reigning house, and very strong it is too. The Wittelsbachs have a firm hold on the affections of their subjects, and their influence is great. The old Regent Luitpold, who died a couple of years ago, was

wonderfully esteemed and beloved. His son, the present old King Louis, is also very popular. He is a convinced upholder of religion, whereas his son, Crown Prince Rupert, is believed on this point to be contrarily disposed.

Both father and son, however, agree in loyalty to the German Empire. At the outbreak of the War the King of Bavaria was foremost amongst German rulers in expressions of imperial patriotism, and he was said to have cheerfully greeted the news of our declaration of War with the words 'One enemy more.' The son's temper is already well known, and the fact that he is regarded by some Legitimists in this country as *de jure* heir to the throne of Great Britain and Ireland¹ seems to have availed nothing to stem his fury against this country in the War.

In this common German sense as regards the War the Bavarian people seem to be in agreement with their rulers. Stray statements to the contrary which have appeared in the Press here seem to have no foundation. With all their Southern easiness the Bavarians show no lack of discipline, and the Bavarian official is little, if at all, less exact than the Prussian. Like as it is in many other respects to German-speaking Austria, Bavaria has nothing of that slovenliness which is such a provoking feature of Austria: that slovenliness which the latter country shows, for instance, to such an uncomfortable degree in its railway administration.

Germany presents a strange blending of two conditions which, at first sight, are generally thought to be conflicting. We have considered the deferential regard shown to the reigning Princes and the peculiarly exalted position held by the Emperor. Side by side there is, especially in Prussia, a large measure of what may be called Socialism. Between the two there is a far scantier conception of individual freedom than that which has come to be almost part of our nature here. A distinguished Frenchman of last century remarked that Prussia was one huge garrison. In great part it is so. The other part consists of officialdom. What is not absorbed by the Army is absorbed by the State.

But these facts must not lead us to the sadly wrong conclusion that the German character is wanting in vigour or in initiative. The reverse is the case. Their commercial enterprise is well known to us. Even in national matters much voluntary energy is shown. There is the Boy Scout movement, and for years we have been hearing of the Navy League for the enlargement of the Navy, of which Prince Salm was the leading spirit.

The fact seems to be that their existing form of government

¹ The Crown Prince's mother, the present Queen of Bavaria, is an Archduchess of Austria, and belongs to the line Este-Modena. She is a descendant of Henrietta, Duchess of Orleans, daughter of Charles the First.

suits on the whole the spirit of the nation, at least in its present stage, and that it fits in with its abilities and its strivings. On one occasion a few years ago, crossing the Belgian frontier from Germany, a young Westphalian, who had been living for over a year in Belgium, spoke of the number of German blackguards and wastrels who took refuge across the border. Upon my asking him whether he preferred living under the Prussian system of supervision to living under the more easy-going Belgian *régime*, he answered emphatically that he preferred the former.

Where this highly organised system suits the character of a nation the whole presents to the world outside a very effective contrivance of power. We are becoming accustomed in this country to the statement that, because the German Army is a conscript one, a good deal of its moral fighting worth must be discounted. But to most people who know Germany such statements sound rather surprising, and one cannot help a surmise that the authors of them are inferring rather from premises the general truth of which we all admit, than from personal knowledge of the German nation or German soldiers. For my own part, having been, as a youth, at a German University, and at the same time in a garrison town, and having been frequently in Germany since then; having often discussed national matters, characteristics and politics with intelligent, well-informed friends; and having for nearly two months last year seen the nation in time of war, and talked with many out of hundreds of wounded soldiers in the district where I was detained, I can detect little foundation for these statements.

These wounded soldiers, the majority of whom had been only slightly wounded, represented practically all parts of Germany except Bavaria. They represented the mechanics, peasant proprietors, agricultural and general labourers, artisans, factory hands, innkeepers, and small storekeepers, etc., of Germany. Just because their nation is at war with us it is better to state and to realise that they were, on the whole, well set up, that they were remarkably cheerful, had plenty of spirits, and, as far as one could judge, had the personal spring of the normal, healthy man; and that they in no way resembled 'slaves.' Neither their appearance nor their demeanour presented the slightest trace of coercion. While in that locality they seemed well behaved, and one saw no drunkenness. As far as one could judge, the young women of the place did not seem to make any set upon them. Perhaps one of the advantages of conscription is that, as soldiering is part of the general duty of the inhabitants, it does not cause any strange commotion in their lives. One inferred that the local population was a moral one, because one saw no indications to the contrary, and it certainly appeared to

be a religious one, a special earnestness in this latter sphere being seemingly developed by the fact of the War.

Of course, women from outside would not have been allowed to forgather in the locality, attracted thereto by the presence of the soldiers. With their usual thoroughness, the German authorities take stringent measures to obviate loss or deterioration through this particular channel. In Berlin in the early part of September, in view of an intended large transport of troops through the city, almost alarmingly large precautionary powers were given to the police. Any woman in the streets, restaurants, or any public place, whose appearance or demeanour was suggestive of courtesanship, was liable to instant arrest.

Amongst the fairly long list of regulations prescribed for these soldiers there were provisions against entering public-houses or the dwellings of any of the townspeople other than those in which the soldiers entering were actually quartered, and all were required to be in their quarters by 9 P.M. each evening.

Conversation with them generally bore out the impression which their appearance made. Many of them showed eagerness to get back to the Front. Conversation with one in particular, a young man belonging to the middle class, who had served, as all those belonging to that or the upper class who have attained a certain standard of education are merely bound to do, only one year, gave an interesting insight into many points. One statement, if accurate, would certainly go to show that there was no lack of initiative amongst the troops. He said that for every emergent assault a spontaneously constituted leader was invariably found: if it were not an officer, there would be a non-commissioned officer, or even one of the men, ready at the spur of the moment to call upon the others to follow him.

Before dismissing the soldiers I should like to say a word of comparison of them with volunteers casually seen in the streets of London. The latter are a considerably superior type in bearing and general demeanour. Certain things must be borne in mind. First, the general level, in the various grades of the classes above that of the labourer, of what one may, for want of a better word, call 'decency' in bearing, manners and ordinary social behaviour, is immeasurably higher in England than it is in Germany. Secondly, the splendid volunteering which we have witnessed has been proportionately larger from those classes than from the labourers, or even artisans. Thirdly, in England we have no peasant class, whereas in Germany the peasantry is almost the backbone of the country; and, fourthly, the Germans are not physically and athletically developed as are the English. They have not played games and are not as agile.

No one denies that in everything in life voluntary effort, if

abundant, is preferable. Doubtless there are many arguments which one may urge against compulsory service. But do not let us base any argument on any false belief or assumption that the German army is less efficient because it is conscript, thereby overlooking the fact that it is a citizen army consisting of sons, husbands, and fathers who feel that they are fighting for their homes and common country, and regard it as unpatriotic in the manhood of any country not to be trained and ready to fight for its defence. Much as we may dislike militarism, we cannot aspire to crush it by mere civilianism; we cannot hope to keep it in check without the support of fighting men.

As long as a nation is in accord with a system of militarism and officialdom, as the bulk of the Germans are, the more deadly foe it is to other nations. We find German firms and individuals pursuing some set course like a planet, and this even away from their own country and its government. One occasionally hears people in England say that the Germans have more patriotism than the English. For my part I do not admit that for a moment, and I am strongly disposed to think that in many ways they have less. There is amongst the English a greater love of the soil of their native land, its social life, and its ways than one finds for the like objects amongst the Germans, who are often eager to adopt the social life and ways of this country or America. But there is this amongst a large proportion of Germans—a quality very different from patriotism—a joint spirit of aggrandisement, a common quest of benefit at the expense of others. Therefore when we consider the militarism and officialdom in Germany, do not let us underrate their value by failing to gauge them in their relationship to what exists there. There exists between Emperor, Government, and the prevailing elements in the nation a conspiracy of domination and aggrandisement.

This has probably struck many persons who for years past have had occasion to hear educated Prussians talk. Some sixteen years ago I chanced to see a letter in a German newspaper, from nobody in particular, headed 'Deutschland über Alles,' which expounded these words by foretelling the eventual conquest of England by Germany and the complete supremacy of the German race. To instance an unknown writer to a newspaper may seem worthless, but the point is rather that no letter conceived in such a spirit could ever have found publication in a British journal, except possibly in the *Lancet*, as an interesting illustration of a peculiar form of lunacy.

How the Germans have for years envisaged this country is perhaps now better realised. The Government have, as shown by their publication dated October 9, been quite alive for years to the fact that the German Secret Intelligence Department was

busily engaged in operations here. It is not pretended that even a moderate proportion of the Germans who have thronged this country have been engaged in measures preparatory to a conquest of English soil, or had even conceived that object. But the displacement of England has been a very widespread aim amongst Germans for years, and they have steadily busied themselves with the devising of means to this end.

There is really no analogy between English residency in Germany and German residency in England. English people have never come to play the same part in German life that Germans have played in ours. We have never taken possession of Germany to the same extent that Germans have taken possession of England. The system in their country of control of the movements of the population and of obligatory police notification of all new arrivals in any locality has been unknown here. The naturalisation of Germans in England has been greater than that of English in Germany. Moreover, that, to any extent worth speaking of, English spying has been carried on in Germany is not even alleged there. And we know what a detestably large part it plays in German methods.

A book published in 1913 by Germans in England, in their own language, entitled *The German Colony in England*, gives us some illustration of the remarkable fulness of German life in this country.

An introduction by way of a 'History of the Germans in England' says :

The different articles (i.e. contained in the book) will show that the national consciousness amongst the Germans of London and of England is again striking deeper currents. Since the foundation of the Empire profound developments have completed themselves in the relations of the Germans abroad to the Empire, and not the least cause of this is the energy of the ruler (i.e. the present Emperor) who represents the nation of which we are the sons and daughters.

One of the most interesting of the articles which illustrate the movement referred to is that which describes 'The German Navy League of London.' We are told that the League was founded on the anniversary of the Emperor's birthday, January 27, 1900, on the suggestion of the then Consul-General in London, by Dr. E. Crüsemann, and that it belongs to the Central Association of German Navy Leagues in foreign parts, which stands independently by the side of that formed within the Empire. The article tells us that :

Unfortunately the London Navy League is a good deal kept back within the circles of the German Colony—a fact due merely to ignorance of its life and aims. It is imagined that it is a league whose aims are directed against England. But really nothing could be further from the truth.

A national league of men for whom their German nationality stands above everything—that is what the German Navy League is, and it stands for our Emperor's words: 'Germany's future lies upon the water.'

We have, moreover, mention of the 'Glasgow Navy League,' founded in 1899, and counting from 130 to 140 members.

The book records the foundation, made in 1913, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Emperor's accession, of 'The Imperial Jubilee Fund of Germans in England.' It sets out the appeal made for the purpose, which states that it is

a foundation for charitable and mutually beneficial purposes. The Committee, whose names are signed below, has therefore resolved to make a collection from Germans resident in the United Kingdom, as also from all those who, by reason of birth, descent, upbringing, or other bonds, are united to the German home country. . . . The German Colony in Great Britain and Ireland has as yet never missed an opportunity of making known its love for the Fatherland and its respectful attachment to the exalted personage who stands at its head. It will also show itself worthy of the present memorable occasion.

There follow the names of the Committee: Patron, Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador. Chairman, Baron Bruno von Schröder, and Vice-Presidents, whose names include those of the 'Right Honourable Sir Edgar Speyer, Bart.' and 'Sir Carl Meyer, Bart.'

We reverence even in a war of life or death the charter of the liberty of everyone who has the status of a British citizen, and we cling jealously to the principles of constitutional rights, the precious adjuncts of existence within the British Empire, justly only less to be cherished than that existence itself. There are special present provisions dealing with a class, such that all persons who come within it are subjected to certain restrictions, even though some amongst them are less likely to be harmfully disposed than others who are outside the class. For instance, though the English widow of a German comes under the restrictions, the German widow of an Englishman comes under none. It may be answered that there must be general laws. But that answer does not seem to be appropriate to an exceptional time like that of war, when the only object is the temporary safeguarding from danger from any quarter. Consequently, if the restrictions afford any real safeguard, one might expect to see them applied also wherever else circumstances are known to exist which are at least equally likely to cause a predisposition in favour of the enemy.

We have before us the example of Belgium, where for years Germans in their many thousands, notably the rich and influential, have resided with baneful result to the existence of the kingdom. That one can seriously regard naturalisation as making

such a difference as to constitute a sufficient safeguard seems like the arrogation to it of the nature of a sacrament which by some invisible operation transforms the soul. It is argued by some that the fact of having settled here and having been in a friendly manner admitted to a share in the life of the country must necessarily predispose the persons upon whom such treatment has been bestowed to benevolence or, at least, absence of hostility towards this country. This argument seems to ignore the feelings which must necessarily be excited in such persons by a present environment of hard truths and indignation and well-founded animosity towards their country. Feelings being subjective matters, the present has immeasurably greater influence than any past no matter how long or how friendly. Nothing is more stimulating to patriotism than finding yourself in a country with which your own is at war.

It would be hard to transmit the impression received by the person coming from Germany to England since the beginning of the War. The difference was startling, so that one could scarcely escape the thought that great part of the population here did not realise the difficulties, seriousness, or hugeness of the war in which they were engaged, nor the quality nor temper of their foe. That on their side the German population did realise the gravity of the War had been abundantly evident. Their perception of it produced no panic, but on the contrary a keener vitality and determination, which expressed themselves in many ways. Where I happened to be detained, the bulk of the manhood of the place having been called up, each morning for a period during the holidays the children were summoned to the school and told off to help throughout the day, in field or housework, those families who needed help.

One heard many there say that it was a war in which their existence was at stake. The population here might have said the same if they had realised the strength of the enemy and the intensity of the struggle, and the realisation might have resulted in still further expressions of activity throughout the country.

As regards official control, in one instance only did one see here a close likeness to Germany at war, namely, in the, perhaps, not sufficiently valued secrecy—a quality to which the German headquarters' staff in the West, in an official despatch, attributed much of their early success. This spirit of reticence guided not only the publication of news to the public but also the tidings of individuals in the field.

Otherwise it was very different from Germany, where every detail was strenuously directed to the deadly combat in which the nation was engaged. Within a couple of hours of our declaration of war becoming known in the locality, my room and all things in

it were searched by the police in the presence of the magistrate, one of whose officials, though, perhaps, without his knowledge, kept me away while the search was being made. A like search was made in the case of a born German, domiciled and naturalised in Austria, very shortly after his arrival in the place. Urgent personal instructions which I had written in English on a postcard were required to be re-written and despatched in German. No language but German was allowed to be spoken on the telephone. Yet both magistrate and postmaster uniformly showed great civility; and if one happened to make any comment the answer was 'But this is war time.' Coblenz was cleared at twenty-four hours' notice of every non-German, and if any such had been found in the place after that time he would have run a risk of the extreme penalty. A German correspondent to a German newspaper told how he had ventured to visit the naval station at Cuxhaven, and how he had been advised by a kindly inhabitant to leave without delay lest he might be shot, and had duly followed the advice.

When one had breathed the last of the captive air of Prussia and had shaken oneself free of the braggart frontier officer, who affected to speak in pitying tones of a few British regiments opposed to a 'trained' army, and declared that his country's navy would soon come out of her corner, being assured in reply that the coming out of his navy would be cordially fêted by ours, one began to speculate feverishly on a momentous question as England grew nearer. Anybody can guess what it was: Would conscription have been introduced?

R. S. NOLAN.

IS LOGIC EFFETE? A CRITICISM

IN the February issue of the *Nineteenth Century* Dr. Mercier has given its readers an amusing paper on 'Logic and Science.' How far he is poking fun at his readers, or how far the nonsense he writes is due to ignorance and confusion of thought is difficult to decide. His article begins by an assault on an article which has appeared, it seems, in the *Quarterly Review*, entitled 'The Logic of Thought and the Logic of Science.' As the writer is a logician, this fact gives Dr. Mercier the occasion to deny to logicians the power of accurately expressing their meaning. With the scope and conclusions of that article we have nothing to do; the writer of it will no doubt be amply able to defend himself so far as he is involved in the present discussion. Professor Karl Pearson will also doubtless be quite capable of rebutting the accusation that he believes science to be mere statistics.

The fun Dr. Mercier pours on the common ideas of what science is and does, is very excellent fooling. Yet perhaps we will pardon the humble individual at present writing, for suggesting that there is in Dr. Mercier's mind a certain confusion of the province of Science properly so called. His illustration of chess-men in a chaotic heap being ranged in order by a player is excellent if applied only to the classification of facts. That, however, is a very subordinate function of Science. Science becomes really scientific only when it uses these facts as premises to deduce from them the laws of their succession or co-ordination. Facts—the relation of the stars on each successive night revealed to the observation of those who studied the stars in Babylon, that certain stars did not twinkle, and that these stars on each successive night in a different relation to the other stars. These Assyrian stargazers collated the facts which they had observed, and from them found the paths of the planets in the sky. Several millennia after these early astronomers had been gathered to their fathers Kepler used the facts so observed, and from them deduced his 'Laws.' From these, in turn, Newton deduced the wider law of gravitation. It would have been an analogue of this higher function of Science if Dr. Mercier had

supposed someone ignorant of chess deducing the rules of the game from watching several successive games played.

Our present object, however, is not to point out the limited ideas Dr. Mercier has of the functions of Science, but rather his misconceptions as to the defects he alleges in the logic of our schools and in the methods of logicians. He makes the astounding statement 'In two thousand years logicians have not succeeded in defining logic!' It certainly has not been for lack of trying. To take a few examples: Sir William Hamilton devotes one whole lecture and part of another to that very question; Ueberweg begins his treatise on the subject with a definition of logic; Jevons also begins his little book, with which most students are familiar, with a definition. So Mill, too, opens his more ponderous treatise with a discussion of the possibility of an adequate definition of logic before it has been examined. Dr. Mercier tells us 'there is no difficulty about it'—i.e. about giving a definition of logic, and proceeds at once to give the correct definition for which logicians had been fumbling in vain for twenty centuries. 'Logic is the science and art of reasoning.' When I read these words I could scarcely believe my eyes. I felt sure I had seen something not unlike them elsewhere; on opening Whately's *Elements of Logic* I find that the first sentence amounts to Dr. Mercier's definition: 'Logic may be considered as the Science, and also as the Art of Reasoning.' Further from the misty memories of my youth I recalled the venerable figure of Robert Buchanan, Professor of Logic in Glasgow from 1824 to 1864, and seemed to hear him enunciating, in almost Dr. Mercier's words, the definition of logic. Dr. Mercier is much too young a man, or I should have been endeavouring to ransack my memory to recall, if possible, one of his name as sitting beside me in the junior division of the Logic Class in the penultimate year of Buchanan's incumbency. When Dr. Mercier proceeds to develop his thesis we find his method resembling that of Aristotle, the father of the 'old logic' which he so despises. Dr. Mercier would begin by 'assertion and denial'; Aristotle combines the two in his doctrine of the 'Proposition'; he tells us 'A proposition is a sentence which affirms or denies something of something.' As he goes on, Dr. Mercier's resemblance doctrinally to the ancient Glasgow Professor increases; 'generalisation, classification, definition,' are what Dr. Buchanan taught.

Notwithstanding the superior position Dr. Mercier assumes to those poor misguided logicians, he sometimes, if we may dare to hint it, manifests a confusion of thought as bad as the worst of which he accuses them. He animadvertes very severely on the action of the British Medical Association in proposing to

discuss 'Unconscious Mind.' This in his light-hearted way he identifies with 'Unconscious Consciousness.' If the mind is the faculty of thought, and if there are thoughts which do not themselves come into consciousness but the effects of them do, then his equation is incorrect. Not to have recognised these effects of unconscious thought, we fear, convicts Dr. Mercier of being wanting in the primary quality of a man of science—careful observation. If he has examined the phenomena of mind with any degree of thoroughness, he must be aware that many mental processes go on, so to say, beneath the surface of the mind, apart from consciousness. An act of will is a mental act; but, in walking, every several step must be accompanied by an act of will and be caused by it; yet I am sure that, when he walks, only in rare instances is Dr. Mercier aware of the separate volitions by which each step is accomplished. To take another case: the process of speech. I am sure that when Dr. Mercier, as he tells us, urged on the Medico-Psychological Association 'the justifiability, in certain cases, of punishing lunatics,' he would choose eminently suitable words, and arrange them in a clear, lucid argument; yet much of this choice of words was made unconsciously. Dr. Mercier knew clearly what he wanted to say, and the words in which to say it came of themselves. Yet what a complex of mental operations is involved in the very simplest speech! The same thing occurs in writing. When Dr. Mercier wrote the article with which he has entertained his readers, he had to choose out the words that would adequately express his meaning—had to remember how they were spelt, and had to think out while his mind was guiding his pen what he was next to put on paper. Yet all these mental acts would but rarely force themselves into consciousness.

Further, these unconscious processes are subject to laws. I presume Dr. Mercier is far too accurate a man ever to be guilty of an incorrect spelling, however great the hurry in which he is writing. I confess I do not enjoy this happy immunity from blunders. When I am guilty of a mis-spelling it is the rule that I spell correctly a word of the same or similar sound, but other than that I wish to use. I have found myself writing 'know,' the verb, for 'no,' the negative adjective, or again I have written 'few' for 'view.' This has all the look of dictation to a somewhat inattentive amanuensis. It is as if an intelligence, not my conscious self, had heard the sound, but from not attending to the connexion put down a word which represented the sound as a word other than the one needed by the line of thought. In other words, there seems to be a mind, of the workings of which I am not conscious, which guides my pen generally correctly but which sometimes fails. We may observe that the

amusing phenomena of 'Spoonerisms' are due to something of a similar kind. Such things as those above mentioned are worthy of study, whether Dr. Mercier considers the name of the paper which treated of it logical or not.

While it is perfectly true that we are liable to give a name to our ignorance and think that by so doing it has become knowledge, yet the instance he gives, which by connexion he seems to regard as to the point, scarcely is so. It is from his own experience. As a boy he brought a pebble to his teacher to learn what it was; he got from the master the answer that it was a common jasper. Dr. Mercier says that in giving this answer the master was 'something of a humorist.' It may be that I am ignorant of what humour is, but I fail to see where the humour of the situation comes in. This, however, is by the way. It is to be presumed that his teacher gave him a true answer; if so, the boy got his information, that the stone was one belonging to a class called 'jasper' and to the sub-class 'common.' Classification is one of the things which Dr. Mercier recognises as to be taught under the head of logic. He also knows that a class can only be retained in thought by being named. Of course, the teacher might have proceeded and explained to the boy the peculiar qualities which made that pebble a jasper, the various phenomena that were connoted by that name; but some of the qualities were observable by the naked eye, and could be recognised by the boy and retained in his mind for application to future pebbles. If the teacher gave young Mercier a correct answer, the lad was helped on in the systematisation of his knowledge.

Presumably as a contrast to the false knowledge which Dr. Mercier thinks is all that is given by appending a name to an object, he describes how a child learns that things are breakable. His bottle falls to the floor and breaks with a loud noise; he bangs a toy on the side of his crib: it also breaks with a noise. He learns in that way that things break. The child has thus in his mind, though not yet present in consciousness, the law of cause and effect, that when a change takes place that change has been caused by something. If the infant supposed had further proceeded to throw down his indiarubber doll in the expectation that it also would break with a noise, his disappointment would enable him to reach another step in generalisation. 'Soft things do not make a noise when they fall, and do not break.' That this is a systematising of knowledge is true, but in this is no contradiction of ordinary logic. Even Aristotle argues in this way when on somewhat inconclusive evidence he decides that the want of a gall bladder is conducive to longevity.

There are many statements in Dr. Mercier's article which are difficult to understand. He declares that 'a knowledge of a com-

petent logic would have taught' Dr. McDougall that the relation between Mind and Body is an insoluble problem. It may be that Dr. Mercier is correct, and that we never shall be able to understand the relation between these two elements of human nature, but logic can only reveal this after prolonged reasoning. Dr. Mercier speaks rather as if a competent logic would have prevented Dr. McDougall from at all undertaking the inquiry. This, it seems to us, is a somewhat large demand to make of a logic whatever, even of that 'competent logic' which dwells, as yet unrevealed, in the brain of Dr. Mercier.

Another hard saying is the assertion in the paragraph which follows the one about Dr. McDougall, that 'Logicians enumerate nine or ten "quantities" in propositions, and declare there are only two.' What Dr. Mercier means by saying that 'Logicians enumerate nine or ten quantities in propositions' I cannot tell. De Morgan introduced a distinction between definite and indefinite definite particulars; Sir William Hamilton quantified the predicate; but both admitted only 'universal' and 'particular.' Kant who was a logician as well as a metaphysician, made the logic quantities three, 'universal,' 'particular,' and 'individual'; but that is a long way off 'nine or ten.' Who are the logicians who so enumerate the quantities of propositions? The other sin which Dr. Mercier lays to the charge of these poor logicians is equally inscrutable, but it would be loss of time to discuss the seriously.

At the same time we have an interest in Dr. Mercier as psychological phenomenon. What moved him to write the article before us at all? He does not seem to be a specialist in logic science. What he appears to consider novelties are already commonplaces. In fact, he occupies the attitude of the urchin who would persist in instructing his grandmother how to sue for eggs. As Dr. Mercier is a man with a reputation to maintain he cannot be so ignorant as he would appear to be. What, then, is the inwardness of this proceeding on the part of Dr. Mercier? What is the motive behind his article? It is possible, we think, to find an answer to this question by careful study of the article itself. Dr. Mercier appears to have a bone to pick with Professor Karl Pearson for holding that science is statistics, and for hoping that in the happy by and bye the law of cause and effect will be thrown aside wholly. At the same time Dr. Mercier appears to sympathise with the Professor's assaults on the Mendelianism. For our part Mendelism has always seemed an attempt, fairly successful, to make the biological law of Heredity somewhat scientific. The nomenclature, and the deductions from the theory, may be capable of amendment.

The point which, it appears to us, Dr. Mercier feels most

keenly, and which seems most to have moved him to write, is one in regard to which we are in entirest sympathy with him—viz. the treatment which his thesis on 'the justifiability in certain cases of punishing lunatics' received from the Medico-Psychological Association, before which it was delivered. It is impossible for anyone, whatever the logical doctrines he has been taught, not to see the fallacy involved in the equivocal reply to Dr. Mercier's argument from the practice in lunatic asylums of depriving obstreperous patients of certain freedoms which otherwise they enjoyed, saying that these were not punishments but were simply the withdrawal of privileges. On a similar argument the re-imprisonment of a ticket-of-leave man would not be a punishment, it would simply be the withdrawal of privilege granted. In the case of certain lunatics the power of control, though weakened, is not totally lost, and it can be elicited by this system of rewards and 'withdrawals of privilege,' and, by being exercised, strengthened. This applies to some extent to punishments inflicted by the magistrate; the certainty that crime will be punished may assist the will, though somewhat weakened, in restraining the maniacal impulse. Indeed, there have been cases of murder in which the capital sentence has been commuted to lifelong detention of the accused as a criminal lunatic, where the opinion of Lord Braxfield in regard to a criminal before him 'that he wad be nane the waur o' a hangin'' might have been carried into effect with advantage.

While thus we sympathise so far with Dr. Mercier we cannot go his length. Of course, it is absurd of Professor Karl Pearson to give such undue weight to statistics, and to dismiss the law of causation, and doubly absurd of the Medico-Psychological Association to fail to recognise punishment in the deprivation of privilege; yet surely it is carrying matters too far because of these to condemn as valueless all the logic taught in schools and colleges. It is as bad as the Chinese, who, according to Charles Lamb, burned a house down in order to enjoy roast pig.

J. E. H. THOMSON.

OUR IMPERIAL SYSTEM

SOME few weeks ago the conversation at a certain mess-table of British officers in France—at which I had the honour to be a guest—turned after dinner to the subject of military discipline in the German and the British Armies. My host, a colonel with some twenty years' experience of the North-West Frontier, said to me :

It is character that tells with the men, and I don't know where you will find anything to beat the Englishman in that respect. Take a young subaltern, or, if you like, an Indian civilian fresh from home—a young cub who has hardly cut his teeth, so to speak—and plant him down alone with an outpost on the frontier or in the middle of a big administrative district, and in a few weeks, by sheer force of character and nothing else, he will acquire an ascendancy over his men which it would take a man from any other European country years to acquire—if he ever acquired it at all.

It was no unworthy boast. Many an untold tale of quiet heroism and uncovenanted devotion lies behind it.

Glad hearts without reproach or blot
That do their work and know it not.

Upon such a rock is our Empire built. It has been reserved for the greatest of Empires since the Empire of Rome to apply and to develop this principle of voluntary service, until to-day, in this, her hour of supreme trial, she finds herself with her quiver full, ready and eager to meet her enemies in the gate.

It is, as we know, the sole prerogative of the Crown to raise troops. The private citizen who attempts to raise troops and drill them on his own account would commit a statutory offence. English law recognises the right of every man to carry arms (Blackstone elevates this right to the dignity of natural law) but not the claim to use them in concert. You may arm but you must not drill. It matters not whether the troops be raised here or in the Dominions overseas. It is in the King's name that Colonial troops are still enlisted. I may quote a recent decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in a case in which a soldier in a New South Wales contingent, which had

served in South Africa, was suing the Colonial Government for arrears of pay :

The Plaintiff was in the service of the Crown and his payment was to be made by the Crown. Whether the money by which he was to be paid was to be found by the colony or the mother country was not a matter which could in any way affect his relations to his employer the Crown. . . .

The Government in relation to this contract is the *King himself*. The soldier is *his soldier* and the supplies granted to H.M. for the purpose of paying his soldiers, whether they be granted by the Imperial or the Colonial Legislature, are money granted to the King.

Under these circumstances the money paid was money paid for services rendered to the King.

We must remember, however, to what constitutional limitations that prerogative is subject. After a long and bitter struggle between King and Parliament in the seventeenth century it was established in the Bill of Rights, and the principle is now consecrated in the preamble to the Army Annual Act, that 'the raising or keeping of a standing army *within the United Kingdom in time of peace*, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is against law.'

Observe that the Act says the United Kingdom; it says nothing about the Dominions overseas. Of that more anon. Observe also that it says in *time of peace*. Does it by denying the unrestricted exercise of the Prerogative in time of peace admit it in time of war? That is a question to which more than one answer is possible. Certainly if the Germans invaded this realm to-morrow the King could by the sole exercise of his prerogative call upon each and all of us to take up arms in defence of the realm. Whether he could do that in the case of a war such as the present, falling short of actual invasion, is another question which I am attempting to answer elsewhere. But observe also that the preamble speaks of a Standing *Army*; it says nothing of a permanent *Navy*. The reader may not be aware that not only is it not illegal for the King to maintain a permanent Navy in time of peace without the consent of Parliament, but also that it would be perfectly legal for the King to force men to serve in it—in other words, to revive the press-gang. The townsman need not be alarmed—the King's right of impressment is limited by Common Law to those that go down to the sea in ships and do business in great waters—the landsman is safe. But the Common Law, in limiting the right, has recognised it. The reader will find a case—the case of Alexander Broadfoot—in Foster's *Crown Cases*, a book that was and still is a book of great authority. But more of this when I come to speak of our Colonial Navies.

Does, then, the doctrine of the Army Act restricting the prerogative apply to the Dominions, despite the absence in the preamble of any express words relating to them? Undoubtedly it does. It is an old-established doctrine that the English settlers in distant lands carry the Common Law with them, and not only the Common Law, but also so much of the Statute Law as is applicable to their condition, and, in particular, all statutes prior to the date of settlement that are declaratory of the Common Law. Therefore, the sacramental words of the Bill of Rights and the Mutiny Act which are embodied in the Army Act apply to the Dominions.¹ The King's Prerogative to raise troops in the Dominions is subject to the same limitations there as here. He cannot raise and maintain soldiers there without the consent of the local legislature. Our colonial troops are just as much statutory forces—Parliamentary armies, if we like to call them such—as are our home troops. The numbers, the pay, the discipline are all regulated by colonial statutes. Respect for this constitutional doctrine had much to do with the difficulties which precipitated the revolt of our American colonies in the eighteenth century. When the British Government was engaged in its great struggle with France for the hegemony of North America it always recognised, hard-pressed though it was, that it had no right to compel its American subjects to raise troops—especially for service in the hinterland beyond the colonial frontier. It had to fall back on voluntary enlistment, and upon requisitions on the colonial Governments to supply quotas—requisitions which, as we may read in Pitt's correspondence with the colonial Governors, the colonies were none too ready to supply. The failure of these and local requisitions compelled the British Parliament to maintain a garrison in America, and the attempt to tax the colonies for their support led to results with which everyone is familiar. The maintenance of colonial garrisons was, however, in no sense illegal, and the Crown continued this policy in her remaining colonies right down to the year 1870, and in some places still continues it. But she could not compel the colonies to contribute to their support. Nor would the colonies volunteer such support unless it was accompanied by control.

It was the recognition of this difficulty—the impossibility of combining imperial control of local forces with local expenditure upon the maintenance of those forces—that caused the gradual withdrawal of colonial garrisons some fifty years ago. The military establishments—barracks, fortifications, and so on—were handed over to the colonial Governments as a free gift. The result was that until some ten years ago, or less, our colonies

¹ As regards the conquered colonies the same limitation of the prerogative would undoubtedly be implied in the grant of responsible government.

—with the exception of South Africa, where a garrison was left after the termination of the Boer war—were practically defenceless on land. They have since found it necessary to put their house in order. Australia, Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand have within the last seven years each of them passed local Defence Acts, all of which, with some variations, adopt the principle of compulsory service. In Australia and South Africa the compulsion extends to training in peace; in Canada, which has a militia, the compulsion is limited to service in war. The scope of this compulsion to serve in war is in point of age decidedly large—every citizen from seventeen to eighteen years of age is liable to serve right up to his sixtieth year. The chief exemption in South Africa is significant—persons not of European descent cannot be members of the force. In each case these Defence Forces, as they are called, are divided into a Permanent Force and a Citizen Force, corresponding roughly to our Regular and Territorial Forces respectively, but with this important difference: that service in the Citizen Forces is not as here, voluntary, but compulsory.

What is the place of these forces in imperial strategy? That is a question which I will consider more closely when I come to examine the naval forces of the Dominions. But I may here remark that the creation of these land forces in the colonies has coincided in point of time with the concentration of the Imperial Fleet in home waters, and there can be little doubt that the two departures are causally related. In the case of Australia and Canada no doubt the emergence of a new planet, a great Asiatic Power, in the firmament of nations had also something to do with the military activity of the Dominions. Be that as it may, the question remains how far can these forces be considered as being truly Imperial forces—forces which our Army Council and the Committee of Imperial Defence can take into account in the strategy of a European campaign? Now, legally speaking, the Defence Acts of the Dominions do not directly contemplate the use of these forces outside their territories at all. Like our old Militia the basis of service in these forces is domestic. We find ancient Acts of Parliament asserting that by law no man is compellable to go out of his county to serve as a soldier except in case of sudden coming of strange enemies into the kingdom. Militia duty was not distinguishable from police duty—both were based on the principle of the *posse comitatus*, and the sheriff can at law call out every man of us to assist in the execution of a writ or the keeping of the peace. Militia duty was the reverse side of this police duty. And although under the exigencies of war Englishmen might have been compelled to serve out of their county, they could never be compelled to serve out of the realm.

This is the principle governing the terms of service in the colonial forces. The Australian Acts provide that no member of the force is bound to serve out of the Commonwealth without his own consent. The South African Act extends the liability to service beyond the boundaries of the Union, but limits it to South Africa. But that does not mean that co-operation with the Imperial forces is necessarily confined to the territory of each Dominion. What it does mean is that the co-operation which is now being so splendidly given is voluntary—it is the expression of spontaneous loyalty, unbought and unforced.

Such Imperial contingencies are provided for. The Governor-General is empowered in time of war to place the defence forces or any part thereof under the orders of the commander of any portion of the King's regular forces. This express provision was necessary, because in the absence of it the King's commission issued to officers in England gives them no legal authority over Dominion forces. In virtue of it the colonial troops can now be brigaded with our own men without impairing the unity of command. What is hardly less important than unity of command is uniformity of discipline. Here there was a legal difficulty. A colonial legislature could enact a code of discipline for enforcement within its own territory, but, in accordance with a well-known rule of law, it could not make that code enforceable outside it. Unlike the Imperial Legislature, colonial parliaments cannot legislate ex-territorially. To what code of military law, then, are Canadian and Australian troops serving in Europe subject? Section 177 of our own Army Act has solved the difficulty. The colonial code is to apply in virtue of the Imperial legislation; failing such a code, our own code, as enacted in the Army Act, is to be extended to the colonial troops serving by our side. As a matter of fact, Australia has adopted our own Army Act, the provisions of which are 'common form' in the Defence Acts of the Dominions.

Thus is uniformity of discipline secured.

Something, too, has been done to create an Imperial school of strategy and tactics. Thanks to Lord Haldane, we have had since 1909 an Imperial General Staff. The principle of that Staff is, without interfering with the autonomy of each Dominion, to secure the possibility of combining all the forces of the Empire in one homogeneous army. Reciprocity is provided for by attaching an officer from each Dominion to the War Office and an officer from the War Office to each General Staff in the Dominions.

This far-sighted conception of an Imperial school of strategy we owe to Lord Haldane, of whom it may truly be said that he saw the problem of defence steadily, and saw it whole. We have

not the space to enter at the present moment into the question of War Office administration during recent years.³ Our immediate object is merely to outline the legal and political foundations upon which the system of Imperial Defence is built. Enough if we say here that it is to Lord Haldane that we owe in a very large degree the success which has attended the prosecution of the present War—the creation of a Territorial Force for alternative use for home defence or foreign service, the redistribution of business among the Army Council (which he first put on a statutory basis) on a system which combined specialisation of function with collective deliberation and supreme Ministerial control, the idea of an expansive Expeditionary Force; and, above all, those plans for the mobilisation and transport of the Expeditionary Force, which were worked out to the last detail in the secret *War Book*, and the success of which is a matter of common knowledge. Political memories are notoriously short, but these are services which will not be forgotten.

What of India? Here, indeed, we enter the country of romance. The Indian Army is the mirror of the Indian peoples: almost every caste and every tribe has taken service under the British *raj*. The conditions of that service are a striking commentary on the character of British rule. The reader will remember that in the armies of the Roman Empire none but citizens could serve in the legions, and that service in the auxiliaries was only ultimately rewarded by the bestowal of the coveted status. The policy of the Emperors was to denationalise the subject peoples as insidiously as possible. Under Vespasian provincial auxiliaries were studiously posted in other provinces than their own. Britons were sent to Dacia, Syrians to the Danube. Well might Tacitus say 'It is by the blood of the provinces that the provinces are conquered.' Even the legions, when recruited, as they came to be, from provincial citizens, were carefully composed of mixed nationalities. Gaul and Spaniard served under the same eagles. *Divide et Impera* was the motto of the Roman recruiting system. The armies of Rome became a military constitution; they were neither Italian nor provincial, and in the hands of despotic emperors they became the instrument of Italy's own subjection until the mother country herself became but a province of the Empire.

How different is our Indian Empire! There are, indeed, many similitudes between the Roman and Indian Empires, and Lord Bryce has already emphasised them in a brilliant chapter of his *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*. But there are also many differences and none more remarkable than this: that the Indian regiments accentuate the native character instead of

³ The writer has gone more fully into this subject in *War, its Conduct and its Legal Results*, John Murray, 1915.

attenuating it. Sikh serves with Sikh, Ghurka with Ghurka. Nor does the auxiliary change his political character on enlistment. Military service confers no civic rights, for the simple reason that the auxiliary, whether soldier or civilian, already possesses them. The distinction between citizen and subject, so rooted in the Roman system, is unknown to our law; so, indeed, we might almost say is the distinction between soldier and civilian. India is a country of personal law—I admit it—and distinctions are indeed drawn in the Code of Criminal Procedure between persons of European descent and Asiatics; but, without going deeper into a complex subject, I may at least say this: there is nothing in the constitution of the Indian Army resembling those features of the Roman Army which were to prove so fatal to the cause of political freedom.

We may, if we like, call the English troops in India Imperial legionaries and the native troops auxiliaries, but the distinction must not be pressed too far. There is, however, this difference between the two: the English troops in India and the English officers of the native troops are, like their comrades at home, subject to the disciplinary code of the Army Act. The native troops are governed by a different law—the Indian Articles of War, and those Articles contrive to govern the discipline of the Indian troops now serving in Europe.

There is one aspect of the Indian Army which is of great constitutional importance. If the reader will look at our Army Annual Act, by which Parliament annually fixes the number of His Majesty's troops and thereby restricts the Crown to raise no more men than are therein granted, he will find the words 'exclusive of the numbers actually serving within His Majesty's Indian possessions.' In other words, the numbers of the Indian Army are unlimited by statute. Here it would seem is an instrument of despotism: the Crown might intimidate its English subjects by the presence of an Indian Army whose pay and numbers are subject to no Parliamentary control. Troops sent to India are placed on the Indian establishment; they cease to come under the annual Army Estimates. But the draughtsman of the Government of India Act was careful to guard against such an attempt to outflank the constitutional securities of the Bill of Rights. The Act provides that

Except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of H.M.'s Indian possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the revenues of India are not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, applicable to defraying the expenses of any military operation carried on beyond the external frontiers of those possessions by H.M.'s Forces charged upon those revenues.

We may remember Mr. Disraeli's liberal interpretation of that constitutional safeguard and how he anticipated the consent

of Parliament when he moved the Indian troops to Malta, thereby provoking a great constitutional controversy in the House of Commons. I will not enter into the merits of that controversy here. Sufficient if I say that the clause does ensure that sooner or later in any such operation Parliament is enabled to act, at one and the same time, as the guardian of the liberties of the Indian people and our own.

I have failed in my purpose if I have not succeeded in showing how firmly based is this system of Imperial Defence upon the principles of constitutional freedom. The separation between civil and military authority which Diocletian introduced into the Roman Empire, and by which the whole civil polity was suffocated in a shirt of steel, is unknown to ours. Under Diocletian the army was an *imperium in imperio*, and the policy by which Pompey superseded the senatorial governors by his military legates was carried to its logical conclusion. Diocletian's policy may have saved the provinces for the Empire (it checked seditious governors), but it ruined such autonomy as they had. No such necessity confronts ourselves, because we have made autonomy the very corner-stone of our rule. We do not fear our colonies because we have learnt to trust them. The result is that everywhere the military power is the servant of the civil authority and not its master, and even an English commission will of itself carry with it no authority over a colonial trooper. Voluntary co-operation, not Imperial subjection, has been and is our policy. That being so, the soldier, British, Indian, or Colonial, does not stand for a privileged caste. A British soldier, we have been told in classical language, is only a civilian armed in a particular manner. He does not by putting on the whole armour of His Majesty thereby put off the obligations of a civilian. If he undergoes any change of status at all it is in the direction of losing rights rather than acquiring privileges. Enlistment often operates as disfranchisement—not by law but by force of facts. It is difficult—as revising barristers have shown—to establish that exclusive control which is the test of the occupation franchise if you happen to sleep in cubicles in barracks. It is still more difficult to establish continuous residence when you are called away to camp or on active service. Parliament has only recently had to pass an Emergency Act expressly protecting members of the Territorial Force from the disfranchisement which would otherwise have followed upon their embodiment. No! our Army is, as Lord Haldane once declared it should be, 'a popular institution, not a menace to civil liberty.'

An extremely important departure in the direction of the co-ordination of the problems of Imperial Defence was taken a few years ago by the creation of a Committee to deal with such problems. The constitution of this Committee is an informal

one, almost as informal as that of the Cabinet itself, and it has never been defined either by prerogative or statute. It normally consists of the Ministers responsible for the Army and Navy respectively, together with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and the Secretary for India. It is, however, a very elastic body, and whenever matters affecting their departments are under consideration other Ministers may be summoned, and not only they but the permanent officials. The presence of officials thus discriminates this body from the Cabinet, from which it also differs in having a permanent secretariat with a permanent record of its deliberations for the use of successive administrations. In that respect it has done much to neutralise problems of defence so far as political parties are concerned, and to secure continuity of policy. Indeed, a member of the Opposition, Mr. Balfour, is summoned to its deliberations. Not only so but representatives of the colonies may and, when present in London, do attend. The Prime Ministers of the Dominions present at the periodical Colonial Conference invariably take advantage of their presence in this country to attend the meetings of the Committee. And lately the Imperial Government have invited the Dominions to participate regularly in its deliberations by providing for the permanent presence in London of one of their Ministers, though nothing has, we believe, yet been done to carry this proposal into effect. There are, of course, limits set to the power of a body of this kind, owing to the necessity of preserving the supremacy of the Cabinet and its complete responsibility to Parliament. Hence the Committee has no independent initiative and no executive authority. It is a purely consultative body. But its importance in providing for a common policy of defence throughout the Empire cannot be over-estimated, and in it probably lies the germ of all future developments in the direction of the closer unity of the Empire.

We have already referred to the Imperial General Staff. The object of creating it was not merely to provide for the common study of strategical problems—that is largely the work of the Committee—but to enable the War Office and the War Staffs of the Dominions to work out a harmonious plan of rapid mobilisation in the event of war, and to provide for a common system of drill, training, and equipment. Thus, to quote the words of the Prime Minister, provision is made for 'one homogeneous army.'

It remains to say a word about the Navy. To-day there is the nucleus of a Colonial Navy in the waters of the Southern Pacific. Such a fleet would have been regarded as unthinkable under the old colonial system—nay, it would have been impossible. With all the autonomy conceded by the Mother Country to the American Colonies—and it was not inconsiderable—there

was one thing she would never concede—the shipping trade. Under the Navigation Acts the colonies were sternly excluded from the mercantile marine. All the carrying trade had to be done in British ships—it was a close preserve of the Mother Country. Great Britain had long guarded her admiralty of the seas with jealous care. You will find sound lawyers in the seventeenth century, like Selden, gravely arguing that British sovereignty extends far beyond British territorial waters. ‘The King of Great Britain,’ said Selden, ‘is Lord of the Sea flowing about as an inseparable and perpetual appendage of the British Empire.’ As we know, the Lords of the Admiralty recently notified neutral countries that the North Sea is out of bounds; we have proclaimed a kind of naval protectorate over its broad waters. That seems a startling development to us and only justified by the exigencies of war. But in the seventeenth century, and indeed later, an Englishman would not have hesitated to put forward such claims even in time of peace. Our frigates when they met a foreign ship above Cape Finisterre forced her to dip her ensign and lower her topsails in acknowledgment of our supremacy, and the ship which was rash enough to dispute our maritime prerogative received a cannon-shot across her bows. In such circumstances the Mother Country was not disposed to allow her colonies to develop a mercantile marine of their own which might open the doors to free trade with other countries. It followed that if a mercantile marine was forbidden to the colonies, so also was a Colonial Navy. Admiralty jurisdiction was never regarded as falling within the sphere of colonial courts, and, needless to say, a colonial legislature could not legislate for merchant shipping on the high seas; even to-day such legislation is only possible by an Imperial enabling Act. The Navy was, as it still is, a matter of high prerogative. Thus long after the withdrawal of the colonial garrisons the White Ensign continued to police the seas of the Dominions. Until about six years ago little was heard of Colonial Navies.

What was the secret of the change? It may be told in one word—Germany. The oft-quoted preamble to the German Naval Law of 1900 said this:

In order to protect German trade and commerce under existing conditions only one thing will suffice, namely, Germany must possess a battle fleet of such a strength that even for the most powerful naval adversary a war would involve such risks as to make that Power's own supremacy doubtful. For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German Fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest Naval Power, *for as a rule a great Naval Power will not be in a position to concentrate all its forces against us.*

The answer of the British Admiralty was to do the very thing the German Government assumed we could not do. Our Fleet,

till then dispersed over the Seven Seas, was gradually concentrated in home waters. In 1902 there were 160 British ships on foreign and colonial stations; in 1912 there were only 76. We had to take account of the possibility of a surprise coming like a thief in the night. As a strategist of high authority has put it: 'We must be prepared at one average moment for the enemy at his selected moment.' There in a sentence is the secret of our policy of concentration. To-day we know that it has been our salvation. But the effect of it was to impoverish the colonial stations. The Dominions suddenly realised how much they had owed to this Imperial insurance of their commerce and this Imperial guardianship of their shores—given, be it remembered, by the Mother Country without any corresponding contribution or cost.

Australia had, indeed, done something as early as 1884 to provide for a system of naval defence, and had entered into an agreement with the Imperial Government, by which she undertook to contribute an annual subsidy to the maintenance of an auxiliary squadron in Australian waters. She stipulated, however, that those vessels were not to be employed outside the Australasian waters, even in time of war, without the consent of the Colonial Governments. 'Cash contributions without control,' said one of her representatives, 'are not in harmony with colonial nationalism.' This was to raise profound questions of constitutional law, foreign policy, and naval strategy. When Australia began to substitute a contribution of men for a subsidy of money, and not only to maintain ships but to provide them, the question became inexorable. Sir Wilfrid Laurier went further, and declared that, as regarded Canada, 'it was for the Parliament of Canada, if she created a Canadian Navy, to say not only where but *when* it should go to war.' Happily that extreme doctrine of a kind of colonial neutrality has found little countenance. The modern conditions of naval strategy make unity of control absolutely imperative in time of war, and the fate of the Dominions may be decided by a battle in the waters of the North Sea. In a remarkably powerful Memorandum of October 1911—one of the most important documents that has ever issued from Whitehall—the Admiralty, in reply to a request from Mr. Borden, laid down the principles of Imperial strategy, and pointed out that 'in the *general* naval supremacy of Great Britain is the primary safeguard of the security and interests of the great Dominions.' Once that is destroyed in home waters nothing could save them. Long ago, as long ago as 1764, long before Captain Mahan wrote his memorable book, an English Secretary of State grasped this fundamental truth: 'It is upon the superiority of the fleets of Great Britain,' wrote Halifax, 'that the defence and security of her colonies ever have, and

ever must, principally depend.' Canada and Australia, while pursuing different policies of contribution, eventually united in support of this cardinal truth, and the Naval Defence Acts of the two Dominions provide that in case of emergency the Governor in Council may place at the disposal of His Majesty, for general service in the Royal Navy, the ships and crews of the Dominion. Such ships were already subject to the code of discipline laid down in our own Naval Discipline Act, which, by an enabling Act, known as the Colonial Naval Defence Act, can be adopted, subject to such adaptation as they think fit, by the Dominion Governments. By a recent Act (1911) the ships were placed at the disposal of the Admiralty, and subject to our Naval Discipline Act, the King's Regulations, and the Admiralty Instructions without any modification at all.

Space will not permit me to enter into the profoundly interesting questions raised in the debates on the Canadian Naval Aid Bill, whose fate is still uncertain. They resolve themselves into a single question—which is the better policy: to contribute ships which shall become, whether in peace or war, an integral and permanent constituent of the Imperial Fleet, as New Zealand has done; or to raise local navies which, except in emergency, shall remain exclusively under colonial control—the policy pursued by Australia? The Admiralty has left the question to each Dominion to decide for itself. In Canada it is still undecided. But in his superb speech, a historic speech, of the 5th of December 1912 in the Canadian Parliament, Mr. Borden advanced very cogent reasons for the policy of contributing ships to the home fleet instead of the particularist policy of a local navy. He pointed out that it would be twenty-five or fifty years before Canada could hope to lay down the expensive shipbuilding plant and to develop the high technical skill necessary to construct a local navy. In memorable, and indeed moving words, he reminded his audience that no local navy could hope to do for Canada what the Imperial Navy did—to police the high seas, to ensure her commerce, to protect her subjects in distant ports.

It is profoundly true. The British Navy is a World Navy. It is, and must be, mobile; its ultimate mobilisations and dispersions are a pressure-gauge of international relations; thanks to its unceasing vigil our ships are in every port, our flag is on every sea, our bills of exchange are honoured at sight. Vessels post o'er land and sea to carry the golden grain which is the life of the people.

Unity of control and freedom of movement is, therefore, the prime condition of an Imperial Fleet. The policy of concentration has its marginal disadvantages, as the raids of that chartered libertine of the Indian Ocean, the *Emden*, disagreeably remind us. But we can afford to ignore that. We have still sufficient

ships, though not more than sufficient, to satisfy the second law of naval supremacy, the law of local superiority, which consists in the power to send in good time, or to maintain permanently in some distant theatre, forces adequate to defeat the enemy or hold him in check until the main decision has been obtained in the decisive theatre. That superiority the Australian ships have already established in New Guinea and Samoa.

We are going, and are destined to go, in Burke's memorable phrase, through great varieties of untried being. Profound changes lie ahead of us. It will be far more difficult to make peace than it was to make war. Political changes, economic changes, constitutional changes will convulse Europe—perhaps for a generation. The old order changeth, and in the new everything will be subjected to a searching scrutiny. But over the uncharted seas and unplumbed depths upon which we shall have to voyage there will shine a beacon whose rays were never more brilliant than now—the beacon of Imperial loyalty. Everywhere—in the dark hinterlands of the African Protectorates, in the great client-states of India, among the tribal clans who salute King George as the paramount Chief of Zululand, under the Southern Cross, and beneath the Northern snows, there is but one unwavering answer.

Such is our Imperial system—flexible, expansive, voluntary, forged by links which are truly light as air but strong as iron. It depends, as the reader will have seen, entirely upon the unsolicited support of willing peoples. It is, indeed, itself a symbol of the growth of our Empire—an Empire which, whatever its failings, was never founded upon pedantry or conceived by art. We have very little literature of an Imperialist character. Literature is self-conscious—and the founders of our Empire were never self-conscious. Neither were they doctrinaires. We have no theory of Empire. We do not talk of 'a place in the sun,' nor of the 'terror' of an Imperial name. Our Government's anxiety has been not to incite its pioneers but rather to restrain them. The metaphor of 'the weary Titan' is not idle. Empire has been thrust upon us. The words of the preamble to the India Act of 1793, in which Parliament disclaimed designs of territorial aggrandisement, were literally true. Our Government has often, perhaps too often, disavowed the acquisitions of its sons. Its Empire has grown out of the adventurous spirit of its children—here a trading company, there a religious communion, in one place a planter, in another an explorer, and slowly, reluctantly, with great searchings of heart, the Mother Country has accepted the responsibilities thus thrust upon her. She shall not pass away.

J. H. MORGAN.

LAISSEZ-FAIRE OR PROTECTION?

A STUDY IN HALF-TRUTHS

Now that Party strife has ceased, killed by real warfare, it is fortunately possible to discuss the subject of Protection simply as a problem in economics, and not as a Party matter. The present occasion for 'reconsidering creeds and philosophies' is peculiarly opportune, for three reasons: we can do so without being accused of Party bias; the enormous expense of the War will almost inevitably necessitate a tariff for purposes of additional revenue; and, in any case, a kind of Protection is already forced upon us, owing to the stoppage of a large body of imports previously derived from Germany, and the diminution of other imports from countries now at war or affected by it. Free Traders, no less than Protectionists, recognise the desirability of 'capturing German trade,' and the home manufacture of goods previously imported no longer shocks Free Trade susceptibilities. The economic aspects of this are well worth studying. We are not for ever to be debarred from discussing a scientific subject because it once formed the field of political controversy, and proved unpopular for Conservative vote-catching.

I may say that I have been a close student of this subject ever since Mr. Chamberlain reintroduced it in 1903. On the whole, nothing has struck me more forcibly with regard to it than the truth of a certain epigram in a volume by Professor Chapman. 'Theories,' he says, 'tend to crystallise into formulae expressing half-truths.' Most true is this of the whole Tariff discussion of recent years, which has been buried under a mass of such formulae, with the greatest possible confusion of thought in consequence. To clear up this confusion now, it is necessary to go back to beginnings, and analyse the original theories which have since crystallised into such confused shapes. We must open our eyes and take a fresh look at things, and we shall find that they assume an astonishingly new aspect. For example, supposing we had never heard of a Tariff question, of Free Trade and Protection, would it strike us, on the face of it,

that it was a desirable thing in itself to send millions upon millions of valuable goods out of the country when millions of people in the country would be only too thankful to receive them? And yet our export trade, the sending away of those goods, has appeared to the majority of Tariff Reformers as the most desirable thing to aim at. It will be within the recollection of all who followed the Tariff controversy that the words 'export' and 'import' were harder worked than any others. The discussion centred on them. To find out why this was so, we must go back.

Protection as an economic theory suffers from having made a false start. The earlier Protectionism, indeed, was based on the very natural and deeply rooted human instinct that it is more patriotic to use goods made at home by our people than those made abroad by foreign people. But the first attempts to give a scientific basis to this belief resulted in the theory known as 'Mercantilism,' and it is this theory which, notwithstanding its complete refutation by Adam Smith, has bred such lamentable confusion of thought ever since. The essence of the theory was that the wealth of nations consisted in gold. That country was richest which could accumulate most gold in it. It was further argued that international payments were very largely made in gold. The conclusion derived from such a theory is obvious. Export all you can, in order to bring as much gold into the country as possible; import as little as you can, to avoid having to send gold out. Aim in particular at a 'favourable balance of trade,' a phrase which has amazingly survived, in order to obtain a perpetual influx of gold, a perpetual balance on the right side, so to speak. That was the Mercantilist theory in a nutshell, and though the theory itself is almost forgotten—in fact, has never even been heard of by many of the contestants of to-day—though it was exploded over a hundred years ago, and has been further shattered by almost every economist of note ever since, nevertheless, its fragments still survive. They survive in our exaggerated respect for 'exports' in particular and foreign trade in general. The phrase 'excess of imports,' constantly used of late years, is only another rendering of the older but still used 'unfavourable balance of trade,' and is directly attributable to Mercantilism. Even more direct was Mr. Seddon's famous statement that England was sending 160 millions of golden sovereigns abroad every year in payment for her 'excess of imports,' which appeared to Mr. Seddon and some of his hearers as a very dreadful thing. In point of fact, a glance at a Blue Book was sufficient to refute that statement, and to show that, on balance, we usually import more gold than we export, which is not surprising; since England is collectively probably the

largest owner of gold mines in the world, through the capital she has invested in them in all parts of the world.

Everyone will remember, too, the laborious efforts of amateur Free Trade statisticians to show how we 'paid for' our great import trade : so much by exported commodities, so much by shipping, so much by the interest due to us on capital invested abroad, etc., etc.—anything, in fact, but by gold. I am not sure, indeed, that some of these gentry did not end by convincing themselves that we really 'paid for' more than we got : a surprising conclusion, which, nevertheless, owing to the topsy-turvydom of ideas on the subject, appeared to give them satisfaction ; just as the apparently gratuitous receipt of some millions' worth of commodities for nothing struck terror into the hearts of the stoutest Tariff Reformers, and appeared to them as the direst calamity. As a Protectionist, I freely admit that one side was every bit as bad as the other. It is a real tragi-comedy that all this pother, this weary game of 'cross questions and crooked answers,' was about a theory abandoned by every responsible person with the most rudimentary knowledge of economics at least a hundred years ago.

Admitting, then, as every one must, the fallacy of the Mercantilist theory, how is it that Protectionism survives? It survives because its economic soundness *never really depended on Mercantilism at all*. The latter was merely a misdirected attempt to provide the necessary scientific basis. The old instinct that it is nationally right to use goods made at home, if possible, in preference to foreign goods, has a perfectly sound economic justification, notwithstanding the false start of Mercantilism. This we shall see later.

Before we come to Adam Smith's very complete refutation of the Mercantilist theory it is necessary to examine in greater detail two 'formulae expressing half-truths' which are derived from Mercantilism, and in particular have given rise to great confusion of thought. The first is the well-known phrase 'Exports pay for Imports.' The complete and original meaning intended to be conveyed by this phrase was 'Exports—i.e. goods and services—and *not gold*, pay for Imports.' This was a true and sufficient answer to the Mercantilist contention that imports drained gold out of the country in payment. But of late years its meaning has become curiously perverted. It has constantly been used to mean something to this effect : that as British goods and British services do the paying, all is well ; with the corollary that if goods previously imported were made at home instead, we should stop having to pay for them, to the detriment of those formerly making the goods which did the paying. This, of course, is ludicrously wrong ; a good example of the danger of

half-truths. The *whole* truth is that goods and services 'pay for' or exchange for, *via* money or its equivalent, other goods and services the world over, whether we send our goods across a frontier and call them 'exports' or not. Thus, on the assumption that certain goods were made at home instead of being imported, the same amount of other goods or services would still be required to pay for them. The metaphor of 'paying' itself gives rise to confusion of thought. It is just as true to say that imports pay for exports as *vice versa*. So in this case to say that certain goods would still be 'required to pay for' other goods, previously imported but now made at home, gives a rather false impression: it suggests some sort of compulsory, and perhaps reluctant, payment. This, of course, is not the case. The additional goods now made at home create an additional purchasing power, which, as people are commonly willing to sell what they make for sale, is naturally exerted.

The frequent assumption, therefore, that the home manufacture of some commodity previously imported compels a corresponding decrease in production in some other direction, on the grounds that an 'import' no longer has to be 'paid for,' is simply childish. The only difference is in the people 'paid.' Nor does it even imply a cessation of a corresponding volume of exported goods. Why in the world should it? Is some Customs' official to come round and say 'England has ceased to import German pianos; you must therefore cancel your sales of Sheffield cutlery for export, and export no more!' The notion is absurd. The only 'export' which necessarily ceases or does not take place is the very intangible one of the 'service' rendered to 'abroad' by the investment of a certain amount of capital abroad, which is diverted instead to a home industry. Far from being reduced, there is every reason to expect an increase of our exported goods, for why should not the newly established industry itself develop an export trade? The thing has been done again and again in Protected countries.

In short, as a rather epigrammatic way of saying that trade is essentially barter, this famous phrase may have, or once have had, some value. As used of late years, however, it has merely served to introduce a mass of transparent absurdities.

The second 'formula' which I wish to discuss is really a sort of offspring of the first. It is this: 'Capital goes abroad in the form of exported commodities.' What this was originally intended to mean was 'not in the form of gold,' a sound enough answer to the Mercantilist ideas on the subject. But this formula also has been strangely distorted of late years and made to mean something quite different, something to this effect: Capital goes abroad in the form of exported commodities, which are made

by British labour. What a fine thing it is, therefore, that capital should go abroad! Obviously, the more we send the better, for thus the more British labour will be employed. That is the half-truth. The whole truth is that capital goes to *all* industries, whether at home or abroad, in the form of commodities, since no one builds their factories, etc., out of gold. But again, the difference is, Who gets those commodities, that capital on which the employment of labour depends? Are industries and labour in this country to be maintained by those commodities, or industries and labour abroad? In many cases, of course, the latter is highly desirable and thoroughly sound policy—e.g. the development of many Colonial industries. What I object to, however, is the totally false assumption that, because home labour makes the exported commodities which represent foreign investments, foreign investments are therefore the only ones of vital interest to home labour; whereas, in actual fact, as regards this side of the matter (the manufacture of those commodities) British labour is equally interested in either case; while, other things being equal, the home investment is necessarily and obviously of greater benefit to labour in this country, since it is in this country that the labour is employed by it.

There is one other aspect of this matter which ought to be dealt with. The investment of capital abroad was discussed at some length by Mr. Chiozza Money (*Elements of the Fiscal Problem*). As his treatment of the subject is typical of much modern Free Trade writing, I will here criticise it. I may say that the very simple point that anyone should doubt the desirability of a foreign investment because it is a foreign investment, and not a home investment, seems hardly to have occurred to Mr. Money. He is almost solely concerned with showing that the imports received as interest 'do not deprive anyone here of labour.' 'They are, on the contrary,' says Mr. Money, 'part of the very fund of real wages that is distributed year by year.' They are 'an addition to the wealth of the country.' As the example chosen by Mr. Money is tea, we can well believe that its importation does not deprive tea-growers in England of employment. As to competitive imports, however, that is another matter, and I fail to see why the importation of, say, wheat grown by British capital should produce any different effect on home wheat-growing than that grown by American capital. Mr. Money is totally at variance with Adam Smith on this point, for the latter readily agreed that free importation of a commodity probably would cause unemployment in the home industry concerned. This, however, is not the real gist of the matter. The effect of imports is presumably the same whosoever capital produces them; the real point is once more the inevitable half-

truth that it is interest *from foreign investments only* which is 'part of the very fund of real wages,' 'an addition to the wealth of the country,' and so on. No mention is made of the fact that interest on *home* investments is exactly the same, while the capital, being at home, supports home labour. Is a pair of boots made at Leicester by British capital any less 'an addition to the wealth of the country' than a similar pair made by British capital in France, and received as an 'import'? Of course not! Then why disguise the fact? I do not suppose Mr. Money is purposely misleading, but tell the working-man that interest on foreign investments is such a splendid thing, while omitting to state that, however splendid, interest on home investments is *just the same*, and you naturally lead him to think that foreign investments are the only things that matter, which is misleading to a degree. He has been told again and again that 'capital goes abroad in the form of commodities'—which he helps to make; he is told that the interest received from this exported capital is 'part of the very fund of real wages,' 'an addition to the wealth of the country,' and all the rest of it. Is it any wonder that he views foreign investments with more than complacency? And yet every word is equally true of home investments, with, in their case, the immensely important distinction that the capital itself, which is what really does employ labour, is at home and employing home labour. There was never a more monstrous 'lie that is half a truth' than this; albeit uttered probably in good faith by people who have been content to accept 'formulae expressing half-truths,' without going to the root of the matter and discovering the whole truth. It is not too much to say that the labouring classes in general have been absolutely fooled in this matter of 'capital invested abroad' by pseudo-scientific propaganda; whereas the truth, unconfused by false science, is so straightforward and obvious that anyone ought to be able to see it.

We now come to Adam Smith's refutation of the Mercantilist heresy, and we shall find it simple and obvious enough.

His refutation lies in demonstrating that real wealth does not consist in money, of which gold is, so to speak, the archetype, but in the things which money will buy. Gold, after all, is only a metal, which by convention we agree to accept as a medium of exchange. But we cannot eat it, or drink it, as Midas discovered. We cannot make machines, or factories, or clothes out of it; it will not minister to us as a doctor or lawyer or banker. It has its commercial uses, simply as a metal, just as other metals have; but to mistake gold, in the money sense, for real wealth is to mistake the means for the end. Wealth itself consists in commodities and services. Thus the doctor exchanges, *via*

money or credit, his services for bread and meat and housing. As between nations, this non-material form of wealth, which we call generically 'services,' assumes very great importance, as, for instance, the services to other countries of our shipping industry, banking and financial services, and so on.

All this becomes so obvious when once pointed out that I need not elaborate it further. But meanwhile, what becomes of Mercantilism? Mistaking the means for the end, the Mercantilists encouraged exports in every way they could, by bounties on exports and so on, in order to bring what they considered wealth—i.e. gold—into the country. But, all unconsciously, it was the real wealth they were urging to leave the country. They discouraged imports, believing these would drain wealth—gold—out of the country in payment. But, again, it was the real wealth they were preventing from coming in. No refutation could be more complete.¹

But Adam Smith found himself, as all Free Traders must, faced with another and more basic difficulty. Granted that his *definition* of wealth was right, and that of the Mercantilists wrong, did it follow that this country would be more wealthy, the distribution of wealth more even, and the amount of labour employed greater, by importing than by home manufacture? It was easy to see that the importation of cheaper foreign goods would injure the home industry concerned, and therefore render it and those in it relatively less wealthy, thus reducing the amount of employment in it. But would the ultimate total wealth in the country, the aggregate volume of employment in the country, be adversely affected? Would there be more employment under Free Trade than under Protection, or less?

Adam Smith endeavoured to show that, far from being decreased, the amount of employment in the country would be increased; and, in order to do this, evolved what I have called, for want of a neater description, 'The capital-tight frontier theory.' The industry of a country, he says, with perfect truth, is limited by and dependent on the amount of capital employed in it. Stripped of all technical jargon, this means that if my works or business, and everybody else's in the country, are run fully efficiently, I shall not economically be able to employ more labour without increasing my capital—i.e. my plant generally, or some part of it. Just as 'wealth' does not mean money, but the things, material or not, which money will buy; so 'capital' does not mean an abstract conception of so many thousand pounds invested, which yield me an annual income, but real wealth used

¹ I am fully aware of the economic importance of gold as the basis of credit, especially in time of war; but it is impossible adequately to discuss banking and exchange matters within the scope of this article.

productively—i.e. to produce further wealth; e.g. a machine, a factory, or a farm. Trace capital to its ultimate point, and you will find it always and necessarily exists in some such concrete form. Even the capital of a doctor is analogous, and consists in his accumulated skill and knowledge. Keeping this conception of capital in mind, it is clear enough that we cannot employ the staffs of, say, two breweries, if there is only one in existence; or, as Adam Smith says, 'Industry is limited by capital.'

In order to show, therefore, while perforce admitting that foreign competition injured the home industry, that nevertheless *the sum total* of employment in the country would not be reduced, it was necessary for him to show, if possible, that the sum total of capital in the country would not be reduced. Consequently, he evolved his 'capital-tight frontier' theory, already referred to. This theory, or statement, practically was to the effect that the frontier of a country forms an impermeable barrier to the egress (or ingress) of capital. Why this, the most basic and most flagrant fallacy of 'national' Free Trade, has never yet been properly exposed, I do not profess to know. It was certainly not exposed by List, generally hailed as the apostle of scientific Protection, whose argument is little more than an elaboration of 'the infant industries' idea, conceded long ago even by orthodox Free Traders, headed by J. S. Mill. It has been touched on by such writers and economists as Professors Ashley and Nicholson, but they have certainly not driven home the fact that the Free Trade theory stands or falls by it; and as it is to-day patently wrong, Free Trade must fall.

Every individual [writes Adam Smith] endeavours to employ his capital *as near home as he can*, and consequently, as much as he can, in support of domestic industry.

From thence onwards, as anyone may see for himself who takes the trouble to read *The Wealth of Nations*, he assumes, not only that every individual 'endeavours' to do this, but *does* do this, until we reach his final conclusion :

Though a great number of people should, by thus restoring the freedom of trade, be thrown out of their ordinary employment . . . it would by no means follow that they would thereby be deprived of employment. . . . The stock (capital) which employed them in a particular manufacture before *will still remain in the country* to employ an equal number of people in some other way. *The capital of the country remaining the same*, the demand for labour will be the same.

Observe the 'capital-tight frontier' ! But it needs little power of deduction to see that if the capital does *not* remain in the country the demand for labour will *not* be the same, on Adam Smith's own showing.

A word of explanation is here necessary. The capital we are concerned with in all these cases is not present capital, to any extent, but future capital. Obviously, the capital represented by the buildings, etc., of an industry or business must 'remain in the country'; equally obviously, if, *ex hypothesi*, that business is ruined, or even maimed or checked by foreign competition, this particular capital does not and cannot employ the same amount of labour as before. The capital of the country *in respect to that business* does not remain the same. It is depreciated; it may be reduced to mere old bricks and scrap iron and disused machinery. But considering capital as a whole, generically, we see that it is a sort of Phoenix, which is re-born from its own ashes. It is naturally regenerative. Every year so much is saved and added to the capital of a country, partly to repair the inevitable wastage and depreciation of old capital, partly as new capital to extend existing businesses or to start new ones.

It is of capital in this future or potential sense that Adam Smith is really thinking, though his language is not very plain: an error repaired by Mill; and it is in this sense we must consider it. Adam Smith's real argument is that, as none of this future capital will leave the country, but 'will remain to employ an equal number of people in some other way,' the sum total of labour ultimately will not be diminished, but rather increased; as I shall show in the next paragraph.

The central conception of the Free Trade theory was that of 'Natural advantages.' Smith argued that if a foreign country could supply us with a commodity cheaper than we could make it, this proved that that country had a natural advantage over us for the manufacture of that article; and even if the advantage was only acquired, it would in either case still be better economy for us to give up the former manufacture to that other country which had the advantage, and to devote ourselves to some other industry in which the advantage lay with us. Thus both countries, and, with universal Free Trade, all countries, would obtain the maximum result at the minimum of effort. Meanwhile, as regards any given country; ours for example:

The general industry of the society, being always in proportion to the capital which employs it, will not thereby be diminished, but only left to find out the way in which it can be employed with the greatest advantage.

The capital 'will still remain in the country to employ an equal number of people in some other way'—and presumably, since 'the other way' is supposed to be more advantageous, an even greater number of people will be employed.

The theory is beautiful in its simplicity, and works out like a sum in simple addition. Unfortunately, it all turns, if

we are to regard the existence of nationality, on the aforementioned 'capital-tight frontier.' It scarcely needs pointing out that if the (future) capital does *not* remain in the country the demand for labour in the country will *not* be the same. The same amount, or more, of labour will be employed, truly enough; but it will not be labour in this country. It will be labour wherever the capital goes to. This is the fatal flaw in the 'national' Free Trade theory, a flaw that absolutely shatters it. When we consider that to-day we have about one fifth of our whole capital invested abroad, the folly of relying on a system based on the supposition that capital will not go abroad at all is patent.

The real truth is that *real Free Trade is incompatible with and definitely antagonistic to nationality*, that preference for living in a certain part of the world rather than in another part, because it happens to be 'my country.' Even apart from sentiment, such factors as language and climate render Free Trade an impossible ideal. Be it clearly understood that, uninfluenced, capital will go anywhere, and where it goes labour must follow, or remain behind without that capital to employ it. It ought always to be borne in mind, too, that Adam Smith imbibed many of his ideas from cosmopolitan philosophers, Quesnay in particular; and the latter said that, for the proper conception of Free Trade, it was necessary to imagine the world as one vast commercial republic. Adam Smith, however, was at any rate a patriot, and by means of his 'capital-tight frontier' theory he endeavoured, as it were, to make of our country a microcosm of the globe. He *wanted* to show that Free Trade was right, and he *wanted* to adapt it to the idea of nationality. It doubtless appealed to him strongly, because of his passion for individual liberty, non-interference by the State, *Laissez faire*. Free Trade represented all these to him, and he made a gallant but mistaken attempt to reconcile it with nationality, which he also loved. Substitute the word 'world' for 'country' in all his argument, and all he says is true. For there is only one 'capital-tight frontier'—that of the globe, and as Mr. Balfour said in his fine speech at Bingley Hall, 'We have to-day mobile capital, international capital.' Had Adam Smith written: 'Though a great number of people should, by thus restoring the freedom of trade, be thrown out of their ordinary employment, it would by no means follow that they would thereby be deprived of employment. . . . The stock which employed them in a particular manufacture before will still remain *in the world* to employ an equal number of people in some other way. The capital of *the world* remaining the same, the demand for labour will likewise be the same, though it may be exerted in different places (anywhere in the world), and for different occupations,' he would have

written the truth, and we should not to-day be a Free Trade country.

In order to grasp the Free Trade argument in its completeness, it is necessary to examine also the converse case; not that of an industry more or less ruined by Free Trade, but of one established, or kept established, by Protection. J. S. Mill, who so thoroughly assumed the Free Trade mantle of Adam Smith, affords us the best example of the orthodox treatment of such a case, and incidentally reveals how rooted had become the 'capital-tight frontier' fiction by this time, notwithstanding that, apart from Free Trade dogmas, he was perfectly familiar with foreign investment on a large scale.

He commences by restating Adam Smith's dictum that the amount of industry in a country depends on the amount of capital in it. He continues :

Yet in disregard of a fact so evident, it long continued to be believed that laws and Governments, without creating capital, could create industry. A Government would, by prohibitory laws, put a stop to the importation of some commodity; and when by this it had caused the commodity to be produced at home [good evidence, by the way, of the efficacy of Protection!] it would plume itself upon having enriched the country with a new branch of industry, and parade in statistical tables the amount of produce yielded and labour employed. Had legislators been aware that industry is limited by capital, they would have seen that, the aggregate capital of the country not having been increased, any portion of it which they, by their laws, had caused to be embarked in the newly acquired branch of industry must have been withdrawn or withheld from some other in which it gave, or would have given, employment to probably about the same quantity of labour.

Observe how absolutely the possibility of the requisite capital being 'withdrawn or withheld' from any *foreign* 'source or destination' is excluded! The 'capital-tight frontier' with a vengeance! From what British industry, I wonder, came the capital for, say, the German-owned Sanatogen works in Cornwall? Why should not the capital be 'withdrawn or withheld' from that vast sum of hundreds of millions which annually we invest abroad? Why? Because Adam Smith said that people did not invest abroad, and we have been content to believe it ever since with the facts staring us in the face! When Adam Smith wrote, his statement was more or less true, and there is an illuminative footnote in Mill to the effect that 'Foreign investments have ceased to inspire the terror that belongs to the unknown.' That was written in 1865, and how much of that 'terror' survives to-day? Yet Free Trade as a national system really depends on it, on a factor which everyone knows has utterly ceased to exist. It was that 'terror' which enabled Adam Smith to say, with truth in his day, that 'every individual endeavours to employ his capital as near home as he can.' It was a form of natural Protection on which Adam

Smith counted, and for a long time it operated. It did, when Adam Smith wrote, constitute a comparatively 'capital-tight frontier.' That it does so no longer, and has long ceased to do so, hardly needs demonstration.

There are two further comments to be made on the above extract from Mill, which is the Free Trade case against Protection. Firstly, the obvious one, that if the capital in question were 'withdrawn or withheld' (usually the latter) from a *foreign* source or destination, additional labour *would* be employed, on Mill's own showing; and, secondly, as with my quotation from Adam Smith, that Mill's argument is sound enough if we regard the entire world as 'one commercial republic,' and do not care whether labour is employed in this country rather than in some other. Of course, regarding the world as one commercial unit, as the founders of Free Trade before Adam Smith intended it should be regarded, it is manifestly true that the capital drawn to one industry by Protection must have been 'withdrawn or withheld' from another somewhere else in the world, and in such a case no one would care. Having no national considerations to worry about, the only point of importance is that the sum total of employment in the world is not adversely affected. As, however, the world happens to be composed of different nationalities, it makes all the difference to us in England, for example, that capital should be withheld, say, from Germany, and employed in England; and this, on Mill's own showing, Protection can accomplish. It can enable a Government to 'plume itself upon having enriched the country with a new branch of industry, and parade in statistical tables the amount of produce yielded and labour employed.' Protection is above all a *national* idea. The cry 'Support home industries' is *not* economically wrong, as it would be if Free Trade were right. We have not merely a sentimental but an economic justification for doing so.

This strange obsession, in defiance of the most notorious facts, of 'the capital-tight frontier,' has led all the Free Trade economists, from Adam Smith to Professor Marshall, to disregard a most important distinction. In all their writings they always refer to the capital of a country as synonymous with the capital *in* a country; with the deduction that the capital of a country—i.e. owned collectively by the inhabitants—is necessarily a criterion of the amount of employment *in* it. This, however, is by no means the case. We get the apparent paradox that, as regards employment, it may be better for a nation to be less wealthy, in order that a wider distribution of wealth may be achieved.

To illustrate this, suppose an island, inhabited by a few rich men, with their families and servants, and let us suppose they

actually import everything they require for their daily consumption. What they consume, as Mill says, supports no one but themselves; though in real life this is obscured by the fact that the goods received as interest on foreign-invested capital are not, as a rule, those actually consumed by their owners, but are exchanged for an equivalent value of other goods (and services) which the owners do consume. To return to our island: its imports will be large; its visible exports probably nil, and the employment in it trifling, consisting merely of a few domestics, gardeners, and so on. But outside that island, wherever the capital of its rich inhabitants may be, hundreds of thousands, perhaps, of men and women will be employed by that capital. In such a case, we see plainly that the mere wealth of the inhabitants is no test of the amount of labour employed *in the island*.

Now, let us suppose that some superior power decrees that some article shall no longer be imported into the island—say, wine. We will further suppose that the soil and climate of the island are not unsuited to viticulture, though, as a concession to Free Trade convictions, less so than somewhere else. The inhabitants, still desiring wine, decide to start a native industry, and some of their capital is ‘withdrawn or withheld’ from outside and devoted to this purpose. For this, labour is required, and we will imagine that the island contains a certain number of aborigines who can be utilised for vine-growing and the manufacture of wine. In short, the industry is started, and employment given to labour otherwise ‘unemployed,’ merely eking out a hand-to-mouth existence.

Now, because this home-made wine costs more than the imported, the aggregate wealth of the community is, *pro rata*, reduced. Yet some hundreds of people are employed who otherwise would not have been employed. In other words, more employment is given in our island, even though it is collectively less wealthy, because the prohibition or checking of a certain import has induced the capital-owning class to employ a part of their capital in it instead of outside it, thus forcing them to share their wealth among the inhabitants instead of among those of another country.

The considerations of vote-catching have hitherto prevented frankness on this point. No Conservative dared admit that goods made at home might, even at first, cost more. My object here is not merely to admit the possibility, but to condone and even extol it. If they do cost more, it is only the price paid by the nation for the extra employment given in the country, and probably a very trifling price for a very great gain. An extra penny a pound for sugar, say, would not grievously afflict

many people; but it might be just enough to launch the beet-sugar industry in this country, to rehabilitate agriculture in many districts, to start sugar refineries, to encourage the manufacture of sugar machinery, and to employ thousands. It is worth it. Of course, just as taxation is unremunerative beyond a certain point, so beyond a point it would not pay to insist on the home manufacture of certain articles, such as the instance taken by Adam Smith, of growing grapes for wine under glass in Scotland. With taxation, we find that up to a point the duty—e.g. on imported tobacco—may be increased and yield an increasing revenue. Beyond that point the rise in price diminishes the consumption of tobacco to such an extent that even the higher duty yields a lower gross revenue. So with protective duties. Up to a point, even if the home-made goods cost more, the extra price paid for them by the other inhabitants does not reduce employment in those industries using them enough to counter-balance the gain in employment in the new industry. For instance, owing to the rise in price of some such article, a certain industry is hampered, and reduces its staff, actually or potentially, by 100 men. But the industry making the protected goods may be employing 1000 men who, but for Protection, would not have been employed. On the other hand, the rise in price may be so great as seriously to cripple the original industry, so that it has to discharge more labour actually than the new industry can employ. Nevertheless, up to a point, a rise in price is nothing to be afraid of, but rather welcomed. Students of Professor Marshall's 'Marginal' methods of argument may find a good application for them here.²

By way of finally illustrating the inherent simplicity of this long-debated matter, once the Mercantilist mists are blown away, let me reduce the rival cases to their very simplest terms, and present them in the form of a sum in simple arithmetic.

Let us suppose that in England there are just two industries; say, a carpenter's and a blacksmith's. The carpenter's wife, we will suppose, wants a blouse of French silk. The carpenter, therefore, 'exports' a table to France, which we will value at 5 units, and 'imports' 5 units value of silk. England's position is that she has simply 'swapped' the one for the other, and the addition to her wealth is just 5 units value of silk.

The Government now decides to make silk in England. Its importation is forbidden, and an English silk industry is started.

² The argument that unless Protection does bring higher prices, it can be of no use, is quite unsound. What industries ask for first is not higher prices, but *more customers*. Given these, they can generally *lower* prices. Now, 'more customers' is just what Protection gives, by diverting potential home customers from the foreign to the home industries.

The carpenter's wife insists on another blouse; but now it has to be English silk. Again the carpenter parts with a table, but this time it goes to the English silk industry, instead of to the French one. England's position now is that *she has both silk and table*, which latter she would have lost had the silk been imported. In other words, England has gained 10 units of value instead of 5. Now, what is the orthodox and only Free Trade answer to the apparently obvious moral of this? Simply our old friend 'the capital-tight frontier'; *for there is no other*. It has to be assumed that all the available capital of the country is already locked up and fully employed in the country. On our assumption, for the sake of simplicity, that there are only two industries—a carpenter's and a blacksmith's—and no more capital available, clearly, if it is wished to establish a new industry, this can only be done by 'withdrawing or withholding,' as Mill puts it, capital from one of these two; in this case, the blacksmith's. Consequently, by establishing a silk industry, we merely 'rob Peter to pay Paul.' By what the country gains in silk it loses in horseshoes. Including the blacksmith's production in our account, the national gain in either case would be as follows:

Under Free Trade.

5 units of French silk (but loss of a table)
5 units of horseshoes

—
Total 10 units.

Under Protection (the Free Trade view of it, that is).

5 units of English silk (but no horseshoes)
5 units of table

—
Total 10 units.

Even this does not do the Free Trade case, such as it is, full justice; for we have to assume that, owing to 'natural' or other advantages, silk can be manufactured more economically, more cheaply, in France than in England: that therefore the capital withdrawn or withheld from the blacksmith's industry produces a smaller return in English silk than it would have done in horseshoes. Thus the sum would stand:

Under Protection (the Free Trade view).

4 (say) units of English silk (in place of 5 units of horseshoes)
5 units of table

—
Total 9 units.

i.e. actually a comparative loss of 1 unit to the country, and all that that involves in the way of employment, etc., as compared to the state of affairs under Free Trade.

This last is the absolute essence of the true Free Trade contention, and is easily answered. Let us grant, for the moment, that English silk, at first at any rate, cannot be produced as cheaply as French silk; but assume also that it is not necessary to disestablish and disendow our blacksmith in order to start an English silk industry: that the capital is, in fact, 'withdrawn or withheld' from a *foreign* 'source or destination'; let us assume that the frontier is not 'capital-tight,' and that this new capital is *additional* to that already in the country.

How would the sum stand then? We should get:

Under Protection.

5 units of table
5 units of horseshoes
4 units of English silk

Total 14 units.

i.e. a gain over the Free Trade position of at any rate 4 units; which, translated, means the *addition* of so much industry and employment as is required for the manufacture of goods at home which previously were imported. But even the above desirable result makes a concession: that English silk *cannot* be made as cheaply as French silk. That concession, however, as regards imported manufactures in general, I am by no means prepared to make. It is common knowledge that in the bulk of manufacturing industries, as between the chief manufacturing countries of the world, there is no insuperable 'natural' advantage. Adam Smith's example of growing grapes under glass in Scotland is not analogous. Cheapness is, in most manufactures, simply a matter of a large enough production and a good enough organisation³: for example, the Ford Motor Company, of America. Its raw materials are probably no cheaper than ours; the cost of its labour is certainly far higher. But it has an output of about 900 cars a day, and an organisation that is unequalled, and it can undersell any car of the same quality throughout the world. Thus, assuming that our requisite capital is *additional* to that already within the country, and not simply withheld from another home investment, there is no reason, in the great majority of cases, why we should not, by making the goods ourselves, realise the full 15 units of value; or even more, if it ultimately proves, as it may, that we can manufacture at a lower price than we previously paid for the imported commodity?

And why should we not assume this? There is every reason, on the contrary, why we should. Indeed, it appears to me almost axiomatic that the capital required to establish or extend a protected industry in this country would be withheld from a foreign

³ See note on page 711.

and not from a home destination. For this reason: there are only two places where capital can be invested—at home or abroad; inside the country or outside it. Now, things pursuing the normal course of events under Free Trade, as at present, a certain amount of capital is invested at home year by year, which bears a fairly fixed ratio to the amount of industry in the country. The rest perforce goes abroad; to how large an extent is not always realised. The last figures I have available (from *The Economist*) are for the year 1909, when for 18,000,000*l.* invested at home, 163,000,000*l.* went abroad, in the proportion of 74,000,000*l.* to our Colonies, and 89,000,000*l.* to foreign countries. Now, supposing that the necessity or opportunity arises to manufacture at home certain goods previously imported: such a necessity as is brought about by the checking of some import by means of Protection, or its stoppage, by reason of the present War. From what destination is the capital withheld? Surely from a foreign one. For an *additional* demand for capital is made. In the ordinary course of events, this country could only, and would only, absorb a certain amount of capital, and the rest would go abroad. But here is a fresh demand. The normal demands would be met as before, but the new one would be satisfied by capital which, for want of another outlet, would otherwise have had to go abroad from sheer force of circumstances, from sheer inability to find a sufficiently attractive opening at home. That appears to me the obvious deduction to draw. Even supposing, however, that *some* of the fresh capital required would, in any case, have found a home investment; and there is no very clear reason why, under Free Trade, the normal demand should be affected one way or the other; even supposing this, it is surely reasonable, with the vast annual amount of our foreign investments, and the equally vast possibilities of foreign-owned capital being attracted to this country, to suppose that *some*, a fairly large proportion, even if not all, of the fresh capital should be 'withdrawn or withheld' from beyond that 'capital-tight frontier' on which Adam Smith based his case. And, if it is, it *does* follow, *pro rata*, that, for every penny of it, more labour is employed than otherwise would have been. As Mill puts it, 'Every increase of capital gives, or is capable of giving, additional employment to labour; and this without assignable limit.' Let us make a bid for this additional employment. Granted nationality on the one hand, and the international and cosmopolitan nature of capital on the other, there is no sound economic reason why we should not do so. Our doing so will not, as some 'Tariff Reformers' have appeared to believe, introduce either the millennium, or even, indefinitely, 'work for all,' since population always tends to increase up to

the limits of what capital can support. It will, however, raise the level of employment higher than it would be under unaided Nature and Free Trade ; just as irrigation, while unable to produce an unlimited amount of crops, does bring, so to speak, abnormal fertility to otherwise barren acres.

My last point is that of revenue, which is one we are likely to have to consider seriously, whatever our Free Trade convictions may be. It has been customary among Free Trade politicians to cry down the revenue-producing powers of a tariff, from obvious political motives. There is, for example, their famous dilemma, that Protection and a revenue from a tariff are irreconcilable one with another. This, of course, is not the case, since a wise Protectionist tariff does not aim at the total exclusion of foreign goods ; in order to preserve a certain amount of healthy competition. Thus the goods which are kept out afford Protection, while those that come in afford revenue. As to whether 'the foreigner pays the duty,' that deeply pondered-over but essentially trivial election cry, everyone knows that sometimes, by being able and content to accept lower profits, he does pay the duty, and sometimes he does not. It depends on the economic position of the article in question. These political catch-words, however, need not detain us. Nobody will deny that Protection affords protection, and I trust I have shown that, given nationality, this is economically justifiable ; and, after all, the giving of Protection to home industries is the main object. But, as regards revenue from a tariff, which is a subsidiary, though highly important object, I cannot better describe the revenue-producing powers of a tariff than in the words of that eminent Free Trade economist, J. R. McCulloch, which should be a sufficient answer to those who deny the efficacy of a tariff to produce revenue on one or other of the above grounds, or because, as they say, the cost of collection would swallow up the greater part of the revenue. Writing of facts which had come under his own close observation, McCulloch says :

The net Customs revenue derived from duties on imports amounted in 1845 to no less than 21,706,197*l.*, and notwithstanding the exorbitant duties on tea, tobacco, and a few other articles (which would be more productive if reduced by half), it would be easy to show that no equal amount of revenue was ever raised in any country or period of time with so little inconvenience, and that there are no grounds for believing it could be so advantageously collected in any other way.

If we compare the volume of imports (roughly one sixth) in 1845 with that of to-day, we shall better be able to appreciate the enormous revenue which this country might derive from a Protectionist tariff, apart altogether from the benefits conferred by Protection itself, which, by increasing the wealth in the country, would provide even further sources of revenue.

Since the above was written, events have compelled our Free Trade Government to abandon in practice many positions which in theory they are still pledged to hold. They will probably be compelled to abandon others, even more vital to the Free Trade cause. For example, we have it on the authority of the Bradford Dyers' Association, and of practically every authority concerned, that the enormously valuable aniline dye industry, hitherto chiefly a German property, cannot be started in this country on a sound financial basis without a Government guarantee of Protection of some sort after the War is over; the reason being that capitalists, whose co-operation is necessary, will not 'divert' their capitals to a sufficiently large extent in this direction without this guarantee. And no one can fairly blame them. Investing money from purely altruistic motives is apt to be an expensive hobby.

The same state of affairs almost certainly exists with regard to the sugar-beet industry, a magnificent agricultural and industrial opportunity of which we have not yet seen fit to avail ourselves; thereby losing a whole year's start, at any rate; since crops happen to grow at a certain period of the year.

As regards the aniline dye industry, an alternative method of Protection has been proposed, and has found favour with such Free Traders as Lord Cromer (letter to *The Times*, January 23, 1915)—namely, the system of subsidies, or bounties. Lord Cromer considers it the lesser evil. While agreeing that it would probably be less of a shock to Free Trade sensibilities, I personally consider it a far more crude, and far less economic, method of applying Protection. It is a process of 'robbing Peter to pay Paul,' pure and simple. This is not necessarily bad, assuming Paul to be a deserving case; but it is not the best way of relieving Paul. However that may be, the fact remains that even such eminent Free Traders as Lord Cromer (and the Bradford Dyers' Association probably includes a few also) are all agreed that to 'capture'—*and keep*—this industry, some form of Protection is imperative. Whether the Government will promise it or not still remains to be seen. It seems a choice between doing so and failing to acquire the industry. The same, I think, is true of sugar beet, and probably of most of the other industries which we desire to capture and to keep; or even merely to keep, in some cases.

Another noteworthy departure from the principles of *Laissez-faire*—which is the psychologic basis of Free Trade—is the control recently assumed by the Government over future issues of capital. Especially is it noteworthy in the distinction drawn between home (or British) and foreign investments. This action of the Government is about as clear a recognition as we are likely

to get from Free Traders that, in contradistinction to the views of Adam Smith, a Government *can*, with benefit to the nation, 'direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals,' and that, in the opinion of our present Free Trade Government, this action is *not* 'folly and presumption,' as Adam Smith described it.

Without attempting to catalogue the Government's lapses from Free Trade economic grace, it is only right to put to ourselves this question. If, now that war has enlarged facts so that even the most purblind pedant amongst us has to see them, we find that every vital principle demanded by a certain theory has to be jettisoned in practice, and the principles of the opposite theory substituted, are we not justified in the deduction that the practice and the opposite theory are right, and the old theory wrong? It is vain for Free Traders to plead that these lapses are only emergencies of the War. War has altered the degree of these matters, but not their basic principles. An aniline dye industry will not cease to be a valuable national acquisition after the War is over; and it would have been valuable before the War. Doubtless it would be particularly valuable now, because our dyers are actually deprived of certain products which their industry requires. But the supplying of these products is, nationally, the least part of the matter. The really important thing is the extra employment opened up for capital, and therefore for labour, in this country, both directly and indirectly. Such a process is like a transfusion of life blood, which extends its vivifying effects throughout the whole corporate body.

DOUGLAS GRAHAM.

SEA FREIGHTS AND THE COST OF FOOD

THE fluctuation in the rate of freights upon foodstuffs, general merchandise, and raw materials carried from oversea is always of first importance to the industrial population of Great Britain, but during the present critical period through which we are passing the interests of the whole population are more directly affected, and the matter is therefore one of national concern.

A strong agitation has been raised in favour of Government intervention with the view to cheapen the cost of sea freight upon all cargoes carried in British vessels destined to the United Kingdom. Meanwhile the recent important debates in the House of Commons, which brought forward many points of great interest, have done much to enlighten the general public upon this very difficult and complicated question, and the decision of the Government not to take any of those drastic measures that have been persistently urged has met with general approval.

That there would be a general advance in the price of foodstuffs during the period of the War was natural and expected. We are at war with a first-class naval Power, but although there have been substantial increases in prices, the doleful predictions of those who upon every conceivable occasion urged that, should Great Britain be involved in hostilities with a great naval Power, bread would soar to famine prices, and our population be reduced to a state bordering upon starvation, have happily been falsified. Upon the outbreak of war, and as an immediate consequence, international commerce was greatly hampered, and, in fact, most seriously restricted by financial difficulties. These disturbances in the world's commercial relations grievously affected the ramifications of our great shipping industry. In the course of time, however, confidence was re-established and international financial operations again became possible.

When the War broke out shipowners were among the first to feel the effects of the alarming situation with which we were confronted. Our merchant ships were scattered in all parts of the world; enemy cruisers were to be met with on every sea, and the danger of capture and destruction was imminent and great, as was quickly proved by the number of British vessels that were

overtaken and sunk by the *Emden* and other German cruisers. Immediately preceding the declaration of war the freight markets were in a state of severe depression, and signs were not wanting that the shipping industry was on the eve of a long period of unremunerative employment. Added to the unprofitable freights a serious strike had broken out in the ranks of sea-going engineers, and many loaded ships were hung up for a considerable period in the home ports owing to the shipowners being unable to concede the demands of the Engineers' Union for a higher scale of wage. Some of the first vessels offered to and accepted by the Admiralty for transporting coal, etc., to the British Fleets were actually on passage home from the Mediterranean in ballast, being unable to secure homeward freights from the Black Sea, etc., and in many cases these vessels were being brought home to lay up pending a revival of the freight markets. The opinion was general in shipping circles that the industry was in danger of suffering a like period of depression to that experienced after the Boer War—a depression that lasted from 1902 to 1910. During these years many of our steamship companies were in serious financial straits. So low were freights that no adequate return was available upon the large amount of capital invested in the industry, approximately 150,000,000*l.* being sunk in tramp steamships alone. Owners were not only unable to declare dividends but seldom were in a position to make any provision for the rapid depreciation of their ships. This depression came to an end in 1910, and was followed by a general revival in freights, which enabled shipowners to augment their fleets by the purchase of new ships, and when the present War broke out the newly acquired tonnage was of incalculable value in providing the Admiralty with ships of recent construction, possessing the latest and most approved facilities for convenient and rapid loading and discharging, and in every way competent to perform the indispensable services of transports for the Royal Navy.

Our shipowners have always prided themselves upon the fact that by their own unaided efforts they have built up our mercantile fleets. They have received little Government assistance; on the contrary, the general complaint is that the industry has been considerably hampered by excessive legislation. It must be remembered, however, that shipping is one of the most dangerous of our national industries, and that shipping legislation has been mainly exercised with the view of minimising the risks and improving the conditions of labour of those employed in the industry.

It may not be generally understood that as a rule each ship is a distinct limited liability company. A steamship manager who controls a large fleet of vessels is really running a number of

separate and distinct companies, for whose management he is responsible. Thus while the shareholders in one company may secure a good return upon the invested capital owing to successful voyages, other ships under the same management, owing to exigencies of freight markets, may be sailing at a loss.

The attacks which have been made upon shipowners have naturally been deeply resented in shipping circles. To blame shipowners for forcing up freights is unreasonable and absurd. Freights are ruled by supply and demand. If the demand for ships from any part of the world is greater than the available free tonnage, then freights will advance until the supply is adjusted to the demand. It may be that the Argentine is short of tonnage and is paying a higher proportion of freight than that ruling from India, Australia, Canada, etc., but the price of grain will be adjusted by imports from other parts of the world, and while some shipowners will benefit by the increased freight from the Argentine, others may be carrying cargoes home from other parts of the world without profit.

Although some ships have greatly benefited by the present high freights, many are still locked up in the ports of the Baltic, Azof, and Black Seas, and must remain idle until the end of the War or until the fleets of the Allied Powers are able to relieve them.

It should be clearly understood that the ships of our mercantile marine, with the exception of those engaged in some important general and regular lines, are free from any rings, conferences, combinations, etc., nor have any extraneous means been adopted to raise freights since the outbreak of war. The bulk of the cargoes from distant grain ports are carried by tramp steamers. These vessels are free to engage in employment from any part of the world, and each voyage is a separate venture, the success or failure of which depends entirely upon a variety of circumstances. A shipowner sends his ships where he expects the best combination of outward and homeward employment, and this is the secret of successful steamship management, but his calculations are often upset by circumstances over which there is no control.

The present high standard of freights cannot fail to return handsome profits to the shareholders who have capital invested in ships that are free to take full advantage of the present position, but the profits earned under the existing abnormal conditions are nothing approaching what they would be were such freights obtainable under anything like normal conditions. The high level of freights now general is largely the result of a number of disabilities, many of which were quite unforeseen, and which have added enormously to the cost of navigation; in fact, the diffi-

culties which have confronted shipowners since the outbreak of war have been of a character little understood by those not closely in touch with the industry.

In the early days of August last our ships were trading under policies of insurance covering them only against the ordinary perils of the sea. For many years shipowners have taken energetic steps to persuade the Government to adopt a scheme of State insurance against King's enemy risks, and under such a scheme shipowners would have been contributors. Had this precautionary measure been adopted, the State would have held in reserve large accumulated funds to meet contingent losses. However, the reasonable proposals of shipowners did not receive Government favour, and they worked out a scheme themselves through the medium of their Protecting and Indemnity Associations for mutually sharing the losses not covered under the ordinary policies of insurance. Upon the outbreak of war it was fortunately discovered that the Imperial Defence Committee had foreseen the difficulties which would follow hostilities, and there was already in existence a scheme prepared by that Committee, under which the State agreed to combine with the shipowners and to share the risks provided for through the Protecting and Indemnity Associations. Under this scheme the State undertakes 80 per cent. of the risk in return for 80 per cent. of the premiums paid by shipowners to their Associations for this purpose, thus leaving 20 per cent. to be borne by the shipowners themselves.

The Liverpool Steamship Owners' Association estimates that the total value of ships employed since the outbreak of war (excluding those taken as Government transports, upon which the State assumes all risks) has been about 120,000,000*l.*, and it is probable that the war insurance has cost shipowners at least 3 per cent. on the ships valued at this figure.

A heavy charge has therefore fallen unexpectedly upon the shipping community, which has materially added to the working costs. As an instance, in the case of one firm managing a fleet of eighteen large tramp steamers, already the sum of 14,000*l.* has been paid in premiums to cover King's enemy risks since the outbreak of war. This is, of course, over and above the premiums payable to cover ordinary perils of the sea.

The scarcity of crews to man the ships has also proved a problem of more than ordinary difficulty. The withdrawal of the men of the Royal Naval Reserve for service in the ships of the British Fleet, and also a proportion of the 30,000 alien sailors who found constant employment in our merchant ships, has not only caused a serious shortage but has also raised the standard rate of wages from 5*l.* 10*s.* per month current in July last to

7l. 10s. per month, which is the wage now demanded and paid by tramp steamers.

Some 1500 merchant vessels have been requisitioned to comply with the demands of the Admiralty, representing about 20 per cent. of our total mercantile marine and about 10 per cent. of the world's tonnage. These ships are the largest, finest, and most modern of our merchant vessels, and have the highest speed and best equipment for rapid loading and discharging.

The withdrawal of this great fleet of cargo steamers from the world's trade was bound to have an immediate effect upon the freight markets. So serious a reduction in the competition for the transport of cargoes to and from all parts of the world would in any circumstances have caused a great rise in freights, but under the prevailing sensitive conditions the advance was certain to be of an exceptional character, and although freights appear to have reached the top, it is doubtful if there will be any appreciable fall unless circumstances arise to facilitate despatch in loading and discharging both in United Kingdom ports and abroad, for ships are quite unable to perform the same amount of service under the existing abnormal conditions as they are capable of rendering in normal times.

There has, of course, been a serious and continual shrinkage of available tonnage owing to the number of merchant vessels sunk by enemy cruisers, submarines, and mines, and the usual perils of the seas. No less than 466,000 tons of British shipping have been withdrawn from British registers owing to these causes, besides the British vessels interned in enemy ports and those that are unable to leave the Baltic and Black Seas. Considerable time will be necessary to replace this shortage, owing to the delay in the shipbuilding yards due to the depletion in the ranks of skilled labour and the large amount of Government work now under construction in private shipbuilding yards and engineering shops. Where Government work is under way, orders for private account have to be set aside. The setting back of the dates of delivery of new tonnage has caused a great demand for second-hand ships, which are now changing hands at most extravagant and previously unheard-of prices.

Probably the greatest difficulty which shipowners have to face, and which has undoubtedly been one of the main factors in influencing the freight market, is the great congestion upon railways, on quays, and in warehouses. The delay in loading and discharging cargoes has been most pronounced, and has been the source of much irritation and loss to all connected with the import and export trade, besides prolonging the length of voyages when ships are urgently required.

These delays are naturally not confined to the ports of our own country, but are met with in French and Italian ports and in

all countries which are directly or indirectly affected by the War. In the case of the North French ports, voyages have in some cases taken four or five times as long as under normal conditions.

These delays have made it impossible to fix the position of steamers, upsetting calculations as to dates of loading and sailing. Docks and harbours are congested with cargo lying waiting for steamers which are hopelessly behind their expected loading dates, and general confusion has resulted as regards the shipment and delivery of merchandise. On the 29th of January the London docks were so congested that forty vessels were lying at Gravesend waiting for discharging berths. These delays are mainly due to the movements of troop trains, the carriage of immense quantities of munitions of war, the withdrawal of large bodies of men from their regular employment through enlistment, gaps thus caused being inadequately filled by men of inferior quality and unskilled in handling heavy traffic. According to the *Railway Gazette* over 70,000 of the most active employees have been withdrawn from the railway service, many of whom were in operating departments and whose places cannot be readily filled. Shortage of barges, rolling stock, carts, and horses are all contributory causes.

The unfair and exaggerated charges levelled against ship-owners as being wholly responsible for the advance in the price of foodstuffs were the subject of debate in the House of Commons on the 12th of February. These accusations, made with much acrimony and persistency, did not meet with the approval of the Prime Minister, for during the course of his speech there is no trace of reflection upon the shipping interest. In dealing with the difficulties of transport and the rise in freights, the Prime Minister said :

In the case of wheat, it has no doubt been a factor of considerable importance, but by no means the main factor, and I am not sure that an exaggerated value has not been attributed to it in some quarters. Let me take one or two illustrations. Experts in these matters are accustomed to take what is called No. 1 Manitoba wheat as the standard. The price in Liverpool of that quality rose between July 1914, just before the war, and January of the present year from 36s. 3d. to 57s. 11d. a quarter—in round figures, by 22s. Of that 22s. no less than 18s. 6d. is to be attributed to the increased price in New York, and only 3s. 6d. to the increased freight. If you take Argentine wheat, there undoubtedly the rise in freights has been a more substantial factor. But the Argentine crop, for reasons to which I have already referred, has not come forward, and it is the American crop which dominated the market during the whole of this time. I am not at all sure, if the Argentine crop had been forthcoming at an earlier date, whether the Argentine grower would not have got quite as much as the shipowner of the increased price to the British public. Though I do not in the least minimise the importance of the question of freights, it is desirable that we should realise that it has not been the determining factor, but only a contributory cause. The deter-

mining factor in the market has been the price in the Chicago and New York markets. These high prices in America may be, and I suspect are, due—to a large extent beyond the legitimate causes, curtailed supply and increased demand—to speculation. The market there is in a very sensitive—what I believe they call a nervous and jumpy—condition.

I do not know that there are any means by which the Governments of the world can control the speculations of the market. As a rule, speculation provides its own remedy. At any rate, after next June, when, so far as we can anticipate, there is no great likelihood of any substantial shortage in the wheat supplies of the world, the era of feverish speculation will come to an end.

American speculation in wheat is no new feature, and has been carried on to an enormous extent since the outbreak of war. More favourable conditions for gambling in wheat could hardly have been found, with urgent demands for purchase from European Governments, added to the buying for private account, and it is therefore small wonder that prices in Chicago and New York advanced by leaps and bounds.

It was not in the nature of things to expect otherwise. Our country is so dependent upon imported foodstuffs that during a national crisis of such magnitude we are at the mercy of grain-exporting countries, and have reason to congratulate ourselves that wheat has not risen beyond the present inflated values.

As the Prime Minister has so recently told the nation, he attributes the rise of 22s. per quarter in the price of wheat in Liverpool between July 1914 and January of this year, as to 18s. 6d. to the increased price in New York, and only 3s. 6d. to increased freight. The Government are in possession of all available information and statistics, so that this statement may be taken as substantially correct, and it is, in fact, also borne out by independent investigations.

Those who urge the Government to fix the maximum price for food should remember that we depend upon imported food and cannot, therefore, control prices. Germany can fix maximum prices, because that country only imports to a limited extent.

If the advice of those who urged the provision of national granaries, as a guarantee against high prices during war times, had been listened to, matters would have been different.

It is most important to bear in mind that the rise in freights did not follow closely upon the declaration of war, owing to the difficulties in international finance, and the general uncertainty. As a matter of fact, freights continued at a low level for some considerable period, therefore high prices have been charged on cargoes of foodstuffs which were imported at normal rates of freight. The cargoes of grain upon which inflated freight rates have been paid are only now arriving in this country.

The Labour Party is urging the Government to commandeer and work the whole of the fleets of British merchant ships at maximum rates of freight. The mere suggestion is fantastic. Departmental control of 20,000,000 gross tons of shipping, representing nearly 50 per cent. of the world's tonnage, would in any circumstances entail stupendous operations. Furthermore, the difficulties of fixing maximum rates of freight become insurmountable when we remember that vessels are under commitments for long periods ahead, besides which British shipowners, controlling as they do so large a proportion of the world's tonnage, do not confine their operations to the carriage of cargoes to and from the United Kingdom and our colonies, but undertake a vast business in transporting merchandise between foreign nations. At present many of our ships are under charter for the conveyance of grain from America, to Italy, Spain, Greece, etc., owing to shortage of stocks in those countries, and the inability to purchase from South Russia owing to the closing of the Dardanelles.

In order to fix maximum rates of freight, it would also be necessary to fix maximum rates of wages for the officers and men who man the ships, maximum prices of provisions, coal, etc.

We must not expect normal, or anything approaching normal, freights as long as the War continues. The markets are in a very sensitive condition and are subject to violent fluctuation. Merchants are eager to secure ships to transport merchandise to markets which are in urgent need of their goods and for which high prices are offered. Neutral countries are paying these high prices, and also high freight charges, therefore the carriage of foodstuffs to this country has to compete with neutral countries for its tonnage requirements.

The total tonnage of the mercantile steam fleets of the world is 45,403,877 gross tons, out of which Great Britain and her colonies possess 20,523,706 tons, or 45 per cent.

It is a splendid testimony to the enterprise of our shipowners when we remember that so small a proportion as 20 per cent. of our mercantile marine suffices for carrying on the whole of the transport services required by the Admiralty, and that we have been able to transport to the Continent the largest army which Great Britain has ever sent across the seas.

When the tonnage voluntarily offered has been insufficient for the nation's requirements the Admiralty has had recourse to the requisitioning of ships. While this action has secured the necessary amount of tonnage, it has led to undue hardships owing to the mode of selection leading to unequal demands upon individual owners. In many instances the greater proportion, and in some cases the entire fleet, under a particular management is doing

Government service, at a reduced rate of remuneration out of all proportion to that which is being earned by ships free to take full advantage of the current market rates offering for outside business.

Shipowners have no wish to shirk their full share of this important service, but they rightly contend that there should be a distribution of responsibility so that the burden may fall equitably upon the whole shipping community. The Government have under their control 1500 vessels, representing one fifth of the whole of Great Britain's mercantile fleet, and there are sure to be difficulties in the way of effective management. These vessels are largely being employed as colliers, conveying coal to all parts of the world to recoal ships of war.

Shipowners are loud in their complaints as to the manner in which these ships are kept lying idle in port, often with small quantities of coal cargo on board, but we must remember that it is of supreme importance that an available and ample supply of coals may be instantly found to replenish the depleted bunkers of ships of our Navy, and the extra cost of transport is of no consequence compared with the need of meeting every emergency and having coal at the right place at the right moment.

The continual and unavoidable policy of commandeering ships for the Admiralty created a panic in the minds of merchants, who day after day saw the available supply of tonnage gradually dwindling as it was absorbed for Government purposes, and this has naturally led to a scramble for ships, with exporters bidding against each other for tonnage. This, of course, caused a rise in freight on outward cargoes, the effects of which in due course spread to all quarters of the world.

It must not be assumed from the remarks of the First Lord of the Admiralty that, because 'on the average during the last three months 8000 British vessels have been continuously at sea,' this fleet has been sailing under anything approaching favourable conditions. Greater care has had to be exercised in navigation, necessitating deviation from recognised courses to avoid capture, mines, and submarines, thus prolonging the length of the voyage. On our own coasts many lights have been extinguished, and during the long winter nights navigation for this reason has been seriously impeded.

Besides the withdrawal from general trading of the immense amount of tonnage necessary to fulfil the requirements of the British Admiralty, and British shipping withdrawn from trading from other causes, there has been a further diminution of available tonnage in consequence of the complete cessation of trading of the merchant fleets of Germany and Austria-Hungary, these fleets alone representing 14 per cent. of the merchant tonnage of the world.

The French and Russian Governments, and to a lesser degree Italy and Spain, have under charter a large amount of British shipping.

There has been a great outcry against the continued advance in the price of coal, due in a great measure to the patriotism of the miners, who have joined the Colours in thousands and have thus been the means of reducing outputs to an alarming extent. Shipowners suffer their full share of the increased cost of this precious commodity, not only when taking in supplies at the home ports on the commencement of a voyage but also at coaling depots abroad. The following list of current prices, compared with ante-war figures, at the principal foreign coaling depots will illustrate the enormous increase in the price which shipowners have to pay for Welsh coal since the outbreak of war :

	Prices in July 1914			Current Prices	
	s.	d.		s.	d.
Gibraltar	24	6	per ton	50	0
Malta	24	6	"	50	0
Marseilles	28	6	"	50	0
Algiers	23	6	"	47	6
Port Said	29	0	"	54	6
Suez	39	0	"	64	0
Buenos Aires	33	6	"	54	6
St. Vincent (Cape Verde)	33	6	"	54	6
Las Palmas	30	0	"	52	0

These are very serious advances and, considering the large quantities of coal consumed upon a round voyage, must materially add to the working costs and reduce the margin of profit.

Lately the Government has put into service many of the interned enemy steamers. They are largely employed in carrying coal from the East Coast ports to London, but they are in full competition with British and neutral tonnage and command the same rates of freight. The entry of this new tonnage to compete in the freight market has not had any appreciable effect, nor has it eased the price of coal to the London consumer.

When a great demand arises for ships to carry cargoes from any particular part of the world, as has been the case recently with America and the Argentine, the great distances which separate the different grain-loading ports are responsible for the unequal distribution of tonnage. As shipowners often arrange voyages months ahead to place their tonnage in position to meet demands from the grain ports, should there be a failure of crops, as has been the case in Australia, or a poor export from India, combined with the dislocation of the world's trade through the upset in finances which followed the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, considerable delay must inevitably occur before ships can be worked into position to meet the extra demands from any other grain centre. The following table of distances between the chief

grain-distributing ports, colonial and foreign, and the Port of London will illustrate the point :

San Francisco	13,700 miles
New Zealand (Wellington)	11,900 "
Australia (Sydney)	11,500 "
India (Bombay)	6000 "
" (Calcutta)	7900 "
Argentine (Buenos Aires)	6300 "
United States (New York)	3245 "

The President of the Board of Trade has already been supplied with the views of representative shipowners upon the cause of the unprecedented rise in freights, and has appointed an advisory committee consisting of representatives of the principal railways and docks in the kingdom to consider and advise upon the whole question of congestion in the docks. The task before the committee is one of extreme difficulty.

British shipping is the envy of the world. The enterprise of our shipowners is a national asset that calls for admiration. During the long period of depression which the industry experienced at the beginning of this century, freights remained at so low a level that cargoes of grain were imported into this country from distant parts of the world at rates of freight which offered no adequate return upon the invested capital ; but, notwithstanding this, our fleets were kept up to date and new tonnage put into the water. Everything was done to run ships on the most economical lines, and the industries of the nation greatly benefited by the cheapness of freight. When trade expanded and new sources of employment opened out, our ships were capable and ready to fulfil the requirements. As the demand for larger ships was felt they were provided, and now that the call has been made for ships to undertake vital national services the ships are ready and are at the disposal of the country.

The onerous and dangerous duties which have fallen upon the mercantile marine are being efficiently discharged. The First Lord of the Admiralty in his speech upon the naval situation told the country that ' the Admiralty was deeply indebted to the ship-owning world for all the aid and co-operation which they had received, and regarded the closest union and goodwill between the Admiralty and the mercantile marine as indispensable at the present time.' Such a testimony coming from so high a quarter should go far to silence criticism.

W. H. RENWICK.

Cardiff.

The Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY cannot undertake to return unaccepted MSS.

THE
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AND AFTER



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THE NEUTRAL MERCHANT:

THREE AMERICAN NOTES AND THE ANSWERS

THE intellectual barometer stands at 'Hazy' on the subject of neutrality, even in this country. In Germany it has ceased to register anything which even pretends to be intelligent. In the United States there are what might aptly be called cyclonic and anti-cyclonic disturbances. If my view as to English knowledge of the subject be questioned, I would ask my readers how often they have of late met in the newspapers the phrase 'Duties of Neutrals,' and what answer they have found to the inevitable query, 'Which be they?' Within the last few weeks I read a contribution to *The Times* from 'A Legal Correspondent,' in which these duties were referred to in most bewildering fashion. He said that there existed special bonds between this country and the United States; that both have stringent Foreign Enlistment Acts; that both agree to what are known as the 'Three Rules' of the Washington Treaty as to the duties of neutrals, and that both had promised to bring these Rules to the notice of other States. This statement was painfully misleading; the 'Three Rules' were agreed to as the basis on which the Alabama arbitration was to be decided, and related solely to the subject

known as 'Foreign Enlistment.' But if by 'Duties of Neutrals' is meant, as I presume to be the case, the duties of neutral Governments, they can be summarised in one great negative—to do nothing, except when they are called on to defend their neutrality against action taken by either of the belligerents, in the cases provided for by the Hague Convention of 1907 relating to neutrality. So far-reaching is this universal negative that it includes non-interference with their traders in their dealings with belligerents.¹ If, however, the term refers to duties of neutral traders, then it is inapt and misleadingly inaccurate; for the existence of any such general duty as to cease trading, for which the Germans are so strenuously contending, is wholly imaginary.

Fifty years ago another continent was riven with war, and there was much talk of what a neutral might do, and might not do; and there appeared in *The Times* a series of letters signed 'Historicus,' in which, among other things, the elementary principles of neutrality were very strenuously and very lucidly set forth. Very strenuously, for there was a certain M. Hautefeuille who had filled the world—like the Dernburgs of to-day—with much unsound doctrine. Now unsound doctrine was a thing which stirred Mr. Vernon Harcourt to the depths of his soul, and those only who have heard him know what waves of wrath surged up in his brain. He had the art of transferring to paper the billowy language he was wont to use; and as you read you hear the rotund sentences rolling onwards to swamp the frail bark of his adversary. But he had another art: of clear thinking and lucid exposition. In the series of Whewell Lectures which I attended at Cambridge in the year of grace—, of which I still preserve my notes, he seemed to make plain the whole mystery of Public International Law. New times have produced new teachers of the old heresies; and it is good to turn once more to the pages of the 'Letters of Historicus,' for again the neutral nations are invited to 'upset the whole fabric of international law which the reason of jurists has designed and the usage of nations has built up.' To adapt his references² to Burke and Canning to himself, 'I would that we had yet amongst us his multitudinous eloquence and his poignant wit to do justice upon the presumptuous efforts' of the German Foreign Office. The world, indeed, seems still to need his teaching. From what one hears in the market-place I gather that there is a vague feeling in the air that our case is not *quite* so good as we should like it to be; that there is a mysterious crevice in our armour-joints through which, if not the German, at least Uncle Sam has pricked us. There is a nebulous 'something'

¹ This is expressly declared by article 7 of the Hague Convention of 1907 relating to neutrality.

² *Letters of Historicus*, p. 121.

about neutrality, especially about 'neutral duties,' which seems to preclude accurate thinking; and even the 'Legal Correspondent' does not always pierce the haze. So the student, in memory of an hour spent after lecture in his master's rooms in Neville's Court, when kindly patient, and so lucidly, he expounded to him the meaning of a difficult decision, will endeavour to weave into a continuous whole the threads of the doctrine which he taught. It is not that people don't know; only that they forget.

The neutral trader is the centre round which the principal doctrines of international law dealing with neutrality have gathered. It seems strange at first that in time of war the commercial rights of a mere money-making civilian should invariably form the subject of endless discussions; but this civilian really holds a very important position in the waging of war; it could not go on without him. Each belligerent has need of him, and it is essential to each to prevent the other from satisfying that need. To block the enemy's communications with the neutral trader is one of the surest ways of ending the War. To this end many ingenious things have been devised, and as many equally ingenious to counteract them; and in this the trader's fertile brain has materially assisted. The problem is a complex one, for each belligerent as a buyer must strive to keep him in a good humour, but as a fighter must do all he can to thwart him. As for the neutral trader himself, he is calmly indifferent to the merits of the fight; nothing pleases him so much as to be 'Jack of Both Sides.' He will take all he can get from one side and cry out for more from the other. When the War is over we may muse philosophically on some aspects of the protest which the United States Government has addressed to Great Britain on behalf of its traders; for the present, with all its serious issues hanging in the balance, the American Notes require careful study, for they themselves raise an issue as serious as any which the War has raised—whether Great Britain has been true to the principles she has so often preached, or whether the German accusation, or the American suggestion, that she has violated them can be substantiated; whether, when all is over, we shall be able to say proudly that it has been War with Honour.

Two Notes have been addressed to Great Britain, and it will be convenient to refer first to the second Note, which deals with the use by our merchantmen of neutral flags. The neutral trader is directly concerned with this custom of the sea, for he may have cargo on board, and if this means of deceiving the enemy's warships is declared to be illegal he runs the chance of its being sent to the bottom.

The facts which gave rise to the Note are of the simplest. On the 30th of January two German submarines appeared off Liverpool, and, giving the crews ten minutes to take to the boats, torpedoed and sank some British merchant vessels. On the 6th of February the *Lusitania*, coming up the Irish Channel at the end of her voyage from New York, hoisted the Stars and Stripes and came safely to harbour. To these simple facts may be added, according to the German version, that the Admiralty advised the master by wireless to hoist the American flag; or had issued a secret order to merchant ships in general to hoist a neutral flag in the circumstances. Whether these facts are accurate or not is absolutely immaterial; but the Germans have based on them the charge of violation of international law. It should be noted with surprised wonder that the German Admiralty seems to have forgotten that the *Emden* sailed into Penang Harbour flying the Japanese ensign, and that this, added to her other disguises, enabled her to accomplish her raid successfully. The United States Government, having been appealed to by Germany, addressed a Note to Great Britain, to the great jubilation of her adversary; for she had just planned the infamy of her new piracy, and the smart of the thrashing administered to herself was somewhat mitigated by the fact that the other boy got a 'wiggling' too. The position of the United States is so delicate, her diplomatic officers have achieved so much, her people have done and said so many things that have gone to our hearts, that it is impossible to be querulous at the presentation of the Note; yet when it is analysed it seems to go far beyond what was necessary to the occasion, and it has enabled Germany to confuse, in her usual clumsy fashion, the *post* and the *propter* in the sequence of events.

The Government of the United States reserved for future consideration the legality and propriety of the deceptive use of the flag of a neutral Power in any case for the purpose of avoiding capture; but pointed out that the occasional use of the flag of a neutral or an enemy under stress of immediate pursuit, and to deceive an approaching enemy, was

a very different thing from the explicit sanction by a belligerent Government for its merchant ships generally to fly the flag of a neutral Power within certain portions of the high seas which, it is presumed, will be frequented with hostile warships. A formal declaration of such a policy for the general misuse of a neutral's flag jeopardises the vessels of a neutral visiting those waters in a peculiar degree by raising the presumption that they are of belligerent nationality, regardless of the flag they may carry.

The Note declared that the United States would view with

anxious solicitude any such general use of its flag ; it would afford no protection to British vessels, it would be a serious and constant menace to the lives and vessels of American citizens, and a measure of responsibility for their loss would be imposed on the Government of Great Britain.

The reply of the British Government was short and to the point. It dwelt on the fact that the Merchant Shipping Act sanctions the use of the British flag by foreign merchantmen in time of war for the purpose of evading the enemy ; that instances are on record when United States vessels availed themselves of this facility during the American Civil War, and that therefore it would be contrary to fair expectation if now, when the conditions are reversed, the United States and neutral nations were to grudge to British ships liberty to take similar action. 'The British Government,' it continued, 'have no intention of advising their merchant shipping to use foreign flags as a general practice, or to resort to them otherwise than for escaping capture or destruction.' Finally, the responsibility for the loss of neutral vessels in such circumstances must fall on the nation which had deliberately disregarded the obligations recognised by all civilised nations in connexion with the seizure of merchant ships.

It is clear that the American Note had special regard to the future, and expressed no opinion as to what had occurred in the case of the *Lusitania*. Now she did not fly the American flag to escape capture, but to escape the probability of being unlawfully sunk by a German submarine ; for in view of what had already happened off Liverpool it is more than probable that a submarine was in lurking for her ; to judge from the German irritation at her escape, it is practically certain. What she did therefore was in self-defence, and even unlawful things become lawful when they are done to escape extreme danger. The Note refers to the use of a neutral flag to escape capture, the reply justifies it, and the Merchant Shipping Act sanctions it. But, seeing that capture by the enemy is equivalent to destruction, quite apart from the methods of the new piracy, there can be no doubt that the principle of self-defence covers this case also. Self-defence is a natural law which has been embodied in all legal systems, and Nature has sanctioned this special defence. 'Protective coloration' is the device by which she defends the weak from the unscrupulous strong ; it is 'mimesis,' a mimetic change, which Nature not only approves in the case of actually hunted animals, but also and mainly devises for those which are likely to be hunted. So the analogy is complete, and the change of her 'colours' by the *Lusitania* to escape the lurking danger of the submarine stands justified by both natural and human law. I prefer this explanation to the theory of the *ruse de guerre*.

I pass now to the more serious matter of the Note of friendly protest of the 28th of December, which was an amplification of one already presented on the 7th of November. It opens with the declaration that the present condition of the trade of the United States, resulting from frequent seizures and detentions of cargoes destined to neutral European ports, has become so serious as to require a candid statement of the view of the United States Government that the British policy is an infringement upon the rights of its citizens, and denies to neutral commerce the freedom to which it is entitled by the law of nations. An improvement had been confidently awaited on account of the statement of the Foreign Office that the British Government 'were satisfied with guarantees offered by the Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish Governments as to the non-exportation of contraband goods when consigned to named persons in the territories of those Governments.' But although nearly five months had passed since the War began, it was a matter of deep regret to find that the British Government

have not materially changed their policy and do not treat less injuriously ships and cargoes passing between neutral ports in the peaceful pursuit of lawful commerce which belligerents should protect rather than interrupt. The greater freedom from detention and seizure which was confidently expected to result from consigning shipments to definite consignees rather than 'to order' is still awaited.

The general principle is then laid down that, 'seeing that peace, and not war, is the normal relation between nations,'

the commerce between countries which are not belligerents should not be interfered with by those at war unless such interference is manifestly an imperative necessity to protect their national safety, and then only to the extent that it is a necessity.

But articles on the list of absolute contraband consigned to neutral countries from America have been seized and detained 'on the ground that the countries to which they were destined have not prohibited the exportation of such articles.' Italy had prohibited the export of copper, and shipments to Italian consignees or 'to order' cannot be exported or transhipped; only copper can pass through that country which is in transit to another country. Yet the British Foreign Office had 'declined to affirm that copper shipments to Italy will not be molested on the high seas.'

In the case of conditional contraband there is a presumption of innocent use when it is destined to neutral territory, yet the British authorities had seized and detained cargoes without

being in possession of facts which warranted a reasonable belief that the shipments had in reality a belligerent destination as that term is used

in international law. Mere suspicion is not evidence, and doubts should be resolved in favour of neutral commerce, not against it.

Cargoes had, in fact, been seized 'because of a belief that, though not originally so intended by the shippers, they will ultimately reach' the enemy. A consignment of conditional contraband shipped to a neutral port does not raise a presumption of enemy destination; such a presumption is directly opposed to Lord Salisbury's statement as to foodstuffs (applicable to all conditional contraband) which, 'though having a hostile destination, can be considered as contraband only if they are for the enemy forces. It is not sufficient that they are capable of being so used. It must be shown that was in fact their destination at the time of their seizure.' As to concealed contraband, it is conceded that there is a right to detain neutral ships when there is sufficient evidence to justify belief that contraband articles are in their cargoes; but the ships cannot be taken into port and there detained 'for the purpose of searching generally for contraband, or upon presumptions created by special municipal enactment which are clearly at variance with international law and practice.' Many of the industries of the United States are suffering 'because their products are denied long-established markets in European countries which, though neutral, are contiguous to the nations at war.' The effect on trade is not entirely cured by reimbursements for damages suffered when an enemy destination has not been established; 'the injury is to American commerce as a whole through the hazard of the enterprise and the repeated diversion of goods from established markets.'

Resolved into its simplest expression the complaint is a criticism of the way in which the doctrine of 'continuous voyages' has been applied by the British Government; but there is also a veiled criticism of the doctrine itself; and, by way of further complaint, it is pointed out that the embargoes which have been declared in certain countries have proved insufficient to prevent the doctrine being applied. As to the principle asserted that doubts are to be resolved in favour of neutral commerce, it has no warrant in common-sense, for it puts a premium on the neutral trader's ingenuity, an ingenuity which has itself given rise to the doctrine of 'continuous voyages.' Seeing that commerce is in the balance against a nation's existence, the doubt must obviously be resolved in favour of the more important consideration. The Note is also open to the general criticism that it is based on the position of the vendor and ignores the purchaser. But the true criterion of destination must often be found in the intentions of the neutral purchaser of which the neutral vendor may be ignorant.

An interim reply was sent by the British Government on the

7th of January. It begins with a cordial concurrence in the general principle that a belligerent should not interfere with trade between neutrals unless such interference is necessary to protect the belligerent's national safety, and then only to the extent to which this is necessary; with this qualification, however, that we shall endeavour to keep our action within the limits of this principle, on the understanding that it admits our right to interfere when such interference is, not with *bona-fide* trade between the United States and another neutral country, but with trade in contraband destined for the enemy's country, and we are ready, whenever our action may unintentionally exceed this principle, to make redress.

The figures showing the export of copper from the United States in 1913 and 1914 to Italy, Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland ('countries which, though neutral, are contiguous to the nations at war') are then compared, and their astonishing increases duly noted. The conclusion is very clear.

With such figures the presumption is very strong that the bulk of the copper consigned to these countries has recently been intended not for their own use, but for that of a belligerent who cannot import it direct.

Granted the soundness of the American proposition, the British case falls within it; the 'imperative necessity for the safety of the country' has arisen. As to concealed contraband the case is even clearer. Cotton is not on the list of contraband. But information has reached the Government that 'precisely because we have declared our intention of not interfering with cotton, ships carrying cotton will be specially selected to carry concealed contraband; and we have been warned that copper will be concealed in bales of cotton.' For this there is only one remedy: the cargo must be examined and the bales weighed; further, this cannot be done at sea, therefore the ship must be brought into port. The general justification of the action of the British Government is couched in these weighty words, which go to the foundations of the whole law of contraband and the right of search: 'We are confronted with the growing danger that neutral countries contiguous to the enemy will become, on a scale hitherto unprecedented, a base of supplies for the armed forces of our enemies and for materials for manufacturing armament. . . . We endeavour, in the interest of our own national safety, to prevent this danger by intercepting goods really destined for the enemy, without interfering with those which are *bona-fide* neutral.' The extraordinary procedure adopted by the United States Government of *prohibiting* the publication of manifests within thirty days after the departure of vessels from American ports, obviously increased the difficulties of the British Government in exercising its right of search in even the most ordinary circumstances. If I am right in my view that the duty of

neutrals is to do nothing, for the simple reason that any action may be of assistance to one of the belligerents, it must be confessed that this order comes perilously near to a breach of neutrality.

The reply deals also with the seizure of foodstuffs, but it is unnecessary, in view of subsequent action taken in regard to them, to refer to this part of the document. It also mentions a somewhat unusual complaint, not included in the American Note, of our own embargo on rubber, imposed in consequence of a new trade in exporting rubber from the United States in suspiciously large quantities to neutral countries, which had sprung up since the war. The complaint is not very intelligible, because it looks at embargo from the wrong point of view.

The full reply of the British Government was dated the 10th of February. It contained the very important declaration that our action against neutral vessels 'has been limited to vessels on their way to enemy ports or ports in neutral countries adjacent to the theatre of war, because it is only through such ports that the enemy introduces the supplies which he requires for carrying on the war.' In other words, the importance of the doctrine of 'continuous voyages' at the present time is emphasised; and its necessity is demonstrated by a further review of trade statistics, which led to the inevitable conclusion 'that not only has the trade of the United States with the neutral countries in Europe been maintained as compared with previous years, but also that a substantial part of this trade was, in fact, trade intended for the enemy countries going through neutral ports by routes to which it was previously unaccustomed.'

But even more important is the opinion deliberately expressed that international law, like every other judge-made law, is a live body of principles which can and must keep abreast of the times. Its rules are not arbitrarily devised as occasions arise, but are based on principles which have developed with the progress of the world. Any apparent changes in the law which Great Britain has introduced are not arbitrary inventions which have in view merely the crushing of Germany, but are justified by well-known principles applied to new conditions. The process of adaptation is no new one. The advent of steam-power had a notable influence on the development of the law, for the facilities introduced by steamers and railways, while they simplified the task of the neutral trader in contraband, had enormously magnified the difficulties of the belligerent. The question in issue can be stated in almost primitive fashion. Are the rules which governed the rights of belligerents, when there were no railways, to govern them when the transit of contraband over the frontier of a neutral and a belligerent State has been made so

easy? The answer is not an absolute negative; it is that the old principles are vital and will warrant extension to meet the new occasions.

But to explain the reasons for a step which has already been taken and to find sound reasons for a step which has to be taken are two different things. The first requires reasoning power, the second imagination; and I find this in the position boldly taken up and courageously insisted on, that the growth in size of ocean liners has rendered a further amplification of the old rules necessary. They must be brought into port for examination.

The American loves the cut and thrust of argument, and must at once have acknowledged that the reference to the fact that the doctrine of 'continuous voyages' originated with the Judges of the United States was not a *tu quoque*, but a brilliant illustration of the principle of development of the law. It is abundantly clear from every paragraph of this remarkable reply that this doctrine has become the one principle worth fighting for now, for our national safety depends on it. And the American will appreciate the delicacy of the compliment which can find no stronger arguments than those used by the Judges of the United States Prize Courts when they established it.

The earlier American Note of the 7th of November had contended that 'the conclusion of the right of search should rest upon the evidence found on the ship under investigation, and not upon circumstances ascertained from external sources.' But the major premiss is that the actual destination of the vessel to the neutral port is only the cloak for the real destination of the cargo to the enemy; and the citation from the judgment in the case of the *Bermuda* is a complete answer:

The final destination of the cargo in this particular voyage was left so skilfully open . . . that it was not quite easy to prove, with that certainty which American Courts require, the intention, which it seemed plain must have really existed. Thus to prove it required that truth should be collated from a variety of sources, darkened and disguised; from others opened as the cause advanced, and by accident only; from coincidences undesigned, and facts that were circumstantial. Collocations and comparisons, in short, brought largely their collective force in aid of evidence that was more direct.

To introduce the rigid rules of evidence necessary to a common-law action in a question which is not a law-suit at all, but an inquiry, would obviously cripple the effectiveness of the doctrine of 'continuous voyages'; the occasions with which that doctrine deals have by force of circumstances created the most important source of supply of those commodities which a belligerent must at all hazards prevent his enemy obtaining. And if we go back to the root-principle, that the whole law and every part of it depend on the right of self-defence, no stronger

argument is necessary to justify the principle laid down in this case, nor for the provisions of the Order in Council of the 29th of October which throw the burden of proof of his innocence on the neutral owner of contraband.

I now come to the Note to Germany of the 12th of February, delivered in consequence of the notification of her under-sea policy, and for which 'Warning' is the only appropriate term. The statement of the principles set at defiance is introduced by the satirical formula 'It is unnecessary to remind,' the whole object of the Note being to remind the German Government that the interference with the freedom of the sea is limited to search and blockade, and that in the absence of blockade the belligerent nationality or contraband character of the cargo must be determined before a vessel may be destroyed.

To this Note came the German reply which set forth England's iniquities and violations of international law, which were in startling contrast to the scrupulous observance of 'valid international rules regarding naval warfare' by Germany. There is a complacent reference to the American Note to Great Britain of the 28th of December, which sets out the details of our iniquities 'sufficiently, though not exhaustively'; but the main interest of the document is its method of dealing with the duties of neutral States towards Germany.

Neutrals have been unable to prevent the interruption of their commerce with Germany, which is contrary to international laws.

Germany is as good as cut off from her overseas supply by the silent or protesting toleration of neutrals not only in regard to such goods as are absolute contraband, but also in regard to such as, according to the acknowledged law before the war, are only conditional contraband or not contraband at all. Great Britain, on the other hand, is, with the toleration of neutral Governments, not only supplied with such goods as are not contraband or only conditional contraband, but with goods which are regarded by Great Britain, if sent to Germany, as absolute contraband—namely, provisions, industrial raw material, etc.—and even with goods which have always indubitably been regarded as absolute contraband.

There follows a reference 'with greatest emphasis' to the enormous traffic in arms which is being 'carried on between American firms and Germany's enemies'; after which come two sentences most typical of German occultness:

Germany fully comprehends that the practice of right and the toleration of wrong on the part of neutrals are matters absolutely at the discretion of neutrals and involve no formal violation of neutrality. . . . If it is the formal right of neutrals to take no steps to protect their legitimate trade with Germany, and even to allow themselves to be influenced in the direction of conscious wilful restriction of their trade, on the other hand, they have a perfect right, which they unfortunately do **not** exercise, to cease contraband trade, especially in arms, with Germany's enemies.

The involutions of these astonishing sentences are worthy of the White Queen at her best, and it is quite a difficult exercise to arrive at their meaning. So far as I have been able to get at it, it is something like this: Trade is free; you neutral traders have a right to trade with Germany as with Great Britain; why don't you? That would be the 'practice of right.' Germany has as much right to have you trade with her as Great Britain has; why do you deny her that right? You allow yourselves rather 'to be influenced in the direction of conscious wilful restriction' (in other words, you submit to having your cargoes seized by Great Britain). Of course you have the right to take no steps to protect your legitimate trade with Germany, and you take none (in other words, you refuse to resist the seizures of your cargoes by force); that is 'the toleration of wrong.' And so you cease to trade with Germany. But you have also a perfect right to cease trading in contraband (especially in arms) with Great Britain. Why don't you? In her case you do not allow yourselves 'to be influenced in the direction of conscious wilful restriction.' To all of which the neutral traders reply: When you begin to make an appreciable attack upon our trade with Great Britain and seize our cargoes, then you may be sure that we shall be influenced 'in the direction of conscious wilful restriction' of that trade also. But until that time arrives, we regret that we cannot take the risk of having to run the gauntlet of the British Fleet. In all seriousness these mysterious sentences mean no more than that Germany has lost such influence upon the sea as she ever had, and the neutral trader has made a note of it and governs himself accordingly. Therefore the traffic in arms, in spite of her pathetic protests, must go on.

So much for the Notes and the Answers, and I pass to the realm of international law.³ In a recent debate in Parliament a noble Lord suggested that, in view of German disregard of it, we need not be 'too fastidious' in our application of its principles. Even at the best of times, before war shook things to their foundations, the layman was disposed to look on it as a thing of shreds and patches. I am sure he would be surprised to hear that the principles are coherent, and that there is a thread of simple common-sense running through all the various doctrines. The fate of the Empire depends on the action which the Government takes on these important questions, its honour on this action being strictly in accordance with the law which the nations have agreed to. I make no apology, therefore, for treading once more the well-beaten track, for I take it that it is the business of the good citizen to know what he is talking about, and in

³ A sketch of the view of international law presented in this article appeared in some letters by the present writer to the *Daily Dispatch*.

order to help him I shall begin at the very beginning. And the beginning is War.

At the outbreak of war the nations are divided into two classes: those that are fighting and those that are not. To give them their scientific names, they are belligerents and neutrals. With the laws of war I do not concern myself, but only with those principles by which neutrals are supposed to govern themselves in order to avoid being swept into the vortex.

The only means by which this most desirable object can be achieved is by steadfastly bearing in mind the natural consequence of meddling in other people's frays. It gives rise to the very simple maxim 'He who joins himself to my enemy makes himself my enemy and may be treated as such.' For the world's peace the doctrine 'He who is not with me is against me' finds no place in the maxims of nations. Now there is a root-principle of neutrality, and if it is once let go all the subordinate principles will fly off and become isolated bodies careering through intellectual space, and doing an incalculable amount of damage. This principle is, that neutrality is a state appertaining to the Governments of the non-belligerent countries, and to the Governments alone. Azuni says 'that 'the state of neutrality is not, nor can be, a new state, but a continuation of a former one, by the Sovereign who has no wish to change it.' But neutrality has nothing whatever to do with the individual, and all the puzzles which confuse the public mind arise from the fact that the word 'neutral' is applied indiscriminately to Governments and to individuals. The importance of appreciating this is manifest, for if it is unsound the German case in which the contrary doctrine appears and reappears over and over again is right; if it is sound that case tumbles to pieces. It is the persistence with which the German Foreign Office has dragged the opposite contention in by the heels on every possible occasion which makes it so necessary to insist on the recognition of this principle. The burden of their reply to the United States, the condition on which they will abandon their evil under-water practices, is that this principle should be given up, and the neutral trade in arms with their enemies declared illegal. If it could be thought for a moment that the United States was likely to be beguiled into abandoning it, then the peace of the world would indeed be in jeopardy. But, unfortunately for the Germans, the Americans know full well what the principle means, and the place it holds in the international system, for them to give even the slightest hint that this is possible.

What, then, does neutrality mean? That the Government of a non-belligerent State must do nothing to assist either belligerent, either with arms, or men, or money. It is not difficult to

* Cited *Letters of Historicus*, p. 127.

understand why neutrality is not applicable to the individuals of the non-belligerent States. Nations subsist by international commerce, and there is no reason why, because two of them go to war, all their trade with the others should be cut off. Therefore we get at once to this axiom, that war does not affect neutral trade with either belligerent, but the traders in neutral countries are entitled to carry on business with them. And so the neutral trader makes his first appearance on the scene.

But to adopt the language of the day, *Krieg ist Krieg*; and if the neutral trader has rights so also have the belligerents, and the doctrine of contraband of war gives expression to them, though few doctrines have been so loosely put into words. I think I am fairly stating the prevalent and mistaken opinion when I put it thus: That it is a breach of neutrality to trade in contraband, and that it is the duty of a neutral State to prevent its subjects from so trading. The Germans, in adopting this popular idea, are juggling with the word 'neutrality,' and they do so in a way which is almost pathetic; yet their version of what they are pleased to call 'true neutrality' is so near to plausibility that I must be at pains to elaborate the real principle. A belligerent has a perfect right to apply the maxim 'Who helps my enemy becomes my enemy' to the neutral trader. But seeing that he is an unarmed civilian he cannot be made to fight. The remedy against him is therefore confiscation of his goods. The special way in which the trader can help the enemy is by supplying him with munitions of war and other means of carrying on the fight. In order that there may be no mistake a more particular list of things which help the enemy is made out, called 'Contraband of War.' Now the belligerent has no right, much less any power, to prevent the trader from selling these things to his enemy; but he gives him fair warning that if he sends them by sea cruisers will be on the look-out for his vessels, and they will be detained and searched and the contraband cargo seized. If the trader turns to his Government and invokes its protection, talking about the 'freedom of the sea' and the 'common highway of the nations,' he will get for only answer 'The threat is justified and I cannot help you. You are assisting the enemy and must take your chance. I cannot prevent you taking that chance, nor can I order you to forbear, for then I should be interfering in favour of the other belligerent, and that would be a breach of neutrality on my part. All I can do for you is to see that you get fair play if you are caught, and proper damages if you are innocent.' So now we get to the law in its first shape: the neutral trader is free to carry on his trade with either or both belligerents to any extent, in arms or in anything else; but if he trades in contraband he takes the risk of losing his cargo. The justification for the rule can be put in

simplest language. The belligerent has obviously no right, merely because he is at war, to order neutral traders not to carry contraband to the enemy, nor even to expect that they will not. Neither can he insist that the neutral trader's Government should intervene on his behalf, and so commit a breach of neutrality towards the other belligerent.

Certain subsidiary questions arise at this point. First, the familiar distinction between absolute and conditional contraband. This follows in direct sequence from what has already been said. The belligerent is not fighting the civil population, but only the enemy Government and its forces. This compels him to interfere with neutral trade in everything that enables that Government to maintain its forces. But how to draw the line between things destined for the civil population and those destined for the forces? For things destined for the civilian may be serviceable to those forces. There must be a more or less arbitrary list of both kinds of contraband: the principle governing conditional contraband being found in Lord Salisbury's *dictum* as to food-stuffs already referred to, which was followed by Sir Edward Grey's statement that we had not interfered and did not intend to interfere with cotton.

I confess that there are many considerations which challenge the logic of the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, and give it more the character of a humanitarian concession. It introduces a new bone of contention between belligerents and neutral traders, and it opens up the grave danger of concealed contraband in cargoes which are themselves innocent: the concealment of copper, for example, in bales of cotton. In view of the more rigorous rule of blockade where the distinction disappears, it seems rather to be a preliminary measure in the process of throttling the enemy; the first turn of the screw, and a suggestion of sterner measures which are in store.

It is important to note that the determination of what is contraband, what absolute and what conditional, is left to each belligerent. Seeing that no law is possible on the subject, that agreement has got no further than the unratified Declaration of London, and that it could not be for the enemy to decide, there is no one but the belligerent left. But it rests on a better reason. Each belligerent is master of his own fray; he can direct the attack at his own discretion, and can strike his blows where he pleases; and if we bear in mind what he *could* do, the concession that some things shall only be contraband if they are destined for the enemy's forces is clearly a reservation of strength rather than an expenditure of force. There is no rule which imposes half-measures on any belligerent; he may exert all his strength and destroy or seize all his enemy's property if he is able; the principle of blockade expressly provides for it; the only thing

that is required of him is that, until he proceeds to extremes, he must be careful how he interferes with neutral property.

Another point requires explanation. Of course all enemy ships upon the seas are lawful prize. But it strikes one at once that here is a departure from the principle that you do not make war upon the civil population, for merchant ships are civilian property. The neutral trader has, however, been looked after, for the Declaration of Paris has proclaimed that 'neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag.' But in the converse case, it would not seem reasonable that enemy property in neutral ships should escape capture. But the Declaration of Paris steps in with the arbitrary rule that 'the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war.' It cannot be said that this rule has done much to safeguard the 'freedom of the sea' for neutral vessels, for there is no doubt that guns consigned to Germany discovered on an American ship on a voyage from Galveston to Pernambuco would be lawfully seized; and if the guns may be seized the vessel may be detained and searched. But practical considerations work in favour of the neutral trader. Not all the hosts of the Allied Fleets would be sufficient for the stupendous work which would be involved in putting this rule into practice; therefore good sense has decreed that the destination of a ship to an enemy port shall be adopted as the practical working factor in its application, at least in the case of conditional contraband. But this has engendered the idea, which certainly is no part of the rule in its naked simplicity, that neutral ships sailing to neutral ports can carry enemy cargoes of contraband with impunity. Enemy destination is supposed alone to afford a presumption that there is contraband for the enemy on board; but if there were any doubt that the idea is erroneous, the words 'whatever be their destination,' in a judgment of Lord Stowell's, to which I shall presently refer, describing the ships over which a belligerent may exercise his rights at sea, must dispel it.

I have talked of the belligerent right of seizure. But civilised nations, recognising that in the most elementary statement of the case not all neutral cargoes even with an enemy destination are liable to seizure, have realised the necessity of establishing a tribunal by which this question of liability and consequent confiscation can be decided. With the right of some cargoes to escape there came into being at once the duty of withdrawing the decision from the summary process which the sailor would inevitably adopt. The question of liability might be a complicated one of fact, law might be involved, a Court was essential. But as to its constitution there were only three alternatives: enemy judges, obviously impossible; neutral judges, or an international

Court, not very practicable; there remained nothing but judges of the belligerent country. Hence the anomaly of the Prize Court sitting in the seizing country's territory, presided over by judges of that country. An anomaly, because it is contrary to the elementary rule that no man shall be a judge in his own cause; yet the judgment of a Prize Court is a judgment *in rem*, it passes property, and is accepted as binding against all the world by the Courts of all other countries. There have been in the past complaints of the decisions; sometimes they have been followed by diplomatic representations. But in these times when—I imagine for the first time in history—a civilised Government has been deliberately charged with having recourse to lying, it surely is a bright spot in the international horizon to think that the system of Prize Courts has produced judges who, as the world has recognised, have been among the greatest.

But the detention of neutral ships at sea, and the seizure of the contraband that they carry to the enemy, can be put much higher than a mere belligerent right; nor does it spring solely from the vindictive principle that the neutral aiding the enemy becomes an enemy; it is based on the supreme right of self-defence. It is the inevitable counterpoise to the right of the neutral trader to continue trading even in contraband, in spite of war. The importance of this right of the neutral trader is the measure of the importance of this right of the belligerent. And this right of the neutral trader itself was put on the large commercial ground by Mr. Huskisson: 'Of what use would be our skill in building ships, manufacturing arms, and preparing instruments of war, if equally to sell them to all belligerents were a breach of neutrality?'⁵ But it can be put on a still larger ground. Without it the small nations would go to the wall. If there were such a doctrine as Germany now contends for, a great country with unlimited resources could speedily annihilate all the weak nations one after the other. There is no such doctrine as that when war is declared the warring nations are to fight it out with their own resources only. It is not the duty of neutral traders to keep the ring and let the best man win. Sentiment does not come into the question. The neutral trader may serve that side which he earnestly desires should win; but the other belligerent has the extreme penalty of confiscation in his hands, and sentiment must inevitably fade into the background.

The conclusion of the whole matter is that the two great war doctrines are, the right of the neutral trader to trade in contraband, and the right of the belligerent nations to seize his cargoes. Combined, they make the simple principle that the neutral trader may supply contraband subject only to the risk of seizure. 'The

⁵ Cited *Letters of Huskisson*, pp. 133, 170.

right of the neutral to transport,' says Kent, 'and of the hostile Power to seize, are conflicting rights, and neither party can charge the other with a criminal act.'*

But the principle of seizure is still in a very crude state; and seeing that all cargoes destined for the enemy are not liable to seizure, and that for practical reasons it is neither possible nor advisable to bring in every cargo for adjudication in the Prize Courts, a supplementary right has been devised, known as the right of search. It is the first step in the seizure, and, on the one hand, affords the belligerent an opportunity of letting innocent cargo go free; on the other hand, it gives the owner of the cargo an immediate opportunity of proving its innocent character. The right of search is often stated as an independent right, but it is in reality secondary to the right of seizure, and references to it obviously apply equally to the right of seizure. As to its unlimited nature I need do no more than quote the well-known words of Lord Stowell in the case of the Swedish convoy.' It is incontrovertible

that the right of visiting and searching merchant ships upon the high seas, whatever be the ships, whatever be the cargoes, whatever be their destination, is an incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of a belligerent nation. . . . This right is so clear in principle that no man can deny it who admits the legality of maritime capture, because if you are not at liberty to ascertain by sufficient inquiry whether there is property that can be captured, it is impossible to capture.

On this another rule has been grafted which is suggested by the enunciation of the law as to the right of search. That right *must* be exercised for the very same reason that the right has been allowed, for otherwise you do not know whether you have the right to seize. From the *right of search* has therefore developed the *duty to search*; and it is the omission to recognise this duty that has plunged the German Admiralty into its piratical career.

But the heart of the neutral trader is desperately ingenious, and no sooner had he obtained the inch to which practical considerations made him appear to be entitled than he developed it into the ell of his own imagining. He argued thus: A neutral vessel bound to an enemy port is liable to detention, because the presumption is that she has cargo for the enemy, and that her cargo is probably contraband; the presumption also is that cargoes on board a vessel bound for a neutral port are not destined for the enemy, even though they may be contraband; nothing easier than to bring them across the sea in a neutral vessel with a neutral destination; all that remains to be done is to pass them on to the belligerent, either trans-shipping them into another vessel and sending it down the coast, out of the way of the attentions of the enemy's cruisers, or better still, if the neutral

* Cited *Letters of Historicus*, p. 129.

' *Ibid.* p. 177.

and belligerent countries are contiguous, by rail across the border. And the best of the plan is that the trader on the other side of the water, say some innocent trader in copper in the United States, need know nothing about it, so that if by chance the cargo does get seized he will do all the shouting.

With this problem, devised in some such human fashion, the United States was faced during the Civil War, and the Judges settled it in characteristic and logical manner. They discovered the doctrine of 'continuous voyages.' It is nothing more than the simple application of elementary principles, and is arrived at by the elimination of the presumption of innocence which the voyage to the neutral port raised. All presumptions may be rebutted, and this one manifestly. 'Be the destination what it may,' the right of search existed; the presumption had only been allowed to grow because it was convenient. If goods destined for the enemy reached him by way of a neutral port, that port was only an intermediate destination; the ultimate destination was the enemy, and there was a continuous voyage to him from the port of shipment. Therefore the seizure, and therefore the search, were justified, and could not be denied merely because 'the final destination of the cargo was left so skilfully open.' But the neutral trader's wits are sharpened by much profit in prospect; he is no simpleton, and a consignment of, let us say, copper from the United States is not likely to be addressed 'Herr Krupp von Bohlen, Essen, *via* Rotterdam, by kind favour of Messrs. Petersen and Co.' Hence a most ingenious argument conducted on the principle 'You shut your eyes, I'll keep mine open.' A consignment 'to order' perhaps may legitimately be seized, but certainly not one consigned to a specific person in the neutral country. The sophistry is obvious, and behind it the neutral trader struggling for his profit is plainly discernible.

And now the pendulum swings back, and in the doctrine of embargo the really neutral trader comes into his own. 'Embargo' is the action taken by a neutral Government in regard to goods which have been declared to be contraband by one or other of the belligerents; and the point to be emphasised is that it springs directly out of the doctrine of 'continuous voyages.' In order to prevent neutral ships destined to its ports with goods which the belligerents treat as contraband being detained and searched at sea, it prohibits the export of those goods from its own ports. The embargo satisfies the belligerent who would otherwise have searched the ships, that these goods will not go out of the neutral country, and therefore will not get directly or indirectly into the hands of the enemy, and he therefore feels justified in letting those ships go free; the doctrine of 'continuous voyages' cannot apply. Now the reason for the embargo

is that the merchants of the neutral country require the commodity for themselves. Suppose, for example, that Spanish merchants require copper for their own use; then in order to ensure cargoes of copper coming direct to Spanish ports without being interfered with at sea by the search of belligerent cruisers, the Spanish Government might put an embargo on copper: that is to say, might prohibit its export. There could be no better evidence that the Spanish merchants were importing the copper for their own trade, and that none of it would get through to the enemy. I can therefore best describe an embargo thus: It is action taken by a neutral Government to protect those of its merchants who do not desire to engage in trade in contraband from the consequences which would result from the action of those who do. There is only one point in connexion with this doctrine which requires attention. Is the action thus taken by the neutral Government a breach of its neutrality to the other belligerent? For, undoubtedly, it does act favourably to the belligerent who has declared the goods to be contraband. The answer is simple. Once admit the strict logic of the doctrine of 'continuous voyages,' it follows that an embargo is a measure neither directed against one belligerent nor imposed to favour the other. It is simply a measure of self-defence, taken in order to prevent the national industries from suffering from the undoubted belligerent right of detention at sea and possible seizure.

And now I come to the last point of all, blockade, which is the supreme manifestation of force for the purpose of crushing the enemy. Here all minor considerations vanish. The artificial distinction between absolute and conditional contraband disappears; there is no longer any free list; neutral as well as enemy vessels are subject to seizure, whether going to or coming from the blockaded port. The humanitarian concession that war is not made on the civil population finds no place; indeed, blockade derives much of its efficacy from the pressure which the strangling process brings to bear on that population. It has been described as a siege carried on at sea, but under somewhat more elastic conditions than a land siege. It is a convenient comparison, because all the outcry against its inhumanity is silenced by the recollection of Paris in 1870, and the vision of what Paris would have been in 1914 if the German plan had succeeded. It is rigorous, almost brutal, but it is war, and war admits of no half-measures which come within the code of civilisation; and this measure, extreme though it be, has long been recognised as legitimate warfare. Nor is there any conventional limitation as to the time when it may be resorted to. Coming as it naturally does at the end of the discussion to which other principles have led up, it might appear as if custom had decreed that it should

only be resorted to after all other measures had failed. But there is nothing to prevent a war starting with a blockade; nothing, that is to say, in the theory of the subject, though there are any number of practical reasons which make it improbable. I presume, however, that if a great maritime Power were at war with a State which had only a miniature fleet, a blockade of its coasts would be the speediest and therefore the most humane way of bringing it to a conclusion. Certainly there is no rule or custom which prevents a State at war from putting forth its full strength at once.

The ascending scale is easier for purposes of study; the mind grasps smaller things more easily, and they prepare the way for the appreciation of the greater things. But it is not by a process of logical development that we reach blockade after a study of contraband; you do not discriminate in order afterwards to discard. Blockade is treated last more conveniently because it involves the greatest development of force against the enemy; but it would have been more logical to have begun at the other end of the scale, starting with the greatest exhibition of force, and letting the series of rules emerge in diminishing strength. In view of what remains to be said, it is of great importance to appreciate that blockade, which cuts the enemy off absolutely from the outer world, lies at one end of the scale of what one belligerent may do to the other, and the seizure of contraband on a neutral ship going to an enemy port, which cuts the enemy off but partially, lies at the other end. There can then be no difficulty in justifying what comes in between.

But the most curious point is that it is only when we come to the recognition of this extreme manifestation of force that we meet with artificial rules. A blockade must be 'effective.' Yet this word, as to the meaning of which in its ordinary use there can be no doubt, is given in treaties and by the authorities a wholly artificial meaning. Sometimes it includes the exact contrary to effectiveness, as that 'A blockade is not regarded as raised if the blockading force is temporarily withdrawn on account of stress of weather': during which the adventurous skipper may run in. It is not necessary to labour the point; but it is necessary, when measures short of 'blockade' have been taken by England, that the full extent of what blockade pressure upon neutral trade means should be understood.

In order to determine what characterises a blockaded port, that denomination is given only where there is, by the disposition of the Power which attacks it with ships, stationary or sufficiently near, an evident danger in entering.⁸

A blockade [by cruising squadrons allotted to that service, and duly competent to its execution] is valid and legitimate, although there be

⁸ From the Convention of 1901 between England and Russia, cited *Letters of Historicus*, p. 92.

no design to attack or reduce by force the port or arsenal to which it is applied, and that the fact of the blockade, with due notice given to neutral Powers, shall affect not only vessels actually intercepted in the attempt to enter the blockaded port, but those also which shall be elsewhere met with and shall be found to have been destined to such port, with knowledge of the fact and notice of the blockade.*

I have come to the threshold of a subject of gravest importance, the new policy of the British Government adopted in answer to the 'war-zone' declaration of Germany, and I stop. To devote to it merely the end of an already long article would not be treating it with the consideration which it deserves, and which the question demands. Moreover, it would not be expedient for an ex-official Englishman to discuss the subject controversially at present; it is sufficient that the measure has been adopted after full and mature consideration by the Government, that the question is political as well as legal; it must be taken to be within the legitimate powers of a belligerent. Presently, to judge from what has already happened, there certainly will be any amount of nonsense talked and written about it; already the term 'paper-blockade' has come in handily for the making of a paragraph, and some bold spirit has hit upon a brand-new term, 'Long-distance-blockade.' Also there has been some not very wise talk about 'Two wrongs not making a right.' I would suggest to those who feel irresistibly impelled to discuss the question that they should omit the word 'blockade,' for, as we have seen, it is a pernicketty term, and all sorts of legal niceties spring up in its train. I have endeavoured to show that 'blockade' is the extreme manifestation of that force against the enemy which lies at the root of the authority which has been given to the series of principles governing belligerent interference with neutral trade, and that these principles are not a mere adventitious set of rules drawn up at odd times as wars occasioned them. The manifestation of force has been regulated, and so also has been the interference with trade; but the regulation has not been on arbitrary lines. The principles and the rules have resulted from the play of natural forces, exerted by the belligerents on the one side, by the neutral trader on the other. The rules are not even a compromise. The clash of forces has thrown off alternating sparks, rules recognising now the right of the one, now the right of the other. But in the supreme display of force known as 'blockade' we find that the right of the belligerent does, as is inevitable, take the upper hand, and the right of the neutral disappears. And there are two French maxims worthy of note just now: '*Qui veut les fins veut les moyens,*' and '*Qui peut plus peut moins.*'

F. T. PIGGOTT.

* From a speech of Lord Grenville, cited *Letters of Historicus*, p. 108.

P.S.—I must briefly refer to two questions which appear at first sight to conflict with the principles advanced in this article—Foreign Enlistment, and the King's Proclamations of Neutrality.

Before agreeing to the 'Three Rules' which, as I have pointed out, deal solely with 'foreign enlistment,' the British Government declared that they could not assent to the contention that those rules were a statement of principles of international law in force at the time when the *Alabama* claims arose. This is expressly stated in article 6 of the Treaty of Washington. 'Historicus' cites some American decisions which bear out this view. Further, in one of his Letters¹⁰ he explains the true inwardness of the Foreign Enlistment Act:

The Enlistment Act is directed, not against the *animus vendendi*, but against the *animus belligerendi*.

It prohibits warlike enterprise, but it does not interfere with commercial adventure. A subject of the Crown may sell a ship of war, as he may sell a musket, to either belligerent with impunity; nay, he may even despatch it for sale to the belligerent port. But he may not take part in the overt act of making war upon a people with whom his Sovereign is at peace. The purview of the Foreign Enlistment Act is to prohibit a breach of allegiance on the part of the subject against his own Sovereign, not to prevent transactions in contraband with the belligerent. Its object is to prohibit private war, and not to restrain private commerce.

It is only when it has become the subject of agreement between two or more States that 'foreign enlistment' assumes an international as well as a municipal character. I presume that this municipal character has not been lost by the inclusion of the duty to prevent the fitting out or arming of vessels in article 8 of the Hague Convention of 1907, relating to neutrality.

As to the Proclamations of Neutrality, so much as recites and reinforces the Foreign Enlistment Act need not trouble us; the King's loving subjects are exhorted to comply therewith. The rest of the Proclamations amounts in the first place to a warning to subjects not to do 'any acts in derogation of their duty as subjects of a neutral Power in a war between other Powers, or in violation or contravention of the law of nations in that behalf'; but, as 'Historicus' says,¹¹ 'The nature of the penalty is pointed out with equal clearness and correctness—*viz.* the withdrawal of the King's protection from the contraband on its road to the enemy, and an abandonment of the subject to the operation of belligerent rights.' What those belligerent rights are I have endeavoured to explain.

F. T. P.

¹⁰ *Letters of Historicus*, p. 168.

¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 132.

GERMANY, AFRICA, AND THE TERMS OF PEACE

THERE are aspects of the struggle now proceeding with Germany which it is imperative that the reflecting and the influential among us should keep in mind. One of these questions affects Africa: how we are to deal with the Germans in Africa, and, having dealt with them, there and elsewhere, what is to happen in Africa at the termination of the present War. I feel impelled to publish views on the subject because others do not keep silence; and often those others have little or no first-hand knowledge of Africa and its peoples. They may utter proposals like that of some months ago in *The Times*—to hand over German East Africa to the Japanese—and thus do us infinite harm out in Africa amongst intelligent Africans; or they may be seized with sentimental pity in reflecting on German achievements in exploration, and blandly propose to forego any attack on German Africa as 'unkind' or 'ungenerous.' Or, on the other hand, filled with the Jingo greed of the 'eighties and 'nineties, they may be licking their lips at the prospect of annexing huge new tracts of Africa without the slightest regard for the indigenous natives and their inherent rights and likings.

Others are unwilling that Africa should compete in sentiment with Belgium. They wish the public attention riveted on the woes of Belgium, and for aught they care France should be persuaded to give up Morocco to Germany—if it is Morocco she wants—so that the German troops may be induced to leave Belgium. I want to show in these pages that it is of almost more importance to Great Britain than it is to France that, come what may, Germany shall be kept out of any foothold in Morocco or other parts of North Africa. Also, that no matter what mercy may qualify our terms—the terms of the Allied nations—in regard to European territory belonging to the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and wishing to remain connected with them, it would be a vast mistake, an unjustifiable blunder, to allow German rule to continue in Africa; or, having abolished it, to restore conquered territories to Germany after the War.

It will probably not surprise those who have given close attention to political geography to be reminded that the devastating War now raging broke out fundamentally over African questions. The War was prepared for and provoked by Germany far more with the intention of getting Morocco as one of the results of victory, than even the mediatising of Belgium and the inclusion of the Low Countries within the Customs Union and armament of that Germanic Empire; which, with Morocco as its pivot, was henceforth to dominate the Old World. Utterly frustrated have been those who, like myself, believed and hoped that German ambitions in regard to Morocco were at an end, after the patched-up settlement of 1911-12. Possibly Germany was content at that period to let such ambitions fall into abeyance while she, in company with Austria, strengthened the Germanic hold over the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor. The outcome of the Balkan wars was a disagreeable surprise to her. The virility and war genius developed in Greece, Servia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria promised—at any rate on the part of Greece and Servia—a stout opposition to any Austro-German advance towards Salonika and Constantinople. Apparently, therefore, Germany armed with greater intensity; and while resolving eventually to assert herself in the Balkans, determined to strike for world-power in the first instance by the rapid annihilation of France during a presumed mood of British neutrality, and to wrest from France as the price of some crushing victory and occupation of Paris the cession to Germany of Morocco in the first instance, and of as much more of French Africa and other oversea possessions as Great Britain might stomach without going to war. I shall not occupy space by giving chapter and verse for this opinion; but if you place side by side the published despatches and telegrams which passed between the German and the British Governments in the two or three days preceding the declaration of war, and the utterances of authorised German publicists, such as Bernhardt and Maximilian Harden, you will find that I am absolutely correct in stating that the first object coveted by Germany as the outcome of a successful attack on France—even if it had to be a stage at which she must rest awhile and content herself—was Morocco.

I make this assertion with the greater emphasis because, owing to my interest in African affairs and my long personal co-operation with German officials in Africa, I have been in close touch with the personages and parties who were shaping the German Colonial and Imperial policy between 1909 and 1914. I was invited in 1909 to address the German Colonial Society in London on the subject of a policy of German expansion in Africa and elsewhere which would bring Germany least into conflict with the permissible ambitions and strategical geography of the other

Great Powers. In consequence of this address I was invited in the following year (1910) to give lectures to audiences in Germany—Southern Germany it turned out to be, because Northern Germany would hear nothing from an Englishman who espoused the French cause in North Africa. But in Württemberg and in Bavaria the addresses proved so acceptable in 1910 that they were repeated in 1911, and in 1910 and the two following years I paid other visits to different parts of Germany for the discussion of colonial and African topics.¹

Down to the spring of 1914 I found the determination to wrest Morocco somehow from France was a motive in German 'colonial' policy which lay deeper and inspired greater efforts than surface ambitions about Congoland or Asia Minor. In my articles and addresses I dealt out full justice to the remarkable ability of the Germans, their great courage, intelligence, and adaptability to local circumstances. But I could not tolerate the idea of their entry into North Africa as a ruling Power. I felt in recent years that the slightest concession to them—even such as a coaling station on the coast of Morocco—would entail eventually a losing battle on the part of the French, and that it would be even more fatal to British interests. If Germany had got possession of Morocco, she would have been able before long to bar the British sea route to the Mediterranean, Egypt, and the Suez Canal; and, secondly, she would have menaced most seriously the British sea route to the Cape of Good Hope, the West Indies, and South America. The Germans themselves were good enough geographers to realise that Morocco was the necessary basis on which their world-power must be reared. The occupation and mediatizing of Belgium was mainly a step for the subjugation of France. No more French territory was desired—possibly—(unless Great Britain had been too weak to oppose the inclusion of Calais in a mediatised Belgium); for the time being no great exactions would have been made from either Russia or the Balkan States—all that could wait. It was *Morocco* that Germany wanted, and Morocco of which she will be, I trust, for ever baulked, no matter what may be the degree of victory achieved by the Allied cause in the War now being waged.

With the exception of North Africa, however, no one who has read my works or attended my lectures can have accused me of suggesting an ungenerous treatment of Germany as a colonial Power. At one time, indeed, I was rebuked in a section of the English Press for my pro-German sentiments. The outbreak of the present War and the manner of conducting the War have

¹ The impressions formed on these journeys have already been published in the *Nineteenth Century and After* and in my little book on *Common Sense and Foreign Policy*.

naturally changed my outlook very considerably. Whereas down to July 1914 I welcomed every legitimate means of promoting Anglo-German friendship and co-operation, since the destruction of Louvain and the revelation of the long-prepared plots in South Africa I have experienced the same revulsion of sentiment which has changed so many other Englishmen from admirers of Germany to cautious enemies, unable for the rest of their lifetime to trust in the possibility of permanently friendly relations between Britain and the two Great Powers of Central Europe.

This change of pro- into anti-German may easiest be illustrated by a little parable which is mainly founded on fact. Some twenty years ago there lived in the vicinity of a beautiful town on the south coast a remarkable personage who was actually of German extraction, though to all intents and purposes an Englishman. He was a distinguished graduate of one of our Universities, who had made remarkable and far-reaching discoveries in science, and although of a slightly unamiable disposition his achievements had won him a respect and a regard which were far extended, and which increased as years went on and the magnitude of his scientific work was better appreciated. He was moderately well off, but possessed a peculiar megalomania which manifested itself in an intense desire to interfere with the neighbouring estates. He wished, as a matter of fact, to carve through them a way down to the sea coast. Usually his procedure was to offer rather inadequate sums for the acquisition of coveted strips, or, if possible, to urge litigiously his rights over disputed portions. Suddenly, and almost without warning, his mere disagreeableness and truculence of manner changed into absolute mania. He took forcible possession of the land he wanted, and shot right and left with a revolver at astonished protesters, besides in his rage doing insensate and unpremeditated damage. Fortunately for him and for his family, his violence had no fatal effects. He was consigned to Broadmoor as of unsound mind, and his family, which was large, compensated the injured persons.

There was much about his behaviour and his actions which excited horror and disgust, and consequently it became the fashion for a time to deny his great abilities and the extent to which we had been indebted to him in the past for his discoveries and his patents. There was an equally strong disposition to visit the sins of the father on the children, to maim their university or their public careers, and deny them all opportunity for applying their talents successfully. But as time rolled by and other *causes célèbres* absorbed public attention, something like a just balance was achieved. The children of this maniac restored the family name to honour, and in course of time made the fullest possible public amends for their father's outbreak, while once

again impartial men of science gave the devil his due, so to speak.

This altered and disguised version of a twenty-year-old occurrence may be taken as an illustration of the horror caused universally by Germany's unwarrantable attack on border peoples, and explains at the same time why so many of us who had become pro-Germans down to the 1st of August 1914 have found it hard to subscribe to the falsehoods and the semi-falsehoods now being circulated as to the unimportance of Germany in the worlds of science and industry. It explains how eager many of us are to see the end of this War in every sense; and to behold a conquered Germany, to begin with, a chastened, and, as Eden Phillpotts puts it, a 'surgeoned' Germany; but a Germany restored to sanity, and once more playing a leading part in the world's affairs, contributing to the world once more the research work of her first-rate biologists, geographers, philologists, and chemists.

Just as it was necessary to consign the personage in my story to Broadmoor, or some such institution for criminal lunatics (from which I like to think he emerged several years afterwards, cured, co-ordinated, and able to contribute to his sons' research work, and to the building up once again of the family fortunes); and just as he was never again placed in a position to influence students and young people of other families: so after our recent experiences in Asia and Africa, I venture to argue, however merciful the Powers of the world may be in regard to leaving all German-speaking European territory under German control, the German Empire must be deprived of the privilege of educating the backward races of the world. Once peace is made on terms fair to the Allied Powers, commensurate to the frightful losses they have sustained in valuable lives, in money, in historical buildings and works of art, we may hope to see German steamers again plying from port to port in the British, French and Russian Empires, German merchants reopening their houses of business throughout the British Empire, and German industries once again finding in Africa the raw material they require and the markets for their manufactured goods. It would be an altogether short-sighted policy on the part of the rest of Europe to attempt to starve out and eradicate such a splendid people in mind and body as are the various Teutonic nations. But with Christianity must go justice, and with generosity and forgiveness safeguards against any further attempts at a forcible establishment of German rule outside Germany. Therefore I assert, as a necessary condition of our future political geography, that the map of Africa of the future must be without a German possession on it, even though in course of time the German trade with Africa may grow

to larger proportions than it attained in the days before the War broke out.

To all who have studied Africa it is painful to write or speak harshly of Germans; so much do we owe to them as pioneers of science in that continent—as, indeed, throughout the world. But we are now compelled to discuss how this mad nation must make amends for its homicidal folly, and what is the measure of punishment and restraint which the rest of Europe—belligerent and neutral—must endeavour for its own safety to impose on the German Empire.

In the earlier days of the War, before we realised the enormous prepared fighting-strength of Germany and Austria, there was much talk of only signing peace in Berlin or Vienna, of an occupation of all Germany's principal towns by the Allied forces. But as things have developed it may well be that when the German armies have been finally and with much difficulty and terrible loss of life ejected from Belgium and Luxembourg, from Poland and Serbia (which they may once more reach) and Constantinople, from Metz and Mulhouse, the Allies' commanders may decide to lose no more valuable lives in attempting the occupation of Prussia, the Rhineland, or Bavaria; but to beat Germany into peace and disarmament in girdling her frontiers and cutting off her food supply. Indemnities, of course, must be imposed to compensate Belgium, first and foremost, and the people of Western Poland, Serbia, and Eastern France. How is Germany going to pay these hundreds of millions of pounds? She may be bankrupt, she may not have the nerve to confiscate the private estates of the Hohenzollerns and the other ruling families. Her colonies will remain virtually her only asset: her colonies and her vast concessions over Turkey-in-Europe and in Asia. Japan has been compensated already for her share in the world-struggle by the acquisition of the German leases in North China; Russia may eventually recover her thousand or fifteen hundred millions sterling spent on the War by taking Germany's place at Constantinople and in Asia Minor; France will have repurchased by blood her lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine. But Belgium? But ourselves? By retaining *the whole* of German Africa (except the portions of Cameroons-Congo and of Togoland already occupied by France and likely to remain French) we shall secure at any rate some small pledge that our frightful and exhausting expenditure on this War of self-defence will eventually come back to us and enable us to re-capitalise Belgium. In this way we eventually recouped ourselves in the past for war expenditure forced on us by Spain, Holland, or France.

And yet it is precisely these German possessions in Africa

which sentimentalists would have us leave alone or, if already taken, hand back when the War is over! Almost they would seem to argue that the War was of our provoking and of our making!² That the incredible miseries and incomputable losses suffered by utterly innocent Belgium are of no importance, are not to be repaid by a defeated Germany. We hear a good deal just now of Germany's utter disregard for the principles of international law, of fundamental Christianity, of the fair play and decency of conduct which all civilised belligerents should observe. Personally, I think all such remonstrances are a vain waste of words: they are like attempts to reason with a mad dog or a mad bull. Germany while she struggles is going to do us the utmost harm she can: she will be without pity, as afterwards without remorse. Well, having regard to her manifest national insanity and her desperate condition, I feel less rancour against her than I do against some of my friends and acquaintances, in and out of scientific societies and the altruist Press, who would willingly wipe her crimes off the slate and not take what means of punishment and restraint we find ready to hand in conquering and retaining her African colonies.

Probing below the surface, I can detect mixed motives in this damping down of a forward African policy: a fear amongst the Morellians that in replacing Germany we may institute unjust conditions of life, labour, and property amongst the real owners of the land in Cameroons, East and South-West Africa—the negro or negroid natives. Such will point to a certain trend in our native policy both in and outside the Union, in Trans-Zambezi Africa—even here and there (they say) in East Africa, and very much so in French Congo. Mr. Morel has never quite forgiven the French for their imitation of the Leopoldian régime in French Congo; he has been swift to detect the unfairnesses in French rule over Algeria, and has asked 'Is this to be repeated in Morocco?' No; certainly not. But I doubt if Mr. Morel knows all North Africa from Morocco to Tripoli as well as I do, whose

² To counter the stale argument that Germany plunged into this War to fight for a place in the sun, I would point out that the Western Powers and Russia between 1890 and July 1914 had virtually inducted Germany into a Colonial Empire and Spheres of special privilege of nearly 2,000,000 square miles, with about 75,100,000 inhabitants.

In conjunction with this benevolent attitude it is almost amusing to read the proposals incited by it in Germany or among German-Americans. The latest circulated of the informal German proposals for peace are that the War is to terminate by a general absolution all round, no indemnities, and as a reward for withdrawing from Belgium, Germany is to be given the whole of the Belgian Congo. This is equivalent to a burglar who has smashed your conservatory and murdered your servants saying 'I will restore your silver and your wife's jewellery if you will let me take what I choose out of your garden and poultry-yard.'

personal knowledge dates back to 1879, and has been gained by periods of residence in those regions, as well as numerous tourist trips. I have from time to time commented on the less satisfactory results of French intervention in North African affairs, but I have emerged from my long study of North Africa convinced that in the main that region and the world at large owe nearly as great a debt of gratitude to France as is due from South Asia and the world at large for the similar British work in India. Have the Moroccans at any time in their history been able to govern themselves, to preserve and maintain justice, peace, a flourishing commerce, freedom, happiness, or friendly relations with surrounding peoples? No. Would they have attained to these conditions of civilised existence under German rule any better than they have done already under the protection of France? No. Would trade between Morocco and the rest of the world have been any freer under German control than under that of France? Less so. Already the French have been realising the disadvantages of a selfish policy in the trade of Algeria (freedom of trade is guaranteed in Morocco, and is partially in force for some time yet in Tunis).

As to ourselves, I so far appreciate the strength of the arguments of Mr. Morel (though he is sometimes inconsistent, and would not have measures which have to be applied to Congoland equally in force in Southern Nigeria) that I should like to point out, as a corollary to the addition of German South-West Africa, East Africa, and the Western Cameroons to the British Empire, that there must go out to the world and to the intelligent natives of those regions some assurance that Britain steps into Germany's place resolved to maintain in the lands newly added to her Empire *absolute free trade, respect for the private property of natives and for tribal property*, full liberty for missionaries to reside and to circulate, and *a veto against distilled alcohol*. Such a proviso brings us up against another class of objectors who are—perhaps without knowing it—*advocati diaboli*, inward admirers of 'German' methods of overriding native rights, of the German determination (shown clearly in their thirty years of African administration) that the native shall have no rights, no franchise, no voice in his country's administration. He is to obey, and blindly. Subject to that condition, he will be well and jovially treated. The paper constitutions of France in Africa may not always read very well. Often they do not exist, and the 'native' lives under an apparent despotism. But in actual working the French colonies in Africa—except in the 'concessionnaire' region of French Congo, wherein Mr. Morel's animadversions and those of his correspondents were fully justified—were far more 'pleasantly' governed than were those of Germany or some small portions of the British Empire.

The proof of the pudding is in the eating : if France had not on the whole governed well and kindly her vast African domains, would they have stood by her as they have done in the present War? We may also rest satisfied that our own conduct of African affairs has on the whole been just and wise, since, from the outbreak of the War to the date of writing this article, the loyalty to the British *régime* among the African Negroes, Negroids, Hamites, Arabs, and Egyptians has been remarkable. We have only met with treachery and ingratitude among a small section of the Whites in South Africa.

So, then, we must brace ourselves for a great effort : we must take over as quickly as may be all German Africa, except the districts that legitimately fall to France (we have no Alsace-Lorraine to recover) ; and we must govern them with respect for native rights and for such institutions as are not harmful, and with a commercial policy similar to that of all the Crown possessions governed from London : absolute free trade and no preferential duties. Then the world at large will not grudge us the position of guardian and administrator over such great areas of Africa : areas which must be open to the legitimate trade and enterprise of all nations, even of the Germans when they return to sanity.

Some of those who have carped at my drastic proposals to confiscate all the German Colonies, Spheres of Influence, and railway concessions have themselves proposed a counter policy which was crueller and far less realisable. It was to penalise German commerce for a long period after the War, to shut it out of the civilised marts ; but apparently to leave Germany free still to trade with her restored oversea possessions. She must be punished for this War, for her crimes against Belgium and France, for her breaches of international law, written and unwritten. But to prevent her trading and yet expect her to pay off huge indemnities would be as absurd as our pre-Dickens policy of locking up debtors, so that they could not work to pay off their debts. We must take away from Germany the nearly 2,000,000 square miles of colonial empire and exclusive privileges which she had been about to put together with our full consent in 1914. Such a splendid appanage must be divided between the protagonists in this struggle : Britain, France, and Russia ; Servia and Montenegro. And the compensation of Belgium must be a charge laid upon all the Allies. Germany must henceforth make shift without colonies, other than those very flourishing colonies she has already established under other flags. Thus her punishment will be short and sharp, in addition to such indemnities and surrenders as I have indicated. But concurrently, her head being shaved, the cathartic administered, the blood-letting no more than

was surgically necessary, she can be received back into the fold of nations; and her next generations will, in her returning prosperity and in the new love and admiration which will once more be provoked by new German achievements in the peaceful arts and industries of life, learn to look back on the dreadful years between 1914 and 1916 as the patient recovered from brain fever views the dark cloud which descended on his reason and blotted out for a brief time his right comprehension of his surroundings.

Since the first part of this article was drafted, and after I had delivered an address before the Royal Geographical Society on the subject of the future of Africa, I received a letter from a Fellow of that Society which is so far typical of the objections raised to the policy I propose, that I venture to quote it, as it represents some of the arguments employed by those who are not necessarily pro-Germans, but who at the present time express an unbalanced leniency in regard to Germany. The writer is 'Colonial-born and very proud of England's Colonial policy in general.'

'I was present' [he writes] 'at your lecture . . . and during the first part . . . I felt "Here is the right spirit in which to solve international problems." But at the later portion my heart sank. If Germany (supposing we win) is to be ousted entirely from Africa, will she not feel, and rightly, a burning sense of injustice that will lead inevitably to future and more terrible wars? You will say "But she is to blame and deserves punishment." No doubt; and I do not say *some* punishment would not be salutary. But excessive punishment puts us in the wrong and defeats its own end. Now it does seem excessive, and that in a high degree, to exclude all future Germans from any national share in the development of Africa's vast resources, simply because of the egregious madness in the party now dominant. Surely it would be enough so far as Africa is concerned, if she were—say—to cede Metz to France without any African compensation when she knows that if she had listened to reason she might have had a good *quid pro quo* without any war at all. But that we ourselves should take her colonies is particularly hateful when we have already—have we not?—about eight times as much as she; and when we said at the beginning of the war that we were not out for gain. . . .

'I had felt so glad when you won the audience round to applaud such good work as Germany had done; but when you showed the map nearly all red and they applauded much more, then I was miserable and should have been ashamed to look a neutral in the face.

To this should be added—by those who wish to look all round the subject—the recent letters of Mr. E. D. Morel in the *New Statesman* and the editorial notes thereon.

I certainly try to look all round a subject; to consider it from the impartial point of view that we seldom attribute to Divine Providence, because each nationality or clan wishes to annex the Deity to itself and its own petty purposes. But, judged by

some such tribunal, I cannot think the verdict would be given in favour of the policy outlined by my Colonial correspondent or by Mr. E. D. Morel, and those who think, write, and speak similarly. Germany had become, prior to the War, a nation of 65,000,000 of remarkably vigorous, intelligent, and industrious people. Austria-Hungary, perhaps not to be characterised by quite such favourable adjectives, represented another 45,000,000; but the foreign policies of the two Empires had become so fused and so completely formulated and dictated from Berlin that we may for convenience speak of both these great Central European States (in the present argument) as 'Germany.' Austrians and Hungarians were becoming as much interested in German overseas possessions as Germany was becoming in the Austro-Hungarian influence over the Balkan Peninsula, in Egypt, or in Asia Minor.

Well, somewhat late in their national history Germany-Austria desired areas for oversea expansion: areas they might colonise where the lands were empty or areas in which they could obtain exclusive concessions and gradually build up an exclusive German-Austrian commerce. The other Great Powers of Europe, willingly or unwillingly, had between 1878—when Austria acquired her first rights over Bosnia and Herzegovina—and July 1914, recognised the unavoidableness of these 'colonial' desires; and Germany-Austria was rapidly inducted into an external empire which (without discriminating between colony and sphere of influence) I have estimated at an area of 2,000,000 square miles, with a non-German population not far short of 75,000,000—regions which in point of wealth of products and openings for industry might have ranked much higher in the great colonial empires of the world than by mere computation in numbers of square miles. Yet Germany wanted still more, and wanted it chiefly at the hands of France, and to some degree also at the expense of British and Russian interests. In answer to such hints,³ we may suppose (without much stretch of imagination) that France, Britain, and Russia had not opposed a complete veto to any such suggestions, but had said 'We may be prepared to facilitate your progress in certain directions, provided we now have a definite and final guarantee that you are not going to break the peace of the world and attack any one of us at a disadvantage. Therefore, if you want A, B, and C, you must be prepared to cede to, or to arrange with, us the points d, e, and f.' (I write these last in minuscules because they were so very much smaller in proportion of area and value than what is represented

³ Given between 1910 and the summer of 1912 at Potsdam interviews, at private visits of French and British statesmen to Germany, and at diplomatic interchanges of opinions during the Conference of London.

by A, B, and C.) Germany scarcely deigns to argue these questions seriously, but having already made her preparations for attack, with at least a year's foresight and with great ingenuity, suddenly plunges the world into war over the question of Serbia (since the earlier Zabern pretext had failed to catch fire): and three days after the declaration of war has commenced the ruin of Belgium.

The result of this action, of this entirely unprovoked outburst on the part of Germany (undertaken, we now know, with the naked ambition of acquiring Morocco and most of the French colonies and of forcing her way to Salonica and Constantinople), has already caused Belgium the loss of about 100,000,000*l.* sterling in destroyed public and private property and nearly three-quarters of a million of lives out of her small population. It has robbed the world—possibly for ever—of such miracles of art and of historical interest as the buildings of Liège, Flanders, Hainault, and Brabant; it has virtually destroyed the Cathedrals of Reims and of Soissons, and the remarkable public buildings of nearly all the towns in North-East France. It has cost France the lives or validity of nearly 500,000 of her best soldiers, and Britain a similar loss already of 100,000. It has inflicted damage on British property to the tune of some 10,000,000*l.*,⁴ and caused an enormous drop in the value of securities on which so large a proportion of our middle-aged and elderly population maintain their existence (as the form in which their savings of a lifetime have been stored). Russia has had losses in killed and wounded soldiers exceeding those of France. Those of Serbia and Montenegro must have amounted to at least 200,000—the flower of the army of both countries. All Western Poland has been ravaged and its historical buildings treated like those of Belgium. The loss to Polish property must be at least equivalent already to 50,000,000*l.* sterling. Serbia and Montenegro are, for the time being, virtually ruined, brought to bankruptcy. There is scarcely a public building left standing in Belgrade or in Antivari.

So far the German attack has failed of its main purport, but authentic documents show that on the chance result of a battle here and there in North-East France would have turned far more terrible issues. Paris if occupied would have been completely destroyed as no city has ever been yet in the history of the world, as the alternative to the French submitting to complete German conquest and placing their army and navy at the disposal of Germany for the conquest of Britain. Belgium would have been incorporated for ever in the German Empire, together

⁴ Besides doubling our taxation and our cost of living, robbing 50,000 poor families of their breadwinners, and adding 1000,000,000*l.* eventually to our National Debt.

with Luxembourg; Holland have been mediatized; Italy and Greece have been reduced to the rank of vassal Powers; Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro, together with Albania and European Turkey, simply have become German provinces in actuality if not in name. An attempt would then have been made to turn the British out of Egypt and replace them by Germans, to have carried the German conquest to the very borders of India. Preparations had already been made, in the event of the tide of success turning in Germany's favour, for a German annexation of all South Africa, and of as much of East, Central, and West Africa as they could have subjugated.

Even now certain victory is *not* in sight for the Allies. If we have sustained losses and made sacrifices in our own defence of men and money to the extent suggested, these are probably only a third of the cost we shall have to pay ultimately for our independence from German domination.

Supposing that the tide of victory turns in our favour and we are able to dictate peace to Germany-Austria, surely justice is to be considered as well as mercy? Surely no sane statesman of any one of the Allied Powers would propose to let Germany off without as far as possible making good what she has destroyed and giving compensation for what is irreplaceable? Yet what are Germany's assets? To attain his ends the German Kaiser has already lost either through death or by invalidity three millions of his best fighting men, best citizens, and best industrials. In a few more months Germany will be virtually bankrupt and her people will be on the verge of starvation. Supposing by that time we are in a position to dictate peace, how out of these famine-stricken and exhausted populations are we to obtain immediate money indemnities? Obviously the only things that lie ready to our hand as just compensation to a very small degree for the losses we have sustained are Germany's oversea possessions, either her actual colonies or her spheres of influence and concessions. Even these (I have computed) could only be capitalised at the outside at 100,000,000*l.* in value, and consequently would at most provide the money indemnities due—less, indeed, than what is really due—to Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro.

We will assume, however, that we have sufficiently reduced Germany to exact from her the retrocession to France of Alsace-Lorraine, and the extrusion of Luxembourg from the German Empire in any shape or form and its transference to the protection of Belgium; Great Britain might claim the Island of Heligoland, which she ceded in 1890, but that would have no monetary value, though it might be just as well, having reclaimed it, to mine it and blow it up completely so that the sea flowed over it and finished it as a naval station for Germany. But we shall

have spent on the most favourable estimates, before peace is in sight, 1,000,000,000*l.* sterling, in addition to our already heavy National Debt, and we shall have spent this first and foremost to defend ourselves from extinction as an empire, as much as to prevent our Allies from similarly falling a prey to Germany. What have we done to Germany, how have we hindered German expansion or German industries to deserve such a cruel blow? Surely it is only fair for us to expect in course of time to get back this 1,000,000,000*l.* and wipe off this latest addition to our National Debt? And what have we that we can lay hands on belonging to Germany which will, at any rate, go some way towards the liquidation of this sum? Only her colonies.

It has always seemed to me from the very start of the War that all the frothy talk about dictating peace in Berlin or even Breslau or Vienna did not outline the practical policy the Allies ought to pursue. To reach any great centre of German rule or wealth would be enormously costly in men and supplies. It is far better that the Allies should resolutely expel the Germans from Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and Poland, and if possible from Alsace-Lorraine; from Asia, Oceania, and all parts of Africa; and then express their situation in the familiar tag '*J'y suis; j'y reste.*' They could then continue the silent pressure of starving out Germany and Austria until they ceded these outlying provinces and overseas possessions and agreed to the other conditions of peace.

What should these other conditions be? They should be such as to exact just reparation from the German people for the inexpressible crime of 1914-15 and yet to give that people a chance of returning to sanity, to happiness, prosperity, and an eventual brotherly co-operation with the rest of Europe. We should not ourselves make the mistake of Alsace or of Posen, and take away from the control of the German, Austrian, or Magyar peoples any territory which rightly belongs to them or which, at the wish of the majority of its local inhabitants, prefers to remain German or Hungarian. Certainly we should not waste any more months in front of peace in pleading the cause of nations who have remained neutral after the 1st of April 1915. Danish-speaking Slesvig, wrongly retained after 1865, ought to be restored to Denmark, but we should certainly not protract the War to wrench German-speaking Schleswig from United Germany. Reasonable compensation to Serbia and Montenegro would take the form of the cession to Serbia of Herzegovina, to Montenegro of Cattaro, and to Serbia and Montenegro of the right to deal as they pleased with all Albania except the circumscription of Valona and Epirus. Galitsia, Ruthenia, and Bukowina must be ceded to Russia, on the under-

standing that Russia adds Galitsia to Russian Poland and makes out of it an autonomous Polish State under a Russian Prince. The retrocession of Posen or of any part of East Prussia to Poland would be too cruel a cut into the vitals of Germany. If the Poles—once a real State of Poland is refounded—do not care to live in Posen under German rule, they must immigrate into autonomous Poland.

Special indemnities must be exacted from Germany to cover the cost of rebuilding the French, Belgian, and Polish towns she has destroyed. Finally, she must consent to an arrangement in regard to the regulation of naval strength and be left with a fleet which will be sufficient to defend the honour of the German flag on the high seas of the world which are not under the control of one of the great civilised Powers. She has shown so completely her disregard for treaties and engagements that henceforth her present enemies can only consider a treaty with Germany valid which is backed by guarantees. My idea of a guarantee that she would keep any agreement she enters into in regard to the armaments question would be that after the conclusion of peace the Allied Powers should pledge themselves that in all territories, colonies, and spheres of influence taken away from Germany and attributed to themselves, German goods and German commerce generally should, *so long as she kept her treaty obligations*, be treated on the most favoured nation basis—that is to say, not suffer from any differential duties as regards imports or exports. In fact, under these new conditions, Germany would find in the external empire that she and Austria-Hungary have jointly lost almost as good a market for her industries and her commercial enterprise as it was prior to the War. But, if she failed to maintain any agreement she might make in regard to the regulation of naval or military armaments or limits of territory, this clause of the Peace Treaty would fall *per se*, and German commerce henceforth be at the mercy of the Allied Powers over a very great proportion of the Old World.

Lastly, it is my own most earnest hope that I may live to see Germany and Austria-Hungary once more in the forefront of prosperous civilised States and on friendly terms with the other great nations of Europe. The cutting off of the German colonial empire would cost Germany at most about 50,000,000*l.* of invested capital, and if no crushing indemnity be in addition fastened on the German people they may soon recover from the losses of the War and find the world's markets as much open to their commerce and industry as ever before. With regard to such inevitable money indemnities as must be part of the conditions of peace—mainly the compensation due to Belgium—I would venture to suggest that since Germany has in the main been led into this

War by the Hohenzollern dynasty (backed by one or two other princely houses) the private property and domains of these ruling families should be seized by the German State and applied to the settlement of the indemnity, which they would just about suffice to **meet**. When Germany awakens from her dream, from the hypnotic trance into which she has been thrown, and sees things in **their** proper light, it is on the Hohenzollerns that her hate should justly turn and not on England.

H. H. JOHNSTON.

WHAT THE GERMANS DID IN EAST AFRICA

DURING the years 1886 to 1888 I happened to be living in Ugogo, a country in Central Africa lying half way between Lake Tanganyika and the East Coast. Later, it was included in German East Africa, but in 1886 it was ruled by native chiefs, whose weakness it was that they owned no man as suzerain.

To this district, in 1887, came three German colonists, agents of the newly formed German East African Company, whose aim it was to open up trade in their new possession. The senior of the party was a man named Krieger, about forty years of age, an experienced traveller and an energetic worker. In all the dealings I had with him, and they were not infrequent, I found him a sensible and straightforward man. The next in seniority was a retired Prussian lieutenant, a polite and pleasant man, but without the force of character of his senior. The last, and youngest, was a fair-haired Saxon, apparently of the mechanic class.

The German Government, I was informed from the coast, had just taken over their immense district of tropical East Africa, and these men were the first pioneers to bring to the people of Ugogo the message of German civilisation.

I was glad to see that they behaved fairly to the natives, though they expected them to work with that German energy and attention to detail which are not exactly the methods of the Central African.

Only on one occasion did they come to blows with the native authorities, and that was due to a pardonable misunderstanding on their part. The natives were enjoying a three days' drinking carousal, and the Germans, unaware of this time-honoured custom, were pressing some not unjustifiable demands. At the best of times an African does not take kindly to being hustled, and when he is just getting into his cups he is apt to resent it quite fiercely. The discussion grew heated, and one of the German native servants, who had made the demand, was shot. The others ran back to the German quarters and Krieger and his party came out to inquire. In a short time there was an animated

encounter. The natives, half fuddled, but quite frightened, sought the refuge of their mud and wattle huts, and discharged poisoned arrows through the crevices, whilst the Germans replied with explosive bullets. A few of the more daring natives who remained outside were speedily put *hors de combat* by the German missiles.

My colleague and I soon arrived on the scene and explained the situation to Krieger, and suggested that he should wait until the morning, when the natives would be sober, before he took any further steps. He was most reasonable and agreed to allow us to act as envoys for the natives in the morning. The following day brought return of sobriety to the natives, and with the realisation of what had happened they were quite ready to accept the German terms, and the incident closed.

But whilst Krieger and his companions and many another similar band of veterans were doing their duty well and manfully in the far interior, a very different state of affairs was taking place at the coast, where all the young and inexperienced Germans had been placed in authority. This was the first great mistake made by the German Company. Realising that their agents in the far interior would be quite removed from their supervision, whilst those on the coast would be directly under it, they sent their experienced men inland and kept the younger men near by. In doing this they overlooked the most important fact that the whole interior was occupied by small, uncivilised, badly organised tribes more or less at enmity with one another; so that every mistake or ill-treatment would be little likely to provoke a rising in a people accustomed to the rule that might is right. Even if it did so, the rising would only be a local one, with little likelihood of the disturbance spreading.

At the coast matters were totally different. There lived and ruled the Arabs. Dignified men, accustomed to be treated with deference, Mohammedans, and tenacious of their beliefs and customs, they were not only well organised but counted a numerous following amongst the natives of the coast and islands. It should have been obvious to the Company that these men required careful handling, and that any rising amongst them would spread far and wide, and would be of an importance out of all proportion to anything that could occur in the interior.

The younger Germans, suddenly invested with the most absolute authority, and under the impression that the very name of German would be a shield to them from the consequences of any of their actions, almost ran amok amongst their new subjects. One young upstart, put in charge of a coast town, was in the habit of daily summoning to his breakfast table the dignified Arab governor of the place. He kept him standing in front of

the table, and between his mouthfuls gave him the orders for the day. Other young Germans, acting I have no doubt in complete ignorance of what was the correct thing, were in the habit of walking into the mosques *and taking their dogs in with them*.

It was these little gaucheries, more than any particular political upset, which started the great conflagration that so rapidly enveloped the whole coast, and made its way as a smouldering fire far up into the interior, and which eventually cost the Germans so much treasure in both blood and money.

The younger Germans soon found the coast too hot to hold them, and not willing that their services should be prematurely lost to the Fatherland they promptly took dhow to the island of Zanzibar, which glistened so invitingly like a town of marble palaces on the eastern horizon. The Company now appear to have realised their mistake, and promptly recalled to the coast the men whom they so thoughtlessly had banished to the interior. My three friends in Ugogo were amongst the number, and received orders to come; but by this time the whole intervening district from the coast to Ugogo, some two hundred and fifty miles in width, was in a ferment, and they could only travel with safety at night, hiding in the scrub or the long grass during the day time. Deserted by most of their servants they had a very trying time, but, finally, two of them reached the coast alive, Krieger and the lieutenant.

Almost immediately on his arrival Krieger was sent to Kilwa, a coast town south of Zanzibar, and there he was joined by Fischer who had been pioneering on Kilimanjaro, living close to a friend and colleague of my own, who had formed the same good opinion of him that I had of Krieger. Here, with another man and about twenty native soldiers, they were put in charge of the little mud fort, where they were very shortly besieged by the Arabs. For three days they gallantly held their own against overwhelming numbers. Poor Krieger was shot in the thigh early in the proceedings by an Arab sharpshooter, but he bravely continued the fight. At last, when all of the little party had been wounded or killed, the Arabs rushed the fort and massacred the survivors.

Meanwhile something had been happening incredible to us English people when we first heard of it. A German gunboat had been at anchor in the little bay, close inshore within half a mile of the whole proceedings, of which they must have been interested spectators during those three fatal days. The beleaguered party had signalled again and again for assistance, but the only reply they received was that the commander had received no orders to assist them.

Not long after this the British Admiral in his flagship was

at another coast town a little further north, Bagamoyo, or Dar es Salaam, I forget which, when he saw a group of German natives gathered on the shore and hard pressed by the Arabs. The latter were not actually attacking them, because this time, not a gunboat, but the whole German East African Squadron were close inshore watching. Until the sun went down, and only until then, those unfortunate natives knew they would be safe, and they were buoyed up with hope that before the sun set the ships of their new Fatherland would take them under its care. They learnt afterwards what Fatherland might mean, as we have learnt what Kultur means. The English Admiral had no such pleasant illusions, he knew what the practice of the Germans was, and so signalled to their Admiral 'Are you going to send ashore to help your natives?' 'No,' was the laconic and uncompromising reply. Our Admiral then trained his guns on the beach, and under their protection the staff-captain took the ship's boats ashore and brought the German natives safely to the flagship. Meanwhile, the German squadron looked on. This perhaps was hardly surprising after the events of Kilwa. If German civilians were considered as dirt beneath the feet of German officers, what must have been the status of German natives?

The happenings of to-day suggest one practical point. Will the strong and opulent who, in the German Empire, have been trained to disregard the weak and lowly, divide with them their food in the time of scarcity, or will they hoard it? A great deal depends upon the answer to this momentous question. No Government can discover where all the food supplies lie hid, and a selfish nation may die of starvation in the midst of a sufficiency.

In the final issue, in a long war, the result depends entirely upon how the civil and military population hold together, and I said to myself twenty-seven years ago in Africa, and have often since said to my friends, 'I do not now fear the result of a war with Germany. When it does come, victory will go to the race which holds together to the last, and of which the units will strive to help and save each other without regard to their respective military or civil or social status.'

Such a desertion of compatriots as occurred in the case of Krieger and his friends would be unthinkable to us. We not only strive, at all costs, to save the lives of useful citizens to whatever class they may belong, but we allow and encourage strong and noble lives to sacrifice themselves for the weak and even the ignoble. It looks at first sight as if this were a sentimental and suicidal policy. Actually it is the way, and the only way, by which can be built up an Empire which shall hold together in the face of all opposition, and shall endure unto the ages.

S. T. PRUEN.

*BISMARCK—AND WILLIAM II.:**A CENTENARY REFLECTION*

PRINCE OTTO EDUARD LEOPOLD VON BISMARCK, Germany's greatest son, was born on the 1st of April 1815 at Schönhausen. He died on the 30th of July 1898 at Friedrichsruh. Fate has its ironies. Apparently William the Second took the terrible decision which brought about the present War at a Council held at the Neues Palais in Potsdam on the 30th of July 1914, the anniversary of Bismarck's death; and the celebration of the centenary of Bismarck's birth is taking place in the turmoil of a War which seems likely to end in the destruction of Bismarck's life-work and of the Empire which he had laboriously created.

To the broad masses of the English-speaking people, and even to most well-informed men in this country, Prince Bismarck is an unknown and a sinister figure, a mysterious and terrible character, a man of blood and iron, Germany's evil genius, a statesman devoid of human feeling; who by diabolical cunning, unscrupulousness and violence, by the medieval methods of Machiavelli, united Germany; who imprinted his character deeply, and fatally, upon the new Empire, and forced it into a path which inevitably led to the present catastrophe. Those, however, who see in Bismarck a bloodthirsty and unscrupulous schemer of boundless ambition, who believe that the Iron Chancellor is responsible for the present War, and that William the Second and his supporters have merely acted in accordance with Bismarck's teachings, are in error. The principal characteristic of Bismarck's foreign policy was not its daring and unscrupulousness, but its perfect sanity, one might almost say its wise moderation and its cautious restraint. The present War is solely the work of William the Second and of his entourage. Had not the Emperor and his counsellors deliberately thrown to the winds Bismarck's pleadings for a sane policy and his unceasing admonitions, Germany would still be prosperous and at peace. Unfortunately, statesmanship is little studied in Great Britain. *Berlin* Bismarck, the statesman, is almost unknown even to those who are keenly interested in politics and who have adopted politics

or diplomacy as a profession. This is the more to be regretted as Bismarck was probably not only the greatest diplomat but the greatest statesman, in the fullest sense of the word, of whom we know. In his social policy, economic policy, parliamentary policy, and in matters of organisation and administration he was a pioneer, and in all these he was probably as great as he was in the sphere of foreign policy. Unfortunately, statesmanship, the greatest of all human sciences, is completely neglected at the Anglo-Saxon Universities in both hemispheres. If it were taught, as it ought to be, there would be chairs of Bismarckian statesmanship at every university.

The greatness of a statesman may be seen not by his eloquence and his parliamentary and electoral successes, but by his national achievements. Bismarck created an empire and made a nation. Measured by the positive success of his activity Bismarck was undoubtedly one of the greatest statesmen known to history. In 1862, when Bismarck became Prime Minister of Prussia, Germany was merely a geographical expression, and Prussia was a weak, poor, small, torn, and disunited State. It consisted of two disjointed halves, which were separated from one another by the independent States of Hanover and Hesse. It had only 18,491,220 inhabitants. It had practically no merchant marine, no manufacturing industries, and very little wealth. The nation and its Government were in conflict. Austria dominated and domineered over Prussia. The country had been shaken to its foundations by the revolution of 1848. Another revolution seemed not impossible. Civil strife was so acute, and the internal difficulties of Prussia were so great when William the First ascended the Prussian throne, that he had actually written out in his own hand his act of resignation. With difficulty Bismarck induced the despairing monarch to tear up that fatal document. King and Parliament were in deadly conflict. Kingship had fallen so low in public esteem that, as Bismarck has told us, scarcely anyone raised his hat to the King in Berlin except a couple of Court hairdressers. Such was the position when Bismarck took office. He resolved to break the power of the pugnacious Prussian Parliament, to strengthen to the utmost the authority and power of the Crown, to deprive Austria of her leadership, to conquer for weak and despised Prussia the supremacy in Germany and in Europe.

Bismarck is unique among statesmen. Gifted with marvellous foresight, he formed the full programme of his entire life-work as a comparatively young and quite inexperienced man, and was able to carry it out in every particular in the course of a long and laborious life. In manuscript notes written down in March 1854, and in a long memorandum sent to Otto von

Manteuffel, the then Prime Minister of Prussia, on the 25th of July 1854, both of which are reprinted in Vol. II of the *Anhang zu den Gedanken und Erinnerungen von Otto Fürst von Bismarck*, we find laid down the complete policy which Bismarck pursued unswervingly to the day of his death. He then advocated, for instance, that Prussia should follow not a German but a purely Prussian policy; that she should make herself supreme in Germany, following, if necessary, an anti-Austrian policy; that she should cut herself off from Austria, and should not support that country if the pursuit of her Balkan ambitions should involve the realm of the Hapsburgs in trouble with Russia. As a young student, Bismarck, like many men of his time, dreamed of a United Germany. However, while the vast majority of Germans wished to unite all the German States and the States of Austria-Hungary in some loose form of federation, Bismarck aimed at creating a compact and purely German Germany, a great national and homogeneous State, under Prussia's leadership, expelling Austria out of Germany and leaving to the House of Hapsburg the rule of the alien nations, of the Slavs, Magyars, Roumanians, and Italians. In the beginning of his official career Bismarck advocated the acquisition of Schleswig-Holstein with Kiel, desiring to make Prussia a seafaring and naval Power. He recommended the construction of the Baltic and North Sea Canal, and looked hopefully forward to a war with Napoleon the Third, who then dominated Europe, trusting that his overthrow would unite Germany and give to Prussia the hegemony in Germany and Europe.

Bismarck became Prime Minister of Prussia in 1862. Supported by the King, he immediately set to work to strengthen the Prussian Army immensely, for he wished to make Prussia independent and powerful with its help. As the Prussian Parliament absolutely refused to vote the large funds required, he governed for years without a Parliament and without a budget, collecting the taxes by force. Two years after, in 1864, supported by Austria, he made war upon Denmark, and took from that country Schleswig-Holstein and Kiel. At that time, Austro-Prussian co-operation was indispensable for achieving Bismarck's aims. As the two Germanic Powers seemed firmly united, and as Russia and France were not ready for war, the States of Europe only protested against the seizure of the Danish territories, but did not intervene. Austria had served Prussia well by enabling her to acquire the coveted Danish territories, but the defeat of the Dual Monarchy was required to make Prussia supreme in Germany and to give her the leadership of the other German States, the adherence of which would immensely strengthen her military power. The Austro-Prussian condominium in Schleswig-

Holstein lent itself admirably to the production of the necessary *casus belli*. It was duly brought about in 1866. The Prussian people and their parliamentary representatives, who had dreamt of a Greater Germany, embracing Prussia, Austria, and all the smaller States, and who detested Bismarck as an enemy of liberalism and of representative government, protested passionately, but in vain, against the *Bruderkrieg*, the fratricidal war. Owing to the great increase of the Army, made against the will of the representatives of the people, Prussia defeated Austria, and that country lost her supremacy both in Germany and in Italy. By arms Prussia had established her paramountcy in Germany.

Austria's defeat had freed Prussia from Austria's leadership, had made her independent, had greatly increased her power and prestige, and had loosely attached to Prussia the Central and South German States, who naturally inclined towards the victor. To weld Prussia and the South German States into a firmly united body, to give Prussia for all time the leadership in Germany, and to reconquer the formerly German Alsace-Lorraine Bismarck required a successful war with France, the hereditary enemy. He clearly recognised that only a victory over France could arouse among all the German States and peoples an enthusiasm sufficiently strong to overcome the petty jealousies which had divided Germany since the dawn of her history.

In six years, from 1864 to 1870, Prussia had, under Bismarck's leadership, fought three most successful wars. She had acquired free access to the sea. She had created an organic connexion between the detached Eastern and Western halves of the Monarchy by incorporating Hanover and Hesse as a result of the war of 1866. She had acquired vast German territories, and had firmly joined to herself the purely German South German States. She had reconquered Alsace-Lorraine, and had won for the King of Prussia the Imperial Crown. Thus, Bismarck had at the same time made Prussia great, had united Germany, and had firmly established the authority of the King. He had achieved all this against the will of the people and against that of the most influential circles. Even the King himself had always to be persuaded and convinced, cajoled and threatened, to follow Bismarck's lead. Government against the will of the people, as carried on by Bismarck, had proved marvellously successful. The King-Emperor was given the full credit of Bismarck's achievements. Hence, Bismarck's successes had steadily increased the authority of the monarch. The people had been taught to trust their rulers blindly and unquestioningly, and to treat their shortsighted parliamentary representatives almost with contempt. The belief in authority among the

people was greatly strengthened by a patriotic education in the elementary schools, and by making the formerly free universities of Germany and the Press instruments of the Government and of the Imperial will. Thus, the liberal and democratic Germany of former times was destroyed.

Having created Prusso-Germany's greatness, Bismarck wished to establish the country's security for all time. By an economic policy which at the same time was wise and daring, he created a wonderful system of State railways, and a powerful and efficient merchant marine. He converted Germany from a poor and almost purely agricultural State into a wealthy industrial country. He introduced a system of State Insurance which has been copied by many countries, and secured Germany's position among the Powers by the most wonderful system of alliances which the world has seen.

By sparing Austria after her defeat of 1866, Bismarck made possible her reconciliation with Germany. By placing the Dual Monarchy into opposition with Russia at the time of the Russo-Turkish War, he raised the spectre of a Russo-Austrian War. It alarmed Vienna very greatly, and made an Austro-German Alliance not only possible but necessary. Fearing the abiding resentment and hostility of defeated and humiliated France, Bismarck wished to isolate that country. The German-Austrian Alliance did not seem to afford a sufficient guarantee against the formation of an anti-German coalition, in which France would, of course, be the moving spirit. To alienate France and Italy, Bismarck gave to France at the Congress of Berlin Tunis, to which Italy had by far the stronger claim, and thus he involved these two countries in bitter hostility, and a ten years' Customs war. He prompted France to acquire colonies in opposition to England, and at the same time encouraged England to occupy Egypt, to the possession of which France considered herself entitled. Thus, he estranged France and England. Furthermore, England and Russia were made to quarrel over Constantinople and Asia.

France's hostility, combined with Austro-German pressure, forced Italy to join the German-Austrian Alliance. The Triple Alliance was created. Germany could rely on the support of two Great Powers, while France, Russia, and England were isolated. Germany's security seemed thoroughly established. Nevertheless, Bismarck still feared the formation of a coalition hostile to Germany. It is true the Triple Alliance was a purely defensive instrument. Still, Russia might conceivably feel threatened by that combination and endeavour to protect herself by a counter-alliance with France, Germany's natural enemy.

To prevent Russia and France combining, Bismarck not only

demonstrated to Russia Germany's sincere friendship whenever an opportunity offered, but he concluded with that country a secret but purely defensive alliance which assured Russia that Germany would not aid Austria-Hungary if that country should attack Russia, but, on the contrary, observe towards Russia an attitude of benevolent neutrality. The two treaties completely shackled Austria's freedom of action, and tied that country to the German car of State. They made Austria-Hungary a junior partner in the Alliance. With the two alternative Alliances Bismarck could always play off Austria-Hungary against Russia, or Russia against Austria-Hungary. The initiative in the Triple Alliance was reserved to Germany.

As England was hard pressed by France in Africa, and by Russia in Asia, she naturally inclined towards Germany, and would probably have assisted that country in a war with France and Russia. She was considered to be an unofficial, a semi-detached, member of the Triple Alliance. In addition, Roumania, ruled by a Hohenzollern Prince, was attached to the Triple Alliance by treaty, and Turkey could be relied upon to support Germany against Russia in time of need. As Russia and England were friendly to Germany, France was isolated and unable to find an ally. By this wonderful system of alliances, concluded with all the important European nations, which were encouraged to quarrel among themselves, Bismarck dominated and directed all Europe. An anti-German coalition was unthinkable. Germany ruled Europe.

✧ Bismarck pursued not an ambitious policy of domination, but a purely nationalist and a conservative policy. He did not aim at ruling the world. The wars which he had brought about were in truth wars of nationality. They were undertaken solely for the purpose of uniting the divided German nation. They were means to an end, and they were necessary for Germany's unification. Ever since his youth, Bismarck had wished to see all Germans, except the Roman Catholic Austro-Germans, united in a single State, ruled by the Hohenzollerns. In 1871 he had achieved his ideal. When, by three successful wars, he had accomplished his aim, he considered his work completed. He had created a great German Empire, and he desired the new Empire to keep the peace and to remain a purely German State. Ever since 1871 Bismarck strove to avoid war. It has often been asserted, but it has not been sufficiently proved, that Bismarck intended to attack France in 1875. He denied that intention to the day of his death, unceasingly condemning wars of ambition or precaution, such as that brought about by William the Second.

The future historians of Germany may tell their readers that

Bismarck created the German Empire and that William the Second destroyed it. It seems exceedingly strange that Bismarck's successors proved unable to continue Bismarck's work, for their task was simple and easy. At the time when the Iron Chancellor was dismissed the position of the German Empire was impregnable. The Triple Alliance was a rock of strength, and as Austria was kept in check by the German-Russian secret treaty of alliance Berlin retained the initiative. England, Russia, Turkey, and Roumania were firm friends of Germany, and were likely to support that country in case of need. Isolated France was Germany's only enemy. It is true Bismarck had no great successor. He has often been reproached for not having trained a statesman to take his place. However, great statesmen, like great poets, are born, not made. Besides, Germany no longer required a great statesman to continue Bismarck's work, for that farseeing statesman had left to his successors the fullest and the most detailed instructions for their guidance. His policy, like that of every truly great statesman, was distinguished by its simplicity and by its absence of secrecy. No statesman has ever taken his contemporaries more freely and more fully into his confidence than has Prince Bismarck. He laid his policy open to all Germany, and the Germans showed their gratitude and admiration for the founder of the Empire by publishing in full Bismarck's innumerable speeches and addresses, despatches, State papers, newspaper articles, confidential and private correspondence, and his conversations and table-talk in many hundreds of volumes. Modern Germany gave itself over to a veritable Bismarck cult. The Bismarck literature of Germany is about as copious as is the Napoleonic literature of France. Bismarck's views on every subject and on every question were studied, not merely by the elect, but by the masses. His *Memoirs*, his political testament, were and are probably as widely read and as frequently quoted in Germany as the Bible and Goethe's *Faust*.

William the Second came to the throne on the 15th of June 1888. He disagreed with Bismarck on important questions of domestic and foreign policy. He dismissed the founder of Modern Germany on the 22nd of March 1890. After his dismissal, Bismarck watched with concern and anxiety the unceasing, reckless, and neurotic activity of the young Emperor. He feared that the youthful monarch, encouraged by Court flatterers, place-hunters, and adventurers, might endanger, or even destroy, the newly created Empire, and deep pessimism took hold of him. Hoping to save his country, Bismarck devoted the remaining eight years of his life entirely to political teaching. He laid down the principles of his foreign and domestic policy in a large number

of newspaper articles and speeches, he criticised freely and fearlessly the mistakes of his successors, and he gave to his country the essence of his statesmanship, the *arcana imperii* in his *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, his *Memoirs*, which may be found in every German house.

Bismarck's pessimism as to Germany's future, which impressed numerous Germans who paid him homage in his retirement, was chiefly caused by the unstable, rash, overweening and domineering character of William the Second, by his vanity and by his susceptibility to flattery. I have already quoted in this Review¹ the following two paragraphs from Bismarck's *Memoirs*, obviously comparing William the Second with his grandfather, but they will bear repetition :

The Emperor William I was completely free from vanity of this kind ; on the other hand, he had in a high degree a peculiar fear of the legitimate criticism of his contemporaries and of posterity. . . . No one would have dared to flatter him openly to his face. In his feeling of royal dignity, he would have thought ' If anyone has the right of praising me to my face, he has also the right of blaming me to my face.' He would not admit either. . . .

What I fear is that by following the road in which we are walking our future will be sacrificed to the impulses of the moment. Former rulers looked more to the capacity than the obedience of their advisers ; if obedience alone is the qualification, then demands will be made on the general ability of the monarch which even a Frederick the Great could not satisfy, although in his time politics, both in war and peace, were less difficult than they are to-day.

Referring to the misrule of former Prussian kings, Bismarck significantly wrote in his *Memoirs* :

In an absolute monarchy no one except the sovereign can be proved to have any definite share of responsibility for its policy. If the King comes to any unfortunate decisions, no one can judge whether they are due to his own will or to the influence which various personalities of male and female gender—aides-de-camp, courtiers and political intriguers, flatterers, chatterboxes, and tell-tales—may have upon the monarch. In the last resort the royal signature covers everything ; how it has been obtained no one ever knows.

William the Second dismissed Bismarck because he thought his own policy wiser than that of his experienced Chancellor. Believing himself a genius, he wished to be his own Chancellor. He had no use for statesmen, for men of genius and of character such as Bismarck, but only for time-serving nonentities, for men without backbone, who were ready to execute without question the Imperial will and every Imperial whim, regardless of the consequences to the country. On the 1st of July 1897 Bismarck commented on the impending retirement of Herr

¹ ' The Ultimate Ruin of Germany,' *Nineteenth Century and After*, September 1914, page 529.

Marschall von Bieberstein from the German Foreign Office. He discreetly pointed out that not Herr von Marschall, but the Emperor himself was to blame for the mistakes of Germany's foreign policy made since Bismarck's dismissal. He wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* :

A number of papers, especially the *Kölnische Zeitung*, give a good character to Herr von Marschall at the occasion of his impending resignation. . . . We have not noticed that Herr von Marschall has been guided by any political views and principles of his own in carrying out the Imperial orders. We are convinced that he possessed certain principles when he entered the Foreign Office, but we do not believe that he had any opportunity to apply them during his seven years of office. We believe that he has merely done his official duties by carrying out the instructions which he received from the Imperial Chancellor on behalf of the Emperor. . . . We do not intend to criticise Germany's policy during the last seven years, but we should be acting unjustly in holding him responsible for that policy. We consider that he had no part in shaping it, that he merely did what he was told.

William the Second has made numerous absolute pronouncements, such as 'You Germans have only one will, and that is My will; there is only one law, and that is My law.' '*Sic volo, sic jubeo.*' 'Only one master in this country. That is I, and who opposes Me I shall crush to pieces.' Like another Louis the Fourteenth, William the Second taught the people '*L'état c'est moi.*' Bismarck dreaded the Emperor's inclination towards absolutism. He considered his recklessness to be doubly dangerous in view of the great power possessed by the monarch, and the abject flattery and servility prevailing in German Court circles, on the one hand, and in view of the extreme docility of the well-drilled German nation on the other. Hence, Bismarck strove with all his might to create a counterpoise to the Emperor in an enlightened public opinion, in an independent Parliament, and in frank public criticism of the Emperor's policy. He wrote in his *Memoirs* :

Absolutism would be the ideal form of Government for a European State were not the King and his officials as other men to whom it is not given to reign with superhuman wisdom, insight, and justice. The most experienced and well-meaning absolute rulers are subject to human imperfections, such as an over-estimation of their own wisdom, the influence and eloquence of favourites, not to mention petticoat influences, both legitimate and illegitimate. Monarchy and the most ideal monarch, if in his idealism he is not to be a common danger, stand in need of criticism; the thorns of criticism set him right when he runs the risk of losing his way.

Criticism can only be exercised through the medium of a free Press and of Parliaments in the modern sense of the term.

After his dismissal, Bismarck settled in Friedrichsruh, his country seat, close to Hamburg, and the *Hamburger Nachrichten* became the principal organ in which he stated his views, in numerous anonymous articles which betray his authorship by

their style. They will be found collected in the seven-volume work of Penzler, and in the two-volume work of Hermann Hofmann, two journalists who edited them, and in the publications of Poschinger, Horst Kohl, Liman, Blum, and other writers on Bismarck. It should be added that the vast majority of the extracts given in this article have not been published in the English language.

In the *Hamburger Nachrichten* of the 24th of November 1891 Bismarck commented severely on the Emperor's pronouncement '*Suprema lex regis voluntas.*' He contrasted it with his first speech from the throne, on the 27th of June 1888, in which the Emperor had promised that he would maintain the existing constitution, and had stated that he was satisfied with his position as established by it.

On the 11th of December 1891 Bismarck received the Editor of the *Eisenbahn Zeitung*. Referring to the Emperor's pronouncement '*Sic volo, sic jubeo,*' he told the journalist that he saw Germany's salvation in the possession of a strong monarchy and of a Parliament which defended the rights of the people. On the following day, the 12th of December 1891, receiving a deputation of the town of Siegen, Bismarck said :

The most disquieting feature for me is that the Reichstag has abdicated its position. We suffer everywhere from the bureaucracy. . . . The Reichstag is the indispensable cement of Germany's national unity. If its authority declines, the bonds which hold Germany together are weakened.

On the 24th of July 1892 Bismarck, addressing a South German deputation at Kissingen, said :

I would have gladly continued my work, but our young Emperor will do everything himself. . . . The German Reichstag is the focus of our national life. To strengthen the Reichstag, the responsibility of Ministers should be increased. Anyone can become Imperial Chancellor, whether he is fitted for the office or not, and the Chancellor's post may be abused to such an extent that he becomes a mere secretary, and that his responsibility is limited to executing the orders he receives. . . . If ministerial responsibility were established by law, a man who does not possess the necessary qualifications would not take office. . . .

When I became Minister, the Crown was threatened by the people. The King was discouraged because he could no longer rely on his Ministers, and he wished to abdicate. Hence I strove to strengthen the Crown against Parliament. Perhaps I have gone too far in that direction. We now require a balance of power within Germany, and I believe that free criticism is indispensable to the monarchy. Otherwise we fall a prey to official absolutism. We require the bracing air of public criticism. Our entire constitution is based on it. If Parliament becomes powerless, becomes a mere tool in the hands of the Government, we return to the régime of absolutism.

Bismarck was particularly dismayed at the Emperor's unceasing and exasperating interference in foreign politics which

threatened to create everywhere enemies to Germany. On the 30th of July 1892 he stated in his speech at Jena that in foreign policy the most important thing was not activity but patience, and he attributed much of his success to the fact that he had learned patience when stalking deer or fishing. Continuing, he said :

The basis of a constitutional monarchy is the co-operation of the monarchical will with the convictions of the governed people. . . . It is a dangerous experiment nowadays to strive after absolutism in the centre of Europe. Henceforward we must aim at strengthening independent political thought and political conviction in our Parliament and among the German people. . . .

The wars which united Germany were necessary, but there is no need for further wars. Our wishes are fulfilled. We should be frivolous or clumsy if we allowed ourselves to be involved in further wars without need. If we follow a conservative policy we shall be able to hold our own against all comers, although we are in the centre of Europe. Germany cannot conduct aggressive cabinet wars. Besides, a nation which can be forced into such wars does not possess the right constitution. . . . Since 1870 we have avoided further wars and have striven to strengthen Germany. In building up the empire some kind of dictatorship was necessary, but that cannot be considered as a permanent feature. Our task can be completed only when Germany possesses a powerful Parliament which embodies our sense of unity.

As Bismarck's appeals to the German Parliament and to the German people to assert themselves proved fruitless, he endeavoured to find a counterpoise to the Emperor in the minor States of Germany, which are represented in the Federal Council. He wrote, on the 11th of June 1897, in the *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten* :

According to Article 8 of the German Constitution, there exists within the Federal Council a committee on foreign affairs, formed by representatives of the Kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, and Würtemberg, and by two representatives elected by the other Federal States. That Committee is entitled to demand information from the Government regarding diplomatic affairs. Formerly, a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Council was of the greatest rarity. Prince Bismarck guided Germany's foreign policy, and no one felt the necessity of controlling him. Now matters are different. Although we do not wish to criticise the achievements of Prince Hohenlohe or Herr Marschall von Bieberstein, we feel that it is necessary to remind the country of the existence of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Council. We are of opinion that the German people are entitled to know the character of the 'changes' which have taken place in the relations between Vienna and Berlin, about which inspired Austrian papers have been writing, and we hope that these 'changes' have not taken place at Germany's cost, that they will neither lead to Germany's isolation nor to Germany's dependence upon Austria and Russia.

The watchword of modern Germany is 'Machtpolitik.' Unrestrained violence is advocated as a policy. During recent

years, and especially since Bismarck's death, many leading Germans have advocated a ruthless policy devoid of morality and based exclusively on brute force. Modern Germany has paid lip-worship to Bismarck, but has disregarded his teachings, for that great statesman endeavoured, in the main, to follow an honest, moderate, and straightforward policy, and he attached the greatest value to political morality. On the 21st of July 1893, addressing a thousand people from Brunswick, Bismarck said :

The possession of moral authority is a very important factor in political life. To avoid wars, something more is needed than the possession of a powerful army. I attach value to the respect and the prestige which Germany enjoys among the non-German nations. Respect and prestige are desirable not merely to satisfy national vanity and ambition. They are valuable and extremely useful assets which carry with them great advantages, and we suffer when Germany's prestige and respect are diminished.

Contemplating with concern the Chauvinistic tendencies which had become noticeable in Germany under the government of William the Second, Bismarck, after his retirement, unceasingly urged that Germany should follow a policy of peace, of moderation, of good faith, and of good fellowship towards other nations. He wrote in his *Memoirs* :

We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeling which has been called forth through our growth to the position of a real Great Power by the honourable and peaceful use of our influence, and so convince the world that a German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less partisan, and also less harmful for the freedom of others, than would be the hegemony of France, Russia, or England.

It has always been my ideal aim, after we had established our unity within the possible limits, to win the confidence not only of the smaller European States, but also of the Great Powers, and to convince them that German policy will be just and peaceful now that it has repaired the *injuria temporum*, the disintegration of the nation. In order to produce this confidence it is above everything necessary that we should be honourable, open, and easily reconciled in case of friction or untoward events.

In most cases an open and honourable policy succeeds better than the subtlety of earlier ages.

Advocating a peaceful, honourable, and straightforward policy, Bismarck was absolutely opposed to unnecessary wars, and especially to preventive wars. Hence, he would not allow the military men, who easily incline towards war, to exercise any influence upon statesmanship. He wrote in his *Memoirs* :

Even victorious wars cannot be justified unless they are forced upon one. Besides, one cannot read the cards of Providence far enough ahead to anticipate historical development and make one's own calculations accordingly. It is natural that in the staff of the army not only young, active officers, but experienced strategists also should feel the need of

turning to account the efficiency of their troops and their own capacity to lead, and should wish to make themselves renowned in history. It would be a matter of regret if that feeling did not exist in the army. However, the task of keeping that feeling within such limits as the nation's need of peace can justly claim is the duty of the political, not the military, heads of the State.

That feeling becomes dangerous only under a monarch whose policy lacks sense of proportion and power to resist one-sided and constitutionally unjustifiable influences.

How peaceful Bismarck's views were may be seen from the following New Year article which appeared in the *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung* on the 4th of January 1892. We read :

The indisputable predominance of Germany in European policy from the end of the Franco-German War to the end of the 'eighties was due, before all, to the superiority of the German army and to the great personal prestige and influence enjoyed by the Emperor William I. and Prince Bismarck. Since then other nations have increased their readiness for war, and since the disappearance of the old Emperor and of his Chancellor, Germany's authoritative position has naturally diminished, for only fresh successes can give Germany that prestige and influence which she acquired in the times of these men. However, successes similar to those achieved in the time of William I. do not often recur.

The German Empire, as left by its founders, does not require new foreign wars, for nothing can be gained by them. On the contrary, Germany's principal aim must be to increase its internal strength, so that the Empire may be able to weather future storms. In the time of William I. it was necessary to bring about appeals to arms, because the foundations of Germany's national life had to be laid. Now it is Germany's task to avoid these decisions as far as possible, for by war nothing can be gained, and only that which has been won can be lost. That has been Prince Bismarck's leading political idea ever since the Peace of Frankfort in 1871. . . . In entering upon the New Year we express the wish that German statesmanship may not abandon the fundamental directions which have been laid down for its guidance, that Germany may, at least in the domain of foreign policy, continue to pursue the old course.

After dismissing Bismarck, William the Second announced to the world that he would henceforth steer the ship of State over a new course, and that he would lead Germany towards a great and glorious future. Filled with anxiety lest the reckless ambition of the Emperor would involve the young Empire in unnecessary and perilous wars, Bismarck wrote, in a series of articles published in the *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung* between the 12th and 18th of May 1892 :

Prince Bismarck had created Germany on a broad national basis. When that task had been fulfilled he and his successors had only to preserve Germany's position, the creation of which had demanded such heavy sacrifices. This being his fundamental maxim, it was necessary for Germany to be as strong as possible. At the same time, it was necessary to avoid, as long as possible, all appeals to arms in which Germany

could win nothing, but could only lose. His leading view was that every extension of territory beyond the limits of 1871 would be a misfortune. . . . Bismarck's entire foreign policy culminated in the idea of isolating France and of placing the new frontiers which he had given to Europe under the protection of all the other Powers. . . .

Germany's position and activity will always largely depend upon her Allies. On the day when the leading German statesmen have to decide on peace or war they should inquire conscientiously whether the prize is worthy the sacrifice, and whether the desired result cannot be equally well obtained without a war, the issue of which no one can guarantee. War is made only for the sake of peace. It is made only in order to obtain those conditions in which we wish to live with our opponent when the war is over. . . . Is it really necessary to pursue a new course? The new pilot is, perhaps, not able to steer the German ship of State with the knowledge and determination of his predecessor, but is it therefore necessary to abandon altogether the course that had been steered in the past?

Wishing to avoid unnecessary and ruinous wars, Bismarck desired before all to avoid a war with Russia, Germany's traditional ally, who had saved Prussia from extinction in the time of Napoleon, and who had supported her in the wars of 1866 and 1870, and had thus enabled Germany to achieve her national unity. Besides, Germany and Russia had no conflicting interests, and neither Power had reason to covet any territory possessed by the other. Desiring that Germany should develop in peace, and fearing the possibility of a hostile attack, Bismarck had concluded a purely defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy. It seemed, therefore, not likely that Russia would attack either Germany or Austria. Hence a war with Russia seemed to be possible only if an Austro-Russian quarrel should break out about the Balkan Peninsula and if Austria was the aggressor. Bismarck was determined that Germany should not be drawn unnecessarily into a purely Austrian quarrel. Hence he had concluded with Russia a secret defensive Treaty which, as has previously been stated, assured that country of Germany's benevolent neutrality in the event of an Austrian attack. As long as Russia felt sure of Germany's benevolent neutrality if attacked by Austria, she had no cause to ally herself with France. Thus France remained isolated, and Austria could not venture to attack Russia unless with Berlin's approval. Hence she was compelled to be guided in her Balkan policy by Germany. If, on the other hand, Russo-German relations should become bad, it was clear that Russia would turn to France for support, and that Austria would be able to drag Germany into her Balkan adventures. Bismarck wrote in his *Memoirs* :

After the conclusion of our defensive alliance with Austria I considered it as necessary to cultivate neighbourly relations with Russia as before. . . .

If, however, Germany should quarrel with Russia, if an irremediable estrangement should take place between the two countries, Austria would certainly begin to enlarge her claims to the services of her German ally, first by insisting on an extension of the *casus foederis*, which so far, according to the published text, provides only for the measures necessary to repel a Russian attack upon Austria; then by requiring the *casus foederis* to be replaced by some provision safeguarding the Austrian interests in the Balkans and the East, an idea to which the Press has already succeeded in giving practical shape.

The wants and the plans of the inhabitants of the basin of the Danube naturally reach far beyond the present limits of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The German Imperial Constitution points out the way by which Austria may advance and reconcile her political and material interests, so far as they lie between the eastern frontier of the Roumanian population and the Gulf of Cattaro. It is, however, no part of the policy of the German Empire to lend its subjects, and to expend their blood and treasure, for the purpose of realising the designs of a neighbouring Power.

In the interest of the European political equilibrium the maintenance of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a strong independent Great Power is for Germany an object for which she might, in case of need, stake her own peace with a good conscience. But Vienna should abstain from going outside this security, and should not deduce from the alliance claims which it was not concluded to support. . . .

After Bismarck's dismissal the defensive Russo-German Treaty, the so-called Re-Insurance Treaty, was not renewed. Prince Hohenlohe wrote in his diary on the 31st of March 1890 :

It seems more and more clear that differences regarding Russia between the Emperor and Bismarck have brought about the breach. Bismarck intended to leave Austria in the lurch, while the Emperor wished to support Austria, even if his policy should involve him in war with Russia and France. That is made plain by Bismarck's words that the Emperor carried on his policy like Frederick William the Fourth. Herein lies the danger of the future.

In another part of his *Memoirs*, Prince Hohenlohe wrote that the Emperor's refusal to renew the Russo-German Treaty was the principal cause of Bismarck's dismissal.

The old Emperor was so strongly convinced of the necessity of Germany keeping peace with Russia that on his death-bed, addressing William the Second, he said, according to Bismarck : 'Thou must always keep in touch with the Russian Emperor; there no conflict is necessary.' These were some of his last words.

Bismarck had been dismissed largely because the Emperor wished to reverse Bismarck's policy towards Russia and Austria-Hungary. Foreseeing that a discontinuance of the Russo-German Treaty would ultimately, and almost inevitably, involve Germany in an Austro-Russian war about the Balkans, where Germany had no direct interests, Bismarck wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* on the 26th of April 1890, only five weeks after his dismissal :

Austria cannot hope to obtain Germany's support for promoting her ambitious plans in the Balkan Peninsula. These Austrian plans have never been encouraged by Germany as long as German's foreign policy was directed by Prince Bismarck. On the contrary, the Prince has, at every opportunity, particularly at the time of the Bulgarian incident, shown with the utmost clearness that he is very far from wishing to promote Austria's special interests in the Balkans in antagonism to Russia. Such a policy would not be in harmony with the stipulations of the Triple Alliance. That Alliance views only the *damnum emergens*, not the *lucrum cessans*, of the signatory Powers. Least of all is it Germany's business to support Austria's ambitions in the Balkan Peninsula. If such ambitions exist, and are to be promoted with the assistance of other nations, Austria-Hungary will have to address herself not to Germany, but to the nations interested in Balkan politics. These are all the Great Powers except Germany. They are (apart from Russia) England, France, and Italy. Austria can always arrive at an understanding with these Powers if she wishes to further her interests in the Balkans, and Germany need not concern herself about them. Germany's point of view is this: that she has no interests in Balkan affairs.

Five months later, on the 29th of September 1890, Bismarck renewed his warning in the *Hamburger Nachrichten*:

In the past, when the relations between Germany and Austria and between Germany and Russia were discussed, there were two points of danger: Firstly, that German policy—or, what would be worse, the German Army—should be placed at the disposal of purely Austrian interests in the Balkans against Russia; secondly, that Germany's relations with Russia should be endangered and brought to the breaking-point by unnecessary Press attacks. We have always warned against this two-fold danger, but we have never advised a breach of treaty faith towards Austria. The Austro-German alliance does not demand that Germany should support Austria's Balkan interests against Russia. It only demands that Germany should assist Austria if her territories should be attacked by Russia. . . . We attach the greatest value to the preservation of good and cordial relations between Germany and Russia. If Austria and Russia should differ, Germany can mediate most successfully if she is trusted in St. Petersburg. Besides, a breach with Russia would, according to our inmost conviction, make Germany dependent upon Austria. . . . No one can object if Austria succeeds in her Balkan policy without a war with Russia which would demand enormous sacrifices in blood and treasure. The Balkans do not concern Germany. We are interested in the maintenance of peace, and we do not care how Austria and Russia arrange their spheres of interest in the Balkans. . . .

Being anxious that good relations should exist between Germany and Austria, and that Austria's power and position should be preserved, we have opposed mistaken views as to the scope of the Austro-German Treaty, and have endeavoured to show that that Treaty does not oblige Germany to support Austria in the Balkans.

Hinting at the so-called Re-Insurance Treaty with Russia which William the Second had refused to renew, under the provisions of which Germany was to support Russia in case of an unprovoked attack upon her by Austria, Bismarck wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* of the 24th of January 1892:

The Austro-German Treaty of Alliance of 1879 contemplated, as far as Russia was concerned, only mutual defence against a possible attack. Hence Germany always pointed out in Vienna that the Austro-German Alliance protected only the Dual Monarchy itself, but not its Balkan policy, against Russia. With regard to the Balkans, Germany had unceasingly advised Austria to find protection by means of a separate Treaty with the States interested in the Balkans, such as England and Italy. Relying on the unaggressive character of the Austro-German Treaty, Germany was always able to go hand in hand with Russia, and to influence Austria if the Eastern policy of that country seemed likely to take an undesirable turn.

This advantageous position, the maintenance of which made considerable claims upon the skill of Germany's diplomacy, was later on believed to be too complicated. Besides, personal misunderstandings [between the Emperor and the Czar] impaired the good relations between Berlin and St. Petersburg, and led to the Russo-French rapprochement. Thus the position has changed to Germany's disadvantage. Formerly it was in Germany's power to arrive at any moment at an understanding with Russia, in consequence of treaty arrangements which existed side by side with the Austro-German Treaty, but which exist no longer. In consequence of the estrangement between Germany and Russia, Austria has been enabled to exercise considerable pressure upon Germany.

Foretelling the present War and the breakdown of the Triple Alliance, Bismarck continued :

Apparently German statesmanship no longer observes a disinterested attitude in Eastern affairs. By following the path upon which she has entered, Germany is in danger of gradually becoming dependent upon Austria, and in the end she may have to pay with her blood and treasure for the Balkan policy of Vienna. In view of that possibility, it will be readily understood that Prince Bismarck again and ever again gave warning that Germany should not break with Russia. . . .

The change in the European situation to Germany's disadvantage cannot be excused by extolling the power of the Triple Alliance. Formerly the Triple Alliance existed as it does now, and its importance was increased by the fact that Germany had a free hand, directed it, and dominated Europe. We fear that since then the strength of the Alliance has not increased. . . . A crisis in Italy, a change of sovereign in Austria or the like may shake its foundations so greatly that in spite of all written engagements it will be impossible to maintain it. In that case Germany's position would become extremely serious, for in order not to become entirely isolated she would be compelled to follow Austria's policy in the Balkans without reserve. Germany might get into the leading-strings of another Power which, it is true, has accepted the new position of Germany. However, no one can tell whether Austria's historic resentment will not re-awaken and endeavour to find satisfaction at Germany's cost if the fortune of war should no longer favour Germany or if the pressure of European events should weigh upon us. Notwithstanding her fidelity to treaty, Austria may be disinclined to bear the supremacy of the new German Empire.

Considering good relations between Russia and Germany absolutely essential for Germany's security, and desiring to bring about a renewal of the Russo-German Re-Insurance Treaty, Bismarck at last embarked upon a great Press campaign. He revealed to Germany and the world the fact that there had

formerly existed a secret treaty with Russia in the plainest language in his celebrated article which appeared on the 24th of October 1896 in the *Hamburger Nachrichten*. We read in it :

Russo-German relations remained good until 1890. Up to that date both States were fully agreed that if one of them were attacked the other would observe a benevolent neutrality. For instance, if Germany were attacked by France she would be sure of Russia's benevolent neutrality, and Russia would be sure of Germany's benevolent neutrality if she was attacked without cause. That agreement has not been renewed since the time when Prince Bismarck left office, and if we are rightly informed about the occurrences which have taken place in Berlin it appears that the failure to renew the treaty was not due to Russia being dissatisfied at the change of Chancellors. It was Count Caprivi who refused to renew the mutual insurance of Russia and Germany, although Russia was ready to renew it. As at the same time Germany pursued a philo-Polish policy, it was only natural that the Russian Government should ask itself: What can be the object of Prussia's Polish policy, which stands in flagrant opposition to the friendly relations established at the time of the Emperor William the First?

We need not mention other anti-Russian indications at the German Foreign Office. Caprivi's attitude in the general European policy and in Germany's Polish policy was such that Russia, notwithstanding her great power, had seriously to consider the future. During the Crimean War all Europe, Prussia excepted, had been hostile to Russia. We do not intend to assert that a similar position will return. Still, it is only natural if a powerful State like the Russian Empire says to itself: 'We must have at least one reliable Ally in Europe. Formerly we could reckon with the three Emperors Alliance. Afterwards we could depend upon the House of Hohenzollern. If, however, in times of difficulty, we should meet with an anti-Russian policy, we must endeavour to arrange for support elsewhere.' The Kronstadt meeting and the first rapprochement between Absolute Russia and Republican France was solely brought about by Caprivi's political mistakes. Hence, Russia was forced to find in France that security which of course her statesmen desired to obtain.

This article created an immense sensation not only in the entire German Press but in the Press of the world. The Government-inspired Press accused Bismarck of high treason in divulging secrets of State, and threatened him with the public prosecutor and with imprisonment. The disclosure led to a prolonged Press campaign in the course of which Bismarck defended the Re-Insurance Treaty with great vigour in numerous articles. With wonderful energy Bismarck, who was then eighty-two years old, endeavoured once more to direct the policy of Europe with his indefatigable pen. He not merely criticised Germany's foreign policy and pointed out the dangerous mistake which had been made in destroying the intimate relations which existed formerly between Russia and Germany; he endeavoured at the same time to bring about a re-grouping of the Powers and to create differences between Russia and France likely to destroy their recent intimacy. This may be seen from many articles of Bismarck's, published at the time in various journals.

In his *Memoirs* Bismarck summarised his views as to the attitude of Russia and France in this blunt phrase : ' With France we shall never have peace ; with Russia never the necessity for war, unless Liberal stupidities or dynastic blunders falsify the situation.'

' Dynastic blunders ' have done what Liberal stupidities failed to achieve.

In his articles and in his *Memoirs* Bismarck repeatedly pointed out that Austria-Hungary might not only abandon Germany in the hour of need, but, remembering the loss of Silesia to Prussia and the Battle of Königgrätz, turn against Germany.

Unceasingly Bismarck pointed out in the clearest language that Germany was under no obligation whatever to support Austria in the Balkans, and that, in case of serious Austro-Russian differences, such as those which arose in July 1914 about Serbia, Germany should not act as Austria's unconditional supporter but as a mediator between the two States. Bismarck wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* on the 15th of January 1893 :

The Austro-German Treaty of Alliance provides only against an attack on Austrian and German territory on the part of Russia. Being thus limited, the possibility is excluded that the Treaty may serve Austria's special interests in the Balkans. The purpose of the Alliance is exclusively to prevent a Russian war of aggression. Its purpose is in no way to strengthen Austria in the pursuit of a purely Austrian policy in the East. Germany has no interests in the East. Besides, if she supported Austria's Balkan policy she would defeat the purpose of the Treaty, which is to preserve the peace. If Austria was entitled to the support of Germany's bayonets if engaged in the East, a collision with Russia would become probable. Hence the *casus foederis* is limited to the possibility of a Russian attack upon one of the two Allies. The task of Germany, as Austria's Ally, consists in acting as a mediator between the two Powers in case of differences in the Balkans. If Austria wishes to further her individual interests in the Balkans she must seek support not in Germany, but among those countries which are interested in the East—England, France, and Italy.

Bismarck spoke and wrote in vain. His shallow successors treated his advice with contempt. The great German statesman not only pointed out the mistake which the Emperor had made in breaking with Russia but he tried to re-create the intimate relations which formerly existed between Germany and Russia. His exertions proved unavailing, and he wrote despairingly in the *Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* in June 1892 :

The worst that has happened under the Chancellorship of Caprivi is that all the threads connecting Germany with Russia were suddenly broken. The German Emperor tried to win over the Russians with amiable advances. However, busy intermediaries reported to him expressions from the Czar's entourage which proved that his intended visit

to Russia would be politically unsuccessful. Then William the Second immediately went to England and concluded with England the Treaty relating to Zanzibar and Heligoland, and that anti-Russian demonstration was followed by his philo-Polish policy, which was hurtful to Russia. Germany's foreign policy could not have taken a more fatal step than to threaten Russia with the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland in case of a Russian defeat. That was bound to lead to the Franco-Russian rapprochement and to Kronstadt.

Bismarck clearly recognised that the alliance between Italy and Austria was an unnatural one, and that Italy's fidelity to her two partners would depend partly on the character of Germany's policy, partly on England's relations with Germany. In view of Italy's long and exposed sea-border and of her vulnerability in case of an attack from the sea, Italy could obviously not be expected to support Germany and Austria if such support would involve her in hostilities with the strongest Naval Power. For this reason, among others, Bismarck was anxious that Germany and England should be firm friends. He wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* on the 13th of June 1890 :

The co-operation of Germany, Austria, and Italy threatens no one. The Triple Alliance does not involve dangers which would become fatal to the co-operation of these three States. On the contrary, the Alliance is designed to strengthen the peace of Europe. The *casus foederis* towards Russia arises only if Russia attacks the territory of one of the two Allies. This limitation deprives the Alliance of all aggressive tendencies, and excludes the possibility that it may serve the special interests of Austria in the Balkan Peninsula and thus threaten the preservation of peace. . . .

The Austro-Italian Alliance is not equally favourable. Between Austria and Italy there are unadjusted differences, which are to be found particularly on the side of Italy, such as the anti-Austrian aspirations of the Irredentists. Besides, the Italian Radicals are opposed to the Triple Alliance, and sympathise with France. . . . In view of France's aspirations, Italy must be able to rely on the assistance of the English Fleet, for the Triple Alliance cannot protect the Italian coasts. Hence, Italy has to think of England, and consideration of England may conceivably limit Italy's freedom of action. The maintenance of the present relations between Austria and Italy must be the principal care of the diplomats, especially as, if Italy for some reason or other should abandon the Triple Alliance, the Austrian Army would be compelled to protect the Dual Monarchy against Italy. Hence it would no longer be able to fulfil Article 1 of its Alliance with Germany, according to which it should assist Germany 'with its entire armed power.' By the detachment of Italy, the Austro-German Alliance would militarily lose so much that its value would become very problematical. . . .

If we sum up the considerations developed we find that the present position is quite satisfactory. As long as Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy are united in the Triple Alliance, and as long as these three States may reckon on the assistance of the English sea-power, the peace of Europe will not be broken. We must take care that friendly relations between Austria and Italy and between Italy and England shall be maintained. Besides, we must see that the Triple Alliance is restricted to its original scope, and that it is not allowed to serve those special interests which have nothing to do with it. We therefore firmly trust that, as

far as Germany is concerned, the 'old course' will be preserved with particular care.

Bismarck died on the 30th of July 1898. We know from his speeches in the Reichstag that he attached the greatest value to good relations between England and Germany, that he saw in England 'Germany's natural and traditional ally.'² Hence he never thought an Anglo-German war possible. To him such a war was, as he said, unthinkable. As long as the great Chancellor lived William the Second did not venture upon pursuing a violently anti-British policy which was bound to drive this country into the arms of France and Russia. Although William the Second was hostile to England, he was probably restrained by the fear of Bismarck's criticism during the Chancellor's lifetime. Soon after Bismarck's death William the Second began his naval campaign. When Bismarck had closed his eyes a violent anti-British agitation, financed by Krupp and carried on by hundreds of generals and professors, was started throughout Germany, and in 1900 was published the great German Navy Bill, in the introduction of which we read the ominous and oft-quoted words: 'Germany requires a fleet of such strength that a war with the mightiest naval Power would jeopardise the supremacy of that Power.'

Bismarck had observed the Emperor's Anglophobia in its more modified form with alarm, fearing its effect upon Italy. He had written in a series of articles on the European situation, published in the *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung* from the 12th to the 18th of May 1892:

In discussing Anglophobia in Germany we must remember that the principal Anglophobe is supposed to be the Emperor William the Second, who was hostile to England not only as Crown Prince, but even during the first years of his rule.

England's attitude towards the Triple Alliance depends not upon the Heligoland Treaty, but on Italy. If England is opposed to Germany, we can never reckon upon Italy's help. . . . The Austro-Hungarian Army is at Germany's disposal only if the Dual Monarchy does not require its use against Italy. Otherwise, one-half of the Austrian Army would be lost to Germany. . . . Italy is therefore a very important factor in the Triple Alliance, even if she limits her action to abstaining from attacking Austria. . . . The idea that Russia may make a surprise attack upon Germany is Utopian. Only moderate diplomatic skill on Germany's part is required to avoid a war with Russia for generations. The tension among the nations would be greatly diminished if we should succeed in re-creating in leading Russian circles the faith in Germany's neighbourly honesty which has disappeared since Bismarck's resignation. . . . A Russian war is a calamity which must not be brought upon the population of the Eastern Provinces of Germany without pressing necessity. The seriousness of a Russo-German war is particularly great, because it would immediately lead to a Franco-German war, while, on the other

² The principal passages will be found in 'The Ultimate Ruin of Germany,' *Nineteenth Century and After*, September 1914.

hand, a Franco-German war need not lead to Russian intervention. Besides, the impossibility of obtaining adequate compensation for such a war must be borne in mind. What can Germany obtain from Russia? . . . At best she would obtain a second neighbour-State thirsting for revenge. Germany would be in an uncomfortable position created by her own rashness.

Bismarck did not consider England's support as a matter admitting of doubt. He reckoned upon it as a matter of course. Commenting upon an important colonial debate in the Reichstag, he wrote in the *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung* on the 8th of February 1891 :

The value of England's friendship consists in this: that in case of a war she protects the Italian coasts or, which is perhaps more uncertain, helps in protecting the German shores. By doing this, England would largely act in her own interest. . . .

Three days later he wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* :

In decisive moments our co-operation with Italy would be influenced by England's attitude. The greater or lesser measure of good relations between England and Germany is not without influence upon Italy's policy, and it is certainly questionable how Germany's relations with Italy would shape themselves if Italy should no longer be in the position of being attached by an equal friendship to England and to Germany.

On the 19th of May 1892 he wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* :

We have repeatedly had occasion to point out that Italy's faithfulness to the Triple Alliance depends largely upon the relations existing between England and that country. Italy cannot run the risk of being isolated in the Mediterranean, and of being defeated by France. Hence she must be certain of the protection of the English Fleet in case of need.

The agitation for strengthening the German Navy began in a mild way soon after William the Second came to the throne. Bismarck, observing that dangerous development with concern, warned Germany against frittering away her strength and competing on the sea with the French or English Fleets. Addressing 3000 people from Schleswig-Holstein, Bismarck said on the 26th of May 1895 :

I wished to acquire Schleswig-Holstein, because unless we had that province we could not hope to have a German Fleet. It was a question of national dignity that in case of need Germany should be able to hold her own against a second-rate Navy. Formerly, we had no fleet. I should consider it an exaggeration for Germany to compete with the French or the English Navy. However, we must be strong enough on the sea to be able to deal with those second-rate Powers which we cannot get at by land.

Two years later Bismarck warned Germany more emphatically against creating a fleet strong enough to challenge England. On the 4th of September 1897 Mr. Maximilian Harden published in the *Zukunft* the following pronouncement of Prince Bismarck :

The papers are discussing unceasingly whether the German Fleet should be increased. Of course, all that is required in the opinion of sober-minded experts should be voted. I have never been in favour of a Colonial policy of conquest similar to that pursued by France. As far as one can see, the most important thing for Germany is a strong and reliable Army provided with the best weapons. I am of Moltke's opinion—that we shall have to fight on the Continent of Europe for the possession of Colonies. We must beware of undue economy in naval matters, but we must also guard ourselves against fantastical plans which might cause us to quarrel with people who are important for our position in Europe. *Qui trop embrasse. . .*

In December 1897 Bismarck stated his views on Germany's transmaritime policy as follows in the *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten* :

The German Government should not embark on undertakings unless they are absolutely required, or at least justified, by the material interests of the State. . . . Nothing would be more strongly opposed to Germany's interests than to enter upon more or less daring and adventurous undertakings guided merely by the desire to have a finger in every pie, to flatter the vanity of the nation or to please the ambitions of those who rule it. To carry on a policy of prestige would be more in accordance with the French than the German character. In order to acquire prestige, France has gone to Algiers, Tunis, Mexico, and Madagascar. If Germany should ever follow a similar policy she would not promote any German interests, but would endanger the welfare of the Empire and its position in Europe.

Bismarck clearly foresaw that by embarking recklessly upon a policy of adventure in the colonial sphere Germany might endanger her relations with Great Britain. Besides, he foresaw that by wresting Port Arthur from victorious Japan in company with Russia and France, and occupying Kiaochow, she might later on be exposed to Japan's hostility. He did not understand why Germany should have gone out of her way to drive Japan out of Port Arthur with the help of France and Russia. Therefore he wrote on the 7th of May 1895 in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* :

It appears that Japan, following the friendly advice of Germany, Russia, and France, has abandoned the Liao-tung Peninsula. Germany has no interest whether the district in question remains in China's possession or not. If she has nevertheless exerted pressure upon Japan she might have had reasons with which we are not acquainted. Possibly the policy made in Berlin may have been due to the persuasiveness of people who were in favour of a policy of prestige similar to that pursued in the time of Napoleon the Third.

If Germany's action at Tokio was intended to do a service to Russia, it might perhaps be approved of. However, Russia might have been supported by an attitude of benevolent neutrality without active interference. . . . For the present we believe that Germany's initiative in East Asia was not timely, and we doubt whether that policy and the extraordinary change of attitude towards England can be justified. We

cannot help fearing that Germany's initiative in East Asia is merely a symptom of a defect from which our foreign policy suffers: that it springs from the inability to sit still and wait. We do not see why it was necessary to run any risks. . . . Germany's action has diminished the sympathies for Germany which hitherto existed in Japan. That loss was perhaps unnecessary. The loss incurred on the one side may perhaps be balanced by gains, but only the future can show whether there are any gains.

Reverting to Germany's East Asiatic policy, Bismarck wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* on the 23rd of May 1895 :

Germany's action against Japan can only be explained by a desire to regain good relations with Russia, which have lately been lost. If that is the case, the Government should be careful not to fall between two stools. Russia desires to obtain ice-free harbours in the East, and Germany has no reason either to support or to oppose her. During decades we have endeavoured to encourage France to develop and expand in every direction—except in that of Alsace-Lorraine. We have encouraged her to expand in Tunis, in India, and in Africa, and we have a similar interest as regards Russia in the East. Germany has little interest in the Black Sea, but still less in the Sea of Japan. . . . As we said before, we do not know the intentions of the Government, but we can only recommend that Germany, after having once more grasped Russia's hand, should hold it firmly and stand by Russia as long as Germany's own interests are not hurt thereby. If the contrary policy is followed, the result would be that we should offend Russia as much as we have already offended Japan by our interference.

Bismarck gave two most impressive warnings regarding mistakes in foreign policy in general and regarding a German attack on France, such as that which took place last summer, in particular. In Chapter XXVIII. of his *Memoirs* the great statesman wrote :

Errors in the policy of the Cabinets of the Great Powers bring no immediate punishment, either in St. Petersburg or in Berlin, but they are never harmless. The logic of history is even more exact in its revisions than the chief Audit Office of Prussia.

In Chapter XXIX., entitled 'The Triple Alliance,' Bismarck wrote regarding a German attack upon France :

It is explicable that for Russian policy there is a limit beyond which the importance of France must not be diminished. That limit was reached, I believe, at the Peace of Frankfort, a fact which, in 1870 and 1871, was not so completely realised at St. Petersburg as five years later. I hardly think that during the Franco-German War the Russian Cabinet clearly foresaw that, when it was over, Russia would have for neighbour so strong and so united a Germany.

Bismarck was a most loyal citizen. He never endeavoured to revenge himself on the Emperor for the disgraceful way in which he was dismissed, and for the persecution which, after his dismissal, he suffered at the hands of the bureaucracy, no doubt by the Emperor's orders. Although he distrusted the Emperor's reckless and adventurous personal policy, he never

attacked him or reproached him personally. He merely criticised his advisers and their action, and laid down the broad principles of Germany's policy in his posthumous *Memoirs* and in numerous speeches and articles. Bismarck's worst fears have been realised. The German nation, as I said before, has paid lip-service to Bismarck, but has utterly disregarded his warnings and advice. William the Second and his courtier-statesmen have apparently destroyed Bismarck's creation. They cannot plead that they were not warned, for Bismarck foretold unceasingly that the Emperor's rash interference would lead to the break-up of the Triple Alliance, make Germany subservient to Austria-Hungary, involve her in war with Russia about the Balkan Peninsula where Germany possesses no interests, detach Italy, bring about Japan's hostility, and end in Germany's isolation in Europe. The official and non-official spokesmen of Germany assert unceasingly that a world conspiracy has been formed against their country, that Russia, or England, is to blame for the present War. Those who are acquainted with Bismarck's writings know that the present War has not been caused by England's jealousy or Russia's ambitions, or France's thirst for revenge, but only by Germany's own folly, and especially by the action of her Emperor, who dismissed Bismarck, disregarded his warnings, and plunged the nation into a war which may end in Germany's destruction.

Bismarck died at the ripe age of eighty-two. During no less than thirty-nine years he was in the service of the Government, first as Ambassador and then as Prime Minister and Chancellor. As Prime Minister of Prussia and Chancellor of Germany he was uninterruptedly in office during twenty-eight years, and during the whole of that long period he laboured and fought unceasingly with the single object of establishing the German Empire and of consolidating it. Bismarck scarcely knew the meaning of pleasure or of relaxation. He laboured day and night. Frequently in the course of the night he called one of his secretaries to his bedside and dictated to him. The great Chancellor gave all his time, in fact his whole life, to his country. After his dismissal in 1890 he spent the last eight years, not in resting from his labours, but in fighting for his country. He fought not against the Emperor, as his enemies and enviers have often asserted, but against the pernicious policy, the incompetent statesmen, and the dangerous influences which, he feared, would cause Germany's downfall. Bismarck laboured and fought in vain. At the centenary of his birth the wonderful edifice which he erected almost single-handed seems to be crumbling. One man created the German Empire, and another one is apparently destroying it.

J. ELLIS BARKER.

LA BELGIQUE D'AUJOURD'HUI ET LA BELGIQUE DE DEMAIN

JE viens de passer quelques jours en Belgique, dans ce qui nous reste de Belgique, de Belgique indépendante. C'est un bien petit pays—quelques lieues carrées à peine—un pays de brouillards et de marécages, arrosé de sang, semé de ruines, mais c'est le dernier refuge de nos espérances, le suprême réduit de nos libertés. Ce pays, hier encore, avait une capitale : Furnes dont les monuments unissent la grâce de la Renaissance à la sévérité du Gothique : l'artillerie lourde des Allemands nous en a chassés. Mais s'il n'a plus de capitale, il lui reste une Armée, et il lui reste un Roi. Hier encore, ceux qui connaissaient mal le Roi Albert ne voyaient en lui qu'un jeune homme timide, appliqué, un peu gauche. On le savait courageux. On n'ignorait pas qu'à l'exemple d'autres jeunes souverains, comme le Roi d'Espagne ou le Roi d'Italie, il était d'esprit libéral, qu'il rêvait de réconcilier la royauté avec la démocratie, et, peut-être, avec le socialisme. Mais il a fallu la guerre pour le révéler à lui-même et aux autres, pour faire surgir des lisières de la Royauté un Homme, ferme, droit, intrépide, qui force l'admiration de ses ennemis, et en qui les Républicains, eux-mêmes—et nous en sommes—saluent les vertus militaires et civiques d'un Hoche ou d'un Marceau.

Quant à l'Armée Belge, elle a, depuis sept mois, subi les plus dures épreuves. Un instant, après la chute d'Anvers, on a pu croire que c'en était fait d'elle, et je me souviendrai toute ma vie de l'impression désastreuse que nous eûmes lorsque, le 10 octobre, nous vîmes sur la route de Furnes à Dunkerque, défilér dans un effrayant désarroi les avant-gardes de la retraite—30,000 soldats de forteresse—pêle-mêle avec un flot de 60,000 réfugiés. Mais, à l'arrière, heureusement, les divisions de l'Armée de Campagne tenaient tête à l'invasion. Elles tinrent pendant deux jours, pendant dix jours, en attendant que les Français arrivent. Elles tinrent malgré des pertes terribles—15,000 tués ou blessés sur un effectif de 50,000 bayonnettes. Elles tinrent contre trois corps d'armée, jusqu'au moment où, pour la première fois depuis le début de la guerre, elles

entrèrent en contact avec la grande armée des Alliés, et relayées par celle-ci, ou mises à l'abri par les inondations de l'Yser, elles connurent enfin un repos relatif.

Qui les eut vues alors, sans les revoir depuis, aurait peine à les reconnaître.

Il y a quatre mois, l'Armée Belge était réduite à quelques milliers d'hommes, sans souliers, sans couvertures, sans vêtements d'hiver. Mais, avec une rapidité merveilleuse, elle s'est refaite. Ses effectifs sont rétablis, ses pertes sont réparées, son moral n'a jamais été meilleur, et, tout le long des côtes de la Manche, depuis la Normandie jusqu'en Flandre, la Belgique d'aujourd'hui, frémissante et en armes, se prépare à refaire la Belgique de demain.

Dans les camps d'instruction, tout d'abord, de Rouen à Dieppe, il y a des milliers de recrues, venues pour la plupart de la Belgique occupée. A l'appel du Gouvernement, elles ont passé les lignes Allemandes, au péril de leur vie, et attendent avec impatience le moment d'aller faire le coup de feu contre les Allemands.

Viennent ensuite, autour de Calais, les Dépôts divisionnaires, où il y a encore quelques milliers d'hommes : soldats des anciennes classes ou convalescents que, bientôt, l'on renverra au front.

Enfin, par delà la frontière française, les six divisions de l'Armée de Campagne, bien équipées, bien armées, avec leurs effectifs complets.

Toutes ces troupes, bien entendu, ne se trouvent pas en même temps sur la ligne de feu. Dans la règle, les hommes restent pendant 48 heures aux avant-postes, aux tranchées, ou au piquet, et 48 heures au repos, dans les cantonnements. Mais, pendant ce repos même, il ne connaissent pas la sécurité, car il n'y a pas, dans la Belgique d'aujourd'hui, une seule localité qui ne soit sous le feu des batteries allemandes ; que cette localité s'appelle, par exemple, L. . . . à l'arrière, P. . . . sur la ligne des tranchées, ou X. aux avant-postes.

Voici L. . . . d'abord, un petit village du Furnes-Ambacht, à plus d'une lieue des lignes ennemies. Jamais un projectile n'y était tombé, et jamais, sans doute, un soldat Allemand n'y mettra les pieds. Mais, au mois de janvier dernier, on y a fait cantonner des troupes. Toute une compagnie avait été logée dans l'église. La nuit après, tous dormaient d'un profond sommeil, lorsqu'un obus de vingt-et-un, faisant crouler la voûte, tua 43 hommes !

Ce sont là, au surplus, des accidents exceptionnels.

Pour entrer, réellement, dans le domaine de la mort, il faut aller jusqu'à cette interminable ligne de tranchées, qui, partant

de la mer, va de Nieuport à Dixmude, et delà, par Soissons et par Rheims, jusqu'aux Vosges.

Encore ne faudrait-il se figurer que, dans cette zone dangereuse, tous les points soient également dangereux.

A Nieuport, à Dixmude, devant Ypres, la bataille est, pour ainsi dire, continue, et les obus ne cessent guère de pleuvoir. Par contre, dans d'autres endroits, où l'on s'est terriblement battu, au mois de Novembre, et où depuis lors les inondations ont rendu toute avance à peu près impossible, c'est à peine si, de temps à autre, on échange quelques salves de shrapnels. Aussi, depuis la bataille de l'Yser, le village de P., ou plutôt les décombres du village de P., sont devenus en quelque sorte un but d'excursion pour toutes les personnes qui sont admises à aller au front. Le poète Emile Verhaeren y est allé; la Reine y vient quelquefois, et un abri où elle s'est arrêtée s'appelle 'Le Repos de la Reine.' Les hommes politiques qui désirent faire figure de héros, ne manquent pas, eux aussi, de s'y rendre, et peuvent, à leur retour, dire qu'ils ont 'visité les troupes sous la pluie des shrapnels.'

En fait, comme on ne tire que par intervalles, et que les artilleurs allemands ont, à cet égard, leurs habitudes, le risque est aussi réduit que possible, et, actuellement, pour courir des dangers à P., il faut y séjourner, comme le font les soldats et comme le font les dames anglaises qui y ont établi un poste de secours.

Elles s'étaient installées au début à cinquante mètres des tranchées, dans la première maison du village, mais cette maison a été détruite, et elles habitent aujourd'hui un autre logement, moins exposé, mais qui peut néanmoins, d'une heure à l'autre, être éventré par un projectile.

Que l'on ne se figure pas au plus que le danger qu'elles courent les empêche de goûter, malgré tout, la joie de vivre. Elles ne seraient pas des Anglaises si, dans cet enfer de P. . . , elles n'avaient pas trouvé le moyen de se créer une sorte de *home*, où elles aiment à recevoir leurs amis.

La dernière fois que j'y suis allé, deux officiers aviateurs étaient venus en auto avec un appareil cinématographique, et, pendant qu'au dehors les canons Belges et les obus Allemands faisaient alterner leurs détonations, ces dames et leurs hôtes prenaient le thé et regardaient passer les films.

Ce ne sont pas nos soldats Belges, au surplus, qui y trouveraient à redire. Eux-mêmes, dans les tranchées, rivalisent de bonne humeur avec leurs amies, les 'Misses.' Au fond de leur abri, couchés sur la paille, près du feu où ils cuisent leurs pommes de terre, ils rient, ils chantent, ils jouent aux cartes. Je me suis

même laissé dire qu'on avait amené aux tranchées un vieux piano, trouvé à Nieuport.

D'aucuns, d'ailleurs, se plaignent de mener une vie trop calme, et regrettent de n'avoir pas l'occasion de tirer plus souvent des coups de fusil sur les 'Boches.'

Les 'Boches,' en effet, sont maintenant assez loin, sur la rive droite de l'Yser, ou, tout au moins, de l'autre côté de la zone inondée.

Pour les approcher, il faut aller jusqu'aux avant-postes, dont certains se trouvent à deux kilomètres au delà des tranchées.

C'est ainsi que l'autre jour, ou plutôt l'autre nuit, je suis allé avec quelques officiers, faire visite à la Grand'-Garde de X. Là-bas vit, depuis un mois, dans une ferme en ruines, une des plus étranges et des plus héroïques figures de cette guerre : le Lieutenant L., un moine franciscain, qui a quitté son couvent pour défendre son pays. Mais, après avoir ainsi troqué la robe contre l'uniforme, il conserve, dans sa nouvelle vie, les habitudes de l'ancienne. Aujourd'hui, comme hier, il vit en cellule, hors du monde. Le poste d'observation qu'il dirige est inaccessible le jour, parce que ses abords sont fauchés par la mitraille. Aussi longtemps qu'il fait clair, un fil téléphonique est son seul lien avec le gros de l'armée. On relève les soldats qu'il commande. Il refuse d'être relevé. On le ravitaille la nuit, quand ce n'est pas impossible. Si on ne le ravitaille pas, il jeûne. Pendant trois jours, dernièrement, il resta sans eau potable. Mourant de soif, il mit dans une marmite de l'eau des inondations, de l'eau salée, où macèrent des cadavres, la fit bouillir, et lécha les gouttelettes qui venaient se fixer sur le couvercle.

La nuit avant celle où nous le vîmes, un obus entra et éclata dans le sombre taudis qui lui sert de chambre. Par un hasard extraordinaire—peut-être dit-il un miracle—il s'en tira avec une éraflure au doigt. Comme nous lui demandions si cette existence n'était pas insupportable, il nous répondit : 'Jamais je ne me suis senti plus heureux, car j'ai conscience de me rendre utile.' Ces mots, d'ailleurs, qu'il a gravés avec un clou sur la muraille, nous disent sa pensée : 'Vive le Roi !'

Quelle distance, à première vue, entre ce moine, ce conservateur, ce royaliste, et le républicain, le socialiste, l'internationaliste, qui venait, par cette nuit d'hiver, lui faire visite ; et cependant, quand nous nous serrâmes la main, à l'extrême pointe de cette Belgique d'aujourd'hui, unifiée dans la souffrance, nous avions le même cœur, la même volonté, la même espérance : libérer notre pays, chasser l'ennemi qui nous guettait, dans ses tranchées, à deux cents mètres et, avec la Belgique d'aujourd'hui, refaire la Belgique de demain !

Cette Belgique de demain, que sera-t-elle ? Qui saurait, qui

oserait le prédire? Mais, quoiqu'il arrive, quoique l'avenir nous réserve, nous savons, nous osons affirmer que cette Belgique *sera*.

Peut-être même pouvons-nous aller plus loin, et nous risquer à dire ce qu'elle ne sera pas, ce qu'elle ne doit pas être.

Avant même que d'avoir vaincu, d'aucuns affirment déjà que la Belgique de demain doit être une Belgique agrandie, aux dépens de l'Allemagne.

Quand nous allions aux Etats-Unis, et passions par l'Angleterre, nous eûmes l'honneur de rencontrer un diplomate éminent, qui jouera sans doute un grand rôle quand seront fixées les conditions de la paix future. Il nous disait : 'La Belgique, après cette guerre, doit devenir un grand pays.' Et d'autres, moins mesurés dans leurs propos, se hasarrent à dire : 'Il faut que la Belgique de demain s'étende jusqu'à la rive gauche du Rhin.'

Il est trop tôt pour parler de ce que nous pourrions légitimement demander au jour de la victoire : peut-être une rectification de la frontière du côté de Moresnet et de Malmédy, ou même le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, si, librement consultés, les Grands-ducaux manifestaient le désir de s'unir à la Belgique. Mais il n'est pas trop tôt pour dire, dès à présent, les raisons qui nous feraient repousser le dangereux cadeau que serait un morceau d'Allemagne.

Au point de vue de notre politique intérieure, d'abord, notre pays est suffisamment divisé par le dualisme des langues, par la différence des points de vue entre les Flamands et les Wallons, pour que ce soit folie d'y vouloir annexer des populations allemandes, avec d'autres mœurs, d'autres habitudes, d'autres traditions.

De plus, et surtout, procéder par force à des annexions de territoire, créer en Europe de nouveaux irrédentismes, transformer une guerre de défense contre l'impérialisme germanique en une guerre de conquête contre le peuple allemand, ce serait enlever à notre cause tout ce qui fait sa grandeur, sa noblesse et sa légitimité.

Il y a quelques semaines, à Londres, les Socialistes des nations alliées—français, russes, anglais, belges—se réunissaient en Conférence dans le but d'affirmer, s'il était possible, une politique commune. Pareille tentative semblait condamnée à un échec. Comment faire coïncider en effet les points de vue d'hommes aussi différents, placés dans des conditions aussi différentes, que les socialistes belges, légitimement exaspérés par le traitement dont leur pays a été l'innocente victime, les Socialistes français, conscients d'être en état de légitime défense, et les anti-militaristes de la Confédération Générale du Travail, les Tolstoïens de l'Independent Labour Party, et les

révolutionnaires russes, placés dans cette alternative tragique de faire crédit au Tsarisme qui ne désarme pas, ou de faire tort à la démocratie occidentale, en armes contre l'impérialisme germanique? Nous y sommes parvenus cependant. Certes l'ordre du jour voté par la Conférence a été critiqué. On l'a trouvé vague et imprécis. On n'a pas compris, on n'a pas voulu comprendre, que c'était un résultat essentiel d'avoir obtenu l'unanimité sur cette affirmation que la victoire de l'Allemagne serait l'écrasement de la démocratie en Europe et que, pour éviter cette catastrophe, la guerre devait être menée jusqu'au bout.

Seulement, les Socialistes n'eussent pas dit leur pensée toute entière s'ils n'avaient pas ajouté que ce but, ce n'est pas l'écrasement politique et économique de l'Allemagne, mais au contraire, la libération de l'Allemagne, dominée ou trompée par ceux qui la gouvernent.

Ce qui fait pour nous, en effet, de la guerre actuelle, une guerre sainte, c'est que nous avons conscience de lutter pour le Droit, la Liberté, et la Civilisation.

Nous luttons pour le Droit, incarné dans la Belgique, dont les plaies saignantes crient vengeance au Ciel, et le Droit ne sera vengé que le jour où notre pays sera rendu à lui-même et intégralement indemnisé.

Nous luttons pour la Liberté, c'est à dire, pour le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes, et la Liberté ne triomphera que le jour où la Pologne sera ressuscitée, où la France recouvrera ses frontières naturelles, où, de la Mer du Nord aux Balkans il n'y aura plus un peuple qui subisse la loi du plus fort.

Nous luttons, enfin, pour la Civilisation, et la Civilisation ne sera sauvée que le jour où sera vaincue, non pas l'Allemagne 'des penseurs et des poètes,' mais l'Allemagne des hobereaux, des militaires professionnels, des fabricants de canons, l'Allemagne de Krupp, de Zeppelin, de Guillaume II., et aussi l'Allemagne de ces *intellectuels*, qui ont si complètement vérifié cette parole : 'Science sans conscience est la ruine de l'âme.'

Ils sont pires que ceux qui ont commis les pires méfaits, car ils les ont approuvés, sans avoir l'excuse de la fureur du combat. La Belgique a été violée, et ils ont approuvé; la Belgique a été martyrisée, et ils ont approuvé; la Belgique a été ruinée, affamée, décimée, et ils approuvent encore!

Aussi, contre ceux-là, le monde entier se lève, et, c'est notre ferme conviction que dans cette lutte, le dernier mot restera à l'Humanité!

EMILE VANDERVELDE.

VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY SERVICE?

(I)

WANTED: A MILITARY CONSTITUTION

So averse are the English people to anything in the nature of a rigid system that they have hitherto resisted all proposals even to codify their civil laws. Every year this gap in the national polity costs a king's ransom. Lawyers are enriched and litigants are impoverished. Nor does the man in the street always know for certain what is criminal and what is not. Perhaps it is this aversion to a regular system which has for many centuries prevented the existence of a military constitution in England. The scheme under which our military forces have hitherto been raised has been a patchwork of hand-to-mouth expedients, for no well-considered axiom of foreign or domestic policy has dominated its contrivance, but, on the contrary, from time to time new regulations have been piled upon old and new conditions upon existing ones to meet successive emergencies.

Besides an instinctive dislike of symmetrical schemes which is a national failing, it is to be feared that traditions of domestic dissension have caused a deep-rooted hostility to what was long termed a standing army. These traditions have now become a superstition; they date as far back as the quarrel between Charles the First and his Parliament. The Parliament, having executed the King and subverted the constitution, proceeded in its turn to enforce its authority with troops. Again, in the reign of James the Second, the army played an important rôle in the rebellion which established the Whig ascendancy. And after the battle of Waterloo rendered possible a partial disarmament, the troops we continued to maintain were regarded with dislike and suspicion by democratic agitators in spite of the moderation, and even timidity, of the executive in employing them to maintain public order. When the Crimean War broke out the British Army had almost ceased to exist. A mere handful of long-service regiments constituted a sort of Pretorian Guard, without reserves, without a second line, and with no territorial affiliation.

Moreover, these troops lacked almost entirely the administrative services to enable them to take the field as an army; the sanguinary lesson of the campaign that followed produced some good effect, which was enforced by the Indian Mutiny, and by the resurrection of the French power under Napoleon the Third. First the Militia was revived, and a few years later the sense of national danger created the Volunteer force in the teeth of parliamentary and official enmity. The Franco-German War of 1870 and a number of small colonial wars between 1859 and 1899 compelled successive Governments gradually to increase our military resources, but when the catastrophe of the Boer War overtook the Empire, we were, relatively to other nations, even more unprepared for a serious campaign than in 1854. Fortunately war was confined to what history will consider a mere colonial rebellion, the suppression of which taxed the whole military power of the British Empire, but our relations with our continental neighbours were so bad when the early disasters in South Africa occurred, that we were within an ace of being attacked by a European coalition, which might easily have included our present Allies as well as the German Empire. At this most critical moment nothing but the Fleet stood between us and destruction, there were no trained troops, and hardly a round of ammunition left in the United Kingdom.

The British Empire rounded the perilous corner because of the inability of our enemies to combine among themselves, but the margin of safety was so narrow that even the parliamentary politician recognised its nature and understood that something had to be done to prevent its recurrence. The foreign policy of the nation was radically amended. Instead of standing outside the system of European States in 'splendid isolation,' England definitely gravitated into the alliance which existed to curb the power of Germany. The process was slow, and the actual ranging of Britain with the Powers of the Entente was not an accomplished fact until 1911. This delay would have been very wise if the interval had been employed to reorganise our military forces so as to give effect to our policy. Unfortunately our politicians vainly imagined that Allies could take the place of an army.

It is not now too early to consider what shape and form our military institutions should assume after the present War, both because military institutions take a long time to mould and also because popular interest, without which great organic changes cannot be carried through rapidly, diminishes as soon as the peril of war seems to be over. Now is the time to take decisive measures. The neglect to use popular enthusiasm during the Boer War in order to reform our military constitution is costing

us to-day the life of our bravest and best, and, that which may appeal more closely to the 'Pacifist' Party, it is also costing us about two millions sterling a day.

The present writer on several occasions in the *Nineteenth Century* and elsewhere opposed the proposals of the National Service League because it was evident that a great war would probably break out before they could bear fruit, and they were unsuitable to our needs and also altogether insufficient from a military point of view. For example, they only contemplated training partially a vast Militia for home defence, with no obligation to go on active service across the Channel. They corresponded, in fact, in no respect to the military needs of our country. Moreover, Voluntary Service, had it been properly administered and properly supported, could very easily have produced five times the Expeditionary Force sent out by Mr. Asquith's Cabinet to stem the tide of German invasion last August. The product of Voluntary Service in the hands of Lord Kitchener has absolutely proved that point, and having regard to the undoubted advantages of Voluntary Service over Conscription in certain respects, especially in a great maritime Empire such as ours, there was much to be said for retaining that method of enlisting soldiers. But as the writer on more than one occasion pointed out, nothing short of Conscription can produce full muster rolls. The advisability or otherwise of a revolutionary change in our military constitution really depended on our foreign policy. If we needed 300,000 field troops in first line, and no more, to carry out that policy, the voluntary system could be relied on to produce them if it was properly worked. Parenthetically, it may be said that no serious attempt was made by any Government since Waterloo to give that or any other military system a fair chance. If, however, numbers on the Continental scale are required, nothing but compulsory service and universal obligation can supply them.

It is possible, and even not unlikely, that the numbers required to maintain our army on the Continent during the course of this War can be obtained voluntarily, both because of the national enthusiasm and also of other causes which, anyhow, limit the numbers we can put into line irrespective of the numbers who enrol. The question which has to be faced, and which should be faced now, is how the country is to preserve its independence after the War. It is only while the fear which was inspired by the German advance into the heart of France is remembered that we can count on popular support to render these realms safe in the future, and a crucial difference will arise between two schools of opinion. The first will maintain that this War will establish a lasting peace on the Continent:

the second will argue from the general development of organised might, not only in Europe but also in America and elsewhere, that national independence in the future, as in the past, will depend on the ability of any given State to protect itself. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that our insular security is diminishing with every new infernal device imported into naval warfare. Also that the wars of the future, if they do occur, will be waged with even higher military organisations than heretofore, and will be quite relentless in their character and in their final issue.

If the only result of the present War was to be an intensifying of the armament competition in peace with its accompanying burden of taxes, on the top of whatever the War may cost, then the prospect of the future would be dark indeed; but, mercifully, that is an unlikely result for a decade or more, because the vast expenditure of the present War will at any rate limit the outlay on artillery, battleships, and other war material in the near future. It is probable that Germany has touched the high-water mark of her tide of conquest, and it will strain all her resources to the last extremity to retain what she has seized. It is even possible, particularly if Britain succeeds in bringing her whole military power to bear, that Germany will be defeated and temporarily crushed. Temporarily, because the Liberal bravado of extirpating the 'arrogant Prussian military caste' is as absurd as most Liberalism. This caste includes all the inhabitants of Germany and German-Austria, some eighty-five millions of people. These numbers are too great to be extirpated even by professional orators and pacifists. Their military strength may be, perhaps will be, broken for a generation, but one generation is not a day too long to reconstruct the ramshackle edifice of our military laws. If, however, Germany avoids defeat and retains Belgium after the peace, it will probably be obvious, even to Viscount Haldane, that British independence will strictly depend on British ability to fight. Even that far-seeing statesman will hardly repeat his reassuring *bon mot* of last year, 'There will be no war!'

So that whatever is the result of the present War, whether Germany is able to retain her present conquests, or whether her military power is broken for twenty-five years, it is incumbent on all patriots to unite now, while they can get their way, in restoring the health of our military organisation by placing it on a sound, simple and effective basis to meet the peril of a future war with Germany and her possible allies. But after all, the next British war may not be with Germany at all. There are other States in the world whose potential military and naval might is even greater than the present power of Germany, and with whom we have been at bitter war

in the past. It is far from impossible that we shall quarrel with some other State in the next fifty years, though our intentions will be good. We are much more likely to be able to give them effect if we are strong enough to render the hostility of our neighbours unwise and unprofitable. An England subjected to Free Trade and at the same time insufficiently guarded will always be a certain source of discord among the nations which from time to time will produce great wars. But a strong British Empire should and probably would be a great guarantee of European peace in the future, and perhaps the only guarantee. Not such a guarantee as Mr. Asquith made good for Belgium, but power to withstand wanton aggression or the quarrelsome attitude so often caused by suspicion and nervousness in diplomacy.

Of course the training of a considerable proportion of our youth to arms cannot be effected without an annual military budget exceeding that of recent years, but it need not be phenomenally high. At the end of the War we shall probably be in possession of so much stores and equipment that little will be required in the way of initial expense under these headings. The creation of a modern organisation for the Army would greatly reduce the former cost *pro rata*, and it must never be forgotten that while Conscription absorbs some of the wealth of the nation, it increases it considerably on the balance by improving its stock of men, their working capacity, and the length of their lives, besides averting the cost and bloodshed of future wars. So that the bogey of costly armaments eating up the national revenue, which democratic reformers would like to distribute among the electorate under the specious label of Social Reform, more bluntly termed the modern type of political bribery, should not deter the survivors of this War from profiting by its appalling lesson. The cost of compulsory enlistment need not and probably would not exceed the inevitable cost of Voluntary Service, because even if the Army were reduced to its former insufficient numbers after the War, the trend of the world's politics would soon compel successive Governments to increase their military forces somehow, and all the old spendthrift tricks and devices, bounties, capricious and repeated changes of the terms of service, confusion between Foreign and Home liability, would reappear and reduce to chaos any Army that the War creates for England.

To rehearse all the arguments in favour of compulsory enlistment would fill a volume, but there are certain points which, although they are not new, yet because they are habitually overlooked and forgotten it is necessary to press upon the attention of thoughtful folk; and in the near future it is not perhaps too sanguine to hope that we shall count among us more thoughtful folk than hitherto.

Before the outbreak of the War in 1914 the foreign policy of Britain was to maintain a balance between Germany and her allies on the one hand, and Russia and her allies on the other. That, at any rate, was the problem which had to be solved by our military chiefs, and to which every other consideration was small by comparison. The vital necessity of fulfilling this condition was constantly denied by the orators of the political faction which controlled the Government, but, none the less, it was never absent in their intentions, nor indeed could it be. For England to withdraw into splendid isolation would have been an extremely perilous policy while she lacked the military power to render her isolation safe or possible. She was, therefore, thrown into the necessity of consorting with one or other of the groups of European allies. Before the troubles in South Africa the British Foreign Office, although without forming any definite agreement, acted generally in concert with Germany, particularly during Bismarck's tenure of office. Then came the building of the German fleet, the Kruger telegram, the South African War, and the Morocco question. Britain having moved from the German camp towards that of its opponents, and having committed herself to a friendship with France and Russia, it became all-important that she should be strong enough to prevent a rapid overthrow of our friends, for then we might easily have been the next to suffer. The Liberal War Minister, Lord Haldane, who was in office during the critical years when the policy of the Cabinet had made an eventual breach with Germany inevitable, had subscribed to the doctrine of his military advisers and had agreed in principle to despatch a British Army to France in case that country was attacked by Germany. The most formal assurances to this effect were repeatedly made by British to French military authorities, but only four divisions of infantry were maintained capable of rapid mobilisation, and in order to pay for their administrative services, without which they could not have moved at all, reductions were actually made in the establishments of the remaining infantry and artillery. It is not easy to say for certain what military strength we ought to have maintained to give us a casting vote when the inevitable crisis arose. The highest military authority had officially advised the Liberal Government that a field army of 500,000 men, with 500,000 in reserve, was needed at that period for the defence of the Empire. The present writer would have been content then with three-fifths of that total, but the ridiculously inadequate army maintained by the Government, hardly stronger than we possessed in the 'fifties, served the purpose of provocation rather than of defence.

All great wars create an epoch in the history of war. The

conditions are now changed, former estimates are obsolete, and it is clearly evident that the wars of the future between neighbouring States will more than ever demand the whole national strength. We might conceivably make war on Brazil or Japan by using our naval supremacy in attacking the extremities of our enemy, as we attacked Russia in the Crimea; but if in the future we are involved in a struggle with another European empire or coalition, even with allies on our side, the whole force of our manhood will probably be needed to ensure victory. By the same process of reasoning, the very fact of being able to muster that force in arms will probably enable us to keep the peace. Accurately to forecast the figures which will be required in the future is difficult, but it is certainly a moderate estimate to assume that a million field troops, with at least a million trained men in reserve, will be essential to our position as a great European Power. It is not to be expected that under any scheme of enlistment such numbers can be obtained by Voluntary Service. However great the theoretical advantage of Voluntary over Compulsory Service may be, vast numbers in the future will be essential to security in peace or to victory in war, and to obtain these numbers there is no alternative to Conscription.

The peculiar strategic position of the British Isles will always demand naval superiority over our most likely Continental rival, and although our former inaccessibility will tend to diminish with the progress of mechanical invention, yet our insular position will always confer upon us the great advantage of immunity from a sudden invasion by hastily mobilised troops. We shall always have a respite, more or less brief, between the outbreak of a quarrel and the moment when we must encounter the enemy's field troops. In consequence of this condition it is open to us, even more than to the Swedes and Swiss, to raise the necessary forces by a Militia system. Six months' recruit training, followed by three or four annual rehearsals of a month's duration each, would provide us with the Army we require as far as the training of the rank and file is needed. Annual contingents of 200,000 men, less than half of the numbers available in any one year, would suffice to produce a war strength of a million in the first line if six such contingents constitute the first-line regiments. The next six contingents would be the trained reserve of the first line, and older contingents than twelve years' service would be able to form a real Territorial Army for the defence and garrison of the British Isles. The so-called Territorial Force, into which the Volunteers were converted, has only been partially available to fulfil this condition, for a simple reason. It has been wanted for pressing service elsewhere.

In order to arrive at a just conclusion as to the Army we

shall need for our future security, we must think a long way ahead, because armies are not built in a day, as we are now painfully discovering. If Germany emerges intact and unbroken from the present struggle, it goes without saying that our national existence, like that of France since 1870, will once more depend on our constant readiness to defend our independence. If Germany is humbled and defeated, it is probable that she will rapidly recuperate, and, sooner or later, resume the maritime rivalry which has brought us into collision with her. Even victory can only procure us peace for perhaps a generation, and a generation is not long to get a military constitution into working order. And, as I have already suggested, Germany is not the only great Power with which we have quarrelled in the past.

As far as it is possible to judge now, England and France are unlikely to have serious differences in the near future, though the thing is not quite impossible. But the Europe of to-morrow will include a vast and surging Slav population which has recently come into its lands by successful war, and which will not hesitate to make war to extend them. It seems very improbable that the Bulgarians will attack the British Isles, yet it was the blood feud of the Serbians which opened the War of 1914 and sent the peasants and workmen of our English counties to be slain by the thousand in many parts of the world besides Northern France. The experience of the last year should suffice to prove that Britain is too great, too rich, too near to the Continent, and too intimately bound up with its politics to avoid being implicated when war rends it asunder. There is no reason to doubt that Mr. Asquith's Cabinet ardently wished to keep the Empire out of European complications; no one denies that the diplomatic service has been skilfully performed, and yet the thing proved impossible. Future British Cabinets will not find it any easier..

Since, then, the quarrels of our neighbours may involve us in war, however unwillingly, and in spite of the most conciliatory policy towards the great States with which we are in contact, it will be a suicidal policy for us to be too weak in the future to make ourselves felt in the councils of Europe while peace is in the balance, and on the battlefield should the most adroit policy fail to keep us out of the trouble. Yet the danger is great that we shall once again trust to luck, hope to wriggle out at the last moment, or improvise an army after the outbreak of war. And perhaps the censoring of all criticism since last August has concealed from the nation, first, the appalling risk we were exposed to by the destruction of France as well as of Belgium, and, secondly, the fearful penalty we are paying in lives and money for the state of unpreparedness in which we were caught by the catastrophe of war.

The national tendency to meet all difficulties as they occur by improvising remedies has some admirable aspects, but in the field of land warfare it is absolutely fatal. In old days it caused the downfall of Saxon England and the substitution of a Continental system of military and civil organisation for the native laws. This made England a mighty Power under the Plantagenets, and formed the basis upon which the subjects of Elizabeth and her successors founded our oversea Empire by a series of victorious wars. It is far harder to hold than to seize, and the one chance of the British people retaining their dominions and Imperial position, a feat which no maritime empire within reach of great land Powers has yet succeeded in accomplishing, will depend upon our taking count of the real situation in good time and on our being honest with ourselves, a difficult task for Englishmen.

It is absolutely necessary that the laws which regulate the existence of the British land forces should be crystallised and codified. Every subject of the King should know for certain in the future what demands can be made upon his personal service, and in return every one, whatever his grade, should be protected in the enjoyment of his rank and rights. The anomalies and injustices which have disgraced our military administration in the past, and must perforce cling to any system whose organisation is a patchwork quilt of temporary expedients, must be swept away. There is no reason why British military administration should remain a bye-word for all that is unjust, inexpedient, and illogical; and when we remember the talents of our principal rivals in this same field of organisation it becomes plain that, in order to survive in the future struggle for life which is the evident destiny of European States, we cannot possibly afford to handicap ourselves by a slatternly and ill-regulated military system.

Although we have always had too few troops, we have always had too many sorts of troops. Last August found the British Forces composed of a Regular Army at home, another in India, and a third in the Colonies, all having somewhat different terms of service and more or less illogically mixed up with one another. Then there were the Militia, Volunteers, and Yeomanry, renamed Special Reserve and Territorials. The Special Reserve was only one of several reserves, and no single officer or man of all these forces had any well-defined ideas of what his military obligation to the State might be, nor what rights he had under his military status. As far as can be ascertained by appeals to the Law Courts, the Regular officer is an outlaw, having no rights at all, and as much at the mercy of the crafty lawyers who intrigue themselves into the exercise of sovereign power in this country,

as the household slaves of the Negus of Abyssinia. That, at any rate, is the justifiable conclusion to be drawn from the litigation between Major Adam and the War Office. Just before the War a jury awarded Major Adam 2000*l.* damages for the malicious circulation of unfavourable confidential reports calculated to injure his prospects as a candidate for Parliament. This verdict has been reversed by a Bench of Judges on appeal. But the verdict of common sense and common justice will be that if the case was susceptible of trial by jury the verdict of the jury should never have been disputed by an appeal, and especially at such a time as the present.

The general position of an officer in the Regular Army is not only unsatisfactory but ridiculous. Though he is the expert among a host of partially professional assistants, he is too often passed over in favour of the latter for the command of newly organised forces which would give him the long denied chance for showing his capacity and establishing his position. But then such promotion would mean more pay and pension, and the 'Treasury,' whoever that may be, objects to any public money being expended on the officers of the Army as a body, though certain high posts are not only well paid but far too well paid. The selection of superior officers in peace will always be a very difficult matter to regulate, but it may be remarked that our practices in this all-important branch of military administration cause almost universal discontent and disapproval among the officers concerned, while in the hosts of our redoubtable enemy an absolute confidence has prevailed in the expediency and justice of the methods by which their leaders are chosen. This alone confers on the German army a notable and dangerous element of superiority, even were it not better organised in other respects and far more numerous than ours.

To return to the question of what numbers we must maintain in the future, it is clear that the oversea Imperial Forces, the troops in India and the Colonies, must be recruited and serve under totally different conditions from the Home Forces required to protect our European position. The Oversea Forces must be Volunteers, and should have a permanent career open to them. The training of an annual contingent of 200,000 recruits for the Home Army for six months in each year, besides the annual month's training of the first-line troops, will require an establishment of professional soldiers which will not be less than 3 per cent. of the total of the field army—viz. 30,000 officers and men to form the professional nucleus and instructors of one million field troops, with an annual contingent of 200,000. Of course it would be desirable to double this proportion; 30,000 may be considered a minimum, and it provides employment for

officers and soldiers of the Oversea Forces in their own country as a relief to Tropical service, or on retirement from it.

It is not feasible within the scope of this article to give the details of any proposed legislative scheme for constituting an adequate Home Army for the British Isles, but only to insist that the time has come now to face the absolute necessity for this reform. The leaders of the Parliamentary Opposition, usually too busy with party politics to attend to national defence, but now out of work, might profitably undertake the serious study of the subject. If they were better versed in the matter there might not exist the notorious consensus of opinion that even the present Liberal Ministers are preferable to any alternative Cabinet which the Opposition could at present offer.

To recapitulate the reasons for raising the question of Army reform at the present juncture, first and foremost time presses. Time is the essential condition of getting a military organisation into working order. The proposed scheme of a Militia system would, for example, take twenty-four years before it produced its full numbers, and in the interval voluntary enrolment of all sorts of uneven categories of trained or partially trained old soldiers would have to supplement the existing cadres. The crisis of a great war is said to be unsuitable for a root and branch reform of our military system, and doubtless this argument has some weight, but the matter brooks no further delay. Moreover, and this reason is in itself sufficient, the electorate can now comprehend the need for laws which will ensure our armed strength in the future, and as certainly the power to make these laws will have evaporated when the obvious danger has been met and peace restored for a brief term of years.

When the British Government resolved to make war on the Germans in defence of Belgian neutrality it took the most momentous executive decision of any British Cabinet since the Peace of Amiens. Evidently its policy must correspond to this bold act, or the result will be disastrous. The only chance before the War of our living in peace with the Kaiser's Government lay in our having an Army as well as a Fleet which commanded respect, and after the War this will still be true. It is unnecessary to labour the point that a defeated Germany may ally itself with other Continental States. It will naturally gravitate to the strongest Power or group of Powers. The Germans are likely to entertain vindictive feelings towards England for several decades at least, and all the old reasons for maritime and commercial rivalry will ere long reappear and exert their inevitable pressure, whatever future British Governments may do to cultivate peaceful relations.

The British people must realise that besides the maritime Empire, the Colonies and coaling stations which they possess, and which arouse the covetousness of their rivals, they also possess a land which is of supreme strategic importance in any war which may break out in Western Europe. Owing to our geographical position it is almost impossible for us to refrain from taking sides in a great European quarrel. Since the reign of Henry the Eighth we have only kept clear of these wars when we were too weak to make ourselves felt by reason of internal troubles, and when at the same time the Continental war was of a partial character, such as the wars of 1866 and 1870, though we are even now finding out how closely they affected our fate.

It is much less easy to make it understood that properly digested laws should regulate the terms of any service, the rights of all ranks employed, and their liabilities. But without such laws our Army will always be inferior in certain vital respects to the well-developed military constitutions of Continental States. Before this War it was arrant folly for a man of capacity to become an officer, relying on his military talents to give him an interesting career; if he hoped to earn a livelihood it was more foolish still. Better by far be articulated to a solicitor! In all probability he would make a good income instead of spending one, and on the outbreak of war would find himself much better placed in the military hierarchy by serving in the Auxiliary Forces. In war everyone offers his services, but wars are won by preparations in peace, and in peace there is only one way of obtaining the right men as leaders and instructors of our army, and that is by treating them the right way. It is a long while since any British Government has attempted to do so. Officers are a negligible factor in the great contest of votes, and unless they possess social interest in certain legal and political circles they are of no account whatever in the State.

The final and most important consideration is the answer to these questions: What form are future wars likely to take? Shall we in the future be more or less within reach of Continental attack? They certainly give grounds for reflection, and it is only too plain that nothing but the power to exert its whole armed strength will avail our country or any country to protect its vitals in the future. The wars of the future will be fought by millions of men, or staved off because millions of men are ready and able to take part if their country is involved. As regards the naval aspect of the case, the supremacy which has heretofore conferred immunity from attack has already disappeared somewhat, and is likely to be less and less reliable with the march of science. Even this War has seen our coast towns bombarded in spite of an unchallenged superiority afloat. There

are submarines and their possible development to be considered, and, most insistent of all, the need to prevent the naval bases of Western Europe falling under the sway of a powerful enemy.

Conscription, and Conscription alone, can train and mobilise a million field troops at the outbreak of war with the necessary reserves, and a well-considered revision of our military laws is required to make Conscription possible and tolerable. Such a revision is also required to remove the abuses and anomalies which handicap the administration of our War Office.

CECIL BATTINE.

VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY SERVICE?

(II)

COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE IN ENGLAND: A RETROSPECT

THE dictum that the Common Law of England recognises on the part of every able-bodied adult male a liability to render military service, when required to do so in the defence of the realm, has caused much surprise among those to whom obligatory military service means nothing less than militarism of the purest Continental type. But if ten centuries of unbroken custom, recognised and sanctioned in innumerable statutes, are sufficient to constitute a law, the law in question can be proved. Its history may be divided into three periods: the first, when the liability existed, but we have little or no information how it operated or by what means it was enforced; the second, when it was enforced by statute and the machinery of government; the third, when it was not enforced at all.

Nothing in early English law is more familiar to the general reader than the *trinoda necessitas*, the threefold obligation on all freemen in Saxon times, which included the obligation to take arms in defence of the realm against invasion or for the maintenance of internal order. It was, we are told, by a general levy of the whole population that the early wars against the Danes were fought: in each county the *ealdorman* summoned the *fyrd*, and when the realm was so fortunate as to have a military genius for its king the war might have a successful issue. With an Alfred for king and savages like the early Danish raiders to contend against, there is no difficulty in understanding how the system worked. But in later days, when the English after their period of storm and stress settled into an unadventurous peace, from the death of Edmund Ironside and the accession of Canute onwards, it is not easy to understand how the *fyrd* was in fact collected. In Stubbs's *Select Charters* extracts are given from Domesday Book as illustrating the customs with regard to military service found in different parts of the country. 'When the king went on an expedition' Oxford sent him twenty of her burgesses or paid 20*l.* in lieu. 'Qui monitus ire in expeditionem non vadit, c. solidos regi dabit.' In Berkshire, 'si rex mittebat

alicubi exercitum, de quinque hidis tantum unus miles ibat,' and each hide paid 4s. for his pay and victualling for two months. 'These monies were given not to the king but to the soldiers.' It is impossible, however, to avoid the suspicion that such entries describe not so much the ancient militia law of the country, but either the particular customs of a particular town or district—the first beginnings perhaps of the regular military tenures—or what the Conqueror's Commissioners of Inquiry in 1086 wished to be considered the law. It is of some significance that in the earlier Anglo-Saxon laws that are still extant no similar references appear to occur. The references in Domesday are, on the one hand, too rare, and, on the other hand, too precise to form a satisfactory foundation for the national system which unquestionably existed before the Conquest, and leave us in complete doubt as to the means whereby that system was enforced.

We are told that Canute's *hus-carls*, his personal retainers, formed the nucleus of a standing army, which was imitated by his successor. But the host that followed Harold to victory at Stamford Bridge and to disaster at Senlac, what was the motive that gathered them together? At a time when the ancient divisions of shire and hundred had lost much of their original meaning and the conception of England as a single realm was still a comparative novelty, when the tradition of fighting to obtain land to settle on and make a home in was dim and faded and, on the other hand, there had not been for generations the need to fight for very life against ruthless invasions from the North, it is difficult to understand how that primary obligation to render military service for the common good was enforced and what machinery of the law could be invented to keep it effectively alive. We know that in some way or other it did survive. Whether knight-service—that is to say the tenure of land by military service—was a natural growth in England or, according to another theory, was introduced, as it were, at a blow by the Conqueror, it is certain that feudalism, once established, tended to obliterate the more ancient law of the *fyrð*. The Norman king would look for help in his wars to the great nobles whose landed possessions depended on a strict compliance with the conditions on which they had been granted, rather than to a shadowy law which existed before the Normans came to England, and which had failed to organise a successful resistance to their invasion. Throughout medieval times it is probable that the feudal system supplied an army more consistently and more effectively than the ancient law of the land, but apart from it the law still subsisted, coming into greater prominence as feudalism decayed and triumphantly surviving when feudal tenures were finally abolished.

Some random notes on the evolution of the law of compulsory military service and the establishment of the Militia of our own days may be of interest at this time when the question of national defence must inevitably be in the thoughts of everyone. That the County Militia was pre-eminently the oldest and most constitutional of the military forces of the Crown is so much of a commonplace that we are apt to think it untrue or at all events more of a rhetorical statement than a fact of history. But the continuity of English law from the earliest ages can scarcely be more strikingly illustrated than by reference to the history of the Militia, and it may even be of practical utility to realise that an obligation to render military service when required, as exemplified by the Militia ballot, is no mere creature of statute, no importation from abroad, however nearly it may approximate to the 'conscription' of foreign countries, but one of the most deeply rooted of all English institutions.

In Florence of Worcester's Chronicle under the year 1094 we have a glimpse of what seems to be the survival of the ancient system under the Norman kings. He tells us how Rufus in the course of his wars in Normandy finds himself in need of reinforcements, how he summons 20,000 foot-soldiers from England, how they assemble at Hastings, each one having with him 10*s.* for his victualling. Then Ranulph Flambard, by the king's direction, takes their money, sends them home again, and transmits the funds so obtained to the king in Normandy. One may look on this as an example of the iniquity of an ill-advised king making money out of the patriotism of his subjects, or one may look at it as a sensible measure by which money was obtained to pay for a well-trained army of professional soldiers in place of such an ill-equipped and undisciplined host as thirty years before lost the day at Hastings; but, whichever view is fairer, the incident itself is a clear illustration of the traditional law of the land, and the assembly at Hastings was an exact prototype, even down to the detail of the 'conduct-money' each man carried with him, of the levies which we shall find mustered five hundred years later for Elizabeth's foreign expeditions.

It is, however, in the Assize of Arms of 1181 that we have set down for the first time in statutory form a comprehensive scheme of universal military service. The first clause requires every holder of a knight's fee to be possessed of certain armour, and later clauses impose analogous obligations on men who cannot be supposed to be bound by any tenure of land: every freeman whose goods or income amount to 16 marks is to have a hauberk, helmet, shield, and lance; if he is worth 10 marks his arms are to be of a cheaper kind; all '*burgenses et tota communa liberorum hominum*' are to have helmet and lance and *wambais*—

apparently some kind of mail coat that differed from both the *lorica* and the *aubergel*. These they were to keep by them for service when required, neither selling, pledging nor lending them, and to leave to their heirs or their heirs' guardians, and no more than these were they allowed to keep. They might not sell arms to anyone to take out of England, nor might they themselves take them out of England except by the king's command. Finally, elaborate provision is made for an inquiry by the king's Justices, through sworn jurors in every hundred and town, to ascertain how many men there were falling under each category.

It is significant that the Assize does not attempt to specify what is the amount of military service required from the lieges. This is taken for granted as part of the Common Law: all that the king is concerned with is to see that the lieges are properly equipped for discharging the obligations incumbent on them. We know that forty days' service in the year was generally reckoned as the amount required from each holder of a knight's fee, but we know also that constant disputes arose as to the occasions on which it might be required, and even the limit of forty days 'seems to have existed rather in theory than in practice, and its theoretic existence can hardly be proved for England out of any authoritative document.'¹ It is scarcely likely that the more general obligation to military service was ever more clearly defined. We should be disposed to assume that it did not extend to service beyond the seas if it were not that impressment for the Navy, which was based in a precisely similar manner on the immemorial Common Law, and to which we shall refer again later, involved necessarily obligatory service outside the realm. As it would seem that this obligatory service was always paid for, it is a fair conjecture that at every period of our history the law, though compulsion was always in the background, was so administered as to secure an amount of voluntary service sufficient to obviate any necessity actually arising for defining with precision the length to which compulsion might be carried.

The press-gang forms a prominent feature in literary pictures of the past: the hardship of being torn from home was no doubt keenly felt; numerous Acts of Parliament—which perhaps were not very strictly complied with—alleviated the hardship by granting exemption to special classes of the community, and the Courts of Law were constantly called on to decide whether the press had not been illegally applied; but it does not appear that occasion ever arose for determining how long a seaman impressed against his will might be compelled to serve. The same vagueness to this day attends jury-service. A juryman *may* in certain circumstances obtain a certificate which will exempt him from

¹ Pollock and Maitland's *History of English Law*, i. 233.

further service on juries for a time, but this is not of very general application, and it would almost seem that the law which requires or required us to render service to the State as soldiers, or sailors, or jurymen whenever the State has need of such service fixes no limit within which such services must be restricted. The subject was much discussed in the early part of the sixteenth century, when the powers of the Crown were undoubtedly strained beyond the limits of the law; but it cannot be said that the limits of the law were even then very precisely ascertained.

At least we may be sure that in the early part of the thirteenth century military service was not felt generally as a hardship. The sixty-three chapters of Magna Charta enumerate in great detail all kinds of evil practices by the Crown for which a remedy is demanded, from such great matters as the freedom of the Church, the right to a *judicium parium*, or the encroachments of the Forest Law, down to the repair of bridges (Cap. 23), the commandeering of horses and carts for transport purposes (Cap. 30), and the removal of unauthorised fish-weirs (Cap. 33), but never a word can we find with regard to compulsory military service! The Charter is one long catalogue of the matters in which the king had used his powers illegally or oppressively, but military service is not one of them.

In later times traces begin to appear in the statute-book of the obligation to serve in the king's army having been enforced with harshness, but in such a connexion as to show clearly that the obligation itself was beyond question. Thus 18 Edward III. stat. 2 cap. 7 provides that the pay of soldiers 'chosen to go in the king's service out of England' shall fall on the king from the day they leave the county in which they were chosen to serve till the day of their return. 1 Edward III. stat. 2 cap. 5 declared that no man should be charged to arm himself or to go out of his shire otherwise *than had been customary in times past* for the defence of the realm. 25 Edward III. stat. 5 cap. 8 again appears to point to a certain confusion between military service arising out of the feudal tenures and the much older Common Law liability. Under it no man was to be constrained to find men-at-arms, hoblers or archers, except by tenure or common assent and grant of Parliament. These and other similar references have much significance as showing that, vague and undefined as the common law liability to bear arms in defence of the realm may have been, the fact of its existence was beyond dispute.

Curiously enough, it was in Philip and Mary's reign that the law was most clearly defined. An Act of 1557 (4 & 5 P. & M. cap. 2) lays down with great minuteness the arms with which each citizen was required to furnish himself, and sect. 7 positively

enacts that this obligation should not in any way lessen obligations arising from the tenure of lands. It is, in fact, a re-casting for the purpose of more modern requirements of the Assize of Arms of 1181, with a very important amendment. It was the Sheriff of each county on whom, as the local representative of the Crown, the responsibility of enforcing the law had hitherto devolved, but by the sixteenth century the dignity and authority of the Sheriff's office had greatly declined, and now the Act transferred this duty to specially selected Justices of the Peace empowered by Commissions under the Great Seal to ensure compliance with the Act in each county.

This is the statutory origin of the County Lieutenancy as it exists in our own time. It has been commonly said that Lords Lieutenant were first instituted by Henry the Eighth, and it has been inferred that the institution of the office was due to the centralising policy of the Tudor kings. But, like most other English institutions, it seems rather to have been a natural outgrowth of an earlier system. The Sheriff, whose undoubted duty it was to muster the levies in each county, was sinking in importance, and more particularly in military importance, throughout the Middle Ages. His jurisdiction was limited to his own shire. When the county levies were required for the suppression of internal disorder the Sheriff naturally took command; and as for this purpose alone military force might often be required, it is in vain that we attempt to draw a sharp line between the *posse comitatus* summoned to maintain good order and headed by the Sheriff in person and the county levies mustered by him for service in the king's army. When the king himself was in command, the Sheriff's duties would be ended when he delivered over the quota required from his county, but when the king himself ceased to take command, it became necessary to appoint some deputy or Lieutenant of the king. For a time, no doubt, the feudal levies marching under the banners of great barons, and held together by the bond of land tenure, supplied the place of the county Militia; but the Wars of the Roses broke the power of the barons, and during the Tudor period it was usual for the Crown to appoint by special commissions nobles of high standing to command the levies which the Sheriffs under the older law had summoned for military service. The Acts of the Privy Council during the Tudor reigns illustrate the process by which these Lieutenants of the king, at first appointed in special emergencies, became in time part of the permanent machinery of government. Thus, in 1542 letters were sent by the Council to the Sheriffs to have the county levies mustered and arrayed in anticipation of an incursion by the Scots, and the Duke of Norfolk was appointed

the King's Lieutenant to command the army of the North. In 1547 Commissions of Array were issued to certain great nobles, both to collect and arm troops. In 1551 commissions were issued for a similar purpose to persons of high standing in twenty-eight different counties. In some counties more than one Lieutenant were appointed, and on the other hand the same Lieutenant was sometimes appointed for more counties than one. A similar practice prevailed, in spite of the statute of 1557, up to the end of the century. The Principality of Wales was commonly treated as a separate unit, and again the Lord President of the Council of the North was regarded as the King's Lieutenant for all counties within his jurisdiction. Further commissions were issued for the summer of 1552, and again in 1553. It is noteworthy that the Lieutenants were at the first resorted to for other than merely military purposes. In 1552 a circular was issued to them with instructions to make search for counterfeiters of money, and in 1558 they were directed to appoint collectors of certain taxes. On the other hand, instructions were issued from time to time to Sheriffs and Justices with regard to the county levies, and in 1586 the Council expressed Her Majesty's pleasure that the Earl of Bath, who had been appointed Lieutenant, should, by reason of his youth, consult his Deputy-Lieutenants in the discharge of his duties.

We can perhaps best see how this machinery worked by reference to 1588, the year in which the peril of invasion was more insistent, or at least was thought to be more insistent, than it has ever been since then. Lords Lieutenant were well established by that time, and instructions were sent them on the 1st of April to call out the county levies, but the system was not complete; it was apparently only in the southern half of England that the Lords Lieutenant were held responsible. In the minutes of the Privy Council we hear little of the northern counties, except that the Earl of Huntingdon, who was Lieutenant of Leicestershire, was also 'Lord President of the Northe Partes,' and in that capacity was instructed on the 17th of June to see to the fortifications of Tynemouth and Newcastle, in case the Spaniards should attempt a landing there. He, rather than the local authorities, appears to have organised the measures for the defence of the realm.

Again, Norfolk appears to have been without its Lord Lieutenant, all instructions being sent to the Deputy-Lieutenants. Both in this county and Suffolk the inhabitants, finding the encampment on the sea coast 'greatlye chargeable and burthensome unto them,' the Council 'thought meete the same should continue onelye for one month,' one company relieving another at the end of that time. In those parts Sir Thomas Leighton

was given a special commission to review the local levies and report to the Council thereon. The Sheriffs of Norfolk, Suffolk, and Essex were bidden to render him assistance. Sir John Norris was sent on a similar mission to Kent, Sussex, Hants, and Dorset.

Again, the Lord Chancellor being Lord Lieutenant of Middlesex, it appears that the County Justices took the levies in hand. They were first required to find 1500 soldiers, but pleaded that large numbers claimed exemption on the ground either that they were servants or officers of the Queen, or were citizens of London, or belonged to the Tower Hamlets, or had houses elsewhere, and consequently were charged elsewhere for military service. The number was accordingly reduced from 1500 to 1000.

Lastly, the Council appears to have communicated with the Earl of Pembroke, Lord President of Wales, rather than with the Lieutenants of the Welsh counties. Here, too, a special Commissioner (Sir Thomas Morgan) was sent down from London to organise the troops.

It soon became apparent that persons liable to military service were not furnished with the necessary arms and armour, and instructions were sent to the various County Lieutenants to take for the purpose all arms sequestered from recusants two years before, and to seize any more that might now be found in the possession of recusants. These were to be sold to the persons requiring them, and the price paid over to the owners.

A main army, called the Queen's Guard, was formed under the Lieutenancy of the Earl of Leicester, the Lord Steward. The retainers of any peer summoned to attend Her Majesty were to join this Guard instead of serving in the county levies, and from many of the counties the greater part of the musters raised were summoned to London and thence to Tilbury in August—the whole of the Hertfordshire levies (1500); 1500 out of the 1871 raised in Surrey; 1500 out of 1900 for Berks; 1150 out of 1164 for Oxfordshire; 2500 out of 4000 for Gloucestershire; 3000 out of 4239 for Suffolk; and so on. Arms were issued from the Tower of London to this army, and instructions were sent to the Lord Mayor that he should tell the City brewers to 'carrye some quantitie of beere thither where they should finde readie moneye.'

The Deputy-Lieutenants, however, stayed in their own counties, sending off the trained bands under the captains they had appointed, with the 'coat and conduct money,' for which each county was liable. There appears to have been some chicanery about the raising of this money. In Devon the Council are given to understand that far greater sums had been collected by precepts from the Justices than were ever used. In some parishes money was exacted, but 'never a souldier trayned.' Men

had been pressed and discharged again on payment of monies, their places being taken by untrained recruits, some of the Justices being themselves under suspicion of complicity in such malpractices. It is clear that the picture drawn by Shakespeare in 2 *Henry IV.* iii. 2, of Falstaff's recruiting expedition into Gloucestershire may well have reproduced his own experience in the year of the Armada, and have exaggerated the facts to no great extent. Indeed, one cannot but suspect some knavery having been the occasion of a reference to the levies for this very county in the Privy Council's minute-book under the date of 18th of August. Thomas and Joseph Baynham, having been given by the Lord Lieutenant of Gloucestershire the charge of 'trayning and conducting' 200 soldiers apiece, 'wherein they had taken great care and diligence,' complained that the charge had been afterwards assigned to others. The Lord Lieutenant was ordered to look into the matter. The 'forwardness' of the Deputy Lieutenants of Somerset in collecting for the quota required from their county men 'well-chosen and of willing minds' called forth a week before a special letter of thanks. In Hertfordshire, on the other hand, strict measures had to be taken with 'divers gentlemen and others' who fraudulently changed the good and serviceable horses they had furnished at the musters for very bad ones.

On the whole, if we may judge the temper of the times from the proceedings of the Privy Council, the patriotism shown in our present day of stress need not fear comparison with the 'spacious days' of Queen Elizabeth.

One more extract from the Acts for the Armada year may be quoted as illustrating how the novel Tudor militia system superseded the older county institutions. The Council were on the 27th of October informed that, though a Commission under the Great Seal had been issued to the Sheriff of Cambridgeshire to take unto him the *posse comitatus* for the enforcement of a decree in Chancery whereby one William Redman, Archdeacon of Canterbury, was to be put in possession of the manor of Great Shelford, yet the Sheriff, meeting with resistance 'to the hurte of some of his companie,' had after several attempts failed to carry out the law. Lord North, then Lieutenant of the county, was accordingly commanded to go to the Sheriff's assistance and arrest the offenders, sending them up to London or taking sureties in 200*l.* each for their appearance before the Council.

The proceedings of the Privy Council during 1589 illustrate our subject from a somewhat different standpoint. The military operations for this year were chiefly concerned with the retaliatory expedition to Portugal fitted out by Drake, Sir John Norris, and other 'adventurers,' of whom the Queen was one. Though this

could not in any sense be called an operation for the defence of the realm, instructions were sent early in January to the County Lieutenants in the south of England to levy troops for the purpose, and measures were taken for the impressment of trumpeters, drummers, fifers, surgeons, and armourers to join the expedition. There seems to have been no general opposition to these measures, and it may be further noted that instructions were sent to the Lord Chief Justice, the Lord Treasurer, and the Lord Mayor and Sheriffs of London to prevent the arrest of any persons enlisted for the expedition, and to set free any who had been arrested (otherwise than in execution) since enlistment. The men from Hampshire, however, were ill-supplied with arms, and a letter had to be written to the Lords Lieutenant (of whom there were then two for the county), pointing out that 5*s.* for a coat and 3*s.* 4*d.* for a sword was 'verie lyttle,' and asking that further allowance should be made. In May letters were again sent out to the Lieutenants for mustering, arming, and arraying the county levies. It is not clear what was the occasion of this. It may have been done on account of bad news from Portugal, where Drake and Norris's forces were not prospering as well as the Council may have anticipated; but from a letter sent to one of the Lords Lieutenant of Hampshire on the 13th of May it would appear that the Council was by no means satisfied with either the quality or the quantity of the troops levied in this and the preceding year. His lordship was enjoined to take counsel with such of the County Justices as he should think meet how these defects might be remedied.

Soldiers were also required to garrison the 'cautionary towns' of the Low Countries, such as Flushing, Ostend, and Bergen-op-Zoom, where the English were helping the Dutch in their struggle against Spain. Most of these appear to have been obtained by impressment, and the Lord Mayor of London was told on the 6th of May to collect some forty or fifty from the City, where were 'divers masterless men to be found that lived idly, and might well be spared.' It was probably one of these who was brought before the Council on the 4th of June by a pursuivant for having used 'contemptuous woordes when he was to be presed as a drommer to goo towards Ostende.' It does not appear what was eventually done with him. No other contumacy of the kind is recorded during the year. In all, some 500 were levied or 'imprest' from London for Ostend alone, 404 of whom had to be supplied with arms from Government stores: 150 of them being said to be 'verie bare apparelled' and 'in naked sort,' the Lord Mayor was enjoined to take order that they should be furnished with 'necessarie rayment' at the cost of one mark apiece. On the 8th of June the Lord Mayor was

told that in future all levies should be raised in the City through him, instead of by officers sent expressly by the Council. From various instructions issued, it is plain that the Council had reason to fear peculation in the matter of the soldiers' pay after their arrival at Ostend.

Lastly, we may mention that inquiry into the frauds of 1588 in connexion with the Devonshire musters was continued in 1589, with the result that the monies fraudulently obtained were apparently, after much trouble, refunded. Similar frauds were discovered in Wiltshire. Forty shillings seems to have been an ordinary price for a man to pay to a Justice or his servant for discharge after having been impressed.

It is probable that a thorough examination of the daily minutes of the Privy Council for three successive years, at a time when military service was being freely enforced in accordance with the Common Law, will give a fairer idea of the operation of the law than would be given by a selection of the more striking entries during an extended period. No excuse, therefore, is needed for quoting further references to the subject in the year 1590. In this year an expedition was fitted out for France under the command of Sir John Norris to help Henry the Fourth against the League. It was at first intended that the greater part of the troops should come from the garrisons of the 'Cautionary Towns,' but deference was paid to objections raised by the Dutch States, and instructions were sent in January to the County Lieutenants to have their quotas ready for service. Out of every hundred men, forty were to be armed with pikes and corslets, five to be halberdiers, twenty musketeers, and the rest 'shot with callivers' (an arquebus lighter and shorter than a musket, which was fired without a rest). But to save the county expense in each case, the levies might be short by ten per cent., 'though the Queen's Majestie is to make her paie to the full number without saving any penie therebie.' It is not clear in what proportion the monies raised in the counties for 'coat and conduct' were ordinarily supplemented by allowances from the Exchequer, but it would appear that some controversy had arisen with regard to the heavy cost of the levies constantly raised during Elizabeth's reign for military purposes. Later in the month further instructions were issued, with a special recommendation to summon such persons to the muster 'as have served as soldiers aforetyme,' but much was left to the discretion of the Lieutenants as they should find 'most convenient both for the service and the ease of the contrie.' Later in the year, when the levies were ordered to march to various ports to embark for foreign service, 4s. a head was allowed by Her Majesty 'for everie coate,' and for 'conduct' either a halfpenny for each

mile or 8*d.* for each day from the time they left their respective counties. The soldiers were also to be given their ordinary wages till they embarked, further allowances on board ship, and when they landed in France to 'enter into the monethlie paie.' Great care was to be taken to have an inventory of their arms and 'apparrellinge,' so that all might be restored on the army's return from foreign service.

It is clear from these and other similar entries that while service abroad in the Queen's armies was recognised as obligatory, the machinery for raising the necessary forces was not so well established but that disputes might arise with regard to it, and fresh instructions had constantly to be sent to the officers charged with the duty of enforcing the obligation. The difference in the operation of this law and that for impressment for the Navy, which appears to have had a precisely similar traditional origin, is very remarkable. The press-gang lingers in our memory mostly for the hardships it entailed and the efforts made to evade it: impressment for the County Militia carries with it no such associations. Whether it be that military service is more congenial to the Englishman than service on board ship, or that it was less onerous to him through being enforced by his neighbours and known officials instead of by strangers; or (which is perhaps the most probable reason) it was easier from the earliest times to escape it by providing a substitute, it has certainly left no such memories as the naval press-gang has. Further, while statutes for the purpose of enforcing military service are very numerous, naval impressment appears in our statute-book merely as a burden which Parliament has from time to time found it necessary to alleviate by granting exemption to certain classes of persons or by restricting the powers of the Crown with respect to it.

But however this may be, the reign of Elizabeth saw the last of obligatory military service in the strictest sense—that is to say, the sense in which service in the Navy was enforced up to the last century. The Act of 1557 was repealed in James the First's reign (1 Jac. I. cap. 25): an Act of Charles the First (16 Car. I. cap. 28) declared impressment by the Crown for the Army was illegal, though it authorised Justices of the Peace by order of Parliament to impress all men between 18 and 60 for the war. In the disputes between King and Parliament it would appear that Parliament repudiated not so much the ancient obligation to military service as the methods by which the Crown had enforced it. In the Petition of Right it is martial law as imposed by Royal Commissions that is mainly impugned. Nevertheless, it would not have been surprising if, in the welter of civil strife that followed these disputes, the ancient law of the realm had

been finally and irrevocably submerged; and it is perhaps the strongest evidence of its tenacity that it reappeared in a comprehensive and carefully elaborated form in one of the earliest Acts of the Restoration Parliament. The law of 1557 was re-established in a modified form. In each county there was to be a Lord Lieutenant, who should appoint Deputy Lieutenants to undertake the duty of mustering the county levies when occasion required, the soldiers to be provided by owners of property in proportion to their income. Some relics of the older system remained in that certain great Crown officers, the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, the Warden of the Stannaries, the Governor of the Isle of Wight, discharged this function within their several jurisdictions in the place of County Lieutenants, and to this day the City of London has a Commission of Lieutenancy but no Lord Lieutenant.

Then when the Seven Years' War put a severe strain on our military resources more stringent measures were necessary for reaping the full benefit of the County Militia, and the Militia ballot was introduced by an Act of 1757. Under this the liability of every able-bodied adult to military service might have been made a reality, but it would appear that in fact the ballot was not put in force till 1775, and from the first every man balloted was allowed to find a substitute. During the Napoleonic period various experiments were made for the purpose of obtaining a Reserve Army from the material supplied by the oldest of our constitutional forces, and Militia Acts have been very numerous. Mr. Fortescue, in his *County Lieutenancies and the Great War*, gives a full account of the system during 1802-14. He points out that in all the discussions on the subject it was taken for granted that no one balloted for the Militia would serve in person, and notes that in one year in the Middlesex Militia out of more than 45,000 men there was only one principal—i.e. only one who was not a substitute for an original ballottee! Whatever may be said of the suspension of the existing Militia Ballot Act, which has for long been an annual ceremony, it cannot be contended that under the existing Acts any approach to universal personal service could be made. The Militia Acts are a remarkable illustration of the law by which civic freedom involves a liability to military service whenever national interests demand it; but Mr. Fortescue has pointed out in a very convincing manner that their actual operation has been in the past by no means favourable to the national interests whenever those interests have made a large increase in the Regular Army necessary.

Any novel application of the law which we have traced from the eleventh century onwards would form a subject of discussion

quite beyond the limits of the present article. Such application would obviously require the creation of administrative machinery not so far in existence.

The Acts relating to the Militia form an almost impenetrable tangle into which no one is likely to enter unnecessarily, but so far as the ballot is concerned the law at present, according to the officially authorised *Manual of Military Law*, appears to stand as follows: Those provisions of a Consolidation Act of 1802 (42 Geo. III. c. 90) which relate to the ballot are still in force, though they have been amended by some later Acts. No ballot for the Militia appears to have been held since 1810, except in the years 1830 and 1831. First in 1816 under a temporary Act, and then in 1817 under a permanent Act, the provisions for annual training were suspended year by year by Orders in Council. Next, from 1829 to 1865 annual Acts were passed suspending all proceedings for raising Militia by ballot, except when specially authorised by Order in Council, as happened in 1830 and 1831. The Act of 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. c. 46), though for one year only, has been continued in force since 1865 by Annual Expiring Laws Continuance Acts.

Lastly, in 1808 and 1812, independently of the legislation referred to above, special Acts were passed for raising by ballot in each county a force of men between 18 and 30, which was styled 'Local Militia,' and is said in the *Manual of Military Law* to represent the old general levy. Each man balloted must serve in person for four years and receives no bounty. No force has been raised under these Acts since 1815. From 1815 to 1832 Orders in Council were annually passed suspending the operation of the Acts, but the Act authorising the issue of these Orders was itself repealed as obsolete in 1873. The 'Local Militia,' as distinguished from the regular Militia with which we are more familiar, does not seem to have ever been of actual importance; but the provisions relating to it are of interest as showing at what a comparatively recent date the ancient law of military service was embodied by Parliament in a statutory form.

H. B. SIMPSON.

WAR AND THE FARMER

THE farmer is a chartered grumbler, and some dispensation of Providence, doubtless wise, provides him with a grievance at all seasons. When sunny weather is ripening his corn he remembers that it is shrinking his root crops; when the rain bulks his roots he remembers that it is spoiling his corn. If prices are high he declares that it is difficult to buy linseed or cotton cake and barley meal at a fair figure; if prices are low he will point out the impossibility of growing corn at a profit. If a prolonged spell of fine weather brings his clover and meadow hays safely to the stack he will point out the urgent need of rain for the seed clover and the after feed. He may have learned by experience that seed clovers can thrive through a drought, but the theory of his childhood is too firmly established to be relinquished at the bidding of mere fact. It follows that his complaints are regarded as incidental to his occupation, and are seldom taken seriously. At present he may be heard to declare that he is one of the worst sufferers from the War, but with wheat somewhere between fifty and sixty shillings a quarter, oats hard to obtain, and the price of meat standing high, nobody is prepared to believe him. He has cried 'Wolf' so long that, now the wolf is really at his door, his protests rouse very little interest.

To begin to understand his present position, it is necessary to remember that for long years past the number of agricultural labourers in this country has been steadily shrinking. Many causes have contributed to the decline. The development of towns and urban industries has drawn men from rural districts; the call of the Dominions overseas has taken agriculturalists from the British Isles by the hundred thousand. Canada and Australia have little use for the town-bred worker; they have gone so far as to warn him to stay away unless he has the wherewithal to live while he looks round for the place that may or may not be forthcoming. On the other hand, the sturdy labourer has always been welcome; he has a standing invitation. Special fares are arranged for his benefit; work awaits his arrival, and the wages are sufficiently high to enable him in Canada after a few years of strenuous life to take up one of the 160-acre farms

that can be paid for over a term of years, farms on which 50 acres have been broken up and laid down to wheat, on which a homestead with suitable outbuildings has been set up and much of the pioneer work accomplished. Canada, with an area greater than that of the United States and little more than ten per cent. of its population, is hungry for men; Australia, not very far behind Canada in area, and with special advantages of her own, is equally clamant, and, since the twentieth century dawned, Great Britain has parted with more than a million of her sturdiest sons. They have not gone in the main from the towns but from the country. Our Dominions overseas receive a set-back from time to time; they outgrow their financial resources or suffer from over-speculation in one form or another, and then they must call a halt; but whatever the nature of the reverse, nothing less than an unforeseen succession of bad harvests can diminish the call for agricultural labour, and the agents of the Dominions go through every county at home telling in no reticent or guarded fashion the story of an Eldorado overseas.

For some years past the farmer has felt the pinch and has done nothing. Agricultural wages have remained as near as possible to starvation point, any little increase, grudgingly conceded, having been more than offset by the rise in prices of the necessities of life. It has not been possible for the labourer to pay an economic rent, the shilling or eighteenpence that he contributes weekly has not availed to keep his overcrowded home in habitable repair, and it is hopeless to build new cottages for him on the basis of a four per cent. return. Even if it were, the farmer would not undertake the task unless he owned his farm; he will not often do it then, and the landlord has not recovered from the long season of low prices, and is concerned with his mortgages rather than with improvements. Local authorities have the power but lack the will; their concern is for the ratepayer's pocket, and they themselves are ratepayers. Farmers have long complained that the present farm hand works far less than his father and grandfather did in the long day that brought them to the workhouse at last; they know that the man who does little at home develops new capacities in the Dominions, but they do not realise that the conditions and surroundings in the stimulating air of Canada or Australia, added to the living force of a vigorous democracy, are sufficient to account for the change. Here the labourer has no future; there his future is in his own hands. The present Government tried to improve the status of agriculture through the medium of the Small Holdings Act, but, as I pointed out in these pages some year or two ago, they did no more than put the cart before the horse. They exhausted the small capital that labour could save or borrow and provided no

market for produce. A couple of bad seasons could, and generally did, suffice to throw the labourer back into his old, hopeless position.

It followed naturally from the conditions briefly outlined here that this country was not in the position to part with its agricultural labourers when War broke out. There were no reserves to fall back upon; the men who left could not be replaced, for they are skilled workmen, albeit the worst-paid in Great Britain. Unfortunately the dangerous disease required a desperate remedy; the farmer and the landowner found themselves side by side on the village platform urging every able-bodied man to serve his country in the hour of need. Thousands of married labourers answered the call and went to submit their strength to the discipline of training. They left home cheerfully, partly out of the Anglo-Saxon love of adventure, partly out of the knowledge that their wives and children would be better off than they had ever been. The labourer with three or four children might bring home fifteen or sixteen shillings a week; out of that he would require perhaps as much as sixpence a day for his own beer and tobacco; the remainder must feed him as well as the family, and the housewife's task was hard. To-day he is better clothed and better fed than he has ever been; he is setting aside a certain amount of money against the end of the War, while his wife draws fifteen shillings weekly, with an extra allowance for each child. The farmer works short-handed; he has in many cases raised the wages of those who remain behind, and he knows that the fighters will not return to the old conditions when War is over. They will be new men demanding new terms and treatment, and if they cannot find them at home they will look for them abroad.

Having taken toll and tithe of his labour, the Government bade the farmer sow more corn; and when these instructions were issued many farmers realised the seriousness of the situation, none more than those whose plough horses, or some of them, had been commandeered soon after harvest. Straw had been denied them, but they were bidden to increase the tale of bricks. It was reported by the Board of Agriculture that an addition of ten per cent. to the corn area might be anticipated, and this may be set down roughly at about 200,000 acres. To bring this change about many labourers would be necessary, the extent varying according to the nature of the soil. Draining, liming, stone clearing, manuring, ploughing, cultivating, harrowing, rolling, would be necessary, together with some sacrifice of pulse, forage, root crops, and new pastures. Whatever the measure of labour required, it would not be inconsiderable, even granting that certain pulse and forage crops require more attention than corn, and the conditions would be further

complicated by the fact that low-grade farming is far more common in this country to-day than it used to be in times when labour was plentiful. Without using modern machinery, the only safe labour-saver, the farmer has been forced, or has chosen, to farm poorly. One sees in nearly all parts of rural England fields with wide borders untouched by the plough and full of corn cockle, thistles, coltsfoot, bindweed, dodder, docks, field foxtail, and nettle; all too often these unwelcome visitors, to say nothing of others, have eaten far into cultivated land. At the best of times they seemed to have passed out of control; they will become a worse danger than before, when the already attenuated supply of labour is spread over a wider area. Spraying, draining, deep ploughing, fallowing, digging, all take time, cost money and demand hard work.

Parliament has partly recognised the special needs of the hour, and is prepared to allow children to work on the land and to advocate the employment of women. In Scotland and the North of England women are accustomed to help, and their labours are valuable, particularly in the dairy, for few cows will yield as freely to men as to women; in the south and centre women are hard to find even for milking, and now that the wives are receiving an ample allowance it is to be feared that their appearance in the fields will be sporadic. The value of children is doubtful, and the wisdom of their indiscriminate use more doubtful still. You may find them in pea-picking time doing their share and welcoming the little holiday from school, but their attendance in all weathers as constant workers is not likely to be regular. The mothers have no incentive to urge the children, and the physique of the country-born is not what it is popularly supposed to be. Down to a few months ago they did not always have enough to eat; the food their father's agricultural wage commanded was of the poorest. Herded together in overcrowded cottages, sleeping in rooms from which all suspicion of fresh air is excluded, they are in many cases more puny and delicate than the children of the towns.

To add to the farmer's troubles, the winter now at an end has been extremely unfavourable. Down to the end of September the year's rainfall was below the average; by the end of December that average had been exceeded. The mid-winter months provided nothing but rain, the frosts that complete the work of the plough and make the earth friable were conspicuously absent, low-lying lands were flooded in every direction and are saturated, winter-sown corn suffered, and spring sowing, late everywhere, has in certain parts been abandoned. If the full shortage of labour has not yet been experienced, it is because the land, down to middle March, has been too soft for spade or

plough. Some farmers have been unable to send their corn to market because there was no dry wind to remove the moisture from the stacks, and in the face of rising prices they have been unable to handle last year's harvest. This statement applies only to those more fortunate men who are able to hold their produce of whatever kind until the early glut, following hay or corn harvest, has been absorbed by the consumer. It is safe to say that the weather has been a factor in that rise of prices that has forced bread to its present figure and has added so much to the troubles of those whose earnings have been adversely affected by the War. Those corn-holding farmers who made a desperate effort to ignore the weather merely flooded the market with grain that could not be used for anything much more useful than poultry food.

With a favourable winter it is possible to have all the spring corn sown in March, and to have the other work on the land well forward. Under the exceptional conditions of the past six months there is hardly a farmer in the country whose preparations for the coming season are not badly in arrear, and even if he had a full complement of labourers he would not be free of anxiety. However small his supply at present, there are certain demands that must be met. He must have horsemen and cowmen, he must have stockmen and a shepherd under ordinary circumstances; whatever the size and needs of his holding, the live stock claim attention for the good and sufficient reason that they represent a part of his capital and cannot be neglected for a day. Only when their needs have been satisfied can the actual work on the land be considered. There is another difficulty before him. However ill-supplied he may be, there are others who are worse off and will endeavour to secure additional labour at his expense with the bait of a higher wage. Almost for the first time in his life, the farmer must conciliate his men, and they have not been slow to realise that they have the whip hand. Apart from the farmers whose chief concern is corn, the cattle-breeders, the men who live by fattening stock, the keepers of a dairy herd—all have been face to face with shortage of labour.

Enough has been said to show that the double problem of a mild, rainy winter and a short labour supply lies beyond the ordinary methods of solution; we may turn now to consider the effect upon the farmer of the extraordinary rise in prices since War began.

To do this it is necessary, in the first instance, to divide farmers into two classes. The first, a comparatively small one, embraces the men with ample capital and considerable holdings of their own. There were not many of these a few years ago, but after 1910 the general upward tendency of prices began to make

itself felt, and, while hundreds of landowners were selling a part of their estates in order to limit the area of increased taxation as applied to themselves, thousands of substantial farmers took advantage of the opportunity to become their own landlords. A farm is a very intimate and personal possession : every field has its special capacities, its little failings only to be checked by those who have watched it year by year ; the old-established man can thrive where a new man would either fail or earn no more than a bare living. The comparatively rich farmers are in a position to mould their supplies to the demand, to sell or to hold, to increase one crop and diminish another, to use the best fertilisers, keep a good herd of cows or flock of sheep, and to purchase pedigree sires. They are sure of their market, and though bad weather and scanty labour affect them too, they can gather the benefits without suffering greatly from the evils of high prices. They have never known what is called in country parlance ' Saturday night farming '—that is to say, they have not to condition their work to the needs of their wages and living bill. Their holdings may be anything from four hundred up to a thousand acres, in some few cases several thousand, and as they are always practical and often hard workers who do not spare themselves more than they spare their men, the circumstances of the time present few vital difficulties. Perhaps the best farming in England is done by men with moderate holdings ; too much land is almost as bad as too little, and undoubtedly some farmers hold more than they can attend to. It is unlikely that the big men will be able to raise as much spring corn as they hoped to do a few months ago, but theirs as a rule is high farming, and they are staffed to face abnormal times. It would be well for the country at large if farmers of a fairly large holding were in the majority, but the fact remains that it is very greatly outnumbered by the small men whose labours and responsibilities never end, and whose profits, always at the mercy of chance, have been ruined by high prices.

Paradoxical as this may seem it is easily explained and understood. The greater part of this country is farmed with insufficient capital by men whose grandfathers were prosperous until the repeal of the Corn Laws, whose fathers struggled to keep their homes together by aid of grants and rebates from the landlord. They farm with a minimum of labour, with old-fashioned implements, inferior stock, insufficient fertilisers, and the mental equipment of mid-Victorian times. In a good year they may set a little money aside, in an average year they earn a living, after a bad season they must draw upon their scanty savings or fall into arrears. Some have purchased their holding in the last few years and have a mortgage upon it ; whatever the times and circumstances they must struggle on as best

they can, because there is not under the sun another occupation for them. Their inability to pay proper wages or keep decent cottages for their labourers is one of the main factors in the agricultural unrest; even if they merely rent their holding and do not own it, the chances are that the landlord is relatively as poor as they. A burnt stack, a lost horse or cow, an outbreak of swine fever, any one of these ordinary incidents of the farmer's year will cripple them for the time being. By reason of their lack of capital they flood the market and depress prices. As soon as their hay is stacked it must be sold to pay the extra hands that helped to cut and cart and stack it; their corn goes to the threshing machine as soon as it can be hired and to market in the week or two following; nothing must stay on the premises after it becomes saleable. Those who have studied the Board of Agriculture's weekly returns will not have failed to note how prices fall as soon as hay or corn is ready for market, and the money paid at a hundred centres keeps the small farmer on his feet. He is essentially backward in all his methods and intolerant of progress; having no money for modern improvements he is suspicious of them. Suggestions of co-operation in whatever form fall upon deaf ears; he knows that he has mastered the peculiarities of his own few fields and believes that this mastery extends to the whole practice of farming. A dour, hardworking and woefully backward man, he nevertheless does a brave day's work and seldom voices a specific grievance. To-day he is in serious trouble and needs prompt assistance.

The Government that came to the assistance of the banks and Stock Exchange can hardly overlook the small agriculturalist, for his troubles are largely due to the War, and for all his faults or shortcomings the country requires his services. Harvest was beginning when war broke out, and the ready-money grower sold his wheat at about forty shillings, his barley at thirty, and his oats at twenty-five, all fair prices. He was able to buy seed-wheat for winter sowing at a moderate figure. By the time the rise in prices began to be noticeable, the great majority of farmers, who are not stock-breeders with good connexion, had nothing left to sell. In accordance with their custom they had finished with corn for the year, and were turning their attention to fattening oxen, sheep, pigs, their main source of support between harvests. For stock feeding they require maize, barley meal, middlings, linseed cake, beans, cotton cake, oats, and peas. It is impossible to quote prices with certainty when they move from day to day, but in general terms it may be said that maize and barley meal have gone from thirty shillings a quarter to forty. Middlings and linseed cake have risen about 3*l.* per ton, cotton cake about 2*l.* per ton. Beans have gone from about thirty-two shillings to forty-two, oats from twenty-five shillings

per quarter have reached thirty-five, and peas have advanced from thirty-six shillings to forty-eight. Before these lines can be printed changes in either direction may be recorded, but it may be said that the farmer has been compelled to pay twenty-six or twenty-seven shillings for the food that a pound would have purchased before War began. In some cases the proportion is even higher. Spring-seed corns are very expensive. The man who sold his wheat at two pounds in August last will probably find that his spring seed costs three, or even more, for you cannot sow any kind of wheat in spring. Oats for March planting will cost him five shillings a sack more than his own fetched, and seed barley shows in some cases an increase of fifty per cent. The rise in the price of stock, although it is not inconsiderable, is not sufficient to cover the added cost of foodstuffs, and one hears in all directions of farmers who have been obliged to sell stock before it was ready for the market, either because they could not afford to buy more food at the enhanced figures, or because they needed the money to meet the high price of seed oats and barley. Some farmers with milking herds and contracts that run to April have been losing money, few have made any. Even where they could pay for the food required, there have been other difficulties; first, the delay in getting delivery by rail on lines required for military service; and, finally, the difficulty of carting. All these are small matters enough: so, too, is the additional two or three shillings to the wages of the labourer; but the cumulative effect is very considerable, and while many men can hardly see how they are going to hold out between now and harvest, still more realise that a really bad harvest would give them their knock-out blow. August weather in these islands is always variable, and it is clear that the harvest will take an unusual time to collect, in the first place because of the extension of corn area, and secondly on account of the labour shortage. Nowadays the hands make great efforts because so many farmers pay a lump sum for harvesting, and the sooner it is over the more profitable it is to the harvester; but even with men working as they never work at other times one may see the harvest considerably delayed by a few days' rain. If we have a wet harvest thousands of acres of corn will remain to rot in the fields, unless some new conditions are developed between now and August.

There are one or two other points relating to the financial position of the small farmer. He does not employ much labour, but what he does employ is costing him an addition of fifteen or twenty per cent. For assistance at harvest time he will need to pay a special price. His tithe being regulated by the price of wheat, oats, and barley, will in all probability be higher this year than it has been for a quarter of a century, and if he be

farming on a short or yearly tenancy he may reasonably expect to find his rent raised. Corn prices rule rent as they rule tithe, and it is well to remember that very many of those wicked Tory landlords, who really understood the farmer's difficulties, and knew how to distinguish between facts and appearances, have sold a great part of their land to men without traditions, who look upon it as an investment and nothing else. When the small man cannot thrive and the big man can absorb his holding the modern landlord or his agent will merely say *Vae victis*.

If the country could spare its small farmers there would be nothing more to be said, but it cannot. We have too few in England at present, and the real necessity of the hour is to help them to help themselves, to overcome their innate contempt for modern methods, and to place before them the means of making up for the loss of men and horses, the increased cost of food-stuffs, the increasing cost of freights, and the railway company's delays. This work, which can only be accomplished by the Government, has long been necessary, and we have only gone without it at a great cost in efficiency and with ample waste of national resources. To-day, when all our business methods are undergoing the closest scrutiny, the claims of agriculture cannot be overlooked, and even if the Government has not yet taken any steps to help the farmer, it has at least recognised his need for assistance.

There are two ways in which the Government can come to the farmer's aid. The first is by the supply of that modern machinery by which the shortage of labour may be made up. Steam and petrol can do a giant's work. For example, the steam cultivator can reduce a big field to order in far less time than three teams of horses would require, and for the smaller fields that cannot be handled by the large engines, by reason of the room they need for turning, there are small motor ploughs that save both time and money. A horse working all day can pull one tenth of its own weight; to compare this with engine capacity is to realise at once how much time and labour are lost under the normal conditions of ploughing. Much of the work done in all small farms by hand under cover could be more than trebled by the introduction of small engines fed by oil or petrol—chaff cutting, meal grinding, root pulping, water pumping, and the rest could be completed in a fraction of the time. On the road the slow-going farm wagon could be replaced by the motor van. The harvest in North America consists of little more than one operation; a single machine serves to cut the corn and thresh it, being fed by the straw, for which there is no demand. In this country the value of straw for thatch, litter, chaff, and other purposes, calls for some other fuel, perhaps the substitution of oil or petrol, but this should not prove a problem beyond the

resources of our engineers. It is interesting to note that nearly forty years have passed since experiments in ploughing by electricity were carried on in France. To-day the highest point of agricultural development, as far as labour-saving machinery is concerned, has been reached in America, and the methods followed in both the United States and Canada are worthy the closest attention, even though it must be admitted that the harvest weather in America is more reliable than it is here, and that for the best results fine days are indispensable.

At the present moment one cannot expect farmers to invest in modern machinery; even if they had the inclination they lack the means, but if the Government, through the Board of Agriculture, would supply the necessary machinery at different centres throughout the rural areas, and would notify the farmers of the terms on which they could be hired, the whole procedure of farming by machinery could be put upon a business basis. The farmer does a certain amount of hiring already; the steam plough, the threshing machine, and other agricultural plant, pass in their due season from farm to farm. This supply, however, is in private hands, is only moderately efficient, and leaves a large field of work untouched. Some farmers have their own machines, though they are only in use for a week or two in the year. If the Board of Agriculture took the matter in hand the middleman might be eliminated, the area of operations would be extended considerably, and, by reason of the rapidity with which the work can be done, it would be possible to collect the harvest for a number of farms in the time and with no more labour than is required for one. It would pay the farmer to meet charges that paid an interest on the outlay and provided a sinking fund to buy new machinery in due course. In a few country districts enterprising merchants may be found to take the farmer's corn from the threshing machine to the market town, prepare it for market and sell on commission. Unfortunately such firms are few.

Motor wagons for the transport of corn, hay, straw, and some of the stock from farm to railhead or market, would be an immense advantage to farmers. At present one man, sometimes two, go on a journey that may be ten miles or more out and home, by the side of the slow-moving carthorse. They take their time, receive a special allowance for carting, and stay as long as may be necessary at their favourite inn to liquidate it. Coal is generally carted from distant stations in the same comfortable, primitive fashion. In short, the whole pace of farming needs to be speeded up, and this can only be done by Government aid. As the Government demands more corn in the country's vital interests, it is not unreasonable that it should provide the machinery that will ensure the required supply under new condi-

tions that have made soldiers of so many agricultural labourers and made farming on the old lines well-nigh impracticable.

The other pressing need of the hour is a system of co-operation, for which we must look to Denmark rather than to North America for a model. It is not necessary to discuss the Danish system at any length; its general principles are familiar to all who take any interest in agricultural problems, and though the Danish farmers are not a very thriving body, they would hardly be able to remain in business at all if they followed our English methods. Co-operation has been demanded these many years; a few stray experiments have been made and failed because farmers would not assist. To-day the case is altered; the country needs all the food it can raise, and it is common knowledge that in every county in these islands an immense amount of fruit and vegetables is wasted annually because it can find no market. While there may be a shortage of certain foods in one district, in another these same foods are being fed to the pigs. To make a single journey with a small supply is not a paying proposition; to send some foods to London is to incur a heavy expense for cartage, railway freight, and commission, and then to have the produce handled by a buying ring in the London market, so that the result of the whole transaction is often a definite loss. This has been the actual experience of the writer. The co-operative van would solve all these problems and would carry the good food to those who stand in need of it. Our present system is wasteful and ridiculous. While the fruit wastes in the English orchards, the townsman buys what has been sent from America or the Cape and has contributed the most of its flavour to the ships and trains that carried it; while not a tithe of our gardens and orchards pay toll to the honey bee, we pay 30,000*l.* a year for foreign honey.

If Denmark can make general farming and small culture possible through the medium of co-operation, why can we not do the same? And, having taken the responsibility of establishing the small-holder, why should not the Government give him the only assistance that can enable him to bear the heavy burden of the gift?

It may be that down to the present the country has not been ripe for the change, that the hostility of the backward farmer has been a factor in the delay. Now the times have changed, and those of us to whom active participation in the present world tragedy is forbidden are prepared to do all that in us lies to increase the country's food supply and to see it directed into the right channels. But only the Government can give this movement the impetus necessary to enable it to ride, rough-shod if need be, over the ruts of long accumulated prejudice.

S. L. BENSUSAN.

THE TRUTH ABOUT BIRTH- AND DEATH-RATES:

A REPLY TO DR. BREND

No subject which has been brought further forward by the War is of greater importance than that dealt with by Dr. William A. Brend in the March issue of the *Nineteenth Century*, in an article under the rather sinister title 'The Passing of the Child.' His view that 'changes have occurred, and are still taking place, in our population which point to the conclusion that the population of Germany, already much the greater, will in ensuing decades tend more and more to outstrip ours at an increasingly rapid rate,' is so gloomy that it must have depressed many of his readers. They will probably welcome any destructive criticism of Dr. Brend's paper which can reasonably be offered, and may even be disposed to listen to one who has studied the population question without any theological or socialistic prejudices, and has failed in consequence to see that the Malthusian principle is 'an exploded doctrine,' as it is so commonly described.

A brief historical review of the subject will enable the reader to appreciate the significance of Dr. Brend's cautiously vague arguments which 'point with a high degree of probability to a further fall in the birth-rate altogether independent of any increase in the practice which is the main cause of the fall, as well as to an automatic rise in the death-rate at no very distant time.' In 1798 the Rev. T. R. Malthus showed in his famous *Essay on the Principle of Population* that as food supplies could only be increased slowly, populations could only be increased slowly—in other words, that high birth-rates only caused high death-rates. He advocated the remedy of late marriage and small families; nevertheless, the birth- and death-rates continued high. But his theory became accepted, and became the basis of Political Economy and of the Doctrine of Evolution. Meanwhile, the system of early marriage and small families, or Neomalthusianism as it is now called, had sprung up. About 1832 a popular pamphlet on the subject was written by Dr. Knowlton,

an American physician. In 1876 its sale, which had hitherto been very small, was suddenly forbidden in England. In the following year Charles Bradlaugh and Mrs. Annie Besant were prosecuted for publishing it to defy this prohibition. Although Lord Chief Justice Cockburn summed up strongly in their favour, the trial was decided against them. But it aroused widespread interest, and many of the reading public immediately began to limit their families. From this year the birth-rate commenced to fall in England, Germany, Austria, Holland, and Belgium, and within a decade or so in all the other European countries except Russia, the Balkan States, and Ireland. It may be noted here that the leading Neomalthusians, on humanitarian, eugenic, and anti-socialistic grounds, specially advocated encouragement of the new parental prudence among the poor and unfit.

Though the birth-rates were falling fairly steadily year by year as restriction extended downwards in the social scale, the populations continued to increase as fast as before because the death-rates fell with the birth-rates, as it had been predicted they would. But the decline had not been long in progress before false alarms began to be raised about the population diminishing. In vain did the Neomalthusians attempt to draw public attention to the equally falling death-rate, and the consequently unaffected rate of increase. In time, however, it became impossible to ignore the fact that the death-rate was correspondingly falling. So the suggestion—a particularly gratifying one to socialistic reformers—was started that the reduction was due to ‘improvement in conditions,’ the inference being that it was not due to any reduction of the pressure of population through family limitation. One suggestion, that it had all been brought about by the recent Public Health Act was easily disposed of, as this measure could hardly account for the strikingly synchronous reduction of the death-rate in the other countries where the birth-rate was declining. But the vaguer appeal to ‘improvement in conditions’ persisted, and still persists. Timely supplemented by a new line of anti-Neomalthusian argument—statistical corrections for age and sex distribution, which will be examined later—it underlies the whole of Dr. Brend’s argument. The reason why it still persists is that the following question continues to be ignored: *Why has the death-rate risen in those countries where the birth-rate has risen, and why has the death-rate been stationary in those countries where the birth-rate has been stationary?* There are four countries in which the birth-rate has risen, namely Ontario (from 1895 to 1908), Japan, Ceylon, and Bulgaria. In every one of them the death-rate rose in close correspondence with the birth-rate. Can it be said that ‘conditions’ were deteriorating in these countries, thereby

increasing the death-rates? Again, in four countries the birth-rate has remained practically stationary, namely Russia, Roumania, Jamaica, and Ireland. In these the death-rate has remained practically stationary—though Russia seems in the last few years to have had a reduction of its death-rate, *and* of its birth-rate. Will Dr. Brend maintain that there has been no progress in these countries of the kind which, according to his view, would reduce their death-rate? Italy is another case to which attention should be directed. Its birth-rate only began to decline about 1886. It was then about 38 per thousand, and fell to 32.5 in 1901, the death-rate meanwhile falling from about 28 per thousand to 22. According to the *Eugenics Review* for October, Italy's birth-rate stopped falling in 1901—and so did the death-rate! Italy's birth- and death-rates have remained practically stationary from 1901 to 1910! Yet 22 per thousand is a high death-rate. Why were the doctors and social reformers unable to reduce it these ten years?

The only satisfactory explanation of the very remarkable way in which the death-rates follow the birth-rates, i.e. of the strikingly high correlation between these rates, is the Malthusian one, namely that in every country in the world (except New Zealand, and perhaps also Australia) the birth-rates are, though in varying degrees, still excessive, and that the populations, in these varying degrees, are all pressing on their means of subsistence.

What happens when an excessive birth-rate falls is that the infants, children, and adults live longer because of their share of the insufficient food-supply being increased. In 1876, when our birth-rate was 36 and our death-rate 21, the average duration of life was about 35 years. As the birth-rate fell, this steadily increased, till now it stands at about 53 years. Why, therefore, should we not go on reducing the birth-rate so long as the average duration of life goes on increasing—in other words, so long as the death-rate falls with it? But Dr. Brend apparently believes—and this is one reason for his pessimism—that an average duration of life of 53 years is as high as we can expect to get. To this, indeed, he seems to attribute the arrest in the fall of the death-rate since 1912. He should have observed, however, that the birth-rate has also been practically stationary since 1912, and should consider whether the Maternity Benefit (to which and similar schemes he seems partial) has not actually had the effect of arresting the fall of the death-rate by arresting the fall of the birth-rate—that is, by encouraging an increase of the already excessive birth-rate among the poor.¹ But what grounds

¹ In Hungary the same phenomenon followed the Act passed in 1901 for the State care of necessitous mothers and infants.

are there for supposing that we have already reached the maximum average duration of life? None, except the determination, which we have been exposing, to ignore the economic or Malthusian factor in the maintenance of high mortality rates. Every thoughtful person must see in the mass of poverty still in our midst a potent cause of shortened lives. What reason is there to suppose that the average duration of life in a sufficiently fed community would not be over 70 years?

Assuming that an average duration of life of 70 years is possible, and that our coal and iron advantages will continue enabling us to maintain our annual increase of population of 1 per cent., the death-rate will at least continue falling with the birth-rate till the latter reaches 20 per thousand. 'But,' may exclaim someone who has more faith in numbers than in the abolition of poverty and unfitness, 'the birth-rate may go on falling for many years after the death-rate will have ceased to fall with it.' The general answer to this is that there is still a very large proportion of unmarried men and women in the population, and to suggest that most people will be glad to be married and have at least two children when, through the reduction of rates and taxes and charitable demands by a low birth-rate among the poor, they will be able to do so easily; the particular answer is to point to New Zealand, where the birth-rate, having fallen till the average duration of life had risen to over 60 years, ceased to decline, and the marriage-rate increased. Another objector may, with Dr. Brend, deplore the thought of a larger proportion of people in the population being over 40 years of age. But surely the steadily rising average duration of life means that men and women are retaining their youth longer as the pressure of life diminishes. In another decade the age-limit for war service may well be over 40 years. Moreover, a country wants money as well as men for national defence, and it is the people past 40 who are the main reservoir of savings and of experience.

Before the foregoing argument is concluded, the paltry differences may be briefly considered which Dr. Brend, following on the work of Dr. Newsholme on the correction of vital statistics, introduces in the shape of modifications for age and sex distribution. (1) That the decline of the birth-rate is causing, or will cause, a change in the age and sex distribution unfavourable to a sufficient production of children. In the Registrar-General's Report for 1912 the actual analysis was given of the fall of the birth-rate and these corrections. The fall of the crude birth-rate from 1876-80 to 1912 was 11.53. This was partly responsible for *increasing* the number of women between 15 and 45 years of age, which should have raised the birth-rate by 2.86; but the

proportion of married women became smaller, which should have lowered the birth-rate by 1.1. The two disturbing influences acting together should, therefore, have caused a net rise of the birth-rate of 1.76; whereas there was an actual fall of 11.53, showing that the fertility of marriages had fallen even more, viz. by $11.53 + 1.76$. So this correction, which is one of the largest, is only 1.76, as compared with a total drop of 11.53. (2) That the decrease of the death-rate is not such a gain as appears at first sight, because it is due (a) to a smaller proportion of infants among whom mortality is (necessarily?) high, and (b) to a more favourable distribution of ages. As to (a), Dr. Brend argues as if infantile mortality were a constant, and as if there were about as high a rate among the infants born to well-nourished mothers in the West End as to the underfed mothers in the East End. This, however, is too simple a way of explaining why the death-rate follows the birth-rate. The average infantile mortality in this country until recently was about 130 per thousand born, while the fall of the birth-rate has been from 36 to 24, a drop of 12 per thousand of the population. Hence, for a million of the population there are 12,000 fewer births; and, since in each thousand of these births there were 130 deaths, a reduction would result of 12×130 , or 1560 deaths in a million of the population, or 1.56 per thousand. Thus the whole effect of the fall of the birth-rate on the general death-rate by reducing infantile mortality would have been 1.56 per thousand. Since the actual fall of the general death-rate was no less than 8 per thousand (viz. from 22 to 14), it is obvious that the great part of it represents a real improvement in the health of the people. As regards (b), it is only necessary to refer to the table given by the Registrar-General for 1909 showing the crude and corrected death-rates for various countries at different times. In only very few cases did the differences between the crude and corrected figures exceed 1 or 2 parts per thousand, in spite of differences of birth-rates of from 15 to 20 per thousand, and of such extremes as regards migration as were shown by New Zealand's immigration and Britain's emigration. It might also be noted that in France the birth-rate has been falling for over a century, and is now the lowest on record, yet the death-rate is still decreasing, and shows no signs of the 'almost inevitable' rise which Dr. Brend makes out must well-nigh be upon us.

No table of comparative figures for the average duration of life in the various countries seems yet to have been published, and the following is an attempt to supply one. Such figures are the best indication of the degree of civilisation, though these had better be taken as only approximately correct. The table is based, where possible, on the mean of the years 1910-11-12. It

is interesting to note the pacifist countries above the 50 years-and-over line and their low birth-rates; also that Germany will be the next country to come above the line:

	Birth-rate	Death-rate	Natural Increase	Average Duration of Life
New Zealand . .	26.2	9.3	16.9	61.3
Australia . . .	27.5	10.8	16.7	56
United Kingdom .	24.4	14.2	10.2	53.8
Sweden	24.1	14	10.1	53.7
France	19.1	18.3	.8	53.2
Norway	25.8	13.4	12.4	52.8
Denmark	27	13.2	13.8	51.9
Belgium	23.4	15.8	7.6	51.7
Ireland	23.2	16.7	6.5	50.6
Holland	28.2	13.5	14.7	50.1
Switzerland . . .	24.9	15.7	9.2	50.1
Germany	29.8	16.9	12.9	43.9
Italy	32.4	19.8	12.6	39.1
Austria	31.7	21.2	10.5	38.3
Japan	34	21.3	12.7	36.8
Spain	32.3	22.8	9.5	36.7
Servia	37.6	21.7	15.9	34.6
Hungary	35.7	24	11.7	33.9
Bulgaria	41.6	24.5	17.1	31
Roumania	42.1	24.6	17.5	30.7
Russia (European) .	45	28.3	16.7	27.8

A very few words in conclusion will suffice for Germany. If any people had reason to be alarmed about the falling birth-rate it would be the Germans.² Whereas ours has been decreasing by about .3 per thousand per annum, theirs has in recent years been falling by over 1 per thousand—thrice as fast as ours, and the fastest in the world. The figures from 1908 onwards were 32.1, 31.1, 29.8, 28.6! It is safe to assume that in 1914 Germany's birth-rate was only 25.6, as against our 23.6. The poverty which must follow her tremendous expenditure of money in the War will surely accelerate the decline of the birth-rate, so that it will overtake ours within three or four years' time, and approximate to the figure in France within a decade. Moreover, her huge sacrifice of breadwinners, as well as the expenditure of money, must raise the death-rate in the coming years much more than will happen in our country. Germany's rate of natural increase will probably fall below 7 per thousand, while ours, if we do not exceed our present rate of casualties, and if we afterwards capture some of her trade, will very likely continue at about its present rate of 10.

² Since this was written the *Lancet* (March 20) reports a paper by Herr M. von Gruben bewailing the rapid fall of the German birth-rate in characteristic *répopulateur* fashion.

Germany's day for rapid increase of population is over, and she will soon realise that her national safety will require her to enter into an *entente* with France, Belgium, Britain, and the other low birth-rate countries of Western Europe. So long as the terribly high birth-rates of Russia and the Balkan States continue, so long must we all be fully prepared for the disturbances that may arise from their pressure of population—a dangerous pressure, as evidenced by their very low average duration of life. Apart from the hopeful prospect of a Western European *entente* which would securely maintain the balance of population at home, it should not be forgotten that Australia and New Zealand have the continuously highest rates of increase in the world, and that Canada, another rising continent, should long continue her present rate of 10 per thousand per annum. To a Neomalthusian, therefore, our population question has no gloom such as Dr. Brend has depicted. Were we now frankly to recognise it and to encourage parental prudence among the poor, and if the War were over, one could say that the future of the British Empire was full of promise.

That the foregoing views are not merely based upon theory but have also practical experience on their side is shown by the case of Holland. There the Neomalthusian League has been registered as one of the Societies of Public Utility, and has been able to work freely and effectively among the poor. The general mortality has fallen to the lowest, and the rate of increase of population has arisen to the highest, in Western Europe. The army figures show a steady and most remarkable progress as regards the numbers and physique of the recruits. It also appears that the demand for Socialistic legislation is comparatively weak in Holland. We, on the other hand, keep playing into the hands of the Socialists and muddling on towards a state of completely reversed selection. The modern parental prudence is a movement which everyone agrees cannot be arrested. It is surely time, therefore, that it began to be openly recognised and intelligently directed on individualistic lines.

BINNIE DUNLOP, M.B., Ch.B.

RICHARD GRAVES
AND 'THE SPIRITUAL QUIXOTE'

THERE are few to-day, even among students of literature, who have read Richard Graves's *Spiritual Quixote*. It is seldom, indeed, that a book, when once it has attained reputation and even fame, falls so deeply into oblivion. First published, anonymously, in 1773, *The Spiritual Quixote* went through numerous editions during the next forty years, and was generally supposed to have taken its place among classic English novels. In 1812 Mrs. Barbauld included it in her series of British novelists. Since that date it has never been reprinted, and to the present generation its very name is almost unknown. The curious searcher may find it, as I have, in a remote country farmhouse, unread by the farmer's daughters, or on a Charing Cross Road bookstall. No one now thinks of it as a comic masterpiece, in its own way among the best of English novels.

It might be curious to inquire how it is that this once popular book was suddenly thrown aside and forgotten. Largely, no doubt, the book was out of harmony with the rather prim and serious tastes of the Early Victorian period. Graves was a clergyman and a schoolmaster, a man of fine taste, orthodox though tolerant in matters of religion, quite unexceptional also in his attitude towards moral questions. But the savour and vivacity of his humour, the occasional picaresque touch, the little audacities of expression, were not of the Victorian epoch, while his satire of religious extravagances—entirely good-natured as it was, and, indeed, skilfully adjusted to avoid offence—was positively dangerous ground in days when Methodism was firmly established and Evangelicalism was permeating the Church. Moreover, Graves belonged to an age of provincial intellectual centres, and spent over fifty years of his life on the outskirts of Bath, one of the chief of these provincial centres. He was not a professional literary man; he made no attempt to build up his own reputation; his books were not published under his own name, and it is evident that he impartially extended to himself the same humorous satire which he bestowed on all the world

around him. Finally, he was emphatically a man of the eighteenth century, which his life almost covered; he loved the people and the ways of his century, and even in his broadest humanitarian ideals was still its child. It cannot be altogether surprising that when the great Romantic movement swept over England, and Scott's novels poured forth from the press, Graves shared the fate of many who deserved it more. His great contemporaries, indeed, Fielding and Smollett and Sterne, stood firm by virtue of their laboriously erected reputations, but Graves—whose masterpiece deserves to rank with all but the best of theirs—reaped the fruits of his good-humoured modesty. He was submerged.¹

II

Richard Graves the Younger, as he is sometimes called, born in 1715, was the son of Richard Graves the Elder, an antiquary referred to by Hearne as a most worthy and virtuous gentleman, an excellent scholar, and sweet-tempered man. It is supposed that his son described him in *The Spiritual Quixote* as Mr. Townsend, a benevolent old man with antiquarian foibles, who is the father of the heroine, and had tried to bring up his children in an eccentrically ancient Roman manner. The Graves family had settled at Mickleton, in Gloucestershire, but they belonged to Yorkshire. It was in allusion to this northern origin that in some of his novels Graves calls himself 'Peter of Pomfret.'

We first hear of young Graves at the age of sixteen, when, being already 'a pretty good Grecian,' he was elected scholar of Pembroke College, Oxford, which Dr. Johnson had left two years before. Here, as he says in his *Recollections of Shenstone*, he 'joined a very sober little party who amused themselves in the evening with reading Greek and drinking water'; the authors selected being Epictetus, Theophrastus, and others outside the University course. A little later, however, he entered 'a less mortified symposium,' including Shenstone, and here they 'supped Florence wine, and read poetry, plays, *Spectators*, *Tatlers*, and other writings of easy digestion.' He was even, as he admits, to be found among those who 'drank ale, smoked

¹ After his death, in 1805, a complete and uniform edition of Graves's works was projected, to be accompanied by a biography, partly written by himself, and completed by his daughter and executrix, Lucilla Graves, but there was evidently no encouragement to proceed with the scheme. The unfinished MS. of this Life is now in the possession of Mr. S. G. Hamilton, Graves's great-great-nephew. The best published account of Graves is contained in the *Remains* of the Rev. Francis Kilvert, who became curate of Claverton in 1816 and piously collected all the available information about the old rector. It should be added that the credit of practically rediscovering Graves's masterpiece belongs to the distinguished French critic, Marcel Schwob, who, however, never wrote of it.

tobacco, punned, and sang Bacchanalian catches the whole evening.' But his scholarly tastes, inherited and acquired, were not thus dissipated; he took his degree in 1736, on the same day, it is interesting to note, as Whitefield, who was a servitor of the same College, and in that year also he was elected Fellow of All Souls. He now became intimate with Blackstone, and is said to have continued his intercourse with the great jurist until the latter's death.

It was intended that young Graves should study divinity. He preferred medicine, came to London, and attended two courses of anatomy. Then, however, he fell ill, and apparently realising that he was not sufficiently robust for a surgical career, he devoted himself more seriously to divinity. In 1740 he entered Holy Orders, and became family chaplain to Mr. Fitzherbert, near Ashbourne, in Derbyshire, where he also performed parish duties. He remained here three years, and with the good fortune which in this matter accompanied him throughout life he enjoyed the society of many distinguished people, attracted by the fine qualities of the host, and especially the hostess who, said Dr. Johnson, had 'the best understanding he ever met with in any human being.' Mr. and Mrs. Fitzherbert are said to be the Sir William and Lady Forester whom we are introduced to so delightfully in *The Spiritual Quixote*, engaged with their friends on a summer evening picnic in a grotto above the river Dove, with music and wine and song. The chapters which follow this introduction are indeed an incomparable and many-sided picture of an upper-class country home in the middle of the eighteenth century, vividly bringing before us its elegance mixed with homeliness, its bucolic frolics, its serious and benevolent philanthropy. In this picture we find Miss Sainthill (who is said to stand for Dr. Johnson's friend, and 'sweet angel,' Miss Boothby), the witty and vivacious old maid, with her long nose, and her snuff-box, and her measured repartees. The learned chaplain is duly mentioned, but all we hear of him is that 'he is gone to the "Bowling Green Club,"' the old-time substitute for golf.

On leaving the Fitzherberts Graves became a curate at Aldworth (within riding distance of Oxford), where he lodged with a farmer named Bartholomew. Here was enacted the love-story of the novelist's life, the heroine being the younger daughter of the house, Lucy, then aged sixteen. More than a quarter of a century later Graves introduced into *The Spiritual Quixote*—under the guise of the episodic history of Mr. Rivers—the detailed narrative of this courtship. It is perhaps the most interesting episode in the whole novel. Graves's humour is here subdued to a deep tenderness, his realism is expended on a serious picture, and he succeeds in producing an idyll of old English life not often

surpassed in eighteenth-century literature outside the pages of the *Spectator* or *The Vicar of Wakefield*.

The marriage was not altogether prudent from a worldly point of view, and it gave offence to Graves's family, not unnaturally if the unconventional circumstances of the union are faithfully recorded in *The Spiritual Quixote*. His bride was scarcely of his own social position, and he thought it desirable to send her to London for two years to complete her education. Moreover, Graves had had no intention of entering the married state, and was scarcely in a financial position to do so, for it meant the abandonment of his All Souls' Fellowship. But it is evident that he was not the victim of infatuation: he was too shrewd an observer, he had too much knowledge of the world, to make the mistake that easily befalls the scholarly, inexperienced curate. The marriage seems to have been entirely happy, and Mrs. Graves even gained the approval of Mr. Graves's aristocratic friends, for we find one of these, Lady Luxborough (Bolingbroke's sister), referring to his 'agreeable' wife.

The risk of financial distress was averted by another of the fortunate circumstances which befell Graves. He was presented, in 1750, to the Rectory of Claverton, to which was shortly after added the adjoining Vicarage of Kilmersdon and the chaplaincy to the Countess of Chatham. It was a comfortable living, and it not only gave him a competency and leisure but placed him amid a circle of distinguished and congenial friends. Henceforth there was no danger that Graves would share the fate of those much-tried Anglican parsons who were compelled in that age to labour unremittingly amid difficulties of all kinds in return for a miserable pittance. Graves has incidentally described in *The Spiritual Quixote* the life of at least one such devoted servant of the Church, whose parish was situated in a little paradise; the vicarage was a thatched cottage, covered with honeysuckle and sweet briar; there was only one living-room, and here the vicar, with his squalling children and scolding wife, sat in his dressing-gown, 'every faculty of his soul fully employed; for he was reading a folio that lay on the table to the right, hearing his little boy read, who stood by him on the left, rocking the cradle with his foot, and paring turnips.' Graves could now afford to contemplate such a scene, which he had doubtless often viewed, with serenity. He found at Claverton the satisfaction of all his modest desires. Here he remained, for more than half a century, till his death, never once leaving his parish for so much as a month at a time.

Claverton, a romantic little village on the outskirts of Bath, presented in those days, it is said, a combination of attractively picturesque features rarely combined in one spot. The old

rectory, near the church, was a long, low, even humble building, lying beneath the level of the road, and until it was enlarged Graves occupied the manor house, now destroyed, a beautiful old sixteenth-century building, reported to have been built by the architect of the famous Kingston House at Bradford-on-Avon. Hither he was able to attract his intimate friend Shenstone, and Claverton became the poet's favourite haunt. Near here, too, was Prior Park, the seat of Ralph Allen, who, shortly after Graves settled there, acquired the manor of Claverton. Shenstone is nowadays only a name, though he was in his own small way a pioneer of the great Romantic Movement; but Ralph Allen, outside Bath, is scarcely even a name. Yet in that day he was a famous personage, loved, almost adored, by his numerous friends. A distinguished official, wealthy, genial, highly cultivated, he sought the friendship of many of the famous literary men of the time, some of whom—Pope, Fielding (who dedicated *Amelia* to him), Warburton, and others—came down from time to time to Prior Park, where Allen seems to have kept open house. Graves soon became an assiduous and welcome visitor at Prior Park.

But the Rector of Claverton's restless energies were far from absorbed by his parochial duties and his social pleasures. A young family grew up around him, and when there were four children it occurred to Graves's versatile mind that the best and most economical way to educate them would be to establish a school. This he accomplished; his reputation as a teacher ultimately became considerable, and at one time he had forty pupils, among them being so brilliant a person as Malthus, the famous author of the *Essay on Population*.

Even the school was not enough to employ all Graves's activities. There remained yet another outlet, which in the end has proved the most memorable of all. He had always moved in a more or less literary circle; his chief friends were eminent literary men; it was natural that he should himself turn to letters. He never, however, sought to become a professional man of letters. He wrote, by native instinct, to please himself, to record his judgments of men and things, to revive sweet memories, to while away winter evenings, to find consolation amid the cares of old age. In this way, after he had reached middle age, Graves wrote a considerable series of books, continuing his literary activity until his death in extreme old age. The longest of these books, the only one by which his name deserves to live, was also that in which he placed most of himself, his experiences and his philosophy of life. He published it anonymously, at the age of fifty-eight—almost the same age at which Cervantes published his great romance—in three volumes under the title of *The Spiritual Quixote; or the Summer's Ramble of Mr. Geoffry Wildgoose: A Comic Romance*.

III

The Spiritual Quixote follows, though with no slavish imitation, the classic model furnished by Cervantes. That is to say that we have the central figure stirred by a too highly strung idealistic impulse to sally forth on a great mission, in Wildgoose's case the restoration of primitive Christianity; we have his faithful, uncouth, earthly minded servant; we have the variegated adventures, serious and comic, of this pair; we have the long interspersed narrative episodes, often of considerable interest and skilfully introduced. Wildgoose, the spiritual Quixote, a young country gentleman living with his mother, on his return from the university, is moved to religious enthusiasm, partly by reading old Puritan literature, partly by the arrival at his village of some strolling preachers. He becomes a preacher himself, and in order to gain further spiritual illumination he sets forth to find Whitefield, taking with him, in the capacity of servant, the village cobbler, Jerry Tugwell. At an early stage of his adventures Wildgoose falls in with a young lady who has been compelled to run away from home; this distressed damsel, Julia Townsend, arouses Wildgoose's chivalrous feelings, and his quest eventually becomes the quest of love. It is Julia Townsend whom at the end he finds, and he settles down in his native village, reconciled to the Church and a life of normal and benevolent activity. Graves concludes with a moral which forecasts that of *Wilhelm Meister*, who, like Saul the son of Kish, went forth to seek his father's asses and found a kingdom: 'Providence frequently makes use of our passions, our errors, and even our youthful follies, to promote our welfare and conduct us to happiness.'

In a certain sense, it will be seen, *The Spiritual Quixote* may be called a religious novel, but not in the sense in which we nowadays call *Robert Elsmere* a religious novel. In order to understand the book, Graves states in the Introduction, it is necessary that a man 'should have dipped into the Bible sometimes, or, at least, should have occasionally conversed with those who have.' But, however serious the underlying idea may be, Graves consistently maintains the note of comic romance. It is not difficult to account for his impulse to make the new religious movement of his day the leading motive of his comic romance. Its excesses and peculiarities appealed to his observant humour; while, on the more serious side, Methodism presented a practical problem to the country parson, for even the village of Claverton had on one occasion been visited by a journeyman shoemaker preacher, who, during his stay, had attracted large crowds. Methodism had indeed been brought home to Graves thirty years earlier, for his younger brother, Charles Casper—described as a

good, kindly, quiet man, who was perhaps the original of Wildgoose—had in early life been carried away by the new movement, and became for a time a Methodist preacher at Oxford, though he afterwards entered the Church. This fact, with Graves's invariable good-humour and genial vision of life, may account for the entirely kind and always inoffensive manner—though offence was sometimes taken—in which Graves dealt with Methodism, an attitude entirely different from that of Butler, a century earlier, in his attack on Puritanism in *Hudibras*. Moreover, Graves had himself gone up to Oxford before the founders of Methodism left it, and the unconventional way in which they are introduced into the pages of the novel adds to its value as a typical picture of English eighteenth-century life.

After many adventures, comic and semi-tragic, Whitefield is encountered early one morning, in Bristol, 'sitting in an elbow-chair (in a handsome dining-room), dressed in a purple nightgown and velvet cap; and instead of a Bible or Prayer-book (as Wildgoose expected), he had a good basin of chocolate, and a plate of muffins, well-buttered, before him.' Graves brings out, impartially, his conception of Whitefield as a man of real spiritual unction alloyed with a somewhat plebeian worldly wisdom. He also casually gives us a glimpse of John Wesley. Wildgoose and Tugwell had found themselves at noon near Worcester, in a deep valley, through which ran a winding silver stream shaded with alders. They rested in their cool retreat, Wildgoose pulling out a godly little manual to read, and Tugwell instinctively rummaging in his wallet until he had attracted his master's attention to the question of luncheon. When thus occupied two travellers passed along the road, and sat down in the same agreeable shade, one of whom ' (though his long hair was somewhat in the style of Ralpho in *Hudibras*) had a gentleman-like appearance, both in his dress and his address.' This was Wesley, and after converse which began with observations on the innocent freedom of the birds around them, and passed on to fate and free-will, Wesley, his horses having come up, continued his journey. Graves's fairly respectful treatment of Wesley's personality again illustrates the soundness of his judgment and his complete control of the humours of comic romance.

If we attempt to place *The Spiritual Quixote* among the chief English novels of the eighteenth century, we can scarcely fail to recognise that it stands by itself. It is impossible to couple Graves with either Fielding or Smollett, although *The Spiritual Quixote* was at one time attributed to Smollett. Fielding impressed his books with his own great personality, Smollett with his brilliant talent, but they were both, practically if not quite literally, professional men of letters. They wrote to earn their

living as well as to amuse or to influence the public, and their efforts to do so often display a deplorable lack of levity. They belonged to the transitional stage, when the man of letters who lived to write was giving place to the man of letters who wrote to live, a disastrous change which has produced results we know. Graves wrote to amuse himself; that is doubtless the secret of his wayward ease; that is why every page of his book is readable. He has all the levity which we miss in his stolid predecessors. If we compare *The Spiritual Quixote* with *Joseph Andrews* or *Humphrey Clinker*—which are probably the novels of Fielding and Smollett most easily lending themselves to this comparison—we note, not only that Graves's book is much more various, but that it is more modern. It presents us, indeed, with no single figure that stands out so memorably as Parson Adams, and it cannot rival Smollett's masterpiece for sustained brilliance and caustic wit, but, unlike them, it is never heavy and it is never brutal. Graves's mental alertness, his unfailing humour, here serve him well, while his genial love of men, altogether distinct from Fielding's humanitarian philanthropy, becomes naturally translated into urbanity. This observant yet indulgent humour, one notes, is that of the cleric, and Graves may perhaps in this respect remind us of another cleric, his contemporary, the Rev. Laurence Sterne, and still more, I think, of Goldsmith, a cleric's son, who has immortalised himself by delineating clerical life. A more delicate masterpiece than Graves's comic romance, though on a very much smaller scale, *The Vicar of Wakefield*, published only seven years earlier, is probably the only novel of that age at all allied to *The Spiritual Quixote*. Graves's romance has something of the same tender levity, the same rapid vivacious movement, while it also reveals a mature breadth and variety, which were outside the scope of Goldsmith's immortal little story.

Where, however, Graves's book is distinguished from the other novels of his time, and, indeed, from his own books in general, is by what may be termed his naturalism. This is a quality equally far removed from the naturalism of Zola and the precise realism of Defoe. It is the expression of a direct and unaffected vision of men and the world; and that vision is the outcome of Graves's whole temper and mode of living. Here, after a lifetime spent in going in and out among men and women, and up and down the highways of Central England, Graves gathered in the harvest his quick and genial eye had reaped. Picture after picture seems to have come to him out of the past as he sat in his study during the long winter evenings, the people he had known, the houses he had lived in, the scenes he had witnessed, the experiences he had passed through. With

a little dexterity they could all be woven into the adventures of the Spiritual Quixote and his man Tugwell. It is the peculiar privilege of the form of narrative art devised by the genius of Cervantes that it affords infinite scope to this introduction of the variegated incidents of life into a coherent novel. At the time when Graves was writing his comic romance, Goethe was about to show how even the deepest and boldest visions of the world can be woven into this same pattern. The two essentials for success are some original quest which harmonises all the pictures brought before us by enabling us to view them all at the same angle, and, behind this phantasmagoria, a creative artist with a personal vision of his own, an alert and vivid power of observation, and a tender spirit of human sympathy and indulgence—that indulgence which, as Renan said, is often a form of justice. It is this art and this spirit which Graves was able to put into *The Spiritual Quixote*. It is they which, we now find, have set on this book, plucked from the rubbish heap of the past, a permanent seal of distinction.

IV

The Spiritual Quixote became immediately popular and its fame spread widely. Edition after edition came from the press in England, and a translation appeared immediately in Germany, and shortly afterwards in Holland. It continued to be issued without the author's name, and Graves showed no anxiety to claim the reputation which was now his due, though it was sometimes given to Smollett. He had dedicated the work to 'Monsieur Pattypan, Pastry-Cook to His Most Sacred Majesty King George the Second,' in the hope that 'you are not over-stocked with waste-paper by my brethren of the quill,' and he was not apt to take an unduly solemn view of his literary avocations. Possibly also he felt that to a clergyman and a schoolmaster it would be a dubious advantage to claim the authorship of a comic romance. But he was encouraged to carry on his literary pursuits with new ardour. After 1773 books came rapidly from his pen, though they were all of much slighter texture than *The Spiritual Quixote*.²

A place by itself among Graves's works is occupied by his little book of reminiscence of his intimate friend, Shenstone, who seems to have had a considerable influence on his mental development. Shenstone is introduced, by name or under a disguise, in several of Graves's books. Thus in *The Spiritual Quixote*, Wild-

² One branch of Graves's versatile literary activity is constituted by his translations from the classics, notably his rendering of Marcus Aurelius's *Meditations*. This was recently reissued by Messrs. Methuen and Co., and is the only book of Graves's reprinted in nearly a hundred years.

goose spends a night with Shenstone at Leasowes, or Shenstone's Folly, as his estate near Birmingham was called, and *The Spiritual Quixote* takes the opportunity of showing his disapproval of one who paid a 'greater regard to Pan and Sylvanus than to Paul or Silas.' Shenstone, with his elaborate gardens and his cascades and his Gothic bedroom with painted windows, was, in his own artificial way, not only a verse-writer with fine musical feeling, and one of the first of landscape gardeners, but also, like Horace Walpole, a pioneer of the Gothic revival. Graves's little book of reminiscence is admirable in its way, an excellent picture of a man in whom we can to-day take little interest. To his contemporaries Shenstone's genius was indisputable, but his little star was quickly lost to sight in the brilliant dawn of the Romantic Movement.

Graves's fondness for verse-making was, as he himself states, due to his early intimacy with Shenstone. From that period on, he says, in his collected volume of occasional verse (published in 1776, and entitled *Euphrosyne: or Amusements on the Road of Life*), verse-making had been a 'chemical disease' with him. 'A distich or even a hemistich aptly applied has often afforded as much consolation as a glass of cherry brandy, or a sermon on affliction of an hour long.' It was in this spirit that he always regarded verse-making, not as a serious vocation. He never, he says, formally sat down to write verses; they were usually composed on a jogging horse to relieve the tedium of a journey, or else to alleviate the tedious journey of life. They reflect this origin for the most part in their gay triviality, their casual spontaneity.

Graves put all of himself in *The Spiritual Quixote*, his best literary art, his choicest experiences of life. There was little over for the numerous books that followed, even though they often exhibited his characteristic vivacity and humour. They are slight, often very slight indeed. But though there is little substance in these books they are still usually readable. Graves retained his alert wit and observation, his crisp and rapid style, easy and often careless as it certainly is, even in the garrulous reminiscences of an old man who had travelled so little and seen so much.

These later books enable us to obtain a fairly clear picture of Graves himself as he lived and moved among men, a picture which concords with that furnished by others. In the Dedication to his *Lucubrations*, 'by the late Peter of Pontefract' (1786), Graves speaks of himself as 'our late friend,' and outlines his own career as a younger son, marrying early, engaged in teaching, and leading a life of active and fatiguing work. 'He could only amuse himself in an evening with such kind of reading

and writing as, in an indolent posture, lolling in an easy chair, or leaning on one elbow, a man may be supposed to have attended to.' There is no allusion here to his parochial duties. But Graves glances at himself from that point of view in his *Columella*, which also contains reminiscences of Shenstone and other friends.

Mr. Pomfret, the little Rector, who is an old acquaintance of mine [says the Canon], is a worthy man, and a man of reading, and had taken his degrees in the University. But he is a poor, hectic, miserable-looking creature, and the want of dignity in his person, the want of spirit in his reproofs of vice, and the want of a good elocution to inculcate his virtuous sentiments, prevent him from doing that good in his parish which he might otherwise have done. He preaches tolerable discourses, but with so little emphasis that his audience frequently fall asleep in the midst of them. If he has occasion to exhort privately any of his parishioners he does it in so timorous and undecisive a manner, and with so much hesitation, that it loses its effect. 'I have been told,' says he to a drunken fellow, 'but perhaps it may not be true, that you are apt to drink a little more than does you good sometimes. I am afraid, John, you will get an habit of drinking, if you don't take care, John!' 'It's very fine weather for the after-grass, Master Pomfret,' replies honest John.

And we may be sure that the parson was relieved at the new turn the conversation had taken.

Various accounts of Graves and the portraits painted by Gainsborough and Northcote enable us to fill in the details of the sketches he has given of himself.³ He was short and spare, though active, with large, expressive blue eyes under an intellectual forehead, prominent nose, small mouth, well-cut chin, his face on the whole expressing a singular benevolence. In speech, as in his books, he had a flashing wit, and a gift of impromptu epigram; but his utterance was not only rapid but with a tendency to stutter, so that he called himself 'the worst of all possible speakers.' This same rapidity of movement which marked his speech, and is one of the graces of his style, was visible also to an even comic extent in his walk. It was, we are told, not so much a walk as a trot, with both hands extended before him, in his left, perhaps, his large gingham umbrella, and in his right a stick or any other object he might be carrying. He wore a brown wig, and his costume generally when at home was 'the clerical coat of the period, much too large for him, black smalls, and silk hose, and full'd white cambric neckerchief.' As he advanced in age he wore top-boots and a low beaver hat, much battered. It was a joke against him at Prior Park that, having the privilege of dining in his boots so that he could leave early to

³ I refer especially to R. E. Peach's *Historic Homes in Bath*, vol. ii. pp. 90-100, and to reminiscences quoted by Kilvert.

ride home, he would in his hurried way carry off his dinner napkin on his spurs.

Whatever the ludicrous traits in Graves's personality, he was always a well-bred gentleman, courteous to everyone, good-humoured, cordial, and it is clear that he was welcome in all societies. His natural politeness, his simplicity of manners, imparted charm to the manifestation of his ardent and energetic spirit. His eccentric impetuosity was combined with an essential love of order. 'Ever in a hurry and always collected,' wrote one of his pupils, 'though seemingly composed, yet amidst all his velocities coolly methodical :

By turns he seemed grave, gamesome, learned, wild,
In sense a sage, simplicity a child.'

Whatever frailties Graves possessed seem to have been on the surface. His biographer, the Rev. Francis Kilvert, blessed with a nineteenth-century sense of ecclesiastical decorum, states that Graves's 'lively and epigrammatic vein occasionally betrayed him into levity not wholly suitable to his sacred character.' Mr. Kilvert, no doubt, was shocked to find that in old age Graves had written a *Plea for Unseasonable Gallantry*, and therein declared that

Amidst my cramps and other strange ills,
I am eager to converse with angels.

But there are no scandals of any sort connected with Graves's name; and Kilvert, who had every opportunity of knowing, states that there is no evidence that he failed in his duties as a parochial clergyman.

Although the course of Graves's daily life was confined for half a century within so narrow an orbit, his daily visits to Bath and his intimacy with the circle at Moor Park alike served to keep him in touch with the world outside. His active mind was never merely parochial. In politics he was a Whig, and, like many of the advanced Whigs of that age, he was in sympathy with the humanitarian ideals, then being elaborated, especially in France, which now seem to us so characteristic of that century. They could not fail to appeal to his humane and benevolent temper, essentially that of an optimist. In his *Eugenius*, written when he was about seventy, he vigorously defends the present as against the past, arguing that, as a result of the growing liberality of governments, Europe 'may in time be formed into one grand Commonwealth; and even Rousseau's Utopian system for an universal peace to be guaranteed by the several States may be adopted, and at length prevail over the whole world.' And at the end of the book he expresses the hope 'that the next generation

at least may see if not the golden age or paradisaical state, yet at least the silver age of the world again restored.' Considerably less than a generation brought the French Revolution, which converted so many optimists into pessimists. That it had that effect on the cheery Rector of Claverton, who survived it for fifteen years, there is no evidence to show.

Graves retained, we are told, his 'boyish agility' until the age of fourscore. He was not without troubles; his declining years were saddened by a son who turned out badly, involving himself, 'imprudently or rather wildly,' as Graves put it, in difficulties of which now nothing is known. Yet 'never,' wrote Warner in his *Literary Recollections*, 'did the hand of advanced age lie lighter upon a human being or less exert its withering influence on the intellect, genius, and feelings.' Like many others, however, who have attained extreme old age, Graves had had to face and to conquer the problem of invalidism. In a book called *The Invalid*, published when he was ninety, he gives an account of his method of living, and it may interest some modern food reformers to know that he had anticipated them in taking a lesson from the old Venetian Cornaro. In early life he suffered much from ill-health, but he chanced to meet with the life of Cornaro, who, he found, had derived the greatest benefit from limiting the amount of food to six ounces. He adopted Cornaro's rule, eating two slices of mutton for dinner, and only taking a slight breakfast and supper; by this diet, with regular exercise and care, he soon recovered 'a tolerable share of health,' though if he deviated from this rule he suffered from headache, sore-throats, and colds, which were usually cured by abstinence. As regards wine, his rule was 'after the third glass thrust the cork into the bottle.'

Graves was able to conduct service almost to the end. In his last illness the sacrament was administered to him by his old pupil Malthus; he died on the 23rd of November 1804, and was buried in the parish church.

The dust has gathered thickly over Graves and all his productions. It is worth while to stir that dust for a moment to catch a glimpse of an interesting old eighteenth-century figure who typifies some of the best elements of his time. His productions may, for the most part, sleep in peace. But *The Spiritual Quixote*, once rescued from amidst the pile, is not likely to be again forgotten. It is one of our classic English novels, and as a many-sided picture of old English life can scarcely be equalled.

HAVELOCK ELLIS.

TELEGRAPHS IN WAR-TIME

THE importance of direct and secret telegraphic communication by essentially deep-sea, 'All-British,' cables between the different branches of the Empire—for diplomatic purposes and for gathering together the resources of our widely scattered domains—is now forcing attention in a practical way in connexion with the great prevailing War.

The general belief that the mastery over and retention of cable communication in time of war resolves itself into a question of naval supremacy proved itself correct at quite an early period, for besides several new cables being laid down by British vessels in the English Channel and elsewhere, it was within but a few days of the outbreak of hostilities that we cut the German Atlantic cables to the Azores—thus breaking off the enemy's communication with the United States—besides several other Teutonic telegraph links. In fact, we have pretty well isolated Germany from her colonies as well as from neutral countries. To be more exact, we have rendered something like a dozen German lines absolutely useless, their repair being very difficult to effect. Most of these pass under the English Channel, where their dislocation or control (for censorship purposes) is a fairly simple matter, but others are in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, the interruption being effected—as in the case of the Azores cable—quite near the landing place. In a word, except through the 'wireless' service, Germany can only telegraph to her dupe and ally Austria and to one or two comparatively minor European countries.¹ It is, perhaps, possible that occasional

¹ The following statement on the subject has been actually given out officially by the German Information Service :

'Germany has five cables ending at the Island of Borkum, in the North Sea—one going to Brest, in France; one to Vigo, in the north of Spain; one to Teneriffe, on the Canary Islands at the north of Africa; and two by way of the Azores to New York. All five lead through the English Channel, so that it was not difficult for England to cut them. On the other hand, it will be very difficult, even impossible, for Germany to repair them as long as the War lasts.

'Between Germany and England there exist six cable lines—partly German, partly English—which, of course, are not used now. From Germany's west coast, therefore, no communication with the world is possible.

'The telegraphic communication *via* Holland, Denmark, Norway, and

messages may be got through the Atlantic cables, with the aid of third parties, to certain neutral States, but all messages suspected as coming from the enemy would naturally be stopped.

PACIFIC CABLE INTERRUPTION

On the other hand, all our own trunk lines have been kept intact, with the exception of the 'All-British' Pacific line, a section of which—that between Vancouver and Fanning Island—was interrupted on the 7th of September, a German man-of-war having that day landed a party at Fanning Island to effect the said object.²

Fanning Island—scarcely more than a desert rock—is situated about 400 miles to the southward of the Hawaiian group, the population consisting of 26 white men, 4 white women, and 260 natives. All the 'whites' are connected with the cable station in one way or another. The highest point of the island is only some 9 feet above high-water mark—rendering invasion a peculiarly easy matter—and the dull monotony of life received a severe shock when the German cruiser *Nürnberg* paid its eminently informal call. On the other hand, the Germans made the most of a fleeting visit. They attended strictly to business, doing over 30,000*l.* worth of damage to the cable and station outfit, some of the instruments costing 1000*l.* each. How thoroughly the work of destruction was effected is brought to light by the fact that communication was only completely restored on the 6th of November.³ The southern section (Fanning-Fiji) was quickly repaired, but the northern section (Fanning-Vancouver) was what the Germans had

Sweden can only be kept up by cables that end in England and France, where, of course, cablegrams are censored.

'The ways to the south *via* Austria or Italy are also blocked, as the cables that run from west to east in the Mediterranean belong to an English company, the Eastern Telegraph Co., and end in English territory. The cables starting from Italy, and also from Turkey, go *via* Malta, Gibraltar, and Lisbon to the Atlantic Ocean. With Africa no communication is possible without using the cables of the "Eastern" Company, and telegraphic land connections with China pass through Russia or British India. Therefore, with the exception of the wireless service, Germany can telegraph only to Austria-Hungary, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries. Spain and Portugal are cut off, too.'

² This cable had experienced a great rush of traffic immediately on the outbreak of war, the receipts becoming three and a-half times as much as at ordinary times. Indeed, the cable now carries about 140,000 words a week—equivalent to seven million words per annum—instead of the 200,000 despatched during the first year of working. Most of this increase is accounted for by the compulsory use of 'clear' messages, but enough represented diverted traffic to prove the value of the line as an alternative and safer route in time of war.

³ They even returned to the island forty-eight hours later to make certain that no repairs had been effected meanwhile, or no undetected reserve (duplicate) apparatus installed.

naturally paid their best attention to, it being considerably the longest in existence—i.e. 3458 nautical miles.

Soon after the interruption, the Pacific Cable Board despatched a steamer (s.s. *Kestrel*) to the lonely island with supplies and new instruments, and the following report by the officer in command (Captain E. L. Tindall) is not without interest :

‘ We arrived at the north end of Fanning Island at daybreak on the 25th of September. I gave orders for the chief engineer to bank the fires so that no smoke would be visible. We crept up cautiously, and from the masthead of the *Kestrel* we surveyed the surrounding water for the presence of a war vessel, and found none. I then proceeded around the island and to the harbour entrance. We noted a ship’s boat with a crew which was apparently grappling for the broken cable.

‘ We were greeted upon our arrival by Superintendent A. Smith and his staff, and our welcome was a genuine one. The devastation caused by the Germans was apparent before we landed, and evidence of the free use of gun-cotton and dynamite could be seen many yards from the shore. The landing buoy to which vessels make fast was demolished.

‘ Although none of the residents of Fanning Island had suffered any personal injury from the German landing force, the feeling against the British Government in not giving this important station their naval protection is quite marked.

‘ While the people of Fanning were expecting the presence of a German cruiser for about three weeks, no one really thought that Germans would actually attempt to seize the island, especially as the British Government knew the whereabouts of the *Nürnberg* and the *Leipzig*.

‘ They kept a man on the look-out for two weeks, and on the 7th of September two vessels, which proved to be the *Nürnberg* and a collier, were sighted. Both flew the French flag, and so sure were the Fanning islanders that these were friendly vessels that preparations were made to launch a boat from shore and show them an anchorage. It had hardly started on its friendly mission when two boats, loaded with Germans, put off from the *Nürnberg* and came in full speed for the shore. They did not even wait for the boats to ground on the beach, but jumped into the water waist deep, and with fixed bayonets and drawn revolvers commanded the surprised little gathering of Fanning islanders to surrender. They rushed on shore and mounted a Maxim gun, which was trained on the cable headquarters. Marines were posted all around the station, while officers and sailors, armed with rifles, made their way to the office building.

'The cable employees were hard at work, and were paralysed to see a German officer at the door of the operating-room with a revolver. "Take your hands off those keys, all of you!" he commanded.

'The men were made to line up against the wall while the sailors with axes smashed the delicate and costly instruments. A good deal of valuable mechanism was left intact, indicating that their knowledge of cable instruments was very crude.

'A cable message had been posted conspicuously which stated that the *Nürnberg* or *Leipzig* was due any day. One of the German officers saw this, and, with a smile, said "Rather interesting, don't you think? I'll take this for a souvenir."

'Another party was engaged near the shore end of the cable, trying to locate it. Failing in this, heavy charges of dynamite were planted and the cable blown to atoms. A crew from the collier grappled for the cable further out to sea with the intention of doing additional damage. Still another party planted dynamite and gun-cotton in the engine-rooms, the boiler-rooms, refrigerating plant, and in the dynamo-rooms. The explosion from these charges was terrific, but no one was hurt. A search was then made of the offices and a number of valuable papers were taken. These papers were taken aboard the *Nürnberg*, and a few hours later an officer returned and hastily summoned a detachment of men. The papers had revealed that several valuable instruments were buried—in reserve for just such contingencies; that a quantity of hidden arms and ammunition existed, and that there was 600*l.* in the office safe. The latter was blown open and the money taken. The officer in charge of this section of the expedition apologised, and said that this was the first time in his life that he had acted the part of a burglar.

'The buried instruments were blown up and the guns and ammunition seized.

'Through all of this devastation the courtesy extended by these German officers was most marked. They expressed themselves as being greatly surprised that no armed resistance was offered, as they had every reason to believe that Great Britain had taken the precaution to defend this important outpost.

'The officers and men worked with feverish haste and seemed anxious to get away. The private quarters of the employees were left unmolested.

'A little humour was interjected into the occasion when one of the German sailors borrowed a saw from the cable station and felled a giant flagpole at the top of which flew a British flag. The pole was cut into sections, and the saw and flag were taken aboard the *Nürnberg* as souvenirs.

'The officers appeared to have a complete knowledge of what was going on in the outside world, and seemed to be in possession of as much information as those who had been in daily cable communication with the mainland. The collier was carefully disguised, and there was nothing which would reveal her identity. She is about 2200 tons register, and had an elaborate grappling outfit aboard her, whilst her men seemed to be experts in this class of work.

'The Germans completed their task in about twelve hours, and steamed away, west south-west, toward the Marshall Islands.'

It is clear from the above, as well as from other evidence at hand, that the cable would never have been disturbed but for two factors: (1) That the German cruiser and her consort sailed under false colours—the French flag; and (2) the entire lack of protection accorded to the island, on which this highly important 'All-British' strategic line is landed. The present writer has always urged that each of the three intervening cable stations—i.e. Fanning, Fiji, and Norfolk Islands—should be adequately fortified with guns over the cable landing of a range that will carry out to fairly deep water, where cable interruption would be a difficult and time-taking process, such as could be checked by our cruisers at sea.⁴

THE COCOS EPISODE

The valiant Captain von Müller, of the now defunct *Emden*,⁵ also attempted one of his bogus-funnel ruses as a means of similarly taking by storm the cable and wireless station on Keeling-Cocos Island. It would indeed have been a crowning

⁴ The following is a quotation from a report on the measures taken by the British Government to guard the cable office and cable landing of the Commercial Cable Co.—an American company—at Waterville, Ireland.

'The office building is completely enclosed by a barbed-wire fence, patrolled within by a sentry. At the office door is stationed a second sentry, to whom must be shown a pass by all persons entering or leaving. The basement windows—outside the battery and testing rooms—are blocked up with sand-bags. Preparations are now being made to close up the windows on the operating-room floor with a bullet-proof protection of galvanised iron and timber, after which we shall be working completely in artificial light. The cable landing is protected by barbed-wire entanglements and guarded; a guard is also maintained at the engine-house. The latter place is presently to be bullet-proofed, and the water-tower by the office similarly protected. A building of blockhouses is also intended.'

If such careful steps can be taken by our Government to protect the property of an American company—the Commercial Cable Co.—surely it behoves us still more to do something adequate to guard against telegraphic interruptions on the Imperial State Pacific cable to Australia and New Zealand!

⁵ For nearly two months this German cruiser had enjoyed a successful and relatively glorious career. Out of nineteen British vessels which she had captured she destroyed eighteen, the aggregate tonnage being over 80,000, and the value 2,000,000*l*.

victory for this famous German officer. But it was not to be, for the ruse was detected—and well ahead—by those in charge on shore, who promptly advised by 'wireless' several of our men-of-war near by, which led to the *Emden's* ultimate doom. Moreover, a 'rush' cable message was sent out to the Navy Office at Melbourne, who acted with wonderful promptitude on the information given. It is evident that the cable and wireless superintendents—with the experience before them of what had happened at Fanning—exercised considerable alertness, besides acting with exemplary intelligence and despatch in a way that contributed largely to the result achieved.

The *Emden*, in going to Cocos Island with the idea that she would seriously damage the interests of Great Britain by cutting some very important cables, actually ran into a hornets' nest. It was the thought and work of a moment, on the appearance of the famous corsair, to flash the tidings of her arrival to east and west and south and north; in short, to every point from which signals could reach his Majesty's ships, which, under the directing hand of the Admiralty, were closing round the German cruiser.

The landing parties of the enemy did, indeed, succeed in cutting two cables (since repaired), but they were too late. The intelligence which proved so fatal to the *Emden's* career had already passed over the wires.

The story of the telegraphists' part in the sinking of the *Emden* is one of those records of ready wit and efficiency which make the best of romance. The guns of the *Sydney* sent the *Emden* on to the rocks, but those guns would not have come into play had not the telegraphist at Cocos quickly recognised the enemy in all her disguise, and despatched the warning message throughout the world, which brought the *Sydney* up in time. It is almost disturbing to think that before the boat's crew had landed from the *Emden* the warships were moving to the rescue, and London was making arrangements for repairing the cable and wireless stations. The men who perform these unostentatious miracles—and upon whom, in the last analysis, the linking-up of our scattered ships, as well as of our scattered Empire, depends—are not known to the great public. On desolate little islands, in remote alien cities, they lead the loneliest of lives. For conversation they must talk across the wires to colleagues, possibly equally lonely, a thousand miles away. They know as soon as kings and ministers what is happening in the great world from which they are exiles, but they have to keep the charge with an honour as strict as their devotion. For a full and illustrated description of the Cocos episode reference should be made to *The Zodiac*—that admirable little organ of the cable-station official.

LESSONS LEARNED

The War has already served to draw attention to the fact that the more cables there are between any two points in the Empire, and the greater the depth in which they are laid, the less likely is communication to be broken off.

It has also revealed the desirability—if not actual necessity—for all our Inter-Imperial communicating links being placed under a Government Board of Control in strategic and general national interests, with a fixed and lasting policy as to administration to meet all such conditions.⁶ Had an authority of this nature been in vogue previously to the War, the charges for ordinary rates would not have been maintained at the same high figure under a state of censorship, for a board of this class would have throughout studied public (national) interests as a whole, rather than the admittedly human interests of shareholders. For satisfactorily carrying out the proposed Government administration scheme all the cables landing on our coasts might suitably be connected direct to the General Post Office and hence with the War Office—and the cable stations sealed up—during warfare.

Again, had such a central authority existed it is pretty certain that the censorship of cablegrams would have been more effectively dealt with—under a single, organised and uniform, system. For a considerable time all code messages were entirely ‘banned’—with very serious business results, both as regards cost and delay.⁷ It has to be remembered that shipping companies, etc., are normally in the habit of despatching cablegrams in the same way that the ordinary individual communicates by letter. Thus, they have experts continually working at the perfection of their code, which often costs over a thousand pounds sterling. By the disuse of codes the ‘cabling’ expenses of such firms are increased nearly fourfold. For instance, a cablegram to Australia, which ordinarily costs about 5*l.*, will in plain language run into anything between 15*l.* and 20*l.* Indeed, it is stated by a certain firm that the War cabling restrictions had cost them, during the month of August, over 750*l.*—i.e. at the rate of nearly 10,000*l.* a year (!), whilst, on the other hand, owing to the interruption of some of the overseas mail services, the call for favourable telegraphic facilities is all the more marked. Then, again, business firms naturally attach considerable

⁶ Surely the control of our Inter-Imperial cables should at least be taken over in these emergencies, just as the railway systems—with perhaps less reason—have already been. Occasion may be taken here to mention that cable rates, under a certain amount of pressure, have been reduced to a somewhat greater extent than railway rates—other things being equal in regard to monopoly, etc. The financial position of the cable companies is, however, of a sort that would justify enterprise more than in the case of railways.

⁷ Even now messages are frequently stopped altogether without any intimation being given to the senders, though bona-fide English firms.

importance to secrecy, and there is always the possibility of an ordinary clerk in a cable company's office, belonging to a far-off market, disclosing—may be inadvertently—the contents of a plain-language message to his personal acquaintances or to the competitors of the sender. Yet it is an open question whether plain-language phrases are not far more readily and effectively used to convey another meaning by the German spy and such like—as the notorious Lody did, indeed—than any commercial codes. In other words, plain-language code is, in actual fact, probably a greater danger than any ordinary commercial code. Thus, the important point for a censor to concentrate his attention on is, really, the actual origin of a message and whom it is intended to reach.

On the other hand, that really efficient censorship is a first necessity for the satisfactory administration of our Inter-Imperial communications in time of war should be fully recognised. Unfortunately, however, it may be gravely doubted whether this condition prevails, largely on account of extreme pressure and lack of the necessary special knowledge and experience in those to whom the censorship duties are entrusted. Were a satisfactory Board of Control established for the administration (especially during war-time) of all our Inter-Imperial telegraphic links—such as I have frequently suggested^{*}—it is pretty certain that the censorship of cablegrams could be more effectively dealt with than at present. This is assuming that the Board were not mainly confined to considerably overworked military officers with no experience in cable working.[†] In any case, there is fairly conclusive evidence that messages of an apparently innocent character are being got through by the enemy which in actual fact have had an inner meaning (to someone not disclosed as the ultimate receiver) altogether opposed to British interests and of first service to our foes. It is surely of comparatively little use our cutting off Germany's means of communication if we allow the enemy (as we undoubtedly have been doing) to obtain and despatch telegrams through British or neutral lines—even those landing on our own shores! As a matter of fact, there has been a considerable and otherwise unaccountable increase in the

^{*} Notably in a paper read before the Royal Society of Arts on April 28, 1914, on 'The Administration of Imperial Telegraphs' (vide *Jour. Roy. Soc. of Arts*, vol. lxii. No. 312); also *Nineteenth Century*, July 1914.

[†] A soldier, however smart he may be, can scarcely be expected to know all about cable matters any more than a civilian can about military tactics. That those responsible are doing their utmost to meet requirements there can be little question, but unfortunately that is not everything. It has been sometimes said to be characteristic of this country that those responsible for the administration of our great services usually have no knowledge of the tools the operations of which they have to direct. However that may be, is no other talent available amongst those anxious patriotically to serve their country during the war?

number of so-called neutral cablegrams (passing through neutral countries) during the War.

Censorship can readily be effected where full control exists, but not so, of course, where that state of things does not prevail.

THE MISSING LINK

Naval supremacy has so far enabled us to maintain control of all the Eastern-bound cables. But in these days of floating mines, submarines, and bombs the position might conceivably be somewhat modified; and if our telegraphic inter-Imperial communication of one sort or another were to become seriously disturbed it would be a sorry day for the Empire, and the Mother Country in particular—partly from the standpoint of our food supply.

Happily, the All-British Pacific Cable is now repaired; but for some time we were solely dependent on the 'Eastern' lines for maintaining cable communication (by way of the somewhat vulnerable Suez Canal) with India, Australia, and New Zealand.

Even so, under normal present conditions the 'All-British' Pacific line cannot be regarded as a very reliable means of communication between the Mother Country and Australasia—in war-time especially—so long as we require to rely on American-worked Transatlantic cables for connecting up therewith. Thus there can be little doubt that the fact of having no Atlantic cable under British administration is a distinct defect at the present juncture, and would be still more serious were the United States, for business or political reasons, ever to side with Germany.¹⁰ In the first place, we are not in so good a position as a censorship as we really ought to be. Secondly, so long as our sole communicating links with Canada are the property of American companies, it would be impossible to bring into force such a Central Authority as is urged in this paper for administering our entire Inter-Imperial telegraphic systems. But the broad question we have to ask ourselves is as follows: Is it good for the Empire that its vital communication should be in the hands of a foreign corporation—especially under conditions of war on the one hand, and unsettled contraband questions on the other? Does such an arrangement make for security or secrecy, or for the control over communications which it is desirable the Government should possess on the outbreak of hostilities? Under present conditions, if ever the United States were to be at cross purposes with Canada, she (Canada) might be completely at the mercy of her American neighbours by being cut off—in the matter of com-

¹⁰ A general election is due in the United States next year. Meanwhile the German vote seems likely to be 'nursed' in some quarters. In fact, the German vote may prove as formidable a feature in American politics as the Irish vote over here!

munication—from the Mother Country. Then, again, supposing American sympathies were to become increasingly German, there would be considerable likelihood of the leakage of any strategic messages we might be sending to other parts of the Empire. The question as to whether such a contingency is probable or not is altogether beside the mark; for it is the business of Governments, in the interest of the country, to provide for all contingencies of a really serious nature. With cables under foreign administration, though landed on British territory, messages are always liable to be deciphered in code, and any messages may be ordered by the foreign Government to be blocked or copies sent—say, to headquarters at Washington.¹¹ In a word, a cable landed on British territory, with British clerks and foreign ownership, does not constitute reliable British control, as anyone knows who is acquainted with the working of a cable system. Moreover, anything which tends adversely to complicate the question of censorship should surely be overcome if possible.

But for the Government allowing, in 1912, all the six British Transatlantic cables to pass into the hands and control of an American company,¹² there would have been nothing to complain of in this respect. There would then have been no chance of any of our own messages being censored or the contents notified to others.

The publication of this article occurs at a moment when the Board of Trade has just been applied to for renewal of the now expiring landing licences of these American-controlled cables. Occasion is therefore taken to urge the Government to refuse to renew the same except on conditions that will at any rate materially meet what amounts to a serious defect. Even so, however, the real and pressing need for a line owned and worked by the State in inter-Imperial interests, for connecting up with the 'All-British' cable, becomes clearer every day.

The Mother Country and Canada have already had things to say to each other of an essentially private nature, yet they were hampered in so doing by the fact that their communications would at the same time become known to foreigners.¹³

¹¹ That messages are quite ordinarily subjected to foreign scrutiny where vital issues are at stake there can be no doubt. For instance, in connexion with the *Titanic* disaster a telegram sent by Mr. Ismay from the British steamer *Carpathia* was intercepted by the United States Government at Washington. This, in itself, serves to show that, whenever it is thought necessary, surveillance, interception, censorship, or other control is likely to be instituted by the American Government if desired.

¹² As I more than once pointed out in advance, had our Government refused to transfer the British licences of the Anglo-American Telegraph Co. and the Direct United States Cable Co. to the Western Union Telegraph Co. of New York the deal would have been effectively stopped. This was certainly a neglected opportunity of a highly important order.

¹³ The futility of relying on codes for secrecy purposes is well recognised by experts. Moreover, there can never be any assurance against the banning of

We must not forget, too, the possibility of the United States falling out with our ally Japan, conceivably on the over-running of California by immigrating Japanese. In that case we could scarcely expect to count on any of these American-controlled Atlantic cables being of much service to either the Mother Country, Canada, or any section of the British Empire. Under these conditions, indeed, Great Britain being an ally of Japan's, all our messages would be forthwith censored by the United States Government! Surely it were better to censor other people's messages than to have our own censored.¹⁴ The changes in foreign politics are so rapid and uncertain that a serious misunderstanding might even arise between our present friends of the United States and ourselves, and then of what value to us would any of these American-worked cables be? In such circumstances we should be entirely cut off from all telegraphic communication with Canada.

Seeing that we had to wait for so appalling a disaster as that associated with the s.s. *Titanic* before we became aware that all was not as it should be in the matter of maritime safety, it is to be hoped that we shall not similarly have to wait till we are cut off from the rest of the Empire before serious attention is given to this matter.¹⁵

Those who have opposed the scheme for a State Atlantic cable connecting up with the 'All-British' Pacific cable and land line have partly done so on the mistaken premises that for effecting the said link we should be using the country's revenue at the expense of British shareholders in what were originally British cables. These cables are now—on a ninety-nine years' lease—practically the property of the Western Union Telegraph Company of New York; moreover, the dividend is a fixed one, assured by the American Company to the said shareholders, and is, therefore, quite independent of any State competition. Further, anything which is used by the State for the purposes of the country—her welfare and defence—should be considered from that point of view rather than with regard to any particular section of the community. Thus a project of this character at once becomes a suitable subject for provision out of public funds.

Those who rest their arguments for opposition to the pro-

codes by the Power controlling a cable—as we have ourselves rendered clear in the present war.

¹⁴ The writer has dealt with this aspect of the matter more fully in the *Quarterly Review* for January 1914 as well as in the course of evidence to the Dominions Royal Commission (Blue Book Cd. 6517).

¹⁵ Railway disasters are commonly left to heap up before recommendations by Board of Trade inspectors are acted upon—and then only at the dictate of actual legislation.

posed State Atlantic cable on the ground that it would not prove a financial success (and criticise unfavourably the 'All-British' State *Pacific* cable) should examine the returns of the Pacific Cable Board, the annual balance-sheet of which shows clearly how, with development, the financial position has steadily—and enormously—improved from year to year.¹⁶ Then, again, it has been suggested that sufficient traffic for the proposed State Atlantic Cable could not be relied upon to keep it anything like busy. This suggestion, however, appears to be made without considering the great increase that would accrue as a result of the provision of the cable and land line. Yet, in the writer's opinion, if the cable does not warrant itself nationally and strategically, it does not warrant itself at all; and those who argue that neutral cables are of greater strategic value than All-British lines should note what is actually done with neutral cables on emergency. 'Might is right' then appears to be the maxim!

It should be remembered, too, that whereas we are spending some 50,000*l.* per annum on various subsidies to different cables, this proposed Transatlantic cable—the most important missing link in the whole Imperial telegraph system—would only mean about 10,000*l.* to the Mother Country, the Dominions concerned having already (repeatedly, indeed) expressed a desire to take their proportionate share in the undertaking.

Let us not forget that the strength of a chain is really that of its weakest link; and the weak link in the Imperial chain is at present the American Atlantic Cable System, on which it is dependent for communication between Great Britain and Canada.

There are also those who argue that the State Atlantic line would be unsuitable on the score that wireless telegraphy is more economical, both in regard to establishment and working. It should, however, always be remembered in this connection that the cable is pre-eminent in the matter of efficiency, and that there are no signs at present of this condition of things being reversed. Efficiency is far more important in such a matter than economy, much as we may hope to see cable rates radically reduced before long.¹⁷

Without wishing to make too much of the actual turn of

¹⁶ Thus the traffic receipts for the last financial year amounted to 196,000*l.* odd instead of 79,000*l.* for the first complete year of working, whilst the increased expenditure does not bear anything like the same proportion. This is a very satisfactory state of things when it is remembered that for want of a unified trans-Pacific-Atlantic system the Pacific Cable Board (unlike the 'Eastern' Companies) has no traffic offices of its own in London.

¹⁷ That efficiency is considerably more important than economy in telegraphy is proved by the fact that business people frequently pay 2*s.*—in place of 2*d.*—per word to have their messages 'rushed' from London to Paris *via* New York (instead of the ordinary—shorter—route) for the sake of expediting transit.

events, opportunity must be taken to remind those who, in opposing the proposed Imperial Atlantic cable, have never been able to conceive the possibility of our country being engaged in serious warfare, that such has, indeed, come about sooner than might have been expected. A glance at the House of Commons debate of the 3rd of April 1912 serves to indicate that people with 'superior knowledge' and the comparatively brief experience afforded by party political administration do not always come out 'on top' after all. The following quotation is what I have in mind :

The honourable member first raised the hypothetical case of our being at war with some European country, and, secondly, of the sending of a cipher telegram that could be deciphered or communicated to others. Really, such a contingency is so remote that I do not think this House should make any costly provision to meet it.

Yet the right honourable gentleman who spoke thuswise proposed to provide a far more costly—and comparatively untried—wireless service at the country's expense! No one seems to have thought of criticising the Imperial wireless chain from the standpoint of cost, any more than anyone in his senses would now object to the national expense of a Dreadnought—though also more than double the price of an Atlantic cable. Certainly *Hansard* affords entertaining reading if indulged in historically!

One can almost hear it being urged that this is no time for expenditure on the proposed State Atlantic Cable. It is but natural that such a view should be held by those who only think of communication from the standpoint of business during peaceful periods, and fail to appreciate that it is still more essential as an element in strategy and defence. The writer has some hope that the latter feature may be appreciated at a time when we are gradually spending on the Great War upwards of two millions sterling *per day*, and when, therefore, a single lump sum of half a million added to the same Estimates would form but a small item.¹⁸ It should be further stated that considerably more than enough cable of suitable type is already to hand in this country—partly cable that has only recently been manufactured, but which, owing to the War, has not gone to its intended destination. This surely should be turned to account for completing the missing Imperial link, unless the Government can arrange satisfactory terms for the absolute and unqualified appropriation

¹⁸ These are, indeed, different times from those—really but a few months ago—when, with many 'politicians,' war was not dreamt of, and when, therefore, almost insignificant expenditure on defence was severely criticised. Yet it is but a dearly bought lesson that we are learning, which we might, by even moderate foresight and provision, have saved ourselves in the piping days of peace. As, indeed, that grand old patriot Lord Roberts tried hard to make us understand, had we established a standing army of say 3½ millions strong, we should have rendered what has taken place out of the question.

of at least one of the American-controlled transatlantic cables. This—or an independent new cable—would alone meet the requirements of the Board of Control here urged for our Inter-Imperial Communication system, seeing that no American-owned cable could be brought under such an authority.

WIRELESS IN WAR-TIME.

Let us now take up-to-date stock of the position of wireless telegraphy in connexion with this great War. The art has provided, as it were, a new organ of sense to commanders both on land and sea, to enable them to determine without delay the state of affairs at very distant points of the field, and to issue orders accordingly. Thus wireless has proved of considerable value. It may nowadays be said, indeed, that on the ability of a Government to communicate instantly with its naval and military officers—and they with one another—is likely to depend in large measure the final outcome of the struggle in which we are now playing so vital a part.¹⁹

'Wireless' has, however, also proved to be a somewhat uncertain and distinctly two-edged weapon to rely upon. The very first day after the declaration of war revealed the comparative ease with which a 'wireless' system may often be 'jammed.' This was effected by the enemy's 'wireless' station at Swakopmund, near Omataka, German South-West Africa, the result being completely to swamp—by a higher power—all signals received at Cape Town, 850 miles off. On the other hand, a few days later a British cruiser entirely destroyed the wireless station at Dar-es-Salaam, German East Africa. A number of other wireless stations have since been put out of service and are no longer available for communication purposes, and these are set forth in the last official list issued by the Berne Telegraph Bureau.²⁰ Among them is Togo (German West Africa), the biggest wireless station in the world outside Europe, which had been in existence about three years, and had kept up nightly talks with Berlin throughout. This we should have 'wiped out' before capturing Togoland; but, unfortunately, the Germans destroyed it previously to our invasion, which was really effected mainly for the set purpose of acquiring this wireless station—

¹⁹ According to the Official 'Eye-Witness' at the Front, the Army Signal Headquarters Office is the nerve-centre of the army in the field, receiving messages from all quarters by wire telegraph, telephone, wireless telegraphy, and motor cyclists. About 3000 messages are, in fact, handled daily.

²⁰ A memorandum issued by the German Colonial Office on the course of events in the German colonies contains references to the more or less complete interruption—so far as the German Empire is concerned—of communication by cable and wireless telegraphy. Just as Germany controls but few colonies now, so, similarly, she has very few wireless stations left, and none at all in the Pacific.

partly in order to 'listen in' to wireless communications from the enemy's wireless headquarters at Nauen, near Berlin.²¹

But though the Togo plant is not available to us for picking up the official messages which are continuously sent out from Nauen, the Marconi Company has been doing highly useful work at their stations in reading off the Nauen signals, and also those wafted forth from the new—and still higher power—station at Hanover. A large proportion of these messages consists of false versions of war occurrences (partly in English) for the benefit of the United States and other neutral countries, whom Germany wishes to impress. If it were thought desirable, the signals could be effectively stopped or rendered unreadable by jamming—i.e. by transmitting from any of our high-power stations a series of impulses of corresponding wave-length so as to drown down the German signals, thus preventing their reaching Tuckerton or other wireless stations. But it is thought, on the whole, better to permit the emission of false statements to proceed, in order to note their purport, through the Marconi stations. As, however, the writer took occasion to suggest almost at the commencement of hostilities, it might be well to counteract the effect of this 'news' in neutral countries by disseminating accurate particulars of the War from the great Eiffel Tower station. For if neutral countries were made acquainted with the real facts, they would surely recognise that Germany was a common danger and a common enemy to the whole civilised world; and in order to bring the War—and the more or less universal paralysation of trade—to a speedy conclusion, they would then very likely join forces with the Allies for the purpose of completely and speedily suppressing their Teuton foes.

Whilst 'wireless' has more than once done splendid work as an agent for detecting crime and detaining evil-doers, it has also frequently served as a ready weapon to the unscrupulous—*inter alia*, by the transmission of unauthorised signals. Since the outbreak of war it has been largely used by Germany in this way. Thus it is that several British merchant vessels have been ensnared by the enemy; and, on the other hand, there can be little doubt that the enemy's cruisers have more than once been well served by secret wireless stations—partly on neutral territory. Again, stories are current in well-informed

²¹ Besides being in communication with Nauen—3450 miles distant—Togo was also in wireless touch with various stations in the Cameroons, with Windhuk in German South-West Africa, with Tabora, German East Africa, as well as with the Palcos and Caroline Islands. This immense station at Togo (near Kemina) had served, in fact, as a big receiving and distributing centre for messages from Berlin to Germany's African possessions. Through it also German ships in those waters could be warned and German cruisers instructed.

quarters that in the United States the Germans are systematically using wireless telegraphy to serve military ends. The American radio-telegraphy service is strictly controlled by the U.S. Government, and the plan seems to be to instal secret plants in inaccessible places and send messages to cruisers, couched in apparently innocent language. American newspapers recently had something to say about one such plant which was alleged to be situated among the almost unexplored tumble of mountains, forests and water which cover most of the State of Washington on the Pacific Coast. The code employed is said to make the messages resemble harmless business telegrams of quotations, prices, etc. In contradistinction to cable telegraphy, in the case of 'wireless' the origin of a message can never be known or traced for certain, and messages that may seem to be coming to a British warship from the Admiralty—or *vice versa*—may really be bogus messages from the enemy for the purpose of misleading our forces. Though in her adventurous roving the now defunct *Emden* mostly refrained from sending wireless signals, she appears to have been throughout a ready 'listener' on a wide scale, and was always well acquainted with the whereabouts and projected movements of our ships without revealing her own.

This War has already, times without number, proved on the one hand the great value of wireless for disseminating instructions and information widely, directly, and speedily; but it has also obviously revealed the risk that is necessarily run in its employment—if only on account of the complete absence of secrecy or of certain knowledge as to the origin of messages. Indeed, it is often a question whether silence may not be wiser. That question never arises with the cable. Further, all wireless messages received require to be regarded with the greatest caution before being assumed as authentic or suitable for being acted on. That the late Admiral Cradock was misled by false wireless messages really originating with the enemy there can be little doubt, and his disastrous encounter off the Chilian coast is probably attributable to this and to the wireless instructions he sent to his fleet—as well as those intended for him—being 'jammed' by the enemy.

That wireless telegraphy—like the carrier pigeon—is of great service to espionage is clear; and there is weighty circumstantial evidence that a good deal of important information has been thus disseminated by spies from our shores to German vessels at sea, notwithstanding the prohibition of the private wireless apparatus. Indeed, although no single station of sufficient power could successfully transmit to Germany without detection, it is quite possible that, by means of a chain of small power stations

with hidden aerials, messages might be transmitted a few miles at a time, and thus get across the North Sea or the Channel. A comparatively small station with an aerial hidden in the roof of a house, or carefully trained up a flagstaff floating the Union Jack, may well transmit over a distance of 100 miles. Such stations could, indeed, easily pick up signals sent out by our own 'wireless' stations, whilst also receiving instructions from enemy 'wireless' stations.

The existence of 'private' radio-telegraph stations in different parts of the world has already been the subject of much diplomatic correspondence, and will undoubtedly be made the occasion for stringent international regulation in days to come. Meanwhile, on the very outbreak of hostilities the Postmaster-General—quite rightly—not only vetoed the use of all private radio-telegraphic stations in this country, but even the possession of wireless apparatus of any kind.²²

It only remains to be said that, with at least five Government Departments separately concerning themselves in wireless telegraphy more or less actively, there is the same need for a central authority here as with cables; and there would be everything in favour of a single Government Controlling Board for the combined administration of our Imperial system of cables and wireless, with representatives thereon of all the departments concerned. Such a Board would get over much long drawn out inter-departmental correspondence, besides ensuring a uniform policy—so especially essential in time of war. Moreover, stricter secrecy could then be ensured.

Partly in view of the strategic aspect of telegraphy, the following data relating to wireless stations throughout the world will probably be of interest. There are, altogether, 629 such stations. The United States leads with 198; the British Isles come next with 101, Canada 41, France 39, Italy 38, Russia 31, Brazil 29, Germany 29, Norway 27. China and Sweden have only three stations each in working order, but several more are being erected.

Yet the rapid growth in the number of wireless stations has in no way checked the increasing mileage of submarine cables. In the past six years this network has progressed by 125,000 miles, of which 35,846 belong to different nationalities and about 90,000 to various private companies. There are, in fact, now some 290,000 miles of cable in operation at the bottom of the sea, of which 154,000 are British, 62,700 American, 27,000 French, 27,000 German, 10,000 Danish, and 9000 Japanese.

²² The Wireless Society of London has done much useful work in watching for improper uses of wireless. Moreover, the *Wireless World* affords considerable information on the subject.

Enough has perhaps now been said to show that the War experience so far in wireless telegraphy only tends to prove that, whilst of enormous value during hostilities as in peace times, it is still a very two-edged weapon, such as no complete reliance can be safely placed in, and that it certainly does not at present serve as a suitable substitute for cable telegraphy wherever the latter is available. Indeed, the following bygone opinion still holds good :

To believe it possible to discharge an electric impulse into ether, and expect it to be as reliably communicated through the range of Nature's atmospheric and electrical phenomena to its destination as a current can be passed through an unbroken electrical conductor connecting two points, requires a faith in man's conquest over Nature which is altogether beyond comprehension.

CHARLES BRIGHT.

THE GERMAN-AMERICAN

THE Revolution of 1848 shook most Continental thrones, and in turn filled Germany with fervent socialistic aspirations after freedom, which were, however, put down with a strong hand by the Prince of Prussia, destined later to develop into Kaiser Wilhelm the First; on whom his admiring grandson conferred the further distinction of 'the Great,' before it was conferred on him by history, to which the world usually leaves this supreme tribute. But on his way to that pinnacle of fame the Emperor William, who was heir to his brother Frederick William the Fourth of Prussia, and later Regent when the King became subject to intermittent attacks of insanity, had a good deal of mud flung at him by such of the Germans as loved liberty. It was probably because liberty was one of the luxuries denied to the sons of the Fatherland that so many wanted it, fought for it and died for it, while those who could neither gain it nor die for it shook the dust of the Fatherland from their feet and went in search of countries where liberty is not so fatally unpopular. This explains the large number who, in 1848, emigrated to America in search of freedom, and furthermore, Germany being a poor country in those days, to obtain a decent living in that promised land whose streets were reputed to be paved with gold.

For German emigrants this legend has indeed proved true, for none have been more prosperous or more valuable to their adopted country. Although they were of less muscular build than the Irish, who by mere physical strength and endurance made possible the first railway across the United States from the Atlantic to the Pacific, they were better educated even when labourers, while their artisans, merchants, and many professional men, among whom were some of the highest eminence, who had been an honour to their Fatherland as they were later to the United States, proved of inestimable value. But German and Irish have one common characteristic: they have not even yet been quite assimilated by America, so when referred to they can never escape the distinctive 'German' or 'Irish,' as the case may be. Also from the beginning they have been inclined to intermarry among themselves, and socially they have kept rather

aloof from their American fellow-countrymen. Although these barriers have been slowly breaking down the last few years as the result of universal and excellent educational facilities, of increasing political supremacy and wealth, the very fact that a certain political influence is described as 'Irish' and another is appealed to as 'German' proves that America has not yet assimilated these two races, although the time must come when there will be no more hyphenated Americans, and when in her own interest she must stand between her naturalised citizens and the danger of alien interference by that country from which most of them were only too glad to escape.

It is but just to admit that the German-Americans have always been identified with law and progress, nor, unlike the Irish, have they been biassed by a too romantic attachment to their native country, in which most of them refused to live under existing conditions. The Irishman had dreams of returning to end his life in the old home, but the German has always been quite contented only to go back on visits, just to give ocular proof to his relatives of his aggressive prosperity, safely shielded as he is from conscription and other little drawbacks of his late Fatherland by his American citizenship. And he rejoices all the more when he observes the increasing taxes wrung from a people whose earning power is out of proportion to the demands of a Government whose perpetual interference with the rights of the individual has created a new crime of the first magnitude entitled *lèse-majesté*. That, too, when as a brand-new American he has learnt the lesson that 'he's as good as anybody,' and may say whatever he chooses, and that the worst that can happen to him is that nobody will listen. In addition, he recognises new social standards fixed by a military caste, the first of which is the snubbing of the purely civilian, unless heavily smothered in cash. No wonder, then, that the German-American finds no inducement to end his days in his ex-Fatherland. On the other hand, the tenacity which made the Irishman long to end his life in the Old Country in peace and happiness was merely a romantic misconception of his own nature, for an Irishman with only happiness and peace to look forward to would be inconceivably bored! But possibly this aspiration may explain why the Irish have been so long in taking root in America, for the first generations did not, so to speak, unpack; instead they were prepared for instant flight back should home-sickness prove unbearable. It was the first generation that suffered, for the second grew more reconciled, although they too did not become quite American, only Irish-American.

That was the trouble. Sometimes in those far-off days one came across amusing reversions to type characteristic of that

much simpler time if not of this, now that the Irish-Americans sway the politics of the United States, and the German-American bankers bring the pressure of their financial influence to bear on the situation, possibly for the good of their late Fatherland and incidentally for their own.

The early Cunarders, which at that time sailed from the provincial wharf of Boston, were very little and always, as a female passenger expressed it, full of Beacon Street; and Beacon Street even to this day still represents aristocratic Boston. At such times Beacon Street unbent its stiff back and was quite affable to less aristocratic streets, and even shared a hymn-book with them at divine service, an ineffable condescension that stopped short at Liverpool with an abruptness that nearly hurt. On such a voyage one realised the chasm that separated the 'real' American from the Irish-American who now rules Boston with a political rod of iron. But such is the whirligig of time!

The only cabin-de-luxe on such a pre-historic Cunarder was the captain's, which, if he chose, he could sub-let and pocket the proceeds. To have the captain's cabin also conferred a certain social distinction, and it was usually sacred to the more exclusive rich and great. On one such voyage two occupants were invisible, and two chairs at the captain's table were always empty. Now the cream of Beacon Street sat at the captain's table, the ladies a little sharp of nose and elbow, and the gentlemen nearly English in their distrust of the unIntroduced. But as the captain's cabin was sufficient introduction they made cautious inquiries as to the health of the invisible. One day solved the mystery. A passenger strolling on deck found the door of the captain's cabin open and in it were wedged a stout and elderly Irish couple. He wore a knit Cardigan jacket, cloth cap with the peak behind, and a black satin stock illuminated by a resplendent diamond brooch. His lady, he called her 'mother,' was in green poplin and a red Paisley shawl; a defiant black velvet bonnet rose on the back of her head. Her eye was snappy and suspicious. His was green and ruminative, and signalled timidly for human converse. They proved to be Mr. and Mrs. O'Flannigan, who thirty years before had sailed from Ireland to New York in the steerage of a sailing ship, on which occasion they had made a vow that whenever they returned to the Old Country it would be in the very best. And here they were, the victorious product of the liquor trade, in the captain's cabin! 'But,' Mr. O'Flannigan admitted with a sigh as he looked about at the dingy glory of this stateroom-de-luxe, 'it ain't all it's cracked up to be, and it ain't pleasant to sit in alone, not for long.'

'Why don't you eat in the dining saloon?' they were asked.

They looked secretly at each other, and then 'mother' spoke, 'We're afraid.'

It was a disgraceful confession for people in the captain's cabin.

'Afraid,' and 'mother' twisted her thumbs in her Paisley shawl, 'afraid of using the knives wrong, and afraid of their noses and their looks.'

Whereupon Mr. O'Flannigan burst out while he mopped his heated brow, 'I says to mother, I says, if I want to put a knife down my throat I will, and all Beacon Street can't stop me, only I—I don't darst to do it in there,' and he referred with a dingy thumb to the dining saloon, 'and so we eat in the steerage—with friends. It ain't enough to hire the captain's cabin,' and his eye looked gloomy and dissatisfied, 'one's sorter got to be born in it!'

Another reversion to a humble type was German. In the same town there was a noted restaurant kept by an enterprising German, who had worked his way up from dish-washing to the supreme command, till he used to stroll between the tables and exchange greetings with gratified patrons. The great man had an only son destined to succeed him, to which end he also was set to dish-washing, after which he became so accomplished a waiter that as a reward of merit the old man bestowed on him a handsome cheque, with the strict injunction to go abroad and spend it all to see the world and improve his mind. He was gone six months, and when he reappeared there was nothing in his outer man to denote that seeing life was either expensive or polishing. Even his clothes were the same, with an added appearance, characteristic of waiter's clothes, of having been made for somebody else.

It was not until after supper that the paternal eyes twinkled and, between two puffs of his pipe, he asked encouragingly, as between man and man, 'I guess you ain't brought home much of that cheque! Seeing life isn't cheap, is it, heh?'

'You just wait an' see, father,' said the son who was not a prodigal, and opened a rather greasy pocket-book, 'I guess you'll be satisfied. I ain't cost you a cent, an' I've brought home mor'n you gave me,' and he handed his astonished parent a larger cheque than the one he had carried away.

'What in thunder,' and the old man stared first at the cheque and then at his heir, 'have you been doing? It costs big money to see the world.'

'An' ain't I seen the world?' the son retorted with modest assurance, 'I guess! Why, I wa'ant aboard that ship an hour before I was waiting at table for a steward who hadn't turned up. An' I hadn't mor'n got to London when I got a first-class job

at a restaurant. After that I up and did a bit of waiting in Paris—in a hotel. I wa'ant out of it twice,' he added triumphantly, 'an I've clean forgotten the name. Then I got tired and quit, and so I worked my passage to Berlin in a dining-car, an' got a real daisy of a place there, an' there I stayed ever since, for it was real homey. But I've found out something!' he concluded, satisfied with his contribution to the wisdom of the world, 'and that is cooking smells just the same everywhere.'

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In those old days no sooner did the Germans reach the promised land than they became naturalised and cast in their lot with their new country, which was the wisest thing they could do, as it safeguarded them and their sons from coercion by what was once their native land, for Germany has a far-reaching military arm and a long memory for those who try to escape conscription. In return for this, all the United States required of them was that they should become loyal citizens, and by their good conduct avoid the criminal laws, and employ such talents as they possessed for the service of their adopted country. But from the beginning a barrier has stood between them and the native American, which is rarely surmounted until the second generation, and still prevents their entire assimilation, and that is language. An alien language is a barrier which makes a foreigner of a man even among people with whom he has cast in his lot, and with whose principles and aspirations he is in full sympathy. It makes him lonely and ready to cling to old memories, even to forget old sufferings. He lives in the past, to which, however, even in his sentimentality nothing would induce him to return. All the same, socially and racially he is inclined to keep to his own, which is narrowing and alike bad for people and country. There are important American cities more German than American, where more German is spoken than English, and where education is as much German as English. This is an evil, for although their loyalty may be the same as that of the American without a hyphen, of which one is assured by the sterling qualities of the German-Americans, still it is this barrier between the two great races in one country that has enabled the German Government to threaten America with reprisals at the polls, through those very citizens to whom she has given shelter, peace, and prosperity. For the sake of their own future, people who accept the hospitality of a country and settle there should first of all learn its language and make it their own, and let the language of the country they have left become of secondary importance. For the bi-lingual facility of the German-American, broadening though it may be in its added possibilities for knowledge, may also

among the less educated exercise a deteriorating effect both on the English and the German. In America, if only the one language can be spoken perfectly, let that language be English.

The Berlin threat of reprisals through German-Americans at the polls has so far only succeeded in rousing the deep and just resentment not only of Americans, but of those German Americans who are as loyal to the United States and all it stands for as the best Americans can be. For there are many more such than German propagandists like to admit. Here, for instance, is a quotation from a recent letter written by a prominent German-American, a man of eminence and of great influence in the city in which he lives: 'It is a terrible War, and Germany will certainly have to pay heavily for the dastardly outrages she has committed against civilisation and humanity. But I sincerely hope that the next year will find us at peace, and England triumphant.' Indeed, these German-Americans who are not pro-German suffer from no illusions about their late Fatherland, and they know, none better, the value of the benefits conferred on them by America, its liberal government and free institutions which permit them to satisfy their reasonable ambitions, and assure their children's future. Who of them, threatened by a conquering Germany—which would turn the world into one Empire ruled by a despotism unique in its cold-blooded, blundering cruelty, which spares not even its own—who would not take sides with the country to which they owe everything, rather than the country they have repudiated, and to which they owe nothing but the accidental circumstance of having been born there, although sharing with the rest of the world the privilege of being uplifted and aided by its noblest genius? But how has that great country fallen! Whatever natural sympathy the German-Americans still feel for the country which was once their home, they will undoubtedly at the crucial moment remember that their first and most solemn duty is to America, which has been their refuge and their salvation.

If one considers that Germany has no scruples as to the methods she employs to gain her ends, and that indeed she herself asserts that success justifies every crime, it is a matter for gratitude that so far her sinister purposes have met with constant defeat. When one opens certain pro-German papers published in America one has a sense of being deafened by the uncontrolled fury of their propaganda. America is threatened unless she is properly neutral, and properly neutral, according to Germany, means to favour Germany. But even if the bitter attacks of the pro-German propagandists, from the German Ambassador to those 'exchange' professors who, having once basked in the warmth of the Imperial approval, are pro-German for ever—if

their attacks, subtle or otherwise, confuse some sane judgments, how can that affect the ultimate result? What German-Americans not subsidised by Berlin, with the exception, possibly, of those good old-timers of the first generation pursued by sentimental home memories, or others who want to assert themselves and their political influence as against the native American element, would want to return to the feared and familiar slavery? Would it, other considerations apart, would it pay? And, after all, is that not the crucial test by which political issues are decided these days?

Sometimes one suspects, for one can hardly doubt the sound German-American common sense, that all this violent pro-German invective represents nothing, achieves nothing except a fictitious success fanned with increasing weariness from Berlin, and may at best be briefly described as a fireside patriotism. For the fireside patriot enjoys all that is most thrilling and harrowing during the War, and gets it, so to speak, cheaply and safely, he and his sons being well sheltered behind their American citizenship; so, whatever their blatant loyalty to the old country, he and they run no risk of having to fight for it. He is even in no financial danger, for his American investments are probably sound, and the merciful distance between him and his late Kaiser prevents the long arm of necessity from reaching his purse, and this is the time when heart and purse are one. Tears these days are very commendable, but they are of no earthly use unless accompanied by a cheque. One is reminded of the first immense pro-German mass meeting at the Madison Square Gardens in New York at the beginning of the War. It was crowded by thousands of German-American sympathisers, and when later a collection was taken for the cause, one felt a certain sense of amusement at the sadly small result—estimated at elevenpence ha'penny per head! Indeed, real enthusiasm should never stop short at the pocket! For it is the easiest and safest thing in the world to sit in a comfortable armchair, in the pleasant glow of the fire, and over a good cigar and a bottle of Rhine wine burst into lurid denunciations of England the hated, and the supineness of the American Government. Had not pro-German patriotism really stopped at the cheque-book the world would have rung with it, for it is Berlin's policy to encourage and exaggerate all public manifestation of sympathy with her cause if only for the disconcerting moral effect on the Allies. So far as the world knows, there has been no outpouring of treasure to aid Germany from the masses of well-to-do as well as enormously rich German-Americans. Indeed blood may be thicker than water, but there is

that in the free German-American blood which will not again suffer the old, mad, ruthless despotism which the tragic War of to-day proves unaltered.

The masterly strategy of the German propaganda as an important branch of her Foreign Office first became a factor to be reckoned with in America on the occasion of that famous visit of Prince Henry of Prussia to the United States—we may add in parenthesis that America, being a republic, dearly loves a prince—and Prince Henry proved himself a most charming visitor, in spite of being nearly killed by the exhausting hospitality of the Great Republic. It was the first time that Germany came into her own, represented as she was by a prince of the Imperial house, and for the first time Germany was on a social level with the 'real' Americans. No wonder that in the universal enthusiasm England was quite forgotten, although only a few years before the British Lion, in the person of Admiral Sir Edward Chichester, had prevented the German Admiral von Diedrich from interfering with Admiral Dewey when he bombarded Manila. But republics have proverbially short memories. So nobody thought of the bluff British Lion when Prince Henry, polite but exhausted, was drawn in State, attended by Governor and bodyguard and all the rest of the glory, from Boston to Cambridge to receive an honorary degree from Harvard University in the presence of the aristocracy of these famous towns, till President Eliot of Harvard, in addressing the distinguished visitor, welcomed him, as he said, not as the brother of a great Emperor, but as the grandson of the great Queen who had always been a friend of the United States. All honour to that grand old man who did not forget and who has never forgotten the world's debt to Great Britain. One feels convinced that the Lion was comforted, and that he purred softly and contentedly.

Those were the days that marked the beginning of that ardent friendship which Germany has ever since manifested towards America because it suited her deep-laid schemes. But as one studies the effects of German friendship on Austria and Turkey, a nation cannot but accept it with foreboding. It was the beginning of the German-American 'exchange' professorships, of the founding of the Germanic Museum at Harvard to which the Kaiser presented innumerable German plaster casts, while the statue of Frederick the Great—a great but certainly not a democratic ruler—he gave to the United States, to which it proved something of a white elephant. Indeed, the indefatigable Kaiser has left no stone unturned to endear himself to America and regain the loyalty of his lost subjects. One

wonders what the world would be like to-day had German diplomacy proved as efficient as her mighty Army! But fate has so far intervened, and if one studies the blunders of German statesmen and the inspired utterances (that is, inspired by Berlin, but nothing higher) of her admirals, generals, and minor great-nesses, one gathers at least one supreme comfort out of this tragic time: and that is that even this great empire, and what it is pure flattery to call her diplomacy, are mercifully served by very many bungling patriots who have quite mistaken their vocation in life.

ANNIE E. LANE.

*A TOWN IN NORTHERN FRANCE:**MARCH 1915*

THE quay is crowded. A few blue-clad porters carry luggage ashore. Blue-uniformed soldiers stand with fixed bayonets on the railway lines, on the station platform, and at points of egress. Khaki-clad soldiers swarm over the ship's gangways: disembarkation officers check every man's papers as he lands. A general officer with his staff is conducted direct to a waiting motor car and driven, without a moment's delay, through the town and away into the open country beyond. Other officers crowd into the refreshment room for luncheon, and every seat is filled; little French newsboys scream 'Dailee Mell.' When the officers move out, the non-commissioned officers and men crowd in. Two ladies, inappropriately clad in khaki cotton dresses and pearl necklaces, offer tickets for free meals to them. In some instances they are accepted, in many cases they are declined, respectfully and with embarrassment; for most of the men returning from leave have sufficient money and something to spare. An hour passes; the refreshment room empties. The manager and his wife are counting money at a desk. The military train is filling, and in half an hour more it steams away, and a few civilians are left standing on the platform, which the blue-coated soldiers still guard with those long spiky French bayonets. An elderly Englishman walks across the quay to the white ship lying waiting for ambulances which will presently come down from the hospitals in the town bringing their loads of wounded for home; a few are already sitting on deck seats in various states of disablement—some sad and anxious-looking, but most of them cheery and enjoying the somewhat cold spring sunshine and fresh air.

The elderly civilian has, apparently, a free pass everywhere. The army doctor in charge welcomes him.

'Yes! a full ship to-night, but mostly doing well, and lots of them will be back again in a month or two. Thank you for your help, Dr. Lumsden: it's most useful to have you at hand, knowing all the ropes in this foreign place. When in difficulty, we quote you, and it always smoothes things out. By the way, I know they sent for you from the Hôtel de Londres an hour ago.

An English lady wanted attention; our fellows did what they could, but it was a case for you. She broke down over her son's wounds. He is dying in our hospital at the Bellevue, shot through the lung, and other wounds.'

'I'll go there on my way back. I came down to see my nephew off to the Front from England.'

And the doctor who has practised at --- for thirty years leaves the ship and makes his way over the quays crowded with Red Cross ambulance cars, Army Service motor wagons, a Kilburn omnibus, and a hundred other English vehicles; past the tarpaulin-covered mountains of army stores to the town itself.

The Hôtel de Londres is crowded. Its entrance hall is full of English officers; a few ladies; three or four Indian doctors in khaki (there is a hospital for Indian soldiers a few streets away); French Army surgeons attached to the English staffs, in khaki uniforms, un-English in shape and detail; Red Cross nurses passing in and out in parties of five and ten to their work in the neighbouring hospitals; Indian orderlies waiting for orders, dumb, but smiling in a strange land. The whole scene about as different and unusual as anything the dwellers in a French seaport a year ago could possibly have imagined.

Dr. Lumsden went direct to the little office of the proprietor at the back of the hall. Madame la propriétaire welcomed him with expressions of gladness and a stream of inarticulate protesting sounds indicating that her patience with existing circumstances and conditions of life was quite exhausted. But her smiling lips belied her, and she and her husband are quite content with the English invasion.

Yes, the English lady was upstairs in No. 21. Madame would telephone for her maid to conduct the doctor to her.

In truth, the lady is ill. She has come over to see her son in hospital, and has found him dying, delirious, and still obsessed by the ordeal of the trenches. 'Shoot, and shoot straight,' he calls continually; 'we must stop them—God! what a thin line we are [he whispers this] to stop that crowd. We can't—but we must.'

Always the same words—of the pain of his shattered shoulder, his torn lung, he knows nothing. His mother's voice he cannot hear: her touch he shakes off, it prevents him shooting, of course. He will be quieter soon, the nurse told her. Won't she go to the hotel and rest a little? The nurse promised to send. No! but the surgeon insists; and the lady tries to go and faints.

Dr. Lumsden asks the maid some rapid questions, and then approaches the lady and prescribes. She tells him he must try and strengthen her so that she can behave better; but she has had a shock.

‘Your son is in good hands, Mrs. Ingram, the surgeon is the best he could have even if he were in London.’

He does his best to encourage her. She must not let delirium alarm her too much. They are most of them like that—and it passes. Shall he come again in the morning? Yes, she will be grateful. She has a little sleep, and then goes back to the hospital. Her boy is calm now, and entirely conscious, so she is happy till next afternoon, when he dies.

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Dr. Lumsden, a little more tired now, for he sees what is to happen and it troubles him, passes out on his interrupted round. He is stopped in the Rue Lafayette by a messenger, who has been twice to his house and each time has been met with a sharp, short ‘*sorti*’ from Annette, the maid, who refused to predict when the doctor would return.

Madame Duval, the wife of a prosperous shopkeeper, was anxious about her little boy. Her own doctor was with the Army. If Dr. Lumsden would have the goodness of heart to excuse her sending for him, etc., etc.

He finds the lady nervous and very angry—chiefly with her husband, who is defending himself without much spirit. The boy has caught something terrible from these English soldiers—always in the shop—entering as if it belonged to them, forsooth—no salutation—mere English common soldiers to enter the shop of persons like her husband and herself! Madame’s stream of invective ran on till Dr. Lumsden quietly but firmly desired her to take him to the child and to cease talking and wasting his time.

Presently he comes downstairs again with Madame. Monsieur Duval’s anxious face appears from the private door to the shop.

‘Nothing to be alarmed about, and you need not accuse your English customers. The child has caught measles at the school of St. Geneviève. I know, because I have other patients from there. There is no measles amongst any of the English here.’

‘That is all very well,’ chimes in Madame, ‘but who can tell what other malady they will bring in?’

‘They pay for what they buy, surely? Is it not so? But if you do not want them, why not put up a notice: “No English served here”?’

‘Pay! yes, I make them pay when my husband here does not interfere—’

‘Oh! and the things these good compatriots of Monsieur’s buy! Monsieur, it would astonish you. They must be rich, these English boys. Do not listen to my wife. She fears the

English are enemies and will take our country. As for me, I welcome them, because I know better than that.'

Dr. Lumsden is in the street by this time.

Opposite is the old hotel of the days of travelling carriages; one enters under an archway into a paved courtyard which guests have to cross to get to their rooms from the salon and the *salle-à-manger*. Beyond, through another archway, the stables. A college friend of the doctor has an office here and is working the bureau for tracing the 'missing'; various relief committees are established here, and the sleepy old house has never been so crowded since railways came and the old paraphernalia of the Grand Tour disappeared into oblivion.

Dr. Lumsden passes on his round—up the long hill to a quiet street behind the walls where he has an English patient, an old lady of ninety-six, who has not yet heard of the War down again through the market square, where Annette, basket in hand and door key on finger, is cheapening cauliflowers for his refreshment.

'Telephone for Monsieur—Villa Labordette,' she interrupts her bargaining as he passes.

He nods and looks at his watch.

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'Marie, I am not well. I have an abominable migraine. My limbs scarcely support me when I walk. I am old and weak, and I fear I must consult the doctor. Go to Jean and see if he knows what doctors there are left in the poor place. Probably all are with the army. We old women must do without—after all what would it matter if we died?'

'Jean says, Madame, there are but four doctors left in — and three of them have the grippe. There remains but the English doctor Lumsden; and shall he call by telephone that Dr. Lumsden should attend Madame?'

'Yes, Marie, and ask that if possible he comes soon, for I expect Monsieur le Général and I do not wish their visits to clash.'

'Yes, Madame.'

And Marie goes off on her errand while Madame la Comtesse de Clairville Beaurieux drew the silk shawl closely round her thin shoulders and shivered.

Her careworn face grew graver and she lapsed into thought. She was thinking of her beloved home in Champagne, torn, trampled, destroyed, by the foul German enemy, and of her two grandsons fighting under the French flag. Old and lonely, she had retreated to her villa by the Channel. Old Jean, her

butler, and old Marie, her maid, brought her. The other men servants were all with the army, the women fled to their villages.

The lodgekeeper's wife and another native woman or two made a little household for her at the Villa Labordette, and there Jean did his best to maintain the 'state and ancients' of the Château Beaurieux on the meagre income the Comtesse was able to collect from her shattered resources. Every summer she was wont to spend a few months at ———, but in winter she had never occupied the rather draughty house with its many wide windows looking seaward.

'Dr. Lumsden will come to Madame with all haste, but must be forgiven if he is late since he is overwhelmed with work.'

'Monsieur le Général Valletort,' announces Jean with all ceremony. Madame gives him her slender hand, still white and shapely, to kiss, and bids him draw a chair near to her sofa and the stove. The gallant old man is all deference to the well-bred lady.

'And your grandsons? news of them first, please, before we talk of anything else.'

'They are well and they write to me as often as they can. Georges is on the staff now and has the father's wise head and quiet ways. Pierre is promoted Captain and is happy. Oh! General, how long have I to bear it all—I mean have we all to bear it? I must not be selfish as if I alone suffered.'

'Ah! Madame, not long now. Have hope. Winter is long but it has served us well. Soon is the beginning of the end. There are terrible days ahead, days of anxiety and sorrow; but the end comes and can be but one end—victory for us and freedom for France. I am proud to have lived long enough to see it. I always, since 1870, feared to die before I saw France regenerated. You and I remember those days. We lived through them and nothing that is happening now can equal that misery and shame, and at last we have new hope, and a certain one.'

'Yes, General, let us have hope and courage. I am too old to be alone, perhaps, for I lose heart at times and that is a bad sign. Perhaps I am too much alone and then here one feels no longer in France. The English invasion is almost too much. Everywhere there is that wretched khaki. The very word is dreadful and I do not understand. It may be well for France but could we not, with our own army, defeat the hateful Germans and drive them out? Why must we wait and suffer all this misery because our ally is not ready? We were ready —'

'Is that so?'

'But surely—you do not think our army would fail us. Ah! you cannot think we shall fail now? No. I know we cannot. Georges and Victor both tell me and I have perfect confidence. But why wait?'

'Because we too wanted time. France is only lately regenerate. Germany struck because she knew we were strengthening ourselves, but the process was not yet complete. Madame, let me tell you what an old man knows because he has heard it from men who saw. You remember the awful days of last September, when the Germans wrecked your home and were within a few miles of Paris itself?'

'Remember ——!'

'It was a "strategic withdrawal to a position prepared beforehand," you remember, that left your land and your home at Beaurieux trampled and ruined. It was to a pre-arranged line of defence that our Joffre had all along planned to hold. Everyone was to have perfect confidence. There was nothing to fear. The Government went to Bordeaux merely for a little change. Madame, let me tell you. Give me six matches—no, I have them—the wooden English ones you detest—never mind; they serve to show you. See, this match is our northern army ——'s; the next is ——'s army; here is the English army, then poor ——'s, the rest matter not—so, and so, and so, right away to Belfort. And here, facing our northern army, is von Kluck, then others, and this one here is the Crown Prince.

'You did not know and no one was told what was happening—what happened. Von Kluck turned our left flank—that match is broken to pieces; fling it away; it is of no account as an army. The next ——'s—piff—he is smashed too. Von Kluck is racing south-east, he has them in flank—they are no longer an army—fling that poor match away. Then the English, where are they? fled, disintegrated, a rabble. He knows it. He has seen the roads strewn with their equipment, everything they could throw away was flung by the roadside to lighten them for flight. It was a rout and he knew it. And to his left another French army, outmarched, in disorder, their line broken, facing too much east and themselves kilometre upon kilometre from the English who should have joined them; a gap of many leagues, his cavalry report. What does he decide to do? It is night. He has to rest his men a little. Shall he march straight on Paris now or smash this broken army of ——'s? The long-legged English are of no account—as all Germans knew.

'It is the choice of his life and—he chose wrong. He decides to let Paris wait and to take the other French army in flank, drive it into the Crown Prince's hands. You see this

wooden match is the Crown Prince as I told you. What glory for him, to defeat a French army, opposed to him, to be the first to hack his way through to Paris! Von Kluck is perhaps more loyal than wise—I do not know—perhaps he thinks he will work it all out and his Prince shall have the glory. Perhaps he has had a telegram from his War Lord—who knows?—at all events he turns on ———. But he does not know ——— has been withdrawn; a stronger man has taken over his command the day before. The army that Von Kluck was to outflank is, God bless it, facing him fair and square. Never mind; the Prince will come up behind. And now, Madame, a surprise for you and for Von Kluck. Those English cowards who had fled! What do you think? Fled, yes, but undefeated; the finest retreat in history, Madame! What Von Kluck saw thrown down in the roads was everything a soldier can do without and yet remain a soldier. There was no rout. Their generals, with their experience of war that not one of ours had ever had, maintained a perfect control. They rested, they reformed, they attacked—Madame, they saved Paris and they saved France!’

And the old General in his excitement threw all the matches in a bunch on to the stove and smote the table with his fist.

‘Monsieur le Médecin, Madame’; and Dr. Lumsden bows to the Comtesse with great politeness and then to the General. The latter is coughing. Madame has tears in her eyes.

‘Aha! mon cher Dr. Lumsden, you are arrived at a welcome moment. Madame and I were discussing your country and your countrymen, and I was, old grumbler that I am, telling Madame all their faults and saying that they will never understand us Frenchmen. “Frogs,” you say, is it not so? of us all. Aha! Madame is alarmed, but no, no, Dr. Lumsden and I are old friends.’

So Madame had time to collect herself, for the General’s story, illustrated so dramatically with the wooden matches had moved her. She was more agitated by Dr. Lumsden’s presence than she had expected to be. It seemed like the climax of her disillusionment, and yet it hardened her in her smaller prejudices—she felt ungenerous and unwilling to discard them. She hoped the General would talk of other things and soon leave her. He was already moving to make his adieux.

‘But one question before I go, Doctor. How are those gallant sons of yours, fighting in the next army to Madame’s grandsons? For I know where they are, and my old military friends tell me sometimes a little about the position of things.’

‘As far as I know they are both well, General—busy beyond letter-writing, so I hear seldom. Like all our English boys, they

felt they had to go. One is a doctor with the army and the other enlisted as a private soldier. He has his commission now.'

'Adieu, Madame,' and he kissed her hand again; 'I leave you to the good offices of my friend, and I pray he may cure you of every ill that troubles you.'

So Dr. Lumsden prescribed his remedies after hearing what Madame la Comtesse had to tell him.

'They will help a little, Madame, and good news of your grandsons will help more. The peace, when it comes, will be your cure.'

'There are many like me among your patients, Doctor. It is fortunate we have you here to help us, and I am grateful. I wish your sons well. The General was too generous. It was I who was doubting the value of your country's help to us. He has told me the truth and I see I was wrong. "He who knows all can understand all"—we have the proverb that is common to all languages. Your soldiers are difficult to understand—so gay and laughing, making war a joke, a game. Have they no thoughts of their women and children at home? No, that cannot be. Is it, then, the laugh that conceals the heartbreak?'

'No, Madame, not the first—and not even quite the second. It is their training. We in England make everything, even life, a game. Games are a great part of our education. The good and the wise keep the rules, whether they are winning or losing—and the first rule is to play with all your heart; what we call to "play up." The next is not to show emotion. We have it—we are as full of sentiment as any nation, as free to avow it, but always provided there is no public, no third person even, looking on. This is a strict rule of the game. If you had seen what I as a doctor have seen you would realise. These English wounded men here in hundreds in your hotels which are hospitals—you do not know what courage and endurance they show—and what tender things they think and do and plan for their women and children at home. I have often to be their means of communication and I know. And even to me there is the concealing smile, the gay laugh, the humorous word that helps us both and makes us understand each other, because we learnt the game that way.

'There is much besides that you, Madame, cannot understand in the English invasion. There are ladies here doing work which no French lady would undertake. They, too, have been taught differently. Ah! yes, I know—there are one or two ladies here, not more, who are not English ladies or ladies at all, but whose doings are too much chronicled and discussed. We are not proud of them any more than you, Madame, are proud of Madame de — — as a Frenchwoman. We cannot help it any

more than you can help Madame de ——. But there are many hundreds of English ladies here doing women's work for the wounded of their country and of yours that you, Madame, would be proud to know and to receive, though your own compatriots would not do such work. They would get it done and see that it was done. English ladies are trained differently, and they can do, without hesitation or failure, much work that is less well done, Madame, in your hospitals.'

'You astonish me, Doctor, but you help me. I am glad to distinguish between the English women we see and hear of in the town. Perhaps then we have something to learn from them in war, though war has been so much nearer to us and so much more cruel. For one does value house and goods and the beloved pictures and the old china and all that makes the home. Do you know those German staff officers in my salon had sheep killed and cut up for food in order to destroy my furniture, my carpets, my hangings? I was fond of these things for old association, and they made a slaughter-house of my drawing-room! God has protected you in England from that, and yet we have something to learn from Englishwomen in our conduct in war'—and Madame smiled sadly—'and I begin to see we have.'

'Madame, war is a great teacher: this War surely the greatest we can ever listen to. We should all listen—we who cannot be in arms can look on in awe and wonder, and learn. I will say adieu, for I have much work to do.'

'Adieu, Monsieur! and my thanks from my heart.'

Annette is standing at Dr. Lumsden's open door as his *fiacre* draws up. Her face is one large smile. She sees nothing but the squad of Highlanders swinging down the street—khaki tunics and stockings and tartan kilts that nothing will induce them even to cover with khaki aprons—and Dr. Lumsden has to touch her arm before she stands aside—blushing finely—to let him pass into his house.

'Pardon, Monsieur! but Monsieur is late and must be fatigued.'

'Yes, Annette, bring me some dinner—when the Scotchmen are out of sight! Annette, Madame Duval says she cannot bear English soldiers in her shop and is afraid they mean to take your country.'

'That Monsieur should listen to Madame Duval, who is a peahen and a wicked one too! And the way she robs those poor men who go there to buy souvenirs to send home—it is a scandal! Mongrel Swiss that she is—understanding neither French people nor English! I myself have stopped her and saved a poor

English boy paying three francs for a cup and saucer worth seventy-five centimes. Yes—and a brave boy too—worth fifty Mesdames Duval and all her shop thrown in.

‘Monsieur, your soldiers are veritable heroes! and to think of the killed and wounded over here!—well, the devil take Madame Duval for her evil tongue, and Monsieur’s dinner will be served in five minutes. Entrecôte à l’Anglaise and a chou-fleur au gratin, Monsieur.’

C. H. BABINGTON.

THE CASE OF DR. AXHAM

II

It was my privilege in December last¹ to be allowed to prefer a plea on behalf of Dr. F. W. Axham, whose name was struck off the Register by the General Medical Council in May 1911, because of his association, as anaesthetist, with Mr. H. A. Barker, the Bonesetter of Park Lane. I hope I succeeded in proving to the satisfaction of every unprejudiced person that Dr. Axham had been treated with quite unnecessary harshness, and that the time had arrived when he might be *justly reinstated in the position which he had occupied for fifty years without a blemish or a stain*.

If in the following pages I can succeed in demonstrating that the 'outsider,' with whom he was and is associated, is in no sense of the word a 'quack,' but an altogether exceptional person engaged in beneficent work on entirely sound and scientific lines, it is obvious that I shall greatly strengthen that plea.

A very strong feeling exists at the present time that the medical profession should seriously take in hand an investigation into the claims of manipulative surgery. The evidence that has been accumulating during the last ten or fifteen years makes it quite clear that there are a vast number of people suffering from various affections of the joints with which the regular practitioner is not competent to deal. The instruction which he has received at the schools is not of such a nature as to qualify him to deal successfully with these complaints. Yet there are men outside the profession who are possessed of a secret or knack or system—call it what you like—which enables them to deal effectually with such cases. The profession are well aware of the fact; but apparently they take no steps to avail themselves of information which lies to their hands. They are content to assume an attitude of aloofness and incredulity, and to pose like those who fondly asked 'Can there any good thing come out of Nazareth?'

Now, it always appears to me that the one blot on the escutcheon of a noble profession is the blind prejudice which it has

¹ 'The Case of Dr. Axham,' *Nineteenth Century and After*. December 1914.

ever entertained against those outside its ranks who have ventured, from time to time, to suggest that they were in possession of an idea which might be of assistance in the treatment of human maladies. It has always been assumed that the brain of the layman is incapable of conceiving anything likely to be of practical utility in the sacred domain of medicine and surgery.

A man may have travelled the world over; he may have witnessed the elementary treatment of disease amongst savage tribes; he may be in possession of the highest scientific acquirements; he may have investigated the most complex and delicate appliances in different countries; he may be possessed of the keenest power of observation; he may have been brought face to face with disease in its manifold forms, and have witnessed the unsuccessful efforts of trained physicians and surgeons to alleviate or cure; nevertheless, it is presumed to be inconceivable that he, being an outsider, should be able to evolve a remedy, an appliance, a process superior to that which the faculty are accustomed to employ.

Yet it has always been considered that the true scientific spirit manifests itself in a readiness to sift, and test, all evidence from whatsoever quarter. Bigotry, prejudice, narrow-mindedness, conceit, are entirely alien to the scientific pursuit of knowledge. How, then, can the faculty attempt to explain, or condone, their conservative opposition to discoveries on the part of the layman, or innovations when suggested by pioneers within their ranks?

For unvarnished history reveals the fact that medicine has progressed with the assistance of the layman and the pioneer, in spite of, and in face of, the bitter opposition of the pundits of the profession.

(a) Cinchona was introduced into Europe by Jesuit priests, who had learned its value from the Indian tribes of South America;

(b) Ether was first employed as an anaesthetic by an unqualified man;

(c) Lithotomy was introduced by a layman;

(d) The first Caesarian section was performed by one who had no diploma;

(e) Pasteur was refused a hearing by leading physicians because he had no medical degree;

(f) When Harvey announced his discovery of the circulation of the blood, he was denounced by the profession of his day as a 'circulator' or quack;

(g) Lister was scoffed at when he advocated the employment of antiseptics;

(h) The laryngoscope was sneered at as a physiological toy;

(i) The early ovariologists were threatened by their colleagues with the Coroner's Court ;

(j) When Villemin submitted to the Académie de Médecine experimental proof that phthisis was infectious his doctrines found no favour ;

(k) When Bodington advocated the open-air treatment of consumption the idea was ridiculed ;

(l) Years later, when Sir W. McCormack's father read a paper enunciating the same doctrine, a member of the ' Medical and Chirurgical Society ' asked that that body should be protected against such papers ;

(m) When electricity was put forward as a curative agent it was looked upon with suspicion ;

(n) Massage introduced in our own day was regarded as an unclean thing ;

(o) While fifty years ago, when Wharton Hood was applying, with such success, the methods which he had learned of the bonesetter Hutton, he was openly denounced as a quack ; and it was even suggested that there was something irregular and improper in his practice.

This strange record may be said to justify a frequent suspicion, on the part of the public, that the medical profession officially is more awake to its peculiar privileges than to the true interests of suffering humanity.

It might be thought that by this time it had learned its lesson, and was prepared to receive with open arms any outsider, or pioneer, who could bring forward a remedy or system likely to assist it in its noble effort to reduce the burden of human suffering.

But enlightenment seems as far off as ever.

Bonesetting, or manipulative surgery, is still generally taboo to the profession : its principles are unknown and untaught, and its exponents, good, bad, and indifferent, are lumped together as quacks, and treated with contumely and scorn ; and this, in spite of the accumulation of overwhelming evidence of the value of those principles.

In November 1910 a Blue Book was issued—*On the Practice of Medicine and Surgery by Unqualified Persons*—embodying reports by local medical officers of health. This book was published with the avowed object, not merely of influencing public opinion, but especially with the idea of promoting legislative action for the regulation of the practice of medicine. That such legislation is needed is universally allowed ; but common sense requires that it should be based on a fair and impartial inquiry into the true circumstances of the case.

But it is easy to demonstrate that this report, or series of

reports, is everything but impartial : that it is, on the contrary, absolutely biased, narrow-minded, and utterly untrustworthy.

The summary states (page 8) that numerous complaints have been received of the encroachments by bonesetters upon the surgical practice of qualified practitioners; that the number of bonesetters is increasing; that an astonishing amount of public confidence is reposed in them; that Friendly Societies in the North even accept certificates from them in cases of accident as equivalent to certificates from medical practitioners. The effects on public health are declared to be disastrous, and, in particular, it is reported that 'the greater number of bonesetters undertake complicated cases, and irretrievable harm is sometimes caused. Dislocations are treated without being reduced, and permanent disablement sometimes results.' It goes on to affirm that 'what bonesetters practise is fraught with danger to their patients, that any success is accidental, that the results are, on the whole, disastrous, and that only a natural shrinking of the victims of pretentious quacks from displaying their credulity and folly prevents this danger from being demonstrated to the public.' It is also asserted that their patients are 'drawn largely from the working-class population,' and are 'in many cases illiterate and uneducated.' In their blind and unreasoning condemnation of osteopathic methods, these doctors stultify themselves by classifying such skilled and gifted operators as Hutton, Atkinson, and Barker with illiterate bonesetters, vendors of patent medicines, quacks, and charlatans. True, there are bonesetters and bonesetters; but there are doctors and doctors, and there is a vast amount of bungling in the profession which never comes to light because, being members of a sacred trade union, they are pledged to stand by each other, through good report or evil.

But here is the extraordinary fact—not one jot or tittle of evidence is brought forward to substantiate the sweeping generalisations and accusations that are made so glibly. In the eyes of thinking men, therefore, the report fails to carry any weight whatever, and stands condemned as a merely narrow-minded diatribe.

The publication of summaries of the report in the various journals not unnaturally evoked a series of spirited controversies, showing that, though the medical profession may choose to bury its official head in the sand, the public has, by this, come to realise that bonesetting is no longer in the primitive stage of mid-Victorian days, but has developed, in the hands, at any rate, of Mr. H. A. Barker, into a sound system of therapeutics on a thoroughly scientific basis.

In so far as the report can be said to have any reference to

Mr. Barker at all—the report makes no exceptions in its diatribe—it is, I will not say grossly unfair, but manifestly ridiculous. It is an absurdity to hurl abusive generalisations at the head of an educated man, a serious student, who has devoted the best twenty years of his life to the alleviation of human suffering; it is sheer ignorance to suggest that his patients ‘are drawn largely from the working classes,’ and are ‘in many cases illiterate and uneducated’; it is rank wickedness to insinuate that his practice is ‘fraught with danger to his patients, that any success is accidental, and that the results are on the whole disastrous.’

The report failed—I will not say to wreck—but even to shake the solid position which Mr. Barker occupies in the opinion of the thinking public. It did more than fail: it evoked such unbounded testimony to his unfailing skill that the profession are no longer able to venture upon a wholesale condemnation of bone-setting.²

Accordingly when the medical correspondent of *The Times* rashly rushed into the fray, intending to belittle the work of the bonesetter, he was so embarrassed with the evidence with which he was surrounded that whereas he set out to curse he only succeeded in blessing.

Soon after this Professor Howard Marsh made another effort in the columns of the *British Medical Journal*; but Mr. Barker replied with a paper in the *English Review*, which completely upset the contentions of the professor.

Now, as Dr. Axham was drummed out of the profession solely on account of his association with Mr. H. A. Barker, it will be just as well to ask—for the benefit of the profession—who is Mr. Barker, and what do the public think of him?

The profession as a body have always acted as if they were under the impression that Mr. Barker was some common, ignorant charlatan, and they have generally done their best to induce the public to entertain a similar idea. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Mr. Barker, whose father was the much-respected Coroner for South-West Lancashire, has from early youth been interested in mechano-therapy, and it was the most natural thing in the world that, when he was old enough, and opportunity offered, he should be taken as an assistant by his cousin, Mr. Atkinson, who, in the latter half of last century, was easily the most famous bonesetter of his day.

² See article in the *English Review* by Mr. Walter Whitehead, F.R.C.S., F.R.S. (Edin.), June 1911, p. 478. ‘I am convinced that the attitude adopted by the medical world towards the method of manipulative surgery is only adding another regrettable page to those chapters in its history which it recalls with profound shame. Blinded by professional prejudice, the medical world has stolidly opposed nearly every innovation and discovery which has been submitted to it.’ The italics are mine.—J. L. W.

Atkinson was the successor of Hutton, but advanced far beyond him in his methods, and his waiting-rooms were crowded with distinguished people of all kinds from Royalty downwards.

On Atkinson's death in 1904, Mr. Barker took his cousin's place in Park Lane, where he has ever since continued to practise. Those who have had any dealings with him recognise at once that he is no ordinary man. His quiet, unassuming manner, his silent reserve, are at once indicative of strength and self-confidence. At first glance you are satisfied that he is a serious student, that he is perfectly cognisant of his limits and his power. There is no suggestion of pretence or sham about him whatever; he strikes you as knowing exactly what he can do, and as being the last man in the world to venture on a rash experiment. In appearance, in manner, in conversation, he is, in fact, the very antithesis of a quack. He is as far in advance of Atkinson as Atkinson was in advance of Hutton. Twenty years' experience has resulted in the development of a scientific system of treatment, the soundness of which is demonstrated by the unfailing regularity with which cures are effected in case after case brought before him. Twenty years' experience has caused him to acquire a proficiency in his art that enables him to know exactly what can be done and how to do it deftly.³ Patients, in all ranks of society, from all parts of the world, officers and men of both Services, sportsmen, athletes, cricketers, football-players, members of Parliament, the aristocracy, dignitaries of the Church, lawyers, barristers, journalists, and, lastly, medical men and their families (but '*secretly for fear of the Jews*') have resorted to his consulting-rooms.

The names of those who have experienced relief at the hands of Mr. Barker, to quote *Truth*, would 'probably comprise a more imposing list than that of any living surgeon.' Such a list for obvious reasons could never be published; but, taking only such names as have appeared from time to time in the various newspapers, it is obvious that Mr. Barker's patients are by no means 'drawn largely from the working-class population' and 'in many cases . . . illiterate and uneducated,' as the Blue Book suggests, but from the cream of intellect and society.

* "It is by those means that Mr. Barker has won his way to the topmost position on this side the Atlantic. His present reputation has been won by actual achievements, in the face of cruel and reasonless opposition, by a series of successes, maintained through two decades, in cases where the ablest surgeons, working on orthodox lines, have failed. On that score I have no doubt whatever. The evidence has convinced me. It has swept away the prejudice that for years made me an unrelenting critic, and such evidence accumulates daily—coming often from the highest quarters of society and intellect.'—*Ibid.* p. 480.

To instance a few names taken from the correspondence columns of the daily newspapers :

The Marchioness of Exeter.
 Lord William Cecil.
 Duchesse de Lousada.
 Countess of Yarborough.
 Lady Markham.
 General Count Gleichen.
 Major-General Ketchen.
 Col. Sir Charles King-Harman.
 Mr. J. M. Moorsom, K.C.
 Sir Daniel Gooch.
 Mr. Walter Larden.

Lady Low.
 Admiral Reynolds.
 Admiral Mark Kerr.
 Sir Krishna Gupta.
 Sir Archibald Sinclair.
 Mr. Hart Davis, ex-M.P.
 Mr. Featherstonhaugh, K.C., M.P.
 Lord Digby.
 Baron Bentinck.
 Sir Herbert Parsons.
 Mr. H. G. Wells.

Now the one remarkable feature about all the patients who attend the consulting-rooms of Mr. Barker is that they are the failures of the orthodox registered practitioners. Each one is an advertisement of the fact that there is a 'hinterland' of surgery still, that there is something which even registered practitioners of the first rank do not understand.

Each one tells the same tale—months or years of suffering, painful, expensive, and ineffectual resort to surgeons of all degrees of eminence, experiments of all kinds fruitlessly performed, bandages, plaster of Paris, steel cages, enforced rest, and even the knife—but never a cure.

It is all very well for the profession to envelop itself in a mantle of exclusive self-satisfaction ; but it must be blind indeed if it cannot see that Mr. Barker's success constitutes a very heavy indictment against its methods, and, when Dr. Axham is considered, against its ethics also.

It has been objected by surgeons that the various people must have been 'unfortunate in their choice of professional advisers' ; but, if that is so, it renders the indictment a thousand times more serious, for a mere glance at the few names we have given makes it clear that, having the means and the burning desire to be healed, they must have consulted, one or another, every leading surgeon in Britain.

It is no reflection whatever upon the individual practitioner that he knows nothing of bonesetting ; he has never been taught, and he is not allowed to learn ; but it is a very grievous reflection upon the faculty officially that, because of a childish etiquette, it is content to practise painfully and expensively upon the suffering public rather than learn from a layman what, as it happens, only a layman is competent to teach.

The amount of suffering that has to be borne by the public, not merely from natural causes, but from the so-called therapeutic treatment of the orthodox surgeon, solely and entirely on account of official narrowness and prejudice, is appalling.

The few letters which I append—gathered from newspapers⁴—reveal, in language carrying infinitely more weight than anything I could employ, a preference of private interests to the public weal which is so callous, so ignoble as to be perfectly inexplicable on the part of a corporation which exists for the good of the public.

FROM THE MARCHIONESS OF EXETER,

To the Editor of 'The Times.'

SIR,—Having seen Mr. Heather Bigg's letter saying that the manipulative methods of Mr. Hutton and Mr. H. A. Barker are practised by surgeons, I should like to state that, although I visited several doctors and surgeons at different times during seventeen or eighteen years, such treatment was never tried or even spoken of. Allow me to give a short history of my case.

In 1893 or '95, whilst running down a steep hill, I displaced the cartilage of my left knee, and was laid up for a fortnight at that time. After this the joint was a continual source of trouble to me. It would slip out whilst dancing, playing tennis, or even wiping my boots. I saw several surgeons about it, but they were unable to help me beyond ordering me elastic knee-caps, etc., and, finally, a large 'cage,' which I wore two years without benefit. My knee was then so weak that it went out on the smallest provocation.

Over a year ago I consulted Mr. Barker, who at once diagnosed what was wrong with my knee, and when gas had been given the cartilage was put in its place, and I left his house without any discomfort. After a few days' further treatment I was completely cured. I can now play tennis, dance, etc., without any support whatever, and in perfect comfort.

Yours truly,

M. EXETER.

Burghley House, Stamford, February 14, 1911.

The two following letters from Dr. Sutherland Rees-Phillips and Dr. George Garrard show conclusively that doctors themselves and their children have to seek from Mr. Barker the relief which distinguished surgeons at home and abroad are unable to afford them :

To the Editor of the 'Express.'

July 22, 1914.

SIR,—I notice several letters on Mr. H. A. Barker's great claim to recognition. Let me give you my experience as a physician.

I was in a fair way of becoming a cripple this year. I went to Mr. Barker. He cured me and made me walk well again, and made me grateful as anyone could be. This is what occurred :

I slipped while playing golf ; my right knee swelled up and got painful. I had been in the habit of walking some eight miles a day, but then a quarter of a mile, and that with a stick, was all that I could do. I had often heard of Mr. Barker and of men who had been patients under him.

Then a clergyman in Exmouth said : 'Why do you not go to Mr. Barker ? I have been to him and been cured by him.' I was for many years

⁴ The writer is indebted to the courtesy of the Editors of *The Times*, *Daily Express*, and *Pall Mall Gazette* for permission to reproduce these letters.

more or less lame, always being uncomfortable, and never getting any permanent cure from the medical men I consulted. I went to Barker. He put me under gas and cured me at once. I walked away from his house a cured man. I have never been lame since.'

The clergyman is a five handicap man at golf, plays cricket regularly, and is a perfectly healthy man. So I went to Mr. Barker, who examined my swollen knee, noticed a painful spot which projected on one side, and put me under gas. Afterwards I found that the projecting spot had disappeared, and that the pain had gone. I went to Mr. Barker five times more, steadily improving till pronounced well.

Now I can do as I used to do—walk several miles, play some golf and some billiards, and enjoy everything. And all things through Mr. Barker, of whom I cannot speak too highly.

SUTHERLAND REES-PHILLIPS, M.D.

Exmouth, and South Bolton Gardens, South Kensington.

FROM MR. GEORGE GARRARD, M.R.C.S.ENG. AND L.R.C.P.LOND.*

'*Pall Mall Gazette*,' September 1910.

Some time ago I had a patient suffering from a painful and obscure affection of the ankle, which was causing her great pain and suffering, making walking almost impossible and which for a long time refused to improve, though orthodox remedies were perseveringly tried. I advised her to see a famous London surgeon. She saw two at different times. She also went to Berlin and saw an eminent surgeon there. Their advice and treatment resulted in no improvement whatever.

When she returned she told me she would like to see Mr. H. A. Barker, as he had cured a friend of hers. I agreed, and she did so. At the end of a few weeks she had made a complete recovery, relief being afforded almost immediately.

My own son was at that time suffering from an ankle injury which also refused to yield to treatment by three surgeons at different times. It prevented him from indulging in any kind of sport at his University. Having already had experience of Mr. Barker's methods, I took my son to him and witnessed the treatment. The patient was put under gas, a few dexterous and determined manipulations of the joint were effected, and the patient was immediately all right. His words as he left the house were: 'I've never been able to walk so well before.' He has been quite well ever since, and now plays football and other games without feeling anything of the old trouble. I join with Dr. Bryce heartily in pleading for the admission of this scientific mechano-therapy, or bone-setting, amongst recognised methods of treatment.

From a letter to '*The Times*' of December 18th, 1911, from Mr. Robert Shewan, of Shewan, Tomes & Co., 27 Leadenhall Street, E.C.

As one who feels a deep debt of gratitude to Mr. Barker, may I add my testimony to that of others as to his skill, and say a word on behalf of the medical gentleman who is now being proscribed by the General Medical Council for assisting him to alleviate the sufferings of his patients?

Nearly twenty years ago, in Hong-Kong, I broke both my ankles. I was assured by the doctors there that nothing could be done for me, and that I should be a cripple for life. I then went home to England, but fared no better. Among others I consulted Mr. Wharton-Hood, who told me that there was nothing to be done to my feet, and added the

* Dr. Garrard was officially warned for the publication of this letter.

information that I ought to have killed myself. After that I did my best to endure the pain of the broken and dislocated bones and put the best face I could upon it.

This summer, however, I was induced to consult Mr. Barker, who, when he had examined my feet, assured me, to my great surprise, that he could do everything for them if I would agree to undergo a simple operation under gas. To this I at once consented, and am glad to say, with a grateful heart, that I can now put my feet to the ground without fear of pain, and walk with the greatest pleasure and comfort, whereas previously I had to walk in boots with an iron plate in the sole, without which I could only stagger across the room.

The following letter from the pen of Mr. O. T. Norris, a late famous Oxford Blue, appeared in the *Daily Express* on the 22nd of August 1913. If Mr. Barker had cured only *one* out of the thirty patients sent to him by Mr. Norris, he would have proved the superiority of his methods; but he cured them *all* in a few days or weeks, after each one had failed to get relief in the highest surgical quarters during months of ineffectual treatment.

To the Editor of the 'Express.'

SIR,—Mr. Barker cured me of long-standing knee cartilage trouble in a very short time, after three well-known medical men had failed even to diagnose the case.

I have sent some thirty other sufferers to him during the last few years, and they have without exception obtained speedy and complete relief.

O. T. NORRIS.

These letters are taken from the public Press, but day by day Mr. Barker is receiving letters from grateful patients; and, in ever-increasing numbers, letters from individual members of the medical profession, who thus privately assure him of their sympathy and their admiration of his methods. It is a glaring testimony to the effectiveness of the tyranny under which the individual member of the faculty is constrained to live and work that when he sees a man healing suffering humanity day by day, by means which the faculty do not understand, when he is convinced the system is scientific and the method sound, when he knows that at the same time the faculty are dabbling blindly and empirically with thousands of cases which Mr. Barker could heal at once—when his conscience tells him that he ought to stand up and speak out like a man for the cause of righteousness—he dare not. He would run the risk of being struck off the Register for 'infamous conduct.'

The only thing he dare do is to write to Mr. Barker privately and confidentially, or to the Press anonymously! This he has done freely; but it is a curious reflexion on a noble profession that its standard of honour has come to be of a different species to that accepted amongst other associations of gentlemen.

Truth has not hesitated to describe the profession as a 'Trades Union'; and in this there is certainly a strong resemblance, that certain men manage to climb upon the backs of their fellows and plant their heels upon their necks.

But I am not without hope that before long sufficient numbers of the profession will be found to express their unanimous protest against the fetters which have been forged by the General Medical Council and ancillary associations under the powers supposed to be conferred upon them by the medical Acts.

The faculty base all their opposition on the presumption that Mr. Barker is a quack; but the wildest flights of imagination could not detect the faintest resemblance between Mr. Barker and a charlatan or quack.

The charlatan or quack is essentially a man who pretends to do what he cannot do; he may be a registered or unregistered, a qualified or unqualified practitioner.

Mr. Barker pretends to nothing; he knows exactly what he can do, and he never fails to do it. He has never had a disaster, and it is only in quite exceptional cases that he is unable to afford relief.

When the faculty call Mr. Barker a quack they are handling a two-edged sword with which they run the risk of cutting their own limbs, for if a quack is a man who pretends to do what he cannot do, he who tries to do what he is not sure he can do, and very seldom does do, comes very near placing himself in the same category. As *The Times* said: 'The medical profession would gain . . . by showing greater toleration all round and by keeping to a definition of quackery more consonant with natural distinctions and less dependent upon artificial ones than that now in vogue.'⁶

The Press has been most generous in its recognition of the genuine nature of Mr. Barker's successful work.

The late W. T. Stead threw himself, with all the generosity of his nature, heart and soul, upon the medical faculty, and produced in the *Review of Reviews* page after page of fact and argument that would have brought conviction to any association open to reason and scientific proof.⁷

Truth, the terror of all quackery, in one article after another has expatiated upon the undeniable and unique gifts of Mr. Barker, and 'the absolute indifference of the "faculty" to considerations of humanity when they conflict with professional etiquette—what it pleases doctors to call "ethics," but what is best described as trade-union regulations.'

Truth has also said 'Probably no one in the medical profession

⁶ See *The Times*, November 7, 1912, 'What is a Quack?'

⁷ See *Review of Reviews*, October 1910.

could produce a more imposing list of patients to speak to his practical qualifications.' . . . 'The wicked bonesetter' (Mr. (Barker) . . . 'cures in a few minutes injuries and diseased conditions which orthodox surgery either fails to relieve or definitely aggravates. He goes on doing this day after day and year after year until his reputation extends over the whole world and *eclipses that of any living member of the medical faculty.*'^a

The Times, in a leader on the 25th of November 1912, generously remarks (and no one would be bold enough to accuse the leading journal of 'gush' or undue precipitancy in focussing public opinion) :

Mr. Barker has cured a great many people whom recognised and even eminent surgeons had been trying to cure for years without any success. Dr. Axham assisted him in cases where anaesthetics were necessary. Both are benefactors to the public, and both ought to be honoured accordingly. Both have been pursued by professional jealousy and prejudice, which have tried hard to ruin the career of both. It is time to put an end to this. It is more than time to acknowledge that if Mr. Barker did not pass through the schools, he knows, about the class of cases he deals with, more than the schools can teach; and also that if cure does not prove the correctness of diagnosis, then diagnosis cannot matter much to the sufferer. Further, it is time that Dr. Axham were reinstated in the position from which he ought never to have been driven, seeing that the only ground for taking his name off the Medical Register was that he assisted a master of manipulative surgery to relieve human suffering for which no relief could be found elsewhere.

The question has been put to me on many occasions 'Do you really believe in Barker?'

I answer 'Certainly I do; I have no option in the matter; as an intelligent being I cannot choose; as one possessed of some knowledge of logic, and not altogether ignorant of the principles of scientific inquiry, I am bound to believe that, as *The Times* says, Mr. Barker is a "master of manipulative surgery" and "a benefactor of the human race."'

I believe in Barker not from any sentimental reason, but simply because of the overwhelming evidence that confronts me—from thoroughly reliable quarters—evidence as to his continuous and unfailing skill in a certain definite and limited field of surgery.

In face of that evidence a man who would dispute the ability of Barker would be fatuous enough to dispute anything.

If you hear people talking about the same man at your club, at hotels, at private houses in town and in the country, at health resorts, at the seaside, at home and abroad, wherever you may happen to be; if his name constantly appears in the magazines and the daily Press; if you see scores of letters in most of the

^a The italics are mine.—J. L. W.

leading journals, one year after another, from people of all kinds, in every station of life, testifying to the relief they have received at the hands of the same man, when all other surgeons have failed ; when you observe that a paper like *Truth*—the declared enemy of all quackery and malfeasance—chooses to devote something like fifty columns in support of this person ; and when, as a finale, *The Times* steps forward as the champion of his skill, you are justified in accepting as an indisputable fact the claim that Mr. Barker is possessed of a sound and scientific system of therapeutics.

If, in addition, you are allowed to see some hundreds of private letters from medical men, some of them from the very leaders of the profession, all telling the same tale in evidence of Mr. Barker's skill—well, the fact is established in accordance with the strictest requirements of scientific inquiry.

It is no longer a matter of opinion.

I say, without hesitation, that the medical profession are satisfied with far less evidence in support of any fact which they desire to establish ; but in this case, because they have interested reasons why the fact should not be established, as they are not able to dispute the evidence they meanly seek to minimise the fact.

For instance, they say 'Oh, well, he's only one of many ! There are lots of bonesetters about.'

Quite true ; there are 'lots of bonesetters about.' There always have been. There always will be, so long as you doctors are too vain and narrow-minded to learn what they have to teach. But doesn't this strike you as being a very invidious thing to say ? You know it is manifestly unfair to lump all bonesetters together, and Mr. Barker in the midst of them. You know perfectly well that he stands quite apart : that his skill, according to your own showing, is unique. His predecessors Hutton, Thomas, and Atkinson did much : Barker does infinitely more. They were as wanderers on the seashore ; he has struck into the hinterland. The paths which he treads fearlessly day by day they never ventured to explore.

'Oh, yes,' say they, again trying to minimise, 'we are quite prepared to allow that he does good here and there ; but surgeons are doing infinitely more good on scientific lines.'

I dispute this entirely. I say it is mean in the extreme to say he does good 'here and there.' He does good invariably. Case after case comes before him, and with clockwork regularity he effects a cure. What have you got to say to such a letter as that of O. T. Norris, the Oxford Blue, who says that after you had tried your skill in vain, he was cured himself, and sent along no less than thirty other sufferers who were all likewise entirely

cured? When you say that doctors are doing more good on scientific lines, you are either labouring under a fond delusion, or stating that which you ought to know cannot be supported by fact.

If the doctors were doing more good on scientific lines Mr. Barker's living would be gone. You know perfectly well that the people who resort to Mr. Barker are, almost without exception, those unlucky persons upon whom you doctors have tried your scientific methods without success. You have tried for one year may be, or for eighteen years, as you did with Lady Exeter, or even for twenty years as you did with Mr. Robert Shewan, and your so-called scientific method was ineffective and useless. It was expensive—nothing more. A glance at the scores of letters which have appeared in the Press makes this painfully clear.

With monotonous regularity the writers, many of them, mind you, distinguished members of your own profession, say that they only went to Mr. Barker after all modern medical science had proved its inability to meet their case. In fact, these very letters, which establish beyond a doubt the scientific nature of Mr. Barker's methods, seem strongly to indicate that you are not working on scientific lines at all, that your methods are, in truth, empirical.

'Oh,' say the minimisers again, 'of course, we have some disasters, but then so has Barker.'

Again I want to argue. You doctors, we know only too well, have disasters, but they are hushed up. You stand together, 'for the sake of the profession.' You support each other through thick and thin. Whatever you think of each other, and say to each other, you keep to yourselves, 'for the sake of the profession.' I am not blaming you. Now, it is not reasonable to suppose, for one minute, that every 'disaster' you have finds his way to Mr. Barker. Suppose one in ten finds his way to Park Lane; Mr. Barker has seen 40,000 or 50,000 patients in the last twenty years. Doesn't it make you blush? And this only in one small department of your work. Yes, you have disasters sufficient to constitute proof in accordance with strictest scientific requirements that your methods are wrong.

Mr. Barker has been making a handsome competence by helping your lame dogs over the stile, and the only way you can excuse yourselves is by mumbling a *tu quoque*! Mumbling I say; for you have more good sense than to say outright what is not true. Where are Mr. Barker's disasters? You know that for years you have been watching him at every turn and corner as a cat watches a mouse—ever ready to pounce upon him. You know perfectly well that if he had had a disaster you would have

seized upon it at once. All these years you have only succeeded in finding one—as you thought ; but, when it was dragged before the Courts, instead of injuring Mr. Barker, it only reflected discredit upon yourselves.

I wish to say quite calmly and fairly that if Mr. Barker had had disasters, you would have unearthed them by hook or by crook ; you would have advertised them ; you would have taken good care that the public should know what you had found. Your medical journals, with all their manifest hostility to Mr. Barker, have never been able to produce a single case. Why ? Because you cannot produce what does not exist.

Frankly, I think all this paltry quibbling is quite unworthy of a great profession. There is no objection you can urge against Mr. Barker that cannot be met, fair and square. As scientific men you are not entitled to scorn all evidence.

You are quite right to fence your preserves, but not against the well-being of the public.

I think it may be assumed from the evidence I have adduced that Mr. Barker has fairly established a claim to be treated with consideration and courtesy by the profession, which exists solely for the noble purpose of alleviating suffering humanity. It must by this be evident to them that in the opinion of all reputable people—outside the faculty—Mr. Barker is engaged in a legitimate way in doing a share, and a large and valuable share, of the work of healing the public. There is nothing secret about his methods ; on the contrary, the ambition of his life is to see his methods recognised and adopted by the faculty. He has time after time expressed his readiness to allow a properly authorised committee of medical gentlemen to witness his operations, and investigate his methods ; he has offered to operate one day a week at any London hospital gratuitously, or to lecture at any medical school.

What Mr. Barker magnanimously requests, I feel the public have a right to demand.

The time has come for the public to say what it so strongly feels—‘ Away with your etiquette ; away with your artificial definitions and distinctions ! You are a public corporation, hedged round by statute with privileges and considerations ; you exist for the public, not for yourselves ; open the doors ; let in the light ; if you do not know how to heal us yourselves, then, in God’s Name, extend some consideration to those who do ! ’ I cannot understand how, in the face of all the evidence that is at hand, in the face of the testimony of countless patients in every walk of life, in the face of the generous sympathy that has been extended by all the leading journals, the medical profession can refuse to acknowledge that, if an offence was committed

against professional etiquette by Dr. Axham in assisting Mr. Barker, that offence has long ago been thoroughly purged. Surely, this is eminently a time when his case might be reconsidered, and a different complexion placed upon the procedure of one who obviously only acted in accordance with the dictates of his conscience.

I put it to all fair-minded members of the profession, that there can be nothing even derogatory for one of their number to associate himself with a man of such proved eminence as Mr. Barker; certainly there can be nothing in his conduct calculated to bring disgrace upon the profession to which he belongs, or to justify any body of men, whether a properly constituted judicial tribunal or not, in attaching to him a stigma which carries with it a disability to prosecute his legitimate calling, is calculated to rob him of his good name, and to 'bring his grey hairs with sorrow to the grave.'

J. L. WALTON.

RELIGION AND REBELLION:

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE BOERS

THE recent futile rebellion by De Wet, Beyers, and a few other backveld Boers, while naturally hurtful to British pride as a reflection on British justice, is not altogether surprising to those who have studied the history of South Africa and the psychology of the Boers. England should feel satisfaction rather at the poor achievement of the gigantic and subtle temptation held out by Germany to a people still smarting under the wounds of twelve years ago. The history of South Africa is a history of futile rebellion, passive when not active. To count accurately the quarrels in which blood has been shed would alone be the work of an historian.

Let us therefore consider the soil of South Africa as predestined for rebellion, and thank our lucky stars that things are no worse. At least there are ample signs that after an eternity of misrule England can at last claim to have won over the great majority of the Boers. Another twenty-five years of self-government will, I believe, complete the great work.

Overpowering psychological causes made the Boers great and glorious rebels. Environment and circumstances made them the implacable enemies of England. For in 1806, as the sequel to a war in Europe between France and England, Cape Colony with its entire population was handed over by Holland to the British Crown. Two parties in Holland had taken sides in the war, and one party had inevitably to lose. For the sum of six million pounds (of which they touched not a penny) the people of Cape Colony were transferred to a hostile race; and this act was the beginning of a destiny henceforth decided by the squabbles of political parties six thousand miles away. From now onward what one Colonial Secretary did lasted only until his Government was outvoted, when some new official undid any good that might have been done, and replaced bad by worse.

Now let us examine the material which this vicious party system attempted to govern. The progenitors of the Boers came from Holland, whose people were the most resolute fighters for religious liberty in the world. The Boers in their formation were reinforced by another group of colonists, the French Huguenots,

who were driven from France by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Both sects had all the virtues as well as the vices of Calvinism. Narrow, unswerving devotion to God is seemingly always accompanied by a certain irreverence towards men. I mean that the intensity of ardent theism precludes hero-worship. The Boers grew into what one might call Calvinistic Social Democrats, further restricted by being pastoral. If one goes fully into the history of rebellion it will be found that the supreme rebels have almost invariably been religious ones. Those who went to America in the *Mayflower* were every bit as contentious and ready to rebel against wrong as the Boers. Does intense devotion to God make man less able to believe in man, or does man's lack of faith in man naturally lead him to God?

Anybody who has lived among the Boers must have felt their lack of devotion to great men. The humblest farm labourer will approach the Prime Minister entirely *sans façon*, just as his father visited Paul Kruger. Great names mean nothing. Homage to achievement and success does not exist. Olive Schreiner is no more to the average Boer than an obscure school teacher would be. Patriotic Afrikaners like Kruger and De la Rey are held in esteem more for their resolute deeds in the Boer cause than for their own genius. It was this lack of hero-worship that made the early Boer occupation of Natal a failure. For after the death of Pieter Retief (he had trouble enough to command) the Voortrekkers found it impossible to agree upon a leader and split up. These hateful jealousies were constantly arising while the Boers were trying to crush the Zulu power; and De Wet's book on the last war proves that the same spirit existed twelve years ago. It exists to-day, and it made the recent rebellion possible.

Dissatisfaction with human things may be defined almost as the keystone to the Boer character. To use an Americanism they are prenatally 'kickers.' One of the most striking differences between the Germans and the Dutch of Europe to-day is the reverence for heroes and the awe of established authority in Germany, and the democratic nature of the monarchy and government in Holland. But the Hollanders have lost the narrow theism of the Boers, and are consequently more easily influenced by men. The Boers have paid heavily for their aversion from hero-worship; to give one striking example, the first annexation of the Transvaal by England was directly due to it. Disorder prevailed in the Republic owing to the attacks of a powerful native Chief, Sekukuni; and it was essential, if interference by England was to be avoided, that an expedition should crush the defiant Kafir. All had been arranged, and the success of the campaign was assured, when the burghers began to murmur that their President was an agnostic, or not sufficiently pious to obtain

for them the blessing of God on their enterprise. In the end the Boers tremblingly returned to their homes, the disorder extended, and Sir Theophilus Shepstone in 1877 formally annexed the country to the British Crown. Had President Burgers been Napoleon he could not have moved these stubborn Calvinists, who in the last war held out until they assured themselves that it was God's will they should surrender. In all the deliberations as to whether or not peace should be made the heroes of the war made but a slight impression on the burghers. It was not until the Boers began to feel that God had ordained surrender that they accepted the terms of Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner. Then as ever they resigned themselves to the heavenly decree and dispersed thanking God in prayer.

Naturally such character as this provides many admirable traits. The Dutch have always been a self-reliant race, they are benevolent and hospitable to a degree, as has quite recently been exhibited in Holland to the Belgian refugees. But, as even in the bracing air of the Netherlands many of the people are slow of thought and action, the indolence with which the Boers have so often been charged is hardly surprising. The indigenous races of South Africa are indeed as slothful as any on earth, and after three or four generations the most energetic European stock loses its vigour. A much more serious charge brought against the Boers is that they are disingenuous to the point of dishonesty. I know people who affirm, too, that the Hollanders of to-day are 'tricky in business.' But whatever basic deceit there may or may not be in the Boers it is abundantly certain that the habit of lying was, as Theal says, developed by early mismanagement of the Dutch East India Company. Taxation was imposed largely on the personal assurances of the taxed as to their income; and here the Dutch settlers were taught to prevaricate in the most seductive manner possible. It is an extraordinary thing, but men who compose a State rarely seem able to realise that their interest is bound up with that of the State. Even in England those able to evade income tax are mildly looked upon as financial heroes, for nobody thinks it a very dreadful thing to defraud the Government. I have seen decent, honourable men in South Africa screen boys who cut up straps on the State railways in the belief that nobody was injured, and that after all it was 'good for trade.' My personal experience is that the Boers on the whole discharge scrupulously any obligations which they believe to be just ones.

The English have consistently attacked the Boers for alleged brutality to the natives, this charge being both openly and freely made by missionaries, and inferred by the entirely different methods of handling the subject races which the British Govern-

ment practised. Here, again, the uncompromising Calvinists acted as they thought was required by God. The Hottentots and Kafirs were inferior to the white men, and the only brutality that constituted a policy was in treating the impious, idolatrous savages as unfit to be the equals of the children of God. That was the Boer view. The missionaries, on the other hand, looked upon the natives with a professional eye, and saw millions of potential proselytes. What missionary could see otherwise? There are still in our midst many amiable Protestants who believe firmly in the converting of all Roman Catholics, and Catholics who look longingly upon the millions of Protestants in a similar manner.

Naturally the Boers and the missionaries failed to agree. Both were interested. Both were sectarian. Both were religious. The pity is that the Government, which should have been neutral, took sides. Nobody can deny that the English missionaries, more than any other men, made the name 'Boer' hated and misunderstood in the United Kingdom. From the very beginning of the English occupation of the Cape, however, there was a clash of ideals and policy between the newly imposed Government and the people. The same clash of ideas prevails to-day between the white man who lives comfortably in Europe and can afford to look with tolerance upon the few blacks in his neighbourhood; and the white man who has to live in a country where the blacks are social and mental inferiors. It is no longer any question of Dutch and English: it is a question of European and colonist. But when the English first occupied the Cape the Dutch happened to be the colonists in occupation, and this question of the natives came to be regarded as a quarrel between Dutch and English. To-day one sees clearly how great was the injustice done the Boers. The British Government, having at last realised that the only possible administration for the colonies is self-government, to-day refuses to help its Indian subjects to migrate to British Columbia, Australia, or South Africa. But had the colonists in the early days of ignorant, unsympathetic, or unjust administration by the Home Government refused to admit Indians they would certainly have been treated as rebels.

There is something about living in wild, spacious countries which makes men curiously independent and unready to submit to wrong. When Wilhem Adrian van der Stel began to exploit the Dutch colonists he found his path by no means an easy one. Oppression and dragooning failed to cow the pioneers, and in the end van der Stel was recalled to Holland and disgraced.

Theal says:

There have never been people less willing to submit silently to grievances, real or imaginary, than the Colonists of South Africa.

And again :

The burghers of South Africa, though relishing keenly the pleasure of making money, have at every period of their history shown a firmer attachment to what they hold to be their political rights and liberties. If at times a few men have been found to waver between money and freedom from misrule, the women have never hesitated to reject wealth at the price of submission to wrong.

Despite these obviously good qualities conscious or unconscious wrongs were inflicted by almost every Governor. In the earliest days of the Cape Lord Charles Somerset hanged at Slagter's Nek (Butcher's Neck) six rebels whose insurrection had been quelled by their own burghers. In 1821 English settlers were sent out to the Eastern Province, of which admittedly they made a great success. But seven years later, when English men and women comprised only one eighth of the population, English was made the official language, and had to be used in all Courts of Law. Lord Charles Somerset was indeed a great autocrat, and, among other things, indulged in the suppression of newspapers. So far as this is concerned it was the more Anglicised part of the people who objected, for the Boers to this day have rather a contempt for newspapers. They tolerate those printed in Dutch, but intensely dislike any news outside of the parish-pump order. Market reports (produce not share), church information, hypothecations, births, deaths, and marriages are enough to satisfy most of their literary appetites. As becomes a godly people, too, they dislike theatres, dances, and all modernity or obvious amusement. Their most popular musical instrument is the American organ, which they consider has a proper godly sound. All Sunday is given up to long-drawn-out harmonies (melodies being considered too secular) on this melancholy apparatus. I have known only one troupe of entertainers really successful in the *dorps*, and the members of this company played sacred tunes on church bells. At Senekal, a little town in the Orange Free State, terrible commotion was created a couple of years ago by a schoolmaster who thoughtlessly allowed a few principles of Darwinism to slip. The Boers, shocked beyond measure at the idea that they were descended from apes, withdrew their children from the school, and petitioned for the recall of the offending master. It is considered more or less as marks of godliness to wear a beard and be married. Both the clean-shaven and the unmarried are looked upon with mild suspicion by the pious.

Nevertheless, the good qualities of the Boers greatly outweigh the bad. Their humanity in the great war was unquestioned, their kindness of heart and conjugal fidelity are pro-

verbial; and they are a rare race, among whom social barriers between rich and poor do not exist. Unconsciously (for conscious socialism would be abominable to them) they are true socialists and lovers of their fellow-men. Art makes little appeal to them, but their fidelity to what they once adopt as their own fills one with hope of the future. Too much must not be expected. A people which has struggled for liberty since its birth at the Cape of Good Hope over 250 years ago might reasonably have been expected to resist very much longer than it has even the liberal rule granted by the British Government. One must not forget history in one's judgments and expectations of nations. What Froude said might profitably be quoted now :

Because the Dutch are a deliberate, slow people, not given to enthusiasm for new ideas, they fell into disgrace with us, where they have ever since remained. . . . We had treated them unfairly as well as unwisely.

That the memory of the many unwise, unfair, and often cruel acts of English Governors between 1806 and 1902 could be entirely forgotten in twelve years of liberal self-government by a tenacious, uncompromising race was asking too much. The splendid and active loyalty of the enlightened Boers, however, indicates that the fierce, narrow Calvinism of the Voortrekkers is gradually wearing itself out, and with it the genius for rebellion. Once the natural leaders of the people receive their just recognition as heroes, progress will be swift, for the heroes of the country are full of good thoughts and good counsel.

STEPHEN BLACK.

HOME RAILWAYS DURING THE WAR

THE British Railway Reports for 1914 are of exceptional importance, not only to the stockholders but to the general public as well. Although the conditions in which the railways have been operated prevent comparisons of the details of receipts and expenditure with those of the previous year, the general results in each case throw an interesting light upon the influence of the War, and the interposition of the Government, upon the traffics, profits and dividends. It is disappointing but inevitable that the accounts should be presented without many of the usual statistics. This is the first occasion, since the adoption of the new system of annual instead of half-yearly accounts and of uniformity of abstracts, on which it would have been possible to compare the details of one whole year with another. The abnormal conditions of the last five months of the past year have prevented the presentation of the accounts in the ordinary way, and in any case many of the figures would have been only superficially comparable. During those five months the companies were working under Government control (a warrant having been issued under an Order in Council empowering the President of the Board of Trade to take over the railways), and their ordinary business had to be subordinated or postponed to military exigencies.¹ The expeditious movement of troops and war materials in time of war is of infinitely greater importance than the interests of individuals or even of trade as a whole, and such expeditious movement was only made possible by means of a central organisation and the co-ordination under Government control of the military and railway administrations. Precedence had to be given, and facilities afforded, to trains conveying troops, guns, ammunition, food supplies, army clothing, horses, motor-vans, and everything else required for the War at home or abroad.

¹ In the House of Commons lately Mr. Runciman denied that the Government had assumed control; they had, he said, only drawn the railway managers together round a table and told them to manage the railways. But they had to manage them in a particular way. They were directed to carry out the instructions of the War Office; in other words, Government business was to be paramount, and if that was not exercising control, it is difficult to know what control means.

This precedence is analogous, on a large scale, to the regulation in London and other big cities whereby all ordinary street traffic is held up, or voluntarily gets out of the way, when a fire engine is signalled. The necessity for keeping main lines clear for the transport of soldiers unfortunately involved the shunting of a great number of trucks of coal and provisions on to sidings, where they became congested and thus helped in conjunction with a scarcity of waggons to bring about temporary shortage and higher prices. These are consequences that could not be avoided and had to be endured with patience. The military situation and military necessities were the main things that mattered. *Salus reipublicae suprema lex.*

Since the 5th of August all the principal British railways have been worked according to the regulations of an executive committee of general managers with the President of the Board of Trade as chairman, whose duties are to control and direct the traffic so as to meet the requirements of the War Office and the Admiralty. This Committee has provided the machinery and regulates its work. In time of war a country's railways are of the utmost strategic importance. Most of those Continental countries—namely, the principal States of the German Empire, Belgium, France, and Russia—whose railways are either wholly or partly State-owned, had in existence, when War was declared, organisations for automatically transferring the control from one State department to another. The Prussian system worked like the mechanism of an accurate clock. In Great Britain, where our methods are of the more happy-go-lucky kind, the virtual transfer of direction to a composite Committee, in which the Government had the ruling voice, was so unexpected that at the beginning there was bound to be some confusion. This, however, is only one of the departments in which we found ourselves in the customary state of unpreparedness when faced with the most momentous struggle in our history. The comparative smoothness which has been evolved from the *mêlée* at the outset deserves the grateful recognition of all classes of the community.

The Government acted under the Regulation of the Forces Act (1871), in the terms of which interposition involved a certain liability. They foresaw the disorganisation of the companies' finances that would be caused by the holding up of ordinary traffic, and the injury which it would inflict on the stockholders, and as a matter of elementary justice, as well as of legal obligation, they undertook to recompense stockholders for this loss. The Act provides that full compensation shall be paid to the owners of the railroads for any loss or injury they may have sustained through the Government taking possession, the amount of such compensation to be settled by agreement, or, if necessary,

by arbitration. In September last the Board of Trade issued an official Memorandum on the subject:

His Majesty's Government have agreed with the railway companies concerned that, subject to the undermentioned condition, the compensation to be paid them shall be the sum by which the aggregate net receipts of their railways for the period during which the Government are in possession of them fall short of the aggregate net receipts for the corresponding period of 1913. If, however, the net receipts of the companies for the first half of 1914 were less than the net receipts for the first half of 1913, the sum payable is to be reduced in the same proportion. This sum, together with the net receipts of the railway companies taken over, is to be distributed amongst those companies in proportion to the net receipts of each company during the period with which comparison is made. The compensation to be paid under this arrangement will cover all special services, such as those in connection with military and naval transport rendered to the Government by the railway companies concerned, and it will therefore be unnecessary to make any payments in respect of such transport on the railways taken over.

A statement made by Mr. Curtis Bennett, representing the Great Western Railway Company at an inquiry held at Fishguard in January, has been construed to indicate a rather wider range of responsibility in financial control than the foregoing summary would lead one to imagine. He said that as 'every penny taken on the British railways went into the coffers of the Government,' the Board of Trade and not the companies were liable for any breach of regulations. This statement has been interpreted in one quarter as implying Government ownership, whereas all it means is that the Government having become guarantors have pooled the receipts for the purpose of making such proportionate contributions as are allotable to the different companies. The net receipts of the companies themselves, *plus* the amounts paid by the Government, are divided amongst the companies according to their 1913 profits. If the arrangement of September had been adhered to, the modification caused by any falling-off during the first six months would have been operative; but it was announced two or three weeks ago that, in connexion with certain wages adjustments, the Government surrendered its claim to reduce the aggregate net earnings in the proportion of the first six months. It is understood that this reduction was rather under 3 per cent., and the net profits are now to be fixed on the 1913 basis, less 25 per cent. of the War bonus to be paid to the railwaymen, to which reference will be made later.

The idea that the Government had guaranteed dividends, somewhat widely entertained at one time, had, of course, no foundation in fact. All that they guaranteed was an income out of which dividends could be paid. It was very desirable, as Mr. Cosmo Bonsor (Chairman of the South Eastern and Chatham

Managing Committee) pointed out, that an arrangement with regard to the basis of compensation should be such as to eliminate as far as possible any conflict of interests between individual companies, and also to avoid all questions as to the services to be rendered by the companies and the charges for such services. It was felt that the only satisfactory arrangement was one under which the Government should get the benefit of all traffic receipts and bear the burden of the expenses, handing over a certain net revenue for distribution among the companies. If an arrangement had not been reached the whole question of compensation would have had to go to arbitration, and might have been postponed, to the great detriment of the stockholders, until the War is over. Hence the existing arrangement, which is happily described by Lord Allerton, Chairman of the Great Northern, as 'a universal pool among the controlled companies of the whole of their net traffic receipts.' To a great extent this involved an interchange, virtually amounting to a pooling, of rolling stock as well. Never in the course of their history have the railway companies worked together with such a singleness of endeavour for public ends. The question naturally arises whether this unanimity of effort, which is imperative in war time, could not be brought into operation in the interests of the community, by means of a great scheme of co-ordination and central control, when the War is over.

If the arrangement had not been modified, it would have been impossible to arrive at the Government's liability without reference to the net earnings between January and June, inasmuch as it would have been essential to know in the first place in what relation the net receipts for the first half of 1914 stood to those for the first half of 1913; and in the next place, what were the figures of revenue and expenditure from the 5th of August to the 31st of December. The first factor we practically have, but the second is wanting. As regards the first half of the year, the reaction in the iron trade during the six months from the 1st of January to the 30th of June, and the still more serious inactivity in the cotton trade, had an injurious effect on the Northern goods traffic. For those months most of the heavy railways had decreases in their gross traffic receipts, as published week by week. The Great Western (which had 106,000*l.* to the good) and the Great Northern were fortunate in being exceptions, and the Brighton, the Great Eastern, and the two Metropolitan companies also had increases. The decreases ranged upwards from 1287*l.* for the South Eastern and Chatham Joint Committee, those of the bigger companies being considerable. For example, Lancashire and Yorkshire's

decrease was 95,300*l.*, the North Western's 81,000*l.*, the Great Central's 72,800*l.*, the Midland's 64,000*l.*, the North Eastern's 39,000*l.*, the Hull and Barnsley's 42,262*l.*, the Caledonian's 21,100*l.*, and that of the Furness 14,584*l.* The weekly statements have, however, a knack of under-estimating the gross takes; allowing for this they show that the Government's contribution on account of the five War months would have had to be trimmed in some cases—not in all—in proportion to the decreases in net earnings of the first six months. Roughly, the working expenses of the bigger companies for the first half of the year average about 65 per cent., and upon this basis it might have been possible to get some sort of idea—conjectural, it must be confessed—of the net amounts to be considered in adjusting the Government's contribution. Any comparison of the traffic receipts is enormously affected by the stipulation that, during five of the twelve months with which the reports deal, no Government payments were made for transport on the railways taken over. Fortunately, in the interests of simplification, these complications need not now trouble us. It may, however, be pointed out that the companies which suffered most in the first half of 1914 will benefit by the new method of averaging the net receipts. The North Western, the Great Northern, the Great Central, and the Lancashire and Yorkshire, all of which were affected by the South Yorkshire coal strike, and some of the southern lines, such as the South Eastern and Chatham and the Brighton, should have better individual results; but these benefits, it must be remembered, will be spread over the remaining companies as a consequence of the pooling arrangement.

The dividend announcements have put to rest a good deal of speculation about the financial effect of the War conditions on the stockholders' interests. With the exceptions of the Lancashire and Yorkshire and Great Eastern, which maintain their 1913 dividends, all the companies make smaller distributions. Generally speaking the reductions, as already indicated, have an evident relation to the drop in gross receipts during the first six months. The Lancashire and Yorkshire, however, is a striking exception. It had the heaviest decline for the period referred to, but over the whole year what was lost in traffics was more than made good by reductions in cost of working, so that the net receipts for 1914 were actually better than those for 1913. Some boards of directors appear to have taken a more conservative view than others, and the number of instances in which the reserves and undivided profits have been increased testify to the anxieties involved in reaching a decision, combining equitable treatment for the stockholders with a prudential regard for the future. In

the following table the changes in dividend are brought together, and to make the comparison more complete the amounts put to reserve and carried forward are also given :

	Dividends		Put to Reserves		Carried forward	
	1913	1914	1913	1914	1913	1914
	%	%	£	£	£	£
North Western Ord. ...	7	6	100,000	100,000	101,828	109,002
Midland Def. Ord. ...	4½	4	200,000	200,000	141,329	131,442
Great Western Ord. ...	8½	6	200,000	200,000	128,780	115,000
North Eastern Consols ...	7	6½	300,000	150,000	135,000	189,774
Lancashire and Yorkshire Ord. ...	4½	4½	20,000	20,000	40,780	45,998
Great Northern Def. ...	3	2½	55,000	80,000	130,797	101,008
Great Eastern Ord. ...	2½	2½	10,000	10,000	111,148	108,909
Great Central 1894 Pref. ...	2	nil	—	—	8700	7800
South Western Ord. ...	5½	5½	—	20,000	42,599	52,823
Do. Def. ...	1½	1½	—	—	—	—
North British Def. Ord. ...	1½	1	40,000	20,000	48,804	34,000
Caledonian Ord. ...	3½	3½	—	—	22,081	—
Do. Def. ...	—	—	—	—	—	—
Brighton Ord. ...	5½	4½	—	—	33,382	39,894
Do. Def. ...	4½	3½	—	—	—	—
Glasgow and South Western Ord. ...	5½	4½	20,000 ^a	—	11,022	21,937
Do. Do. Def. Ord. ...	2½	2	—	—	—	—
South Eastern Ord. ...	4	3½	—	—	4189	7817
Do. Def. Ord. ...	2	1	—	—	—	—
Chatham 2nd Pref. ...	1½	nil	—	—	85,935	73,093
North Staffordshire ...	5	4½	8000	8000	10,842	12,458
Taff Vale ...	4	3½	—	—	9174	14,021
Barry Ord. ...	10	9½	—	—	4288	3333
Do. Def. ...	6	5½	—	—	—	—
Hull and Barnsley ...	3½	3	5000	nil (b)	16,244	11,507
Metropolitan ...	1½	1	—	12,500	8258	11,500
District 2nd Pref. ...	2½	2	20,000	20,000	12,658	13,937
Furness ...	2½	1	—	—	1698	1804

(a) Taken from reserve.

(b) The accounts for 1913 showed reserves, including the 5000*l.* shown above, of 15,000*l.*, but in the balance sheet for 1914 General Reserve Fund figures at 74,113*l.*, and nothing is said as to where the difference of 59,113*l.* comes from.

The most disappointing result is that of the North Western, which is 1 per cent. lower on a capital of 42,890,000*l.*; North Eastern is ½ per cent. lower on a capital of 32,155,984*l.*, Brighton Ordinary is ½ per cent. and the Deferred 1 per cent. lower, South Eastern Ordinary ½ per cent. and the Deferred 1 per cent. lower, Chatham Second Preference 1½ per cent. lower, North Staffordshire ⅝ per cent. lower, Barry Ordinary ½ per cent. lower, Hull and Barnsley 1½ per cent. lower, Metropolitan District ½ per cent. lower, and Furness 1½ per cent. lower. In the remaining cases, except those of the Lancashire and Yorkshire and Great Eastern, which remain as before, the declines are smaller, but the ½ per cent. reduction on Midland Ordinary amounts to no less than 96,708*l.*, and that on the Great Western to 61,476*l.* The Lancashire and Yorkshire not only pays the same dividend as for 1913 and puts the same amount to reserve, but it carries forward about 6000*l.* more. The interesting point about this declaration is that the reduction of gross receipts in the first half, which lowered the interim dividend to 3 per cent., has been made good in the second half, the reduction in expenses being an important factor in the recovery. The Great Northern Deferred

dividend is $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. less than the year before, and some 30,000*l.* less is carried forward. Hull and Barnsley's reduction from $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to 2 per cent. was to some extent foreshadowed by the traffic decrease of over 42,000*l.* for the first six months (caused chiefly by strikes of Yorkshire miners and pit-prop workers in Hull) and also by the drop in the interim dividend from 3 per cent. to $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The balance carried forward is about 5000*l.* less, and nothing is added to reserve against 5000*l.* for 1913. The net receipts of the Joint Committee of the South Eastern and Chatham Companies were 1,775,240*l.*, as compared with 1,821,721*l.*, and most of the loss occurred during the War period. As the South Eastern gets 59 per cent. and the Chatham 41 per cent. of the net pooled receipts, the amounts credited to them were 1,047,392*l.* and 727,848*l.* respectively; Chatham Second Preference, which got 13,072*l.* for 1913, gets nothing for 1914, and the balance forward is reduced by about 12,000*l.*; while the South Eastern distribution drops to the extent of 50,246*l.* The Brighton dividend, $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. less on the Ordinary and 1 per cent. less on Brighton 'A,' was considered disappointing.

Apart from the interest felt in the dividend question, there is the other always instructive subject of the detailed comparison of the year under review with its predecessor, and this, notwithstanding the dissimilarity of the conditions and the lack of many important statistics, will be found to furnish some suggestive information. It is intended in this examination to deal with the principal companies in England and Scotland, companies representing in the aggregate a capital of more than 1,100,000,000*l.*, and paying in stock dividends, over and above debenture interest and other fixed charges, on the average considerably more than 30,000,000*l.* a year. They represent, taken together, about six-sevenths of the entire railway business of the United Kingdom, and are, therefore, in ordinary circumstances, as faithful an index of trade conditions as can be got, and a sort of microcosm of much that pertains to our economic well-being. Their accounts reflect better than any other set of accounts the ups and downs of national prosperity, and a comparison of the figures for 1913 and 1914 shows at a glance the measure of the War's disturbing activities. It will be seen that such local undertakings as the Taff Vale, the Furness, the Barry, and the North Staffordshire companies are included. They serve districts intimately connected with important industrial interests and are, therefore, equally as good indices, in proportion to the volume of their business, as some of the bigger lines. The Metropolitan and the Metropolitan District Companies are also brought in, for although

they are purely London, or Greater London, undertakings, and although they are worked by electricity instead of by steam, they help all the same to throw a light on the passenger traffic. The Metropolitan, it should be observed, was one of the companies not affected by inclusion in the Government control.

It is as well, perhaps, to start with an idea of the relative capital importance of these companies in Debentures, and in Guaranteed, Preference, and Ordinary stocks on which dividends are payable. In the case of some of the Preference and Ordinary stocks the amounts issued do not coincide with those on which dividends are payable, because the companies concerned have from time to time carried out stock conversions that have involved nominal additions to, or deductions from, the issued amounts. For instance, the Ordinary stock of the Midland Company, as issued, amounts to 43,530,656*l.*, whereas this has since been divided into Preferred and Deferred Ordinary, and dividends are payable upon a nominal 78,203,664*l.* Another example is that of the Great Northern Company, whose issued Ordinary stock amounts to 17,863,067*l.*, whereas, as the result of conversion, dividend is payable upon 21,883,530*l.*

	Debentures and Loans	Guaranteed and Preference Stocks	Ordinary Stock
	£	£	£
North Western	39,022,343	44,452,736	42,890,307
Midland	43,593,170	82,079,505	78,203,664
Great Western	25,564,710	37,491,539*	37,082,210
North Eastern	24,204,775	24,780,198	32,155,984
Lancashire and Yorkshire	20,285,848	31,698,502	18,821,470
Great Northern	15,241,538	23,195,260	21,883,530
Great Eastern	18,353,116	23,826,335	15,362,886
Great Central	23,129,978	20,567,488	10,659,020
North British	17,885,456	27,575,902	21,579,287
South Western	15,407,489	20,496,206	22,346,324
Caledonian	11,824,686	23,794,591	21,250,726
Metropolitan	6,671,155	6,042,335	6,465,268
District	3,580,411	6,874,413	3,325,000
Chatham	10,797,946	6,001,145	11,258,282
South Eastern	8,667,511	14,070,686	10,049,730
Brighton	7,175,841	12,077,732	10,447,085
Glasgow and South Western	4,527,725	7,751,540	6,551,250
North Staffordshire	2,845,990	4,487,483	3,594,650
Taff Vale	1,526,258	3,286,623	6,192,500
Hull and Barnsley	5,017,057	1,375,000	3,300,000
Furness	2,396,123	3,029,875	2,642,000
Barry	1,220,031	1,863,051	2,001,240

* Including Rent Charge Stock.

The accounts formerly numbered 10 to 17 inclusive and abstracts A to J inclusive are omitted this year under authority of the Board of Trade. This policy withholds from the stockholders a good deal of information which might very well have been given. There is, for instance, nothing in the new conditions which makes it necessary to suppress particulars of the amounts paid for local rates, Government duty, national insurance, and

passengers' compensation. Nor is there any apparent reason why the number of civilian passengers carried, as well as their classification, should not have been stated. Admitting that details of passenger and goods traffic would have been of but little use for the purposes of comparison, they would still have had considerable interest and a positive value. The lack of abstracts dealing with the maintenance of the permanent way, the rolling stock, the locomotive running expenses, and the traffic expenses, also of the accounts of the subsidiary enterprises of steamboats, omnibuses, docks, canals, and hotels, rob the reports of a good deal of their statistical interest. No complaint, however, would be reasonable on this score, since the same derangement which has affected the train service has equally affected the docks, harbours, etc.

The greater part of the receipts are, naturally, derived from working the railways, but the subsidiary enterprises contribute, on the whole, a substantial revenue. They are included in the following table of the gross receipts and expenses of, in each case, 'the whole undertaking,' and it must be borne in mind that the 1914 column of gross receipts includes the estimated Government contributions on the September basis :

	Gross Receipts		Increase or Decrease	Expenses		Increase or Decrease
	1913	1914		1913	1914	
	£	£	£	£	£	£
North Western	17,219,080	17,328,711	+ 109,651	11,332,184	11,745,141	+ 422,977
Midland	15,962,757	15,859,855	- 103,102	10,174,037	10,188,551	+ 14,514
Great Western	18,020,995	18,200,032	+ 179,037	10,406,109	10,606,962	+ 200,853
North Eastern	12,235,367	12,077,414	- 157,953	7,919,279	8,008,277	+ 88,998
Lancashire and Yorkshire	7,236,982	7,137,780	- 99,202	4,804,757	4,694,696	- 110,061
Great Northern	6,949,467	6,972,605	+ 23,138	4,715,608	4,772,799	+ 57,191
Great Central	6,549,053	6,304,239	- 244,814	4,467,444	4,267,965	- 199,479
South Western	6,101,262	6,125,315	+ 24,053	4,054,577	4,060,477	+ 5,900
North British... ..	5,676,131	5,565,755	- 110,376	3,258,291	3,289,853	+ 31,562
Caledonian	5,467,063	5,430,310	- 36,743	3,293,123	3,270,921	- 22,202
Brighton	3,722,474	3,828,382	+ 105,908	2,332,992	2,471,039	+ 138,047
Glasgow and South Western	2,171,985	2,198,468	+ 26,483	1,391,406	1,421,044	+ 29,636
South Eastern and Chatham	5,276,679	5,353,951	+ 77,272	3,299,561	3,406,378	+ 116,817
North Staffordshire	1,145,750	1,120,208	- 25,542	719,542	711,609	- 7,933
Taff Vale	1,095,424	1,088,388	- 7,056	652,190	635,017	- 17,173
Barry	868,404	866,406	- 1,999	508,446	505,248	- 3,198
Hull and Barnsley	813,334	756,253	- 57,081	483,310	483,875	+ 565
Metropolitan	914,307	969,982	+ 55,675	522,910	553,199	+ 30,289
District	789,662	817,456	+ 27,794	383,132	413,970	+ 30,838
Furness	661,887	650,207	- 11,680	397,431	420,309	+ 22,878

The next table shows the net receipts for both years, also the total net income. The net income, it should be explained, is made up of the net receipts from working the whole undertaking, together with rents, dividends received, transfer fees, and the amounts brought forward. It forms the basis of the appropriations, and is the fund from which, after payment of interest, rentals, Debenture interest, and amounts put to reserve, the

Guaranteed and Preference dividends and Ordinary dividends, if any, are payable.

	Net Receipts		Increase or Decrease	Total Net Income		Increase or Decrease
	1913	1914		1913	1914	
	£	£	£	£	£	£
North Western	5,896,898	5,583,570	- 313,328	6,334,595	6,001,787	- 332,808
Midland	5,788,720	5,671,104	- 117,616	6,362,738	6,238,924	- 123,814
Great Western	5,614,886	5,593,070	- 21,816	5,929,035	5,873,509	- 55,526
North Eastern	4,316,088	4,069,137	- 246,951	4,454,968	4,212,741	- 242,227
Lancashire and Yorkshire ...	2,432,225	2,443,084	+ 10,859	2,602,111	2,621,325	+ 19,214
Great Northern	2,233,959	2,199,806	- 34,053	2,463,016	2,424,567	- 38,449
Great Eastern	2,046,165	2,062,489	+ 16,324	2,173,330	2,193,034	+ 19,704
Great Central	2,031,810	2,036,273	+ 4,463	2,218,221	2,174,311	- 43,910
North British	2,317,940	2,276,903	- 41,037	2,427,282	2,367,776	- 59,506
Caledonian	2,173,330	2,159,489	- 13,841	2,334,041	2,315,642	- 18,399
South Western	2,046,685	2,044,838	- 1,847	2,190,502	2,196,454	+ 5,952
South Eastern and Chatham	1,967,118	1,947,672	- 19,446	—	—	—
Chatham	—	—	—	1,416,960	1,384,966	- 31,994
Brighton	—	—	—	816,183	797,022	- 19,171
Glasgow and South Western	1,389,481	1,357,343	- 32,138	1,534,911	1,487,492	- 47,419
North Staffordshire	780,577	777,424	- 3,153	825,568	823,392	- 2,176
Taff Vale	426,206	406,599	- 19,607	441,288	419,992	- 21,296
Hull and Barnsley	443,234	435,350	- 7,884	461,581	443,487	- 18,094
Barry	330,023	292,378	- 37,645	332,769	295,227	- 37,542
Furness	359,968	351,158	- 8,810	370,488	358,026	- 12,462
Metropolitan	264,437	229,897	- 34,540	279,433	244,045	- 35,388
District	391,397	416,783	+ 25,386	596,838	596,286	- 552
	406,530	403,486	- 3,044	523,073	519,221	- 3,852

The Lancashire and Yorkshire, the South Western, the Great Eastern, and the Metropolitan are the only companies that have a better net income than for 1913. The heaviest decline is in the case of the North Eastern, whose big decrease in gross receipts was accompanied by an increase in expenditure. It is rather curious that whereas the Lancashire and Yorkshire with a gross traffic decrease of 100,000*l.* saved 110,000*l.* in working expenses, the North Eastern with a traffic decrease of 158,000*l.* increased its expenditure by 89,000*l.*

The absence of the usual abstracts makes it impossible to show what the expenditure has been on the two most important items of coal and wages. A year ago several of the reports laid stress upon the increased coal bills arising out of the miners' wages settlement, also upon the advance in the companies' own wages list caused by the concessions made during the great railway strike. All that can be said about the wages question is that the numbers employed have probably been reduced in the second half of the year by the absence of many of the men with the Colours. So far as can be calculated from the authentic figures supplied by some of the leading companies, nearly 70,000 men have gone from the railways of the United Kingdom to one branch or another of the Services. The London and North Western heads the list with 11,449; the Great Western comes next with 9462; the Midland has supplied 7530 (to the 14th of November); North Eastern, 6000; Lancashire and Yorkshire, 4016; Great Northern, 3050; Great Eastern, 3572; Great

Central, 3333 ; South Western, 2100 ; North British, 2000 ; South Eastern and Chatham, 2000 ; Caledonian, 1870 ; Brighton, 1895 ; and so on.

Even if the detailed figures of wages had been given in the abstracts, they would only have been useful for comparison with those of the previous year and no sufficient criterion of the expenses of the current year. A rise of wages to last as long as the War lasts has already been announced. With the cost of living greatly increased and the balancing of the domestic budget becoming more and more difficult, there was nothing at all surprising in the agitation of the railway employees for a higher scale of wages. After several conferences between their representatives and the managers' committee with the concurrence of the Government, a compromise between the offer of the companies and the 5*s.* asked for by the men was reached, it being agreed that a War allowance or bonus of 3*s.* per week for those receiving less than 30*s.*, and 2*s.* per week for those receiving 30*s.* or more should be paid for the period of the War. This will add somewhat about 4,000,000*l.* *per annum* to the wages bill, one fourth of which will fall upon the companies, the remaining three fourths being borne by the Government ; and in consideration of this arrangement the Government have modified their claim under the September agreement, as already explained earlier in this article. No reasonable person will grudge the railwaymen this concession. Apart from the extra cost of living, which has necessitated the fixing of new standards, they have worked hard during the critical time and have won the hearty praise of Lord Kitchener. It is not too much to say that the country is greatly indebted to them for their public-spirited devotion to duty, at the cost of the great strain on their physical endurance, by which alone the punctual execution of our military preparations was made possible. Trade Union regulations as to the hours of work and overtime were suspended without protest. The demand for an advance, therefore, was not a case of holding a pistol at the head of the companies at a time of stress and difficulty ; it was the legitimate outcome of a unique situation and called for consideration in a large and equitable spirit. Many other classes of labour have benefited pecuniarily by the War, but the railwaymen, although they were called upon to make these exceptional exertions, had to be satisfied during several months with the wages of normal times, notwithstanding the abnormal demand on their resources caused by the much higher cost of living. An inevitable effect of an increase in the wages bill, although the companies have to pay only a part of it, will be a corresponding increase in the expenditure for 1915 ; but the Government's acceptance of most of the liability may simplify the situation. It amounts, at any rate, to a

virtual admission of the national character of the railways in war time, and of the exceptional claims of the employees, and in these respects as well as in that of relieving the stockholders to some extent of the additional cost, it has a significance that cannot be overlooked.

It will now be interesting to see what the differences in dividends mean in actual money to the stockholders. Unfortunately, the aggregate is considerable; unfortunately, because just when the tax-gatherer is most urgent the means of satisfying him are undergoing a severe shrinkage. In the following table the Guaranteed and Preference dividends are distinguished from those on Ordinary capital. It will be noticed that, even in the case of one or two companies which have made no change in their distribution, there is a difference in the amounts appropriated. This is due to the issue of small amounts of stock during the year. Capital expenditure is continually going on, and where the capital authorised is in excess of that created additions to the sums that rank must be expected.

Dividends

	Guaranteed and Preference		Ordinary		Capital Expenditure in 1914
	1913	1914	1913	1914	
	£	£	£	£	£
London and North Western ...	1,718,961	1,777,948	3,002,307	2,573,454	1,233,251
Midland ...	2,051,950	2,051,984	2,636,183	2,539,485	532,909
Great Western ...	1,494,077	1,494,077	2,294,451	2,222,975	986,945
North Eastern ...	991,048	991,183	2,242,142	2,087,030	797,882
Lancashire and Yorkshire ...	1,019,267	1,028,198	846,968	846,968	469,062
Great Northern ...	892,910	892,910	788,838	781,509	438,315
Great Eastern ...	773,607	773,607	384,072	384,072	152,711
Great Central ...	866,078	804,078	—	—	386,109
London and South Western ...	738,528	752,110	851,199	816,892	398,155
North British ...	1,078,830	1,078,827	437,380	407,381	344,509
Caledonian ...	772,883	772,883	646,311	623,229	104,393
South Eastern ...	533,939	542,070	401,869	351,723	318,694
Chatham ...	315,803	308,731	—	—	
Brighton ...	603,873	603,887	548,472	496,236	141,836
North Staffordshire ...	158,024	158,024	179,738	157,266	30,164
Taff Vale ...	124,108	126,719	207,700	194,719	66,323
Hull and Barnsley ...	51,250	51,250	115,500	66,000	464,896
Barry ...	81,310	81,310	200,124	180,118	89,968
Glasgow and South Western ...	301,962	301,962	314,052	274,896	83,222
Furness ...	115,195	121,195	66,050	28,490	138,822
Metropolitan ...	284,107	284,107	105,034	80,816	—
District ...	161,680	154,330	—	—	—

In round figures there will be distributed by the companies included above about 1,180,000*l.* less for 1914 than for 1913. If the differences on the other lines be taken into the reckoning, the full loss will nearly approach the sum of a million and a quarter. Although this, spread over the whole body of stockholders, does not show a formidable sum per head, it is of sufficient magnitude, taken in conjunction with the drop in other investment dividends, to make an appreciable difference in the spending power of the investor. The State, furthermore, will be sufferers from the smaller amount on which income tax is payable.

The figures of capital expenditure for the year are included

in the same table. No matter what the conditions are, the policy of expansion goes on, and the capital expenditure is ever on the increase. Whether this is an altogether wise policy, when the whole future of the railways is obscure, is a question for stockholders themselves to answer. As a general rule they take little interest in the authorisation and creation of new capital, and the wholesome check of domestic criticism is too often lacking. A certain amount of new capital expenditure is, of course, unavoidable. Not only have works to be renewed from time to time, but new districts have to be opened up and new custom secured. But a careful examination of the dividend results of much of this continuous outlay—an examination for which there is no room in this article—would certainly establish the fact that it is often unproductive. The stockholders' view, however, is not the only one. Railways to some extent are monopolies, and the privilege of a statutory monopoly involves obligations to the public as well as to the stockholders. In the long run, perhaps, these are identical; although it is sometimes a very long run. Modernisation and the employment of new and improved methods are desirable and frequently necessary for the convenience and rapid transport of the public, and often show excellent returns. An expenditure which promptly develops traffic is beneficial to everybody. This will doubtless be found to be the case with those companies which are supplementing steam by electricity. Railway electrification is a form of capital expenditure that promises immediate results, and at which, therefore, no stockholder can reasonably cavil. Although checked for a time by the War it is nevertheless making progress. A serious set-back was exceptionally given to the London and Brighton suburban enterprise in this direction on account of the Berlin contractors, whom they had employed for their additional sections, being unable to deliver the materials, and the work had to be hung up until new arrangements could be come to. It is a little singular that no reference is made to the subject in the Company's report. In October the London and South Western had no difficulty in raising 1,000,000*l.* of new capital for the electrification of part of its system. This has made steady progress, the main power-house and the sub-power stations being practically completed, and the machinery for working them in course of construction. The first section to be electrified is that from Waterloo to Kingston, for which the laying of the high-tension cables is proceeding satisfactorily. The Central London extension to Ealing is in progress, but the work has not advanced as rapidly as was hoped and the opening will be delayed. The Midland has obtained powers for new lines on the Tilbury and Southend section in connexion with its electrification scheme from Fenchurch Street to Shoe-

buryness. The North Western is proceeding with the electrification of important parts of the outlying London districts. All this seed will no doubt prove fruitful. It is sown in fertile ground where every stimulus to germination already exists. The expenditure of some of the big companies on insignificant branch lines to unheard-of villages and scattered populations is not so easily to be defended.

The efforts that are being made in some quarters to build upon the tentative Government control—if Mr. Runciman will pardon the word—a superstructure favourable to ultimate State ownership cannot be said to have any sufficient warrant. Without denying that the facts set forth in the earlier part of this article have a bearing upon such an issue, that bearing may easily be exaggerated. Many serious considerations must arise, and many initial difficulties be cleared away, before a State purchase of the whole vast and costly railway system of the country can be seriously contemplated. So far, the most that recent experience has shown is the ability of the Government to give due preference to the paramount needs of the situation and to deal judiciously with the labour side of the problem. It is difficult to see how State purchase is brought any nearer by this experience. The more vital questions of the permanent relations of the State as employer, of the creation of a huge new national investment, and of the success or otherwise of other State-managed commercial undertakings, are barely touched by temporary measures contrived for a particular end. If State ownership be ever thought practicable and desirable, there is an Act already in existence which lays down the terms of purchase on which the railways would have to be acquired. These terms are based on the average net receipts of the three preceding years, capitalised at so many years' purchase, and even if there were no doubts concerning the interpretation of some difficult points, the application of the principle would mean an investment of public money on such a scale that the market value of the existing Funds could not fail to be gravely prejudiced by the new rivalry. With a great war on our hands and the prosperity of the country likely to experience a protracted set-back, a proposal that the State should buy up the railways, whatever might be its abstract merits, would be, to say the least of it, inopportune. Some day or other public opinion may demand the nationalisation of the railways; for the present, however, the subject has only an academic interest, and the various deductions that have been drawn from the Government's exceptional action with a specific object are, for any practical purpose, premature.

H. J. JENNINGS.

THE GREEK EASTER AT JERUSALEM

IN the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem there is a spot which guides point out as the centre of the world, and which the Russian pilgrims, and probably a good many others too, believe implicitly to be the exact spot. The first time you are told this you are inclined to smile at the simple but audacious statement; each successive visit to the church shows you the curious truth of it. For Jerusalem is not only the capital of Christendom, she is the centre of the religious world. To her go up year by year all the nations of the earth, no matter by what creed or name they call themselves—Christian, Moslem, and Jew, all turn in hither as to a common home; and so it is that within her narrow limits are found all the elements of that unity which must one day transfigure the city that was built to be at unity within herself.

The most beautiful place in the city, and by far the most reverently kept, is the Mosque of Omar, the Dome of the Rock; but for Christians of every description the Church of the Holy Sepulchre remains the centre of interest. Though we may not believe in its authenticity (and there are many of us who cannot bear to associate such an event with all the unseemly strife and bitterness that rage around it), yet is it hallowed by the tradition of centuries, and even more by the devotion, the belief, the love, and the self-sacrifice, of countless thousands of worshippers. Almost every Christian Communion has its chapel, shrine, or holding within the compass of this wonderful church. We of England have laid a worthy offering at its door, where lies buried Sir Philip d'Aubigny, one of those invincible men who procured for us, and signed, the Great Charter of English liberty: 'To no man will we sell, or deny, or delay, right or justice.' Of your gratitude pray for the soul of Philip d'Aubigny.

The interest of the Greek Easter centres in three great ceremonies of the Holy Week: the Washing of the Feet on Thursday, the Holy Fire on Saturday at noon, and the Easter Mass at midnight. Easter comes at the end of a long and very severe fast of forty days, during which oil, milk, butter, and eggs are forbidden. The pilgrims keep it rigorously, also many of the

poor; and no doubt the physical unbracing that must follow on such abstention from nourishing foods is a big factor in the wild and uncontrollable excitement displayed at these ceremonies. The upper classes, and those whose work taxes the brain and mental powers, observe the first and last weeks of Lent.

The Washing of the Feet takes place on Maundy Thursday at eight A.M., in the courtyard of the Holy Sepulchre. It is supremely interesting as a lingering survival of the miracle play. We were in our places by seven o'clock, in a high window of the Greek Convent, directly overlooking the stand where the feet-washing would take place. The Patriarch was in the church, we were told, at a service which had begun at five; he would fast until it was all ended. A light drizzle was falling, and the air was clear and keen. Already the crowds were rolling together, in a way that was hardly perceptible except by the gathering hum of voices, but owing to the War¹ there were barely half as many pilgrims this year as there are as a rule. Lemonade vendors, and sellers of cakes and sweets, did good business in a crowd that had been on the go since dawn, and had no immediate prospect of returning home. Every window, balcony, roof, and ledge rapidly filled up; babies (some crying, others dazed beyond the relief of tears) were everywhere; pilgrims, excited and emotional, but always devout, made a solid wall of humanity behind the double line of soldiers; photographers were perched precariously in boxes hanging by cords from balconies, adventuring their lives in the pursuit of duty. On the south side of the courtyard, facing the raised stand, was a small balcony, and near it, overhead, a young olive-tree was suspended by cords from an upper window; this was to represent the Tree of the Agony in Gethsemane. The crowd became so dense as time wore on that it could only move in a mass, swaying like a cornfield in the wind; the lines of soldiers kept a clear space round the stand.

And here I may make a brief digression to deny emphatically a charge that is often brought against the Turkish soldiers—that they strike and otherwise ill-treat the crowds at these services. Having grown up in Jerusalem, and having been present at every kind of service, ceremony, and gathering, I can only say that I have never seen a soldier ill-treating anyone in any way on any of these occasions, even when excited 'worshippers' have used fists upon them with more zeal and effect than piety; and I have seen many little acts of consideration, and a uniform good-temper and patience. For instance, at this very service, two little children, who were in danger of being crushed, or at least badly hustled and frightened, were lifted shoulder-high by

¹ The writer is, of course, referring to the Balkan War.

soldiers out of harm's way; an officer held up a little Christian boy so that he might get a good view of the Patriarch; and another officer, seeing the soldiers push back a vociferating old pilgrim-woman, interfered on her behalf, and himself showed her to the place for which she held a ticket.

Soon after eight, the great bells of the Holy Sepulchre clanging out announced the Patriarch's approach, and while their wild clamour filled the air, the procession emerged from the gloom of the church into the bright sunshine in the courtyard. First the Archimandrites, two and two, splendid in robes of red and gold brocade, carrying tapers, and chanting; then, alone, the double snake-headed staff in his hand, came the Patriarch. He was in striking contrast to the procession of which he was the last; they were all in such vivid colours, chanting so lustily as they went; he was alone, clad all in gleaming white brocade and silver, with flowing hair and beard of white, while the sun's rays turned to points of fire the diamond settings of the icons and cross upon his breast, and the jewels in his crown. Full of dignity, silent amid much sound, yet pathetic, too, in the weariness that could not be hidden, the white figure paced slowly through the crowds and ascended the platform. The twelve Archimandrites took their places on cushioned seats; and now the Patriarch's outer robe of white, his jewels, and crown were removed, and he was seen in a plain, straight garment of shell-pink satin, delicately outlined in gold. A large rough towel was girded round his waist, another slung over his shoulder, and a handsome ewer and basin of embossed silver and gold were brought forward. All this time an old priest in the little balcony opposite was reading out the story of the first Holy Thursday and the last addresses of our Lord to His disciples, in a very lusty sing-song voice, without any apparent pause for breath. The Archimandrites, each of whom, of course, represented an Apostle, bared one foot, which the Patriarch, kneeling down, washed, dried, and kissed, his hand being kissed as he rose by each in turn. When it came to the turn of St. Peter (whose part is taken by the Russian Archimandrite), the Gospel scene was enacted literally, and this being ended, the Patriarch resumed his robes and crown. He then descended into the crowd, where a small square platform placed under the hanging olive-tree represented Gethsemane. Three of the Archimandrites grouped themselves in attitudes of sleep upon the steps of the big stand. Here again the whole scene of the Gospel story was portrayed; and watching the earnest faces of the Russian pilgrims, as they bowed and crossed themselves and followed every movement with rapt and devotional interest, you could only feel that to their simple and uncultivated intelligences these scenes

from Scripture made real the Agony and Passion of the Saviour. There is a stage in every life, whether of nations, Churches, or individuals, when men must be taught by means of pictures; the fault is not in those who find happiness and good in such things, but in the grown minds which refuse to let the flock be taught. The service ended with this, and the procession reformed, returning to the Patriarchate. As he passed along, the Patriarch dipped a bunch of flowers in the water that had been used for the washing of the feet, and sprinkled the crowds. The pilgrims liked it very much, the troops evinced less pleasure—judging from the faces of both. A double line of soldiers formed up immediately behind the Patriarch, the crowds broke order and surged after them, and so, swaying to and fro, some following the gleaming processional cross, others scattering to their homes, the throng melted away out of the courtyard. One great ceremony of the Holy Week was over.

The chief event of the week, however, is the Holy Fire, which takes place on Easter Eve at noon. Places had been reserved for us in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and we had to be in them by ten o'clock. We were in a kind of balcony in what is known as the Greek Cathedral, exactly opposite the Sepulchre. Already the cathedral was full of Russian pilgrims, while the rotunda was rapidly filling up with noisy, excited people, pilgrims and others belonging to all the Eastern Churches. On either side of the Sepulchre are two large holes, through which the fire, when kindled, is thrust out; one hole belongs to the Armenians and one to the Greeks, and any intruder of another creed found near either hole would have short shrift. Every place was crowded—the galleries in the dome, the balconies (of which each foreign Consul has one, like a box at the theatre), ledges, corners, and recesses, all showed spectators clustered thick together; and in the deep archways of the rotunda small wooden platforms had been nailed up, accommodating so many persons at a good price. Many of these, with sleeping rugs and carpets, babies, food, and even umbrellas, were sleeping here for the three nights of Thursday, Friday and Saturday, and numbers of the Russian pilgrims, too, were rolled up doglike on the floor of the church. It was a wonderfully interesting crowd, alive with emotion, excitement, and colour; men dancing on each other's shoulders, clapping, and shouting catches from one to the other, until the whole church rang again:

The Fire has shone, and we have feasted:
We have visited the Sepulchre of our Lord.
Our Lord is Jesus Christ.
Christ came to us,
And with His Blood He bought us.

We are rejoicing to-day,
And the Jews are sad!
O Jews! O Jews!
Your feast is the feast of monkeys,
Our feast is the feast of Christ!
There is no religion but the religion of Christ! **Hurrah!**

And :

O Virgin! peace be to thee!
We have visited the Sepulchre and the Church.
Respond, O ye Brethren!
Let not our enemies rejoice!

O St. George! we have prayed at the Sepulchre!
We are Christians, and the candles are carried in our hands!

While the pilgrims were praying
The Sepulchre was opened, and the Holy Fire came forth!

There were also cries of ' Long life to our lord ' (the Patriarch) ; and so it went on, thrown from voice to voice, until the frenzy of excitement spread like fire among stubble. Here and there water-sellers threaded their way in and out, and the soldiers good-humouredly pushed the crowd back within some bounds. A wonderful crowd it was, such as you would see nowhere else in the world probably—only it was hard to remember that you were in church! But to turn your head for one moment was to receive a totally different impression. Just behind, in the Greek Cathedral, the Russian pilgrims were still silently gathering. It was all intensely real to them; there was no shouting here, no pushing, no derisive songs and snatches, but such earnest, watchful eyes, such rapt faces, lips moving in silent prayer, frequent bowing and crossing, and here and there, perhaps, a still figure fallen prone upon the floor in worship. Nothing could have been more arresting than the contrast to us in that balcony; in front the seething, noisy crowd deliberately working up its emotions to a fever pitch; and behind, that dim, silent cathedral full of prayerful watchers.

Shortly before twelve the door of the Sepulchre was closed and sealed by a Greek, an Armenian, and a Syrian priest, and one of the Moslem guardians of the church. A Franciscan monk was also there, to show by his presence that the Latins, too, have rights in the Sepulchre of Christ. The sense of expectation grew in everyone.

The sudden outburst of the great bells overhead at twelve was the climax to the seething excitement of the crowd. Even to a Western imagination those deep throbbing notes, so wild and harsh, so persistent and compelling, are stimulating and suggestive in an extraordinary degree; to such a crowd as this, whose emotions were already strung up to the highest pitch, it was the

last straw. Back in the dim cathedral the golden doors of the Ikonostasis were thrown open, and a procession forming in its depths came slowly into view. First banners, long, narrow, three-pointed ones, each portraying in paint or needlework some scene in the life of our Lord. There are some very old and valuable banners belonging to the church, which are generally used, but because of the split between the Greek and Arab members of the Orthodox Church these were not used this year; they belong to the Arabs and are really ancient, and the right of carrying them belongs to certain of the oldest families. This year four of the banners used were carried by Christian soldiers in uniform, which was nice to see. A procession followed, of choir boys, priests, and bishops, ending with the Patriarch wearing the crown and jewels of his office, and went three times round the Sepulchre; after which, standing outside the sealed-up door, the Patriarch was divested of his outer robe, his crown, and jewels, in none too gentle a fashion by the deacons. Then the seals on the door were broken, and the Patriarch entered alone. A few minutes' breathless suspense—then lighted bunches of candles were thrust through the holes on either side, and a scene of the wildest confusion followed, while the great bells raced and jangled overhead. A priest from the Greek side of the Sepulchre broke through the crowd, waving two great bunches of candles all aflame; he went to light the lamp before the altar in the Greek Cathedral. Runners fought their way through, carrying lanterns, one for the Armenian Church, one for Jaffa. A man is sent from Jaffa every year to bring the Holy Fire back; on his arrival he delivers it up to the priests, who light all the lamps and candles from it. In past years the Holy Fire used to be taken out to Bethlehem by specially selected members of certain families, who conveyed it out with great rejoicings, while the priests, with crosses, banners and candles, came out as far as the Bethlehem Serai to meet it; but owing to jealousy and quarrels amongst these families, which resulted in the fire being extinguished more than once upon the road, the privilege was taken away from the natives, and now a Greek monk is charged with the duty. He drives out to Bethlehem in a special carriage, escorted by three mounted police, and on his arrival is met by the priests and taken in procession to the church.

The fire was passed from one to the other until in a few minutes the whole church was thick with smoke, out of which the flames shone and leaped like living things. Every person was provided with a bundle of tapers, which were lit, and the pilgrims extinguished theirs with round caps specially provided for the purpose, and which are then put by, to be used in time for their burial. It was rather alarming to see the people bathing

their faces and beards in the flame, and passing their clothes through it : 'It is Holy Fire,' they say, 'it can never burn us !' Truth compels me to add that we have never heard of a case of burning, and if a fire were once started in that dense throng it could hardly be stamped out. Those who were up in the dome, or in high places, let down their candles by strings to be lighted, and then drew them up again ; showers of candle-grease fell everywhere, but no one seemed to mind that in the least. But the most wonderful sight of all was the Greek Cathedral, where the Russian pilgrims, their solid immobility absolutely melted by the fierce ardour of their religious zeal, swayed and pushed and panted in the struggle to get their tapers lighted. The whole cathedral was like a scene out of Dante's *Inferno*—rolling clouds of smoke, white straining faces and eager shining eyes of men possessed, lit up by the hungry leaping flames which they seemed as if they would press to their very hearts in the excess of ungovernable emotion. It was through this scene (which I can only describe as appalling in all that it expressed and all that it suggested of human feelings stirred to the very depths) that the Patriarch was presently hurried, holding aloft two flaming candles, and was half carried, half propelled, up the steps into the *Ikonostasis*. We were glad to think that his part in the ceremony was over, and that he could now rest and take a little nourishment before the long but very beautiful midnight Mass, which begins about eleven and ends some time after three.

Straightway upon the Patriarch's departure followed a triple procession of Armenians, Copts, and Syrians, all wearing very rich and beautiful copes and crowns and jewels, and walking in such close rank that they seemed like one long procession. In the midst of this there suddenly flared up one of those nasty little quarrels whose possibility makes the presence of soldiers at every ceremony a necessity, though it is true that these quarrels are becoming rarer and less serious every year with the spread of education. A chair was brought out for the old Syrian Bishop, who was very tired, and the Armenians, following on, found the way blocked, and tried to remove both chair and Bishop, whereupon the irate Syrians seized the Armenian Bishop's staff and tried to break it upon the stone floor. In a moment a furious little quarrel had blown up ; the soldiers ran together to the spot, anxious officers parted combatants, whistles were blown, the bugler unslung his bugle ready for orders, and an agitated young recruit just behind us started loading with ball-cartridge, until his musket was taken away from him by a more level-headed companion. An Armenian priest was seen to leap upon the shoulders of a Syrian confrère, bear him to earth with the weight and suddenness of the attack,

and bang his head hard upon the stone floor; while another Syrian gave an Armenian some very shrewd blows over the head and nose with a thick candle. And it all died away in a very few minutes; a few of the most furious combatants on either side were expelled by the soldiers, and the procession calmly went on its third round. A great deal might have happened, of course, but nothing did. Except those immediately concerned, and the soldiers, no one seemed to pay very much attention; the tumult did not disturb the devotions of the Russians behind us in the very least.

Do the people believe in the Holy Fire? The pilgrims and the unlettered masses do, most certainly. They say that the Patriarch rubs the tomb with consecrated oil and prays, while it grows warmer under his hand, and then suddenly the flame leaps forth. This is the story the Crusaders told and believed—perhaps invented in the first instance. Says Geoffrey de Vinsauf (1192):

On Easter Eve Saladin, with his retinue, paid a visit to the Holy Sepulchre of our Lord, to assure himself of the truth of a certain fact—namely, the coming down from Heaven of fire once a year to light the lamp. After he had watched for some time, with great attention, the devotion and contrition of many Christian captives, who were praying for the mercy of God, he and all the other Turks suddenly saw the divine fire descend, and light the lamp, so that they were vehemently moved, while the Christians rejoiced, and with loud voices praised the mighty works of God. But the Saracens disbelieved this manifest and wonderful miracle, though they witnessed it with their own eyes, and asserted that it was a fraudulent contrivance. To assure himself of this, Saladin ordered the lamp to be extinguished; which, however, was instantly rekindled by the divine power; and when the infidel ordered it to be extinguished a second time, it was lighted the second time; and so likewise a third time. . . . Saladin, wondering at the miraculous vision, and the faith and devotion of the Christians, and exceedingly moved, asserted by the spirit of prophecy, that he should either die or lose possession of the city of Jerusalem. And his prophecy was fulfilled, for he died the Lent following.²

The Russian Abbot Daniel, who was a pilgrim in the year 1106-7, describes how the crowd waited for over three hours, chanting 'Kyrie Eleison,' and 'each one, searching the innermost depths of his soul, thinks of his sins and says secretly to himself "Will my sins prevent the descent of the Holy Light?"' The Bishop looked through the grille into the tomb, 'but seeing no light returned.' 'At the end of the ninth hour . . . a small cloud, coming suddenly from the east, rested above the open dome of the church; fine rain fell on the Holy Sepulchre. It was at this moment that the Holy Light suddenly illuminated the Holy Sepulchre, shining with an awe-inspiring and splendid brightness.

² *Itinerary of Richard I.* Book V. chap. xvi.

... 'The Holy Light,' explains Abbot Daniel, 'is like no ordinary flame, for it burns in a marvellous way with indescribable brightness, and a ruddy colour like that of cinnabar. . . . Man can experience no joy like that which every Christian feels at the moment when he sees the Holy Light of God. He who has not taken part in the glory of that day will not believe the record of all that I have seen.' Early on Easter morning the Abbot went to the Holy Sepulchre, where 'we breathed with ecstasy the perfume which the presence of the Holy Ghost had left; and we gazed in admiration on the lamps, which still burned with a bright and marvellous splendour. . . . The five other lamps suspended above (the tomb) were also burning, but their light was different from that of the three first, and had not that marvellous brightness.' Later, when the Abbot paid his farewell visit to the church, 'the keeper of the keys, seeing my love for the Holy Sepulchre, pushed back the slab that covers the part of the sacred tomb on which Christ's Head lay, and broke off a morsel of the sacred rock; this he gave me as a blessed memorial, begging me at the same time not to say anything about it at Jerusalem.' No doubt!

'Why do the Greek clergy not tell the people that it is only a beautiful symbol?' an English lady once asked a Greek bishop. 'Madam,' he replied, 'if we did they would tear us to pieces—and still they would believe in it!' Some years ago the then Patriarch, with a fine courage not to be over-estimated, did preach about it during Lent. Furious anger was the result, and on Easter Eve the people locked him out of the church. 'God will punish him!' they said, accounting him a blasphemer; and when he died before the next Lent these people, iron-bound in narrowness and prejudice, said that God had struck him down. The Armenians do not believe in the actual descent of the fire from heaven, for every year their Patriarch explains the service to them. The cult is rooted in centuries of tradition, and to the unenlightened but passionate belief of limited minds it represents much of the beauty and the mystery of religion, but it is one of the main obstacles in the way of reform. I suppose the chief upholders of it are the Russian pilgrims, whose religion seems to an outsider to centre in the Dead and Buried Christ rather than in the Risen One. 'Who shall roll us away the stone from the door of the Sepulchre?'

When we again found ourselves at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre the scene was very different. The church was almost empty save for a few Russian pilgrims, and for some men who were busy lighting the countless lamps and candles in every part of it. This is the one night in all the year when everything is lighted, but it takes some time to do, and meanwhile we went

up on to the roof of the Chapel of St. Helena, which is included in the Abyssinian Convent, and where their Eve service was in progress. A small crowd was here, waiting for the procession to issue from a long tent which had been erected at one side. Standing outside in the clear starlight, we could hear the rise and fall of voices chanting in melancholy cadence, and from time to time the deep booming note of a drum that spoke to a Western imagination of the hidden recesses of primeval forests, and rites more strange and ancient than hallowed. Presently we managed to squeeze inside the tent, where, in a space designed for, say, forty, at least a hundred persons were amicably herded together. The dragoman of the Abyssinian Convent (discovering our connexion with the English Bishop*) interrupted the officiating priest to introduce us, and also wrested chairs from others of the clergy for our accommodation near the Abbot. All took the interruption very placidly and quite as a matter of course; the embarrassment was entirely on our part. To our uninformed minds the service proceeding was rather pointless; it seemed to consist solely in reading out of a large and ancient volume, thrumming on a bell-shaped drum, and occasional outbursts of chanting in a very dolorous key. Some of the clergy had curious silver sistra, which they shook monotonously to and fro. The chief interest for us lay in watching the faces before us, stamped as they were with the weariness of centuries, faces that could only belong to the scions of a very ancient race. They are a strange people, the Abyssinians; they are probably the oldest Christian nation extant, dating from the fourth century, when Greek missionaries from Alexandria converted them. They have preserved through ages and through generations the form and tradition of a somewhat crude and barbaric Christianity; they allow polygamy, and forbid the eating of swine's flesh; both baptism and circumcision are practised; controversies on the Nature of Christ, long since forgotten, still excite their orthodoxy; Pilate is accounted a saint for his words 'I am innocent of the Blood of this just Man,' and their devils are all most artistically white.

Presently they all struggled to their feet, and strayed out upon the roof in a somewhat disorderly procession, bearing lighted tapers. The effect was both weird and picturesque—the dark melancholy faces and bright rolling eyes, the ancient robes and gleaming jewels, the monotonous thrumming of the drum pierced by the sharper note of the sistrum, and the never-ceasing roll of that guttural minor chant. This year (we could not find out why) they did not use either the curious silver crowns or the large velvet and gold-embroidered umbrellas that usually adorn

* Bishop Blyth.

the procession. We watched it go its round three times, seeming more like a train of melancholy ghosts let loose upon earth for a space than part of a Christian service in the twentieth century; then we went back into the church.

The sound of sweetest chanting drew us on willing feet up the narrow slippery steps to Calvary, where, amid the subdued shimmer of silver lamps, a Russian service was in act. There is nothing sweeter, more harmonious, or more peaceful than Russian Church music unaccompanied; every Russian seems a natural musician, and the Russian voice can express tones and depths of sound that are beyond the compass of ordinary throats. These strains were as sweet and as haunting as the Pilgrims' Chorus from *Tannhäuser*.

Passing quietly out of Calvary we climbed many steps, broad and narrow, steep and uneven, and trod dusty passage-ways, till we came out upon a narrow gallery very high up in the roof of the Greek Cathedral. Looking down, our eyes picked out of the gloom of that dim place the few worshippers who are never absent, and the soldiers beginning to form up already for the Midnight Mass. From the distance came the solemn chanting of the Russians in Calvary. But the wonder of it all lay in the lights—the countless lights that patient hands had awakened in every corner and recess of this wonderful church, lights that shone and twinkled in starry clusters, lights that burned dim and steady in silver lamps, crowns and circles and constellations of light, light everywhere, soft, brilliant, searching, festal. Far down below were faint sounds of moving feet, and the passing of shadow-like forms, and the murmur of voices; but we were in another world up in that gallery, wrapped round in an extraordinary sense of peace and remoteness quite indescribable. It was the climax to the experiences of a wonderful day—which had been, perhaps, an analogy in brief of life, the noise and clamour and unrest of the earlier part, followed by the calm and quiet of this starlit hour. It quickened the imagination and spoke through it to some deeper feeling, of which the imagination was only the expression. For here some faint realisation of the true life of the church touched you; the glare and glamour, the strife and pettiness, that mar the wonderful building, had no power to break the utter peace of this remote solitude. It was as if the prayers of all the countless worshippers had gathered in a brooding calm up here, in this dim place above the piercing lights. It was an influence not to be resisted, even if you had the will.

With slow reluctant feet we retraced our way downstairs, paused one moment in the place of Calvary, and so into the body

of the church below. Already it was filling for the great Midnight Mass, though it was barely ten o'clock when we took our places. Through the kindness of the Patriarch we were well in front, just near the entrance to the Sepulchre itself, where His Beatitude was to be, while the double row of soldiers behind kept off the ever-swelling crowd of Russian and other pilgrims. The Mass began with a splendid procession of clergy, Archimandrites, and Bishops, with banners and censers. The Patriarch walked alone at the end, all in Easter white, afire with jewelled orders and icons; two deacons, walking just in front, turned every few moments to swing their censers towards him, bowing reverently each time. The slow rise and fall of the chanting, the magnificent robes and jewels, the sweet breath of incense, all combined to make the scene a striking one as the procession thrice wound slowly round the shrine. A young Turkish officer went first of all to clear a way (for a congregation cannot very well be orderly in ranks, where there are no seats or bounds of any kind); we were struck by his gentleness and good-temper with the crowd, and it was a shock to learn next day that when he went home after the service, receiving no answer to his knock, he had to break in, only to find his bride of three weeks had been robbed and murdered by her black servant during his absence, presumably for lust of her wedding-jewels. Splendid as the service was in scenic effect and colour, there was about it also a soberness and restraint which reminded us that it was still the Vigil of Easter. The hush of expectation lay upon that massed crowd, and grew upon us all as the hour drew on to midnight. The service was long, and a little wearying to those who could not understand Greek, but it was really a service, not merely a ceremony, as so many of the Eastern rites seem to us. Presently the Patriarch went into the Greek Cathedral of the Resurrection, and the Litany of Peace was sung, the slow rhythmic beat of the chant fitting most harmoniously the beautiful words of the Litany.

For the peace from above, and the salvation of our souls . . .

For the peace from above, and the salvation of our souls . . .

For the peace of the whole world . . .

For this Holy House, and those that with faith, reverence, and fear of
GOD enter therein . . .

For this Holy City . . .

Let us beseech the LORD.

What a fitting preparation for the Divine Oblation on Easter Eve!

So with prayer, and chant, and much stately ritual, the hours wore on to midnight. And then, with most impressive effect,

the Patriarch, standing before the Sepulchre, lifted up both arms and cried aloud :

Christ is risen ! Alleluia !

Alleluia ! He is risen indeed !

that great waiting, rustling crowd made answer in one glad shout. The great bells rushed together in tumult overhead ; banners and tapers were raised and lowered thrice, like a flag in salute ; the pilgrims, some with tears of joy, embraced each other, saying ' Christ is risen ! ' What a tremendous force the words had for them, uttered in the very city itself, and, as they so ardently believe, at Christ's own Sepulchre ! The wave of rejoicing caught us too, for who could be there and not share in anything so heartfelt and sincere ? It was all most lovely.

Following upon this wonderful scene came the administration of the Holy Communion. The Patriarch first received himself from two Archbishops ; then he communicated them all, each one by name, and each one, before returning to his place, kissed the Patriarch's hand. It was all very reverent and impressive. After the Bishops and clergy had received, the Orthodox Consular staffs came forward ; and then the Russian pilgrims began to press up, their rugged faces shining with emotion and joy. To them this was the climax of all—to receive the Holy Sacrament at the very spot where faith assured them the Body of Christ had lain. But in their ecstatic devotion there is something a little alarming to the outside spectator ; perhaps it is that absolute heedlessness of anything but the object in view. If you give way before their forward movement, well and good ; if not, you must take your chance, for you do not exist for the Russian pilgrim ; he will walk over you as soon as not if you fall, for that is your concern, not his. It is not that he is unkind or wilfully rough, only that he is so enthralled by the fullness of the moment that outside considerations simply do not touch him ; he neither sees nor hears apart from his service. Mindful of this somewhat terrific power of concentration, we gave way before that solid forward move ; the soldiers made place for us, and somehow we were passed through the crowd and gained the courtyard outside. It was cool and fresh and quiet, flooded with the glorious light of the Easter moon—a great contrast to the heat, the quivering lights and tapers, the overwrought throngs in the church behind us, whence the chanting reached our ears in receding waves of sound.

It was nearly three, and as we passed through the silent streets the Holy Sepulchre bells once more clashed out, announcing the close of the service. We breathed a hope that it meant also some rest for the weary, fasting Patriarch.

We had brought away a harvest of thoughts and impressions,

too deep to be lost ; but we had left behind us the power to express them. The peace of Easter was abroad, as well as in that wonderful church and haunted dome above the lights. As the bells rang out their jubilant welcome to the dawn of Easter, all unbidden there sprang to mind the words of the old Mozarabic collect :

‘ Behold, O Lord, how Thy faithful Jerusalem rejoices in the triumph of the Cross and in the power of the Saviour ! ’

ESTELLE BLYTH.

Jerusalem.

PROBLEMS IN THE NEAR EAST

(I)

THE TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS OF THE BALKAN STATES

ONE of the most striking points in connexion with the present War is the success of the carefully laid plans by which Germany took advantage of jealousies and dissensions among the Balkan States in order to hold up a considerable proportion of British and Russian forces in Egypt and the Caucasus. By one means and another, largely bribery no doubt, Germany induced Turkey to make a hopeless attack on Egypt, and to send an army against the Russians. Although it is now quite clear that Turkey's attack upon Egypt cannot have any measure of success, and that she can accomplish nothing against Russia, Germany has, nevertheless, succeeded in the main object of her intrigues in this direction by compelling Russia to keep an army in the Caucasus and England to retain troops on the Suez Canal, which we cannot afford to remove until all danger of further attacks by the Turks has passed. Turkey has thus served Germany's purpose, and what becomes of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the War will no longer give much concern to Germany, who will be unable to render her assistance. One can understand Germany's action, as she has risked everything on the one throw, including her interests in Asia Minor, the Bagdad Railway, Syria, and Mesopotamia; but it is difficult to realise how Turkey could have been so misguided and short-sighted, as she stood to lose in either case; it is certain that even if Germany could have come out 'on top,' Turkey would soon have become merely a German dependency. German intrigues at Sofia resulted in Bulgaria's adopting an attitude friendly to Austro-Germany and threatening to Serbia and Greece, an attitude which has largely neutralised Greek and Roumanian desires to give active assistance to the Entente Powers.

With regard to the territorial ambitions of the various Balkan States, which cause them all to be vitally interested in the present War, they may be shortly summarised as follows:

1. *Bulgaria*.—It was agreed between Bulgaria and Serbia under the 1912 Treaty that in a final division of territory after the war with Turkey the former was to have certain districts, which, at the present date, form the south-eastern portion of the State of Serbia. At the time when that Treaty was made Serbia was regarded as being, perhaps, the weakest unit in the alliance against Turkey. As things turned out, Serbia acquitted herself very well in the war, and inflicted disastrous defeats on the Turkish forces. When Bulgaria was heavily engaged with the Turks towards the end of the war she found that she was not strong enough to drive them out of Adrianople and appealed to Serbia to send help, especially in the matter of artillery. This Serbia consented to do, but on condition that the territorial conditions of the above-mentioned Treaty were modified. She sent the help asked for, which greatly assisted Bulgaria in the taking of Adrianople and the defeat of the Turks. Bulgaria's reply to Serbia's condition, which was not delivered until after the required assistance had been sent, was that she would give a monetary consideration but not any territory. It had been before this agreed between them that in case of any differences as to territorial boundaries these were to be referred to the Czar for settlement. After the defeat of Turkey Bulgaria did not wait for a reference to the Czar, but attacked her allies, Greece and Serbia, with the final result that she was beaten and compelled under the Bucharest Treaty to give up not only what she claimed but further territory in addition (as well as losing Adrianople to the Turks).

During the short period which has elapsed since the Turkish War Bulgaria has much improved her army, which is now in a state of great efficiency. She demands that Serbia should give back to her all the territory she could have asked under the 1912 Treaty. In this Bulgaria is unreasonable. When, however, the present European War is concluded—presumably in favour of the Entente Powers—Serbia, together with Montenegro, will be able very largely to expand to the north-west by the acquisition of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and parts of Dalmatia and Croatia—so largely that she can well afford to be generous to Bulgaria and to cede to her some part, at any rate, of what she asks.

Bulgaria demands from Greece the port of Kavalla, with the towns and districts of Drama and Serres, which form part of the present kingdom of Greece, this being territory which Bulgaria would have had, but lost under the Treaty of Bucharest (owing to her attacks on her allies). Greece is firm in her decision to part with no portion of her present belongings to Bulgaria. Whether or not she will, in a final settlement, see her way, in

view of the possible acquisition of territorial advantages elsewhere, to meet Bulgaria to some small extent, is a matter which she will no doubt consider.

Bulgaria may presumably also look to acquiring after the War (provided that her action is such as in the opinion of the Entente Powers entitles her to consideration) Adrianople and Turkish territory down to the Enos-Midia line. If she is allowed by general consent to occupy this part of Turkey, it will be because the Ottoman Empire will no longer exist in Europe, and because, perhaps, no better future owner for it could be found. Bulgaria, furthermore, has a question to settle with Roumania regarding the Dobrudja, which she naturally wishes that State to hand back to her, this being territory which Roumania acquired from Bulgaria by the Bucharest Treaty, and it seems not improbable that Bulgaria, profiting by the present situation, will be able to secure some territorial concession from Roumania as the price for 'amicable neutrality,' when the latter State proceeds against Austria. In any case it is clear that Bulgaria, provided she does not make another *faux pas*, will, after the War, on one side and the other become a larger State than she now is.

2. *Serbia*.—This kingdom, together with Montenegro, will, as already stated, after the War receive extensive additions in the north-west, and by the acquisition of a slice of Dalmatia will no longer be an inland State, but, like her neighbours—Bulgaria, Roumania, and Greece—will possess a seaboard with some excellent harbours.

Serbia will thus become a far more important and powerful State than she has been in the past. It is also probable that eventually, after the death of King Nikolas, Serbia and Montenegro will amalgamate. This, indeed, seems a wise course, as Montenegro is too small, too weak, and too poor to be able to carry on as an independent kingdom and to do justice to her own resources. The Serbs and Montenegrins are practically the same people, and it is not likely that there will be any opposition to amalgamation in either State.

3. *Roumania* hopes for the incorporation of Transylvania in her dominions. It goes without saying that neither Russia nor her Allies will be likely to go out of the way to bring this about unless Roumania by her action can be considered to have established a substantial claim. At present her policy may not have been quite definitely declared, but there can be little doubt that she will proceed before long to the invasion of Austrian territory.

4. *Greece*.—This country is on a somewhat different footing from the three other Balkan States, as she has no prospect of increasing her dominions in Europe [except by the occupation of the southernmost strip of Albania (Epirus)]. By acting, however,

in harmony with the Entente, and in view of territorial additions to the other States, she thinks that in a general rearrangement of Balkan questions she has a right to consideration. It is doubtful whether she will agree to cede any part of the Salonica province to Bulgaria. The latter State has certainly no valid grounds on which to base her demand for Kavalla, Serres, and Drama. Whether or not, however, Greece eventually consents to the cession of some part of Macedonia to Bulgaria, she looks for an increase of territory by the cession to her of either (a) the islands now held by Italy near the coast of Asia Minor, (b) Cyprus, or (c) Smyrna and other coast towns of Asia Minor, with a hinterland.

Of all the Balkan States Serbia is the one which deserves first consideration. In the face of enormous difficulties she has not only held out single-handed against the attacks of Austria, but has actually on two occasions inflicted crushing defeats on the armies of that Power. She has afforded great assistance to the Triple Entente, has kept some portion of the armies of Austria occupied on her borders, and by holding out against them has prevented Germany and Austria from obtaining possession of the line of railway from Vienna to Constantinople.

Roumania can no doubt look after her own interests in Transylvania. If she desires to extend her dominion in that direction it rests with her to take the necessary action.

Greece, as already pointed out, expects practically no territorial increase in Europe.

Bulgaria has not been fortunate in her attitude so far. There is no moral doubt that she has intrigued with both Austria and Turkey, and the impression has been very generally formed that she meditated a descent on Serbia (when, as seemed at one time likely, that State was too exhausted to continue her resistance to Austria) and the seizure of Serbian Macedonia. She even took what were practically hostile measures against Serbia in countenancing organised attacks by 'Comitaji' bands on the Salonika-Nisch railway, Serbia's only line of communication with the outer world, a line which is of the most vital strategic value to her. Bulgaria disavowed responsibility for these attacks, but as they were made from Strumnitza and other Bulgarian centres where the bands are concentrated and definitely organised, and as the raiders were proved to have been supplied with Bulgarian Government rifles and '1914' ammunition manufactured for the Bulgarian army, and were in possession of machine guns—and as no attempt has been made by the Bulgarian Government to suppress the Comitaji organisation—such disavowals are not worth much consideration.

Bulgaria by her action has alienated much of the sympathy which was undoubtedly felt for her, and has not as yet established much claim for special consideration in a future Balkan settlement. But for her doubtful attitude Roumania might possibly have taken action against Austria before now, and Greece might have been enabled to come to the assistance of Serbia. Up to a certain point the views of Bulgaria can be readily understood. She desired to delay, to be quite sure which way the European War would end before committing herself openly to a definite policy, keeping meanwhile on such terms with both sides as would allow of her finally throwing in her lot with either—a difficult course to follow. At the present date, however, such a policy is clearly an unwise one. It is evident that, however the War may end, it cannot terminate in a crushing of the Entente Powers; probably the utmost which Germany now hopes for is a peace which may not be too disastrous for her. The result of Bulgaria's policy so far is that she has embittered Serbia, thereby rendering a territorial settlement with that State more difficult than it might have been in other circumstances. She has also irritated Greece by covert threats and demands for some of the best and most valuable parts of her dominions. Before the attack made by Bulgaria on her allies, Serbia and Greece, the latter State would have consented to Bulgaria taking a part of what is now Greek Macedonia. Since that war, however, Greece finds herself in an entirely different case; her army has been so reorganised and improved that it is almost equal to that of Bulgaria, and she sees no reason why she should give away territory which was acquired as some compensation for the losses she suffered in men and money during the war which Bulgaria forced on her. It is not a case of Greece holding territory which once belonged to Bulgaria; Grecian Macedonia was never in Bulgarian possession, and the argument advanced by Bulgaria that the country she demands (Kavalla, Serres, and Drama) has a population consisting chiefly of Bulgarians has been clearly proved not to be based on actual facts. Greece is also convinced that Bulgaria would not even be satisfied if her present demands were agreed to, but that she would finally claim Salonika itself. In any case Salonika, without the important tobacco districts of Serres and Drama, would lose a great deal of its value.

It requires no argument to show that it would be unreasonable, when the other Balkan States are enlarging their territories, to call upon Greece to give away some of hers. It would certainly greatly facilitate a Balkan agreement if Greece could be induced to part with Kavalla and a small hinterland; but even if she were largely compensated in the Aegean and Asia Minor, it is true, as her politicians point out, that no compensation of this

description would really remunerate her for loss of territory on the Continent of Europe; while the possession of any holding in Asia Minor would involve her in new responsibilities, and would compel her to defend an inland boundary in a new country separated from Greece itself.

It may be taken as highly improbable that the Balkan States will ever be able to come to an agreement among themselves regarding readjustments of territory and boundaries. That a rearrangement is necessary—after the War—none can doubt. The fact alone that Serbia will largely increase her holding is sufficient to necessitate a reconsideration of the terms of the Bucharest Treaty, a convention which could never have been expected to stand for long. It was a certainty that as soon as Bulgaria recovered from the effects of the war with her former allies she would seek the first opportunity for demanding new conditions and new boundaries. That time is now at hand, and Bulgaria is bringing forward her claims. She has been, apparently, sufficiently well advised to abandon any ideas which she may have had of endeavouring to take advantage of Serbia's exhausted condition during her war with Austria, and to remain strictly neutral, to await the conclusion of the European War and the friendly assistance of the Entente Powers in the arrangement of terms with Serbia, Greece, and Roumania. It is not likely that the Powers will be able to give Bulgaria everything she would wish to have, but it is certain that with a new Serbia extending to the shores of the Northern Adriatic, and possibly a new Roumania embracing the whole of Transylvania, there is ample room and opportunity to provide for a new Bulgaria comprising parts of Turkey and Serbian Macedonia.

It is not probable that there will—eventually—be any great difficulty in bringing Bulgaria and Serbia to an understanding, but matters will not be so easy with Greece, whose statesmen have taken up a very uncompromising attitude as regards Macedonia and the cession of any of Greece's present territory. In any case it will be impossible to please everyone, but whatever final arrangement is made will have to be *imposed*. In the consideration of various territorial boundaries, moreover, it will be of little use to go to the very bottom of the 'nationality question.' It is possible to prove almost anything by argument in this matter; and in many parts of the Balkans foreign populations have settled down happily and contentedly under a new rule and ask nothing better than to be left in peace to cultivate their farms, to be free from wars and raidings, and to have no more change of rulers. The idea that these 'foreign' populations are unhappy and desirous of a new order of things has been largely kept alive by systematic agitation from outside. When the time

comes for the arrangement of a new Balkan Treaty, the 'national question,' while being taken into consideration to a great extent, should not be allowed to stand in the way of geographical and other equally important considerations. The end to be reached is such a rearrangement as will be really workable and lasting and fair to all.

With regard to the Eastern Adriatic, its future partition will naturally largely depend on the course taken by Italy in the present War. There can be little doubt that the great bulk of the Italian population realises that the parting of the ways has now been reached, and that if Italy has any real national ambitions in the Adriatic she must throw in her lot with the Entente Powers. It is obvious that this is the only means by which she can expect to obtain additions of territory on the Eastern Adriatic coast. Presuming that Italy shortly takes action against Germany and Austria, she will be justified in expecting great consideration in the final territorial arrangements. What will be Italy's position if she remains neutral to the end of the War? She will by no means secure the friendship of Austria and Germany, who will never forget that she failed to give them active assistance. She will not have established any specially friendly relations with Russia or France, and, while England will always continue to feel great friendship for Italy, it would be impossible for her to advocate Italian interests, specially, in the general settlement after the War. Italy would thus find herself more or less without any close friends in Europe.

The ambitions of the 'Italia Irredenta' party are well known. They are the acquisition of the Trentino, Trieste, possibly Istria, and some of the Dalmatian ports and seaboard. The extremists of this party go further than this, and consider that the greater part of Dalmatia ought to come to Italy, together with a considerable portion of Albania. The future division of Dalmatia which they suggest is roughly as follows :

1. To Serbia (with Montenegro), a stretch of the coast below Fiume, to provide an outlet for (a Serbian) Croatia, and another stretch further south, including Cattaro and Ragusa, to give an outlet for (a Serbian) Bosnia.

2. The rest of Dalmatia to Italy.

If Italy considers that it is a sufficiently ambitious future for her to hold Valona she will undoubtedly be right in remaining neutral. If, on the other hand, she desires to realise national ambitions she must presumably throw in her lot with the Entente Powers. The question is one for her to decide, and she will no doubt take the course she thinks best.

It is fairly clear now that there is only one way of satisfactorily settling the Albanian question—namely, by giving Epirus

to Greece, the extreme northern strip to the future Serbia (with Montenegro), and either forming the central parts of Albania into an independent or international State, or else possibly handing them over to Italy.

Albania has so far proved to be incapable of self-government. The country may be said to be in a state of anarchy; armed bands belonging to different sections, and independent parties of robbers and brigands plunder and kill in all directions. The most recent exploit of some of these is a treacherous attack on poor Serbia, who already has her hands full, an attack no doubt instigated through Austro-German influence. Italy's occupation of Valona was originally described as a 'sanitary expedition'; we may reasonably presume, however, that it will be permanent. If Valona is intended to be anything more than a strategic position it will require a hinterland.

The appointment of a ruling 'prince' for Albania proved a disastrous failure. This may have been to some extent due to the fact that the Prince of Wied was personally incapable of adapting himself to the conditions prevailing in his dominions, but it seems probable that if Central Albania is formed into an independent State it would be better, instead of appointing a foreign 'prince,' to provide a form of government more on the lines of a Republic, with a strong Council chosen from the different sections of the Albanian population.

With regard to Constantinople—on my recent visit to the Balkan States I found that there was a general expectation that it will be handed over to Russia. The feeling throughout the Balkans is that it would be preferable for Constantinople, with an enclave comprising both shores of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles, to be formed into a State, either to be administered internationally or placed in the hands of some small and inoffensive neutral Power. Experience in the past shows that a condominium is never a great success; it was a failure in Crete, Egypt, and the New Hebrides. On the other hand, the suggestion that a Constantinople enclave should, subject to certain international conditions, be given to Belgium was universally received as being one of the best solutions of the question.

ALFRED SHARPE.

PROBLEMS IN THE NEAR EAST

(II)

ITALY AND INTERVENTION

THE European War came as a painful surprise to Italy. We neither desired it nor foresaw it. It suddenly revolutionised the two fundamental principles of our traditional policy. The aim of the first was to consolidate, under a peaceful *régime*, the recent work of restoring the nation; the second, to maintain at all costs the equilibrium of Europe through our participation in the Triple Alliance, a policy that was far less spontaneous than would have been necessary to fulfil our purpose.

From the very beginning of the War, therefore, the Italian people saw clearly the double danger towards which involuntarily it was drifting. While on the one hand the Italians felt themselves decidedly opposed to compromising the young life of the country in a war they did not want, on the other hand they realised the terrible unknown quantity with which the nation would be faced should the balance of European power change.

At a moment in which all the largest nations of Europe were dragged into the conflict, in order to fight for their existence or for their liberty, Italy, free from that imperious necessity, might have joined that group of belligerents whose victory she considered the easier or more probable. In this way she would have looked after her own practical interests, and thus solved the problem of the future.

Italy, on the contrary, declared her neutrality. It was a brave action, because it forced the nation to defend its destinies by its strength alone. Moreover, it was brave because, on that account, she renounced once and for all an agreement that, though unnatural, rigorously protected our safety—the Triple Alliance.

Europe, it seems to me, is beginning to lose somewhat the sense of value with regard to Italian neutrality. It has been forgotten that neutrality was declared when the intervention of England in the conflict seemed improbable and that of France doubtful. It has been forgotten that, by that very declaration of

neutrality, we implicitly condemned the policy of our allies and made them our enemies. It has been forgotten that in pursuance of that declaration the Government was forcing the country to make sacrifices as great as those of war, yet devoid of practical results. Lastly, people have forgotten that through our rigid interpretation of our national duty we ran the risk of being wholly isolated, thus forsaking the easy way to any practical conquest.

I have spoken of rigid interpretation of our national duty : it is out of that that our neutrality has been born. The Government and the people of Italy, in declaring the conditional neutrality of the country, had to face two inevitable problems resulting from the new situation. The first was the impossibility of helping our allies in carrying out a programme both spiritually and practically contrary to our interests ; the second, the preserving of our national dignity, both in the present and for the future, by respecting the agreement signed with our Allies until the day when their action should prove itself to be decidedly irreconcilable with the fundamental principles of national safety. It is well that it should be known that the great mass of the Italian people to-day is still preoccupied by the desire of proving to the world that Italy knows how to keep faith with her agreements.

While awaiting that day, all inducements of a sentimental character made to Italy continue to be vain and harmful. A people which is on the eve of risking its national existence cannot attribute any value to passing manifestations of sentiment. On the other hand, it has not been easy for Italy to forget the incidents of the *Manouba* and the *Carthage* and the words of Poincaré at Palazzo Borbone, an incident which is certainly Prince Bülow's strongest ally in his diplomatic campaign in Rome. Italians are passionate sentimentalists. Their affection is as violent and as lasting as their hate.

It is on this account that the only idealistic factor that helped to determine Italian neutrality was our traditional friendship for England. Italians do not forget that the English have been the sincerest and most disinterested co-operators in their national *Risorgimento*. Nor do they forget that England has cultivated this historic cordiality of relations and this natural affinity between the two peoples even when our part in the Triple Alliance might have compromised or cooled them. It is therefore difficult to find an Italian in Italy who would fight against an Englishman. I am inclined to believe that the Anglo-Italian friendship contributed far more to our declaration of neutrality than our traditional aversion for the 'Tedeschi.'

Apart from this feeling of cordiality towards England, no spiritual factor other than that which corresponded to a clear and patriotic vision of national interests, and was yet reconcilable with respect for the treaties of which we were the signatories, determined our neutrality. There are some who believe and declare that, at the outset, our neutrality reflected a state of weakness or impotence, and accordingly consider our declaration of neutrality to have been caused by the fact that our Army was unprepared, and by the certainty that the will of the people would have rebelled against concerted action with the Central Powers. Such an opinion in each case is incorrect.

At the beginning of the War our Army found itself in the same condition as those of the greater part of the belligerents. It had the advantage over those, however, of having been trained to war by the recent Libyan campaign, and of having its equipment strengthened thereby. Experience has proved that no nation was prepared for war except Germany. We were therefore at the same point of preparation as the other belligerents, and, like them, could have successfully defended our country.

Having once declared neutrality, military preparations had necessarily to adapt themselves to the new requirements. The greater part of the Italians to-day consider that Italy's possible intervention in the near future could not, and should not, limit itself to the conquest of Trent and Trieste. When calling upon her citizens to make the terrible sacrifice of war, Italy intends that it should result in a complete and definite settlement of the questions of national territory and in sufficient compensation for her traditional Eastern aspirations. All the anguish of Irredentism must finally disappear. Wherever the Italian language, Italian life, and Italian traditions exist, and have existed for centuries, such territories must be gathered under the Italian flag. We intend therefore that the Adriatic question should be completely solved in all respects, while still desiring to come to a friendly understanding with the Slavs with regard to all those questions in which our respective rights are identical or reconcilable. On the other hand, we desire that our position as a great Mediterranean Power should be strengthened by our possible intervention in the solution of the Eastern Question.

In view of the programme which our neutrality forced us to regard as a vital factor in the event of our having to go to war, our military preparation has been carried to the highest degree of efficiency. Italians recognise that their Army, while being sufficient for a defensive war, was not sufficient to ensure victory in a lengthy war such as might be forced

upon them by the unknown quantity of a European conflict. Hundreds of millions were spent to strengthen our armaments, the people were asked to sacrifice themselves in order to prepare for the War. Italy has to-day 1,500,000 men ready, fully armed, and well equipped, both materially and morally, for the strain of a war. Our fleet, which was already efficient before the outbreak of war, has now been reinforced by the addition of six modern and very powerful Dreadnoughts. Our military and naval power constitutes a new and formidable factor which from one day to another could weigh down the balance in favour of one of the two groups of belligerents.

For more than eight months of neutrality, which was defined as watchful and armed because it inevitably preceded intervention, it has been possible to perfect the technical and bureaucratic machinery of military organisation. A nation that has had eight months in which to prepare herself for war, and who is relatively free to choose the moment in which to intervene, must be assured of her success. To-day we are convinced that our army can effectively support all our national aspirations.

I dwell upon this point because it is well that our English friends should clearly understand our intention. They know that Italy is not a rich country, and that the present crisis, which has been strongly felt among us, has followed upon the crisis produced by the national effort during the Libyan campaign. Notwithstanding this, the Government has asked of the country the enormous sacrifice of providing and equipping a great army, and the Italians have made it cheerfully. The National Loan of 40,000,000*l.* was over-subscribed in a few days. The Italians are conscious therefore that every sacrifice destined to guarantee the greatness of the country at this moment must be made.

Those who think, however, that Italy, after having made such sacrifices, can rest content with realising the minimum programme of Trent and Trieste, deceive themselves. So, too, do those who believe in the success of diplomatic negotiations limited to the concession to Italy of more or less substantial rectifications of frontier as a reward of her perpetual neutrality. A country which has made the greatest effort to complete its national strength does not care to run risks in the future for love of a quiet life.

Prince Bülow's attempts prove two things conclusively: the essential importance attributed by Germany to our possible intervention, and the Central Empires' respect for our military power. Conscious and proud of this, Italy might consent to maintain her neutrality only in the case of Austria deciding upon such vast concessions as would have the result of excluding

her for ever from the number of the Great Powers; that is to say, the cession of the Trentino and of every Italian zone in the Adriatic, and the conclusion of an agreement that should safeguard Italy from any possible future revenge at the hands of Austria. But those who know the Austrian mind with regard to us consider this hypothesis absurd, and at bottom every Italian thinks that Prince Bülow's diplomatic intrigue is but a product of the singular relations between Germany and Austria about which we can only congratulate ourselves.

Italians to-day cannot be swayed by diplomatic intrigue. Each one of us feels that Italy must come out of the present crisis either very much enlarged and strengthened or considerably weakened. All the nations which are taking part in the European War are conscious of being able to count upon solid and practical friendships. We do not disguise the fact that we have fallen into the most complete isolation; to avoid the present and future damages that may accrue to us from it, only one way lies open before us: to be respected and feared on account of our strength. Only by means of a more or less effective manifestation of this power can we assure our country the peaceful future which mere military victories could not of themselves ensure.

Summing up what I have already said, it is evident that, while Italy is convinced of the inevitable necessity of fulfilling her highest national destinies in the present hour, there have been two reasons against her intervention. One, the respect due to moral obligations that still bind her to her allies; and the second, the absence of a new element in the European conflict that is in direct contrast with her immediate interests. Any other consideration, whether of an idealistic, political, or aesthetic nature, seems in our eyes to be negligible or of secondary importance. Italy will declare war that day on which one of the above-mentioned reasons shall, by the force of circumstance, cease to exist.

It is unnecessary to remark that these two causes—one moral, the other material—are closely related. When, by reason of this War, in which we have had no part nor responsibility, our interests come to be affected, we shall be inevitably free from every obligation. There is no political consideration that can override a nation's right to existence. So far, that day has not yet dawned, nor can we therefore free ourselves without dishonour or danger from our duties towards the Triple Alliance.

Many will ask what may the factor be that will determine Italy's abandonment of her neutrality. According to our point

of view, it can only assume two forms: either the military break-up of Austria, caused by notable Russo-Serbian victories, or an energetic and decisive action of the Triple Entente against Turkey. The first, by completely disturbing the Balkan equilibrium, would force us to look after our Adriatic interests; the second, following upon the disappearance of Turkey in Europe, would make it necessary for us to take an active and fruitful part in the partition of her spoils so as to preserve our legitimate and traditional aspirations in the East.

With regard to the first question, the breakdown of the Austrian Army, we Italians have no illusions. Russia can only become formidable on the day in which she really breathes freely in the Mediterranean. Austria is still a military organism with exceptional powers of resistance. We know, for instance, that she keeps 500,000 men on our frontiers, which, together with two German army corps, will have the task of opposing the irresistible advance of our national aspirations. This is in itself a proof that Austria's military resources are far from being exhausted, nor do the Italians disguise from themselves the fact that a possible war will be fraught with dangers and unknown elements. The second hypothesis—that of a decisive action of the Allies against Turkey—is looked upon in Italy as being far more probable. The Turco-Italian War proved to us that the Dardanelles could be forced. At that time a flotilla of destroyers succeeded in reaching the Sea of Marmora. We do not doubt therefore that the Allied Fleet, which is attempting the same task in force, will be able to gain Constantinople. The day on which the Allies should force the Young Turks to abandon once and for all their nefarious European policy, Italy could not remain absent or indifferent.

Eastern policy, as a matter of fact, has been always fostered in Italy mainly for traditional reasons. The remembrance of Venice and Genoa is still too fresh in the minds of our maritime population for us to forget that the natural direction of our expansion lies towards the East. Every event that may alter the interplay of European influences, both in the European and in the Asiatic East, finds an immediate and live response among our people. For this reason, above all, the Libyan war was so popular. On this account the events in the Near East are followed with greater interest than those in the West. The action against the Dardanelles provoked an immediate reawakening and keen interest among the Italians. It was immediately followed by Von Bülow's negotiations. That sagacious diplomat realised that the attack on the Dardanelles was to be the prologue of possible Italian action against the Central Empires. That which he offers

us, however, is far too little as compared with what we wish for—namely, to renew the splendid traditions of Venice and Genoa in the East. The supposition of a possible break-up of Turkey in Europe preoccupies us as much as the possible destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. When the material action of the Allies has destroyed the balance between the two groups of belligerents, Italy will be unable to keep out of the War.

That is the new factor to which I referred above as capable of determining Italian intervention. It would solve our extremely delicate moral position, for we should be led to hostile action against Austria and Germany in order to fulfil an end sacred to the destinies of Italy, an end which the Central Empires for their personal advantage, and contrary to our interests, will try to frustrate. The insurrection of the Moslem world against Europe is the only thing which Austria and Germany have as yet accomplished contrary to Italian interests.

It is necessary, however, that the Allies should carefully consider this factor of Italian intervention. Their action against Turkey places Italy in the position of having to choose between isolated action to defend her national interests after the War, and concerted action with the Allies now to attain a common end. A wise diplomatic preparation should precede any military action. It is conceivable that an agreement of incalculable historical importance has been entered upon between Russia, France, and England with regard to the division of Turkey in Europe. We could not have taken part in it for reasons inherent in our delicate position. Italy is anxiously asking herself to-day what her position in the East will be in relation to the Great Powers which have in a friendly way arranged the boundaries and the extent of their spheres of influence in the East.

We therefore consider that a frank determination of the limits within which it is intended to grant us liberty of action in the East will be highly appreciated in Italy. Such a course, considered in relation to its future rather than to its immediate operation, would be found more effective than all the manœuvres of Prince von Bülow. A specific proposal advanced by the Allies, as a result of a possible action on our side against Turkey, would quiet us and might bring about a quicker intervention, which we in any case consider indispensable.

It is well to add that we are awaiting such proposals mainly from Great Britain. For many obvious reasons we are of opinion that our Eastern and Mediterranean interests can be more easily reconciled with those of Great Britain than with those of any other Great Power. We have no wish for any further guarantee than that of an understanding with her in the Mediterranean,

based upon a simple formula of balance convenient to both nations. In an interview that I had the honour of having with Mr. Winston Churchill, and which was greatly appreciated in Italy, the First Lord did not, on the whole, exclude the possibility of such an understanding. Italy hopes that it may be realised. However this may be, it is certain that even to-day negotiations having the object of determining its feasibility or its basis will have an immediate effect on the psychology of the Italian people.

One friendly and outspoken word from Great Britain to-day would be of much greater value than all the diplomatic expedients of Prince Bülow. Its main force of persuasion would lie in a romantic factor that no artifice of the ex-Chancellor could create in favour of Germany: the traditional cordiality of feeling between Italy and England.

GINO CALZA-BEDOLO.

‘SELF-APPOINTED STATESMEN.’

To the Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

SIR,—Mr. J. O. P. Bland, who has qualified himself for the authoritative discussion of European politics by many years’ residence in China, is, I see, very angry in your issue for March at a mere England-knowing Englishman such as I am expressing any opinion whatever about the present European war. There is, I gather, some sort of specialist, the ‘Statesman,’ to whom these high affairs should be restricted. I am afraid that I, as a man with children who will have to live in the world that this war and the subsequent peace will rearrange, cannot acquiesce in the complete abandonment of their affairs to the operations of these mysterious superior beings. So far their occult activities have made a tremendous mess of things, and it is with the deliberate intention of letting the light into their operations that amateurs and outsiders like myself are battering open the discussion of the settlement. Statesmen like Mr. J. O. P. Bland would be more usefully employed if, instead of abuse and suggestions for suppression, they set themselves to correct our crudities and point out our impossibilities.

I have, however, some slight doubt whether Mr. J. O. P. Bland is altogether qualified for the task. He is apparently blankly ignorant of the conditions under which articles published in English papers reappear in America, and he quotes from American papers the abbreviated and garbled phrases of cabled despatches as if they were my weighed and deliberate sentences. If this is not sheer ignorance, then it is very unfair. He seems, too, to have met an ‘Austrian’ language in China, which will be of interest to European philologists. He does, I admit, establish one inconsistency between my first article upon the war and the article upon Holland. It involves an interesting point and one worthy of better treatment than mere reviling from the professional ‘Statesman.’ Assuming victory, can we afford to leave Prussia, with her innate militarism


and her habit of building strategic railways, extending right up to the frontiers of Belgium and Holland? I admit the crudity of annexing chunks of Western Germany to the Netherlands. M. Yves Guyot, also an invader of the province of Mr. J. O. P. Bland, has suggested the separation of Germany west of the Rhine and north of Lorraine from Prussia, and its establishment as an autonomous neutral State within the German Zollverein. Perhaps some real statesman will make a suggestion.—Very sincerely yours,

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*The Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY cannot undertake
to return unaccepted MSS.*

THE
NINETEENTH
CENTURY
AND AFTER



No. CCCCLIX—MAY 1915

A FAMILY COUNCIL

Our recognition of this War as ours, our participation in it, spontaneous and voluntary as it is, determines absolutely once for all that we have passed from the status of the protected colony to that of the participating nation. The protected colony was rightly voiceless; the participating nation cannot continue so. The hand that wields the sword of the Empire justly holds the sceptre of the Empire; while the Mother Country alone wielded the one, to her alone belonged the other. When as to-day the nations of the Empire join in wielding that sword, then must they jointly sway that sceptre.—The Hon. C. J. DOHERTY, Canadian Minister of Justice, at Toronto.

THE public must be getting slightly impatient of reiterated reminders that in this matter or that we are approaching the 'parting of the ways.' But reiteration, though it may provoke rejoinder, does not impair the strength of facts. By general consent there has been, in these last months, an awakening of the national conscience, a readiness, even an anxiety, to go into the confessional and to make amends for national negligences and backslidings. There is some danger lest the crank should exploit this prevailing mood to the advantage of his own peculiar hobby. No such suspicion can, however,

attach to the impressive warning uttered, a few weeks ago, by Lord Milner. Speaking at the Royal Colonial Institute he said :

It does not follow that because the Dominions have played up so splendidly in the War which they had no part in declaring, they would be equally ready to endorse a peace which they would have no share in making and had never been consulted about.

He reminded his hearers that the existing constitutional position of the Empire is 'a very peculiar not to say a precarious' one.

The Dominions are liable to be involved and as a matter of fact are involved in the most terrible and momentous experience which can befall a nation, a great war, without having any share, any control, or voice whatever in the policy which led to that result. This is absolutely unsound and in the long run impossible. It is contrary to all the traditions and most-deep-seated political instincts of our race.¹

Lord Milner's warning was neither academic nor inopportune. On the contrary, it was high time that someone in his position—some one of the very few English statesmen who can command the ear not only of people in this country but of Englishmen oversea—should call attention to a danger which, if unheeded, may involve the Empire in irretrievable disaster. And that, pre-eminently, for two reasons. We have had plenty of warnings against the folly of dividing the bear's skin before the bear is killed. But not content with this, there are some among us who, doubtless with the best intentions in the world, have raised a protest against dividing the bear's skin at all. It should be our part, they urge, to prove the purity of our motives in waging the present War by definitely repudiating the idea of territorial aggrandisement, and even, as far as we ourselves are concerned, of financial indemnity. I do not know that even the unco' guid suggest that a similar act of abnegation should be recommended to our Allies; and if it were only insular Britain that was involved in the War such counsels of perfection might perhaps be followed without much difficulty or danger. But Germany has, since the 4th of August 1914, been at war not with Great Britain and Ireland only but with the British Empire, and with the British Empire she will continue to be at war until a definitive peace is concluded. In the territorial settlement after the War the Overseas Dominions are vitally interested, and we have no right, even for the sake of maintaining our altruistic virtues, to be virtuous and generous at the expense of the sister-nations. It is well, therefore, that the Dominions should have a definite and authoritative assur-

¹ Speech at the Royal Colonial Institute, March 25, 1915.

ance that no settlement shall be made, or even contemplated, without consultation with them.

There is, however, another reason why Lord Milner's warning was opportune. A good deal of misconception has already arisen from the curt announcement recently made in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It will not be forgotten that, according to the resolution adopted by the Conference of 1907, meetings of the Imperial Conference were thenceforward to be quadrennial. A Conference accordingly met in 1911 and another is due during the present summer. On the 5th of February, however, Mr. Harcourt, in answer to a question, made the following statement: 'In consultation with all the Dominions it has been decided that it is undesirable to hold the normal meeting of the Imperial Conference this year.'

No one will be disposed to quarrel with this decision. Neither Ministers at home nor the Premiers of the Dominions have leisure just now for the work of an Imperial Conference of the normal type. But, in order to remove the possibility of misapprehension, Mr. Harcourt's announcement ought, surely, to have been accompanied by an assurance, that even if the *normal* Conference were unavoidably postponed, it was the intention of the Home Ministry to take counsel with the Dominion Governments as to the terms of the after-war settlement.² Had the Colonial Secretary taken this course he would have set at rest questionings and suspicions which, in the circumstances, are not merely natural but inevitable. For what is the present position of the self-governing Dominions in the Imperial Economy?

II

Precisely four years ago, on the eve of the Imperial Conference of 1911, I was permitted, in the pages of this Review, to call attention to the glaring anomaly which characterised, and still unfortunately characterises, the relations between the Mother Country and the self-governing Dominions.³ I then recalled the fact that no less than thirty years ago the Right Hon. W. E. Forster had, through the same medium,⁴ lent the weight of his great authority to a similar complaint. To grant to the Colonies complete domestic autonomy, but at the same time to deny to them any official or effective voice in foreign policy is, as Mr. Forster had argued, to rely on contradictory

² Since the above words were written Mr. Harcourt has made a further, fuller, and more satisfactory statement to the House of Commons. Cf. *infra*, pp. 981-2.

³ 'Why Halt Ye?' *Nineteenth Century and After*, May 1911.

⁴ 'Imperial Federation' and 'A Few More Words on Imperial Federation,' *Nineteenth Century*, February and March 1885.

principles of government. Australia, in particular, had recently discovered, to her grave and perhaps permanent detriment, how serious were the disabilities under which, in these respects, the Colonies laboured. The Australian and New Zealand Colonies were at that time profoundly chagrined by the action or rather the inaction of the Colonial Office, then under the unimaginative rule of Lord Derby, in reference to New Guinea and the Samoan Islands. Mr. (afterwards Sir James) Service, at that time Premier of Victoria, had lately given vigorous expression to the sentiment prevailing in the Australasian Colonies. He complained, and justly, that despite the concession of 'responsible' government to the greater Colonies the Imperial authority still remained, as regards foreign policy, 'to all intents and purposes an unqualified autocracy.'

Subjects of this part of the Empire [he insisted] may be deeply interested in the action or it may be the inaction of the Imperial authorities, but they have no voice or vote in those Councils of the Empire to which Her Majesty's Ministers are responsible.

Autonomous in domestic matters, the Dominions still occupy, in reference to external affairs, the position of 'outside petitioners to the Colonial Office.' Nor did Service seek to disguise the fact that 'the weakness of this position has at times been most disadvantageously apparent and its humiliation keenly felt.'

Two years later the first Colonial Conference assembled. The precise moment (1887) was perhaps suggested by the coincidence of the Jubilee celebrations; but many other things contributed to the momentous decision taken by Lord Salisbury's Government. In proroguing Parliament in 1886 the Queen gave expression to a sentiment which was very generally entertained:

I am led to the conviction that there is on all sides a growing desire to draw closer in every practicable way the bonds which unite the various portions of the Empire. I have authorised communications to be entered into with the principal Colonial Governments with a view to the fuller consideration of matters of common interest.

The Queen's conviction was doubtless inspired by the wave of Imperial sentiment which was at the moment sweeping over the country. The bungling of the Gladstone Government in regard to New Guinea and Samoa; the enthusiasm evoked by the participation of Colonial troops in the recent Egyptian campaign; the defeat of Mr. Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill and the great Unionist victory in 1886; the 'splendid isolation' of Great Britain in European diplomacy; the seizure of Penjdeh by Russia and the anticipated attack upon India; and, not least, the devoted labours of the once-derided Imperial Federation League, then at the zenith of its influence both at home and in

the overseas Dominions—all these and other things tended to stimulate Imperial patriotism. The Government wisely seized the occasion, thus obviously presented to them, for a step forward in the development of Imperial unity.

With characteristic caution the subject of Imperial Federation—indeed of constitutional relations—was expressly excluded from the agenda of the 1887 Conference. In their letter of invitation the Government had expressed the opinion that ‘it might be detrimental to a more developed system of united action if a question not yet ripe for practical decision were now to be brought to the test of a formal examination.’ The same point was taken by Lord Salisbury in his opening address.

Notwithstanding this prudent embargo it was impossible to conceal the dissatisfaction of some of the greater Colonies with the anomalous and humiliating position in which they were placed. Mr. Deakin in particular, speaking on behalf of the Australasian colonies, gave courteous but caustic expression to their sentiments :

We have observed with close interest the discussion that has taken place in the Mother Country upon the question of a spirited foreign policy. There are some of us who live in hopes to see it a vital issue in the politics of Great Britain as to whether there shall not be a spirited Colonial policy as well; because we find that other nations are pursuing a policy which might fairly be described as a spirited Colonial policy. One has only to turn to the despatches which have passed between this country and the Australian Colonies upon the subject of New Guinea and the New Hebrides, and to compare them with the despatches published in the same Blue Book, taken from the White Book of the German Empire, and with the extracts of despatches issued by the French Colonial Office, to notice the marked difference of tone. The despatches received from England, with reference to English activity in these seas, exhibited only the disdain and indifference with which English enterprise was treated in the Colonial Office, and by contrast one was compelled to notice the eagerness with which the French and German statesmen received the smallest details of information as to the movements of their traders in those particular seas, and the zeal with which they hastened to support them. . . . We hope that from this time forward Colonial policy will be considered Imperial policy; and that Colonial interests will be considered and felt to be Imperial interests; and that they will be carefully studied, and that when once they are understood they will be most determinedly upheld.*

The language is restrained but the sentiment is unmistakable. Nor was the Conference allowed to close without a more specific reference to the constitutional problem. At the concluding session Sir Samuel Griffith, as ‘the oldest actual Minister

* *Report of Conference*, pp. 24-25, quoted ap. Jebb's *The Imperial Conference*—a valuable work of reference from which many of my citations are taken, and to which I desire to acknowledge my obligations.

present,' gave expression to a thought which, on this historic occasion, was in many minds :

I consider that this Conference does comprise what may perhaps be called the rudimentary elements of a Parliament; but it has been a peculiarity of our British institutions that those which have been found most durable are those which have grown up from institutions which were in the first instance of a rudimentary character. It is impossible to predicate now what form future Conferences should take, or in what mode some day further effect would be given to their conclusions, but I think we may look forward to seeing this sort of informal Council of the Empire develop until it becomes a legislative body, at any rate a consultative body, and some day, perhaps, a legislative body under conditions that we cannot just now foresee.

Ten years were destined to elapse before the Conference met again in the capital of the Empire. But from the point of view of Imperial solidarity, the interval was not wholly unfruitful. In 1894 a Conference met at Ottawa and dealt mainly with questions of Imperial communications and commerce. More important than the Ottawa Conference was the fact that on the formation of Lord Salisbury's Ministry, in 1895, the leader of the Liberal-Unionist wing in the House of Commons selected as his post the Secretaryship of State for the Colonies. Mr. Chamberlain's accession to the Colonial Office must be regarded as one of the significant political events in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Ever since his rupture with Mr. Gladstone on the Home Rule question Mr. Chamberlain's mind had been moving steadily towards the project of Imperial unification. In this intellectual evolution he was avowedly influenced by the example of Germany.

We have [he said, speaking at the annual dinner of the Canada Club in 1896] a great example before us in the creation of the German Empire. How was that brought about? You all recollect that, in the first instance, it commenced with the union of two of the States which now form that great Empire in a commercial Zollverein. They attracted the other States gradually—were joined by them for commercial purposes. A Council, or Reichsrath, was formed to deal with those commercial questions. Gradually in their discussions national objects and political interests were introduced, and so, from starting as it did on a purely commercial basis and for commercial interests, it developed until it became a bond of unity and the foundation of the German Empire.*

On the same text Mr. Chamberlain preached to the Congress of Chambers of Commerce of the Empire which met in London in 1896.

If we had a commercial union throughout the Empire, of course there would have to be a Council of the Empire. . . . Gradually, therefore,

* *Foreign and Colonial Speeches*, ap. Jebb, i. 306.

by that prudent and experimental process by which all our greatest institutions have slowly been built up we should, I believe, approach to a result which would be little, if at all, distinguished from a real federation of the Empire.'

In 1897, when representatives from every part of the Empire had come together in London for the celebration of Queen Victoria's 'Diamond' Jubilee, another Colonial Conference assembled under the presidency of the Colonial Secretary. Mr. Chamberlain's opening address marked an epoch in the history of imperial copartnership. It was incomparably the boldest and frankest utterance to which colonial statesmen had ever been treated by a responsible Minister of the Crown. At Ottawa there had been no discussion of the constitutional problem, and the Home Government had been represented by Lord Jersey, an ex-proconsul, who was politically opposed to the Liberal Ministry which, in 1894, was in office in England. The London meeting of 1897 was on a totally different plane, and in no respect was its enhanced significance more marked than by the position assigned to the constitutional problem by the President of the Conference.

I feel [he said] that there is a real necessity for some better machinery of consultation between the self-governing Colonies and the Mother Country, and it has sometimes struck me—I offer it now merely as a personal suggestion—that it might be feasible to create a great council of the Empire to which the Colonies would send representative plenipotentiaries—not mere delegates who were unable to speak in their name, without further reference to their respective Governments, but persons who by their position in the Colonies, by their representative character, and by their close touch with Colonial feeling, would be able upon all subjects submitted to them to give really effective and valuable advice. If such a council were created it would at once assume an immense importance, and it is perfectly evident that it might develop into something still greater. It might slowly grow to that Federal Council to which we must always look forward as our ultimate ideal.'

No resolution was adopted or even proposed on the subject so near to the heart of the President, though the *Report* testifies to the fact that among some of the Colonial Premiers there was a strong feeling 'that the present relations could not continue indefinitely.'

Five years later (1902) the Conference again met in London under the same presidency. During the interval a great crisis in the history of the Empire had matured and been successfully surmounted. The wonderful loyalty displayed by the Dominions during the South African war; the deep chord of sympathy and solidarity touched, in every part of the Empire, by the passing

' *Foreign and Colonial Speeches*, ap. Jebb, i. 310-311.

• *Ibid.* i. 322.

of the great Queen ; the crowning of her son, coincident with the assembling of the Conference of 1902, might well have inspired a statesman less imaginative than Mr. Chamberlain with exceptional hopefulness as to the immediate future. Much of the discussion turned upon the question of preferential trade within the Empire—a project to which the Colonial Secretary gave his enthusiastic support. But this is not the point with which this article is concerned. On the constitutional issue Mr. Chamberlain was explicit : he again avowed his own desire for ‘ a real council of the Empire to which all questions of Imperial interest might be referred,’ and at the same time he threw out a frank suggestion to his Colonial colleagues.

If you are prepared, at any time, to take any share, any proportionate share, in the burdens of the Empire, we are prepared to meet you with any proposal for giving to you a corresponding voice in the policy of the Empire.

Of exceptional interest, in this connexion, was the resolution actually adopted by the Conference of 1902. The text of the Resolution is as follows :

That so far as may be consistent with the confidential negotiations of treaties with foreign Powers, the views of the Colonies affected should be obtained in order that they may be in a better position to give adhesion to such treaties.

The principle is very cautiously affirmed, but its significance is enhanced rather than impaired by the delicate consideration shown towards the susceptibilities of the Foreign Office and the Home Government generally, and by the obvious apprehension of the difficulties with which questions of foreign policy are necessarily surrounded. None the less is it clear that the self-governing Dominions were at last coming within sight of the goal discerned, in the far-off days, by Sir James Service and Mr. W. E. Forster. At last they were acknowledged to have some interest in the foreign policy of the Empire of which they were constituent parts. The acknowledgment did not so far, it is true, amount to much ; but it was valuable as a beginning.

Another important step was taken by the Conference of 1902 towards the regularisation and definition of the constitution of the Conference itself and the periodicity of its meetings. Future Conferences were to be held, ‘ as far as practicable, at intervals not exceeding four years,’ and questions of common interest were to be considered ‘ as between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Prime Ministers of the self-governing Colonies.’

Before the time came for the meeting of the next Conference

Mr. Chamberlain had ceased to be Colonial Secretary, and it fell to his successor, Mr. Alfred Lyttelton, to summon it. In doing so Mr. Lyttelton, himself an ardent disciple of his predecessor, made an important suggestion. In his view the time had come for transforming the 'Colonial Conference' into an 'Imperial Council,' which should possess a continuous existence maintained by the creation of a supplementary commission and a permanent Secretariat. Tentatively though the suggestion was put forward, it excited some apprehension in Canada, but before the Conference met in 1907 the Unionist Government had fallen, and the presidency devolved upon a statesman, experienced, courteous, and businesslike, but eminently unimaginative, the Earl of Elgin.

Nevertheless, the Conference of 1907 marked some definite progress along the path which we are endeavouring to retread. Undaunted by the obvious lowering of the Imperial temperature, and notwithstanding the expressed hostility of His Majesty's Government, the Colonial representatives unanimously reaffirmed the famous 'Preference' resolution of 1902. They also made a determined attempt, on the lines indicated by Mr. Lyttelton's despatch, to emancipate the 'Conference' from the control of the Colonial Office. The bureaucratic instincts of the 'Office' were, however, too strong for the young Dominions, and the effective parts of the resolution as ultimately adopted ran as follows :

That it will be to the advantage of the Empire if a Conference, to be called the *Imperial Conference*, is held every four years, at which questions of common interest may be discussed and considered as between *His Majesty's Government and His Governments of the self-governing Dominions beyond the seas*. . . . That it is desirable to establish a system by which the several Governments represented shall be kept informed during the periods between the Conferences in regard to matters which have been or may be subjects for discussion, by means of a permanent secretarial staff, charged, *under the direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies*, with the duty of obtaining information for the use of the Conference, of attending to its resolutions, and of conducting correspondence on matters relating to its affairs.

Three points which I have italicised in the text are worthy of note : (i) the term 'Colonial' has been definitely and finally abandoned in favour of 'Imperial' ; (ii) Dominion ministries are for the first time referred to as 'His Majesty's' ; and (iii) the proposed permanent Secretariat was still to be associated with the 'Office.'

The third point represents, as I have hinted above, a victory for the British bureaucracy. On the second there was an instructive and significant debate, indicative of the desire of the

Dominion Executives to be regarded as co-ordinate in status with 'His Majesty's Government' at home, and as, equally with its members, 'Servants of the King.' The wording, as eventually adopted, was a rather clumsy but not insignificant compromise. Four years later Sir Wilfrid Laurier was able to claim that the discussions of 1907 'were productive of material and even important results,' and it is interesting to note that in his opinion the most important of those results was 'to substitute for the kind of ephemeral Colonial Conferences which had taken place before a real Imperial system of periodical Conferences between the Government of His Majesty the King in the United Kingdom and' (the precise phrase is noteworthy) 'the Governments of His Majesty the King in the Dominions beyond the seas.'

One other point in the proceedings of 1907 demands notice. As in 1887, the Australasian delegates were gravely perturbed by the proceedings of the Foreign Office in regard to the problems of the Pacific. In 1906, after years of wobbling indecision, the British Government had suddenly, without consultation with the Commonwealth or with New Zealand, concluded with France a Convention in regard to the New Hebrides. The whole transaction exhibited a flagrant disregard for the susceptibilities and interests of the people most closely concerned, and aroused bitter and just indignation amongst them. To this feeling Mr. Seddon, one of the most stout-hearted and whole-minded Imperialists, gave vigorous expression only a few hours before his lamented death (June 1906).

The Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments are incensed at the Imperial Government Conference fixing conditions of dual protectorate in the New Hebrides without first consulting the Colonies so deeply interested. The Imperial Government calls upon us now for advice upon what is already decided, making our difficulties very great. The entire subject is of vital importance to the Commonwealth and New Zealand. We ought to have been represented at the Conference. If anybody had been there for us who knew anything about the subject, the result would have been very different. Whoever represented Britain, French diplomacy was too much for them. I cannot honourably say anything further, my hands and tongue are tied by the Imperial Government, but I wish I had the power of Joshua to make the sun stand still.¹⁰

Mr. Seddon's last message to the Empire was re-echoed in the speech of Mr. Deakin at the Conference of 1907. That speech¹¹ deserves to be recalled and carefully pondered at the present juncture. In it he referred to 'the indifferent attitude

¹⁰ *Minutes of Conference of 1911*, Cd. 5745, p. 24.

¹¹ Cf. *Minutes of Proceedings*, Cd. 3523, pp. 548-560.

¹² Drummond, *Life of R. J. Seddon*, p. 365, ap. Jebb, op. cit. ii. 269-270.

of statesmen in this country to British interests in the Pacific'; to the time now past when 'the anxiety of public men in this country was to avoid under any circumstances the assumption of more responsibilities and a great willingness to part with any they possessed'; to a feeling—'an exasperated feeling' thus created in Australia—that British Imperial interests in that ocean have been mishandled from the first'; to the gross bungling of the Home Government in regard to New Guinea and the New Hebrides; to the misrepresentation of the Australians as a 'grasping people,' the truth being that 'it is not a series of grasping annexations that we have been attempting, but a series of aggravated and exasperating losses which we have had to sustain'; and finally to the scandalous treatment of the Commonwealth in reference to the conclusion of the New Hebrides Convention. Mr. Deakin revived the memory of unfortunate incidents only, as he said, 'as warnings for the future and in order to explain the feeling that exists.' To the indictment of the Home Government's procedure—their 'take it or leave it' attitude—there was in reality no answer. Speeches such as Mr. Deakin's, so admirable in restraint, so grave in substance, may well make one despair of the Colonial Office, or any other office in London, ever learning wisdom in regard to the concerns of the Empire. The blunder made by the Gladstone Government in 1884 was, with singular fidelity to discredited precedent, repeated by the Campbell-Bannerman Ministry in 1906, and Mr. Harcourt, it would appear, has been within an ace of again repeating it in 1915. It is to be hoped that Lord Milner and Mr. Fisher have between them contrived to save him from so colossal a blunder.

The mere possibility of its repetition gives additional point to the attempt made by New Zealand, at the Conference of 1911, to put the constitutional arrangements of the Empire upon a less unsatisfactory footing. With this laudable intention Sir Joseph Ward, the New Zealand Premier, moved a resolution which (as amended in the course of the debate) ran as follows :

That the Empire has now reached a stage of Imperial development which renders it expedient that there should be an Imperial Council of State, with representatives from all the self-governing parts of the Empire, in theory and in fact advisory to the Imperial Government on all questions affecting the interests of his Majesty's Dominions overseas.

The atmosphere of the 1911 Conference was, from an Imperial standpoint, unquestionably ungenial; the audience to which Sir Joseph Ward addressed himself was unsympathetic, not to say actually hostile; he was not proof against the frequent and trenchant interruptions of the British Premier, and the speech

with which the motion was introduced quite failed to do justice to its immensely important theme. Sir Joseph seemed to be constantly shifting his sails to catch any breeze that might be passing, and he shifted them with conspicuous ill-success; the only result was to make the course of his argument curiously unsteady. The New Zealand Premier's motion found no support, even from Australia, and but for the courteous demeanour of the President and the members of the Conference it might almost have been said *solvuntur risu tabulae*. Sir Joseph Ward, if not laughed out of court, was certainly left in splendid isolation. Mr. Asquith himself took refuge, *more suo*, in a constitutional *non possumus*.

Sir Joseph Ward's proposal . . . would impair if not altogether destroy the authority of the Government of the United Kingdom in such grave matters as the conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the declaration and maintenance of peace, or the declaration of war, and, indeed, all those relations with foreign Powers, necessarily of the most delicate character, which are now in the hands of the Imperial Government, subject to its responsibility to the Imperial Parliament. That authority cannot be shared, and the co-existence side by side with the Cabinet of the United Kingdom of this proposed body—it does not matter by what name you call it for the moment—clothed with the functions and the jurisdiction which Sir Joseph Ward proposed to invest it with, would, in our judgment, be absolutely fatal to our present system of responsible government. . . . We cannot, with the traditions and the history of the British Empire behind us, either from the point of view of the United Kingdom or from the point of view of our self-governing Dominions, assent for a moment to proposals which are so fatal to the very fundamental conditions on which our Empire has been built up and carried on.¹²

From a debating point of view Mr. Asquith was able to score an easy victory over a not too redoubtable antagonist; but the edge of his argument was a good deal blunted by a communication which he made to the Conference in the first sentence of his speech. He had, as he informed them, received a memorial from something like three hundred members of the Imperial House of Commons 'belonging to various parties in the State' in the following terms:

We, the undersigned Members of Parliament, representing various political parties, are of the opinion that the time has arrived to take practical steps to associate the oversea Dominions in a more practical manner with the conduct of Imperial affairs, if possible, by means of an established representative council of an advisory character in touch with public opinion throughout the Empire.¹³

It is obvious therefore that, for once, the House of Commons was prepared to move faster than the Imperial Conference,

¹² *Minutes of Conference*, Cd. 5745, p. 71.

¹³ *Ibid.* p. 71.

though it is true that the memorial of the House of Commons was in general terms, while Sir Joseph Ward attempted, with indifferent success it must be admitted, to descend to particulars. The truth is that the constitutional resolution did not, in 1911, have a fair chance, and, in the circumstances, it is regrettable that it was moved. The sole consolation is that Sir Joseph Ward did not press his motion to a division, for he would have been left in a minority of one : a position which would have reflected the merits of the debate, but not those of the resolution.

Deplorable as was the issue of the constitutional debate, the Conference of 1911 will remain for ever memorable in the history of Imperial unity by reason of the survey of the foreign policy of the Empire, communicated in private to the members of the Conference by Sir Edward Grey.

Hitherto [as Mr. Fisher admirably expressed it] we have been negotiating with the Government of the United Kingdom at the portals of the household. You have thought it wise to take the representatives of the Dominions into the inner counsels of the nation and frankly discuss with them the affairs of the Empire as they affect each and all of us. . . . I think no greater step has ever been taken or can be taken by any responsible advisers of the King.

No outsider can possibly estimate the value of the confidential communication made by the Foreign Secretary to the delegates from the Dominions. But it is safe to surmise that the magnificent outburst of loyalty displayed in 1914 by the Dominions, their instant and apparently almost intuitive apprehension of the points at issue in the European War, must have been due, in no small degree, to the precise and accurate grasp of the European situation obtained, at first-hand, during the Conference of 1911.

It is, however, worthy of note that the immediate effect of Sir Edward Grey's intervention in the discussion of the Declaration of London was to stimulate and emphasise the desire of the Dominions that they should be taken into consultation in regard to the conclusion of Treaties. The precise procedure is instructive. On the 1st of June Mr. Fisher moved : 'That it is regretted that the Dominions were not consulted prior to the acceptance by the British delegates of the terms of the Declaration of London. . . .' Upon that motion Sir Edward Grey spoke,¹⁴ and on the 2nd of June the Conference resolved :

That this Conference after hearing the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs cordially welcomes the proposals of the Imperial Government, viz.

¹⁴This speech, which will be found in *Minutes of Proceedings*, Cd. 5745, pp. 103-115, is quite distinct from the general survey of foreign affairs made *in camera* to the Committee of Defence.

(a) That the Dominions shall be afforded an opportunity of consultation when framing the instructions to be given to British delegates at future meetings of the Hague Conference, and that Conventions affecting the Dominions provisionally assented to at that Conference shall be circulated among the Dominion Governments for their consideration before any such Convention is signed; (b) that a similar procedure where time and opportunity and the subject-matter permit shall, as far as possible, be used when preparing instructions for the negotiation of other International Agreements affecting the Dominions.

The discussion itself was on a high plane, and in the course of it very serious objection was taken to the autocratic procedure of the Home Government in reference to Treaties which vitally concern the interests of the Dominions. Even General Botha, who throughout the Conference invariably spoke with characteristic modesty and marked consideration for the Home Government, was constrained, on this matter, to express his

profound conviction that it is in the highest interest of the Empire that the Imperial Government should not definitely bind itself by any promise or agreement with a foreign country which may affect a particular Dominion, without consulting the Dominion concerned.

The sentiments of General Botha were the sentiments of all the self-governing Dominions. But if the Dominions were thus concerned in 1911 about Treaties in general, and the Declaration of London in particular, how would they be likely to regard an attempt to make terms of peace, at the conclusion of the present War, without consultation with the 'participating nations' of the Empire?

III

It has seemed advisable to trace, in something of detail, the growth of the idea of Imperial copartnership in foreign affairs, in order to enforce the conclusion to which I desire to obtain assent. The conditions of world-politics have changed with amazing rapidity during the last quarter of a century. Even at the date of the first Colonial Conference (1887) the Pacific Colonies were resentful of the constitutional arrangements under which they were excluded from all share in the foreign policy of the Empire, indeed from all first-hand knowledge of the course of Imperial diplomacy. If such exclusion was intolerable to the growing democracies in 1887, how much more so, when, owing to the development of means of communication, the area of world-politics has notably contracted; when the Pacific communities find themselves in close contact with Western Powers; when the progress of the Yellow races has introduced a new problem of great complexity into international and even

into domestic politics; when, by repeated Conferences, the Dominions have gained larger experience of affairs, and when, by local federations or unifications, they have themselves attained a more important and more assured status in the Imperial Economy.

All this, however, might have been affirmed with accuracy twelve months ago. But will anyone pretend that things stand to-day, even as they stood in July 1914? Reference has already been made to the superb response made by the Overseas Dominions and Dependencies to the call of Imperial patriotism. If there was one thing more than another upon which our enemies counted confidently, it was upon the defection of the Dependencies and the indifference of the Dominions. The whole world knows to-day how little the issue has corresponded with the forecast. Canada has to-day over 100,000 men under arms, and there are more, if called for, to come. 'Two hundred and three hundred thousand men, if that many are needed,' said Sir Robert Borden, 'will be Canada's contribution to the defence of the Empire.' In Canada itself there is only one fear and one criticism, that the Dominion Government has been too dilatory in the despatch of the contingents. To that criticism, said Sir George Foster, speaking a few days ago at Toronto,

there is just one answer. Lord Kitchener knows how many he wants, when he wants them, and how he proposes to handle them, and it has been left entirely in his hands. When he asks for them they will be ready. He is the man who calls, and we are the people who are ready to answer his call. Just so long as the calls follow each other, just so long will Canada answer the calls in obedience to country and Empire.¹⁸

And the quality of the troops is as fine as the quantity is large. Nor has Canada given only of her sons. She has sent munificent gifts to England, and has afforded succour to our suffering Allies. Australia is not behind Canada. Some 40,000 troops have already left her shores, and she has undertaken to send drafts of 3000 men every two months. The latest message from Sydney (April 15) states :

At the reassembling of the Federal Parliament Mr. Fisher, the Prime Minister, said that the unchangeable policy of the Government was to train, equip, and transport to the seat of War every available man.¹⁹

More notable still : the Australian Navy has already taken its share in the superb work achieved by British Sea-Power. It has defended the Australian coasts from the attacks of German cruisers; it has helped to keep open the trade routes of the

¹⁸ *The Times* ('From our own correspondent'), April 14, 1915.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* April 16.

Empire; it has covered the New Zealand Expedition to Samoa and the Australian Expedition to New Guinea; and to it has fallen the honour—most happily and appropriately—of inflicting the *coup de grâce* upon the notorious commerce-raider the *Emden*.¹⁷ In Canada and Australasia nothing has been more remarkable than the unanimity of Imperial sentiment. In South Africa it has been otherwise, and if there is one subject of King George who has deserved better of his Empire than another it is General Louis Botha. History alone can record at what sacrifice of personal feelings, with what single-minded and simple devotion to duty that great soldier and great statesman has accomplished the task of saving South Africa to the Crown and the Empire. Nor has the great Dependency of India lagged behind the self-governing Dominions in its conception of duty to the Empire of which it forms one of the brightest ornaments.

To the world at large all these things have long been known, and a knowledge of them would now appear to be penetrating Germany itself. A few weeks ago there appeared in *Der Tag*—a Berlin publication—a remarkable article.

We have been mistaken [it confessed] in many of our calculations. We thought that all India would rise and rebel at the first sound of guns in Europe, and now we see thousands and ten thousands of Indians fighting with the British against us. We thought that the British Empire would fall to pieces, but the British Colonies are more closely united to the Mother Country than they have ever been before. We awaited a victorious rising in British South Africa, and we have seen only a fiasco.¹⁸

The extent of German miscalculation should be the measure of our own gratitude. Not that the Dominions look for gratitude. They take the 'finer and truer view that the Dominions are not so much helping England as sharing in a fight for their own existence.'¹⁹ This is indeed the naked fact. Unless and until England is at peace, the whole Empire must be at war; and if that war be with a first-class Power it must needs be a war for the very existence of the Empire.

The more clearly this truth is apprehended the more imperative will it appear not merely that no tactlessness should impair the solidarity of sentiment between the scattered members of the British family, but that no effort should be spared to avoid even the appearance of bureaucratic exclusiveness or aloofness. The sacrifices made during these last months by the Dominions, the

¹⁷ For further details cf. the valuable reports from Canada and Australia respectively to the *Round Table* for March 1915.

¹⁸ Quoted from the *Petit Parisien* by the Paris correspondent of *The Daily Mail* (March 28, 1915).

¹⁹ The phrase occurs in an admirably instructive despatch from their Australian correspondent to *The Times* (March 27, 1915).

sacrifices which will indubitably be demanded of them in the months to come, give them a clear right, apart from all considerations of policy, to three things : (i) to *continuous* information in regard to the course of British diplomacy ; (ii) to a definite voice in the negotiation and conclusion of treaties in general ; and (iii) to a substantial share in the conduct of negotiations preparatory to the ' Peace ' treaties in particular.

This is the minimum for which the Dominion Governments may legitimately look, or rather it is the minimum which should be spontaneously offered to them by the Imperial Executive.

Can this minimum be guaranteed without replacing the existing constitutional machinery ? It is impossible to conceive anything finer than the temper exhibited at this crisis by the leading statesmen of the Colonies. ' What the British Government considers to be the correct thing is good enough for my Government. That is all,' said Mr. Fisher recently, ' I have to say.' It is a magnificent spirit ; but the fact that it exists renders it the more imperative that no avoidable strain should be imposed upon loyalty so trustful and spontaneous.

Is there no danger of the Imperial Cabinet presuming too far upon the generosity of the Dominions ?

I cheerfully fall in [wrote Mr. Fisher to Mr. Harcourt on February 15] with the decision not to hold the Imperial Conference this year, *though I have not been able [the italics are mine] to convince myself that the reasons given for postponing were sufficient.*

Interviewed on the 15th of April, after Mr. Harcourt's supplementary statement to the House of Commons on the 14th of April (see note *supra*, p. 967), the Premier of the Commonwealth said ' It is something to know that the Dominions will be consulted when peace is restored, but my advice is do not wait for that time if an earlier meeting is possible.'²⁰ This is indeed acquiescence, but it tends to prove that the danger to which I have alluded is not wholly imaginary. Nor can any impartial observer maintain that the attitude of the Colonial Secretary satisfactorily fulfils the *minimum* conditions enumerated above. On the 5th of February the House of Commons was curtly told that there would be no ' normal ' meeting of the Imperial Conference this year. Nine weeks later it was tardily informed that the intimation as to the postponement of the Conference was accompanied by an assurance that it was the intention of the Imperial Government to consult the Dominion Premiers ' most fully and, if possible, personally when the time arrives to discuss possible terms of peace.' Why was the knowledge of

²⁰ *The Times*, April 16.

this valuable assurance withheld from the House of Commons on the 5th of February? And, though valuable, is it sufficient? Mr. Fisher is plainly still unconvinced, and I confess to sharing his lack of conviction.

It is unfortunately impossible, in this connexion, to ignore the bad record of the Office which Mr. Harcourt represents. However sincere the cordiality of individual officials, the 'Office' has not outlived or overcome the pernicious habit of regarding the Colonies as children to be humoured or even occasionally spoilt, but not to be treated with complete confidence, not to be entrusted with full information, least of all to be considered as responsible partners in the Imperial concern.

Nor can we, again in the same connexion, get away from the statement of Mr. Asquith, already quoted.²¹ The authority of the Imperial Government, 'subject to its responsibility to the Imperial Parliament,' cannot be shared; to it exclusively belong 'such grave matters as the conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the declaration and maintenance of peace. . . .' As a lucid and logical exposition of the accepted constitutional conventions, Mr. Asquith's statement was, of course, unexceptionable. Does he still adhere to it? If so, how is it to be reconciled with the assurance recently given by his colleague at the Colonial Office to the Premiers of the self-governing Dominions?

A much more important question remains to be answered. How is Mr. Asquith's exposition of constitutional doctrine to be reconciled, on the one hand, with the facts of the new situation, on the other, with the views recently expressed by responsible statesmen and publicists in the Dominions? One striking expression of Colonial opinion is prefixed to this article. 'We have passed from the status of the protected colony to that of the participating nation. The protected colony was rightly voiceless; the participating nation cannot continue so.' So spake Mr. Doherty at Toronto.²² Australia speaks in similar accents.

After all [wrote the *Times* correspondent in Australia] the War will not be over till peace is made; and in making peace British statesmen will have to represent the Dominions. Is it not worth while, say thoughtful men here, 'for British statesmen to acquaint themselves beforehand with Dominion ideas? All departmental precedent, no doubt, is in favour of settling everything in London first and then telling the overseas Briton what has been decided without his knowledge; but it is not the department's fault that the Empire still holds together, and this is the heaven-sent time for scrapping their precedents (*Times*, March 27, 1915).

²¹ *Supra*, p. 976.

²² 'Canada,' ap. *Round Table*, March 1915.

Even more direct was the address of the Canadian Premier to the students of McGill University :

You young men [he said] will certainly see it when the men of Canada, of Australia, of South Africa, and of the other Dominions will have the same voice in these questions [foreign relations and 'those questions of alliance and understandings which in the end must determine the issues of peace and war'] as those who live in the British Isles.

And again at Winnipeg Sir Robert Borden said :

. . . It is impossible to believe that the existing status, so far as it concerns the control of foreign policy and extra-Imperial relations, can remain as it is to-day. All are conscious of the complexity of the problem thus presented, but no one need despair of a satisfactory solution, and no one can doubt the profound influence which the tremendous events of the past few months and those in the immediate future must exercise upon one of the most interesting and far-reaching questions ever presented for the consideration of statesmen.²³

These are not the utterances of irresponsible and exuberant rhetoricians, but the emphatic warnings of sober-minded and experienced statesmen.

Have the statesmen and the people of the home-land taken them sufficiently to heart? The history of the recent past is replete with unheeded warnings. In order to enforce its lessons I have, in this article, retold a twice-told but too easily forgotten tale. The moral is obvious. What the Dominions desire, and have a right to demand, is to be allowed to receive and to impart continuous information as to the progress of events and the course of diplomatic negotiation in regard to them. Had there been anything like continuous information on both sides, it is impossible to believe that Lord Derby could have committed the blunder in regard to New Guinea in 1884. Australia is to-day intensely and not unreasonably anxious that it should not be repeated. On this point the despatch of *The Times* correspondent, already cited, is full of wise reflection.

However small [he writes] the help [given by Australia], the most graceful recognition of it that England can bestow will be the acknowledgment that her helpers deserve guidance and explanations; and if we take the finer and truer view that the Dominions are not so much helping England as sharing in a fight for their own existence, the wisdom of guiding and enlightening their leaders during the fight and not merely confronting them at the end of it with accomplished facts is unmistakable. . . . More than half the friction between the Colonies and the Mother Country is the direct result of ignorance.²⁴

That is, he adds, why Mr. Fisher has always been a strong advocate of more frequent Conferences. That is, we may surmise, why he is less than half convinced by Mr. Harcourt.

²³ 'Canada,' ap. *Round Table*, March 1915.

²⁴ *The Times*, March 27.

The debate on the New Hebrides Convention at the Conference of 1907 is admirably illustrative of the point I desire to emphasise, that it is not enough to call the Colonies into council at the last moment when treaties are about to be concluded. A still better because more recent illustration is provided by the debate on the Declaration of London in 1911. Virtually the Colonies were told by Sir Edward Grey that they must take it or leave it, as it stood. Plainly Sir Edward Grey was right, as things stood in 1911. But if he had been at pains to inform himself as to the views of the Dominions, before that stage in the negotiation had been reached, they would have been able to debate the terms of the Declaration without a loaded diplomatic pistol at their heads.

'We desire [as Mr. Fisher bluntly said], as far as it is practicable to do so, not only to be consulted after things are done, but to be consulted while you have ideas in your minds and before you begin to carry them out and commit us to them.

That is the essential point.

Has this principle been conceded completely and generously in reference to the peace settlement at the close of the present War? Some publicists would seem to be satisfied that it has. The *Telegraph* (of Sydney) commented as follows upon Mr. Harcourt's declaration of the 14th of April :

The declaration may be regarded as the heading of a new chapter in the history of the Empire, and one of which a year ago the longest-sighted prophet had not the faintest vision. We are at the dawn of a new era of practical relationship between the Motherland and the Oversea Dominions. Difficult as is the task of adjusting the present system of oversea autonomy to the irresistible demand of unity of Imperial policy and Imperial purpose, a way will be found.²⁵

It is sincerely to be hoped that the anticipations of the Australian journal will be justified by the event; that we may indeed see the opening of a 'new chapter in the history of the Empire'; that the old obscurantist policy is a thing of the past, and that the Dominions will at last be admitted to that full and equal partnership which their loyalty and their labours have so richly earned.

One or two points still remain to be made clear.²⁶ Nothing has been said, so far as I am aware, by responsible statesmen in the Dominions indicative of a desire for separate representation in a Peace Conference. If any such demand has been or

²⁵ *The Times*, April 16.

²⁶ It will be observed that I have avoided altogether the larger constitutional issue, for the discussion of which the moment seems inopportune. I dealt with it in the *Nineteenth Century* for May 1911, and I hope to return to it.

were to be urged I should desire emphatically and categorically to dissociate myself from it. The British Empire will take its place in the Peace Conference as a unit. All for which I have pleaded, all that the Dominions desire is, that the British plenipotentiary should go into conference as completely cognisant of the minds of His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions as of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

This he can only do if he has been in personal contact and consultation with responsible Ministers from the Dominions. Written or telegraphic communications will not, for this supremely important purpose, suffice. This, as I understand it, is Mr. Fisher's point. He does not ask for or desire what Mr. Harcourt has called a 'normal' Imperial Conference. Against such a Conference, 'with all the paraphernalia of miscellaneous resolutions, protracted sittings, shorthand reports and resulting Blue-books,' there are, be it admitted, insuperable objections. All that is asked for is full and frank *personal* communication and consultation.

One thing more is indispensable: that the consultations should not only be personal but *timely*. More than half the mischief in the past has arisen from procrastination: from letting things get too far, before consultation. If His Majesty's Government find it possible to fulfil their intention 'to observe the spirit as well as the letter' of Mr. Harcourt's declaration to the Dominions, there can be no fear of a repetition of the blunders of the past.

Even so the Dominions must not and will not expect to get everything they want. No more than anybody else can they look for a diplomatic victory all along the line. On this point Lord Milner, in the statesmanlike speech already quoted, did well to utter a word of warning:

Needless to say in these negotiations we should not be able to have things all our own way. Even if the enemy were to be utterly beaten, it was not Great Britain or even the British Empire which would be the only conqueror. Our Allies who had borne the fiercest brunt of the struggle would have to be considered, and it seemed almost inevitable that any conceivable settlement would disappoint a good many people, and it might prove disappointing, among others, to our fellow-countrymen in Australia, Africa, and America.

This is a wise and timely reminder. It serves, moreover, to emphasise the point which I have been at pains to elaborate. If disappointment be in store for our fellow-countrymen in the Dominions, *quod Di avertant*, it is the more incumbent upon us to make sure that to the pangs of disappointment there should not be added the sting of just resentment against the Imperial Government. Being no longer children they can endure dis-

appointment, but if we treat them as children we cannot complain if they find vent for their disappointment in abusing those who did their utmost to shield them from it. Treat them as equals and they will contentedly share the disappointments of peace, as they have manfully shared the labours and perils of war. Should any difficulties arise the surest solvent will be found in the timely meeting, if not of an Imperial Conference, at least of a family council.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT.

*GERMAN HATE:
ITS CAUSES AND MEANING*

OF all the passions evoked or revealed by the War none is so remarkable as the intense and massive hatred of England¹ displayed by the German people in word and deed. It is the dominant emotion in a welter of strong emotions. It seems to have taken the British public by surprise, and they are inclined to regard it with a rather amused contempt as just another sample of Pretty Fanny's way. The lady is in a tantrum and when she shrieks 'I hate you' she only means that she has what the little girl called a pain in her temper. The outburst is labelled 'hysterical' and dismissed with a smile of tolerant superiority. That is a very great mistake. The epithet 'hysterical,' which has become a hack of controversial journalism and is sadly in need of a good rest, is here even more out of place than usual. Properly used it denotes a simulated condition, primarily of the body—a feigned disease—secondarily of the mind—a feigned emotion—both unstable and evanescent. In that sense it is a useful word with a definite meaning, but constant misuse has deprived it of all force. A weekly newspaper of literary pretensions recently had an article of moderate length about the War, in which the word occurred over forty times, and throughout it signified nothing more specific than the writer's contempt for the object of his remarks. But if it is used in its proper sense and intended to signify that German hatred is an unreal and simulated emotion then it embodies an extremely serious misconception. The Germans are an emotional people and they are apt to pass from one extreme to another, but not suddenly or lightly or without cause. Their emotions are strong and real, and this passion of hatred is the strongest national emotion they have ever displayed. The tendency to deprecate it recently shown by some German newspapers does not signify any weakening of the sentiment. The protest is rather against violent expression, as undignified, than against the feeling expressed, which seems to be universal and to get stronger instead of weaker. We should do better to understand than to deride it. In no case is it a thing to be derided. If it is lasting, which

¹ They always speak of England, and I follow the usage without forgetting or slighting Scotland.

at present seems only too probable, it will be a source of evil from generation to generation, measureless in magnitude and frightful to contemplate. That vision of assured peace which all the nations comfortably promise themselves 'after the War'—a vision difficult enough to realise with general good-will—will be shattered into fragments; and its place will be taken by an endless vista of future strife. I do not know if this can be avoided in any case. At present it is impossible to see how the deep-seated national antagonisms and racial animosities which have found vent in the War—essentially a war of peoples, not of rulers or diplomatists or soldiers—are to be reconciled. But there can be no possible chance of it so long as the poisonous leaven of national hate cherished by the German people remains at work. It is a problem which demands the most serious study. The first step in approaching it is to have a clear conception of the nature of Hate. This may sound rather pedantic, because it is or seems to be such a familiar thing; but current comments on the German outburst and the subject generally, even by thoughtful men, show a very hazy state of mind. That is not surprising for two reasons. The first is that the same word covers several different emotions, and the second is that hate, though one of the strongest passions that move mankind, has been strangely neglected by philosophers and moralists. The only classical authority I know who has paid much attention to it is St. Thomas Aquinas, who allowed no ethical question to escape his marvellously comprehensive and searching vision. Locke mentions hatred briefly in passing, but is content to define it as the thought of pain which anything produces in us, which shows how little he had studied it.

When one examines the usage of the word in English literature one finds many shades of meaning attached to it. In the Bible, for instance, it frequently means no more than indifference. When Solomon says 'He that spareth his rod hateth his son,' he means a father who does not care enough about his son to take the trouble to correct him or one who unintentionally harms him by a fond indulgence. In neither case is there any sense of animosity. In the well-known passage in St. Luke: 'If any man come to me and hate not his father and mother and wife and children and brethren and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple,' the word signifies a state of secondary affection. This usage is obsolete, but the next shade of meaning, which is a mild dislike, is exceedingly common. When people say that they hate rice pudding or railway journeys or cats they only mean that they do not like those things. The feeling is negative and is better expressed by a negative, which may vary from 'do not like' to 'cannot endure.'

The use of the word hate in this sense comes from the trick of over-emphasis in speech. One has no feeling of active hostility to the objects of mere dislike; one simply avoids them. The whole attitude is negative and passive. Nor is it otherwise with stronger degrees of dislike indicated by such words as 'aversion,' 'detestation,' or 'loathing.' They connote a desire to avoid. Real hatred is quite different. It is a much stronger and a positive feeling, the desire not to avoid but to injure or destroy. *Illum odimus cui volumus et operamur malum*, says St. Thomas Aquinas. That is the criterion—the desire to harm the object. Shakespeare puts it still more strongly. In the line 'Hates any man the thing he would not kill?' the will to destroy is posited as the distinguishing mark of hate.

This positive, active, murderous passion always arises from a sense of injury. It rests at bottom on the instinct of self-preservation, which is a fundamental attribute of life. A living creature, when attacked, tries to injure or destroy the attacker so far as it can. The most timid and defenceless creatures, which usually seek to preserve themselves by flight, will 'show fight,' in however feeble a form, when sufficiently pressed. Hence the saying that a worm will turn. This principle naturally finds its fullest expression in the most fully developed form of life, which is man. In other animals its operation is confined to self-defence at the moment of attack. In man it is carried further and extended to a conscious and sustained purpose of antagonism. There may be some exceptions among lower animals. Instances are recorded of a sustained desire to injure—which is hate—cherished by particular animals against some one from whom they have suffered injury, and gratified when opportunity offered. Such behaviour is related of elephants, horses, dogs, cats, and caged animals. If the observation is accurate these animals must be held capable of hate; but the cases are comparatively rare and exceptional. Hate is a pre-eminently human faculty, just as war, to which it often leads, is peculiar to man. The other animals never make war, as we understand it; and when we speak of war as brutal or dehumanising we are using rhetorical terms which embody a hypocritical falsehood and must cause the devil no little amusement.

The injury which causes hate may be (1) actually suffered or (2) expected or (3) imagined. If it be only expected or imagined the hate which it excites is not lasting, though it may be real and intense while it exists. Hate due to injury suffered is associated with the thought of revenge; that due to injury expected with the thought of fear. Locke attributes hate caused by pain suffered to fear, but that is clearly wrong; there need be no fear at all.

He ignored the biological basis. Fear is present in cases of injury suffered, when renewal is expected, which often happens. The combination of injury suffered and expected forms the strongest ground of hate. Injury imagined may simulate either or both for the time being.

The injury, whether suffered or expected or imagined, may be either material or moral or both combined. Material injury is the more common, but moral injury—such as insult, humiliation, wounded honour or self-esteem—may cause a stronger emotion. When the two are combined the effect is greatly intensified. Thus the conclusion is reached that a combination of moral and material injury, both suffered and expected, is the most potent cause of hate in general. The intensity of the feeling further depends on the degree of injury inflicted and on the temperament of the subject, both of which vary indefinitely in particular cases. It is not necessary that the injury should be inflicted directly on the subject in his proper person. Indeed vicarious injury frequently causes more intense hatred than direct. Injury to one's nearest and dearest may be more deeply felt than injury to one's self. This is a very familiar experience. A mother will resent abuse of her children or harm done to them more vehemently than the same treatment of her own person. Similarly a man will exact sterner reparation for injury to his womenfolk than for injury to himself. His right to do so and to take the law into his own hands is practically admitted by the courts, and in the United States it is recognised as the 'unwritten law.' This raises a question in regard to the Christian doctrine of forgiveness which seems to have been overlooked. The forgiveness of injury done to oneself is not the same thing as forgiveness of injury done to others whom one is bound to protect. The latter is not enjoined anywhere by Christian teaching so far as I know, and herein lies, perhaps, the solution of many difficulties. Hatred is excited by injury not only to persons near and dear to us but also to causes which we hold dear, and there is here a spiritual antagonism transcending the biological.

On the other hand, an injury which causes hatred need not be intentionally inflicted. The doer may be quite passive and even unwilling. His mere existence may be felt as an injury and give rise to the desire to remove him. He may 'stand in the way' of the other and be hated for it. This case is not uncommon, though unintentional injury is not recognised as a legitimate cause of hate and its operation implies some baseness of nature. That, however, does not make the hate any less real or formidable.

So far we have been considering hate in general and what

has been said applies to both individual and collective hate. But before going into the case of Germany a word must be said on the two forms and the distinctions between them. German hatred of England is pre-eminently collective; it is a national passion cherished by all sections of the German people and apparently by almost every member, and directed against England as a nation. Such a collective hate can hardly arise without some sense of real injury, but it is more liable to depend on imagined injury than individual hate through the contagion of suggestion. When two individuals animated by the same feeling meet and compare notes, the result is not merely a double quantity of that feeling but an increased intensity also. The quality is changed as well as the quantity, just as a duplex flame burns with greater intensity than a single one and gives more than double the illumination. When this process is extended to masses of people sensibility is heightened in an extraordinary degree and imagination becomes intensely active. When, further, these faculties are constantly and purposely stimulated by a universal medium of inter-communication and mental exchange, they attain their maximum potency and swell what may be in the individual a moderate emotion to extreme dimensions. This has been happening in Germany, where the people are peculiarly subject to 'mass suggestion'; and for an intelligent comprehension of their state of mind it is necessary to separate the elements at work, so far as that is possible.

The German feeling against England is no new or sudden growth. It has been developing for many years. The Bishop of Birmingham has recently traced it back to the time of the Franco-German War from his own recollections. I agree with him broadly, though my own experiences at the same period were different and wholly negative. He says that when the war broke out public opinion wavered at first about England, but finally settled down to a hostile attitude when they learnt that we were to remain neutral, and that in some towns English boys were liable to demonstrations of hostility. I was in Germany at the time and never encountered any signs of hostility. True, it was the South, where the war, which was regarded as the affair of Prussia, was extremely unpopular. But later we went on to Switzerland and stayed at Davos, then very little known. The hotel was full of Germans, some from Prussia, and they were perfectly friendly, although our sympathies were with the French, mainly, I think, because they were getting beaten. Nor did I encounter the least sign of ill-will when I made my way back through Germany all the way from the Lake of Constance to Aix.

It was shortly after Sedan, and the journey took me through

the country quite close to the seat of war. There were plenty of opportunities for observation because the railway was almost wholly devoted to military purposes and travelling was very slow. Only one train in the day was available for passengers and in many places we had to spend hours waiting for it, with nothing to do but stroll about and watch the endless trains passing through with troops in one direction, wounded and prisoners in the other. I was all alone, a forlorn school-boy, though other English people were travelling the same way, and I made friends with the soldiers. No passports were required and no inquiries made. Nothing more unpleasant happened to me than being occasionally brought up sharp by a sentry if I wandered in some forbidden direction. But there was no unfriendliness, nor in the hotels anywhere, where one had to spend a night. At Cologne I came across some other English travellers who took pity on my loneliness, and their experience had been the same as mine.

The Germany of that day was very different from the Germany of this, and the change has been gradual. I travelled through the country again from Aix to Basle in the following summer after the war and noticed the indescribable arrogance of military officers, who treated the rest of the world like insects, but observed nothing else unpleasant. My subsequent impressions, derived from visits at irregular intervals, are to the effect that, while military insolence has declined from that high-water mark and military manners have improved, other classes have caught the tone, which has become general. It is observable not only in Germany but still more perhaps among Germans in foreign countries. It finds expression in a demeanour which is fully recognised by Germans themselves and described by the slang term *schneidig*. We have no exact equivalent in English. It means originally 'sharp-edged' and has very much the sense of 'smart' but with a quality of aggressive self-assertion. 'Every German,' says Dr. Ernst Schultze in a recent war pamphlet, 'who conducts himself *schneidig* in a foreign country, does more to make Germany unpopular than a hundred quiet fellow-countrymen at home can make good.' But the term is generally regarded as complimentary and it is thought a fine thing to be *schneidig*, which shows the prevalent spirit. This quality is, of course, exercised impartially without any special reference to England; but self-assertion and arrogance provide a favourable soil for hate, the seed of which was sown in 1870 by the resentment felt in political and military circles at England's attitude during the war.

The feeling was much accentuated in 1875 by the positive opposition of England to Germany's plans for a second and final

crushing of France; but nothing that could be called national hostility made its appearance until many years later, and then it was mixed up with German party politics and professional jealousy. I refer to the violent anti-English campaign carried on in 1887-88 in connexion with the fatal illness of the Crown Prince of Prussia, who became Kaiser on the death of his father Wilhelm the First in March 1888. I was living in Germany at the time and witnessed the whole movement. It was partly political and partly scientific. The latter is the more interesting feature because it marked the rise of that spirit among German intellectuals which has made them the most violent and uncompromising haters of England, far surpassing all others in bitterness. The particular object of their animosity was Sir Morell Mackenzie, who had been summoned in consultation first in May 1887 and having won the confidence of the Crown Prince and Princess remained their chief consultant until the end, more than a year later. The leader of the campaign on the medical side was the German surgeon, von Bergmann, who resented the intrusion of an Englishman, but his professional interests went hand-in-hand with the political aims of Bismarck, who directed a campaign against the Crown Princess as an Englishwoman and the supposed inspirer or supporter of Liberal tendencies in the Crown Prince. Bismarck set in motion a Press agitation and a Court intrigue in which he was supported by the Conservative Party and the present Kaiser, and opposed by the Liberals. A fierce combat was waged round the sick-room and the public became much excited. It was at this time that the famous article, 'No Petticoat Politics' (*Kein Frauenzimmer-politik*), appeared in the Bismarckian Press. The struggle went on over the Imperial patient's dead body and even over his grave. A pamphlet was published by authority purporting to be the official account of the dead Kaiser's illness. It was really a violent attack on Sir M. Mackenzie, and indirectly on what he represented, supported by garbling the evidence. The whole thing was fraudulent. The contributors were all German doctors who had either been dismissed from the case or had only a slight connexion with it. None of the eminent men who had most to do with it contributed to the report. These were—apart from Sir M. Mackenzie and Mr. Hovell—the Crown Prince's body physicians, Dr. Wegner and Dr. Schrader, who were in attendance during the whole illness, and Dr. Krause, the German throat specialist, who was in attendance from November 1887 onwards. Professors von Leyden and Senator, who were in attendance as physicians during the last two months, and Professor Virchow, who made the principal microscopic examinations, also did not contribute. This anti-English political pamphlet,

masquerading as a professional and scientific report and full of misstatements, could not have been published without the authority of the present Kaiser. It was too libellous to be published in England and has never been known here, where the facts were wholly misunderstood by the medical profession.

The episode has considerable historical importance and it marks a definite stage in the development of German antagonism to England. Its popular effect was considerably discounted by the play of party politics which made the Liberals a counterpoise to the Bismarckian *Hetze*, but in intellectual and particularly medical circles the feeling was very strong. I experienced great discourtesy myself without the slightest reason and solely on account of the prevailing hostility to everything English. The teaching of Treitschke had by this time begun to exercise a general influence in fostering German self-consciousness, to which the increasing solidification of the Empire also contributed; and England was the chief object against which the rising feeling was directed. The political developments after the accession of the present Kaiser bearing on this point are too familiar to need repetition, but I may mention a small matter which fell under my notice at the time. One of the earliest acts of Wilhelm the Second was to issue an army order forbidding officers to wear the 'ugly so-called English heels.' At that time men still wore high-heeled boots in Germany, but there was already a tendency to take masculine fashions from England and the low heels beloved of English sportsmen—now universal—were being introduced in smart circles. That must be stopped with a firm hand under the new régime. It was a trifling incident, long forgotten, but it marked the inauguration of a conscious school for the promotion of *Deutschtum* in small things and in great. The working of this influence was shown a couple of years later in the scientific field by the sensational and premature disclosure of Koch's discovery of tuberculin.

The development of the German idea in the political and intellectual fields from this time on was accompanied by another form of national expansion which has contributed more than either to the present temper of the German people. I mean the evolution of trade and industry which has brought them wealth and supported a great increase of population in a rising standard of comfort. It is quite recent and has come with extraordinary rapidity. I do not mean that trade and industry are new in Germany; both are very old. But the recent expansion has taken place at such a pace that it has transformed the habits of the people within the last twenty years or less. It had hardly begun when the present Kaiser came to the throne, and the change effected since is astonishing. Nothing has done so much

to solidify the Empire, attach people to it, and reconcile them to the system which maintains it. Nothing has done so much to foster national self-esteem and ambition and the habit of looking down on other nations. In short nothing has done so much to promote *Deutschland über Alles*. It has made the Germans an arrogant nation, permeated through and through with the spirit which filled the military officers in 1871. For it is success, material, visible, tangible; and it has come so quickly that they cannot take it soberly. As they despised the vanquished enemy in 1871 so they despise the economic rival whom they regard as vanquished and whose pride of place they feel that they have taken. Military success and economic success have brought the consciousness of unlimited power and a sense of superiority to the rest of the world. They feel called to a destiny of immeasurable greatness.

This is not the judgment of a foreigner. It is set forth with the utmost candour and full detail in their own war literature, of which the most prominent feature is the enumeration of the superlative merits of the German people and their all-round superiority to others. For my own part I think that they have solid grounds for self-satisfaction. They have really done wonders. But unbridled self-esteem, the extravagant language in which it is expressed, the childlike self-revelation of egotism, the nonsense about Kultur and the utter contempt for nations which have been the pioneers in industrial and commercial enterprise and to whose initiative Germany owes the indispensable elements of her own advance—these things indicate a complete loss of balance. Professor Karl Lamprecht has pointed out the emotional sensibility of the German temperament and its tendency to extremes of depression and exaltation. Success and prosperity have carried it to a height of national self-exaltation such as no people have ever exhibited before, whatever they may have felt.

All this is the psychological background of the present feeling against England, the soil in which potential hatred has been growing and gathering strength for years. Its progress, after the anti-English campaign of 1887-88 and the accession of the present Kaiser, was both revealed and stimulated by the Boer war, when it first displayed itself as a national force. England was generally condemned on account of that war and extremely unpopular in most countries, but the feeling in Germany was stronger than anywhere else. It rose to the point of hatred, and here we come across the first link in the chain of real causality. The German Kaiser had made himself the patron of the Boers and the declared opponent of British policy, and this attitude was enthusiastically approved by the public. He had

led the Boers to expect help and protection, but when the time came he could give none for lack of power. Germany suffered no material injury thereby; but the blow to self-esteem—the moral injury—was severe. And it was not felt by the Kaiser and the Government—the *massgebenden Persönlichkeiten*—alone but by the nation as such because of the psychological condition just described. It marked a turning-point. It gave an immense impetus to the policy of world expansion and sea-power and gained for them a degree of popular support previously lacking. Thenceforward there was no trouble with the Navy estimates. Military thoughts occupied the minds of peaceful folk and the idea of war became familiar. Ten years ago quite sober civilians told me that Germany was strong enough to fight France and Russia together. Then came the English understanding, first with France and later with Russia, the two Powers which the German people had learned to think of in war terms. This did not improve their disposition towards England, and popular opinion, which was getting more and more warlike, criticised the Kaiser, whose old prejudices had undergone many modifications, for being too friendly to England and too peaceful.

There is no greater delusion than the idea, which still persists, that the German people ought to be dissociated from the Kaiser and the military element, and that they have been forced or led into war against their will. It is rather the other way so far as the Kaiser is concerned. He was never so popular in his life as when he declared war. Dr. Poutsma, who was in Berlin, has described the wild enthusiasm with which the populace received him in the streets as he drove in from Potsdam—an enthusiasm to which he made no response whatever. It was the rush of a great pent-up flood let loose—a ‘madness of the masses,’ as the Dutch Socialists called it. In the twinkling of an eye army and people were one and have remained one all through. The enthusiasm was redoubled when it was known that they were to fight England too. At last the moment had come to translate into action the sentiments they had harboured so long with cumulative force. For years all classes in Germany have wished England ill, and wishing ill is one of the marks of hate. I say England, not Englishmen; England as a Power. For years there has not been a class—I believe there has not been a man—who did not long to see the downfall of England. I have seen this feeling come to the surface among the most friendly and peaceful Germans during the most friendly social intercourse inspired by pure hospitality and good-fellowship. All Germany was saturated with it. I do not mean that they looked forward to war with England. I am sure they did not. But they yearned for her humiliation and would have welcomed it from

any quarter. When events seemed to have put the weapon into their own hands they rushed to wield it with enthusiastic delight. 'Now,' said the troops entraining for the Front, 'we shall get our knife in up to the hilt' (Dr. Wieck, army surgeon, in the *Berliner Morgenpost*, August 17).

This is true hate—to wish and to work ill to another—according to the dictum of St. Thomas Aquinas. The questions we must ask ourselves are whether we have earned it and how; with the further questions, whether it can be allayed and how. What cause have the Germans to hate England? For their feeling, I must repeat, is or has been against England, not against Englishmen, though the War has so inflamed the passion that every member of the hated State has fallen under the ban. To find the answers we must examine the question of injury.

We have seen at the outset of this study that hate may arise from injury suffered, expected or imagined, and that the injury may be moral or material. If it be only expected or imagined the hate caused by it can be removed; but if it be real there is much more difficulty in allaying the feeling excited. Previously to the War it cannot be said that England had ever *actively* inflicted any material injury on Germany. They had never been enemies, and had sometimes been allies. It is the fashion now in Germany to maintain that when they were allies England always let Germany do the work and secured the fruits for herself, but that is merely a fantastic reading of history invented to suit the present mood. Whatever the relations were, they certainly left no sting. Nor did England cause any material hurt during the perfectly successful Bismarckian wars. Since Germany began her colonial policy in 1884 England has rather helped than hindered her in acquiring possessions, and the cession of Heligoland in 1890 was a friendly bargain by which Germany's maritime position was enormously strengthened. In the more recent chain of political events Germany has sustained no loss and the Bagdad railway arrangement is admitted by German writers to have been to her advantage. Commercially Great Britain has never discriminated against her, and all the British Dominions have been as freely open to Germans as to anyone else. The Act requiring goods of foreign origin to be marked with the place of production applies to all countries alike, and so far as Germany is concerned the Germans maintain that it has proved a valuable advertisement for their manufactures.

It is impossible to allege any material injury inflicted by any act of England, nor does the most violent German literature that I have seen even attempt it. Nevertheless Germany's material interests have suffered from us, and that is the main ground of

their hate. The British Empire injures Germany passively by existing ; it stands in the way of her expansion. Of course, that is not our fault, and the existence of anything is not a legitimate ground for hating it ; there is something wrong with the hater. It is Germany's ambition and the state of mind described above that make the British Empire hateful to her. The other States of the world do not hate us for existing. At the same time we can understand the German feeling and make allowance for it. To such a people, with their population, their wealth, their power, and their capacity, it is natural that they should desire to occupy a position in the world commensurate with these attributes and to possess trans-maritime dominions such as other States, much smaller than the German Empire and inferior in many respects, already possess. But in whichever direction they turn, all the best is occupied by someone else and above all by Great Britain. It must be simply exasperating to find the British Empire lying across their path in all quarters of the world. They are late-comers at the feast and there is very little room for them. It is their misfortune, not the fault of others, but misfortunes are generally allowed to be irritating.

If the matter had stopped where it was and the other sitters at the board had ceased eating while Germany sat down and made up for lost time she would not have felt so bad. Germany sat down in 1884 and during the thirty years that have since elapsed has made fair progress ; but the others have not stopped, and in particular England has not. There is South Africa, and in this case the blow to German pride noted above added a moral element which enormously increased the sense of injury. Since the Boer war the Germans have fairly hated England. Then there is Egypt. It is true that this concerned France, not Germany, but England's success has swelled the cup of German bitterness. Then there have been extensions and consolidations in East Africa and West Africa and Burma. And all the time the older British Dominions have been growing into great States. Russia and Great Britain have been busy in Persia, France and Italy in the Mediterranean, while Germany has looked on. Hence the principle of 'compensation' and the Morocco crisis, which was another moral defeat for Germany and greatly inflamed the anti-English feeling. The speeches then made by British Ministers are constantly quoted in German war-literature.

There is enough in all this to explain, if not to justify, German hate before the War. It had somewhat abated again more recently through improved diplomatic relations in connexion with the Balkan settlement, and German hostility was rather turned towards Russia. Unfortunately this very fact has had a disastrous effect on public opinion in Germany with reference to

the part played by England in the War. It has given rise to the idea of treachery and double-dealing by England which is the most poisonous element in their conception of Anglo-German relations, because it is the most difficult to remove. In order to understand this point and the conversion of the previously existing ill-will to England into the raging fury of hate, of which we have had so many proofs, it is necessary to grasp clearly and fully the German view of the causation of the War. It is so absolutely contrary to our own that some mental effort is needed to realise that it is indeed their view.

Briefly, it is that the British Government deliberately planned and engineered the War in order to destroy Germany from English envy of her commercial success, and that part of the plan was to lull the German Government into believing in a friendly attitude on the part of England. Thus the War was a stab in the back by a pretended friend. I do not know who first put forward this view, but it has been accepted everywhere without reserve. It is repeated in innumerable pamphlets and with unmistakeable sincerity; the writers are in dead earnest about it. Recently a voice has been raised here and there questioning this interpretation of events, but these critics themselves testify to the universal prevalence of the view criticised; they combat it for that reason. Their own reading of events, which I cannot explain here, is different, but it does not exonerate England. The arch malefactor in the eyes of every German is Sir Edward Grey, who is the modern Macchiavelli or Mephistopheles; but he is only carrying out the work of King Edward, who played Borgia to his Macchiavelli. I might quote from many pamphlets to show the line of argument, but the following passage puts it as plainly as any :

This world-shattering tragedy, the frightful magnitude of which surpasses all records, is the life-work of a man who has already lain for years beneath the sod, the work of King Edward VII., that accursed Prince of German blood, whose chief business during the whole of his reign consisted in the complete 'encircling' of Germany. While the English Constitution confined his ostensible activity within the strictest limits, he worked with all the more feverish energy behind the scenes, conferred with Heads of State in East and West, travelled about in the world, and everywhere stirred up hate against Germany. His official relations, though occasionally over-clouded, were never really strained. He always professed friendship for his nephew Kaiser Wilhelm, the son of his sister, and yet secretly nourished a burning hate against the land of which his sister had been Crown Princess and Empress. King Edward did not wish for war, at least not for war at any price. As a brilliant diplomatist he aimed rather at isolating Germany as far as possible and forming a general league of Germany's enemies and opponents, without regular treaties, yet so firmly forged by envy and hate that in the moment when one of Germany's enemies opened hostilities all the others would announce their solidarity with him and fall upon us together.

King Edward died before an external opportunity of war offered itself, but a still greater trickster entered into the accursed heritage. Sir Edward Grey, this wooden Englishman, who had not seen much of the outer world in his life, had returned somewhat dazzled from the visit which he paid with King George to Paris, and with his inclination for an understanding with Russia increased. Now he judged the right moment had come for him, as King Edward's testamentary executor, to draw tight the artfully tied knot (*Der Weltkrieg*, by Paul Heinsick).

This is a typical German reading of events. To Englishmen it seems so fantastically far-fetched and perversely absurd as hardly to need refutation. It is difficult for us to suppose that the Germans believe it themselves. But that is my point: they do believe it. They firmly believe with an absolute conviction that they are the victims of a deliberate conspiracy to destroy them, treacherously engineered by England out of commercial envy, while professing friendship and good-will. This—and this alone—accounts for their demeanour. It accounts for the intensity of their hate, for the discrimination between England and their other enemies, for the change of tone in men who before the War recognised England as a great Kultur State and many Englishmen as worthy of honour and respect, but who now refuse to see any merit in such a country or in any single member of it. More than that, it accounts for their unanimity, the acceptance of disappointments and hopes falsified, the endurance of increasing burdens and sacrifices, the unshakeable resolution to hold on in spite of all. They believe that they are fighting for their existence against a conspiracy to destroy them, and in that belief they will fight to the last gasp.

This is not a matter for cheap ridicule; it is of the most tragic gravity. For it means, among many other things, that the struggle is going to cost far more effort and sacrifice than is yet realised, that the end is still far off, and that when it comes it will not be an end. Such feelings as this War has raised and will leave behind will endure from generation to generation. The effects of German hate in the murder of civilians and the maltreatment of prisoners are raising a counter-hate which has hitherto been absent. I see no end to it. Let no one suppose that the German people can be annihilated or reduced to permanent impotence. That notion is born of anger and ignorance. They will remain some seventy millions of people. After the lapse of another generation they will be near ninety millions; and they will retain all their gifts and faculties, their industry, adaptability, capacity for organisation and the methodical pursuit of an object, their educational system, and all the other social institutions which they have fashioned to build up strength and wealth. They will be more attached to their country and

more united in spirit through adversity than they were before. And they will cherish hate in their hearts deep and implacable.

There is just one point of light in this gloomy prospect. The injury we are inflicting and are going to inflict on them is real; but the edge has been put on their hate by imagining injuries. It is the absolute truth that England did not plan this War or want any war or expect any war. If she had she would have listened to Lord Roberts. It is the absolute truth that neither King Edward nor Sir Edward Grey ever cherished any such intentions as the Germans suppose, and that if they had they were not in a position to carry them out. It is a complete delusion to suppose that we have cherished hate and envy of Germany. We do not like Germans, which is an entirely different thing. They are not liked in any country, as they are discovering to their surprise and grief. The two things should not be confounded. They have hated England, not Englishmen; we dislike Germans (who do not happen to be personal friends) without hating Germany. As for commercial envy, I know what British manufacturers and traders think, because I have made a special study of it. They are much too complacent and secure in the stability of their own position to envy anybody. It is their greatest weakness; a little envy would do them good. If they were envious it would rather be of the United States than of Germany; but in no case could commercial envy be a rational ground for war in modern times.

It will, however, be difficult to convince the Germans of these facts. Their case, absurd as it seems to us, can be made to look very plausible. If you start with a solid prejudice and a total misconception of English political life and of the English character, if you select your evidence to suit these premises, trim it here and there, suppress some things and exaggerate others, you can make out a case which appeals to German self-esteem and seems to hang well together. It further receives confirmation from utterances on this side which are eagerly seized upon as proof of its correctness. They come not only from bewildered sentimentalists who have lost their bearings, and from eccentrics who must be original and make a splash at all costs, but also and with far more effect from zealous patriots. There is, for instance, a little volume entitled *War on Germany's Trade*, which has come perfectly pat to support the German view. If its authors had been commissioned by the German Government to produce something to help the German cause and strengthen the resolution of the German people they could have achieved nothing better adapted to the purpose. It is quite useless for promoting British trade in any practical way, but the desire to injure Germany's trade is apparent throughout. It has been

translated into German and widely circulated as proof positive that England planned the War for this purpose. Rhetorical passages from the speeches of Ministers are cited to serve the same ends. All these things sink the truth of the German case very deeply in the public mind, and make the impression very difficult to move.

What, then, is to be done? In my humble opinion, the first thing to be done is to win the enemy's respect; and the only way to do it is to beat him. Until this is accomplished, the German belief in their own superiority and contempt for us, which is, as I have shown, one of the chief psychological factors in their attitude, will forbid them to revise their ideas. Respect is the first step towards a just estimate. If they find that they are wrong in one thing they will be open to the possibility that they may be wrong in another; for they are very logical. And they respect strength. We must show ourselves strong, stronger than we have been. The Army abroad has already done much to dispel the false impressions with which the Germans began and to win their respect; but at home we have been far less successful. This is partly due to fabricated news about panic and the failure of recruiting, just as fabricated news about the treatment of German prisoners and other imaginary outrages has added fuel to their hate. But falsehoods perish, and the continued contempt of the Germans is not all due to falsehoods. The incompetence displayed by want of foresight and organisation in the production of war material, the labour troubles, the controversy about racing, the revelations about drink and slack work—all these things justly excite German contempt. They would not be possible in a people who were in dead earnest and doing their utmost. We need to put our backs into it more thoroughly and bear ourselves more manfully as a nation, but we shall not do that effectually so long as the newspapers continue to interpret the daily course of the War as wholly favourable to the Allies, to ignore or belittle the enemy's strength, to represent his position as hopeless, and his collapse as certain, if not imminent.

To beat the enemy is quite enough for all our energies, and to discuss terms of peace or conditions 'after the War' seems to me an idle amusement. Nobody can foresee the end; the death of a single man might upset all calculations and change the whole aspect of affairs. There are two men whose death would certainly have that effect; there are three or four others whose death might. But we must keep the future in view and have a clear conception of the principles that should determine our policy. One of these, I earnestly submit, is the vital importance of removing German hate. When we have won their respect and convinced

them that they have over-estimated themselves and under-estimated others, we shall be on the road ; but we shall have further to convince them that we did not enter on this War treacherously for the deliberate purpose of destroying them. That is what the Headmaster of Eton meant the other day when he made the remarks about not humiliating Germany which have given rise to such violent controversy. What he said was unfortunate and created a false impression, because it was not sufficiently clear that he was referring to future permanent conditions, not to the immediate issue of war. It is not humiliating to be beaten by a worthy enemy, but beyond that we must convince her that England is not the monster of envy, hate, and perfidy that the Germans believe. That is common sense as well as Christianity. The two objects before us should be carefully kept distinct and taken in their order. The first is to convince the Germans that they have under-estimated our capacity; the second that they have over-estimated our rapacity. Any attempt to attain the second before achieving the first would be a fatal blunder; it would be misinterpreted and stultify itself.

A. SHADWELL.

PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW

(I)

DRINK AND THE WAR

THE connexion between Drink and the War has of late been assumed almost with enthusiasm. Had it also been proved there would of course be no more to be said. If the needs of the War are left unsatisfied and the success of the War delayed if not imperilled by the drinking habits of our armament-makers, the situation undoubtedly calls for prompt and vigorous handling. We are living under a strain such as England has never known till now, and unprecedented needs commonly demand unprecedented remedies. I do not question the right of the Government to empty our pockets or to deprive us of our liberties if a peace which is worth having can be secured by no other means. But the greater the sacrifices we are asked to make, the more incumbent it is on those who call for them to show that they are really needed. When suggestions relating to racing and football have been offered, this rule has been strictly adhered to. There was some reason to believe that both these sports were keeping back men from enlisting, and the Government were frequently urged to forbid both during the War. They thought, and perhaps rightly thought, that though some case for such action had been made out it was nothing like a conclusive case, and in the end nothing was done. During the past month a very much more urgent demand has been addressed to the Cabinet and supported by at least one of its most influential members. Ministers are now implored from all sides to do something drastic in reference to the sale of alcoholic liquor.

It is not wonderful that this proposal should have met with very great support. A large number of persons, distinguished and undistinguished, have long associated themselves with what by a curious misuse of terms is called the 'Temperance' Movement. Until now it has been found impossible to excite any enthusiasm in favour of this movement except by explaining at starting that by the temperate use of alcoholic liquor is understood the total disuse of it. The present agitation has been

compelled to make some concessions on this point. There is enough difference between the effects of spirits and drinks containing a smaller proportion of alcohol to make a section of the agitators willing to stop short of total prohibition and content themselves with confining it to spirits. It may be that the case for dealing with drink in this milder fashion is better made out than the case for total prohibition. But to establish even this requires more evidence than has yet been brought forward. It is not enough to prove that drink has done a certain amount of harm to the workmen in Government factories. It must also be shown that the mischief is not mainly due to other causes which can be removed by methods that call for no apology.

The fact that the delay in providing munitions of war is directly due to drinking has not yet been established. It has been assumed that if it can be shown that drinking has even contributed to making a few men work less hard or for fewer hours the case for prohibition is proved. Here and there, happily, inquirers have gone a little farther, and have been unpatriotic enough to ask what has caused this increase of drinking. It is very commonly set down to the greater command of money which the workman enjoys owing to the War. His wages are so high that he can afford to refuse overtime and to go idle on two days out of six, or to take his ease while he is to all appearance working. The workmen concerned do not seem inclined to accept this explanation. The majority of the strikes which have caused the Government such well-founded uneasiness have been for higher wages, and the general complaint about the rise in prices hardly suggests any mischievous abundance of ready cash. The statements of the Shipbuilding Employers' Federation, which the Chancellor of the Exchequer, though he thought them 'very startling,' at once accepted as simple truth, were promptly denied, and the Boilermakers' Society went on to charge the employers with refusing to release so much as 10 per cent. of the men employed on building merchant ships in order to fill up vacancies in the Admiralty yards caused by enlistment. If that charge is well founded it perhaps accounts for more delays in providing the armaments than any shortcomings on the part of the workmen.

Let it be conceded, however, that drink has done all the mischief charged against it. Does it follow that the blame lies only on the men who are set down as shirkers? If they can be drunken and idle when England is fighting for her very life and looking to their labour for the means of carrying on the struggle, the case against them is black. But it is only black so long as we credit them with knowing as much about the War as the great majority of educated Englishmen know. I greatly

doubt whether they know anything like as much as this. Stories of the singular indifference shown to the War and its issues in many parts of the country are often told and seldom contradicted, and if there is any truth in them we can hardly wonder that men thus ignorant of the real significance of what is going on abroad are not disposed to alter all their usual habits in order to make shells faster. The effect of trade unionism in recent years has been to draw men's thoughts away from politics and to fix them on trade questions. This is the explanation of the changed relations between the rank and file of the Unions and their Parliamentary leaders. The latter have become politicians but the rank and file have not followed them in this evolution. The Labour leaders are patriotic because they know the ruin to every class and industry which would follow upon a defeat of the Allies, and they know also that unless we can keep our soldiers and sailors supplied with arms and ammunition there is nothing before us but a disastrous defeat.

I question, however, whether the mass of the workmen know much—indeed, whether many of them know anything—of this tremendous fact. And the cause of their ignorance is that it has never been properly brought before them. It has been comfortably assumed that they learn all the War news from the newspapers. But, to judge from the contents of the journals they mostly read, they are at least equally interested in football and racing. They are not to blame for this. War news as it comes to us day by day is not always either very intelligible or very interesting. That is inevitable where progress is so slow and, in Flanders at all events, covers such small areas. What working men want is to have their reading of the newspaper stimulated and made intelligent by occasional contact with the fire of oratory. If in the great industrial centres where the War must be carried on just as vigorously as in the trenches, though the work of the civilian soldier is only to make weapons for others, a Cabinet Minister, or a member of the Opposition front bench, had spoken plainly to the workmen at short intervals from August onwards, the conviction that the issues now being decided on the Continent involve matters of vital concern to every man, woman and child in these islands would have been so universal that strikes such as have lately taken place could never have happened. The men who have started them would have realised that with them rests the decision whether the victory shall fall to Germany or to the Allies, and they would have known how much hung upon their efforts. In one sense I am writing a day after the fair, for Mr. Asquith has been to Newcastle, and his example will, let us hope, be followed by others. But if much of the slackness attributed to drinking is really due to an ignorance which our

leading men have not until quite lately taken the right means to remove, the Government may fairly be asked not to resort to doubtful experiments until it has been seen what can be done by a little vigorous speaking.

But ignorance of what is at stake is not the only nor perhaps the greatest factor in the slackness complained of or even in the drinking to which it is attributed. Both evils, I suspect, are largely due to methods of work adopted from excellent motives, but with a singular disregard of human needs. The majority of the men employed on making arms and other munitions of war have necessarily been called on to work their very hardest, and, if the end for which they were employed could have been gained in a few days, no limit need have been set to their labour. Soldiers in the trenches have not taken off their clothes for weeks together, though even there it has in the end been found necessary to give them frequent reliefs. But the civilian soldiers have in many cases had no similar rests. They have worked overtime every week-day, and they have worked on Sundays as well. Some three weeks ago Sir Benjamin Browne called attention in *The Times* to the effects of this excessive labour. 'To get the best work,' he writes, 'out of a man (or a horse) they should never be over-tired. The proverb of a stitch in time applies to restoring a tired man as much as anything.' There is nothing new or original in this, but it has been strangely lost sight of in the present controversy about drink. Employers have complained that some of their men—they are always careful to add that the charge applies only to a small number—after a few weeks of this continuous strain are found drinking either at the public-house or at their own homes. The wonder is that this discovery was not made very much earlier. Sir Benjamin Browne thus describes what has been going on :

At the end of a week's hard work a man is pretty tired, but he is tempted by the offer of double pay to work on Sunday also. That night he is seriously tired and overdone, and though it may be said that he takes advantage of the double pay to take two days' holiday, it may equally be said that he is so tired that it takes two days to rest him. And is not the utterly tired man exactly in the state when out of sheer weariness he is most likely to fall a victim to drink?

Another great employer, Lord Inverclyde, writes in the same strain. He admits that excessive drinking is in itself a serious evil. But as regards the War he thinks it a side issue. It is not the primary cause of too little work being done. It is not wonderful that employers who realise the magnitude of the task on which England is engaged should urge their men to the utmost. But it is wonderful that they should forget that the limits of possible labour and of useful labour are not identical. In a long war it

is not the work which most exhausts the workman that brings most benefit to the nation. It is the work which, as each separate task is finished, leaves him able to begin another with an equal prospect of bringing it to rapid completion.

The quotations I have made are both from employers, but the representatives of the workmen give much the same warning. The Managing Committee of the General Federation of Trade Unions 'has evidence of serious physical and mental overstrain and increasing sickness rates, and it believes that the aggregate output of munitions of war would be increased if labour and facilities were properly organised and proper rest periods provided.' And this conclusion finds general support in the reports from the local Unions on which it is founded.

The real cause of the present scarcity of munitions of war is probably to be found in the unwillingness or inability of the Government to treat labour for military purposes as one great whole. Now, we may hope, this is being seriously taken in hand, but it is the omission to resort to it sooner that has landed us in our present straits.

But for the speeches of Mr. Asquith at Newcastle on the 20th of April and of Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons on the 21st, I should have said that Ministers were not to be blamed for this. There are limits to human energy, and a Cabinet suddenly called to carry on the greatest war in history, with an Expeditionary Force of only 160,000 men and a body of Territorials possessed of every qualification except the essential one of training, was faced by a military problem that left them neither time nor thought for anything except the creation of an Army. But Mr. Asquith scorns to avail himself of such a plea. His words are: 'I saw a statement the other day that the operations not only of our Army but of our Allies were crippled, or at any rate hampered, by our failure to provide the necessary ammunition. There is not a word of truth in that statement.' Then what is the meaning of the recent outcry about Drink? If there has been a real shortage of labour it is necessary to investigate the causes of it, and Drinking may possibly be one of them. But what if there has been no shortage of labour? That as I understand him is Mr. Asquith's conviction. There may be such a shortage in the future, perhaps in the near future, but that will be a shortage not of labour but of labourers. The men who are now at work upon armaments are doing their utmost, but more men are needed to keep up the supply, and the new-comers may not work as well as those we now have. Mr. Lloyd George gave chapter and verse in support of Mr. Asquith's scepticism. He told the House of Commons that 'during the fortnight of fighting in and around Neuve Chapelle almost as

much ammunition was expended by our artillery as during the whole of the two and three quarter years of the Boer War.' Here is one fact that goes to disprove the alleged shortage of labour. If the ammunition was expended it must have been made. A second fact is the unexpected change in the character of the ammunition owing to the substitution to a large extent of high explosives for shrapnel, and the consequent need of a new kind of machinery. How far this difficulty has been got over is shown by the increase in the output of ammunition. 'By the month of March that output had been multiplied nineteen fold,' and Mr. Lloyd George 'has no hesitation in saying that in the month of April the increase will correspond to the increase which has taken place in the preceding month.'

The Prime Minister had the advantage of being uncommitted on the question of Drink. He could pass it by without having any earlier speech brought up against him. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was less fortunate, and he had to remind the House that he had only said that the mischief done by drink is the work of 'a very small minority,' but that this very small minority may throw large works out of gear. I have no doubt that this is a perfectly true statement. But how does it tally with the tremendous assertion that 'Drink is a worse enemy than Germany'? I wish that England could say that in Flanders she had only to deal with 'a very small minority' of German troops.

Even if we take Mr. Lloyd George's view of the existence and of the cause of the shortage of ammunition, the mischief can best be dealt with by organising those exposed to the temptation on military lines. A man who shirked his proper tale of work might then be put under arrest. If in consequence of this he wished to leave the service of the State he might be left free to do so, because he would find no outside market for his labour. All the machinery used for making munitions of war would be in the hands of the Government, and the skilled armament worker who had wilfully thrown up his post would find his occupation gone. When each separate act of excess was found to carry its penalty with it, the time-table list in an armament factory would be speedily reformed. A State which cannot keep its own servants in order had better give up the business.

Some scheme of this character is possibly in preparation. If so, it is strange that this particular moment should have been chosen to start an agitation for dealing with the mischief on quite different and far less effectual lines. Owing to the want of a proper organisation of the civilian army portions of the rank and file have got out of hand. Disputes about wages have led some men to strike work altogether. Of others it is complained that they will not work long enough without

taking a holiday, or that they do not put their full strength into the work they are professedly doing. Some of these cases of default can fairly be set down to drinking, and they furnish the best possible reason for placing the manufacture of armaments on an entirely new footing. Instead of this a large section of the public has for some weeks past been imploring the Government to turn their attention, not even to the ill consequences of excessive drinking, but to the suppression of all drinking. If this has had no other bad result, it has certainly led to a serious waste of Ministerial time. There have been frequent Cabinet Councils, and on the morning after each the public has been regularly informed that the subject is 'still under consideration.' In view of the tremendous importance of the armament question, this concentration of the Government's attention upon what at most is only a part of the subject has been a grave misfortune.

All these reasons for looking elsewhere than to drink for the cause of the inadequate production of munitions of war are often put aside, on the ground that no harm can be done by taking precautions of which the worst that can be said is that they are superfluous. And if this were a true statement I should agree with it. Undoubtedly it is well to leave nothing undone that may help, even remotely, to bring the War to a speedy and triumphant close. But the policy of prohibition cannot have this result. The ultimate object of the present conflict is to destroy the temper which has made Prussia what she is. The object—the unconscious object no doubt—of the so-called Temperance Movement is to make England more like Prussia. A quarter of a century ago Archbishop Magee brought much odium upon himself by declaring that he would rather see England free than sober. He had no faith in a reformation of character brought about by physical means. What is the moral value of the sobriety of a convicts' prison or an inebriates' home? It does for the inmates just what Don Quixote's helmet did for its wearer. It is only valuable so long as it is not tested. A drunkard is properly punished—and might well be more sharply punished than he is—because he gives wilful offence to his neighbours. But why should the man who simply gratifies a harmless taste for a particular kind of drink be singled out for punishment? Abstinence imposed as a penalty on violent drunkards might be a useful measure, because it would only interfere with the liberty of men who had forfeited the right to go free. But abstinence enforced on sober people who are doing no harm to themselves or to anyone else is nothing short of tyranny, and tyranny does not change its nature by being exercised by well-

meaning enthusiasts who have convinced themselves that alcohol, even in the smallest quantities, is sheer poison.

I ask, therefore, with Lord Hugh Cecil, 'Was there ever anything less reasonable suggested than that innumerable citizens who are perfectly temperate, and who have nothing to do with munitions of war, should be deprived of a legitimate satisfaction, because some of the workmen employed by Government are morbidly given to drink?' No doubt the question can be answered in a moment by the real promoters of the present agitation. They deny that the satisfaction is 'legitimate,' and in this way they save their own faces. But those whose names give the demand what real force it possesses do not go this length. They are willing to deprive 'innumerable citizens' of a satisfaction which they admit to be in itself 'legitimate,' though as yet neither the connexion between drink and the shortage in the supply of munitions of war, nor the impossibility of making good this shortage by other means, has been established. Englishmen have had a startling lesson on the lengths to which State interference may be carried in the example of their chief enemy in the present War. The Prussian Government have applied this doctrine with the thoroughness which marks all their acts. They claim the right to regulate every department of human life. Whatever makes for the good of the State as interpreted by them is right. Whatever does not satisfy this test is wrong. We have seen the results of this teaching in the present War. Why is it that many German officers have been willing to execute orders of which they do not really approve? They are not exceptional monsters of cruelty; they are human beings like ourselves. Why then are they found obeying these inhuman commands? Simply because they have been taught to put their consciences into the hands of their superiors and to set the supposed interests of the State above every other consideration. To reconstruct life in England on the pattern of life in Prussia would give pleasure to our adversaries, even in defeat. It would mean that their best-hated foe was engaged in an unconscious imitation of themselves. There have been instances of recent legislation in England which savour somewhat of the philosophy which makes freedom consist in making other people do whatever those in power happen to think good for them. That they can have any right to do what they think good for themselves is so pestilent a heresy that the State is bound to put it down. The Insurance Act was in its degree a measure of this kind. It rested on the imaginary right of Parliament to dictate to millions of working men and women how they shall invest their scanty savings. The prohibition of alcohol would

imply a similar right to dictate to these millions what they shall drink.

It will be denied, no doubt, that this is the object of such restrictions as it has been proposed to place on the use of alcohol whether by legislation or under the Defence of the Realm Act. The authors of these suggestions will plead that they are not intended to be permanent. On the contrary, obedience to them will only be demanded so long as the War supplies a justification for them. I do not question the sincerity of these assurances. But I observe that they are not often offered by those whose intentions will really count. The 'Temperance' Party have now such a chance as they have never had yet, and if once they were able under cover of the War to get their main principle recognised, I am not at all sure that this particular interference with personal liberty would disappear with the return of peace. Unfortunately, though Archbishop Magee's warning is even less regarded now than it was when he uttered it, it has not ceased to be needed. A compulsorily sober England will not be a free England.

If prohibition is put aside as wrong or impracticable, are we compelled to dismiss every proposal for further regulating the sale of alcoholic liquors? I think not. There are forms of alcohol which are hardly distinguishable from poisons. One of these has had its mischievous character proclaimed by the action of the French Government. The Paris correspondent of *The Times* describes absinthe as a poison which acts directly upon the nervous system. The effect produced by it is distinguished from ordinary intoxication by the 'convulsive phenomena and hyperaesthesia' which follow upon its use. In the districts where it has been most used lunacy has doubled during the past thirty years, and the Recruiting Boards 'are often obliged to reject conscripts from absinthe-ridden districts because of mental deficiency and other signs of degeneracy.' If recognised poisons are not allowed to be sold to all comers, a drink which is distinguishable from poison only in degree has no claim to be exempted from the prohibition. The example of France has often been quoted as one that ought to be followed in this country. To this there can be no objection, provided that the original and the copy are sufficiently alike. I understand the charges against absinthe to be true without reference to the quantity taken. It does not of course lead in all cases to the full results described by *The Times* correspondent, but it is never a harmless liquor. That is a sufficient reason for forbidding its sale, but before the total abstainers can apply the same reasoning to this country they must prove that the forms in which alcohol is usually taken here are never harmless. They have not done this yet, and as

drunkenness is steadily decreasing among us, and human life is, to say the least, not growing shorter, it is unlikely that any better success awaits them in the future. There is, however, a form of spirit largely consumed by working men in certain districts which appears to be open to very much the same condemnation as absinthe. It is said that on the Clyde whisky is offered for sale within less than six months from its distillation, and that in this new state it is specially mischievous. I do not see that any reasonable objection can be taken to keeping this particular form of spirit out of the market. Why should not the Excise officials be instructed to see that no spirit goes out for consumption until it has attained a certain age? There is a general admission that it is in the districts where whisky still in this poisonous stage is largely drunk that the production of munitions of war is most hindered. The Government ought at least to content themselves with trying a moderate remedy before going all lengths and confounding the harmless and the hurtful spirits in a common condemnation. If the real sinner is the raw spirit, it is this that should be singled out for prohibition.¹

The proposal that beer should share with spirits the paternal care of the Government seems almost to have dropped out of sight, but it has been suggested that wine-drinkers should be put on the same footing as spirit-drinkers in order that the latter may have companions in their enforced abstinence. If this step is really thought necessary to the safety of the Empire, I would only suggest that it be carried out with proper discrimination. If port and sherry are prohibited, the consequent suffering will fall only on neutrals. If the wines of France are excluded from the English market, we shall be practising self-denial at the cost of our nearest Ally. The French vintage of last year was unusually abundant, and one great district looks mainly to the sale of its wines to make up in some degree for the terrible losses inflicted by the German invasion. It is hard to believe that the only way to safeguard the military efficiency of this country is to inflict a heavy money loss upon France.

Have not all these proposals the common fault of taking the stick by the wrong end? Instead of trying, probably to little purpose, to prevent workmen from getting liquor that may make them drunk, why should not we aim at making each instance of drunkenness bring its own punishment? Our soldiers are drawn from the same material as our workmen, and many of them are no better able to resist temptation. Yet when they are in camp or in the field we hear nothing of the War being

¹ I would draw the attention of readers of this Review to the date on which Mr. Lathbury completed his article.—*Editor, Nineteenth Century and After.*

hindered by their excesses. They know that in their case the pleasure of getting drunk is closely followed by the penalty, and this recollection is ordinarily enough to keep them sober. If the present recruiting campaign fails to give us the army we want, conscription seems inevitable, and a principle which we may soon have to apply to the men who fire the guns should be at once applied to the men who make them. Both classes of recruits are indispensable if the War is to be properly carried on; both are under the same obligations to their King and country; and both should be subjected to the same salutary discipline. Lord Derby has put a thousand dockers into khaki. Mr. Asquith and Lord Kitchener between them should find no difficulty in giving to the skilled workers in war material a similar mark of their military calling.

I have only one word more to add. We all know how ardent a champion of total abstinence the Chancellor of the Exchequer has lately shown himself. Will he not give us a practical proof of his new zeal by ceasing to encourage the consumption of spirits in place of beer, and of alcohol generally in place of tea? When he was framing his last Budget he was thinking only of the revenue. When he sets to work on the next one, will he not give temperance a turn? Nothing is more likely to lessen the drinking of spirits than cheaper beer. Nothing will more discourage the consumption of alcohol in all forms than cheaper tea. As yet Mr. Lloyd George's name is only associated with an increased taxation of both. Surely this is not a record that he will care to make permanent.

D. C. LATHBURY.

April 26th, 1915.

PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW

(II)

WORK, WOMEN, AND MARRIAGE

THE period through which we are passing may be likened to a tunnel—one of those long, dark subterranean passages under rivers or through mountain-sides into which the passenger is plunged, all unexpectant, his eyes still dazzled with the sunlight, after no more warning than a shrill shriek from the engine. We are blundering on in the darkness, and when we come out again into God's world it will be in a different country. The old landmarks will have gone. For many of us the sun will shine no more. I have been wondering how these changes will affect women, who, indeed, had been busily engaged in uprooting landmarks for some time before the War. We were watching with some anxiety the evolution of a new type and her efforts to adjust society to her own ideas. When the trumpets sounded and the men girt on their armour the women sank at once, and without a murmur, to a position of secondary importance, glad and proud if permitted by the male autocrats to perform some humble task in any department of war-work. The height of success was reached if one was requested by the representative of authority, no matter how far removed from the fountain-head, to undertake any task which he deemed suitable for amateurs or which, perhaps, he privately despaired of accomplishing with the material at his own command. Entrusted with such charges women performed miracles of improvisation, as is their wont, and although no unbiassed observer of their war-work could fail to see faults, yet on the whole they have grappled successfully, and for the most part selflessly, with the problems presented to them. The few who, even in these dark days, mistake the limelight of the photographer for the sunlight of fame, only bring into stronger relief the thousands all over the country who are quietly and methodically performing a vast amount of hard work.

With the continued demand for fresh fighting-men, moreover, we appear to be reaching a point at which women must, to a far greater extent than hitherto, replace men in the field of labour. The Government is forming a special register of women willing to enter certain trades, even if not previously employed as wage-earners. These trades are primarily, of course, essential to the conduct of war, and include the manufacture of munitions, but agriculture is also specially indicated as a suitable field for amateur labour. It is still uncertain what use the Government intends to make of the register thus obtained, nor is it clear how so varied a list of would-be workers, comprising women of every class and type, is to be satisfactorily sorted by the officials of the Labour Exchanges. Experience in the employment of women of the middle classes leads to the conviction that they cannot be handled in the mass, since they present the widest possible variations of capacity and temperament. Officials skilled in dealing with labour in large bodies will be confronted with a very different problem from any they have previously faced. Moreover what is needed for the type of labour indicated in the Board of Trade circular is not so much keen and trained intelligence as habits of industry and discipline. These, unfortunately, are not the distinguishing virtues of many of the women who, with patriotic zeal, have registered their names.

Whatever may be women's qualifications for various forms of work, however, no doubt exists that they must, in a short time, be far more extensively employed all over the country than before the War. In the last census only four and three quarter millions out of fourteen and three quarter millions of females over ten years of age were returned as wage-earners, and this total included many who live at home and are really only partially self-supporting. The conditions of women's work differ in various parts of Great Britain. Only in certain districts, such as the cotton-spinning areas of Lancashire and Yorkshire and the jute-industry centres of Scotland, are married women extensively and regularly employed in factory work. In Scotland women, married and single, work on the farms and in the fields, whereas in Southern England they have forsaken even the dairy and hen-house. These local differences do not, however, affect the women of the middle classes, daughters of professional and commercial men. They, like the families of the small shop-keeper or minor official, are being more and more pressed by necessity into the labour market, but they despise manual labour as a rule and crowd chiefly into clerical work. In these classes marriage is nearly always a release from wage-earning.

The demand for female labour comes after a period of

depression which affected practically every class of wage-earning women, save those employed in work for the Services. From the highly qualified secretary of a political association which, perforce, has stopped its propaganda, to the typist in a City office or the girl who runs errands in a dressmaking establishment, the whole range of women's work was dislocated by the outbreak of war. It was obvious from the first that many of those who, in accordance with the spirit of the day, had specialised, were forced to realise that the demand for their specialty was dead and not likely to be resuscitated for many months. The teacher of the latest dance or form of physical exercise, the worker in jewellery, rock gardener, breeder of toy dogs, curio-dealer—all the host which has ministered to the hobbies of the rich was suddenly faced with the fact that its patrons no longer have either time or taste for these luxuries. Women have the reputation for being adaptable, but they probably owe it to the fact that, until recently, they did not specialise. The specialist is rarely adaptable, and among women over a certain age one finds the least malleable material.

It is quite probable, therefore, that co-existent with the demand for women's labour we shall still find the unemployed woman, and it is only those who are still young enough to alter their mode of life who will cope successfully with the new conditions. At the same time it is to be hoped that the anomaly of unemployed women's relief work-rooms will be quietly done away with as quickly as possible. As a temporary expedient they may have been inevitable, but they are essentially uneconomic and tend to perpetuate the evil they are intended to combat.

Although there will certainly be more openings for women as a result of the War, it is premature to regard that result as a gain to woman as a whole; more particularly is it a very doubtful blessing to the girls of the middle class. Although one profession—that of medicine and surgery—offers an immediate and certain advance to women, since the drain on qualified men and hospital students will certainly cause a shortage in the next few years, yet that walk of life is one in which the length of training and the expense involved are a serious drawback to many women. In other professions, such as law, which is still practically closed, and architecture, into which they were just entering, the supply at present is quite equal to the demand; indeed, there are many men, hitherto successful, who are unable to make a living. Authorship, journalism, art, music, have for many years known little distinction of sex, and men and women alike are suffering in these professions from war conditions, since books, pictures and music are luxuries to the majority of people.

A great deal is hoped, in certain circles, from the opening of a wider sphere of clerical work, especially in Government departments. Not only will death take toll of the men who have left these posts, but many of them will feel a distaste, after their months of soldiering, for these sedentary and monotonous occupations. The same is probably true of teaching, in those schools where there is a mixed staff, and both in clerical work and in Government-school teaching there is scope for women of all kinds and classes. But for the most part the introduction of female labour into such spheres is not an innovation; merely an increase in numbers. Whether by weight of numbers women will be able to combat the prejudices and traditions which, as a rule, confine them to the less-paid and inferior grades of such work remains to be seen. That battle is only just beginning. In certain trades-unions women are the majority of members but the officials are all men. In Paris, on the contrary, one may see—or might have seen a year ago—a shop owned by a woman who employed her husband as cashier; but then Frenchwomen are so essentially womanly and tactful. It is a situation which few Englishwomen could handle successfully.

Emerging from our tunnel, then, we must expect to find women taking a greater share of the work on which society depends and in spheres hitherto chiefly occupied by men.

Many of them, who had never done regular serious work, have found in cooking for Belgian refugees, or mending and folding clothes, or washing up for a Red Cross Hospital, a greater measure of contentment and even of physical well-being than they have ever known before. They had always been active—for women of our race are seldom lethargic—but the nervous force which they were accustomed to expend in the pursuit of pleasure or on propaganda of a heterogeneous kind has been turned into other channels. It will be almost impossible for them to return to the old aimless life, and it is not too much to anticipate a general assertion on the part of the middle-class woman of 'the right to work.' Unless she is prepared, however, to be both catholic and democratic in her interpretation of the term she may ask in vain.

As a matter of fact the competition for unskilled or partly skilled labour among women is now so keen that the industrial woman can pick and choose, but there never was a time in which the casual worker of this class was less inclined to do extra work. Apart from the districts already enumerated it is not customary in Great Britain for married women as a class to be regular workers, though they may supplement a husband's earnings or support him when he is out of work. In this rank of life the

separation allowance, often made up by employers, gives the wife and mother a better income than she has ever handled before. A case in point is personally known to me. A man earning 1*l.* per week, Reservist, is called to the Colours. His wife gets 16*s.*, plus his allotment of pay, 3*s.* 6*d.*, plus 10*s.* and food, which his employer gives her for partially taking her husband's place. Total, 29*s.* 6*d.*, and no food to find. Apart, however, from the separation allowances, which no one grudges, the billeting of men all over the country has been a source of prosperity to the working classes, and many girls have been called home from service to share the work and the money. Consequently it is now easier to get a good cook at 50*l.* per year than a general servant at 20*l.*, and in parts of the country where the one-servant house is the rule the lamentations of would-be mistresses are louder than ever. With clothing and munition factory, agricultural work and domestic service all competing for unskilled labour, while family incomes are unusually regular and the principal consumer is absent, there is no doubt that the working-class woman is in a very strong position.

Not so the woman of the middle and professional classes, usually accorded the courtesy title of 'educated.' In this rank of life separation or maintenance allowances, even when supplemented by employers, have usually little relation to the normal income, and the latter in the case of many professional-class households is acutely affected by higher prices and increased taxation at the time when earnings are at their lowest. It is, moreover, in this class that the marriage prospects of the girls, not very roseate before the war, will be even worse. Emigration and the limitation of families has thinned the ranks of young men, and the tragic list of only sons who have lost their lives tells its own tale. What is to be the future of the girls of these families?

It was the realisation of this problem which was largely responsible for the changes effected in middle-class education in the last half-century. So long as a domestic existence was the normal—almost the inevitable—lot, girls could be taught merely the domestic arts plus a few accomplishments. But with the growing possibility of a self-dependent existence came the claim that women should be as well equipped as men for the economic struggle. With this battle still in progress came the further demand that all spheres of work should be opened, and now, with universal habits of industry created by war conditions, and with the demand of the Government for women to take men's places (if that demand is to materialise) we may well suppose that yet another Przemysl has fallen before the hosts of feminism who desire an open field for women as for men.

But, after all, is it not premature to draw this conclusion? Does not everything in our social conditions point to the fact that women are being asked to supply untrained labour, and is not that exactly what feminism has always deprecated? As we have already seen, the arts and professions (with the exception of medicine and, perhaps, teaching) which require most skill, or minister to the luxuries and refinements of life, are least in need of recruits, and it is as hewers of wood and drawers of water that the main demand on women is made. At the best they may hope to be called on to fill up the ranks of clerical workers in Government offices or commercial houses, but can we seriously rejoice over such a prospect as an exchange for the matrimonial prospects offered by the men who have gone?

Then there is the pressing question of agricultural labour. There are many imperative reasons for desiring to recruit it from among women. The depletion of the country-side which is so noticeable has as one of its causes the dreary social conditions caused by the migration of all the young women to the towns. Country life, even with hard work, is healthier for women than the factory, shop, or counting-house. And yet even a cursory examination of the question raises doubts as to the possibility of calling women to any extent 'back to the land.' The project of diverting women of the 'educated classes' into the agricultural sphere seems chimerical in view of the actual conditions of work and of housing. Even if such women can accommodate themselves to milking at three or four o'clock in the morning, how can they find suitable lodgings in neighbourhoods where the housing of the labourer and his family is already an acute problem? If he has gone to the war, his wife and children remain. Some owners of country houses are said to have offered them for the accommodation of women agriculturists, but then the offer of a country house, whether for a Red Cross hospital, for Belgian refugees, or for 'lady workers,' is the sort of gift-horse whose teeth have to be carefully examined. In very few cases are such houses suitably situated for this particular purpose, and at best the proposal has about it a flavour of amateurishness fatal to any real success. Suggestions are also being made that increased wages must be offered to tempt women back to agricultural life, but, as a matter of fact, anyone who has had to do with women's work knows how small a part pecuniary considerations play. The manager of a tobacco factory which employs a large number of women and girls tells me that by no conceivable device can he persuade them to go on working after they have earned a certain sum, and the Commission which reported on several very low-paid industries throughout the country noted the prevalence of

a wage standard, above which it was apparently a breach of local feminine etiquette to go! Migration from country to town is a psychological phenomenon, and is found to-day as much in new countries like Australia as in our own.

While farmers would probably resist, for a variety of obvious reasons, any attempt to introduce amateur workers of the 'educated' class as farm hands, they should welcome such efforts as are now being made in Berkshire, by a private committee working in conjunction with the Reading Agricultural College, to find and train suitable country-bred girls of the labourer class and to place them with dairy farmers. While it meets one need of the moment, however, this scheme does not touch the main problem of women's employment, for it increases the competition for the unskilled or rough type of work, which is at present sought for in so many spheres. Once again, the well-nurtured and 'educated' woman may seek high and low for work, while the labourer's daughter can pick and choose.

But if there is one employment above all others in which this disparity of fortune is most evident, it is that of marriage. The proportion of working-class women who do not marry is inconsiderable. Among their (conventionally speaking) better-off sisters it is growing at an alarming rate. Yet the marriage rate of a class does not depend so much on the relative numbers of men and women as on social habits and customs. As I showed in an article in the March number of this Review for 1914,¹ the actual surplus of unmarried women over unmarried men between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five is small, and the real danger is the fall in the marriage rate. The fall in the marriage rate of the middle classes and the rise of the age of marriage has been continuous and progressive since 1881. The postponement of marriage by men means that when they choose a mate she must, if she is of true marriageable age, belong to a generation younger than their own, and this again means an increasing number both of comparatively young widows and of elderly spinsters. Women, it is true, also marry later in life—too late, in many cases, for the interests of the race—but a woman's marriageable period is comparatively short.

In order to form any idea of the prospects of women after the War it is necessary to try to understand some of the causes of the prevalent and increasing tendency among the 'educated' classes to postpone marriage. It is difficult, however, to be sufficiently brief for the purposes of this article without leaving out some important factor. The chief reasons may be classified

¹ 'The Superfluous Woman: her Cause and Cure.'

as psychological, physical, and economic. The complex modern mind demands more from its mate—that is a theory beloved by women, and it is probably true of a fine type of man, but it does not fully account for the state of affairs. Man ‘mates’ without any intellectual affinity. It is when he wants to ‘settle down’ that his complex modern mind asserts its needs. In Athens the rôles were reversed. A man mated in marriage and then sought his mental diversions outside. The male psychology remains the same, and it is the wife who has triumphed over Aspasia, but if man outwits her by evading marriage altogether the triumph is short-lived. As to the second cause, the physical demands of nature are met either by (a) indulgence outside the pale of marriage, or (b) the cult of exercise or sport. This theory must also be viewed in the light of the increased physical exertions and decreased sexuality of the girls of the ‘educated’ class. It is apparently not at all difficult for their male companions to avoid falling in love with them, but the same young men fall very easy prey to a different class of girl. The third reason is, to my mind, the most comprehensive. A wife in this rank of life is a luxury, whereas to a working man she is a necessity. In the Spartan age to which many of us must resign ourselves luxuries must be eschewed, but the young man of the day had begun his self-denial before the War—he had, so to speak, ‘put down’ wives and families. In the mood of seriousness begotten by war he may be inclined to see things in a truer perspective.

A great deal has been said and written about the selfishness of man in refusing to shoulder the responsibilities of marriage, but the demands of an average girl of the ‘educated’ class, her standard of living, her taste in amusements, and her domestic incompetence, are some excuse for the carefulness of the bachelor. For such a state of affairs no remedy exists save a social revolution. If people who can set the standards will adopt a simpler mode of life, and train their young people in it, the movement will spread downwards, and here the influence of war-work will be most beneficial. Simpler habits have already been acquired, the quest for pleasure has been abandoned, in some cases for ever, and real life has been unfolded to eyes which never before had seen anything but trappings and gildings.

It is all to the good, too, that prudence and calculation have been flung for once to the winds and young hearts have come together under the shadow of war. Nature has had her way with many young folks in the last few months, and when we think how she has been starved and pinched and poked into the strait-jacket of worldliness in the last half-century, since love-in-a-cottage went out of fashion, it is good to think that she has

come into her own again. These love matches mean modest homes for many a lad and lass who might otherwise have waited till all the bloom was off life, and only the loaves and fishes remained. Let us hope that they will set an example, and that it will come to be considered creditable, instead of idiotic, to be young, and poor, and in love with life and with each other.

At the present time, and for the last eight months, Nature has had very much her own way in a different rank of life from that which chronicles its war weddings in the *Morning Post*. The stern moralist must reflect that a country which depends on emotional appeal to raise its Army, and then, having secured the flower of its manhood by such appeal, sends them to train for six months or so far from their homes and among admiring women, must expect certain consequences. The consequences are coming in their thousands, and ought, in the interests of the nation and in justice to our fighting men, to be provided for. These, after all, are the outcome of very different circumstances and emotions from the sordid stories of the slums and crowded streets which preface many illegitimate births. At the same time woman as a sex will be badly served if ill-judged sentimentalism elevates these 'war-mothers' into heroines. Each case will need to be treated on its merits, but if marriage is to retain any place in our social system public opinion must continue to make the position of an unmarried mother inferior to that of a wife. This is not the place in which to discuss the question, which is at last receiving public attention, but it appears that accommodation outside the Poor Law, and very special efforts to provide a chance of a healthy and useful existence for both mother and child, are among the immediate necessities of a day which makes never-ending calls on the ingenuity and service of its non-combatants.

In the discussions as to the future which now take place wherever two or three women are congregated together it is a commonplace to hear the most respectable matrons advocating without a blush either the adoption of polygamy or some form of what used to be called free love. Women have a marvellous faculty for detachment in discussing these questions, for it is practically certain that the upholder, in the abstract, of these heterodox doctrines is not only a model of respectability but would be exceedingly shocked at the behaviour of the young woman whose conduct has been glanced at in the preceding paragraph, should that young woman chance to be in her service. Probably our revolutionist subscribes to the funds for providing female police to look after the morals of the camps! The arguments against polygamy or free love need not, however, be founded on any high moral grounds, for in truth they rest chiefly

on the feelings and prejudices of women. 'The history of monogamous marriage,' says Westermarck, 'is the history of a relation in which women have been gradually triumphing over the passions, the prejudices, and the selfish interests of man'; it enjoys a position of security only to be attained by institutions which are the result of crystallised experience. When it is seriously suggested that men who can afford more than one family or establishment should be encouraged to do so as a patriotic duty, the fact is overlooked that if a man has the desire and the means for this form of multiplied domesticity he probably indulges it without any patriotic stimulus. It would solve no social difficulties, and merely complicate the psychological ones, if the wife *en titre* were expected to ask the other ladies to tea. The real difficulty, however, is not to persuade a man to have several wives and families but to get him to have one.

The other claim put forward is that women who may not have an opportunity of marriage, or may not want to be permanently embarrassed with a husband, should be permitted by social codes to have a child if they are in a position to provide for one. The qualification is introduced to meet the obvious objections to starting a child in life without any prospect of being able to keep it without help from the State. The advocates of this qualified 'right' to maternity are not prepared to accept the logical claim for State endowment of motherhood which arises if the father is not obliged to support his offspring. There is a pathos in the proposition which sometimes blinds one to its absurdity. Who is to decide as to the ability of a woman to provide for a child? Probably the very fact of maternity will impair her powers of provision, but in any case must she prelude her adventure by taking out a certificate? Other more ridiculous sides of the proposal are obvious, but chiefly it is founded on a misconception of woman's needs. The lonely woman often thinks it is only a child she lacks to make her life complete and fill her empty heart, but it is quite as much, nay far more, a mate that she really wants. The conclusive argument, however, is that a child has a right to two parents, and that deliberately to start him in life with only one is to cheat him of a birthright, and to take a responsibility which nature never intended to place on one pair of shoulders.

It is a singular thing that this claim, which is frequently discussed by women of the most serious character, should synchronise with the refusal or limitation of maternity by many married women. Observation leads me to believe that these modified free-love proposals are seldom either held or advanced by women to whom marriage and maternity is still a possibility. So long as sex attraction retains its true and normal relation to

the question of child-bearing the healthy-minded woman will hope for a true union, spiritual as well as physical, and will not degrade maternity to a mere act of reproduction, while the sexually frigid woman will have no natural longings. A great deal of the strange talk that one hears among women on these subjects is due to the decrease of sexuality among the 'educated' class. There are many women, young and attractive, who, so far as feeling is concerned, are absolutely neuters. They cannot understand love, and for that reason while they may desire maternity for motives of policy, duty, or self-interest, the whole subject has neither mystery nor romance for them, and is simply thought of as the price to be paid for an assured position and an establishment.

In the *Nineteenth Century* for March appeared two articles on the birth-rate, which afforded an interesting commentary on each other. The 'Passing of the Child' is conclusively shown by Dr. Brend to be the result not of poverty but of prosperity, while Mrs. Richardson,² with much plausibility, claims for the professional classes that prudence and parental care make small families inevitable. There is, however, a distinction to be drawn between the small family and the one-child family, which is practically no family at all, since two persons come together and leave only one behind. The prevalence of the one-child family in well-to-do circles is not always the result of deliberate intention but sometimes of too late marriage, yet a large number of cases must occur to everyone, among their own acquaintances, of families which could very well have afforded to bring up at least four children, where one or at most two are found. Again, the standard of living of the parents—habits acquired in early life—make any diminution in their personal expenditure or alteration in their mode of life appear like a hardship, and it is this, far more than the future of their children, which really weighs with the majority. Were it really their child's welfare they think of, they would realise that the disadvantages of being an only child are so great that it would be hard to imagine what could compensate for them. Of course, when a woman can neither bear nor rear children without the aid of an army of expensive experts the economic question is an immediate one, but that is as much her fault as her misfortune.

While one cannot too strongly deprecate the view of matrimony as a means of obtaining a living without working for it—a view far more prevalent in recent materialistic days than in the despised Victorian age of sentiment, domestic duties, and large

² 'The Professional Classes, the War, and the Birthrate.'

families—it is to be hoped that the increased economic independence of women will not be used as a further impediment to home and family life. This will be the case if feminists succeed in imposing the view that the home should be supported by both partners, the wife working outside the home as a matter of course, after marriage as before, and only taking a few months off for the purposes of increasing the population. This system is more usual in France than in any other country, for the proportion of married women employed there in gainful work is exceptionally high, and although no one would attribute the low birth-rate in France to any one cause the coincidence of the working mother and the one-child family is too striking to be accidental. After all it is a question of common sense. Found a family on an income earned by two, and then withdraw one breadwinner for a period of two, three or more months. The period would be at least a year if she performed her duties fully. The dislocation in the domestic economy of that home would be too great to be endured more than once or at most twice. There has recently been an outcry against the refusal of certain public bodies to employ married women, for instance as teachers; and one of the 'conditions' imposed by the Suffrage societies as the price of their co-operation in the special register of female labour is the withdrawal of all 'penalties' as to marriage, such as are imposed by some Government bodies on their employees. It would be interesting to inquire as to the average number of children among married women teachers.

A fallacious argument is founded on the superior comfort and advantages accruing to the family if a woman is free to follow a lucrative occupation. This is true, perhaps, for the childless or one-child family, but no material consideration can outweigh the disadvantages where a young family must be left to hired care. As good servants become rarer and more expensive this difficulty will increase.

The most striking illustration of the effect of married women's employment on the birth-rate is to be found in the comparison of the rates, both of births and of infant mortality, between the cotton operatives and the coalminers. Dr. Brend³ used these figures to illustrate 'the passing of the child' in order to show that prosperity was not the only cause of the limitation of families, since the rate of wages per family is much the same in both districts. They testify equally to the effect on the family of the industrial employment of wives and mothers. Incidentally, it may interest Dr. Brend to know that no secret is made by Lanca-

³ 'The Passing of the Child,' *Nineteenth Century and After*, March 1915.

shire women as to their customs. 'Tha should ha' coom to B—— sooner,' said one of them in my hearing to the mother of eight children, 'then tha'd ha' knawed better!'

In any attempt to utilise women's labour which the Government may be moved to make, it is, therefore, to be hoped that they will draw a strong distinction between young married women and those who are single or beyond the age of child-bearing. After all, there is no employment to which women can be put of more importance to the State than that of wifehood and motherhood.

As for the middle-class or 'educated' girl and her prospects, there are some advantages reaped already from war conditions. Romance has once more raised its head. Habits of industry have been formed which may help her to reconstruct a sweeter, simpler ideal of married existence. In her eagerness for service she forgot her carefully cultivated ladyhood and became just a woman. The country wanted her hands, for it had need only of a limited number of brain-workers, and so she stooped to conquer. One who has cooked, or washed dishes, or scrubbed floors for love and patriotism in the past has killed one of the dragons which have long stood in her path. She will make, *inter alia*, a better colonist's or settler's wife for the many hundreds of our young men who, when the War is over, will never come back to the narrow if cushioned life in our beautiful, crowded little islands. The girls must go too. Emigration must be one of the principal outlets for the new type of girl after the War—the girl who will never again be content with shams but wants life—hard and raw perhaps, but real and vital.

In the idle, self-indulgent, petted existence of a vast number of 'educated' women lay a great danger to our sex and to the State. Mrs. Richardson's picture of the careful and harassed professional man's wife is only a half-truth. On the other side of the shield see the thousands who, day in day out, crowd the great shopping centres, not purposeful, but simply to fill in the morning hours. For these an army of poorer women has toiled all day and every day, that they may be as the lilies of the field; but with the democratisation of society which has proceeded apace in the last nine months will come a redistribution of female labour. The professional classes cannot afford so many idle mouths. Will they still seek work anywhere but in their own homes, and find every service tolerable save the one that is paid in love only? Surely not!

War tears aside our pretences, shatters our elaborate artifices, and brings us back to the real things, the things that matter. Men and women alike need the lesson, but it is women,

especially the more favoured of their sex, who must point the way. And here let me end on a note struck by a little 'Early Victorian' mother in a letter which I read the other day. She has three big fighting sons serving their country. 'Hurrah for women!' she wrote, 'and hurrah for being the mother of men!'

ETHEL COLQUHOUN.

PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW

(III)

THE PROBLEM OF THE DISCHARGED SOLDIER

THE War is reaching its fiercest stage, and every man of military age who can be spared is wanted for the Front, his place being filled by non-fighters, boys and women.

The difficulties which will be created at the end of the War, especially if it be prolonged, by these industrial emergency arrangements, are of course obvious to everyone. But we are at war, and these things must be done. Anyone who shrinks or would persuade others to shrink from taking whatever action the Government considers necessary to beat the enemy deserves nothing more or less in my opinion than internment in a German military prison. There are too many people in this country at the present time who leave to others the task of grappling with the evils of to-day, choosing for themselves the pleasanter work of lecturing the nation upon what it must do—to-morrow.

Now, consideration for the fate of the men who have given themselves to their country is a problem of to-day.

Two reasons may be given in case there are patriotic persons who may not realise the fact. The first reason is that the knots with which the Government is obliged to tie up private enterprise, and perhaps before we have done the liberty of the subject during this war-time, will not be untied without the most acute industrial friction and heart-burning unless preparation is made beforehand and while we are still united against our common enemy. The second reason is that men of all classes are beginning to realise this with an uneasiness and with forebodings which are already proving prejudicial to recruiting, and before long may bring it to a full stop.

The position, however, though it is becoming serious, is in no way desperate at present, and if matters are taken in time, and the nettle resolutely grasped by the nation and the Government, it is all quite capable of adjustment and a satisfactory settlement. We have to take the problems brought upon us by the War in due order, and if we solve the immediate problem

—crushing the enemy—the settlement of our affairs afterwards will not be beyond us. We have now arrived, however, at the point when we cannot secure the maximum strength of the nation for prosecution of the War unless we seriously consider and prepare for the chief problem which will confront us as soon as peace is in sight—demobilisation.

It is a many-sided problem, and it is perhaps impossible to do it justice in the space of one article. One part of it has already received some attention from the Government—the provision of employment for men disabled from wounds, incurable, but not to the extent of wholly incapacitating them from work. In February the Government appointed a Committee under the chairmanship of the Right Hon. Sir George Murray, K.C.B., to take evidence and report as to the employment of disabled soldiers and sailors. This Committee is still considering the matter. Meanwhile the problem grows. Though the actual number of partially disabled men who have been discharged does not probably exceed 2000, and the Soldiers and Sailors Help Society, which has for some years past carried on a workshop for crippled and disabled soldiers and sailors, has publicly stated that it is prepared, given sufficient financial aid, to provide for all who may require help from this cause, it is sincerely to be hoped that Sir George Murray's Committee will issue its report as soon as possible. The Soldiers and Sailors Help Society has done excellent work for disabled men in the past, but indications are not wanting that the public will insist upon the men who have been maimed for life in defence of their country receiving the care they need from a body which is directly responsible to the nation, and against which there cannot arise, justly or unjustly, distrust or antagonism from labour organisations. The problem, though small in circumference, is an uncommonly thorny and difficult one, and if Sir George Murray's Committee can suggest a solution which meets with general approval, especially the approval of the working classes, it will have rendered a public service of the greatest value.

Then there is the matter of replacement. At the beginning of the War we all had great hopes that the back of the difficulty of providing employment for our soldiers upon their return would be broken, through the generous and freely expressed intention of employers to take back those of their hands who offered their lives to save their country. Employers now are much more chary of making any promises at all, while some of those who promised in such haste, though in all good faith no doubt, are now beginning to repent at leisure.¹

¹ Since this article went to press, employers have publicly stated they will 'give preference' to discharged soldiers. Will it be within their power?

'I am afraid,' an employer told the writer when asked for an opinion as to how far the promises made in the early days of the War were likely to be redeemed if it lasted much longer, 'in fact I am sure that many cannot return to their old jobs again. Take my own case, for instance. We have 170 to 180 men who have enlisted. The first month we paid them full wages, afterwards half wages to those with families in need. We had the firm intention of taking all back again when they returned. We told them we would do so as far as possible. War material now keeps us very busy, and we have had to engage fresh hands. Also to open several occupations to women where formerly we never thought of employing female labour. Some of these new hands are working satisfactorily, and I cannot see how we could possibly take back more than a part of our old employees.' These words were written before war service for women became the order of the day. How far the introduction of women workers will complicate matters at the end of the War no one of course can tell, but it is a feature of the main problem we shall have to face upon demobilisation which must directly affect replacement and will arouse very bitter feeling unless it is taken in time, and principles of action determined and agreed upon, not between the Government and employers only, but between the men and women workers themselves.

Another side of the problem which oppresses many people is the enormous readjustment of industry and of the conditions of the labour market which will have to take place when war munitions are no longer in demand, and the State leaves private enterprise and capital to grope its way back into the paths of ordinary commerce and find out what trade can be carried on with the Continent of Europe after the War.

Ultimately, and perhaps sooner than pessimists will admit, the trade of this country should expand beyond anything we have yet known, and there will certainly be vast need of reconstruction in Belgium and France, Poland and Galicia, and in other parts of Europe yet to be ravaged perhaps. But how far *our* labour will be required, and whether the necessary capital will be available for us to set it in motion, are questions for which most people with experience in these matters have not a satisfactory answer.

Yet another difficulty will have to be faced. The War will probably not be over, at any rate to permit of demobilisation upon an extensive scale, before the end of this year. That will mean that the majority of the men will have been away from their trades a year, and a considerable number for eighteen months. This in the case of those engaged in skilled work requiring constant practice and fineness of touch will be a great

drawback, and unfairly handicap many a good mechanic when he has to take his place with his stay-at-home mates.

A much more extensive and difficult problem, though akin to this, will be the unwillingness, probably in most cases the flat refusal of men whose employment previous to enlistment was sedentary (that of shop assistant or the standing all day long feeding an automatic machine) to return to it.

Those who visit the trenches and watch the life there and its effect on the men, and the men themselves who are in training camps, give emphatic evidence on this point.

The writer questioned on this matter a friend who, though a University graduate and an official of promise in a public department before enlistment in August, has the distinction, rare for men of his class, of still being a private (he had refused a commission six times). 'I am perfectly happy,' he replied, 'and when I looked in on the fellows at the office this morning I wondered how they could stand their life. I never want to see a pen again.' My friend looked a younger man by five years than when I had seen him last. His face was ruddy and blowsed with the weather; his hands hard and—dirty; his muscles like iron. I commented upon his rejuvenation. He laughed and said it was typical. 'I have had eight months without any responsibility,' he said, 'everything is ordered for me and done for me. I work when I am told, do what I am told, and the rest of the time I play. All the time we are in the open air. Most of us feel we can never stand the working indoors again.'

I asked him what the moral effect of the life was upon the average lad of decent upbringing who had volunteered for the War. 'Bad,' he said shortly. 'We are magnificent animals, you know, but the herding of young men together away from their mothers, sisters or wives inevitably lowers their moral standard. It may go up in the trenches, but not with the weaker ones. It is not that the men as a rule are really bad or low-minded, but they grow careless, they lose their sense of responsibility. Something will have to be done, and something pretty drastic, to bring it back again when they return home.'

All of us I expect who have friends or acquaintances in training camps have heard pretty much the same story. The moral of it is that from the point of view of the soldier the pith of the whole problem of demobilisation will not be industrial, or economic, but human—very human indeed. Hosts of these men will have lost by the time they return not only practised skill of hand, but any desire to recover it if the occupation to which it would tie them down is one which would keep them in a confined space or atmosphere. They will not, I think, be long in re-acquiring a sense of responsibility. They will certainly not be

averse to hard manual labour or unaccustomed to it. They will, moreover, be full to overflowing with the 'lust of conquest,' which in men of the British race means a craving for adventure, a new life, and independence. This will mean an enormous impetus probably to emigration and colonisation on the largest scale. If we set beside this craving for free outdoor life on the part of our late ex-clerks, ex-shop assistants, ex-University men, and working men as well, the response being made by women to the call of the Government for 'war service'; if we also take to heart what all who have watched the industrial progress of women for some years past are keenly alive to, namely, that it is difficult to set a limit to the indoor occupations of men which women could not undertake as usefully, and perhaps even better than their brothers, we must see, I think, the possibility of something like a revolution of industrial development among very large classes of the population when the War is over.

Another feature of the demobilisation problem must not be forgotten, a feature which can never be absent when it is a question of providing for the return to civil life of a great number of men of all sorts and conditions drawn from every class of the population. There will be men, and with the huge numbers involved, perhaps thousands, who until they joined the present Army had not earned a living wage, and will not earn it long when they return unless great care and supervision amounting almost to actual control is exercised over them. I mean the men who were work-shy; who cannot when they are not under discipline resist those forms of self-indulgence which make them the despair of the military employment agency and cause the term 'old soldier' to be a by-word among employers.

I suggest that in any preparations contemplated for demobilisation purposes men of this kind must not be neglected. Often enough in spite of their weaknesses they are brave fighters, and in any case they have placed their lives at the nation's disposal. On the other hand they cannot and must not be confused with men of the better class. They really constitute a separate problem.

There is still to be considered, before we can suggest what is to be done, the point of view of the man and the woman worker, more especially the woman, who has stayed at home. At the present time, apart from the uneasiness already alluded to, the attitude of those who are doing the work of the nation towards its young men who are fighting for it is warmly appreciative. Later on, when victories are won and the British Army shows what it can do when the grand attack and advance is in full swing, the appreciation we stay-at-homes feel now will wax to admiration and in the popular mind to hero-worship. As a

result our men will believe, in the innocence of their hearts, that they have only to make their appearance in the 'old shop' to be welcomed with enthusiasm, and to receive preferential treatment in any jobs that are going, including return if they wish it to their former jobs with the full consent of the substitutes who must now go out into the cold, and usually of their mates who, during their absence, have been earning better money than they have ever done before in their lives.

We fear that our returning heroes will be disappointed, for we have not forgotten what happened after the South African War, where the readjustment of labour was a mere trifle in comparison with what we have before us now. Employers know this very well indeed, and, as the letter already quoted showed, probably many have made up their minds not to discharge their present hands where those workers have given satisfaction. Not only, however, will the 'substitutes' stick to their berths if they can, but unless preparation is made against it now there will be a bitterness of feeling on the part of home workers toward the men returning from abroad, which will be little less in extent, and much more difficult to deal with, than the disinclination on the part of the discharged soldiers themselves to take up dull routine employment in office or shop. This bitterness will be especially felt by the women workers. It is useless to disguise the fact that while our suffragists of every degree are loyally co-operating to prevent what Miss Christabel Pankhurst calls the Prussianising of England, and are supporting authorities most meekly instead of breaking their windows, this attitude will not continue when the power of the Prussians is broken. The demand for political enfranchisement of women, and a concerted well-organised agitation for improving permanently the economic position of women, will spring into being on a far wider basis and with a much greater chance of success than the agitation conducted before the War. No preparations for the industrial crisis which demobilisation will present will be adequate which do not take into account the steady and increasingly powerful movement toward economic equality with men which women's leaders of all kinds are promoting and maturing while the War goes on and they are needed to do men's work.

The solution of the problem of discharged soldiers can only be achieved if means are taken to bring into association, while demobilisation is still a question of the future, leading representatives of all those forces in the industrial world, not of this country only but of the Empire as a whole, which will be directly affected by the return of our absent men. These forces include such Government Departments as—War Office, Board of Trade, Local Government Board, and General Post Office; the Dominion

Governments and the larger emigration societies; the military employment societies; regimental associations, which, though now practically non-existent owing to the War, will be very important factors of the situation at its close; employers of labour in all parts of the country, and equally trades unions, both small and great, including women's trades unions; and women who have taken a leading part in the employment of women during the War. Last, but not by any means least, there must be included within the association representative men of business and affairs, experienced social workers and authorities, and those, such as proprietors of newspapers and members of both Houses of Parliament who may have a personal interest in, and the desire to befriend, the men who are returning to the country they have served in the time of its sorest need.

This association of forces must be systematically organised, and each member of it be made to feel that he or she has an individual responsibility in ensuring the success of the undertaking which is to be carried through.

In a word I would like to see measures taken by which all public discussion in the Press as to what should be done with the disabled—whether soldiers should go on the land in England or be emigrated abroad: whether they should be turned out of the Army at once when the sword is sheathed, or trained in workshops at the country's expense until they have recovered their former skill—should be dropped; and means taken to form centrally in London, and locally in every industrial centre and in every county, and finally in all such centres of the Colonies as our Colonial authorities may suggest, committees for thrashing these problems out quietly on a basis which shall build up a united force to shoulder the responsibility of dealing with every individual returning soldier suitably and adequately, without turning away into the cold those who have kept the flag flying at home for him and his, as he has done for them abroad.

The taking of measures of a practical kind to establish united action among all who can help, or hinder, the solution of this mighty problem, has been under the consideration for some time of men of experience, employers of labour, leading trades unionists, and men who have spent the best years of their lives in the Army, and know the War Office organisation from A to Z.

All these are agreed upon the vital need for something to be done, and upon the main lines of advance. The matter has not, it is rumoured, escaped the attention of the Government, in spite of the enormous pressure to provide for the immediate necessities for carrying the War to a successful conclusion, and it is possible that some official pronouncement may be made before long.

But it is not official action merely that this article is written to advocate.

That any association of forces for a National—or, in this instance, an Imperial—purpose such as the solution of the demobilisation problem, must have the Governments of the Empire behind it, and ready, whether financially or in any other way, to give such assistance and authority as may be needed, goes without saying. But the initiation, consolidation, and successful carrying through of so gigantic and so complex an undertaking as I shall endeavour to indicate broadly here, is, be it spoken with all respect, beyond any Government to essay alone, even though armed with all the powers which our present Ministry has been given, and deservedly given, and though demobilisation above all other responsibilities is in the fullest sense of the term a State undertaking.

In order to realise this we must examine more closely the constitution and functions of any organisation which can effectively prepare for, and then contend with and overcome, the innumerable and most difficult problems contained within the central question—How to provide for our men on discharge.

Such an organisation must be, it is obvious, without party and without class distinctions of any kind. It must be, on the other hand, welded together closely by a common aim, and held to its purpose by work and association which in homely but expressive phrase will give everyone something to do.

It is by doing, not by speechifying or pamphleteering, that we shall turn all the difficulties I have cited, and many more there has not been space to touch upon, to good account, and into means for bringing us closer to one another as well as to our soldiers, and drawing them to us, instead of antagonising, or at least disappointing, them when they come home.

Again, this 'doing' must not be through a series of activities carried on spasmodically and in isolation by separate groups of enthusiasts immersed in one side of the problem only. Already we are having separate appeals for public aid to help soldiers to settle on the land in England, and to provide blocks of residential dwellings for the disabled. We shall presently see able articles and appeals in regard to emigration facilities for soldiers, which have already been under consideration at the Colonial Institute.

When the time for the men to return grows near there will hardly be a daily paper without a scheme—or at least a bright idea—containing some marvellous and certain method of benefiting our 'heroes' and only wanting—money.

There is no cause for complaint in all this. If a certain number of persons rush into print, and form Committees to advertise themselves, or even to turn a penny not too honestly,

the very large majority of those who come forward with schemes, even the wildest, are earnest souls whose ardour needs only to be turned into right channels to be of benefit, more or less great according to circumstances, both to the good cause and to the fond parent of the new baby. Nor in order to straighten out the situation is it necessary, as a rule, to kill that baby. In such a problem as demobilisation there is room for a very large family indeed. And the true art of co-ordination and concentration of forces is not the stamping upon and crushing out individuality and initiative, but bringing it into combination, training it to adapt itself to one common purpose, enhancing its real strength if it has any, and only committing it to a lethal chamber if it is either a fraud or too ethereal for this mundane planet.

But this co-ordination and concentration of forces needs very strong hands indeed, and closest and most systematic organisation. It is an army we need, and to begin with we have something which will look to most eyes little better than a mob.

There must be established first of all a central force the particular business of which will be to seek for, gather together, and marshal into order for the great struggle when it comes all lesser forces, whether in the shape of a group of emigration experts or any other individual or collective force which has a policy or plan to lay down that will affect directly the problem of demobilisation. This central force must also strengthen and co-ordinate all local forces—e.g. authorities or persons in the counties and industrial centres throughout Great Britain and Ireland, and in certain centres of the Dominions, in whose hands the task of individual treatment of the men requiring employment on discharge will obviously lie.

The constitution of this central force, call it Council or Committee, or what you please, must be fully representative of all the bodies enumerated as necessary constituents of this army of ours. As has been said, there must be Government authority behind the movement, and the last word in regard to the constitution of the central power, which would be the pivot on which the undertaking will turn, must be said by the Government; but there must be no danger of any important factor in the realisation of the main object in view being left out, either through ignorance of official minds as to what those factors are, or official prejudices.

The central force constituted, a body with Executive functions and the power of constituting Sub-Committees from the main body must be appointed. Even here, however, in this Executive body itself, and in every Sub-Committee it forms, the representative principle must be rigidly observed. Small bodies of

experts—the smaller the better—are needed, but none must be too small for any party or body whose experience or importance entitles it to representation upon that Sub-Committee to be able to say it has been left out.

The functions of the Committees so formed will be of a central character, inasmuch as they will work out and initiate the policy to be followed in regard to the various problems of demobilisation, and then, as part of the Central Association, assist, guide, and, if necessary, direct the local forces in the realisation and carrying out of the policies laid down.

The responsibility, however, of dealing with our returning soldiers will rest quite as much with all the local forces as with the Central Association. In the first place, of course, each local force will be represented on that Association directly; in the second place it will be their part to help the man himself, and see through individually all that the Central Association of forces has made itself responsible to the nation to carry out.

It should not be part of any scheme to thrust discharged soldiers *en masse* into any occupation or into any one part of the country or the Empire. Every man will want first to go home, and if he can, to settle down at home, be that home a country village or the city of Manchester—unless the chances he finds there when he arrives are too limited or unsuitable for the life he wants to lead now that he has laid down his arms. Therefore there must not be a locality throughout the country without its agent or its Committee, or what not, for lending a hand to Tom Brown or John Smith close by his own hearthstone. That agency, however, must be linked up strongly and clearly with the highest authorities in the land, and those new worlds beyond our shores.

A word is due to one great department which will have a considerable part to play in the organisation which I suggest should be created to prepare for demobilisation. That department is the National System of Labour Exchanges.

I have heard it stated that the Labour Exchanges ought alone to deal with the whole of the problem of finding suitable and permanent employment for the men who return, though they may number anything from 500,000—the smallest estimate I have heard given—to 2,000,000. I have also heard other people say that the Labour Exchanges ought not to touch the problem at all, except by registering such men who choose to put their names down on the books of the Exchanges in the ordinary way after their return home. My own view lies between these two extreme opinions. This is no place to enter into details of business or management. I have carefully avoided doing so. Therefore I will not attempt to indicate what these Labour Ex-

changes shall do. Nevertheless, though, taking the question of emigration alone into consideration, I do not see how Labour Exchanges could possibly be justly expected to handle demobilisation by themselves, yet, if the movement for taking hold strongly and comprehensively of the future of our soldiers on discharge were to mean the setting up of a rival competitive organisation of Labour Bureaux for men who have served abroad in this War, the movement would not only be a very bad failure but would be a most unfair and undeserved reflexion upon a very great work attempted, and in many respects successfully attempted, by the officials of the Labour Exchanges. These men have worked almost night and day throughout this war-time. They have given, for years before this crisis, their brains and their energies to building up a system by which no man honestly needing work, and no employer honestly prepared to pay for that work to be done and requiring labour, shall be without the best machinery and facility for obtaining it without delay. They must, certainly, form an important factor in both central and local forces preparing for demobilisation.

The National System of Labour Exchanges then must take full part in this Association for the benefit of the men returning from Service. Upon judicious and practical arrangement between the Labour Exchanges, both central and local, and all other forces engaged in the undertaking, its success will depend more than on almost any other part of the movement.

It is time to conclude this brief endeavour to sketch out the problem of the discharged soldier and the way towards its solution. Many may say still that this is all very well but that before the matter need be considered within the sphere of practical policy we must get on further with the War. This is not, however, the opinion of practical men responsible for the interests of the workmen on the one side and the employers on the other. It is two months ago now or more since a striking article appeared in the *Morning Post* by Mr. W. A. Appleton, Secretary of the General Federation of Trades Unions, on 'Trade Unions and Industrial Training of Soldiers.' In that article Mr. Appleton used these words :

The War will not last for ever, and when it closes the Government must deal comprehensively with the soldier not merely as a transient problem, but as a citizen, who, during a short period of his life, devotes himself to the performance of particular national duties, who must if he lives return to ordinary civil life, lose himself in the mass of the civil population, and perforce shoulder his share of life's ordinary labours and duties. . . . There exists now a mighty sense of fraternal and national responsibility. Ideals and opinions as to methods may differ, but interest in national need and aspirations is strong and general, and offers glorious opportunities of discovering common factors of agreement and action.

A great employer has written as follows :

I have gone very carefully into this matter, and consider something of the kind must be put into operation at the earliest possible moment, as it will make a very great upheaval in the labour market if these men are all thrown on the market without some kind of co-ordinated and examined plan.

Personally I cannot help feeling that taking into consideration the need not only to provide justly and generously for our soldiers on their return but, what is of infinite importance, to prevent injustice being done to the home workers, or to the interests of our young lads and girls whose prospects in life industrially are being most seriously affected by the present position, and will need the closest attention when demobilisation comes, those fine words of Mr. Asquith in his speech at Newcastle on the 20th of April might be used here.

The appeal is made [said Mr. Asquith, alluding, of course, to the organisation of the industrial resources for the War] not to one class more than to another, but to every man individually who has to render his account to his fellow-countrymen, to his children, and to his own conscience for the part which he played, for the share of the common burden which he took upon his own shoulders, when the fortunes not only of Great Britain but of European freedom were at stake.

I would venture to make such appeal now to the nation in regard to making preparation for the future of our soldiers upon their return to civil life.

ARTHUR PATERSON

(Secretary Social Welfare Association for London).

WORDSWORTH AND THE WAR

We live in times of crisis and convulsion, and it is at such times that a steady adherence to the soundest principles is peculiarly important.—

SIR JOHN STODDART, Editor of *The Times* (1811).

THE World-wide War of 1914-15 brings to everyone's memory the great war against Napoleon, 1803-1815. Each conflict throws light upon the other. We now realise the state of England when 'the War' formed the daily and the main interest of the country, we understand how it happened that no Englishman could be fully absorbed in any matter which did not bear upon resistance to the despotic Emperor of the French who to our forefathers was never Napoleon, but always Bonaparte, or Buona-parté. We remember that in the early years of the last century Imperial despotism had enslaved the European Continent and threatened destruction both to the liberty and to the independence of England. We recall with natural pride that Englishmen dealt the last blow to the tyrant of Europe. To-day, when forced to resist by arms the lawlessness of a military Empire, stronger in many respects, and far more unscrupulous, than the Empire of Napoleon, we wish to discover the secret of the triumph achieved by our grandfathers a century ago. It were folly indeed and ingratitude to forget that the immediate cause of England's deliverance from the danger of Napoleonic tyranny is to be found in the transcendent genius of Nelson and the uninterrupted victories of Wellington. But, as we all know, the extraordinary ability of our greatest seaman and of our greatest general would have availed England nothing, had not our commanders by sea and by land been supported by a Parliament which uttered the will of the wisest and best men of the United Kingdom. Our country was saved in the war against the French Emperor, as it must be saved in the war against the German Kaiser, by its people. After 1806 England had no statesman who, even to his followers, seemed of heroic mould. Burke, Pitt, and Fox were dead; there existed no leader who inspired Englishmen with enthusiasm. Grenville, Portland, Perceval,

Sidmouth, Liverpool, or Castlereagh were not names with which to conjure. They do not now live in the hearts of Englishmen. The salvation of the country was not due to the inspiration of any one hero who towered above his fellows. It was due, as it must be due to-day, to the resolution and the faith of the British people. Where shall we find the record or the expression of this saving faith? The true answer is that it will be found, in its best and clearest form, in the political ideas or, in other words, in the statesmanship of Wordsworth.¹ If any reader be startled by the assertion that the best account of the political faith entertained by the wisest Englishmen during the Great War is to be obtained from the writings of a poet who never sat in Parliament nor took an active part in public life, let the critic weigh two or three undeniable facts. He will then see that an apparent paradox is so obviously true that the one plausible objection to the statement thereof is the possibility that, to many students of Wordsworth's works, it may seem to sink into a truism.

Wordsworth was a man of genius. He was a poet, but then he was no common poet; his poetry is the fruit of ardent imagination guided by common sense, by profound reflection, and by the keenest eye for common things. His ideas as to foreign affairs have the closest affinity with his poetry. Both are based upon the recognition of obvious facts. He was endowed by nature with the acutest powers of observation. It is admitted by all men that

The outward shows of sky and earth,
Of hill and valley, he has viewed;
And impulses of deeper birth
Have come to him in solitude.²

But though Wordsworth delighted in the country, and especially in hills and valleys, he drunk in with the utmost rapidity, and when young with avidity, whatever his eyes taught him of town life. Hence he has drawn the best pictures of that Old London which is now to most of us merely a tradition, and not even a memory to any man not enough advanced in years to recall the sights and sounds of at least early Victorian London.

¹ This article does not attempt to deal with Wordsworth as a poet. It is solely an endeavour to state and explain his statesmanship, and further to exhibit the impressiveness of his political ideas during one period only, namely, 1802-1815, and with reference to one subject only, namely, the War with Napoleon. His ideas are to be found in the following documents: (1) *The Prelude*, especially Books VII. to XI. (2) *The Apology for the French Revolution*, 1793 (Prose Works, I., Grosart, p. 3). (3) The Pamphlet on *The Convention of Cintra* (*Ibid.* p. 37), and his letter to Pasley (*Ibid.* p. 197). (4) His *Poems on National Independence and Liberty*, edited by T. Hutchinson, 1895, pp. 303-309.

² Arnold, *Poet's Epitaph*, p. 207.

Whoever doubts that this is so should ponder over the following picture of London streets³ :

. Before me flow,
 Thou endless stream of men and moving things!
 Thy every-day appearance, as it strikes—
 With wonder heightened, or sublimed by awe—
 On strangers, of all ages; the quick dance
 Of colours, lights, and forms; the deafening din;
 The comers and the goers face to face,
 Face after face; the string of dazzling wares,
 Shop after shop, with symbols, blazoned names,
 And all the tradesman's honours overhead:
 Here, fronts of houses, like a title-page,
 With letters huge inscribed from top to toe,
 Stationed above the door, like guardian saints;
 There, allegoric shapes, female or male,
 Or physiognomies of real men,
 Land-warriors, kings, or admirals of the sea,
 Boyle, Shakespeare, Newton, or the attractive head
 Of some quack-doctor, famous in his day.⁴

In regard further to France during the Revolution, Wordsworth wrote with a real and direct knowledge possessed by very few among the politicians of his day. It differs, not in extent only but in kind, from such slight and superficial acquaintance with the French people as may have been acquired by Pitt, by Fox, or by Burke. Wordsworth had wandered through France, and wandered apparently for the most part on foot, during the earliest and brightest days of the Revolutionary movement. He had resided in France, and in Paris, during the conflict between Jacobins and Girondins. He had taken so active a part in this embittered and savage contest that, if he had stayed two or three months longer on what was strictly the field of battle, he would almost certainly have perished by the guillotine, in common with the Girondins who had acquired his admiration and his love. The verses in the *Prelude* portraying the passions of the Revolutionary period are historical documents of priceless value. They possess an authority which cannot belong to the imagination and the glance of Carlyle even when undisturbed by his rhetoric

³ This sketch of the Town is paralleled by many passages in the *Prelude*. Ruskin's works are full of references to Dickens, and Ruskin clearly catches and suggests the likeness, in point of keenness of eye, between the poet and the novelist. See *Modern Painters*, Ruskin's Collected Works, iii. pp. 570, 571, and read the whole note in reference to Dickens. In truth Wordsworth, Carlyle, Dickens, and Ruskin himself belong to that class of men of genius who may be characterised as (if the expression may be allowed) 'thinking through their eyes.' Such men immediately reproduce in thought the impressions which keen eyesight conveys to them, and which ordinary persons overlook. Nor can it be doubted that of the four Wordsworth is the keenest observer, no less than the calmest thinker.

⁴ *Prelude*, 'Residence in London.' Wordsworth's Poetical Works, vol. v. pp. 234, 235.

or rodomontade. Wordsworth again entertained, at any rate up to 1815, a passionate interest in the conduct of public affairs, and sympathised with vigorous action even at times when it approached to lawlessness.⁵ But his faith in causes which appealed to his moral feeling was generally kept within due bounds. He retained indeed throughout life that enthusiasm of humanity which with most men is apt to die away at the approach of middle age, yet even in quite early manhood he displayed a coolness and soundness of judgment⁶ which, if ever acquired at all, is generally the fruit of aged experience. Now all the qualities of Wordsworth's character, if they did not directly qualify him for public life, assuredly protected him from some weaknesses to which are due the errors of parliamentary speakers and leaders. The worst mistakes of such practical men arise not from some lack of recondite knowledge, but from their incapacity, when dealing with public affairs, of fixing their minds firmly and exclusively upon the few vital, essential, and often obvious features of a perplexing crisis. This tendency to lose sight of leading principles because of a politician's pre-occupation with subordinate details was, at any rate in Wordsworth's case, corrected or averted by his undoubted capacity for serious thought combined with the gift, often lacking to systematic thinkers, of keen observation.

Readers, however, who wish to understand the statesmanship of Wordsworth must constantly bear in mind two considerations :

The first consideration is that Wordsworth occupied a special and peculiar political position. He was in reality, in regard at any rate to foreign policy, neither a Whig nor a Tory. The dawn of liberty in France had in his early youth enlisted his fervent sympathy.

Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
But to be young was very Heaven! O times,
In which the meagre, stale, forbidding ways
Of custom, law, and statute, took at once
The attraction of a country in romance!'

These lines contain the spirit of all that was noble in the ideas of the French Revolution ; they sum up indeed the aspirations in 1789 or 1790 of every man throughout Europe who valued the blessings of freedom and believed that the people of France

⁵ See his verses on Rob Roy, written, be it noted, before Scott had introduced that vigorous and crafty head of the outlawed Macgregors to the British public.

⁶ Compare the moderation of the language which Wordsworth (then a young man of twenty-three) uses towards Bishop Watson in the *Apology for the French Revolution*, with the contemptuous invective which Burke (when a statesman of sixty-one) pours, in the *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, upon a thinker so eminent as Richard Price.

' *Works*, vol. v. p. 317.

were entering on the path of human progress. These men of hope all felt with Cowper :

'Tis liberty alone that gives the flower
Of fleeting life its lustre and perfume;
And we are weeds without it.⁸

The religious recluse at Olney triumphed no less fervently, though far more rationally, than Fox in the fall of the Bastille. In welcoming the earlier stages of the French revolt against despotism all the Whigs, with the one exception of Burke, went together.⁹ They thought that the political heirs of the statesmen who, in 1688, opposed the tyranny of James the Second, must of necessity applaud Frenchmen who, in 1789, resisted the despotism of the Bourbons. Wordsworth, however, went further than any Whig. He never mistook a movement, which shook the whole of Europe as violently as did the Reformation, for a second-hand copy of the glorious but almost conservative Revolution of 1688. Wordsworth saw indeed, as clearly as did Burke, that the movement in France was the opening of a new era, and he welcomed it with enthusiasm. As a boy he had imbibed the republicanism of feeling natural to a descendant of Cumbrian statesmen or yeomen.¹⁰ He had learned at college the republicanism of sentiment handed down by the classical writers; he had imbibed the wholesome belief that

Distinction open lay to all that came,
And wealth and titles were in less esteem
Than talents, worth, and prosperous industry.

His life in France had attached him to the Girondins and he for a time had adopted the unsound political philosophy of the Revolution. Nor is there any reason to believe that his sympathy with the Girondins ever died out. It would be difficult, it is said, to find in his works any expression of indignation at the death of Louis the Sixteenth. He no doubt believed, in common with the Girondins, and with reason, that the King was prepared to use foreign help in effecting the restoration of the royal power. Whether this design was duly punished by death is a question for political casuists. It is certain that in England no King would have been forgiven who had sought to recover his throne by the use of foreign armies. Wordsworth undoubtedly held and maintained that the coalitions formed before the time of Napoleon for the armed restoration of the *ancien régime* ought not to have received the help of England.

⁸ Cowper, *Poetical Works*, ii. 142.

⁹ Of Cowper it has been said with truth, but with a certain quaint inappropriateness, that he was born a Whig, and remained a Whig to the day of his death.

¹⁰ *Works*, vol. v. 283.

But, if Wordsworth expected the redemption of the world from the triumph of justice and entertained an unquenchable faith in freedom as understood in England, and as he believed it to be practised in Switzerland, he had in 1802, and probably earlier, adopted a great part, and one may fairly say in every sense the best part, of the teaching of Burke.¹¹ The influence of Burke, reinforced by the bloody injustice of which the Girondins were victims, had impressed once and for all upon him the futility and the folly of the attempt to introduce a reign of righteousness by defying the ordinary rules of public justice and of moral obligation. Nor can one doubt that from the same teacher he had also derived the conviction that a nation was not a mere agglomeration of individuals, and that human progress must throughout the whole world be closely connected with respect for national history and traditions. He had learned from Burke the secret of, to use modern expressions, the historical method. The intellectual connexion between the two men of genius reflects in truth glory upon each. You can hardly give higher praise to Burke than the statement that his teaching freed Wordsworth, and thousands of other Englishmen with him, from revolutionary sophisms and delusions, and you cannot better sum up the peculiarity of Wordsworth's political creed than by the statement that he imbibed the best truths which Burke could teach, but yet retained unshaken that complete faith in freedom and that hope of human progress which formed by far the most valuable and truest part of the revolutionary dogmas.

To this union of ideas, which few men of Wordsworth's generation could easily combine, is due a great deal of his statesmanlike strength. His early republicanism enabled him to see that the French Revolution had in it, in spite of the tremendous evils with which it was accompanied, an element of blessing for mankind. The historical method, further, learned from Burke, combined most happily with Wordsworth's keen eye for every-day facts and his habitual meditation on human character. For it freed him from that belief in abstractions which constantly misguides the most disinterested of revolutionists or of reformers. The ideas of equality, of nationality, and even the sacred names of liberty and of justice, are, because of their very vagueness, the frequent source of the gravest errors. Any man, whether he be a politician, a preacher, or a revolutionist, will work infinite evil, even to a good cause, if he neglects to correct the delusiveness of abstract ideas by always comparing

¹¹ See especially *Prelude*, Works, vol. v. 246, for a high appreciation of Burke as well as a most discriminating criticism of his oratory, of which the strain

'Transcendent, superhuman as it seemed,
Grows tedious even in a young man's ear.'

them with 'the common things which round us lie.' The very thinkers who have made war upon innate ideas are often led, through their partiality for some one general conception, into the very delusions which they think they have exposed. Wordsworth at any rate is always coming back to realities. Then again, his appreciation of different aspects of truth certainly checked the growth of that intense party spirit which corrupted English politics during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Coke of Holkham was a man of ability. He exercised vast influence among the Whigs. When a mere child he was told by his grandfather 'Now remember, Tom, as long as you live never trust a Tory.' The same lesson was impressed upon him by his father, and, when repeating these family anecdotes, he generally added that he had said in reply 'I never have and by God I never will trust a Tory'; he acted throughout life in accordance with this pledge. In Whig circles the tradition prevailed that a mother, when asked by her child why the Tories are so wicked, at once replied 'They are born wicked, and they have made themselves worse.' Sydney Smith was a man of the strongest common sense, of great humour, and of much good nature, but in his writings he found it all but impossible to display common fairness to Castlereagh or Canning. This bitterness was certainly not confined to Whigs. Walter Scott was a man of genius, and of geniality, and, when he trusted to his own sound judgment, he saw clearly enough into the difficulties of social and political problems. But he and his friends generally meant by a man of 'good principles' a sound Tory. In 1824 Sir Walter Scott regretted that the young Duke of Buccleuch should be sent to Cambridge because that university 'was infected long ago with Liberalism in politics,' and at the moment encouraged a doubtful kind of enthusiasm in religion which 'made religion a pretext for particular lines of thinking in politics and in temporal affairs.' The date of 1824 suggests that Scott was frightened by Evangelicalism as preached by Charles Simeon, and somehow or other thought it might tend towards political Liberalism. He looked with some suspicion on the distinctly Whiggish lectures of 'my friend, Professor Smyth,' who is chiefly remarkable in that, being a Regius Professor of History in one of the English Universities, he in 1824 actually delivered historical lectures and found a class of students who attended them. In such a condition of feeling Wordsworth gained in political insight from the fact that he was neither a Whig nor a Tory.

The second consideration which ought to be remembered is that from the year 1803 to at least 1811 most Englishmen feared and all but expected the triumph of Bonaparte. This period of national depression has been hidden from us by the memories of

Trafalgar, of Leipzig, and of Waterloo. But the dread was not in itself unreasonable. The war against France, which ended with the transitory Peace of Amiens, had, in spite of England's naval successes, turned out a failure. It had increased instead of restricting the power of France. It left her supreme among European States. Napoleon ruled a far larger domain and exerted a far more extensive authority than had ever been obtained by Louis the Fourteenth. Even before the Treaty of Amiens was signed he had treated England with contempt, if not with insult. He had caused himself to be proclaimed ruler of Northern Italy. He ruled Switzerland with despotic authority, and, in the eyes of Wordsworth at least, had destroyed every vestige of Swiss freedom, no less than of Swiss independence. In 1798 a savage rebellion had broken out in Ireland; a change of wind would have enabled Hoche to land a French army in support of the rebels; no man could have ventured to predict that one of the most capable among French generals, at the head of picked French soldiers, and supported by thousands of Irishmen, might not have conquered Ireland. Yet in 1801 the mob of London frantically applauded the French envoy who brought hopes of peace. It may indeed be true that 'Fox a Briton died,' but the Whigs as a party had no belief in the war, and had persuaded themselves that Napoleon represented the cause of freedom. Here and there Whigs of eminence, such as were Sydney Smith and Lord John Russell, came to favour the war. But the parliamentary opposition grudged the money spent upon our armies abroad, and encouraged the delusion that Bonaparte was on land invincible. The seizure of the Danish fleet by England was the saving of the country, but Whig moralists condemned it as a flagrant violation of international law, and Brougham saw in the taking of Moscow by Bonaparte nothing but a sign of the Emperor's irresistible power. To appreciate at its right value Wordsworth's foresight as a statesman it is absolutely necessary to realise the moral depression, not to say hopelessness, amounting almost to cowardice, which weighed upon Englishmen up to the beginning of the Peninsular War, and in truth until the English successes in Spain had attracted the attention of the whole world. This spiritlessness caused by the continued triumph of Bonaparte threatened ruin to England.

Bearing then in mind the two considerations which have been insisted upon, let us consider three questions: What was the statesmanship of Wordsworth? Was it crowned with success? What are the lessons which it contains for the England of 1915?

What was the statesmanship of Wordsworth?

It may be thus described: He was a moralist inspired with absolute faith in the triumph of righteousness. He was a

prophet who preached and believed that national failure arose from the faults or sins of a nation and of the men who composed it. He therefore insisted with perpetual reiteration that in the war against Bonaparte, which was a war against injustice and oppression, the inability of England to overthrow the power of a tyrant arose from the errors or crimes of England and from the personal faults of Englishmen. He was a nationalist who anticipated the nationalism of the Victorian era; he was assured that on the one hand the independence of England could be maintained only by asserting the national independence of other European States, and that on the other hand the independence of every other European country, e.g. of Spain, of Italy, of Switzerland, or of Germany, would never be safe until England had succeeded in maintaining her own independence by the destruction of Bonaparte's Empire. Wordsworth was, lastly, and above all, an English patriot. During long years whilst tyranny was triumphant throughout continental Europe and, in all countries, including England, received abject and degrading adulation, he never for a moment faltered in the belief that if England rose to the performance of her one supreme duty, namely, the destruction of the Napoleonic Empire, she might absolutely count upon final victory. For the understanding of Wordsworth's statesmanship it is necessary to perceive the blending together in his soul of three different sentiments. These were prophetic severity and foresight—intense love for the national independence of all truly national states—ardent English patriotism. He was at once a Prophet, a Nationalist, and a Patriot. He enjoined the reform of English life or the renovation of English virtues; the maintenance or the creation of independence for every country united by national feeling, and above all the destruction of that Napoleonic Empire which, whatever benefits it might incidentally confer upon the world, meant the triumph of despotism and, in the greater part of Europe, of despotism supported by foreign arms. This cold summary of Wordsworth's statesmanship means, according to the knowledge or the ignorance of a reader, either everything or nothing. Its true meaning can be gathered only from the words of Wordsworth read in close connexion with the circumstances of his time.

Note first the prophetic denunciation of England's sins and weaknesses, and its gradual transition into faith in England if she rises to the height of her solemn duty.

Milton! thou shouldst be living at this hour:
England hath need of thee: she is a fen
Of stagnant waters: altar, sword, and pen,
Fireside, the heroic wealth of hall and bower,
Have forfeited their ancient English dower
Of inward happiness. We are selfish men;

Oh! raise us up, return to us again;
And give us manners, virtue, freedom, power. (1802.)

O Friend! I know not which way I must look
For comfort, being, as I am, opprest,
To think that now our Life is only drest
For show; mean handy-work of craftsman, cook,
Or groom!—We must run glittering like a Brook
In the open sunshine, or we are unblest:
The wealthiest man among us is the best:
No grandeur now in nature or in book
Delights us. Rapine, avarice, expense,
This is idolatry; and these we adore:
Plain living and high thinking are no more:
The homely beauty of the good old cause
Is gone; our peace, our fearful innocence,
And pure religion breathing household laws. (1802.)

England! the time is come when thou should'st wean
Thy heart from its emasculating food;
The truth should now be better understood;
Old things have been unsettled; we have seen
Fair seed-time, better harvest might have been
But for thy trespasses; and, at this day,
If for Greece, Egypt, India, Africa,
Aught good were destined, Thou would'st step between.
England! all nations in this charge agree:
But worse, more ignorant in love and hate,
Far, far more abject is thine Enemy:
Therefore the wise pray for thee, though the freight
Of thy offences be a heavy weight:
Oh grief, that Earth's best hopes rest all with Thee. (1803.)

When I have borne in memory what has tamed
Great Nations, how ennobling thoughts depart
When men change swords for ledgers, and desert
The student's bower for gold, some fears unnamed
I had, my Country—am I to be blamed?
Now, when I think of thee, and what thou art,
Verily, in the bottom of my heart
Of those unfilial fears I am ashamed.
For dearly must we prize thee; we who find
In thee a bulwark for the cause of men;
And I by my affection was beguiled:
What wonder if a Poet now and then,
Among the many movements of his mind,
Felt for thee as a lover or a child! (1803.)

Here pause: the poet claims at least this praise,
That virtuous Liberty hath been the scope
Of his pure song, which did not shrink from hope
In the worst moment of these evil days;
From hope, the paramount *duty* that Heaven lays,
For its own honour, on man's suffering heart.
Never may from our souls one truth depart,

That an accursed thing it is to gaze
 On prosperous Tyrants with a dazzled eye;
 Nor, touched with due abhorrence of their guilt
 For whose dire ends tears flow, and blood is spilt
 And justice labours in extremity,
 Forget thy weakness, upon which is built,
 O wretched Man, the throne of Tyranny! (1811.)

Though the sonnets dedicated to Liberty rise gradually into hope, and even into assurance of England's irresistible strength, when once she shall have become the strenuous, even though she be the solitary defender of freedom for herself and for Europe, the true offence of England, which Wordsworth finds it difficult to pardon, is that in his judgment she has from time to time been opposed to the freedom of other countries.

In the course of the last thirty years [he writes] we have seen two wars waged against Liberty—the American War, and the war against the French People in the early stages of their Revolution. . . . And, for what more especially belongs to ourselves at this time [1810] we may affirm—that the same presumptuous irreverence of the principles of justice, and blank insensibility to the affections of human nature, which determined the conduct of our government in those two wars *against* liberty, have continued to accompany its exertions in the present struggle *for* liberty, and have rendered them fruitless.¹³

But here Wordsworth's sense both of England's duties, some of which she has neglected, and of England's strength passes into Wordsworth's nationalism.

Read together the two following passages from his prose works :

We ought not to make peace with France, on any account, till she is humiliated, and her power brought within reasonable bounds. It is our duty and our interest to be at war with her.¹⁴

I think there is nothing more unfortunate for Europe than the condition of Germany and Italy. . . . Could the barriers be dissolved which have divided the one nation into Neapolitans, Tuscans, Venetians, etc., and the other into Prussians, Hanoverians, etc., and could they once be taught to feel their strength, the French would be driven back into their own land immediately. I wish to see Spain, Italy, France, Germany, formed into independent nations; nor have I any desire to reduce the power of France further than may be necessary for that end. Woe to that country whose military power is irresistible. I deprecate such an event for Great Britain scarcely less than for any other land. . . . My prayer, as a patriot, is, that we should always have, somewhere or other, enemies capable of resisting us and keeping us at arms length.¹⁴

These words are decisive as to Wordsworth's nationalism. But in plain truth the whole pamphlet on the Convention of

¹³ 'The Convention of Cintra,' *Prose Works*, vol. i. p. 135.

¹⁴ *Prose Works*, vol. i. p. 198.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 204. The whole of pp. 204 to the end of the letter to Captain Pasley deserve the most careful study, though they are too long for verbal quotation.

Cintra must be read and re-read in order to perceive how completely he anticipated the enthusiasm for nationality which was fully developed towards the middle of the nineteenth century. His invective against this Convention of Cintra in reality rests upon and is, in the judgment of later historians, to a great extent justified¹⁵ by the contemptuous disregard which it showed for the feelings, for the self-respect, and for the honour, both of the Portuguese and of the Spaniards.

Wordsworth was enthusiastic on behalf of national independence, whether it was connected with loyalty to a king or with enthusiasm for a republic. To the end of his life he condemned the invasion of France by England and the First Coalition in 1793; for the whole of the allies contemplated some kind of interference with the self-government of France, and some of the Continental Powers aimed at the acquisition of French territory and the dismemberment of France. Wordsworth's position, whatever its merits, was, as regards France, consistent. He was a republican who saw that the French Revolution, looked at from its best side, was a step in the progress of mankind. He came, however, under the influence of many of Burke's ideas. He thus inevitably and rightly turned into a nationalist. He anticipated by more than twenty years the nationalism of Mazzini. For the doctrine of nationalism, as conceived of by Wordsworth and as developed in later years by Mazzini, meant a great deal more than the mere admiration of patriotism. Ever since the days of Marathon and Thermopylæ, and indeed from a much earlier date, there have existed plenty of men and women able to admire the bravery of heroes dying in defence of their own native land. But modern nationalists have done much more than teach that patriotism is a virtue. They have spread far and wide the political creed that every State, at any rate in Europe, ought, if possible, to be inhabited by citizens who were or felt themselves to be one nation, and that no nation should be governed by any foreign Power. This doctrine, whence it follows that every independent nation should support, and if necessary be prepared to defend, the independence of any other nation, was, as one may see at a glance, fatal to the existence of a State such as the Austrian Empire. This was certainly a novel and, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, a startling dogma. Wordsworth had the great merit not only of anticipating by many years the nationalist idea which became dominant towards the middle of the nineteenth century, but also of creating a new doctrine without mingling it with some of the errors with which it has been combined by its most distinguished advocates. He never supposed that nationalism was essentially

¹⁵ See Oman, *Peninsular War*, vol. i. 274-276.

connected with republicanism. He would, if he had lived in 1860, have deemed Cavour a much safer guide than Mazzini.¹⁶ He avoided the error by which many English Whigs were misled, of imagining that the people of Italy or of Germany cared more for constitutional freedom than for national unity. His prophetic foresight that zeal for nationality might be converted, or perverted, into the passion for national power extended by pre-eminence in the use of arms, and might thus destroy throughout an independent nation the love of real freedom, was hardly understood in free countries such as the United States, England, or France, until its truth was demonstrated by the War of 1914-15.¹⁷

On Wordsworth's English patriotism it is needless to insist. It is patent in every line written by him in reference to the Napoleonic War. It may be summed up in one sonnet :

Another year!—another deadly blow!
 Another mighty Empire overthrown!
 And We are left, or shall be left, alone;
 The last that dare to struggle with the Foe.
 'Tis well! From this day forward we shall know
 That in ourselves our safety must be sought;
 That by our own right hands it must be wrought;
 That we must stand unpropped, or be laid low.
 O dastard whom such foretaste doth not cheer!
 We shall exult, if they who rule the land
 Be men who hold its many blessings dear,
 Wise, upright, valiant; not a servile band,
 Who are to judge of danger which they fear,
 And honour which they do not understand. (1806.)

What is not always noted is that his English patriotism is so closely united with his faith in the blessing for every country of national independence that in his mind the two sentiments are

¹⁶ See *Prose Works*, vol. i. pp. 155-157, for Wordsworth's appreciation of the true relation between nationalism and good government.

¹⁷ Take as a sign of the originality of Wordsworth's nationalism, and of the extent to which his statesmanship was in advance of the age in which he propounded it, the expression by Dr. Arnold of Rugby of his 'tenderness for the Austrian Government' and also this sentence written by Arnold in 1830: 'I was delighted also with Venice; most of all delighted to see the secret prisons of the old aristocracy converted into lumber rooms, and to see German soldiers exercising authority in that place, which was once the very focus of moral degradation of the Italian race, the seat of falsehood and ignorance, and cruelty.'—*Stanley's Life of Arnold*, 5th edition, vol. i. p. 275. Note these dates. In 1810 Wordsworth had mastered the principles of nationalism, and had probably adopted them in 1802. Mazzini was born in 1805, and advocated nationalism about 1830-1831. In 1830 Arnold rejoiced in the despotism of Austria in Venice. In 1849 Clough, a favourite pupil of Arnold's, mourned over the defeat of Italian patriots by Austrians. Before 1870 nationalism was adopted by all English Liberals. Wordsworth anticipated the growth of nationalism by at least forty years.

almost identified with each other. Let the following sonnets be taken as illustrations of such blended feelings :

Once did She hold the gorgeous East in fee;
 And was the safeguard of the West: the worth
 Of Venice did not fall below her birth,
 Venice, the eldest Child of Liberty.
 She was a Maiden City, bright and free;
 No guile seduced, no force could violate;
 And, when She took unto herself a Mate,
 She must espouse the everlasting Sea.
 And what if She had seen those glories fade,
 Those titles vanish, and that strength decay;
 Yet shall some tribute of regret be paid
 When her long life hath reached its final day:
 Men are we, and must grieve when even the Shade
 Of that which once was great is passed away. (1802.)

Two Voices are there; one is of the Sea,
 One of the Mountains; each a mighty Voice:
 In both from age to age Thou didst rejoice,
 They were thy chosen Music, Liberty!
 There came a Tyrant, and with holy glee
 Thou fought'st against him; but hast vainly striven:
 Thou from thy Alpine holds at length art driven,
 Where not a torrent murmurs heard by thee.
 Of one deep bliss thine ear hath been bereft:
 Then cleave, O cleave to that which still is left;
 For, high-souled Maid, what sorrow would it be
 That Mountain floods should thunder as before,
 And Ocean bellow from his rocky shore,
 And neither awful Voice be heard by thee! (1807.)

In each poem he is preoccupied with the indignant thought that Bonaparte might subdue the one country which more truly even than Venice had 'held the gorgeous East in fee' and the one country which, for more years than even Switzerland, had defended the last and impregnable home of freedom.

Was the statesmanship of Wordsworth crowned with success?

The answer to this inquiry may be thus summed up :

The foreign policy of England during the nineteenth century, in so far as it coincided with the statesmanship of Wordsworth, was markedly successful; in as far as it deviated from his statesmanship it ended in failure, or at best in very dubious success.

His statesmanship, as we have seen, was founded on two main principles: The one was the destruction at all costs of Napoleonic despotism. No peace was in his eyes worth making which did not attain this result. The other was the adoption, within rational limits, of nationalism, which may be roughly defined as the acknowledgment of the independence of all national States or of States the people whereof were desirous

and capable of constituting a nation. This principle however was with him clearly limited by the necessity of preventing each State from encroaching upon the independence of other States. Hence his proposed creation of a new balance of power.

The policy of England with regard to France coincided with, or at any rate soon came to coincide with, the statesmanship of Wordsworth. Napoleon died a prisoner at St. Helena, and his despotic Empire was overthrown past any possibility of true revival.¹⁸ In consequence of the Congress of Vienna and treaties connected therewith, France, as regards her European territory, retained, subject to slight though perceptible changes, pretty nearly the limits by which she was bounded at the close of the *ancien régime*—i.e. at the beginning of 1790.¹⁹ It soon became clear that England would never again wage war to hinder France from adopting any constitution accepted by the French people. In 1830 Englishmen welcomed the royalty of Louis Philippe with rapturous applause. In 1848 they recognised the authority of the Second Republic. In 1852 they did not oppose the re-establishment of the Napoleonic dynasty. In 1870 they acknowledged the Third Republic as a perfectly legitimate form of government. The conduct of England went far to establish, as a rule or custom of international law, that a Government accepted by the people of an independent State should be acknowledged by all other independent States. This statesmanship was pre-eminently successful. It produced first the maintenance of peace, next the gradual though somewhat varying good-will, and lastly, within a century after the battle of Waterloo, a close and intimate alliance between England and France. The triumph of Wordsworth's statesmanship is here past a doubt.

The policy of England with regard to other countries deviated most seriously from the statesmanship of Wordsworth. There were many reasons why English Governments found it most difficult to adopt Wordsworth's nationalism. Such adoption was inconsistent with the treaties resulting from the Congress of Vienna. They were meant to create a balance of power, but a balance resting on the interest of Governments and not on the wishes either of peoples or of nations. Nor did any British party easily welcome Wordsworth's reverence for nationality. Tories sympathised with the national resistance of Spaniards and Germans to French invaders led by Bonaparte, but, with the destruction of Bonaparte's Empire, Tories became

¹⁸ The restoration in 1852 of the Napoleonic dynasty showed in its actual result that the Imperial system, as it existed in 1809, was dead.

¹⁹ Losses on her part under such Treaties were to a certain extent compensated for by gains. See *Historical Atlas of Europe*, map xiii. and note by G. W. Prothero.

very cool friends of nationalist movements when allied with revolution or republicanism. During the Great War the Whigs had as a party shown less favour than Tories to movements in favour of national independence. Even the invasion of Spain, though utterly lawless, might, they thought, give a blow to superstition and promote practical reforms. When the war had come to an end they honestly believed that the adoption of English constitutionalism, as finally perfected by the Reform Act of 1832, would bestow upon the people of any European State, however ill-governed, all the political blessings which could be desired by reasonable men. The Radicals of the Manchester School fully believed that Free Trade and peace would, in the long run, be enough to promote and ensure the progressive improvement of every European State. They heartily adopted the so-called principle of non-intervention, and construed it as meaning that England should never intervene at all in foreign affairs, and almost as meaning that she should have no foreign policy whatever. True it is, that towards the middle of the nineteenth century most Liberals awoke to the undoubted fact that the cause of nationalism was gaining every day additional recruits, and was likely to produce tremendous changes; and some leading Whigs, such as Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell, to their great credit, came very near, at any rate as regards Italy, to the adoption of nationalist doctrine.

It is however certain that as regards Continental affairs England deviated greatly from the statesmanship of Wordsworth. It is equally certain that English policy, as regards such affairs, was not crowned with anything like complete success. The English people, however, or at any rate a considerable part of the English people, became by the middle of the nineteenth century more and more interested in nationalist movements. Cavour was to educated Englishmen almost the ideal of a patriotic statesman. Garibaldi was to Englishmen of all classes a popular hero, and under the guidance of Palmerston British policy did most certainly give aid and comfort to Italy in 1860 and 1861; one may doubt whether this help did not, in effect, go beyond anything which could fairly be called mere moral support. In any case the success with which English statesmen gained the friendship of Italians was due to the fact that the British people had, as regards Italy, come distinctly round to the statesmanship of Wordsworth. Yet, if you cast a glance over English foreign policy during the last hundred years, it is impossible to say that it has been as a whole successful. The plain truth is that the statesmen of England did not know how to deal with the nationalist movement which was gradually changing the whole condition of the Continent. European wars

were mainly, if not exclusively, connected with the doctrine of nationalism. England then of necessity spoke with an uncertain voice. English ministers thrust upon the Governments of Europe advice supported only by moral force, and tending at any rate up to 1848 towards suggestions that the adoption of English constitutionalism would, in every discontented State, reconcile the Government with its dissatisfied subjects. But moral force turned out in general no force at all, and England's advice was treated with disregard.

The Crimean War—the only Continental conflict in which England took part—was popular. It was hailed by the mass of the people as an attack upon a Power which then supported despotism. It did little or nothing in its technical results to aid nationalists. But the instinct of the people was sound. The Crimean War gave to Italy an opportunity for striking what turned out to be decisive blows in favour of Italian unity and freedom. Yet the English Government was unable to compel Bomba of Naples to observe towards his political opponents the rules of common humanity. The action, or the inaction, of England was of no good to Denmark, nor at an earlier period were the attempts of enthusiastic English Liberals to aid the cause of liberty in Spain or in Portugal of any avail. Few persons at the present moment will be inclined to hold that England's attitude in 1870 was satisfactory. It was certainly not the kind of attitude naturally suggested by the statesmanship of Wordsworth. We come round then to the conclusion that the foreign policy of England was, except in so far as it coincided with Wordsworth's statesmanship, a failure or certainly not a success.

What are the lessons of Wordsworth's statesmanship for the England of to-day?

England to-day stands in the same position in which she stood from 1803 to 1815: she is now, as then, engaged in a holy war against armed and despotic Imperialism. This fact is better proved by one illustration than by twenty arguments.

It is a frightful spectacle to see the prime of a vast nation propelled out of their territory with the rapid sweep of a horde of Tartars; moving from the impulse of like savage instincts; and furnished, at the same time, with those implements of physical destruction which have been produced by science and civilisation. Such are the motions of the French armies; unchecked by any thought which philosophy and the spirit of society, progressively humanising, have called forth—to determine or regulate the application of the murderous and desolating apparatus with which by philosophy and science they have been provided. With a like perversion of things, and the same mischievous reconciliation of forces in their nature adverse, these revolutionary impulses and these appetites of barbarous (nay, what is far worse, of barbarised) men are embodied in a new frame

of polity ; which possesses the consistency of an ancient Government, without its embarrassments and weaknesses. And at the head of all is the mind of one man who acts avowedly upon the principle that everything, which can be done safely by the supreme power of a State, may be done."

This is the language of Wordsworth uttered in 1809. Change but one word and it describes the German despotism which it is our duty to destroy in 1915. We may learn from Wordsworth more than one lesson.

First—The need for England of self-discipline. We must try to do justice, it may be very stern justice, to Germany. We must for our own sake encourage calmness of words, as well as of action and of judgment, in dealing with or denouncing the worst of public crimes. In this matter Wordsworth sets us the noblest example. There is not a word used by him with regard to Bonaparte and his despotism which lacks dignity and truth. He 'grieved for Buonaparté,' and without recurrence to mere abuse draws from Napoleon's career the important lesson that the art of true government is not to be drawn from the experience of camps and battles, but from

Books, leisure, perfect freedom, and the talk
Man holds with week-day man in the hourly walk
Of the mind's business.

We ought to set aside or check all luxury, amusement, or festivity, which in any way jars with the mass of private grief which fills not only the United Kingdom, but France, Russia, Germany, and Austria with personal mourning. It is hard to believe that public races, connected as they are with much of indubitable evil, or that a heavy if not increasing national drink bill, fit the circumstances of the present day. We need, and may come to need more and more, the firmness of indomitable resolution to obtain, at however great expense, patience and suffering, that complete victory which alone can save the freedom not only of England but of Europe, and which alone can justify the ever-increasing agony caused to millions of human beings by the continuance of this just War. All talk about terms of peace and all schemes for federalising the world are out of place ; they are worse than vain ; they may do untold harm ; they divert men from the true duty before us. England and her Allies are not called upon at the moment to form policies for creating a new or a better world, they are called upon to punish and guard against crimes which, if they meet with no penalty, will throw the civilisation of Europe back into barbarism. Men of good

²⁰ *POPE Works*, vol. i. pp. 162, 163

intentions, when thrusting advice upon the public, must condescend to acquire, if it be possible, the humble, but in reality rare, gift of common sense. In following the teaching of Wordsworth we should be careful to note two of its characteristics. The vices or follies which called down his prophetic denunciations all of them tended to interfere with the successful carrying on of the Great War, that is with the performance of the highest and most pressing of public duties. He does not dream of some moral millennium or frame wild schemes for securing perpetual peace. He is again no pacifist.

The nation would err grievously [he writes] if she suffered the abuse which other States have made of military power to prevent her from perceiving that no people ever was or can be independent, free, or secure, much less great in any sane sense of the word without the assiduous cultivation of military virtues.

Secondly—The respect due to Nationalism. England and her Allies are discharging the solemn duty of destroying a new form of imperial despotism. This holy war can attain its object only by assuring freedom and independence to every national State, great and small—e.g. Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Norway, or Sweden—throughout the length and breadth of Europe. We need, in Wordsworth's language, a 'new balance of power.'

Thirdly—England and her Allies must reject every peace which is not based on complete victory. There must be no second Peace of Amiens, and this for two reasons. An imperfect peace means to England complete failure, and failure means the ruin of England and the British Empire. An imperfect peace means, in the second place, the condemnation of the War, as it must in fact though not in name fall short of that destruction of German despotism which alone justifies the efforts and sufferings of this world-wide war. It were well if the Allies should publish the declaration that they will not even look at any proposals of peace from Germany till she has at least withdrawn from Belgium.

To any man of even ordinary humanity there is something terrible in the suggestion that proposals of peace should in any circumstances be declined. But the first duty of anyone, however insignificant or unknown, who offers counsel with regard to the War is to speak, with the utmost plainness, the truth as he sees it. It is however a comfort to any writer if he is able to express his conclusions in the words of men far better known than himself, and of larger experience, and, it may be, of more impartiality than he can claim for himself. Let me urge upon the attention of your readers the words of three men who can

speak with authority. Hear first the language of the French Premier :

We are convinced of victory, which will be the victory of justice. We want Europe liberated, Belgium free. We want the restitution of the lost provinces and the crushing of Prussian militarism, for the peace of the world is irreconcilable with its bloody caprices.

Next read the declaration of my friend Lord Bryce, who has acquired a wider political knowledge of all countries throughout the world than any living Englishman :

If there was anything upon which public opinion in this country and, he thought, in the neutral world was absolutely agreed, it was that those who had brought the evil in Belgium, destroyed its cities, and inflicted poverty and hardship on its people, ought to be made to pay to the uttermost farthing for the mischief they had done.²¹

Hear lastly the opinion of my friend, Dr. Eliot, ex-President of Harvard University. It was given at a meeting of Baptist ministers in Boston. He speaks with the authority due to a life spent in successful devotion to the service of his country. He speaks also with an impartiality not to be claimed by any Englishman. Dr. Eliot said :

Do not pray for peace now. I cannot conceive a worse catastrophe for the human race than peace in Europe now. If it were declared now, Germany would be in possession of Belgium, and German aggressive militarism would have triumphed. That would be a success for Germany after she had committed the greatest crime a nation can commit—namely, faithlessness to treaty rights—and the sanctity of contracts would pass for nothing, and civilisation would be set back for centuries. I do not see how any thinking American can keep himself neutral. Liberty and every other American ideal are involved in this war.

Asked when ministers might begin to pray for peace, Dr. Eliot said ‘When Germany is driven back into her own territory and forced to pay full indemnity to Belgium.’

A. V. DICEY.

²¹ *The Times*, April 8, 1915, p. 7.

THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LOUVAIN

IN the Review *Zentralblatt für Bibliothekswesen* some German intellectuals have attempted to explain and excuse the destruction of the Library of Louvain University. Monsieur Burger, director of the Amsterdam Library, has replied to them in masterly fashion in the Dutch Review *Het Bæk*.

The Germans, in their efforts to justify the burning of a monument entirely devoted to Learning, blame the officials of the Library of Louvain for not having been present to point out to the soldiers the value of the collections—which otherwise would certainly have been spared! A ghastly pleasantry and in the worst possible taste! Can it be possible that after all these months the directors of this German Review are unaware of the horrible scenes of massacre and pillage that go to make up the crime of Louvain? No one will credit that. Rather shall we say that their ignorance is merely a sham—and a monstrous and clumsy sham!

I will not waste time in refuting this vile insinuation, which the official and well-authenticated accounts of the outrage on Louvain suffice definitely to dispel. It is now acknowledged by all right-minded men who are not prejudiced and do not refuse to seek and admit the truth (1) that the fire in the Library of the University broke out *suddenly* after eight days' peaceful occupation of the town by the German troops; (2) that the fire broke out during *the night* of the 25th of August, when all the Library premises were closed and the residents were forbidden to leave their houses after seven o'clock in the evening; (3) that that night of the 25th of August was unquestionably *the first night* of fire, pillage, and massacre. We know the unhappy fate of the unfortunate people who fell into the hands of the drunken soldiers that night—as also during the days and nights that followed. I saw the ruins of the Library again eight days after the fire, and even then I was only able to look at them from a distance and at considerable risk. Broken pillars, an impassable heap of bricks, stones, and beams smouldered in the fire which slowly consumed thousands of volumes between huge portions of

dangerous and threatening walls : that was all that remained of the majestic building known as the *Halles Universitaires*, and of the rich treasure it contained. In the streets of the ruined and deserted city, where the soldiers were completing their work of pillage, and further on even into the country, leaves of manuscripts and books fluttered about, half burned, at the mercy of the wind.

The German Review, without taking into consideration the manifest inconsistency of its assertions, dares to claim that the loss of the Library of the University of Louvain is of no great importance. A somewhat arbitrary assertion ! I am glad to take advantage of the hospitality offered me by the Editor of the *Nineteenth Century* to contradict it.

The burning of the Library of Louvain has caused two irreparable losses : the loss of an historic monument, a gem of the most beautiful architecture of two distinct periods—the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries—and the loss of the collection of manuscripts, books and relics of the University of Louvain.

Let me first say a few words about the monument in which was enshrined the Library of the University. This monument, known as the *Halles Universitaires*, was the old *Halle aux draps*, or Weavers' Hall, of the town of Louvain, which in the course of centuries has been adapted and enlarged, as we shall shortly see.

The first stone of the *Halle aux draps* was laid in 1317, and in 1345 the building was completed. It consisted of a ground floor and an upper story in the roof ; outside were fine doorways—the most beautiful specimens of the civil architecture of Brabant at the beginning of the fourteenth century ; inside were two large halls, one of which had in the course of centuries undergone many changes ; while the other—kept as it originally was, though restored—served as the *Salle des Pas-Perdus* of the Library of the University. This hall was divided into two parts by a series of vigorously moulded semi-circular arches ; these arches rested on pillars with capitals ornamented with two rows of foliage and fruit. Magnificent brackets supported the oak beams of the ceiling ; the subjects they represented were very varied : foliage, burlesque scenes, fantastic or hybrid beings ; all were carved firmly and boldly, forming specimens rarely met with at that period in other parts of our country. Similar works are to be found with us only in a few rare monuments of the second half of the fourteenth century.

In 1432 the University of Louvain received permission from the town to convert a portion of the *Halle aux draps* into quarters suitable for schools and lecture rooms. This condition of things lasted until 1676, when the University purchased the *Halle* from the town ; a little later, in 1680, extensive works were undertaken and a spacious story was added to the building.

This story was divided into lecture rooms for the different Faculties. In 1723 a large building in the Perpendicular style was added to the *Halles Universitaires* for the purposes of the Library.

The whole of this Perpendicular building—ground floor and first story—as well as the whole of the story of the *Halles* added in 1680, was now occupied by the Library of the University.

Amongst the many apartments of the Library of Louvain four are worthy of special mention. First, the large hall—the building of which in 1723 I have just mentioned. This hall was 185 feet long by 43 wide and 35 high; oak wainscoting of exquisite workmanship covered the walls. All round it were pillared recesses, surmounted by canopies, containing the life-sized statues of the most celebrated philosophers and writers of bygone days. At the end of the hall stood two immense columns decorated with hieroglyphic characters and symbols of the sciences and arts. A floor of oak, a ceiling adorned with plaster ornaments, and a door in iron of very remarkable workmanship completed a marvellous *ensemble*—the stately, imposing and harmonious aspect of which has been surpassed by no other ancient Library.

Just a year ago we had turned the school of Civil Law in the old University into a study for professors, and in it we discovered delicate arches, oak wainscoting of a more finished style of carving than that in the large hall, and under a very graceful canopy the large statue in oak of Justinian. This hall—so elegant and home-like in appearance—was a perfect gem of Renaissance architecture.

The school of medicine in the old University remained as it always had been—with its rostra, stalls, and benches. It was the only room on that floor of the *Halles* not devoted to the Library, and it was used as a *Salle de Promotions*. In it, amidst all the splendour of ancient ceremonial, took place the solemn meetings of the theologians, the philosophers, and the scientists. Many indeed are the men of learning, the celebrities of every rank and every country, and the princes of the Church, who have taken part in those memorable debates! I well remember one of the last meetings, at which the distinguished Cardinal Bourne, Archbishop of Westminster, was present.

Lastly, a hall of extraordinary dimensions served as a public reading-room. It contained a collection of portraits of the most eminent professors and greatest benefactors of the old University. This collection was unique and of exceptional interest as a literary history of the Low Countries. How many were there of these master-minds from the beginning of the fifteenth century to the

end of the eighteenth—some famous for all time, others more obscure and retiring—whose memories we piously preserved and whose features have disappeared forever in that tragic fire? Let me name a few of the most celebrated portraits in that gallery: Adrian the Sixth, a professor at Louvain, eventually raised to the sovereign pontificate, the last Pope who was not an Italian; Justus Lipsius, the most celebrated master of Louvain, whose features looked forth from a small canvas of remarkable interest to artists and historians; Erasmus, who lived for several years in Louvain; the historian Molanus (the canvas depicting the features of Molanus was of great artistic value); the humanist Gudeanus; Jansenius—austere and intense of countenance; Andreas Vesalius—a sombre and cracked canvas this, on which could be distinguished a face full of life and character—a faithful and most interesting study, so say connoisseurs, of the countenance of the famous originator of anatomy. Then on larger canvases and in brighter colours the celebrated doctor Rega, Monseigneur de Ram, who restored the University in 1834—and many others. All these savants, who have made their indelible marks in the field of science, seemed to connect by mysterious bonds the living work of a reading-room with the ever illustrious past of our University; they inspired in visitors, readers, and students alike, a respect and love for learning and study.

The University of Louvain did not possess a central library before 1636. Several colleges—there were forty-three under the old *régime*—had small libraries of their own, and it was for this reason, no doubt, that a central collection of books was so long in being established. Two erudite patrons of literature, Laurent Beyerlinck and Jacques Romain, presented their well-stocked libraries to the University—the one consisting of 852 books on theology, and the other of 906 volumes on medicine and mathematics. On the occasion of the installation of the library, Valère André, the first librarian, and a learned historian of our University, delivered an impressive address. This address attracted a great deal of notice, and was published with the first catalogue of the new library.

A Canon of Antwerp, and formerly a professor at Louvain, Dominique Snellaerts, possessed a very valuable library of 3500 volumes—consisting almost entirely of works on the Jansenist Question—which he presented to the University, and this addition necessitated the building of the immense hall of which I have already given a description.

Numerous funds bequeathed by private donors, and rich acquisitions considerably increased the importance of the Library of Louvain. It will suffice to mention the acquisition of the

most valuable and rarest volumes resulting from the sale of the libraries belonging to the Jesuit colleges which were suppressed in 1778. In 1795 and in 1797 a number of very precious volumes were removed, some by the French, others by the librarian of Brussels, Laserna-Santander; and these were never recovered. Since, however, the restoration of the University of Louvain in 1834 the various possessions of the Library had increased so considerably that the academical authorities were obliged two years ago to place at our disposal extensive premises over the large library, and we had just had installed therein a magnificent and immense metal bookcase with movable shelves. The supreme irony of it! The contract for the bookcase had been carried out by Germans, and they had just completed its installation for us! It had taken months to remove all the old books, which had been lying under the dust of centuries. This patient and laborious work brought to light in the most forsaken and obscure corners of the University buildings surprises and discoveries of the greatest importance.

I hasten to say a few words about the manuscripts, printed books, and ancient relics contained in the Library of the University of Louvain. Our manuscripts numbered about five hundred. The most famous was a little manuscript, partly on parchment and partly on paper, written by the hand of Thomas à Kempis; it was called *Sermones triginta ad novicios regulares et vitam S. Lidewigis a Thoma à Kempis conscriptam*. Visitors were also shown several books of Hours ornamented with very rich illuminations and miniatures. One of them was especially remarkable for a series of admirable miniatures. Some manuscripts in English came from the English Carthusian monastery at Nieuport. In 1829 several twelfth-century manuscripts were purchased from the Norbertine *abbaye du Parc* near Louvain. An important section of our manuscripts related to the history of Belgium, and more especially to the history of Brabant. Another very valuable collection of manuscripts was that composed of the lectures and *cahiers* of the professors; this collection had scarcely as yet been examined, but it would have provided a rich mine of learning for historical research. I would specially mention a profusion of works containing the manuscript notes of the most celebrated professors of the old University such as Lessius, Molanus, Miræus, Scott, etc.

The principal wealth of the Library of Louvain lay in its store of old printed works, and amongst these a collection of *incunables*,¹ wonderful from every point of view. In this collection were several very rare editions and some unique specimens. In order to throw full light on it, a few words on the intro-

¹ Printed books of the fifteenth century.

duction of printing at Louvain and the relations of the publishers with the University are indispensable.

In 1473 John of Westphalia came to Louvain and there established his printing presses; in the following year the University appointed him to be *magister artis impressoriae*. In 1474 the first printed work of John of Westphalia appeared at Louvain under the title of *Petri de Crescentiis opus ruralium commodorum*; and this very rare edition with large initial hand-made letters belonged to our Library. Under the auspices of the school of Louvain John of Westphalia brought to light over one hundred and twenty works, editions of classical texts, and even quotations from the Old Testament in Hebrew characters. Our collection of *incunables* included several editions by John of Westphalia. After the arrival of John of Westphalia several printers came to settle in Louvain, and their numbers grew to such an extent that the University had often to come to the aid of poor, aged, and sick printers. Later, in 1512, the celebrated printer Thierry Martens came to take up his abode in Louvain, and devoted his printing presses to the Faculty of Arts. At that time Louvain occupied one of the highest positions amongst the *grandes écoles* of Europe. Some of the greatest humanists of the day went there—such as Erasmus, Ludovicus Vives, Martin Dorpuis, Barland, Rexius, etc. These humanists, with the help of Thierry Martens, edited and revised a large number of texts, and accomplished a series of translations of Greek works into Latin. When in 1518 Thierry Martens announced his intention of printing in Hebrew, he could truthfully say ‘So far as Latin editions are concerned I am second to none; in the Greek I have very few rivals; I wish to achieve the same distinction for my printing of Hebrew.’ When Thierry Martens left Louvain in 1529 his printing presses were taken over by Rexius, a professor at the college of the *Trois-Langues*, and a prolific publisher of Greek texts.

These beautiful editions, which first saw the light at Louvain, were preserved by the savants of our provinces, and when the central Library was planned in the seventeenth century it was enriched by many gifts of special libraries, and among them were found several fine specimens of the earliest printed editions. Formerly the number of *incunables* in the Library of Louvain was estimated to be about three hundred and fifty; but at the time of the removal recently carried out, to which I have already referred, we found in practically all the ancient collections—in the theological collections in particular—a further mass of precious *incunables*. We had just begun to catalogue them, and in a few years’ time we should have been able to offer to the

public a magnificent catalogue of eight hundred or even one thousand *incunables*.

The Library of the University of Louvain contained between two hundred and fifty thousand and three hundred thousand printed volumes. In this immense collection I would specially mention a set of rich and precious works, such as, in regard to completeness of *ensemble*, no other library in the world possessed. I refer to the ancient theological collection. The part played in successive centuries by the Faculty of Theology of Louvain in the great doctrinal quarrels is well known. When Luther's writings made their appearance in our provinces, the doctors of Louvain, who had already been for a long time in conflict with the new doctrines, promptly censured them; and this was the first condemnation of Luther pronounced by a constituted body. On the advice of Margaret of Austria the theologians of Louvain produced some pamphlets refuting Luther; later on they made an index of forbidden books and a list of the works that could be read in the schools; they published several translations of the Bible in the vulgar tongue; and they proclaimed a profession of faith, to which, by command of the Emperor, all the ecclesiastical dignitaries and instructors in religion had to conform. When, by dint of pamphlets and writings, heresy attempted to force its way at all costs into our provinces, the School of Louvain, throwing overboard its ordinary curriculum, devoted itself to refuting every writing of the Reformers by scientific treatises based on the Scriptures and the Fathers; the number of pamphlets, letters, and papers of every description published in our provinces on the occasion of the doctrinal controversies of the Reformation is incalculable.

The controversies of the Reformation had hardly been settled, when a fresh heresy—Baianism—made its appearance in the Faculty of Theology at Louvain, and shook it to its foundations; it was merely the prelude to a longer and sharper controversy—indeed in a very short time Jansenism was causing divisions in the Faculty of Louvain. Jansenius, Professor of Holy Scriptures at the University of Louvain, numbered many supporters, and the disputes and quarrels between the Jansenists and the Jesuits were the source of an abundant and especially interesting controversial literature.

I have already mentioned the valuable collection of Jansenist books bequeathed to the University by Snellaerts. All the documents relating to the Reformation, Baianism, and Jansenism had been bound in volumes, and on the parchment covers could be read the following titles: *Varia reformatoria*, or *Janseniana*, or even *Jesuitica*. What treasures were gathered together in that vast theological library—the like of which we shall never see

again! Two years ago we began to catalogue the old theological collections. In doing so we came upon surprise after surprise, and the publication of the catalogues of these treasures, which had not so far been exhaustively examined, would have been of very great use to the history of the theological controversies.

Like all old collections of books, our Library possessed several bibliographical rarities and typographical curiosities of every description. We had a collection of coins, medals, and some very fine specimens of Flemish bookbinding of the sixteenth century, several of which had been made the object of special study. All the visitors to the Library examined carefully the magnificent work of Andreas Vesalius: *De humani corporis fabrica*. Andreas Vesalius gave lessons at Louvain, and at the same time public anatomical demonstrations. A very rare occurrence at that time was the fact that he had been able to procure a complete skeleton at Louvain. The publication of his work raised quite a storm in the scientific world; Charles the Fifth presented to the Library of the University a magnificent vellum copy of the celebrated anatomical treatise, illustrated by numerous plates representing all the details of the human skeleton. We preserved carefully in large cupboards all the relics of the ancient University—the foundation of which dates back to 1425. Until the last few years the papal bull for the building of the University granted by Pope Martin the Fifth had been kept at the great seminary of Haaren in Holland; in 1909, however, on the occasion of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the restoration of the University, the Bishop of Bois-le-Duc graciously offered this precious parchment to our University, and we considered it the rarest relic of our glorious past. In these cupboards were also to be admired the seals of the Faculties, the medals, the diplomas, and souvenirs of every kind recalling the most important events and customs of the ancient University.

The following is a curious example. The proclamation of the Primus in Philosophy was a great event in our provinces. The Faculty of Arts at the ancient University consisted of four schools: *la pédagogie du Porc*, *la pédagogie du Faucon*, *la pédagogie du Lis*, *la pédagogie du Château*. At a great annual meeting these four schools contended for the palm to be awarded to the Primus. At Louvain the success of the Primus was celebrated with much pomp, and in the province a reception worthy of a prince or a king was given to the laureate. Discourses were delivered and Latin poems recited, extolling the merits of the victor in ceremonious fashion. We possessed quantities of these verses, beautifully written on parchment and surrounded by very gorgeous illuminations. In 1778 on the occasion of the triumph of the pupil of the *pédagogie du Porc* a little allegorical picture

was painted which attracted the attention of all the visitors to the Library. The Pig crowned with a Baron's coronet (the Primus was Baron François de Sécus) occupied the centre of the picture; it was armed with its natural weapons—recalling the *Porcus silvestris* which gave its name to the college. The two fore feet of the animal rested on the dead body of the Falcon—which was lying on its back discrowned; the hind feet of the animal were just about to trample down two lilies. In front of him the Château was collapsing; this was a two-storied tower tottering to its ruin and from the top of it was falling an enormous crown. The animal had in its mouth a streamer on which could be read the following inscription: 'Num Fortia quaeque pedibus calcavi.'

I do not think it is necessary to enter into further details nor give a more complete description of our different collections in order to show how important and valuable was the treasure contained in the Library of the University of Louvain. I am indeed pledged to make a thorough, categorical, and strict examination into this subject; but this examination I am unable to make while absent from my own country, on account of the lack of material.

From 1432 until our own time the *Halles* of Louvain have always been the centre of university life. What precious and touching memories were connected with that historic monument, every one of the halls reminding us of the most glorious events of the past of our University and the heroic episodes of our national history! Over these ruins, so stupidly heaped up in one tragic night, we reflect sadly on the scholarly lessons of Justus Lipsius, on the splendid processions which used to escort the sovereigns of our nation through those imposing halls of the Renaissance; our kings and princes signed their names in the golden book of the Library, in which were also inscribed all the great names of the ecclesiastical, political, and scientific worlds. We also reflect on the heroic struggles that the Alma Mater of Louvain had to endure under Austrian domination, and on the resistance which arose in the ancient *Halles* and declared itself boldly against a foreign and oppressive rule; we reflect that between those venerable walls there burned always that flame of purest patriotism which brought our country to the glorious destiny of 1830 and to the heroic struggle of to-day in defence of honour and liberty! I see again in my mind's eye the stately fêtes which took place a few years ago on the occasion of the celebration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the restoration of the University. These fêtes were held in the great halls of our Library. Intellectuals from Germany were present in large numbers, and they must have been able in a leisurely fashion to

compare our ancient monuments—every stone of which evokes a memory—with their colossal libraries which always lack the maturity of years and the memories of a glorious past. The compliments they paid us on that occasion scarcely coincide with the arbitrary statements of one of their principal scientific Reviews.

A monument of the fourteenth century, a model of the architecture of the period in pleasant and harmonious lines, original and varied designs; magnificent halls, recalling by their majestic aspect and perfect sculpture the most beautiful specimens of the Renaissance; treasures stored up by centuries of fruitful labour and patient research, manuscripts, *incunables*, very rare prints, relics piously preserved by past generations: all that is of little importance in the eyes of the new *Kultur* that Germany would inflict upon the world; all that is nothing compared with the delirious joy felt by a few hundreds of soldiers, drunk with wine and carnage, in contemplating the tragic spectacle of a town in flames, and in terrorising and massacring an innocent population.

Up till now, said the Germans at Louvain, we have burned only small villages, but we are now going to see a large town in flames. This, and this alone, was the reason for the crime of Louvain; for nine days massacre, pillage, and incendiarism succeeded one another under the direction of the military authorities. Now that the crime has been committed, have the German authorities, and that nation which believes itself to be the sole guardian of true civilisation, expressed regret for it? Do they disown it and look upon it as a punishable outrage of the War—the authors of which must be chastised? No, they understood only too well the horror of the criminal action at Louvain and feared that the reputation of the whole of Germany would be attacked; they have tried therefore by every means to justify the crime.

But I must not wander from the point of the discussion, as the Germans tried to do. However often, as an excuse for the pile of ruins left by our enemy's armies in other parts of Belgian soil and in the north of France, the pretext of military operations (frequently, of course, unjustly) may be pleaded, there could obviously be no such pretext to rely upon in the case of Louvain; any statement to the contrary is contradicted by the most glaring facts, and it is equally contradicted by those people in Germany who laid the blame for the Louvain affair at the door of the civilian *francs-tireurs*; this legend, too, the official reports made by our commission of inquiry into the atrocities in Belgium have sufficiently shattered. In vain has the band of intellectuals from beyond the Rhine set itself the task of proving that the German army is guiltless of the hideous crime of

Louvain ; yet now, in order to excuse the burning of the Library of the University and all its treasures, they are fabricating fresh arguments : the officials were not at their posts to allow themselves to be massacred, the so-called treasures of the Library were of no value ! These are merely so many categorical statements the absurdity and insolence of which leap to the eyes of everyone—and this I hope I have sufficiently proved.

The Halls of Louvain will rise again from their ashes ; they will become, as in former days, the centre of a school of learning of which the glorious past is a guarantee for the future. In building a new and magnificent Library we wish not only to restore to our professors and students those materials indispensable to all scholarship and scientific work ; we wish also to show present and future generations that, if the German intellectuals accept the responsibility for the most odious crimes against reason and civilisation, on the other hand the civilised and right-thinking world knows how to unite in execrating barbarity as it deserves, and in solemnly avenging the intellectual and artistic patrimony of which barbarians have callously robbed it.

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FRANCE AND THE VATICAN

HAS France every reason to be perfectly satisfied with her religious situation? Has the separation of Church and State been a complete success? Are there more reasons for leaving things as they are than for making changes? and if changes are advisable what ought they to be? These are the questions which more or less definitely millions of Frenchmen are asking themselves, and which I will endeavour to examine as dispassionately as I can.

I

It is academically certain that the separation of Church and State *per se* is not a good thing; it is evident that if the leaders of the Church and those of civic society should work together towards the superior object which is common to both—viz. the real happiness of mankind—it would be better for everybody.

It is also certain, historically, that the separation of Church and State in France was not carried out in the proper spirit. There was no reason why this momentous step in the history of the nation should not have been taken in amity and good-will, as not many years ago happened in Brazil, or as we saw Norway untie without breaking it the knot which united it to Sweden.

Things took place differently in France. From beginning to end the disestablishment bore the appearance of a violent contest, and each phase of it was marked by an increased tenseness in the atmosphere. This is not the place to inquire which side was originally to blame, nor whether Gambetta was right in letting the country interpret his statement: *le cléricalisme voilà l'ennemi* as a war-cry. It cannot be gainsaid that the French clergy, who had enthusiastically welcomed the Republic in 1848, received coolly its successor of 1870, but somehow they were not alone in thinking that Gambetta was a republican in the spirit of the Commune rather than in the spirit of Thiers, and the notion was apt to create misgivings. On the other hand it promptly appeared that in the immediate vicinity of Gambetta and Ferry—two men completely ignorant of rather than explicitly hostile to religion—there were others who wanted the total disappearance of Catholicism and not merely the disciplining of the clergy.

However it may have been, the efforts of Ferry to make the national education 'neutral' resulted, on the admission of his admirers themselves, in making it 'godless,' and the process of secularisation was accompanied, as early as 1880, by violence, riots, and banishments.

It is needless to recall the law of 1901 on Associations and the cynicism with which M. Combes transformed an Act which its originator, Waldeck-Rousseau, had intended as a liberation, first into a decoy and afterwards into an instrument of spoliation. The present writer has had many occasions in the last few months to notice how vivid and uncomfortable the memory of M. Combes' proceedings has remained with non-Catholic foreigners who on the whole were favourable to the principle of the law.

As to the Separation itself, as it was accomplished in 1905, it was a complete mistake. Here again it would be useless to dwell on the cruelty of an Act which entailed confiscations and expulsions, and made the life of the country clergy, which had always been one of severe economy, a barely concealed fight with poverty. Sentimentalism is superfluous here. It is hardly more necessary to recall that the disestablishment was prepared and carried out with a general ungentlemanliness not pleasant to remember. There was no motive for the abrupt recall of the French ambassador to the Vatican; there was even less cause, later on, for having the archives of the Nunciatura searched by the police, seized and made over to the daily Press, and for brutally expelling Monsignor Montagnini, the prelate who had been left in charge. Nothing could be less 'French' than that treatment of the Pope's representative.

But those who conducted these rough proceedings have a ready excuse: We know no representative of the Pope, they say, because we do not know that there is a Pope; we are laymen, belonging to a secular society, and we know nothing of what you call Church matters. This is almost *verbatim* what M. Léon Bourgeois repeated with gentle obstinacy to M. Denys Cochin, who insisted that the Concordat, being a contract, could not be dissolved without the agreement of both parties. 'We are laymen, we do not know the Pope.'—'Yes, but you are not Turks and yet you have an ambassador to the Sultan.'—'We are laymen, we are not supposed to know that there is a Pope.'

Impossible as it may seem to people who do not realise how stubborn the French tendency to theorise may be, the whole of the proceedings towards disestablishment, which occupied the Chamber of Deputies for months, was vitiated by this extraordinary view of the case. The problem ought to have been as follows: Given a country nominally Catholic but which may be regarded for practical purposes as non-Catholic, what ought to

be the legislation which will satisfy some twenty millions of unbelievers without giving offence to fifteen millions of believers? This would have been reasonable and productive of useful effects. The Chamber preferred to work on very different lines by asking itself: Given an assembly of agnostics who have to legislate on the situation of church-goers, how can they manage to be in contact with these church-goers without bothering about what they call their Church? Month after month the Deputies wrestled with their problem in an atmosphere apparently academic but perpetually disturbed by practical considerations which M. Briand, the commission reporter, saw very well and occasionally explained with complacent archness. Finally the law was passed and M. Jaurès exclaimed 'The Separation is made!' in a triumphant tone, which meant clearly 'The Catholic Church in France is dead!'¹

The result is well known. Pius the Tenth, who was a plain man, turned the tactics of the French Radicals against them; he ignored people who ignored him, and to the amazement of politicians forbade the creation of the 'cultural associations,' which were the pivot of the whole law; the Separation Act was left, so to speak, in the air, and the French Catholics began a new existence without a legal status. It started with the loss of the indemnity to which the French clergy had a legal right since 1800, and with the loss of the cathedrals, churches, Bishops' palaces, rectories, and seminaries, which, with the funds attached to them, were declared municipal property.

So from the moment when Gambetta initiated the movement towards the separation of Church and State, or, to put it in more modern terms, towards the individualisation of religion, until it was declared to have reached its end in 1905, France witnessed an almost uninterrupted war against Catholicism with the violence inherent in religious wars. Now, the remarkable fact is not that the Church hardly showed fight, for she was trammelled by what she still retained of her privileges, but that the majority in a nation numbering fifteen millions of practising Catholics looked on this warfare apparently with indifference. The Chamber lost prestige as it grew older, politicians became despised and frequently had to swallow public contempt, but scorned as they were, every time they went to work against 'Clericalism' they secured majorities. What are we to conclude? Certainly that the French nation thought it better for its progress, and possibly, though more obscurely, thought it better for real and vital religion, that Catholicism should take its

¹ The idea was that the Church under the new *régime* must become pulverised into what M. Anatole France called 'a multitude of rival sects.' All these prophets saw things from outside.

chances as a living influence and show what it could do for itself unaided or even under difficulties. One in a hundred Frenchmen believed that a pagan Socialism founded on Science and resulting in Joy should take the place of a melancholy superstition, but eighty in a hundred had their doubts about Science, and especially about Joy: they thought that religion was good for individuals and even for communities, and they were ready to applaud its survival so long as they saw it freed from political associations. In other words, the Separation seems to have been postulated by the development of France, it is improbable that it could have been prevented, and since it must have come some day, it is just as well that it should have come ten years ago. The only thing to be regretted is that it should have been done in a spirit of hostility, which made it, from the juridical point of view, an evident failure, and the only question to be asked is: Was it fatal to Catholicism?

This question has been so plainly answered in the facts themselves that I only introduce it for charity's sake and for completeness of argument. In only one respect have the Catholics of France been inconvenienced by the new arrangement, and we can have no certitude that the inconvenience was caused by the Separation, for it disappeared with the election of a new Pope: I mean the insolence of Extremists who under the Concordat contented themselves with veiled threats and innuendoes, but began to bully the Bishops the moment the latter were ignored by the State. This however was a minor evil which was sure to decrease as doctrinal discussions became stale, and it appears negligible compared with the catastrophes which the enemies of the Church had prophesied would come when she lost the support of the Concordat.

Nothing of the kind happened; nobody nowadays seriously questions that the Church has been benefited by the Separation. In the first place, she gave to the world that proof of her vitality which was demanded as an important part of apologetics, she became conscious of her own possibilities, and she learned the miracle-working virtue of association; in a word she won for herself the respect which life and strength invariably command. Then having lost everything she rid herself of the old fear of endangering her possessions. Finally she went through the highly educative experience of withstanding her enemies in the name of their own principles. The French Government may well ignore the Catholic Church, but the French courts cannot ignore Catholic individuals, who are voters and tax-payers and have a right to be judged in equity; it is as private individuals that the Bishops have been approved by the magistrates whenever they have tabooed anti-religious periodicals, and it is on the strength

of the Association Law that the *Associations de Pères de Famille* have been acquitted for refusing to entrust their children to notoriously anti-Catholic teachers.

To sum up : the Church under the Concordat had become an unpleasant designation of something which was supposed to be behind the times, and its disappearance as a State-supported institution was inevitable ; since the Separation it has taken on a completely different character ; it is an Association or, to put it better, a collection of associations in which the private citizen with his individual preferences and rights appears constantly in the fore-front ; this alone would secure it the sympathies of the modern man anxious to protect his neighbour's liberties because they are the guarantees of his own, and the gain can hardly be exaggerated. Add that in due time Catholic associations are bound to bring together some fifteen million people and to command an enormous influence. The irresistible conclusion seems therefore to be, first, that there is no longer a ' clerical question ' in France ; and, secondly, that things are better as they are.

II

Does it follow that everything is for the best, and that the French State has nothing to lose by letting things drift along as they can, instead of asking itself whether the mistake which was made in viewing the Disestablishment as a victory instead of a solution ought to be perpetuated ? Divisions and hatreds are always bad for a community, but they are not always fatal. Nay, conflicts of opinions or interests—which are apparently divisions—frequently result in progress, and this is supposed to be a law of history. The difficulty is to see where mere conflicts of opinion become dangerous divisions. This is the stage in which we are at present with respect to the intercourse between the French Catholics and the French State, and in order to be on the safe side, instead of deciding myself, I shall leave it to unbelievers to express their opinions on the subject.

A great many Radicals entertain no regrets about the method and spirit in which the Separation was made. Certainly we ignore the Pope, they say, but why should we seek his acquaintance ? If there is anything good in Catholicism we reap the benefit of it without having to make advances to a foreign monarch whom we consider as a concealed enemy. The Separation has now been our *régime* for ten years : we feel no need of the Pope's amity. We firmly believe that France could fulfil her destinies if she were entirely a nation of freethinkers ; we are in the logic of our creed in refusing to have anything to do with Rome.

To this men of the stamp of M. Leygues, five times a Cabinet Minister; M. de Lanessan, also an ex-Minister; M. Bérenger, the editor of *l'Action*; M. Deloncle, of the *Paris Journal*, a Freemason; M. du Mesnil, of the *Rappel*—all of them foreign to Catholicism, all of them anti-clericals, who have supported the anti-religious laws—have replied in their papers or in Parliament, and their answer can be summed up as follows. The question is not: Can we live without the Pope and clergy? We know we can. It is: Have there been no circumstances in which it appeared that our severing the State from fifteen million citizens and our ignorance of the Pope have resulted in inconveniences? There is no doubt that such circumstances have existed more than once. For instance, the French Government let M. Barrère, its Ambassador to the Quirinal, sign in 1906 an agreement whereby the French protectorate of Catholic missions should be transferred to Italy whenever French missionaries happened not to be a majority in a given establishment; the result was that thirty-three establishments have now replaced the French colours by the Italian flag. Do not you feel the loss? You say that you ignore the Catholic clergy and you plume yourselves on your inflexible logic. Are you quite sure? Do not you silyly support hundreds of Catholic schools in the Levant conducted by the same monks and nuns whom you have made outlaws at home? Do not you vote a yearly 100,000 francs on behalf of the religious—Jesuits too!—who form the staff of the Beirut University? And have you not heard the complaints of our agents in the East who year after year inform you that a number of the schools you support in that way have to be given up by the religious orders because your treatment of them at home rarefies vocations? Again, what happened in Morocco during the first years of the French occupation? The country was in the jurisdiction of Spanish Capuchins, who spoke no French and not improbably were opposed to French influence; your logic prevented you from referring this situation to the Pope, who alone could modify it; so our soldiers had to be content with the ministrations of foreign priests until you managed, at the cost of some dignity, to have the difficulty settled by General Lyautey.

Cannot you see that it was an impossibility to legislate about the religious situation of a country like France without any reference to the constitution of the Catholic Church and to the Pope? You speak of the possibility for France of fulfilling her historic mission even if she were entirely agnostic. But that is speculating about far-away maybes. In the meantime France numbers at least a third of her population who are practising Catholics,

and in the other two thirds thousands and millions may be much nearer their nominal religion than they are near your atheism. Your mistake was to imagine that you had to place yourselves in a false position by ignoring the Pope when you disestablished the Church. You could separate what had to be separated and be on good terms with the spiritual head of millions of our countrymen. It would have been a good policy. If we had an Ambassador to the Pope at the present moment the Prussian Minister and the Austrian Ambassador to the Vatican might be a little less active. What would be the harm? England has no Concordat and yet she thinks it advisable to send an envoy to the Pope. What makes you imagine that your effort to have the civic and the spiritual society independent would be frustrated if the French State should take the same step? Where is there the least connexion between the two things?

This is what the more sensible say to the more radical unbelievers, and the latter have never replied much that was worth recording. In fact, it is not two years since M. Leygues secured a unanimous vote of the Chamber in favour of a motion implying all these arguments.

But the near future holds in store another question so delicate that one hardly dares approach it, a question which *cannot* be solved without a reconsideration of the intercourse between France and the Church. I mean the question of Alsace-Lorraine.

The provinces lost in 1871 held a comparatively large proportion of Protestants and Jews, but in spite of this admixture they were regarded with good reason as exceptionally Catholic regions. Their population is as religious as that of Brittany with the superior consciousness which education and an inherited love of freedom are sure to produce. It is probably owing to their reputation for Catholic loyalty that these provinces were spared the molestations of the *Kulturkampf*, and when Bismarck modified his policy and assumed the reverent attitude towards Catholicism, which the Kaiser still pretends to maintain, their clergy found themselves positively pampered. Their salary was four times what it had been before the annexation, their connexion with the schools was a matter of course, and the authorities seized every opportunity of increasing their prestige. The religious orders were treated with the same consideration. The Jesuits, it is true, were not suffered in the annexed provinces any more than in the rest of the Empire, but numerous other orders—so prosperous that Alsatian nuns or missionaries are to be met with all over the globe—were encouraged in every way. It took the independence of the Alsatian or the shrewdness of the Lorrain to read political views in this treatment, and the loyalty

to French memories which survived in spite of it must have had deep roots indeed. It appeared unflagging, vivacious, and sometimes amazingly outspoken until the laws of 1901 and 1905 were passed. Then silent uncertainty took the place of the manner which during many years had been so refreshing to French visitors, and the present writer remembers well the contrast. We ought not to deceive ourselves : there is no doubt that while the Alsatian clergy live in feverish expectation of the victory which will make them French again, they must also feel an occasional pang at the idea that the France they are going to join may prove different from the country they had to give up forty-five years ago. As there is no clerical question in Alsace-Lorraine, and on the contrary there is perfect unity among the Catholics, the thoughts I ascribe to the clergy must be those of their flocks as well.

The fact is that on the morrow of the recovery of the lost provinces we shall be in presence of a heart-rending dilemma. Let me leave aside the unpleasant anomaly of three French dioceses being governed by German-born Bishops who can only be removed by the Pope : this is only a side-issue. But let us try to imagine the situation of the native Catholics and of their clergy if two French laws enforced everywhere in France must be applied to them as well as to the rest of the country. There is no mincing matters : the application of the Law on Associations and the Separation Law means the expulsion of thousands of religious from their houses and the confiscation of their property ; it means that at Strasbourg and Metz, as in Rheims and Chartres, the Bishops will have to give up their palaces and the priests their rectories, that their salary will be stopped, their churches made over to the municipalities, that the ecclesiastical funds legally constituted under the French laws of yore will be seized, and that, after years of amicable collaboration between the schoolmasters and the priests, the latter, to the amazement of their parishioners, will be denied the entrance of the schools. Can one imagine the scandal of an Alsace-Lorraine receiving this welcome and having to endure this admixture of suffering and shame, this ordeal both cruel and ridiculous? Surely such a treatment would have been impossible even ten years ago when party feeling ran high and the heat of a long contest made excesses a matter of course. Consequently we had better look away from a vision which should never be a reality, and merely try to picture to ourselves the modification in the French religious legislation which is the necessary alternative.

III

Some unimaginative people, among Catholics as well as among anti-Catholics, cannot conceive anything outside their own narrow experience, and they picture to themselves a change in the religious situation of the country as an inevitable return to the Concordat and to the arrangements of fifteen years ago. Now, it is a fact that the millions of people who are persuaded that religion ought to be a purely individual preference would not approve of anything resembling a re-establishment of the Church. On the other hand, it is no less certain that the majority of the Catholics, and especially the clergy, would be quite as opposed to such a solution: they have experienced the bliss as well as the hardships of independence, and they are not likely to give it up just as their greatest difficulties are over. Some other *modus vivendi*, therefore, must be found. As there can be only one, we need not seek it very far. The solution, not only to the present problem, but even to others which must inevitably arise in the future, lies in the frank admission that a mistake was made when the Concordat was denounced, and that it ought to be corrected without delay. This mistake was the impossible resolution to adjust the situation of such a large body as the French Catholics without any reference to the Pope.

The champions of the Separation might have regarded themselves as non-Catholics, even as anti-Catholics, representing a majority in the country not quite so decided as themselves, but indifferent to religion, opposed to its interference with politics, and anxious to keep it within the limits of other intellectual preferences. The Separation Law, therefore, might have reasonably contained the punitive clauses which, in fact, we read in it concerning the possible inroads of the clergy on the political domain: the majority not only of unbelievers, but even of Catholics, would have understood and approved. But the Parliament of a country nominally Catholic, and containing fifteen million Churchgoers, might have been expected not to legislate from the point of view of the comparatively few Agnostics. Such a mistake as that which was made in 1905 can only be made with impunity when no material interest is immediately at stake, but a world-wide organisation like the Catholic Church must occasionally be in contact with material interests, and if this fact is overlooked unpleasant results like those which I pointed out above inevitably follow.

The remedy is as plain as the evil: some recognition of the Church is necessary, and the simplest, the most direct, the least open to misinterpretation and to the imputation of revived

clericalism, consists in imitating England and in sending to Rome an Envoy, who need not be a permanent ambassador, but one whose definite mission might be first of all to prepare the solution of the Alsatian question. Some newspapers will say that the Republic is going to Canossa, but sensible people of any faith and any party will take little heed of a well-worn metaphor. The Republic will only be going to Rome, where a great deal of diplomacy is at work and requires watching. This perfectly simple move will not be a Concordat; the Church will remain separated from the State; the property confiscated in 1901 and 1906 will not be claimed back; the Bishops are content with their unpalatial houses, and the *curés* have grown accustomed to pay their rent; even the ownership of the places of worship can be legally determined without any apparent change in the general conditions; in fact, everything will remain as it is, with the exception of the spirit in which the Separation was made: it was a spirit of hostility, it will henceforward be a spirit of peace, and this will appear at once in the liberal treatment of the clergy of Alsace-Lorraine.

Never were the circumstances so favourable to an arrangement of this kind. The Radical-Socialists may well go on talking of the dangers of clericalism: in their hearts they know that this means nothing, at all events nothing else than the annoyances which have come to them from the flaws in the Separation Law; the fear of clericalism to-day is pure nonsense, and corresponds to no such vital opinion as that which prevailed in the country until 1905. Over against this long-acquired habit of frightening the elector with the clerical bugbear we can set some solid realities which make for calm and peace.

There is no doubt that the War has given rise to a unity of feeling in the nation which shames even the most narrow-minded into the pretence of unanimity. Analyse this sympathy as we will, it is impossible not to find that respect for the Army and respect for religion are its chief ingredients. Bigotry occasionally hints that this attitude will disappear after the War, and that the priest, as well as the soldier, will be forgotten as soon as the danger is past. That is partly true, for human nature is not consistently noble; but if it is true that military enthusiasm will not remain ebullient, and true, above all, that churches will not always be attended as they are now, it does not follow that the French as a nation will sink again to the level of anti-militarism² and anti-clericalism. Love can be more durable

² I use this term as it is used in France: it does not connote a wholesome aversion to the militarisation of a country, but contempt for the military profession, especially contempt for the officer.

than hatred, and everything points out that it will be. We have had few chances indeed of experiencing the happiness of union : how can prejudice speculate on a feeling to which it is foreign? It is certainly remarkable that while the clergy at the Front since the beginning of the War have done nothing more than what they regarded as their duty, the country seems to entertain a special admiration and gratitude for them. This cannot but be looked upon as a new factor in the national existence : the French are once more becoming generous to their Church.

The election of Benedict the Fifteenth is another feature of the last few months which has an exceptional significance. The late Pope was no politician, but he had a policy, and his policy, as far as concerned France, seemed to be a departure from that of Leo the Thirteenth, who was notoriously francophil. This, and the fact that he had not been too well treated by the French Government, and the truth of the old maxim that we forgive the least the wrongs we have inflicted, made it somewhat difficult even for a moderate Cabinet to resume an intercourse with Pius the Tenth. But with his successor matters are entirely reversed. The new Pope is well known to have been a disciple of Cardinal Rampolla, and an admirer of the methods of Leo the Thirteenth. His appointment to a provincial See in 1908, after years of most efficient work as Under-Secretary of State, was full of meaning. So, consequently, was his election, and so was, above all, the very marked choice which he made, first of Cardinal Ferrata, and afterwards of Cardinal Gasparri, for the post of Secretary of State. This double choice was not only an unmistakable declaration of principles, but it amounted to almost explicit advances to the Republic, for no Cardinals could be named more favourable to France than Cardinals Ferrata and Gasparri. The few violent journalists who overlook the significance of these first acts of Benedict the Fifteenth, and have recently called on him in threatening language to do more than what his letter to the Archbishop of Rheims obviously implied, are doing a poor service to their country. In the eyes of every fair-minded observer, it has appeared evident that the new Pope was showing as much sympathy to France as was possible to the most decided francophil in his position. The conclusion is plain : if France thinks it advisable to 'talk with the Pope,' as the phrase has gone for some years, she will with difficulty find a better opportunity ; the sooner the example of England is followed the better it will be.

The reader might wish me to wind up these pages with a prophecy of what I think will be done, but is it not enough to have shown what *must* be done? I would much rather con-

clude with pointing out what is the chief obstacle in the way of an eminently reasonable move. This obstacle does not come from the country, which has had more than enough of divisions of all kinds; it does not come from the Government, although the Cabinet is said to be divided into equal fractions on the subject; it comes from the presence in the Chamber of a few men who have never been able to see beyond the limits of the Palais-Bourbon, and to whom politics only means the selfish chances incident on a change of Government. If the vision of their hungry eyes did not haunt M. Viviani, Sir Henry Howard would have a French colleague in Rome to-morrow.

ERNEST DIMNET.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH GERMAN CHRISTIANITY?

RELIGIOUS newspapers are seldom stimulating reading. *Die Christliche Welt*, a religious journal published weekly in Marburg, is no exception to this rule. It is distinctly depressing, at least to one who does not happen to be a German. At the same time it reveals something of the religious psychology of a people with whom we have much in common, and against whom at the present time we are ranged in enmity.

Die Christliche Welt takes the War very seriously. It is far less concerned with contemporary Church events than is the *Christian World* at this side of the North Sea, or, indeed, than any other English Church paper. There is not an article, scarcely a paragraph in the numbers published this year, that does not hark back to the War. It will not surprise English readers, who themselves are convinced that the Allies are upholding the highest interests of the world, to find that the Germans hold exactly the same convictions with regard to themselves. The chief difference is that the Germans, far more even than the British, appear incapable of understanding how any sane person can avoid accepting their peculiar view of the situation. It has never crossed the mind of the editor that Germany could lose or that his countrymen are not truly Christian striving for Christian ideals in a way Christ would approve.

The professedly Christian character of Germany is in danger of being overlooked in this country, even by well-informed people. That unhappy and much misunderstood man Nietzsche has risen like a comet over our horizon, and, like a comet, has appeared to occupy a much larger area of space than in reality is the case. This metaphor was first used with regard to an earlier dynamic thinker, who sometimes is put into antithesis with Nietzsche. Darwin made a lasting contribution to human knowledge, but he also dragged behind him a 'phosphorescent trail of nothingness,' called Darwinism. This may not be said of Nietzsche. There is in Germany, as there is in Great Britain and France, a strong movement that is undoubtedly anti-Christian, and, unlike earlier anti-Christian movements, this one is directed against Christian

morals. Nietzsche may not be responsible for all this, but he is responsible in part. Nietzsche frankly said that Christianity made him sick. Christian morality, he maintained, was the self-interest of the pack and the great stumbling-block in the way of social progress. He aimed at supplanting Christianity by something else. It is possible that no one would have been more disgusted than Nietzsche at the application of his own theories by Treitschke and von Bernhardi, for he hated Prussians and Prussian *Kultur*. None the less, it may be allowed that this War, and the conduct of this War, is the logical outcome of anti-Christian ideals such as his. The mistake is to regard this anti-Christian element as peculiar to Germany, and to conclude that all Germans are confessed followers of Nietzsche. On the contrary, very many Germans whom I met before the War were inclined to disown altogether the ex-Professor of Classical Philology in the University of Bâle, and to maintain heatedly that he found his appropriate *clientèle* in England alone. The late Professor Cramb has many acute things to say about German thought. Probably he never spoke more wisely than in that passage describing the world-wide character of the conflict between Napoleonic and Christian ideals. 'It is in Germany alone,' he concludes, 'that as yet Napoleonism has acquired something of the clearness and self-consistency of a formulated creed, above all in Berlin and in the cities and towns that come within the influence of Berlin.'

There is another side to Germany—a Christian side—and upon this side *Die Christliche Welt* is not a little illuminating. It represents the views upon matters connected with the War of those who may have been influenced by anti-Christian ideals—no country is more open than Germany to popular movements of thought—but who would be horrified to do anything else than call themselves Christians. The superstructure of British Christianity is so far unsatisfactory as to make it unwise for us to throw stones at German religion. Moreover, since the commencement of the War the Germans, like ourselves, have shown very considerable self-sacrifice, which we rightly believe is a step towards a vital Christianity. This step may be retraced, or no further progress be made, in either country; but we need not be surprised to hear that there has been a real and widespread revival of personal religion in Germany, where a deep undertone of mysticism always has existed, although there have been other sounds in the air for two generations. This revival is more likely to arise in the small towns and country districts. Such an anticipation makes it profoundly interesting to follow the methods by which commonplace German Christians explain to themselves the religious problems of the present War.

In the first place *Die Christliche Welt* shows clearly that the possibility of such a War as this in the second decade of the twentieth century is a puzzle to the 'ordinary simple-minded man.' This is not so surprising when it is remembered that even Berlin professors say that they have never read von Bernhardt's political anticipations, and that the German Government papers maintain such astounding theories with regard to the events leading up to the War. These theories the 'ordinary simple-minded man' in Germany accepts implicitly. Herr Katzer, in *Die Christliche Welt*, tries to find a solution of the problem in an article entitled 'On the Psychology of War.' Herr Katzer attempts to state in Christian terms the well-worn theory that War must be regarded as a necessary condition of human progress. He does it in this fashion. Just as in the individual soul there is a struggle between good and evil, so in the community there must be always a struggle between good men and bad men, good races and bad races. The transition between badness in the individual and bad men and races in the community may not strike us as being very conclusive. It is no difficulty to Herr Katzer, who considers that such a 'creative synthesis' only assumes that mankind has '“a great collective soul” in which the struggle for the highest goes on under similar conditions to the fight for righteousness in individual souls.' From this assumption Herr Katzer proceeds to deduce that 'strife is the only way in which to gain the most sacred possessions of humanity,' and that the German people have a 'hard battle to fight against *the unclean spirits of the nations of the world*' before they can gain for the world the destined 'freedom of the children of God.' The italics are my own.

No one who has realised the intense susceptibility of Germans to accept theories as facts, and their readiness to act upon such theories without delay, will be inclined to smile at Herr Katzer's logic. It is plain that he is in deadly earnest when he declares :

The honour of mankind is given into our hand. We will maintain and guard it with all the strength at our command. Fighting valiantly we will bring it to general recognition. Then will the brutishness in mankind be vanquished and reason will triumph, that reason which points the upward road to God. This belief has gone forth with our soldiers, who, when they die for the Fatherland, also lay down their lives for the good of humanity.

The Germans not only believe this : they are puzzled that such an obvious fact should be disputed by anyone. 'Do you doubt our sincerity?' they ask from anyone who ventures to question whether the Prussian idea of Kultur is a real blessing to the world. There is something distinctly pathetic in this question,

even though the fervour it implies has worked out such uncommonly bad results.

All the contributors to *Die Christliche Welt* are not men like Herr Katzer. Herr Sigimund Rauh contributes a highly curious article on the burning subject of hate. Perhaps a certain simplicity, together with an unqualified belief in a heaven-given mission, renders the Germans incapable of adjusting moral values when their national interests cross the interests of other peoples. Perhaps it is lack of humour, or an arbitrary ethical division made in Germany between self-interest and State interest. At any rate, Herr Rauh naively concludes that hatred in a German is legitimate and praiseworthy, but in Germany's enemies it is 'dirty, petty, senseless raging.' After expressing surprise at the Belgian who, 'not content with rendering the German "harmless" in the defence of the national cause which he [the Belgian] has attacked [*sic*], does his utmost to injure the person of his enemy,' and at the Englishman for regarding Germans as 'an indiscriminate mass of depravity even in their death throes,' Herr Rauh goes on to define the German quality of hate as follows :

Hatred of England. That is a figure of speech. In it England is personified, as, for instance, when one says: I hate a lie, I hate sin. Since the 'Cause' fought against is metaphorically conceived as a person, the word hatred is justifiable. Thus do we hate England or everything English (*Engländertum*). We do not hate the individual Englishman, for we are ready to do him justice, and do not refuse—as would hatred in its blindness—to recognise his good points.

Hatred is implacable (*unversöhnlich*); we will substitute for it retaliation (*revanche*). A short time ago that section of the French whose business it is to excite public feeling wrote that the French could not be expected to keep German incendiaries and monsters as prisoners; they should all be murdered. Well, do we not hear similar utterances in our own country, in private and ill-considered conversations? But no one dares to say such things publicly, for the public conscience does not permit that. If we ask for reprisals, that is rather a different matter, and even something of service to the cause. *But it is just that capacity for once more living on good terms with an enemy robbed of its 'dangerousness' as a nation which constitutes the strength of Germany.* A senseless and prolonged hatred would annihilate European "Kultur." We do not for a moment entertain any idea of it. *We want to conquer that broad 'place in the sun' which is our due, and then let everyone live who lets us live.*

Finally, hatred is low, degrading. It stops at nothing. Who was it that conceived that disgusting medley of races and marshalled a shameless horde of enemies against us? Race-proud England! Dum-dum bullets, lies manufactured wholesale, are appropriately associated with this. Germany will keep clean hands for the sake of her righteous cause. That is not hatred.

Again the italics are my own. The only comment that need be made is that Herr Sigimund Rauh's article is not characteristic of all the other contributors to *Die Christliche Welt*.

'Mental astigmatism' is a disease by no means restricted to Germans. There are individuals in this country who appear incapable of focussing at any given point their own actions and the actions of their enemies. But the disease certainly appears to be epidemic in Germany. Moreover, the people of Germany, as has been remarked, have suffered severely from false information. It is, however, interesting to note that *Die Christliche Welt*, although it is not free from inaccuracies, shows, as might be expected, no desire to exploit wrong information deliberately. It also illustrates *en passant* the saying that 'truth will out.' This is the case with regard to alleged outrages by the poor Belgian peasants upon German soldiers. An Editorial comment in *Die Christliche Welt* runs as follows :

The first atrocities with which this war deluged us were Belgian. During the first half of August our papers were filled with them *ad nauseam*. To-day we know that a great part of these atrocities were conjured up by excited imaginations and immeasurably exaggerated. At Elberfeld, Cologne, Treves, and Aix-la-Chapelle the wounded were supposed to lie by the dozen with their eyes put out. Now we know that there is not perhaps a single authenticated case of this kind. I say reservedly—perhaps; any authentic proof of such case would greatly interest me; but I only require one thing of my informant—it must be proof positive. It is the same with the hands that were cut off. A German official whose duty it was to investigate these stories used the apt expression: 'One should always only believe half of what one has seen oneself.' But this play of fancy is a dreadful thing. It may lie at the root of any of these French and Belgian accusations. The guerilla fighting in Belgium naturally led to irregular interference with the civil population and its corresponding results. But sad as the reality is, far sadder in their effects are the creations of the imagination.

The somewhat unctuous sentiments expressed in the last sentence were called forth by the publication of Belgian and French official reports upon the cruelties practised by the German troops during the early days of their policy of frightfulness. The Editor concludes that, in addition to exaggeration, due regard must be paid to excitement, rage, individual villainy, misunderstandings, and 'military expediency.' One wonders if the infamous German War Book is public property in Germany yet. When the 'ordinary simple-minded man' has read it, and when the decent citizen soldiers tell him what actually occurred, at Louvain and Aerschot, for instance, there may be a change in the present unaccountable callousness of the German people with regard to Belgian atrocities. There is abundant proof that not all the German soldiery were consenting to these things, and the Germans I have known are not backward in speaking their minds about those in authority when they are convinced that they are wrong. The trouble is, at the present moment, they are not convinced.

It is impossible to turn over the pages of *Die Christliche Welt* without asking oneself the question—What is wrong with German Christianity? There is something wrong—distinctly wrong. With every desire to be fair, and to give full credit for sincerity to those with whom we are in deadly enmity, we cannot help feeling that some subtle change has come over the Christian religion as practised and believed in Germany. Germany is not now the nursery that it once was of the most devoted missionaries it has been my privilege to meet. The German Lutheran emigrants that I met during my seventeen years' ministry in Queensland were amongst the most pious, consistent, kind-hearted Christians that I have ever known. They were usually stronger sacramentalists than the British-born, and they were no less strong in religious individualism. I quote Queensland rather than their own country because it was there where I came in more intimate touch with German Christianity than I have done in Germany. What has happened? A lady writer recently stated¹ with great assurance that the change took place at the Reformation. Then the religion of Luther was 're-joined' to the religion of Thor. If this is the case, the change has been long in coming, and the manifestation of the change has been extraordinarily rapid. A public speaker of some standing stated last month, in my presence, that 'Christianity in Germany is a tribal religion—nothing more.' This statement, like the preceding one, has a certain amount of truth in it. But German Christianity is not tribal in a pagan sense, although it certainly seems to have become national in a Jewish sense, as contrasted with the sense in which nationalism can exist as an integral part of a world-wide conception of the Catholic Church. The reasons for this change are complicated, and any discussion with regard to them falls outside the purpose of this article. I suggest, however, with all proper diffidence, that the answer to the question 'What is wrong with German Christianity?' is that it has reverted to a pre-Christian form, and that this form is not pagan but Judaistic. This assumption certainly explains a great deal that otherwise is obscure. Not merely the articles of *Die Christliche Welt*, but the religious speeches of the German Emperor become natural when it is recognised that both are inspired by the spirit of an Old Testament Jew. The whole world is to become blessed by a God Who is the God of Germany. The enemies of Germany become the enemies of God and of His Christ. The ultimate victory of God will mean the glory of Germany, and the subjugation of Germany's enemies. If one reads certain chapters in the second Isaiah with this assumption in mind, it is quite surprising how they adapt themselves

¹ 'Religions and the War,' by Miss M. A. R. Tucker, *Nineteenth Century and After*, December 1914.

to a Germanic interpretation. It is not surprising that they may become iridescent to a German who adopts the assumption without questioning its foundation.

Perhaps no passages in *Die Christliche Welt* are more interesting than the Editor's running comments upon several sermons which he considers 'specially noteworthy,' because with 'great power they associate our national cause with that of God, and give free rein to indignation against our enemies.' Here are a few comments chosen almost at random. First in the list are the sermons of a Roman Catholic priest in Munich, called Worlitscheck. Last are those of Rabbi Seligman of Frankfurt!

Worlitscheck's characteristic sermons are enthusiastic in the cause of the Fatherland. He speaks of helping the war; of the organisation of officially recognised ambulance corps in preference to private aid; of military protection, in which he enumerates everything that can protect us on the three Fronts, the under-world, the outer-world, and the inner-world; he deals with war anxieties, war awakenings, the 'War Saviour' Jesus, Who had to go to the Front—how His whole life wore a military stamp—from His meagre field diet and His many bivouacs during His marches, until His great 'subordination' on the Cross.

Lehmann, with resolute one-sidedness, places the God of Germany in a central position; if present events have destroyed all thoughts of a 'world-religion,' then we shall conscientiously keep a German national religion before our eyes. All his hopes and all his efforts are centred upon making transfigured Germany, the great and glorious Fatherland, the heart of the universe. German Christianity, a German soul, these are his passwords; they announce the dawn of a new era. An elevated train of thought runs through these sermons; the spirit of a second Isaiah speaks in them. They contain no trace of hatred; they are emphatically directed against hatred.

Rump is quite different. His sermons also are intensely patriotic, but they differ in tone; his train of thought is rather 'with God, for King and Fatherland.' In them the insistence on victory predominates. But we do not like to read amongst the many accusations he makes against our enemies the remark 'Against us: a horde of men without Jesus!' He very happily traces a parallel between Germany and Israel, the model nation of our Bible.

The sermons of Rabbi Seligman are of special value. The way in which the preacher transfers to the German nation the great task formerly allotted to God's people Israel of being the only witnesses and pledges for the hopes of mankind is very striking.

It is not necessary to do more than indicate how much these sermons show a bias towards an Old Testament religion without much thought of the wider racial anticipations of the Christian *Regnum Dei*.

Die Christliche Welt is depressing reading, both from a religious and a material point of view. Its chief interest lies in its spontaneity and its honesty. The authorities in Wilhelmstrasse probably care nothing about it. It is, therefore, the more illuminative of a phase of the soul of the German people—and I,

for one, believe that soul to be sound. Perhaps the most hopeful passage in the bundle of papers under review comes from the pen of a woman. Frau Emma von Blumenstein writes :

International intercourse, the possibility of learning to know and understand another type of nation and of forming a correct estimate of it, is almost greater in war time than during peace. The inner peculiarities are in greater evidence when the soul of a people is agitated than when it is in repose, and the measuring of strength and ability in open battle may remove favourable, as well as unfavourable, pre-conceived opinions. It is quite conceivable that two nations should be drawn more closely together during months of hostilities than during whole decades of peace.

The most patriotic Briton may sympathise with the sentiments of this German lady, although it becomes increasingly difficult to conceive how other nations are ever to regain the favourable preconceived opinions they once may have held with regard to Germany.

GEORGE H. FRODSHAM (*Bishop*).

LOGIC AND SCIENCE

IN the February number of this Review there appeared an interesting and amusing article over the signature of Dr. Mercier, who, on several occasions, has enlivened the somewhat dull study of logic and has provided for it a welcome element of comic relief. It happened, however, that the article contained an attack on an essay of mine¹ and the attack was so worded that, to those unacquainted with Dr. Mercier and the subject-matter, the statements concerning my essay might possibly be mistaken for statements of fact. I was accused, amongst other things, of an inability to express my meaning clearly, alternatively of putting forward the idea that there are two different logics—one of thought and one of science. Readers of this essay will be able to judge for themselves concerning the first charge, the second can briefly be described in present-day phraseology as a terminological inexactitude.

On the strength of this misrepresentation my essay was stated to embody a 'crazy notion,' 'ignorance of what science is and of what thought is,' and numerous other absurdities. With regard to remarks of this kind it will suffice to say that anyone who adopts such controversial methods must be very sure of his ground. If it can be shown that the ignorance, craziness and blundering are his own, the controversial violence recoils on the head of the author and makes him appear, if possible, even more ridiculous. That such is the case with Dr. Mercier can be shown without lengthy exposition.

¹ The essay was entitled 'The Logic of Thought and the Logic of Science,' and appeared in the *Quarterly Review*, July 1914. A little further investigation might have informed Dr. Mercier that the article was signed, and careful consideration might have suggested the probability that to mention the author by name might have led to the attack being noticed promptly. As it happened, I did not see the article till after the March number was published. A brief reply from me was just in time for the April number, but was not inserted owing to the suggestion of the Editor that I should include any necessary reply in a somewhat fuller exposition of my own point of view. Thus it happens that Dr. Mercier's remarks have been allowed to pass until now. Any reader sufficiently interested to compare Dr. Mercier's remarks with the original article, and anyone already acquainted with the subject of logic and with Dr. Mercier's incursion into it, will already have duly discounted the statements that come from his pen.

Concerning the title of the previous article, it is as well to repeat a statement, or an admission, made in the article itself. The term *Logic of Science*, the author of which, I believe, is Dr. Schiller,² is one not in general use, and, if read by one possessed of that proverbially dangerous equipment—a little knowledge—is liable to be misleading.³ The meaning of methodology, an uncouth word for which I used the other as a synonym, I shall explain shortly. But Dr. Mercier should try to realise that, with the full intention of saying exactly what I mean, it is hardly possible to do so in such a manner as to make the reading of the title take the place of the reading of the article. Indeed, before making statements concerning the trend of an essay, it is as well to read the essay through carefully at least twice. As Dr. Mercier does not appear to have done so, it is necessary to state that the ideas of two different logics, of science as something apart from thought and of thought as something apart from science, are not to be found in the article at all. There is no hedging. The assertion that in one sense (Dr. Mercier's sense) there is no special logic of science is consistently maintained throughout. The simple and adequate comment on Dr. Mercier's statements is that they are not true.

One other mis-statement, implied if not asserted, needs to be corrected. It arises out of Dr. Mercier's use of the term *logician*. The faults and insufficiencies of my article, the imaginary ones that Dr. Mercier thought he found there, and, by implication, the real ones which he omitted to mention, are put down, not to the ordinary human liability to err, but to my being a *logician*. As Dr. Mercier attaches such importance to definition, it would be interesting for him to define it. It appears to mean anyone who has studied or done original work in logic, except Dr. Mercier. On what ground he excludes himself from the class and from the connotation he appears to have discovered—ignorance, craziness, inaccuracy, stupidity—is not clear. But it is confusing and misleading to find classed together under a comprehensive heading those who are in thought and opinion so far removed. To find myself classed with the

² Dr. Schiller's article under that title appeared in *Science Progress*, January 1914. I cannot, of course, guarantee that the term had not been used previously. The point of the remark that it is probably due to Dr. F. C. S. Schiller is that, so far as I am aware, Dr. Schiller is nearly the only philosopher who has given Dr. Mercier any public support whatever.

³ It is not nearly so misleading as Dr. Mercier would make it appear, and can be paralleled by a large number of phrases current in the scientific world. The *Chemistry of the Terpenes*, *Frictional Electricity*, *Human Physiology*, *Animal Psychology* are all open to objection on similar lines, and might equally mislead anyone ignorant enough not to know that the first merely implies the principles of chemistry as illustrated by or applied to the terpenes.

grave and learned professors whom I am accustomed to abuse as heartily as Dr. Mercier, though with more regard to accuracy and the amenities of controversy, and, I trust, a little more knowledge of the subject-matter, may be a compliment, but it conveys a false impression to the readers of a popular review. It happens that Dr. Mercier and myself have one point in common. We were neither of us trained as logicians, but are both, so far as training is concerned, supposed to be more competent in some other department of knowledge. It is thus very misleading to bracket me with the ordinary academic logician who is learned in the details of many philosophies but ignorant of science. The explanation is necessary, because, though the learned professors and I both use the term *methodology*, we differ greatly concerning its content and function. What, therefore, I say about the current methodology is the attempt of the adverse critic to describe accurately and to criticise fairly. And such opinions as I express about the content of the subject must be regarded as opinions not generally recognised and accepted by logicians.

Having devoted sufficient space to Dr. Mercier's remarks, it will not now be necessary (with the exception of one footnote, which will explain itself) to refer to his article any further. His remarks on logic do not concern me here. Formal logic, as such, has a more consistent and more formidable opponent in Dr. Schiller. The undue pretensions of some logicians are exposed more clearly, and with greater knowledge, by Mr. Alfred Sidgwick. On the general question of the value and meaning of formal logic I can only, for the present, refer readers to my article in the *Quarterly*, which, I think, most of those interested will find reasonably clear. On my own special subject—the scientific side of logical study—I shall give a clearer account if I ignore Dr. Mercier's article, and proceed to describe as briefly as possible what the term *methodology* means, its treatment in present-day academic circles, and my own view as to its content and function.

It will be well, in the first place, to explain in what sense an extension of logical study specially concerned with scientific work has been and is regarded as a necessary addition to the old-fashioned scholastic and Aristotelian logic. It will suffice to say that the old-fashioned logic dealt almost solely with deduction, the formulation of conclusions absolutely and undeniably implicit in premises. Of such deductive reasoning mathematics is the most systematised form. It is to this form of thought that I refer when I describe and criticise ordinary logic, or, as I termed it in my previous article, the logic of thought. The simplest example of a deductive system is theoretical geometry,

best illustrated by the old-fashioned Euclid. Taking as a starting-point a few definitions, postulates, and axioms, the whole superstructure of theoretical geometry follows by a process of rigid deduction. That the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides follows absolutely and undeniably from those postulates and axioms. If this were the only form of science, if the atomic weight of sulphur, the velocity of light, the number of bones in the human body, the constitution of protoplasm, and the extent of geologic time could be deduced in a similar manner from a few postulates and axioms, then the old-fashioned logic revised and extended would still be adequate as a description of the main method by which human knowledge advances and scientific truth is discovered. That deductive reasoning enters to some extent into scientific work no one will dispute, and, in so far as it does so, there is no need for a special methodology of science.⁴

It is, however, equally indisputable that deductive reasoning is not specially characteristic of science, and that as a rule in scientific work other mental processes are of greater significance. Such methods and processes, though also used in ordinary life, are employed in scientific investigation continually, thoroughly, systematically. It is here that the peculiar paradox of the situation is to be found, a paradox which is thrown into strong relief by the whole history of the subject. Science is not a body of certain truth in the same sense as geometry; it consists, in the main, of martial generalisations, facts of experiment, and empirical approximations. The distinction has been recognised both by the exponents of science and by those who wished to depreciate its meaning and value. The former would argue that, as it was based on experimental fact, scientific truth had a firmer foothold than the more shadowy products of deductive reasoning. The latter would maintain that science was an inferior form of study in that the truths were not absolute and the reasoning not formally valid. All were agreed that there was a systematised body of truth of a different kind, of the structure and method of

⁴ It is, perhaps, as well for me to indicate that this statement is identical with the view expressed in the *Quarterly*. The following quotation will suffice:

'It is becoming more and more fully recognised that there is only one form of reasoning, deductive reasoning, and only one form of logic, properly so called, deductive logic. In scientific inquiry, experiment, and observation there is much else than reasoning properly so called, but, *in so far as the scientist reasons*, he deduces, and the method of his reasoning comes within the sphere of ordinary formal logic. To this extent the logic of thought and the logic of science are identical. The rightful extension of logic, now called methodology, consists, or should consist, of the study of scientific method, especially those aspects which are additional to reasoning properly so called' (p. 135).

which the old-fashioned formal logic gave no coherent account. There was not only room for, but necessity for, an extension of logical study if it were to pretend to give an account of the processes by which the human mind arrives at scientific truth.

The most notable attempt to supply the deficiency was that of J. S. Mill. The main object of his work on logic was to organise into a system the methods of science, to express them 'in a regular demonstrative theory like the syllogism.' The general consensus of opinion now inclines to the view that the attempt, in the form that Mill made it, is impossible. It is beginning to be generally accepted that the formulation of a general conclusion from particular facts is a process fundamentally different from the deduction of particulars from universals, that induction, unlike deduction, is not a process capable of rigid expression. Nevertheless, few will deny that, even if Mill's philosophical views are erroneous, his account of the process of scientific investigation is an admirable work and a powerful and penetrating study of scientific method.

Since the time of Mill the term inductive logic has dropped out of use. A number of philosophers consider the implication unsound. The study of scientific method has continued and is now generally known as methodology. It would be giving a too favourable account of the condition of academic thought to say that the object of methodology was to continue the study founded by Mill. It is characteristic of the academic mind that the subjects of University instruction lose definiteness, the original object disappears, the subject-matter changes from a definite study with a definite object to a mass of vague general talk and discussion. The tendency is not specially characteristic of logical studies, it is found everywhere in academic circles. The amount of useless 'research' which cumbers the journals of scientific societies is appalling, a phenomenon which arises largely because those engaged in University work, few of whom are naturally originators, feel it incumbent on them to do something to justify their positions. Be that as it may, the vagueness and indefiniteness of academic methodology defies description. A very characteristic product is the well-known work of Sigwart.* Notwithstanding that this and similar works contain incidentally much valuable discussion, it would be hopeless to attempt to evolve from them any clearly defined object, any unity, any definite result. The contrast between this vagueness and indeterminate-

* *Logic*, by Dr. Christoph Sigwart, translated by Helen Dendy. London : Swan Sonnenschein and Co. 1895. The second volume is the one specially referred to. The remarks are not a special attack on Sigwart, which contains much valuable work. The work is mentioned as being representative of present-day conditions.

ness and the comparative lucidity of Mill and other Victorian writers is striking. We must therefore be cautious in making about current methodology any statement whatever. I should myself define methodology as the study of scientific method, the attempt to throw light on the methods and processes by which the scientist can best advance his subject and discriminate between truth and error. This is part of the object of Mill and of his immediate successors, it is an object that no philosopher has definitely repudiated, but it is an object not very apparent in recent work.

In this matter academic philosophers labour under a special difficulty. In attempting to define the object of their study the exponents of methodology are on the horns of a dilemma. If they adhere to the original object of Mill, they are met with the undoubted fact that, during the seventy years which have elapsed since the publication of Mill's *Logic*, they have accomplished practically nothing. I do not mean merely that they have failed to accomplish the systematisation of scientific methods into a rigid system, which is generally thought to be impossible, but they have failed to do what even Whately agreed to be thoroughly practicable—to lay down rules for the ascertainment of truth by inductive investigation in such a way as to be 'of eminent service.'⁶ On the other hand, if they say, as some do, that their object is to clear up the nature of knowledge, to explain not how we know and how we can discover, but why we know and what we know, they are met with the difficulty that, on this side, there is no distinction between science and ordinary knowledge. On the practical side no sensible individual can deny that there is a real difference between the ordered systematic structure of scientific knowledge, the careful induction of scientific truth from the facts of observation and experiment, and the chaotic mass of information known as ordinary knowledge. There is consequently a need for the empirical study of scientific method. On the theoretical and metaphysical side science is merely knowledge, and methodology would be the metaphysics of no one in particular concerning nothing in particular, a not inapt description of its present chaotic condition.

The above description of the condition of the scientific side of logical study will be accepted as just by a number whose support in the inference I shall presently make has not, as yet, been forthcoming. Since I first pointed out that the study was too vague and shadowy and advocated a more practical outlook, others have joined in the attack. Dr. Schiller in particular has thrown ridicule upon a theory of scientific method which is of no service whatever to the serious student of practical science, and of which

⁶ See Preface to the last edition of Mill's *Logic*, p. vii.

the majority of men of science are absolutely ignorant. There is an increasing consensus of opinion concerning the inadequacy and the futility of the study in its present form. The inference to be drawn I crystallised in my article in the *Quarterly* in the following words :

There are two possible lines of development for the logic of science. One is an advance and improvement so that it may have some bearing on matters scientific and may aid the understanding of the wider aspects of science. The other is its deletion from the field of philosophic thought. . . . With this open alternative we must leave the matter. Actually and practically there is no methodology, no logic of science worthy of the name. Is it possible to formulate such a study, or should philosophers abandon the attempt as mistaken in theory and impossible in practice?

Of the two alternatives which thus arise the one I have always advocated is a methodology which will have a real practical bearing on science. Not only have I continually done so, but I have, on several occasions and in many ways, endeavoured to show by practical examples that for lack of such a study the man of science is continually blundering, that to formulate the methods of science would aid its advancement, and would render less plausible invalid extensions and the many pseudo-scientific shams which characterise present-day thought.'

The idea put forward is, in theory, absolutely clear and definite. Granting that the ordinary practice of scientific investi-

' I am putting into this footnote the other necessary reference to Dr. Mercier. It is interesting to note that he appears to dispute that methodology is a possible or desirable addition to philosophical knowledge. But this is due to his mental confusion. He is in the position of M. Jourdain who talked prose all his life without knowing it, for the greater part of his essay consists of an attempt (I express no opinion concerning its merits) to do not merely what the academic philosopher regards as the object of methodology, but also what I am attempting to impress upon the philosophic world should be its object. This leads to one other point of importance. As I am making clear in this article, the special point of view which distinguishes me from the vast majority of logicians is the contention that the study (whether called logic or methodology matters little) should attempt to distinguish between good methods and bad, true arguments and false, in the practical work of current science. It is somewhat strange to find the same idea in Dr. Mercier's article. There are one or two other points of similarity between statements made in his article and those previously published by myself. As I have already stated, I incline to the view that Dr. Mercier did not read the essay he criticised, but contented himself with reading the title and a few extracts. Had he read the essay carefully he would have laid himself open to the charge of combining a deliberate misrepresentation of a part of it with an adoption without acknowledgment of some of its most characteristic ideas, a not very creditable form of plagiarism. I have no intention of interfering in the discussion between Dr. Mercier and Dr. Thomson (*Nineteenth Century*, March 1915), nor do I feel called upon to express any opinion on the particular criticisms which Dr. Mercier has made on current scientific theories. I will merely remark that, if they were valid, and if they could be deduced from valid logical theory, they would be an example of the practical value of methodology.

gation is anything more than clumsy, chaotic blundering, there must be some principles, some methods which, consciously or unconsciously, guide those engaged in it. Granting that the result of scientific investigation is sometimes true and valuable, sometimes trivial, useless, or even false, it would follow that the former is probably due to the use of valid methods, to the conducting of investigation with a clear understanding of the object aimed at and the methods to be followed; the latter is probably due to the use of invalid methods, to the conducting of investigation in a blind, muddled, empirical manner. To formulate the principles of scientific method would thus be of the utmost value, not only to philosophic thought but to practical science. The suggestion should appeal to the academic logician who professes and teaches a methodology with no clearly defined object in that the original purpose is revived. It should also appeal to him because the proposal is less extreme than that of Mill, and was admitted as possible and practicable even by Whately. Nevertheless, I am obliged to say that, as the result of continuous discussion public and private for more than six years, I am unable to record any definite practical support from the academic world. I can record much opposition, active and passive, fair and unfair, reasonable and unreasonable. The idea which to the common-sense mind seems a truism is, to the academic logician, strange and unreasonable.

There are, of course, a number of objections. From the point of view of the academic philosopher there are several, very important and very practical. In some way it would render more difficult the smooth and easy path by means of which those of a certain type of intellect can confuse their brains with four years' study of the details of many philosophies, and thereupon, dubbed brilliant young specialists, progress towards professorship of philosophy with the duty of lecturing occasionally to a few students when such can be found. To bring any subject to the test of practical reality is not appreciated by its exponents. The suggestion that, as a qualification for the treatment of one branch of philosophy, the exponent should possess a wide knowledge of scientific fact, a clear head, and considerable ability is not likely to be well received. As the number of those expert in logical theory and philosophy who have any competence whatever in science can probably be numbered on the fingers of one hand, the change suggested is of considerable moment. Moreover, the consequences are not altogether indifferent to the man of science. It is foreign to his accustomed routine to be liable to clear, expert criticisms from outside, to find a section of the public who regard him with other feelings than wonder and awe, and to discover that he cannot put forward absurd theories and ridiculous claims

without discovery in less than a generation. Nevertheless, this kind of practical objection is not one that can be allowed to prevail without undermining everything which renders possible the advancement of knowledge. Such considerations need to be mentioned in that the active and passive opposition of the academic world should not be accepted as the final arbiter of original views in matters abstruse and intellectual. When all such has been allowed for, the point of view here put forward remains, in theory, a truism.

It will naturally occur to those interested that it is useless to point out the necessity of a practical methodology without doing something to make the possibility an actuality, without giving a few practical examples of the manner in which philosophical theory can react on scientific work. The possible suggestion that the study, though a theoretical truism, is a practical impossibility is so obvious that no one would raise the matter unless prepared to substantiate his position on the practical side. In dealing with this point the difficulty arises that it is not possible in a brief essay to discuss at length matters scientific. The showing in detail of the interrelation between theory and practice with regard to only one problem, to say nothing of a number, is essentially a matter for presentation in book form. Thus the only manner in which it is possible to indicate to readers of this Review that anything has been done is by reference to work previously published. Those who desire to investigate further will thus be able to do so, and others interested must accept the statements made, remembering (as is shown earlier in this article) that to make incorrect and unwarranted statements in a Review such as this is a form of procedure liable to elicit prompt and effective reply.

Three instances in which I have shown the practical value of philosophical theory in the sphere of science are to be found in the examination of mathematical and other theories of geologic time, the doctrine known as the Dissipation of Energy, and that recent scientific nightmare the Principle of Relativity. Those interested in cosmological speculation will remember how definitely and dogmatically the late Lord Kelvin and Professor Tait asserted that they had proved mathematically from three different lines of argument that the age of the earth could not be greater than 100 millions of years. I have shown^a carefully and in detail that the argument is a fallacy which arose because they

^a 'The Principles of Applied Mathematics and its Application to Secular Cooling,' *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, September 30, 1909, and September 1, 1910, and some other papers. Statement of idea of methodology and consequent discussion on that point with Dr. Bosanquet, *ibid.* May 12, 1910, January 19, 1911.

did not clearly grasp what mathematics was and what mathematics could prove. The mathematical calculations were accurate enough. Both were thorough practical mathematicians. But the arguments they used were utterly invalid because they had no clear ideas concerning the philosophy of mathematics. The second example, the Dissipation of Energy, I have dealt with less fully, but, I think, adequately.⁹ It is another of the fallacies of mathematical physics to which the scientists of the latter half of the last century were so prone. Astounding as the statement may seem, it asserted that the whole Universe was like a clock, contained a certain amount of available energy, and, when this energy was changed to heat and the heat uniformly distributed (the special point and the special fallacy of the doctrine was that the heat of the Universe was ultimately bound to be so distributed) no further life or motion was possible. The more recent Principle of Relativity is still more astounding. The central principle, or one of them, briefly stated, gets rid of the idea of absolute time. According to the theory, one occurrence may be described as taking place before, simultaneously with or after another, according to what is termed the system of reference. Although I have not been able to deal with the matter fully, indeed have only touched upon it cursorily and incidentally, I think I have shown that there are sound methodological reasons for doubting the theory.¹⁰ There is in it a considerable amount of confusion and misinterpretation.

Limitations of space render it impossible either to give further examples or to deal more fully with those already mentioned. Sufficient has been said to indicate that something has been done to point the way to an important and practical advancement in philosophical knowledge. The possibility of further development is dependent upon favourable conditions. It is obvious that a study so involved and so abstruse can exist only if recognised by those in whose hands the practical encouragement of research is placed by the State and by society. The Universities as at present constituted are, if they are anything at all, an enormous endowment of learning and research. The teaching they accomplish is small in proportion to their resources. This condition of things may be right or wrong; it is important that the public should recognise that, in fact, it exists. If the Universities fail in the fundamental duty of giving due recognition and fair discussion to new and important ideas, there is no case whatever for the continuance of the large grants of money that

⁹ 'The Dissipation of Energy,' *Oxford and Cambridge Review*, January 1912.

¹⁰ The few remarks on the Principle of Relativity are contained in a more discursive article entitled 'The Philosophy of Science,' *Science Progress*, January 1914.

are provided for them by the State and by the municipalities. Indeed, the question of their endowment would need careful reconsideration. For such an advance as is outlined in this article University recognition is essential. It is obvious also that very few even among philosophers are competent to carry on such work as I have outlined. It is only the few who are naturally originators, and the peculiarities of this study demand special equipment.

If the advance be possible at all, there are two lines on which it can take place. There is room, in the light of present-day science, for a thorough general restatement of the principles of scientific method as laid down by Mill, taking due account of all the criticism, valid and invalid, that has been made on his work during the past half-century. There is always room, owing to the continual change of scientific thought, for an application of the principles of science to current research and current theory. The thorough and critical examination of the more important and less specialised scientific theories is seldom wasted. In view of the many ways in which the inferences from scientific theories continually react upon practical and social questions, such an examination is needed as a partial check on the dogmatism of the scientific specialist. The foundations of the study were laid in the earlier part of the last century by Mill and his contemporaries. To build on those foundations would do something to give solidity to science and reality to philosophy.

H. S. SHELTON.

THE JAPANESE IN CHINA

THE capture of Tsingtau by the Japanese on the 6th of November 1914 was not only an event of first-rate importance in the progress of the present War but one calculated to change the whole aspect of the Far Eastern question. When Japan took possession of the territory originally leased to Germany she did so as the representative, *pro tem.*, of Great Britain and her European Allies in the present War. China, during the conflict on and for her own territory, between Germany and Japan, maintained her neutrality with commendable discretion. Her task was one of extreme difficulty, and her troubles were not lessened by the forcible entrance into possession of her new tenant. The fresh position had to be defined, and this was no easy matter. Besides, old grievances between Japan and China naturally came up for discussion. The result is strained relationships between these two nations, and an extremely delicate situation which, if not wisely handled, may have serious and far-reaching results. It is impossible to discuss the situation itself, principally because sufficient information of a reliable kind is not available. Therefore this article is confined to setting forth the position of the Japanese in China in such a way as to assist the reader in forming conclusions on the various questions involved as the facts relating to them become public property.

It is fairly certain that there were official communications between China and Japan soon after the Chinese conquest of Northern and Central Korea in 106 B.C., and there are evidences that adventurers from both countries had crossed the Korean Straits long before that period. During the early centuries of the Christian era the influence of Japan in Southern Korea synchronised with that of China in the north, although Chinese rule there came to an end in B.C. 36. Professor Murdoch somewhat discredits the story of the conquest of Silla (South-East Korea) in A.D. 200 by the Japanese, under the Empress Jingo Kogo, but allows that the conquest of the kingdom of Pakche (South-West Korea) in the same year has more solid evidence. On page 42 of his *History of Japan* this writer says :

In the first four centuries of our era the Silla annals make mention of thirteen or fourteen Japanese descents on the coasts; in the fifth

century alone an almost equal number (eleven) of hostile attempts on the part of the islanders is recorded.

Up till the early part of our seventh century Japan held the balance of power among the kingdoms of Korea, but on her retirement had nothing more of value than some copies of the Buddhist Satrus and the Chinese Calendar for all her expenditure of life and treasure. Korea, after its unification in our tenth century, remained an independent State, but paid tribute to China in recognition of her superior greatness.

It is well to bear this brief outline of early Korean history in mind in order to apprehend the position of the Japanese in China as it is to-day. Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910. All that Japan owes to China came by way of Korea—literature, art, religion, philosophy—and every trouble that Japan has had with China or Russia sprang from Korean soil. A glance at the map will show how this was inevitable. Korea joins with Chinese Manchuria on the west, and with Russian Siberia on the north, while it is separated from Japan only by the narrow Strait of Korea, the island of Tsushima being within thirty miles of the mainland.

I do not propose to give even an outline of the history of Japanese communications with China. They were more or less continuous from the earliest time till Japan retired into national seclusion in the seventeenth century. These communications left the two peoples with very little in common. It seems certain that at no time have Chinese settled in Japan in sufficient numbers to influence the customs and manners of the islanders. The languages, houses, dress, food, and even the virtues and vices of the two peoples are so distinct as to warrant their being classed as of different races. The influence of Chinese literature, art and philosophy is everywhere apparent in Japan, but Japan is nevertheless purely Japanese.

Much must necessarily be said about Korea, for this peninsula of 80,000 square miles, stretched invitingly from the borders of Manchuria and Siberia toward Japan, plays the same part in the national quarrels of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as it played in those of the first. With the awakening of China, the spread and pressure of Russian influence in Eastern Asia and the advent of Japan into world politics, the historic Flanders of the Far East became once more the battle-ground of all contending parties. Korea a strong and self-reliant State would have served as an effectual buffer, but it was continually in a condition of internal turmoil which the weak and spasmodic suzerainty of China only aggravated.

The Chino-Japanese War, declared on the 1st of August 1894, was the direct result of an insurrection in Korea. This war

was actually in being some months before the declaration referred to. Troops from China, sent to Korea to quell the insurrection, came into conflict with Japanese troops there as a consequence of the refusal of China to reform Korea jointly with Japan. The sinking by a Japanese cruiser of Chinese transports flying the British flag, and other incidents, culminated in the battle of Asan, in Korea, on the 29th of July. The war was carried to the South Manchurian coast, and Port Arthur, then the chief naval arsenal of China, was captured by the Japanese in November 1894. China was at the mercy of Japan when this war ended, and Japan dictated the terms of peace, which were set forth in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, dated the 17th of April 1895. The first Article reads :

China recognises definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea ; and, in consequence, the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China in derogation of such independence and autonomy shall wholly cease for the future.

China also ceded to Japan the Liaotung peninsula and the island of Formosa. This gave Japan a substantial footing on the mainland of China. Soon after the Treaty was made known Russia, France, and Germany appeared as the champions of the doctrine of the integrity of China. The result was that Japan evacuated Manchuria and retired, with the distant island of Formosa as her only reward for securing the independence of Korea.

At this time Russian pressure on Northern Manchuria had become serious. The Trans-Siberian Railway was commenced in 1891. A connexion with the Chinese Government Railways, which had reached to within a few miles of Peking in 1894, was essential. This was secured in spite of strong British opposition, and the Russianising nature of the movement may be gathered from the fact that the Russian railway gauge, 5 feet, was continued into Chinese territory in the face of protests from the Chinese authorities, who pointed out that the standard gauge of China was 4 feet 8½ inches.

In this connexion it should be noted that by the Treaty of Nerchinsk, made between Russia and China in 1698, the boundary line between the two countries was placed well beyond the river Amur. It was not till the time of the Crimean War that the Amur was seized by Russia under the plea of necessity ; for the Black Sea was blockaded and the Amur offered communication with the Pacific. In 1860 Russia obtained the recognition by China of her right to the whole territory east of the Amur, and in 1875 to consolidate the position, she made an exchange of islands with Japan, by which she obtained Saghalien.

This gave Russia a land connexion with Korea and control of both coast lines on the Gulf of Tartary. The famous port of Vladivostok was established on the extreme south-west of the new mainland territory, with Korea adjoining on the south, Manchuria and all China as a natural hinterland, and Japan removed from her immediate sphere by the evacuation of Saghalien.

All this was the result of natural expansion recognised by both China and Japan, and, had it been possible to maintain the position, all might have gone well for all concerned. But the harbour of Vladivostok was found to be ice-bound in winter, and Russia's need of an ice-free port on the Pacific became the dominant factor in her Far Eastern policy. In all the sordid scramble for railway concessions in China, in which most of the Great Powers of Europe were concerned, and America as well, this was never lost sight of. The position invited trouble, and the part taken by Russia in depriving Japan of the Liaotung peninsula aggravated it considerably.

In the early nineties Manchuria, and incidentally Northern Korea, became the hot-bed of railway-concession intrigue, which, while ostensibly respecting the integrity of China, aimed at political and military control by economic means. In the struggle for concessions Russia won, securing the whole rights in Northern Manchuria. In 1898, when the German Government took possession of Tsingtau by force of arms, the Trans-Siberian Railway had been completed, and Russian engineers were well advanced with the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway from the Siberian frontier into and across Manchuria. China could not force the Germans from Tsingtau, and on the plea of that other much-abused doctrine, equal opportunity, Russia obtained a lease of Port Arthur for twenty-five years from the 27th of March 1898, together with a concession to continue the railway through the Liaotung peninsula to Dalny and Port Arthur. By 1901 the whole line, from Moscow to Port Arthur, was completed, and Russia was mistress of the situation with 1600 miles of railway on Chinese territory and an almost impregnable fort on the very site from which she had assisted diplomatically to eject Japan six years before.

The Russo-Japanese War was inevitable. It took the world by surprise on its outbreak in February 1904, but to those in touch with the developments outlined in the preceding pages it came as a matter of natural sequence. The Japanese took Port Arthur on the 1st of January 1905, ten years after it had been surrendered to them by the Chinese. The result of this war was the transfer from Russia to Japan of all her South Manchurian leases and concessions, as set forth by the Treaty of Portsmouth, U.S.A., dated the 5th of September 1905. The principal

Articles of the Treaty are given here, as they are of more than ordinary interest.

Article I.—There shall henceforth be peace and amity between their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all the Russias, and between their respective States and subjects.

Article II.—The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military, and economical interests, engage neither to obstruct nor interfere with the measure of guidance, protection, and control which the Imperial Government of Japan may find it necessary to take in Korea. . . . It is also agreed that in order to avoid all cause of misunderstanding, the two High Contracting Parties will abstain, on the Russo-Korean frontier, from taking any military measures that may menace the security of Russian or Korean territory.

Article III.—Japan and Russia mutually engage—

(1) To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria except the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula. . . .

(2) To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria now in the occupation or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops with the exception of the territory above named.

The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they have not in Manchuria any preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.

Article IV.—Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.

Article V.—The Imperial Government of Russia transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Talien, and the adjacent territory and territorial waters, and all rights, privileges, and concessions connected with or forming part of such lease, and they also transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan all public works and properties in the territory affected by the above-mentioned lease. . . .

Article VI.—The Imperial Russian Government engage to transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, without compensation and with the consent of the Chinese Government, the railway between Chang-chun (Kwan-cheng-tzu) and Port Arthur and all its branches, together with all rights, privileges, and properties appertaining thereto in that region, as well as all coal mines in the said region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway.

Article VII.—Japan and Russia engage to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial purposes and in no wise for strategic purposes. It is understood that restriction does not apply to the railways in the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula.

Article IX.—The Imperial Government of Russia cede to the Imperial Government of Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern portion of the Island of Saghalien and all islands adjacent thereto, and all public works and properties thereon. The fiftieth degree of latitude is adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded territory.

In a supplementary agreement each party reserved the right

to keep fifteen soldiers per kilometre as an armed guard to patrol the lines of railway.

By Russia's acknowledgment in the second Article of the Treaty of Portsmouth it will be clear that in 1905 Japan 'possessed paramount political, military, and economical interests in Korea.' This was to be expected. In the ten years that had elapsed from the independence of Korea till the signing of the Treaty referred to, the influence of Japan on the peninsula had grown steadily. And yet, internal weakness and external pressure had become, if possible, more pronounced than when Korea was in vassalage to China. This led to Korea becoming a Japanese Protectorate in 1904. In 1906 stronger measures were foreshadowed by the establishment of a Resident-General at Seoul, and on the 29th of August 1910 Korea was formally annexed by Japan. The preamble of the Treaty of Annexation is significant :

Notwithstanding the earnest and laborious work of reforms in the administration of Korea in which the Government of Japan and Korea have been engaged for more than four years since the conclusion of the agreement of 1905, the existing system of government in that country has not proved entirely equal to the duty of preserving public order and tranquillity, and in addition a spirit of suspicion and misgiving dominates the whole peninsula.

The Emperor of Korea was given suitable rank and honours with an annual grant for their maintenance, and peerages were conferred on leading statesmen and officials. Thus ended an ancient dynasty, and the historic peninsula passed under the dominion of the Mikado. Even the name Korea is doomed to disappear and is already replaced by Chosen. Surely this is to be regretted if only for historic reasons. It may easily prove a change for which Japan may have to pay dearly before patriotic accounts are finally adjusted.

Probably, had the Russo-Japanese War ended differently, not only Korea, but Manchuria as well, would have become part of the Tzar's dominions. In any case, it may reasonably be reckoned to the Japanese for righteousness that, while they added Korea to Japan, they saved Manchuria for China.

In order to grasp the new situation it must be borne in mind that Japan is no longer only an island empire, and that a recurrence of Tokugawa seclusion is to her for ever impossible. She is an established Continental Power in East Asia, with land frontiers against Chinese and Russian territory. Geographically, the relative positions of Korean Japan, China, and Russia correspond closely to those of Italy, France, and Austria in Europe.

Since the transfer to Japan of Russia's interests in South

Manchuria, consequent on the war of 1904-5, the old policy of acquiring political influence by economic means has continued without abatement. Indeed, so far as Russia in the north and Japan in the south are concerned, it may be said that political influence has assumed the form of armed possession. The length of the railways controlled by Russia in North Manchuria may be roughly estimated at 1100 miles. In 1913 Japan controlled over 700 miles in South Manchuria, and the substantial concessions she obtained in that year must now enable her to lay claim to the right to protect an aggregate length equal to that of Russia. Full advantage is taken by both parties of the Treaty clause by which each may keep a guard of fifteen men per kilometre, so that the length of line controlled is the measure of the local military strength of the competitors.

The Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1907, and the Convention of 1910, with subsequent recognitions and arrangements, are of the most friendly nature; they aim at the maintenance of the *status quo*, the integrity of China, and the principle of equal opportunity; they regulate commercial, social, and political relationships; but this glaring and ever-growing witness to mutual suspicion and distrust is left unmentioned. Presumably both parties affect to believe that these guards are for the protection of the lines against possible local depredations. I have been over almost every mile of railway in China and saw no such precautions outside Manchuria, and there they are quite unnecessary. Besides, it is well known that the Chinese Government are willing to provide what police protection is required, and would be relieved to see every foreign soldier recalled. In the agreement under which the lines were originally constructed it is stipulated that 'the Chinese Government will take measures for the protection of the line and the men employed thereon.' It was not till after the Boxer trouble in 1900 that guards were considered necessary. It will be remembered that at that time the various nations interested took armed possession of the principal lines of railway. Only Russia and Germany continued this armed possession after the trouble was over. The Treaty of Portsmouth systematised the evil in Manchuria.

If this mutual menace were removed, the end of Russo-Japanese troubles in Manchuria would be well in sight. That some system of policing the lines is necessary is admitted. Every line in China is policed. If Manchuria is, as is claimed, the happy hunting-ground of the Chinese brigand, by all means let there be an extra police-force there, but let it be arranged for with the Government of the country, and not by an agreement between two foreign Powers, based on mutual distrust.

Vladivostok is now, by the use of ice-breakers and other means, practically an open port all the year round. The engineer has triumphed where the diplomatist and the soldier failed.

The open door, equal opportunity, spheres of influence, and the integrity of China are the four phrases representing the international rules for the torture of China. She is exposed by the first, exploited by the second and third, and preserved by the fourth for the perpetuation of the process. Should this Prometheus of the nations ever be unbound, she will have little cause for gratefulness to any of her tormentors, for they have but helped themselves, with unequal results.

The Great Wall of China is the witness to her ancient self-sufficiency. Left alone she grew and spread until her power and influence were limited only by the barriers of communication and the bounds of knowledge. She did not want our missionaries, but we taught her to respect them. She despised our trade, but we forced it upon her. She did not value our money, but we made it her necessity. She removed our first railway from her sacred soil and left it to bleach on the shores of Formosa, but we returned with others which we induced her to keep and use and value, till her sons violated the Great Wall for their sake and stretched their glistening lines to the confines of the Forbidden City. Other nations did much the same. The Yellow River, anciently China's highway of commerce, is still known as 'China's Sorrow' because of the periodical devastations wrought by the breaking of its 'loess' banks in times of great floods, but China's railways have wrought her more sorrow in thirty years than the Huang Ho did in as many centuries. And the end is not yet.

Having endeavoured to set forth the relative or rather contending interests of Russia and Japan, the position of the Japanese in China, as it is to-day, may now be considered more exclusively. Early in the progress of the Russo-Japanese War the railways in South Manchuria fell into the hands of the Japanese. The Russians, seeing this was inevitable, had withdrawn the rolling-stock to the north. But the gauge was quickly altered to suit the engines and trucks of the Japanese lines, which had been actually loaded on transports before it was quite certain that they would be required. The control of the railways practically decided the fortunes of the war. To-day, after ten years of what is, in all but name, Japanese occupation of South Manchuria, more than nine tenths of the Japanese subjects in the territory are to be found in the railway zone.

The exploitation of South Manchuria was not undertaken by the Japanese Government directly, but by a powerful joint-stock company in which the Government is the largest share-

holder. This concern, the South Manchurian Railway Company, is doing very much the same in this part of China as the Canadian Pacific Railway has done in Canada, only the former represents the Japanese Government and the latter private enterprise. The capital of the company in 1913 consisted of 10,000,000*l.*, held by the Japanese Government, and 200,000*l.* held by private subscribers. Debentures to the amount of 12,000,000*l.* have been issued, and these are mostly held by British investors. The Government shares represent the value of the lines as agreed upon when the company took them over, so that, apart from the 200,000*l.* representing private holders, the company is run by the proceeds of debentures issued in London. These debentures are guaranteed, both as to capital and interest, by the Japanese Government.

Japan was the last of the Powers to take a hand in the game of Economic Means to Political Ends. The hand dealt her was a good one, and, so far, it has been played with consummate skill. Britain, France, Belgium, Russia, and Germany are all represented by railways in China, but those representing Japan are, alone, constructed and equipped by foreign capital, and that capital is British.

The South Manchurian Railway Company engages largely in enterprises other than those implied by its designation. It runs a regular service of ships between Dairen (Dalny) and Shanghai, and owns the fleet of the Dairen Steamship Company, coasting in the Gulf of Pechili. The Fushun Colliery, about twenty-five miles east of Mukden, is under its control. This is situated on an extensive coal bed with deposits from 75 feet to 180 feet thick, and a total storage estimated at 1000 million tons. The output in 1913 was 3000 tons per day. With developments then in progress this must now have been doubled. It also owns the Yentai coal fields, north-east of Liaoyang. It owns and runs the great harbour works at Dairen and the wharves and shipping facilities of Port Arthur. It provides electric current for Hoshigaura, Changchun, Mukden, Dairen, and Port Arthur, and gas as well where required. It has large hotels at all these places. It owns about 50,000 acres of land, one third of which is let for building purposes. It maintains hospitals, with a central establishment at Dairen and twenty-five branch stations along its lines of railway. It provides fifteen primary schools and a medical college and a technical institute. It creates townships, erects public buildings, makes roads, constructs telegraph lines, and installs telephones. In short, this great concern runs South Manchuria for the Japanese Government.

In 1913, on the 200,000 shares held privately a dividend of seven per cent. was paid, and two and a half per cent. on the

Government shares. The bulk of the profits go toward capital expenditure, and this to such an extent that one is forced to the conclusion that the policy of the company is to sink as much money in permanent works as possible in the short time at its disposal. The significance of this will appear when the time stipulations in the lease of the Liaotung peninsula and the railway concessions are considered.

The progress of South Manchuria since the occupation of the Liaotung Peninsula by the Japanese is of the most encouraging nature. The advent of railways in other parts of China brought no real benefit to the Chinese communities in the regions they were designed to serve. The traveller by rail can see towns and walled cities from the carriage windows, where everything remains the same as it was a thousand years ago. After their first curiosity subsided the inhabitants settled down to dig and sow and reap, and wheel their squeaking barrows among the graves of their ancestors as their fathers had done. No ambition was aroused, no emulation was stirred. The foreign devil and his inventions were things apart, to be got rid of at the first opportunity and under any pretext. It is so still, except only at the great termini, where employment and interest are provided for a number infinitesimal compared with the uninfluenced millions. For the railway was all the foreigner brought, and those interested in trade and travel were comparatively few.

The Japanese brought more than railways. They encouraged native industries and introduced new ones. They settled to some extent among the people and taught them the utility and profit of modern tools and mechanical appliances. They spent money among them, taught their children, provided hospitals for the sick and employment for the strong. Year by year prosperity spread, new villages and towns sprang up, and the harvests increased. In 1913 there were 86,646 Japanese in the railway zone in South Manchuria, and 920 outside that zone, while 1920 had settled in North Manchuria. To-day it is estimated that there are 100,000 Japanese, and 300,000 Koreans—all Japanese subjects—in South Manchuria alone. These are not all grouped in settlements like other foreigners, but scattered to some extent over the country. They follow their various callings in close contact with the eleven million Chinese who were there before them.

A hundred thousand Englishmen in South Manchuria, or in any other part of China not within sight of a British Legation, would starve. A hundred thousand Japanese grow rich and are object-lessons of thrift and good citizenship, and Japan will pardon me for pointing out that this is largely the result of her people

having lived on a different plane from that of the European nations. Anything approaching mixed communities of Chinese and Europeans is impossible. The whole social structures are so essentially different that few points in common could be found by the most adaptable. Besides, economic conditions are such that the European worker could not exist under the law of equal opportunity. A Japanese artisan can live luxuriously on a third of the pay a European artisan requires for a bare existence. The difference in the standards of living of Chinese and Japanese, class for class, is not great, and it is probably a fair deduction that the greater skill and more strenuous application of the Japanese worker would, with equal opportunity, result in equal economic advantage, with any balance in his favour. A levelling process is, in fact, already proceeding. Two years ago it had reached the stage when skilled Chinese on Japanese railways were demanding the same wages as skilled Japanese, the unlooked-for result of training Chinese in the hope that they would do the skilled work cheap.

That the Japanese may be capable of becoming a social influence does not alter the Chinese official view that their presence in South Manchuria in place of the Russians is merely a change of evils. Indeed it would be easy to reason that to the Chinese Government the change was decidedly for the worse, for, in the event of trouble with Japan, Russian interests in South Manchuria would form both a buffer and a barrier between her and China. Now Russia is removed to the north, well out of the way, and any pressure from Japan, whether by way of South Manchuria or Korea, or both, may be applied direct, and unrestrained by local complications. This, to a Government with which temporising is at once a luxury and a necessity, may well present a highly dangerous situation.

Any salvation China has had during the last half-century has come to her through contending foreign interests. In the absence of these, with a combination of Powers with identical interests bringing sufficient pressure to bear on her, China must yield. And again, when one strong Power, fully determined on its course, moves resolutely while other Powers are so circumstanced that their interference would result in undesirable conflict, China must stand and deliver. The Kiaochau affair is an instance of this. On the other hand, when a balance of interests exists among the Powers China can come out of great trouble with small damage, as in the case of the Boxer so-called rebellion. In this respect China may be likened to a village common. So long as no one wants it or every one wants it, it is safe. It is when one only, or one combination, wants it, and the

rest do not care or are too engrossed with other matters to protest effectually, that it is in danger of being appropriated.

I am reasoning round a situation which it would be unwise and unprofitable to discuss freely under existing conditions. It is no secret that Japan is engaged in a controversy with China which at other times would have brought the Allies, with whom she is, fortunately, associated, on the scene as more than interested spectators. German interests in China, except in the international settlements and on the northern section of the Tientsin-Pukow railway, ceased with the fall of Tsingtau. American interests are more academic than material, and the United States Government is not likely to interfere so long as the international creed, for which it is largely responsible—the open door, equal opportunity and the integrity of China—is not denied. Thus, apart from China herself, the only Powers materially interested are Russia, Belgium, France, and Britain. Their interests are not identical but are competitive with each other as well as with those of Japan, and herein lies the safety of the situation. The four Powers named are engaged in a war which threatens their very existence. Had Japan not been associated with them there might have been reason to fear that the balance they have hitherto maintained might be disturbed to the detriment of China because of their inability to intervene. As it is, Japan is placed in the position of trustee for the Allied Powers, and has an opportunity of proving her real greatness such as few nations ever had. And, despite a world in arms, a nation's greatness is to be measured neither by the vastness of its territory nor its prowess in war.

Perhaps the choice of time for the present controversy with China did not lie with Japan, and everyone will sympathise with her if this is so, for at no time could such demands have been made on her honour as at the present, demands amounting to the sacrifice of all purely personal considerations. And this not only with reference to the interests of the friendly foreign Powers but to those of China as well. In whatever China has failed, and she has failed whenever possible, Japan, more than she, is to-day on trial before an intensely interested if non-protesting world. Personally, I hope and trust and believe that she will rise to the great occasion and permanently increase her prestige among the nations. Any injustice done to China can be repaired, but any injustice to Japan will be self-inflicted and irreparable.

No official information has been given regarding the present negotiations between China and Japan, and under existing conditions unofficial communications have naturally been restrained.

This much is clear—the trouble is mainly about leases and concessions, and the situation is delicate and requires the most careful handling. When I went over the works of the South Manchurian Railway Company two years ago I was struck by the permanent nature of everything that had been done and that was in progress. There was nothing to indicate that the lease of the ports had only ten years to run or that the concession affecting the Antung-Mukden line of 170 miles, connecting the Manchurian and Korean systems, terminated at the same time. On the contrary, extensive additions and costly improvements were in progress at the great harbour of Dairen, and the main line track was being doubled throughout. The Company was making huge profits and sinking the greater part of them in constructional works which will serve for a century after the present agreements expire. The *Engineer* of the 13th of November 1914, after describing the railways and drawing attention to the brief tenure of the Company, adds :

In the face of these things Japan, instead of preparing to reap returns, keeps putting more money into the business every year. One is driven to the conclusion that the South Manchurian Company is not so much a commercial concern as a political force, and that Japan has no intention of quitting Chinese territory.

It will be remembered that the lease of the Liaotung peninsula, which includes Dairen and Port Arthur, was granted originally to Russia for a term of twenty-five years, dating from the 27th of March 1898, and that the lease with all its conditions unaltered was ceded to Japan in 1905. It had then eighteen years to run. With this in view, the agreement concerning the Antung-Mukden line was entered into between the Chinese and Japanese representatives in 1905 for a period of eighteen years. Thus the lease of the Liaotung peninsula and the concession regarding the Antung-Mukden line both terminate in 1923. There is no guarantee of an extension after that date, although it is stated in Article IV. of the Convention that 'on expiration an extension of the terms may be arranged between the two countries.'

The South Manchurian railways were also ceded by Russia to Japan in 1905. The original agreement, still unchanged, has the following stipulations :

After eighty years (from the day of completion of the railway and the commencement of traffic) the line and all its property are to revert to the Chinese Government without payment.

Thirty-six years after commencement of traffic China may take over the line on payment of the following (*sic*), and all capital and all monies

owed on account of the line and interest. As to profits made by the Company, should there be any not distributed to shareholders, these must be taken to be capital returned and deducted from the price paid for the line. China must actually pay over the amount of purchase to Russia before receiving possession of the line.

The line was completed in 1901, and is therefore redeemable in 1937. In 1981 it becomes the property of the Chinese Government without payment. The same conditions apply to the North Manchurian railways still held by Russia.

It is reasonable to suppose that Japan would make an effort to obtain extensions of the Antung-Mukden and Liaotung peninsula agreements so that they should run concurrently with that of the South Manchurian railways. And it is just as reasonable to suppose that Japan will be prepared to pay for these advantages, for, presumably, Japan has no more right to demand time extensions than China has to insist on time reductions. This is how such matters would be viewed anywhere outside China and the sphere of German *Kultur*. So far Japan has paid dearly for all she has in China, both in blood and treasure, and it would be an insult to her sense of justice to insinuate that now she wants something for nothing. The withdrawal of the Japanese from the Liaotung peninsula in 1923 might easily prove a serious matter for China, and for the world, and those who sympathise most with that sorely tried country would contemplate such a step with genuine alarm.

The capture of Tsingtau by the Japanese and the consequent expulsion of the Germans from Shantung created a new situation and changed the perspective of everything in the Far East. China had consented, however unwillingly, to the occupation of Kiaochau by the Germans for a period of ninety-nine years. When the Japanese expelled the Russians from South Manchuria they became possessed of all that was left by them, and the Chinese Government ratified the possession and transferred all the leases and concessions to Japan as Russia had held them. This is probably what will happen in Kiaochau, for in the following quotation from Japan's Ultimatum to Germany the word 'eventual' may easily be made to do duty over a period of ninety-nine years.

To deliver on a date not later than September 15th, 1914, to the Imperial Japanese Authorities without condition or compensation the entire leased territory of Kiaochau with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China.

Those who interpreted this clause to mean that Japan intended to turn the Germans out and hand the leased territory back to

China at the earliest opportunity did not know the Far East. And, apart altogether from financial, political, and strategical considerations, it is difficult to see how China would suffer by the transfer. Germany was certainly a more undesirable tenant in Tsingtau than Russia was in Port Arthur, and the change at Port Arthur was accepted with equanimity.

From the doctrine of equal opportunity it may be argued that as China agreed to a ninety-nine years' lease of Kiaochau all leases should be extended to cover a similar period. It would seem late in the day to put forward such a plea, for Russia leased Port Arthur for twenty-five years after the lease of Kiaochau for ninety-nine years was matter of common knowledge. But the perspective of things has changed since then, and what was merely an indistinct outline in the dim background now stands forward in bold relief. In 1898 the partition of China seemed imminent, and in that event a lease of twenty-five years was as good as one of ninety-nine years.

The change at Port Arthur took place when Korea was an independent State. It was therefore in China's favour inasmuch as it created a balance of foreign interests more conducive to her safety. The position was, of course, materially affected by the annexation of Korea by Japan, and now, with the Japanese at Tsingtau, in possession of the finest harbour and the most strategic railway in China, contending foreign interests of a tangible kind are reduced to vanishing-point. This, with the one Power in active possession making demands for new concessions and time extensions of expiring agreements, is the secret of China's alarm.

Other matters, all of great importance, are under consideration at Peking, but in the absence of official information it would be impossible to discuss them with any degree of accuracy. Leases and concessions are in a manner public property, even though what is being done about them is still the secret of diplomatic circles. I have therefore dealt with them only, and in doing so have merely stated concrete facts and indulged in abstract reasonings, for it must always be borne in mind that Chinese affairs are not to be judged by the standards applied to those of European nations.

Left now to work out her own salvation on any lines, China would come to certain and irretrievable ruin. Foreign influence and a measure of foreign control in some form or other have become essential to her preservation. Her people are patient and her rulers mean well, but the fact that four hundred million people can neither finance nor defend themselves as presently situated is undeniable. In the unrestrained exercise of power weakness is more to be feared than wickedness. The miracle of

the regeneration of Japan cannot be repeated in China. The vastness of her territory, the density and incohesiveness of her population, the difficulties of communication, the chaos of her finance, and the misfortunes of her Government are all against the occurrence of such a phenomenon.

Thanks to the contentions of her friends, China, like Job, holds fast her integrity, although in a material sense, while her friends, to her seeming, like those of the patriarch, maintain the rôle of miserable comforters, harassing her helplessness with specious and powerful arguments in the hope that she will curse God and die. It may, however, be a matter for profitable reflection that, had Job been as patient under the strictures of his friends as he was under personal afflictions, his sufferings would have been greatly mitigated and his last state, none the less, better than his first.

WILLIAM BLAKE.

POLITICAL BOUNDARIES

WHEN primeval man first developed the capacity to take a club in his hand and to hunt for his daily food through the tangled jungles of Asia, he no doubt established a lair for himself in some wind-screened corner which protected his family from the stress of weather and himself from prying eyes. The social unit in those early days was the small family group. As the centuries rolled on and men mingled in gangs of hairy long-toed humans (already differentiated from the type of intelligent animal by the dawning light of reason) for the purpose of hunting with more security and over wider fields, the gregarious habit became more and more insistent, so that with the birth of 'community' the social unit became extended from the family to the community or gang. Men then hunted in packs. Common wants and the superior means of meeting these wants when in combination, together with the advantage for defensive purposes against wild beasts, or other communities of wild men, offered by such combination, were soon recognised and the camp or ring fence contained this human unit.

So it is still in remote districts of the world to-day. In the more inaccessible regions that border the foothills of the Himalaya ranges on the north-east frontier of India, there exist tribal communities of an origin so ancient that it is at present difficult to fix their ethnic derivation. They are by no means wholly savage and barbarous, but have been preserved by the nature of their inconceivably wild environment from intrusion; and their villages, fairly well built and weather-proof, in a climate of which the estimated rainfall is from 600 to 800 inches a year, perched on the hill sides round the central *Moshup* (a long building with many entrances, which is both the village council chamber and the barrack in which the young men sleep at night), form independent communities governed on purely democratic principles by an elected Chief. This Chief remains Chief only so long as he represents the wishes and views of the majority. Here the village is the political unit. Behind and beyond the villages rise the gigantic spurs, forest-covered and trackless, of the lower Himalaya, weird and fantastic in outline

and riven by the deep mist-filled gorges of watercourses. It is amongst these hills that the small amount of cultivation on which the village subsists is carved out of the jungle by fire and axe, and small as it is, the few acres which it covers are shifted from year to year. The world's space is ample around them and the villages are far removed from each other. Official boundaries are unknown amongst these Abors and the cognate tribes of the north-east frontier, and it is only when the borderland of the Brahmaputra plains is approached that there is a vague impression of foreign territory and a barrier. Close as these barbarous peoples live to this borderland of modern up-to-date civilisation, they may be studied as almost primeval in the matter of the adjustment of social conditions of life to environment.

If, on the other hand, we turn to the wide expanse of open plain or steppe, or prairie, or desert, we can still find in this present year of grace not merely reminiscences but practical examples of similar adjustment amongst nomadic tribes such as have existed through all time. The forests of the upper Amazon and of Central Africa still cover secrets of human existence which remain as yet (for a short period perhaps) unravelled, but the most habitable of the world's open spaces have given up their secrets long ago, and it is one of the marvels of the age that we can detect and study the principles and methods of adjustment between humanity and environment in the twentieth century A.D. which might be equally applicable to the hundredth century B.C. Such opportunity will not last long and it is well to make the most of it.

High up on the plateaux of Central Asia we find Turk or Tartar tribes, who have followed in the footsteps of their fathers from generation to generation through an age that is beyond reckoning. Probably the call of the pasture land was long anterior to that of the plough. All through Asia, from the plains of Turkestan to the heights of the Nilgiris in Southern India, do we find the pastoral people claiming precedence of origin from the agriculturist. The lords of the soil were ever the herdsmen and not the ploughmen. Thus the Kirghiz and the Kipchak and the Kasak and the Turkman, until quite lately when white races began to quarrel over their ancestral plains, were undisturbed wanderers and scorers of boundaries, as they were from the beginning. Deep in the heart of humanity, so far as it is derived from Central Asia, is implanted the lust of wandering. We are the same to-day as we were in the great yesterday of the world's ages, and as we shall be through the ages to come. But the Kirghiz of to-day knows his limitations. He is well aware that in his annual migrations there are certain artificial or natural barriers set up which he is bound specially to respect.

Nevertheless it may be doubted whether he does altogether respect them. The nomadic Afghan from the plains about Ghazni, who packs up his belongings, his house, his wives, and his children, and moves yearly across the Afghan plateaux to the pass of the Gomul, and so to British India; and, once over the border, dumps his properties on our frontier (knowing that they are safer there), ere he starts on a further mercantile venture to the outermost edges of India, and beyond, does so on the full assurance that he will not be arraigned for transgressing a boundary so long as he passes unarmed into India. But it may be doubted very much whether the Kirghiz householder, who sets his wife to fold up his Kibitka and his daughter to catch the camels and sheep, and departs smoking in contentment from the Great to the Little Pamir, i.e. from Russia to Afghanistan, or slowly and deliberately wanders down the Beyik pass to Chinese territory in the Tagdumbash, cares whether he transgresses a boundary or not. He still lives in that ideal of existence when boundaries were not, and the wide upper world of Asia was open to him as to his fathers before him.

If from the wide and fascinating fields which offer us the opportunity of evolving an ideal of the earliest stages of humanity progressing towards civilisation, before the separation of peoples and the budding of nationalities, we turn to study the much later stage when certain idiosyncrasies or expressions of character have compacted some communities, and the gradual evolution of tribal families from one common ancestor has separated others into clans, whilst all are together living within comparatively narrow limits of space, we can find examples amongst the independent tribes of the Indian frontier between the borders of British India and Afghanistan. Here we have at once an object-lesson in those features of human existence and intercourse which on a wider scale permeate all humanity equally, and lead to the final necessity of boundary-making.

We are here dealing with a half-baked civilisation. Many civilised institutions (particularly in matters military) are to be found amongst them. They are capable of importing rifles, for instance, from Birmingham, and of paying for them with rupees furnished as subsidies for good conduct from the Indian Government treasury. Their local form of government is patriarchal, and on the whole effective. Wrongdoers are punished and a crude justice is generally administered. Of arts and sciences they know nothing, unless we except that oldest of all engineering sciences—the bringing of water from a remote source to irrigate their scanty crops. In this matter the East has never had anything to learn from the West.

Their national characteristics are as rough and rugged as

their surroundings. On all sides are the stone-strewn slopes of lofty hills, rising to mountain peaks, overlooking on the one side the grey-green spread of the Indus valley cultivation with the glint of the far-off river intersecting; on the other, from the highest steps of the mountain staircases, the rolling, reddish plains of Kandahar, or the hill-studded plateau reaching Ghazniwards, and trailing off northwards into a mountain tangle backed by the faint snow-line of Sufed Koh. Deep gullies and stupendous gorges intersect their hills. The streak of silvery water at the foot of them, gleaming and swirling in its rock-bound channel, is often hardly discernible from above, and yet there are open valleys withal—narrow indeed and with much space wasted in boulder-covered watercourses, but useful for a scanty harvesting of crops, and indeed affording all the pasturage that there is—where there is a little room for expansion. A single valley is often the narrow holding of a single clan. The over-treading of the tribal boundary is most promptly resented, and the separation of clans of similar origin by well marked geographical features is often absolute.

In ordinary times of unwelcome peace there is little or no tendency towards the amalgamation of Khels or clans—nothing short of joint action against the common foe (which is almost inevitably British) ever brings them shoulder to shoulder. Even then there is many a village 'punchayet,' many a solemn open-air meeting conducted by the grey-beards on the hillside, ere a resolution of alliance with a neighbouring clan can be ratified. There is no civil assimilation of the smaller tribes by the larger ones (a tribe may even be represented, as indeed happened in Baluchistan, by one old woman); the whole tendency of their social administration is towards segregation or separation, and they recognise their own local boundaries with probably vastly more respect than the boundary of Afghanistan on the one side, or of British India on the other. The latter boundary, by the way, is beginning to disappear even from our maps.

I always think our quasi 'independent' frontier affords an object lesson of great value to the boundary-maker. Here we may see what it is that leads to the making of boundaries in the first instance; here we find a later phase of those same human emotions and impulses which taught primeval man to keep his own lair, and only to unite with a gang of fellow men when self-interest dictated. What was true of humanity in the earliest dawn of civilised development is true in the successive stages of that development as we can trace them in these days in the woods and plains and mountains of the unredeemed earth; it is true of the most advanced and highly cultured of civilised peoples; it will be true to the end of the world. We must then begin by

recognising this fundamental truth—a boundary is a *barrier*. It is meant to keep trespassers out, not to afford them the means of adjusting the balance in case of joint movement or concerted action, or of laying a basis for international assimilation and culture. It is necessary to give due emphasis to this condition of boundary-making, for Professor Lyde, in his most able address on the Types of Political Frontiers¹ in Europe, laid down as a condition to be observed in selecting a frontier that it should be a line where men naturally congregate. Such a condition is not compatible with the fundamental object of a frontier defined by a boundary line.

Placing the military—i.e. the defensive—condition to be observed in selecting a line for further definition first, undoubtedly the consideration of local ethnic distributions, or racial affinity, comes next. It would be a splendid achievement so to divide the nationalities of the world by fixed lines that no overstepping, and no desire to overstep on the part of any self-contained, self-supporting unit amongst the nations should ever lead to international disturbance. Unfortunately, this is impossible. The distribution of population, to begin with, is not equal. Race expansion in some directions leads directly to an effort to find room for such expansion where population is neither dense nor prolific. As an incentive to emigration into unoccupied and undeveloped lands there can be no objection to such a scheme, nor can it be denied that the ultimate expansion of the highest and fittest races at the expense of the lower grades of humanity is one of the most potent factors in the great scheme of the world's development. Take America for an example. Once the Alleghany barrier was broken down, nothing could stop the westward flow of a young and virile nationality, expanding with unprecedented impetus, till it crossed the Rockies and reached down to the western shores of the American continent. The Red Indian of the prairies was driven from his ancestral hunting grounds by the advance of the white man, and nothing but the artificial expedient of providing 'reservations' out of his own territory has saved him from extinction. Australia and New Zealand have the same story to tell; South America and Africa repeat the tale. All over the world has the axiom been recognised that the coloured man must give way to the white—with just one exception. The absorption of the coloured man's territory and his gradual assimilation into the body corporate of the white has from the beginning been regarded not so much as a violation of the sixth commandment as the fulfilment of the very first one, i.e. to replenish the earth and subdue it. There is an exception, however, and that exception is India. There

¹ *R.G.S. Journal* for February 1915.

has been no appropriation of the soil by the white man in India. There is no colonisation worthy of the name, and certainly no 'assimilation' between the native and European communities. The fact stands out with startling significance that the native population has enormously increased under British Government. It has increased not only in numbers but in economic wealth and in intelligence and enterprise. It is as far removed from close contact and social intercourse with the European as it ever was; indeed, the passing years seem rather to intensify the gap between them. Now the same old necessity for expansion faces the Government, and has already given rise to serious trouble—only this time it is the expansion of the original native population, and not the outspread of the white man. One reason for this is doubtless to be found in the fact that India, and, indeed, the East Indies generally, are not a white man's country. France, Portugal, and Holland have all in turn witnessed the failure of attempts to find a new home for a white race in the Far East, and the Far East itself has its own tale to tell of narrowing boundaries, decreasing areas from which sustenance and support for a growing nation may be derived, and the dire necessity for transgressing boundaries. Japan has had to fight hard for her right to expansion, and China has overflowed her borders everywhere.

Thus all the world over, ever since the days when violent hordes of Mongols or Huns pressed outwards from a limited centre towards the lands of plenty, has the world been obliged to recognise that the law of expansion is one which no increasing and developing nation can ultimately avoid. The only question affecting this universal law is one which concerns not the matter but the method. How is that expansion to be effected? Is it to be emigration or conquest? Where the conquest is one which consists of overspreading the domains of an inferior race, expansion is recognised as a great law of development, and ultimately of the survival of the fittest. Where, however, the expanding community finds itself surrounded by races as powerful as itself, it is a case of emigration or war. It is here that boundaries come in. It is the necessity for defence against misapprehension as to *meum* and *tuum* that necessitates a demarcated line to separate rival interests, and the more that such a boundary denies to an invader from either side an easy access and a right of way, the better. It is the violation of the international boundary which has led to most of the later wars of history.

Wars of religion [says Lord Curzon in his *Romanes* lecture delivered in the Sheldonian Theatre at Oxford in 1907], of alliances, of rebellion, of aggrandisement, of dynastic intrigue or ambition—wars in which the personal element was often the predominant factor—tend to be replaced

by Frontier wars—i.e. wars arising out of the expansion of States and Kingdoms, carried to a point, as the habitable globe shrinks, at which the interests and ambitions of one State come into sharp and irreconcilable collision with those of another.

He instances the Franco-German War of 1870, the sequel of the Austro-Prussian campaign of 1866; the Russo-Turkish War, and our own wars with Afghanistan, as well as the war between China and Japan—all wars for a frontier; and he points out the grave peril of war which was induced by such incidents as those of Panjdeh (on the Russo-Afghan frontier) and Fashoda (on the Upper Nile). More recent and more impressive are the wars of the Balkan States and Turkey, the war between Japan and Russia, and, finally, this latest and greatest War of all which is being waged by the Allied Forces of Russia, France, England, and Belgium against Germany and Turkey for the restoration of the Belgian frontier and the respect for international boundaries in Europe.

In America we have been in sharp antagonism with the United States on two occasions within recent history, and both disputes arose out of a boundary settlement. One concerned the Venezuelan, and the other the Alaskan boundary; whilst it was only the rapid and effective demarcation of a strong and defensible boundary between the Republics of the Argentine and Chile that prevented what would possibly have proved the bloodiest war in South American history.

Thus the world of practical science can no longer ignore the subject of international boundaries—a subject on which at the present day there is no standard literature whatever. But there has recently sprung up a far more intelligent comprehension of matters political, military and economic, relating to frontiers and frontier boundaries. We may hope that the days are past when a frank ignorance of the geography of the area in dispute was affected by the high political authorities who sat down to discuss where a boundary might effectively run. Mapless and guiltless of even an elementary knowledge of technical geographical terms, the embodiment of their resolutions in the form of agreements and protocols thirty years ago was often a mere aggravation of the original dispute. Nor were the methods employed in the field of demarcation much above a rudimentary level until comparatively lately.

It is, however, well to consider what is meant by the word 'international' in connexion with a boundary. Wherever a large community of people are gathered under one central Government which is responsible for its laws and military institutions, we may accept the word nation as defining such a community. Self-governing dependencies and protectorates are

not nations in this sense, inasmuch as they depend on the Central Imperial Government for their international policy and protection; but they may require definite boundaries, and their boundaries will be international. Politically, then, the international boundary should be considered with reference to the supreme Government's power to maintain its integrity as a national barrier, not merely as an enclosing hedge to a State.

Ethnically it would no doubt be an ideal distribution of the various races of mankind if they could be separated into folds according to community of origin and language, and definitely hedged off from each other by lines of dividing hurdles. And this is one of the most puzzling problems of boundary demarcation. Where the distribution of a people is widespread owing to emigration or other causes of dispersion (as in the case of the Jews, for instance), the scattered units of the people must necessarily count sooner or later in the census of those other nations which give them shelter and subsistence. Sometimes such aliens are really assimilated. Some nations possess a far higher capacity for such assimilation of alien units than others. France, for instance, is very successful. There are on record two instances where the French nation has even absorbed Germans, but this was some time ago. Professor Lyde puts this down to the superior charm and attractiveness of the French nation and the insinuating character of their language. The Argentine Republic, again, may be quoted as exhibiting a most remarkable capacity for assimilating aliens; not only has the fusion of races between the Spaniard and the native Indian on both sides the Andes in the past resulted in distinct national characteristics, but European foreigners of all nationalities (except, perhaps, the German), both Latin and Anglo-Saxon, become after a few years' residence as furiously patriotic Argentinians as their Spanish rulers. The Germans apparently possess the capacity neither for assimilating foreigners or of being assimilated themselves. They form distinct communities in the lands of their adoption, preserving their own language and their home customs and Kultur.

We need not quote further examples in reference to this quality of assimilation, but we may perhaps point out the remarkable effect of patriotism in the preservation of national union and strength. The South American Republics understand this factor in consolidating a nationality well. Knowing that a child is not born with the same gift of patriotism as of original sin, they commence early and set the great lesson of fidelity to country and flag before all else. The feeling of patriotism thus acquired sticks to the growing man as his early religious beliefs stick to him. It takes much to change them. Early

environment also induces a kind of patriotism which may be rather analogous to home-sickness. Otherwise, should we find the rugged Baluch or Pathan robber talking of his stony hills with tears in his eyes (when he is away from them), or the Bedouin pining to death in comfortable captivity for want of unlimited space? The mystic and lofty influences of 'Bushido' or analogous sentiments are not necessarily the basis of patriotism, and, although there are undoubtedly men who feel the full significance of a true and noble love of country in its highest and fullest sense, it is to be feared that patriotism for the most part is based on self-interest. Why is it that the German, no matter where you find him, is ready to sacrifice all principles of honesty and honour in promoting the interests of the Fatherland? The German governess in her seclusion, the German waiter in the midst of the crowd, the man holding a dignified British office, as much as a street loafer, are all equally ready to betray the country of their adoption. I know of groups of German villages in South America (there is one in the near neighbourhood of that most fascinating of all the lovely lakes of the Southern Andes—Osorno) where the German colonist keeps within his own ringed fence, talking his own language, and spends his time in religious disputes with his neighbour; and, years ago, I was told of these German settlers that they lived in devout expectation of the day when all South America should fall under German influence, and German Kultur should be the daystar of an enlightened world.

It appears to me that herein lies the real explanation of the solid cohesion of the German units scattered about the world during the present crisis. There is no exalted sentiment about such a form of patriotism—exalted sentiments are hardly compatible with the approval of bestial atrocities—it is an absolute cocksureness (I know no better word) of the ultimate success of Germany's world mission, and of the benefits which will accrue therefrom, which unites all Germany in an apparently solid phalanx of devotion to the Fatherland. It constitutes a real strength which, apart from all ties of ethnic affinity, has to be reckoned with in the rounding off of national interests by boundary demarcation; for what is true of Germany is true more or less of other nationalities, and will remain true so long as humanity remains the same in its unredeemed possession of primeval instincts and emotions. Self-interest (expressed by the will of the majority) is the keystone and measure of national strength, and it is material interests, rather than the ethical or religious or cultural affinities, which have to be considered in the give and take of boundary settlement.

As Professor Lyde points out, Germany made no greater

blunder than when she annexed the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, because she has failed to keep a purely German type true to type in those provinces, and the change of political control to Prussia has not led to any real assimilation—i.e. 'to any permanent peace and progress in civilisation'; but it does not follow, therefore, that ethnic and political frontiers should be made to coincide as a principle. If the will of the majority happens to coincide with ethnical considerations, nothing could be simpler, or better, than a boundary which meets both requirements; but not only are some nationalities so constituted that it would be impossible to unmix the heterogeneous details of the population so as to keep those of one origin within one ring fence, but it may happen that a division, or barrier, is urgently needed between those whose ethnic origin, language, and religious faith are one and the same, only modified, it may be, by the influence of a different environment. As an example of race entanglement in a mixed nationality, take the case of Hungary, or of Western Poland. No ethnical division between the various race units would seem to be possible in either case. As an example of what may prove necessary to separate races of (speaking broadly) the same origin, witness the fierce division of opinion, nearly culminating in war, between the Spanish-speaking Republics of Chile and the Argentine.

In the determination of a political boundary, it is well to remember, in the first instance, that it is to be a barrier, and, secondly, that it is to respect ethnic affinities if possible, but that a fair balance between the economic interests of either side must be maintained whether these interests coincide with ethnical distributions or not. To this latter consideration there is a certain corollary. Since every boundary demarcation (certainly every demarcation that I have been connected with) is a matter of business involving a series of bargains between the two interested nationalities, admitting a certain amount of elasticity on the actual placing of the line, local interests should never be divided if it can possibly be helped. No Solomon's judgment is wanted here. You cannot give half a valley or one half the water rights in a stream to one disputant, and the other half to his opponent. Local interests must be regarded as coincident with national interests in such cases. Any other form of division is incompatible with the idea of a barrier, and the bargain to be struck must be struck in whole pieces. It will be remembered that, in a certain arbitration between the United States and Canada which was effected in recent years, the conflicting claims were carefully summed up by the first judicial authority in England, and judgment was given based on the strict merits of either contention as recognised by English law.

That judgment gave to Canada a right of way by sea to the Alaskan coast at an important point adjudged to be Canadian, but left the command of that way to America by the cession of a certain island. This decision gave deep offence to Canada, and for a time alienated us from our friends. It has, as a matter of fact, established no effective barrier.

When high diplomatic authorities meet to decide on the most suitable line to be adopted for a boundary between two disputing nations, having due regard to its primary nature as a defensible barrier and a fair division between conflicting interests as represented by the will of the people on either side, together with their possible ethnic affinities, the first requirement as a basis for their deliberations is a geographical knowledge of the country concerned. This has been greatly neglected in the past. Since a political boundary is after all a geographical feature, whether natural or artificial, it is essential that in assigning it a position the main topographical distributions of the common frontier adopted should at least be studied. What stories might be told of the awful waste in expenditure, and the risks incurred by neglect of this obvious principle, if space permitted! Millions have been wasted, and war more than once but narrowly avoided as the result of ignorance in high quarters, not only of map geography, but even of elementary geographical terms.

This preliminary settlement of the general line of frontier, or delimitation of the boundary, is the first act in the process. It is embodied in treaties, agreements, or protocols, and as a rule those responsible for subsequent demarcation are not consulted. Thus it happens that in quite recent years, during a time which might almost be termed an era of national boundary making, mistakes have been made which we may reasonably hope never will occur again. Thus in the autumn of 1884 a Commission to demarcate the boundary between Russia and Afghanistan left India by a long and circuitous route for the regions of the Oxus. The wording of the political agreement which defined the general position of the boundary was as vague as was the geographical knowledge which prompted it. Nevertheless, no serious difficulty arose until it was found that the particular point on the Oxus (incautiously mentioned by name) at which the boundary was to touch that river had no existence. It became the business of the Russian Commission to prove that in one form or another it really existed. It was the business of the British Commission to show that, even if it had ever existed, it had vanished from the field. As a matter of fact, the Oxus had widened its banks and sucked the unfortunate place into its midst—a fact which might easily have been ascertained

if the geographical examination had preceded the delimitation instead of following it.

Again, in the year 1895 it became necessary to extend the demarcation of the same boundary to the source (according to international agreement) of the Oxus, which for a considerable distance actually formed the boundary. The discussion as to what affluent at its head really formed the source was fierce and prolonged. Lake Victoria (or Wood's Lake) was finally accepted as the most probable source, and the continuation of the boundary did really start from the head of that Lake. But Lake Victoria was not the source. A gigantic glacier astride of the Nicolas range fed Lake Victoria and Lake Chakmaktin on either side the range equally; and from either lake there flowed a mighty ice-fed stream which poured into the Oxus its great contribution. Another glacier further south started yet another milk-white ice stream, and the relative value of all these sources—estimated in water-carrying capacity—depended entirely on the season and the weather. All this might have been readily ascertained beforehand, and much bitter acrimony between the two countries thereby avoided. Other difficulties arose, owing to sheer looseness of geographical expression, and this second Commission only escaped by sheer good luck and the narrowest margin of time from being winterbound on the sterile altitudes of the Pamirs.

One of the most remarkable instances (and there are many of them) of sheer geographical assumption in the first treaties drawn up between contracting diplomats was that defining the frontiers of Chile and the Argentine Republics in the Patagonian Andes of South America. It was laid down in the original agreement that the Cordillera of the Andes was to mark this southern boundary which, like its northern extension in the same great system, was to follow 'the main range parting the waters of the Pacific from those of the Atlantic.' It was a fine conception, but, unfortunately, the region was unapproachable by the scientific geographer at the time the agreement was drawn up, owing to its occupation by a specially bloodthirsty tribe of Patagonian Indians. As soon as a cursory examination became possible, it was clear that a main range fulfilling the conditions of the treaty did not exist. Several of the great rivers draining westward into the Pacific were found to rise well to the east of the great ranges and to traverse the Cordillera by deep and narrow lake-filled ways, through which the westerly Pacific gales howled with inconceivable fury. A dispute arose as to whether the main range—or main ranges—should be adopted for boundary demarcation or the water parting; and so fierce and prolonged was the controversy that it was only after volumes had been written by the ablest lawyers on either side, and millions spent

in the purchase of ships and war material, that saner counsels prevailed, and the question (which might have been expounded on a sheet of note-paper) was referred to England for arbitration. Thus ended one of the bitterest controversies over a boundary that has been known in modern times.

The final decision in the present War, which has arisen (so far as England is concerned) out of the violation of a boundary, is yet on the knees of the gods. Whilst there is at least no ignorance of geographical detail, such as I have instanced in the above cases, there is equal, if not greater, necessity that the principles supporting efficient boundary demarcation should be understood if a limit can ever be set to the expansion of Prussian military arrogance and political ambition. Whilst it is much too soon to indulge in speculations affecting a new Germany, it may be quite useful to consider what really constitutes the best form of physical boundary, after accepting the general conditions that it is to be a barrier between peoples who claim allegiance to one central government.

Boundaries may be either natural or artificial. It is difficult to conceive of any Government wilfully incurring the delay and expense of demarcating a purely artificial boundary where geographical conditions lend themselves to the adoption of a natural one. Natural boundaries which take advantage of the topographical conformations of nature, and which require none of the paraphernalia which distinguish artificial ones, are those to which the world has been most accustomed since contiguous clans of savages set the hills between them as a readily recognisable barrier. In the remote mountain fastnesses of the Hindu Kush, where the clans of an unconquered tribe, whom we usually designate 'Kaffir,' partition the rugged wilderness between them, there may be found contiguous clans who barely comprehend each other's speech. Between them there is hardly more thought of political alliance or social intercourse than there would be with the fringe of Mahomedan interlopers who surround Kafiristan. These clans occupy the valleys between the hills, each its own valley, and the spurs of the Hindu Kush are effective barriers, because they are high, steep, inconceivably rugged, and often snow-covered.

It is often said that of all natural frontiers the sea—or a desert—is the most effective. The sea has been for centuries the bulwark of our islands. It is accountable for many of those national characteristics which foreigners call insular. It has indeed in times past rendered most efficient service as a protection from interference and invasion. But the sea admits of no exact limitation of the sphere of influence on either hand. Even the three-mile limit which constitutes the claim of neutrality

near the coast is indeterminate, inasmuch as the coast-line itself is indeterminate, owing to the vagaries of tide. The sea, moreover, is the meeting-place of nationalities quite as much as a dividing frontier. The value of the sea, in short, regarded as a barrier, depends absolutely on our power to protect it. At the present moment it happily divides Germany from England, but it does not divide England from France, and through France we touch Germany. To a certain extent the same may be said of any frontier or line of boundary demarcated along the frontier. It is useless unless we can defend it, but there is nothing in the sea itself which lends assistance to the protective fleet. On the contrary, it gives easy access to mines and submarines, while many a neutral frontier line defined on land is in itself a defensive line difficult to cross and impossible to undermine.

Deserts form better frontiers than the sea in this respect. We have the highest military authority for regarding deserts as the most obstructive obstacle to invasion that exists, or rather that existed a century ago. Napoleon says that 'Of all obstacles which may cover the frontiers of empires a desert like this' (he was writing of the Sinaitic peninsula, which has lately been crossed by the Turks) 'is incontestably the greatest, mountains like the Alps take the second rank, rivers the third.'

The one country in the world which owes most to the protective character and the geographical position of deserts is Egypt. Egypt, sandwiched between the impassable Libyan desert on the west and the Sinaitic peninsula on the east, owes her physical identity through all the ages to her desert frontiers. India, protected by the deserts of Sind and Rajputana from invasion striking from Western Asia, for many ages derived immense advantage from the physical obstacle these deserts presented, and was able to keep her attention fixed on the narrow but open gateways of the extreme north-west. The Sahara, rather than the Mediterranean, is the real barrier between Europe and Central Africa. But here again the dispositions of Nature have been met and their value discounted by the ingenuity of man; there is probably not a desert in existence which could not be crossed by a light railway or traversed by motor, and with the extension of the line which may follow the advance of an army at the rate of a mile (or two) a day, difficulties of water and of supplies tend to vanish, and transport takes a new shape. The camel follows the horse into obscurity before the scream of the steam (or hoot of the petrol) engine. It has already been pointed out by one of the cleverer of our exponents of military positions that there is no physical difficulty sufficient to prevent the construction of a light line of railway which should traverse the deserts east of the Suez Canal.

By far the most effective natural barrier is to be found in the ridges and divides of a mountain range. And under almost any circumstances the parting of the waters or divide is preferable to the channel of the watercourse or rivers. Rivers may, under exceptional conditions, prove very effective barriers. Witness the Oxus which, from the Victoria Lake to the point where it emerges from the hills into the plains as the dividing line between Afghan Turkestan and the Central Asian Khanates, is effective by reason of its rocky enclosed banks, the permanence of its channel, and the general absence of human interests on either side. Once it becomes a navigable river it has naturally been absorbed by that country (Russia) which can utilise it best. The whole river becomes Russian, with the exception of the small amount of water drawn off by the canal system of the narrow strip of fertile riverain on its southern bank. No river running free and untrained through a flat valley can form a good boundary. The deep water channel shifts its course; islands appear and disappear, giving rise to constant litigation, while frequently the river itself cuts in half a local estate dividing individual interests. All the biggest rivers in India are subject to these limitations. On the whole the divide (or water parting) has been found to answer best for boundary demarcation. As a comparatively low divide it separates local interests in water rights and minimises territorial disputes. Even where there is difficulty in deciding the exact line of the divide, as, for instance, through a swamp which drains in both directions, there is no likelihood of any dispute arising therefrom. I have known only one small instance of such a dispute. This was in the wilds of the Central Provinces of India, and it was a dispute as to fishing rights. The divide, even when low, is generally well marked and is more frequently uncultivated than the lower and better watered soil; as a rule, there is an appreciable width between the sources of the streams flowing from it on either side. Where it is an unmistakable feature in the landscape, there is no necessity for expensive artificial demarcation. Only when it is comparatively flat do pillars and boundary marks become obligatory. When, however, the water parting is caused by a line of high, rugged, and inaccessible ridges forming part of a mountain system, there is no political barrier to compare with it. What can be more effective than the barrier of the Pyrenees between France and Spain, as level on the sky-line as the keel of an upturned ship, or that of the Alps between Switzerland and Italy, which for the most part is inviolate and uncrossable?

For a typical mountain barrier we must turn to India or to South America. From Kashmir eastward to the great bend of the Brahmaputra, the political boundary of India is carried

for nearly 2000 miles by a series of the most impressive and unapproachable mountain ranges in the world. It is impossible to conceive a grander natural boundary or a more completely effective barrier. Backed by the lofty and sterile uplands of Tibet, it is unapproachable from the north. No engineering feats can compass its passage—neither light railways nor Zeppelins can bridge its rugged cliffs and precipices or weather its wild wind-storms. The gods of India who dwell amongst the snows alone know exactly where that boundary lies. Where, bending southward and westward, it leaves the Central Himalayan ranges and follows the Hindu Kush, finally dropping into the lower altitudes of the Indus frontier hills till, with many a kink and twist, it trails out to the rigid wall of the Kirthar ridge north of Karachi, it is still a mountain boundary—but it no longer marks a great divide except at intervals. It is so carried as to include the maximum of defensive capability against invasion from the West, together with the command of the back doorways of the ever-troublesome frontier tribes, whose wild rough hills are included within British jurisdiction, whilst they are independent in all that concerns their local government. These tribes exist politically on much the same footing as the Native States of India. This western section of our Indian frontier boundary possesses many of the inevitable defects of patchwork demarcation, notably between the Hindu Kush and the Kabul river. So far it is an unstable boundary line.

Much on a parallel with the Himalayan boundary of India is that of South America parting the Republics of the Argentine and Chile. As far south as the 40th degree of South Latitude it is the inter-oceanic divide of the South American Continent, ideal as a barrier from its bleak inaccessibility and the sterility of its flanks. South of the 40th degree it still follows the snow fields and central ridges of the Andine Cordillera, descending only where the rivers break through the chain and sweep amidst forests and rock-bound gorges from the Pampas of the Argentine to the Pacific. Such points are, however, few, and are readily marked. It is only in the extreme south where the boundary touches the Straits of Magellan that artificial demarcation becomes necessary.

Probably one half of the political boundaries of the world depend more or less on artificial demarcation. It is not to be avoided where geographical conformations do not exist to give effect to political principles. There are many ways of running out an artificial line. The earliest method was the construction of barriers such as the earthwork raised by the Mercian King Offa, about 780 A.D., from the mouth of the Wye to that

of the Dee, to keep out the Welsh, or the palisades or walls which were built in China and Europe, which were by no means coincident with an administrative frontier, but protections against the growing force of outside barbarians. The Great Wall of China is by far the most enduring and remarkable of these artificial boundaries. For 1700 years was that wall under the hands of the builder, and for centuries it kept the Mongolian Tartars out of China. It still stands for the most part a solid monument of a most extraordinary achievement, and not yet do we know exactly to what point in High Asia it originally extended. Sir Aurel Stein's remarkable discoveries have added greatly to its reputed length.

The modern artificial boundary consists of pillars or mark-stones erected at frequent intervals, which are neither protective nor always definite.

There is hardly a form of artificial boundary which is not open to objection. Independently of its inherent weakness as a barrier, it requires most careful adjustment to local claims and interests, and a scientific demarcation which in unmapped and unsurveyed countries is frequently a work demanding great labour and expense. The more highly cultivated the frontier and the narrower the local interests, the more exact has to be the record of the boundary marks, which are always subject to removal from natural causes, or in cases of international or even local dispute. Experience has shown that there is, indeed, only one way of effecting such a record satisfactorily, and it consists in a determination of the exact value of each boundary mark in terms of its co-ordination of latitude and longitude. This at once involves careful triangulations and astronomical observations, extended possibly from a base at a great distance. To determine the initial value of the Zulfikar (or Herat) end of the boundary of Northern Afghanistan, extending to Lake Victoria at the head of the Oxus, a series of scientific survey operations were carried from Quetta on the Baluch frontier to Mashad in North-East Persia, and from these, again, triangulation was extended to the Hindu Kush, north of Kabul. To determine the initial value of the Lake Victoria pillar for the Pamir extension to the Chinese frontier of the same boundary, a rough form of triangulation had to be carried across the Himalayas. In these cases it was necessary to ensure a fixed starting-point on the earth's surface; but, once started, large use was made of geographical dispositions and local topographical features.

The worst form, perhaps, of artificial boundary is one defined by the delimitators as a straight line—whether astronomical or otherwise. Parallels of latitude are bad boundaries, but they are comparatively easy to determine approximately. Meridians of

longitude have involved most serious international trouble from the uncertainty which has hitherto attended longitude determinations. I am aware that the boundary between the United States and Canada, which follows the 49th parallel of latitude from the Lake of the Woods to the Pacific Coast—a distance of 1800 miles—may be quoted as having justified its adoption by long-continued existence. But this boundary illustrates the general characteristics of all such lines. Although it meets the purposes of political convenience, and may continue to meet them, it disregards physical and ethnological features, and is already overlapped by French and English Canadians from the borders of Maine to North Dakota; nor is there a feature in it which lends itself readily to any scheme of defence. It is no barrier. The ultimate absurdity of the straight-line theories is to be found when that line is defined crossing a desert. A straight line is never at any time an easy line to demarcate, and when such a line has to be supported by scientific surveys in order to carry it through the midst of a desert (in itself a full and sufficient barrier) where boundary marks are certain to be obliterated by natural causes unless they are maintained at a constant expense, it is simple waste of time and money. Instances of boundaries demarcated in this way are not wanting, either on the Indian frontier or in South Africa.

It is unfortunate for the peace of the world that the topographical conformations designed by Nature for Central Europe should lend themselves so freely to weak international boundaries. The extent of boundary line carried by mountains is limited to Southern Germany, where that country meets Switzerland, the Austrian Tyrol, and Bohemia; and to the barrier of the Transylvanian Alps between Hungary and Roumania. Some use has been made of the Vosges mountains between France and Germany, but from the point where the South-Western boundary of Lorraine leaves the Vosges northward to the sea there is little in the form of natural features to support it. It is essentially artificial. To the east of Germany, and to the north-east of Austria-Hungary, rivers have to a considerable extent been adopted as lines of partition from Russia. If we except the Vosges mountains on the west, the present War is a war involving the violation of flat boundaries, and the invasion of those indeterminate ethnical frontiers which are the usual result of flat boundaries. Nothing, perhaps, can better illustrate the complexity of ethnical admixture which may overspread a flat borderland than a study of the ethnographical features of Eastern Germany from the Baltic to the Carpathians. The German type has overflowed the Prosna, the western boundary of Poland, and spread beyond the Vistula in patches

so intermixed with Poles as to render it uncertain how much of Poland really remains the property of its natural and national inhabitants. On the other hand, the Poles spread westwards nearly to the valley of the Oder. On the face of an ancient map published about the year 1350, and illustrating a popular history of England, called the *Polychronicon*, written by a monk in Chester, is inscribed the remarkable legend that Germany has a larger population than it is able to feed. This points to an impulse in the direction of expansion which has never apparently ceased to exist. Here on the Polish frontier is an excellent sample of a boundary which encourages such expansion together with the amalgamation of races and the spread of culture (or Kultur) such as has been advocated as the first condition which a boundary should serve. It also illustrates the results of an admixture where one of the races is unable from its national characteristic of inadaptability to adjust itself to the social conditions obtaining in the land of its adoption.

A further illustration is to be found in the west, where Alsace and Lorraine still remain French to the core, whilst politically attached to Germany. The evolution of a practical line of separation which, recognising the impossibility of social amalgamation that should tend to the advantage of both, would again restore a barrier without the assistance of a national wall of partition, seems to be an insoluble problem. The best—indeed, the only—security for the peace of the world in future is that secondary condition for a stable boundary which I have laid down—the will of the majority.

T. H. HOLDICH.

IMPRESSIONS IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

WITH the exception of Turkey, of all the countries engaged in war to-day the one whose condition has long been most critical is Austria. Of modern European States it is the most unfortunate inasmuch as it is that which enjoys by far the smallest measure of patriotism. To anybody coming from any more or less homogeneous State the marvel is how Austria has held together at all. It has really only done so as it were mechanically, through a species of political necessity and custom and by virtue of the monarchy.

For many years one had been accustomed to hear occasional anxious misgivings fall from the lips of loyal Austrians as to what would happen when the Emperor died. But amongst friends in Austria with whom I was staying nearly two years ago there were noticeable a perception that the Emperor had grown very old, perhaps too old for his difficult position, and a disposition to look to the heir, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, for a new and necessary activity of government. He was known to be a man of determined character and to have set before himself a vigorous policy by no means universally approved and not quite favourably viewed by the Sovereign.

This attitude of expectation concerning him was a growth of recent years. A longer time ago even whole-heartedly loyal Austrians used to speak of him with no enthusiasm or esteem and often even disparagingly : he was a first-rate shot ; aptitude for rulership he had shown none ; he displayed no special worth of character.

I was staying in Bohemia in the early autumn of 1899. The Archduke's affection for Countess Sophie Chotek and his desire to make her his wife were generally known. The matter was regarded with much disapprobation by a large section of Austrians who are most conservative where questions of mating are concerned. Such a rebellion against the house-laws of the Hapsburgs, which within their large sphere are valid and binding, was regarded as reckless folly, likely further to imperil considerably the position of the whole empire. Countess Sophie Chotek was, however, a woman of considerable cleverness and strength of purpose. The Archduke was of a dogged character. The

Emperor's consent was eventually obtained and they were morганatically married on the 1st of July 1900, the wife receiving the title of Serene Highness, Princess Hohenberg.

Her influence over her husband was great and it contrived to develop in him a deeper sense of the responsibility of heirship to the office of sovereign. Of late years he began to take a more active and prominent part in the State, showing a marked partisanship of the party pledged to the maintenance of religion. His wife, who was a genuinely religious woman, also much influenced his character and private life in this respect.

In Hungary the Archduke was regarded with unfriendly sentiments. He took little pains to conceal a lack of sympathy with the kingdom and he was known to hold the view that it possessed far too large a measure of power. He was believed to favour a policy of Trialism instead of the existing Dualism, lessening the autonomy of Hungary and increasing that of the Croats, who already possess a certain measure of independence within the kingdom of Hungary, by freeing them altogether from Hungary and establishing them as the leading section in a third element in the empire consisting of Southern Slavs.

Some species of federalism seemed to have become necessary in order to preserve the very existence of the empire. How to introduce it was a most difficult problem. Not only is Austria-Hungary divided into various races inhabiting various territories in the empire but there are also many sub-divisions and many instances of small racial units scattered here and there amongst an unkindred population. For instance, in Slavonia and in other parts of the kingdom of Hungary there are various South German colonies, of which the inhabitants are commonly called Suabians. They speak of themselves as such. They have kept their language, a German dialect with a very limited vocabulary. They remain quite distinct amidst the surrounding population.

What a hindrance all this is to the construction of an effective army one can imagine. For the army the language is German. Notwithstanding the fierce efforts made by Hungary to have the words of command in their language for Hungarian regiments, Austria has held her ground on this point. But, needless to say, a great proportion of the rank and file do not know German, and it is necessary for officers to have a knowledge of some national language. It is curious how certain nationalities become identified with certain branches of the service. For instance, in the artillery Bohemians are found in large numbers. In Hussar regiments Hungarians form a considerable proportion.

The Italian-speaking population of Austria is also somewhat divided territorially. The bulk of it is in South Tyrol. At a place where I stayed two summers ago, although only just within

the Italian-speaking zone, the language of the schools was Italian and all official notices were in Italian. In regard to the use of national language Austria is far more liberal than her partner, Hungary, or her neighbour, Germany. Through all that part of South Tyrol an Irredentist propaganda is very active. Trent is the working centre of it and it is systematically promoted from sources within the Kingdom of Italy. Indeed, Trent is divided into two parts, which do not associate with each other—the loyal, including the garrison, and the pro-Italian, consisting mainly of the professional and business classes, who are openly disloyal.

The friends with whom I was staying celebrated the Emperor's birthday, the 18th of August, with much enthusiasm and with festivities consisting in fireworks and illuminations. The peasants showed a mere bucolic, gaping interest in the show. With the exception of a body of youths who marched twice past the house, singing the Austrian anthem in Italian, there was no expression of feeling of any kind amongst them. An attitude of objection and discouragement was taken up by some Italians who were staying in an hotel close by, one of whom remonstrated with a peasant boy on the folly and danger, though it was a fine August night, of taking off his hat during the singing of the Austrian anthem.

Three days before there had been a presentation of new colours to a corps of Veterans in the district. The ceremony took place at the principal town in the valley, the seat of its Government. The little capital was gay with military and holiday crowds. Various corps of Veterans and of 'free-shooters,' some coming from German-speaking Tyrol and some from further off, marched with flying banners to a spot outside the town where an altar had been erected and a 'Field Mass' was said.

After the presentation of the new colours we made our way back to the town, where a banquet had been prepared. It was attended by various members of the military from the district or afar and by the different civil officials. A neighbour at table, a lieutenant of artillery, opened the conversation by stating that he was 'a German.' At first one might have understood him to mean that he came from Germany, although he was in the Austrian Army. But he mentioned afterwards that he was a German-Bohemian as distinguished from a Czech. It is a bewildering fact, which a few more thoughtful Austrians occasionally deplore, that one rarely finds anybody in the empire who calls himself an Austrian. One calls himself a Bohemian, another a Silesian or a German or an Italian. The collective sense of 'Austrian' seems absent.

This amazing want of union formed part of the subject of conversation with my neighbour. He admitted it with cheery equanimity. But when one went on to express wonder and some doubt as to whether, in such circumstances, Austria was going to hold together, he replied with alert and obviously convinced emphasis 'It will hold together.'

The conversation among the guests was carried on partly in German and partly in Italian. After the banquet speeches in either language were delivered, the most stirring being one read in Italian by a Veteran who had been present at the battle of Solferino. But a dreary feature of the day was the lack of enthusiasm among the native populace.

In other parts of the empire a varying like condition is to be observed. Genuine whole-hearted patriotism is to be found principally in Vienna and throughout Upper and Lower Austria, the Salzburg district, and German-speaking Tyrol. In Bohemia it is not a characteristic of either the Czechs or the Germans, between whom there is a long-standing bitter feud. A certain arrogance, which is very marked in many types of German character, and an offensive conviction of the superiority of all that is Teutonic are largely the causes of the feud. The Czechs are, of course, a Slav race. They are on the whole more numerous in Bohemia than the Germans. There are certain districts where one of the races is solely represented or predominates. When both find themselves in large numbers there is a perpetual conflict. In Prague, the capital, there was a long-standing dispute as to the language in which the names of the streets should be put up. The Czechs declare that they were willing that the names should be in both languages but that the Germans wanted to insist on their being in German only. The consequence has been that, the Czechs being in the majority, the names are only in Czech, a language which practically no one outside Bohemia understands. The wary shopkeeper in Prague generally allows the intending customer to be the first to wish 'Good day,' fearing lest, if the latter were a Czech, he would at once walk out of the shop if addressed in the German language or, if he were a German, he would do likewise if addressed in Czech.

I visited Bohemia during the Russo-Japanese War. Warm sympathy with Russia was noticeable. I had many conversations then with an old friend who belonged to a generation before mine, a man of lofty character, universally esteemed for his ability and public spirit, who was loyal to the core and used never to speak of the Emperor, even when he did not agree with any particular matter of imperial policy, except in terms of profound respect. He was of opinion that Austria had for very many years adopted an extremely mistaken policy and that, in view of her

preponderating Slav population, she ought to have cultivated friendship with Russia rather than with Germany. He considered that the former Saxon Prime Minister of Austria, Count Beust, had been her evil genius.

When the present Emperor of Austria ascended the throne as a youth of eighteen years, he was regarded with quite a special interest and fatherly affection by the Czar Nicholas the First. It was only by the help of the Russian troops supplied to him by the Czar that the Emperor was enabled in 1848-49 to put down the insurrection in Hungary. Notwithstanding, Austrian policy developed itself on lines unfriendly to Russia.

My friend who, besides being profoundly loyal, was a patriotic Czech, used to talk in earnest, regretful tones of these matters. He had a whole-hearted hatred and distrust of Prussia, and a deep suspicion of the motives actuating her in the German-Austrian alliance. He despised and hated Prussian political methods. The office of German Consul-General at Prague, he assured me, was mainly one of espionage.

There was a considerable propaganda, nominally religious, but in reality Prussian, going on throughout Bohemia. The object was believed to be to Protestantise the country as largely as possible in order the more easily to make it Prussian. Sums of money were said to be distributed to members of the working-class in order to induce them to have their children baptised in the Protestant faith. The German Empress, who, apparently, is sincerely evangelical, if somewhat bigoted, in her views, was believed to patronise these efforts. The 'Los von Rom' movement of which one used to hear some years ago not only in Bohemia but also in Vienna, Upper and Lower Austria, and even in Tyrol, was little more than a German political propaganda, which was most actively worked in Bohemia.

My friend used to tell a story of a small, cosy dinner in Berlin shortly after the war of '66, at which Bismarck was present with a few intimate friends. Prussia had just defeated Austria. She had drawn from her victory the great, but as yet scarcely perceptible, fruit of the establishment of her unassailable hegemony amongst the German States. She had also, through the farseeing genius of Bismarck, which was near being thwarted by the King's ambition to march upon Vienna, just by virtue of her victory laid the foundation of her close alliance with Austria. But if we except the abandonment by Austria of territorial claims in Schleswig-Holstein, beyond a small portion of Silesia Prussia had little to show in the shape of tangible spoils. The other guests began to chaff Bismarck about the smallness of the bag, saying that at least Bohemia ought to have been annexed by Prussia. Bismarck answered

with a knowing smile 'Make Bohemia Protestant first and then we will take it.'

This fear of a Prussian annexation of Bohemia was quite a real thing with my friend, and he had even spoken of a possible future emigration to England, as in no case would he remain in his own country if it should have come under the domination of the hated Prussians.

The German-speaking Bohemians are sometimes openly disloyal to Austria in their pro-German tendencies. They are generally the most active of the Germanising party in Austria. With the exception of that party, Austrians, even those belonging to the German race as distinguished from the other races in the empire, generally have an antipathy to Prussia. They complain of the arrogant superiority displayed by the North German. They hate the spirit of Berlin, which is the arrogating spirit that prevails in imperial Germany. The union between the two empires is one of their Governments, not of their inhabitants. Naturally none of the numerous Slav races in Austria or Hungary like the Prussians. The Hungarians have no Prussian sympathies of temperament or character, but, as it was indirectly through Prussian hostilities against Austria, whom they hate, that they obtained their autonomy, they do not as a rule profess actual antipathy to Prussia.

The Slav population in Austria is very considerably more than half of the whole. Taking Austria and Hungary together, including the entire dominions, the Slav population does not fall far short of half of the aggregate. Thus, its numbers far exceed those of any other single race, being a good deal more than double those of the German. But in itself it is not united, the Poles being the greatest obstacle to union. Poland is also the greatest barrier to the development of the policy of Panslavism.

The Austrian Poles live in a state of perpetual friction with the Ruthenes, who are, of course, also Slavs and, unlike the Poles, mostly Russophile. Although the Ruthenes number rather over forty per cent. of the population of Galicia, they complain that they are oppressed by the Poles. They are Greek Catholics, that is, in union with Rome but having their own rite and a married clergy.¹ In the earlier days of the campaign in Galicia official reports from the Austrian Army complained of much treachery amongst the inhabitants. It was stated that they by various devices, including that of religious processions, signalled to the Russians the Austrian position.

¹ The term 'Greek Catholic' seems to be sometimes misunderstood in the West and to be confused with 'Orthodox.' It invariably implies allegiance to the Pope.

It is difficult to know at all clearly what the present attitude of the Poles is. They are somewhat in the position of a maiden with a perplexing diversity of suitors. As at the present moment they are owned piecemeal by all those suitors there is so much the more difficulty in making a free, unembarrassed choice.

The Galicians or Austrian Poles have enjoyed far more freedom than the Russian or the Prussian Poles. The last-named have been in recent years subjected to a vigorous Germanising persecution. An inhuman policy, systematically aimed at the stamping out of their nationality, has been actively pursued. The late Prelate von Stablewski, Archbishop of Posen, was driven out of his See by Prussia. After his death the Government would not allow the See to be filled, and they only sanctioned the appointment of a successor after the outbreak of the War, hoping thereby to conciliate the Poles. The school laws directed against the maintenance of the Polish language led not long ago to a vast strike, the parents, with the support of the clergy, refusing to send their children to school. Finally there was the iniquitous expropriation law by which a certain proportion of Polish property was to be acquired by compulsory purchase for German settlers, the native owners to be thus driven out of the acres on which their forefathers had lived for centuries. Such measures may have occurred in the history of other lands, but they have long since been recognised as grossly repugnant to a more mature conception of right and justice; yet we find them amongst the recent laws of a State declaiming with nauseating repetition the word 'Kultur!'

Many Germans and even Prussians feel constrained individually to admit their disapproval of this law. I heard a very few years ago a rather prominent official in one of the Government departments at Berlin admit in conversation that he could not reconcile the measure to his conscience. Another Prussian, discussing the law with me, admitted the iniquity of it, but urged that it had only been enforced in one case (the exact number of cases in which it has been enforced would appear to be six), and in that one case merely in order that the law might be kept alive. The fact would seem to be that the Prussian Government, perceiving at length how it had outraged all sense of justice and humanity, recoiled from its own measure.

It is little wonder then that German appeals to the Polish subjects of Russia, although undeniably they are subjected to a multitude of irksome restrictions by the Government of the latter country, should not have aroused any enthusiasm. Austria went very much further, and would seem to have invited the formation of a national Government and of a national army in Galicia. By the early days of September a legion of fifty thousand Polish

'free-shooters'—not a large number—had been formed. A Prussian Pole informed me that if he had not been engaged with the Western Army he would have given his services to this Polish legion. The German Government is thoughtful in providing a change of scene for certain of its subjects in time of war, so that Poles find themselves exercising their activities on the French frontier while Alsatians are allowed to have a glimpse of Russia.

To the impertinent observer there was a certain element of humour about these various offers to the Poles, because each side seemed to be so lavish in giving the other's portion. Whether Prussia would really be ready to co-operate with Austria in a re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, giving up Posen for the purpose, is exceedingly doubtful. It was spoken of by some as a possibility. The idea of a rehabilitated Poland with a son of the Kaiser for King was also casually mentioned. Of course, the prospect of a buffer State between Russia and Germany would be very welcome to the latter.

If Russia would only convincingly proclaim an intention to re-establish the independent kingdom of Poland—discounting, of course, such opposition as the policy might meet with in Russia itself—what a spur would be given thereby to the cause of the Allies! To say nothing of the effect throughout the whole of Poland, divided in three as she is to-day, a numerous legion might be raised of Poles in America and other foreign parts to fight the enemy. It is an object which would kindle the ardour of great part of the world. Can one seriously say that one aspires by this War to bring along the dawn of independence to the smaller nationalities, if it is not sought to secure that of Poland?

Serbia's claim, deeply as we may sympathise with her national aspirations, is slender compared with that of Poland. Serbia is already an independent kingdom. She aspires to re-establish over large territories an empire which, for a relatively brief period, flickered brilliantly in the Middle Ages. It attained its greatest height under the Sovereign Dushan, who had himself crowned Emperor of Serbia. His rule extended over Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and great part of Albania. Dushan died in 1356. Serbia was completely broken by the Turks at the fatal battle of Kossovo in 1389. Though one would be loth to see any Statute of Limitations applied to nations, it will at once be recognised that this historical claim is scant in comparison with that of the kingdom of Poland, for a period a member of the family of the Great Powers, which comes down to the latter part of the eighteenth century.

Besides, the Poles, if we except the Ruthenes, who would almost assuredly have a claim to some measures for their own protection, are one in race and language; they are one in religion.

The Serbs, including the Serbo-Croatians, are practically one in race and language : they are strongly divided in religion. The population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in common parlance, divide themselves into three—Turks, Serbs, and Catholics, which is a division not of race but of religion. The so-called Turks are the descendants of natives who in the centuries of Turkish dominion over the provinces adopted the Mohammedan religion, and are now more fervent than the Turks of Constantinople. They are the most prosperous section. They form about one third of the total population. The so-called Serbs (in race they are all Serbs) are the adherents of the Greek-Oriental or Orthodox Church, and they are the most numerous section. The Catholics are the least numerous, forming less than a quarter of the population.

They are altogether a picturesque people with a very large and interesting survival of wildness, dressed in attractive costumes. The men are generally very tall and of fine physique, though phthisis is common amongst them. They have weird cries which they are continually uttering, and haunting chants, sometimes of prodigious length. They break into these constantly without any prelude or explanation as if it were just the thing which anybody would have expected next. When they use their cries for any particular purpose they are most effective : they can understand each other from mountain-top to mountain-top, and thus spread tidings throughout the length of the land.

The 'Turks' sympathise neither with Austria nor with Serbia. They still hanker after Turkey, and their souls were sorely grieved at the annexation of the provinces by Austria in 1908, although for thirty years previously, under Austrian protectorate, the union with Turkey had been little more than nominal. An officer of the garrison at Sarajevo told me that several had emigrated to Turkey after the annexation, but that some had begun to return. There appeared to be complete freedom of religion in the provinces.

As to the effect which the presence of Turkey in the War is likely to have had upon the Moslem population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, presumably it will have served to induce in them some temporary closer adherence to Austria, and to dispose them more strongly against Serbia and the Serbs. If so, it will have considerably relieved Austria's task of maintaining quiet in these provinces. It is, however, to be borne in mind that the deposition of Abdul Hamid by the Young Turks was subsequent, though only by about half a year, to the annexation of the provinces by Austria.

The Moslems of Bosnia are uncompromising adherents of Islam. A visit to a shop almost within the precincts of the

Begova mosque, the principal mosque of Sarajevo, was the occasion of an interesting conversation with the owner, an ardent 'Turk.' He scornfully rejected the request of an Unbeliever to enter the mosque while the Faithful were at their noontide prayer. To a somewhat random statement that this was allowed in some other parts of the Moslem world, he argued pointedly that 'this was Bosnia,' an argument which a glance at the map would have placed beyond the realm of dispute. He maintained that the Moslems of Sarajevo were stricter than those of Constantinople: that in the latter city women learned various accomplishments, and that they even learned French, a branch of knowledge which he evidently regarded as indicating the last degree of abandonment. He said that the seclusion of women was more strictly observed in Bosnia, mentioning that his own wife in her eleven years of married life had never once put her foot in the bazaars. Notwithstanding the permission to have as many as four wives, few, he said, availed themselves of the privilege, and the majority, whether from a peace-loving disposition or motives of economy, contented themselves with one.

It was late September when I visited Sarajevo. On the evening of the second day of the Beiram, which resembles our Easter, while standing outside the Begova mosque watching the worshippers, I got into conversation with another onlooker, a Serbian student from Belgrade, with whom I afterwards went into a restaurant frequented by 'Turks' and Serbs of the lower classes. There were several of them seated around, amongst them an intelligent Serb who had worked ten years in Rome and spoke Italian fluently. Most of the conversation, however, was carried on through the interpretation of the student from Belgrade. Upon inquiring how the Serbs got on with the 'Turks,' the workman referred to answered 'quite well—better than with the Catholics.' Upon one's laughingly observing that one guessed the reason, namely, that the Catholics were loyal to Austria, a commotion ensued. An excited whisper went round. The Serb student said that they were asking who and what his companion was. The proprietor came down and asked in German the same question, saying that his customers were very much perturbed, and warning us that it was dangerous to talk politics. The incident finished by the workman's taking off his fez (it is very common even amongst the Serbs and Catholics to wear a fez), and declaring in a tone more emphatic than convincing that he always cried 'Long live our Emperor!'

The Serbs within the kingdom of Hungary, who number over a million, are mostly the descendants of refugees from Turkish oppression who came in during the seventeenth century under their Patriarch, Chernoyevich, many others coming in during

the eighteenth century. They have always kept the Orthodox religion. Their Patriarch has, as such, a seat in the House of Magnates or Hungarian Upper Chamber, and he receives from his See an income of nearly 60,000*l.* a year. The Hungarians hate the Serbs and all the Slav subjects of the kingdom. Altogether they are on very unfriendly terms with all the non-Magyar races, which is unfortunate for them, seeing that the Magyars, or pure Hungarians, are in a slight minority in their own kingdom.

Amongst those who call themselves Magyars there is a comparatively substantial sprinkling of Jews. There is, perhaps, no other country in Europe, unless possibly England, where the Jews are so fraternally regarded by the bulk of the population. They have succeeded in getting the vast proportion of the business of the country into their hands, the shops in the villages, including the drinking houses, being almost invariably in Jewish hands, and they have acquired a very large amount of land. The result, so far as the peasantry is concerned, is often the reverse of beneficial, yet the latter do not display much animosity.

In Austria, where an intolerant prejudice against the Hungarians is often shown, one occasionally hears the words 'Hungarian' and 'Jew' used almost synonymously. This is done rather on account of the large number of Jews in Hungary and of their preponderating influence there than on account of the fact of both being Asiatic races. The Hungarians still show strong marks of their Asiatic origin. One is sometimes startled in Hungary by the sudden vision of a type which might have come direct from Tartary. When the Hungarians, as often happens, speak contemptuously of the non-Magyar races in the kingdom, the latter—for instance, the Roumanians of Transylvania—retort by calling the Hungarians 'Tartars.'

In the Kingdom of Hungary there are about 3,000,000 Roumanians, almost entirely peasants and labourers—a very poor, ignorant, backward population, who live in outward servility and inward hate towards their Hungarian masters. Transylvania has a population of about two and a half millions, of whom about a million and a half are Roumanians. Of the rest the majority are 'Szeklers' or other Hungarians. 'Szekler' is a Magyar word for 'defender,' and it is applied to the descendants of those Hungarians who, many centuries ago, were the defenders of the outlying parts of Transylvania. There are also in the south about two hundred thousand Germans, called Saxons, the descendants of settlers brought in from the districts of the Lower Rhine in the twelfth century. They have till this day kept their identity and their German dialect, notwithstanding the vigorous and deeply resented Magyarising efforts of the Hungarians. But as

they seldom have more than two children in a family they are a decreasing population. There are also small groups of Armenians and Bulgarians and wandering Gipsy tribes, which last, as their main profession is thieving, are generally unpopular with their neighbours.

The Roumanians proudly claim to be descended from the Romans. This claim is strenuously and somewhat acrimoniously disputed by the Hungarians, who maintain that the Roumanians are mongrels, the descendants of nomadic mountain shepherds and goatherds, whose principal strain is Slav. Judging from two quite distinct districts where I have sometimes stayed, there seemed to be a noticeable difference in the types. In two separate places in Transylvania the peasants were generally tall, well built, and rather good-looking, and sometimes gave one the impression of a likeness to the southern Slavs. In a district in Eastern Hungary, not far from the Marmaros Mountains, where, with the exception of the friends with whom I stayed, a few persons on their place and some Gipsies, the whole population was Roumanian, the appearance of the peasantry was rather the reverse of that described above.

The Roumanian language in its essence is Latin, and the similarity of words is often striking. In its own language the race calls itself 'Român' and its kingdom 'România.' The Roumanians, emphasising as they do their claim to descent from the Romans, object strongly to the intrusion of the 'u.' Now that we have made a national approach to a more correct naming of the country hitherto called Servia, there seems to be no reason why we should not show a like deference to Roumania.

The majority of the Hungarian population of Transylvania are Roman Catholics, but there are many Unitarians and Calvinists, a large proportion of the landowners being of the last-named religion. The Saxons are almost exclusively Lutheran. The Roumanians are principally Orthodox, but there are some few hundred thousand Greek Catholics amongst them. In the latter part of the eighteenth century, when Transylvania stood for a time under Austria as a 'Grand-Principality,' the Roumanians, wishing to have the advantages of belonging to a State-recognised religion, sought incorporation with the Roman Catholic Church on terms of adopting, of course, all its doctrine, and acknowledging allegiance to the Pope, but of keeping its own ritual, language, and discipline. A generation later a certain Orthodox monk preached a crusade throughout the country, fiercely denouncing their action, with the result that most of them returned to the Greek-Oriental Church.

Amongst the descendants of those who remained Greek Catholics there seems to be little intelligent grasp of their union

with Rome. On one occasion at table my host, who was a Hungarian Protestant, asked the servant, an intelligent native of the village, who was a Greek Catholic, how one called the Pope in Roumanian. The man said at first that he did not know, but subsequently told us that he believed the answer to be 'Papa de Roma.'

The village church had crude, picturesque Byzantine frescoes. The 'popa' from the neighbouring village used to come every second Sunday. Mass was said in the Roumanian language, and the ceremonial was about the same as that in the Orthodox churches: the people pay a like reverence to the ikons, as they also do in their houses. It was noticeable that the Emperor Francis Joseph was prayed for under the title of Emperor and not under that of King. It may probably be that this is a survival of the years when Transylvania stood for a time under Austria, and that the Roumanians, who were fiercely opposed to the re-incorporation with Hungary, have not in their liturgy changed the title of Emperor to the correct one of 'King.'

More striking was the mention on two or three occasions during the Mass of the 'Bishop of Constantinople.' It made one at first rather wonder if the assertion of a very intelligent Hungarian stableman, who declared positively that the church was Greek Catholic and not Greek-Oriental, was well founded. Subsequent inquiry from a certain 'popa,' much better educated than the Roumanian clergy generally are, resulted in the information that the mention of the 'Bishop of Constantinople' was a survival of an invocation of St. John Chrysostom under the title of his See. After all the stableman was right.

Transylvania is probably one of the richest provinces in Europe, but it is very little known and is almost entirely undeveloped. It has considerable mineral resources. The southern end of it adjoins the Kingdom of Roumania, the town of Kronstadt which lies at the foot of the Transylvanian Alps being only a few hours climb off the royal residence of Sinaia. Roumania has long been casting down love-sick eyes and, like a truly valiant suitor, has conducted the courtship not only by the gentle mode of literature, but also by the more alluring method of banks and loans, at little or no interest, to the Roumanian population of Transylvania, in order to enable them to get the land into their hands.

As yet, with the exception of the peasant proprietors, the landowners are almost exclusively Hungarians, who comport themselves absolutely as lords over the Roumanians. In fact, in common parlance the Roumanians speak of the Hungarians as the 'lords.' They are a united body, distinguished by a warm

sense of hospitality, who are devoted to their Hungarian nationality and to union with the Kingdom of Hungary.

It would be no wonder then if there was a good deal of alarm amongst the latter as to what might happen on the outbreak of war. News from the remote village of which mention has last been made told how its sleep was startled in the early morning hours of the 6th of August by weird cries and the sounds of crude instruments calling the inhabitants to arms. It was their first intimation of the European War, and, strange to say, it is reported to have met with some enthusiasm amongst the villagers.

R. S. NOLAN.

SOME FRENCH AND GERMAN SOLDIERS OF FICTION

I

From Dumas to Bordeaux.

Le soldat dans ce groupe, aussi héros que le général.—VICTOR HUGO.

It may be thought a paradox even to suggest that the soldier of fiction is at his best in a country of conscription. That there should be a strong case for the defence of this theory is, indeed, to those realising the far-stretching influence of the novel, dangerously like a case for conscription itself. Be this as it may, the scantiest knowledge of French literature acquaints us with sufficient lifelike soldiers to form not single spies, but battalions upon the field. It cannot, therefore, be uninteresting to invite even a little company to break rank and 'stand easy' for our inspection, if but to prove that compulsory service is no necessary deterrent to high ideals.

Despite the handsome admission of Dumas that he drew his first inspiration from Scott and *Ivanhoe*, his own *Three Musketeers* may fling down the gauntlet unchallenged to be regarded as the most popular of all the fighters of Fancy Street. In how many languages has this dauntless trio hastened to the House of Fame 'and reached the land of matters unforget'? Mr. Rudyard Kipling's *Soldiers Three* is triumphant witness that the Musketeers were beloved by the boy of yesterday, as when Thackeray 'nourished a youth sublime' upon their exploits. For to-day we need but the statistics of countless cheap editions. Custom never stales their infinite variety, though in parts Dugald Dalgetty and Le Balafré themselves are a little old-fashioned in their speech. The song in *Quentin Durward*, indeed, suits Porthos, Athos, and D'Artagnan better than the chivalrous Scottish archer. They swagger into our delighted presence with a clash of swords, embodied spirits of the 'age of velvet and bright steel,' and, lo, they find the band of sad Cyrano de Bergerac ready to pledge with them, and troll a jolly ditty:

La guerre est ma patrie,
Mon harnois ma maison,
Et en toute saison
Combattre c'est ma vie.

Albeit no novelist, Monsieur Rostand cannot be ignored. Have not his robust Gascon cadets become our friends, and made the most prosaic forgive the poet the tender romance of their half-grotesque, wholly pathetic captain? The vast achievement of Dumas is one immense armoury, and this armour is rarely worn by lay figures. He deals doughtily with arms and the man. Let each select a hero from his chivalrous gentlemen or gallant swashbucklers; they are alike 'blood-tinctured with a veined humanity.'

It is a far cry from Dumas to the elegant Alfred de Vigny, himself a soldier at sixteen, born just too late to help Napoleon conquer. If his classic verse occasionally touches the Alpine height of genius, his prose wears badly, despite the contemporaneous chorus of praise which greeted it. The author of that masterpiece, *La Bouteille à la Mer*, is here a sheer mediocrity. *Cinq-Mars* is to the cool modern an undeniably poor specimen of the 'historical' novel. The hero is a block of wood; the soldiers are theatrical supers in uniforms too often misfits. *Cinq-Mars* is but imitation Scott watered with the 'weak, washy, everlasting flood' of sentimentalism.

De Vigny did far better when he took his immediate predecessors for models in the odd jumble of facts and fiction, with streaks of real poetry, to which he gave the name of *Servitude et Grandeur Militaires*. The disjointed sketches have a golden common quality; a breath of genuine patriotism perfumes their pages. Twelve years of a disappointing inactivity in barracks made their writer abandon his career, but had no effect upon his boundless affection for the service. Like Florence Nightingale, he is indefatigable in underlining the truth that those who look into the bright eyes of Danger learn much from their exacting mistress. He thoroughly believes in a high standard of conduct as essential to success, and his gospel well suits the need of an anxious hour.

Jesting apart, and with due recognition of his always excellent intention to adorn his tale with this particular moral, his rich unconscious humour cannot be wholly overlooked. Possibly it has cheered the progress of many a British schoolboy obliged to follow the adventurous Capitaine Renaud of *La Canne de Jonc* through Oxford reading books. The Captain turns an inspired phrase when he speaks of the cannon as 'La Voix de Bonaparte.' 'J'ai trop aimé les armes grisées par Bonaparte' is a confession which is engaging. 'Il était bon enfant, mais charlatan' is, however, a saying which shows he was not blind to the clay feet of his idol. But it is when Renaud is a boy-prisoner on board H.M.S. *Culloden*, sending letters 'by kind

permission of Lord Collingwood,' of whom he expresses a flattering opinion, that he becomes irresistible. For he reveals to us an amazing British Commander shedding tears (!!) over his separation from his daughters, and drawing an affecting parallel between his own situation as a father and that of the worthy parent of the youthful recipient of his high-flown confidences. Collingwood might and did write prettily to his wife that 'we went into action upon the morning of little Sarah's birthday,' but to picture him, with a French subaltern, 'drying the starting tear,' like an immortal of the *Bab Ballads*, is, as Andrew Lang said of certain Dickensian villains, 'too steep.' De Vigny's ill-starred marriage with an Englishwoman ought to have kept him from such absurdity. It detracts from his undoubted value as a right-thinking patriot. He becomes 'funny,' if certainly 'without being vulgar.'

To turn to Balzac is indeed to turn in this instance from the ridiculous almost to the sublime. Criticism of such part of the prodigal creation of a genius of tireless creative power as the average Balzacian chances to have mastered, can be silenced by a single *chef-d'œuvre*. In less than a hundred pages Balzac captures the 'fine careless rapture' of the soldier under Napoleon, and how much more. He gauges the characteristics of the type of the best men of that amazing hour with the eye of an eagle. He gives us a condensed tragedy more poignant by far than that of his own Lear-like Père Goriot. It is, at first sight, like the blindness of Milton's Samson, 'total eclipse without all hope of day.' If Balzac had written nothing but *Le Colonel Chabert*, Tours might still have proudly called her son 'notre grand.'

Nothing could be at once more dramatic and truer to life than this brief, pregnant biography of the Colonel whose brilliant manœuvre turned the tide of battle at Eylau. The Dantesque horror of his supposed death causing him to be flung naked into a pit upon the battlefield filled with the slain, chills the blood. Nothing in the *Inferno* can surpass the bare recital of the hideous nightmare. That the story is told with a sort of icy restraint by the victim of most cruel circumstances heightens its effect of fear and pity in the mind of the reader. Never was the baseness of woman, the nobility of a great-souled man, drawn with more insistent sureness of touch. Well does Balzac describe his hero :

A le voir, les passants eussent facilement reconnu en lui l'un de ces beaux débris de notre ancienne armée, un de ces hommes héroïques sur lesquels se reflète notre gloire nationale, et qui la représentent comme un éclat de glace illuminé par le soleil semble en réfléchir tous les rayons. Ces vieux soldats sont ensemble comme des tableaux et des livres.

When Colonel Chabert's ghastly resurrection has taken place, his execrable Dalila shows her true colours, and Balzac is merciless in the analysis. But for once the lady does not lead. That single stately fallen gentleman dominates the stage, an incarnation of honour and self-sacrifice. Of his two *grandes passions*, neither gives him solace. His wife is false to the core; his Emperor is in St. Helena. The astute lawyer whose humanity triumphs over his self-interest may well exclaim with wonder that 'l'homme qui a décidé le gain de la bataille d'Eylau serait là,' when he visits the miserable lodging which is yet irradiated with its gleam of beauty by the sheer goodness of its owner. The honest believer in the identity of the Colonel 'dead at Eylau' is another masterly portrait: 'Vergniaud était alors dans mon régiment; nous avons partagé de l'eau dans le désert. Enfin je n'ai pas encore fini d'apprendre à lire à ses marmots.' Nothing can derogate from the dignity of this leader of a most forlorn hope. He is left in a mad-house, sane among those bereft of reason—a martyr to the malice of his enemies. And the woman who has wrought this havoc is dismissed by Balzac as still charming, 'mais un peu dévote.' The rest may well be silence.

Space does not permit any loitering with the homely soldiers of those excellent tellers of a plain tale devoid of all literary pretension, Erckmann et Chatrian. 'Le Conscrit' is a thoroughly honest fellow. He frankly admits that he was not of those who loved their Emperor better than their wives, after the fashion of one of Heine's 'Grenadiere.' He is not a glutton for fighting, but, like a type of Frenchmen with whom we have been till now obstinately unfamiliar, he falls into step at the sound of the bugle call, and does his duty with the 'more than mortal calm' of inestimable value in tight places. To him 'La Panache' is as unknown as is the shameful white feather. If he takes up his sword with patient philosophy, and owns he is not sorry when honour permits it to be laid aside, he wields it stoutly in the interval.

In that spacious epic, *Les Misérables*, the treatment of war alone assuredly gives Hugo his claim to be hailed by Tennyson 'Victor in romance.' He makes it clear he ranks the soldier among the people who really matter; that he recognises, almost with awe, his necessity for the moulding of the destinies of the nations. It is clear also that he rates highly the splendid after-effects of individual valour. Colonel Pontmercy, created Baron by Bonaparte upon the battlefield itself, exercises such influence when dead that his son Marius, law student though he be, takes his place at the barricade in the Revolution of 1848 by sheer impulse of hereditary instinct to strike a doughty blow for some form

of freedom in the pride of his youth. That the cause is unworthy does not detract from his fearless courage. Before he takes to fighting, like a duck to water, his thoughts are detailed at full length with Victor Hugo's own large leisure of style. He wishes to make us realise the fascination of Pontmercy's career; why it was possible for himself to speak of Napoleon in another place as 'de son âme à la guerre armant six cent mille âmes'—a small figure for modern warfare. Thus he pauses in the swift moment of action to tell us how Marius

songea à cet héroïque colonel Pontmercy qui avait été un si fier soldat, qui avait gardé sous la république la frontière de France et touché sous l'empereur la frontière d'Asie, qui avait vu Gênes, Alexandrie, Milan, Turin, Madrid, Vienne, Dresde, Berlin, Moscou, qui avait laissé sur tous les champs de victoire de l'Europe des gouttes de ce même sang que lui Marius avait dans les veines, qui avait blanchi avant l'âge dans la discipline et le commandement, qui avait vécu, le ceinturon bouclé, les épaulettes tombant sur la poitrine, la cocarde noircie pas la poudre, le front plissé par le casque, sous la baraque, au camp, au bivouac, aux ambulances, et qui au bout de vingt ans était revenu des grandes guerres, la joue balafmée, le visage souriant, simple, tranquille, admirable, pur comme un enfant, ayant fait tout pour la France, et rien contre elle.

It is the great-grandsons of such as these who are now our allies. How many of them have already justified the homage of a genius for the courage of his compatriots! 'Tout pour la France' is written in crimson letters above many a new grave. That Victor Hugo very generously recognised the qualities of the British soldier when we were still enemies, proves his admiration for the 'Grande Armée' to be no mere blind infatuation, but the fruit of discerning study. In a single paragraph he conjures back the glamour of those meteoric days when every raw recruit carried in his knapsack the bâton of a marshal of France. We would rather forget the senile anger with which he stooped to revile his foes in 1870.

The novelists have, further, endeavoured to create a purely imaginary Napoleon with such contradictory variety of aspect it would need a ponderous volume to contain their conflicting opinions or his apocryphal deeds. 'Toujours le noir géant qui fume à l'horizon.' 'Best angel or worst devil.' They 'Either hate or love him, so they can't be merely civil.' Victor Hugo's instinct was finer when, in *Lui*, he married the Man of Destiny to immortal verse.

'L'Année Terrible' has set its seal upon the French soldier of fiction as upon the men who died in 1870, and their survivors who have since dreamt one long dream of vengeance. It was natural a wave of pessimism should sweep over French literature, that the agony of conquest should haunt the creative imagination like an unquiet ghost refusing to be laid. The young Republic

found surer relief in scornful denunciation of Napoleon the Little than in diatribes against the arrogant victor. It is vain to look for the sparkling gaiety of the old soldiers of success. Its place is rarely taken by a mordant wit, often by a most melancholy irony.

That, when the present War began, there is alleged to have been a sudden demand for Zola's *Débâcle* in England struck a jarring note. We need no ravens to croak when the bugle calls, and Zola's soldiers trample down the golden harvest as if from the first they were conscious of impending doom. Jean Macquart speaks for an army when he cries despairingly: 'J'en ai assez! . . . Est-ce que ce n'est pas à pleurer des larmes de sang, ces défaites continuelles, ces chefs imbéciles, ces soldats qu'on mène si stupidement à l'abattoir comme des troupeaux?' The unrelieved gloom, the sombre heaviness of style, give the impression that Zola begrudges war even the stern alleviating virtues he cannot quite deny it. But he has pity for the wretched Emperor painting the face ravaged by physical torture to cheat a Bismarck of the right to taunt him with fear. He compels the reader to sympathise with the unfortunate man he depicts goaded into the struggle by an ambitious woman. 'La voix implacable de Paris: "Marche, marche! . . . Meurs en héros que ton fils règne!"' The very peasants jeer as he passes: 'Ca un Empereur! En voilà une bête.' A Zouave tries to shoot him through a window, but he is held back by his comrades. Like his great ancestor, Napoleon the last found no merciful bullet to end his misery.

If Zola's soldiers never add to the list of our imaginary friends, they cannot be forgotten, even if we forbear the painful task of reading *La Débâcle* a second time, unwilling to renew the horror of the first terrified, fascinated impression. What can be more shattering to cherished military ideals than Capitaine Baudouin wrecking the honour of his host for one last wild night of sin on the eve of battle? Nothing except the cowering, abject Gilberte revolting from giving even a cup of cold water to the mutilated wretch who was her gay lover of yesterday, when they meet again in the ghastly improvised hospital where the daughter of pleasure has no place.

There are none of the bright beams which pierce the clouds of Tolstoy's *Peace and War*. It is one long epitome of the dreariness of war, with the echo of that question of mournful passion: 'And as for these sheep, what have they done?' The end is the sight of the lonely figure of Jean Macquart, soldier *malgré lui*. 'Le champ ravagé était en friche, la maison brûlée était par terre, et Jean le plus douloureux s'en alla marchant à l'avenir, à la grande et rude besogne de toute une France à refaire.' It was a

pity Zola died too soon to see what he made of that stupendous task.

Who can blame the sons of the chivalrous Colonel Margueritte if they cherish a faith that better things might have been, had he not untimely perished? They too have contributed their chapter to the pathetic story of a brave army all unready, with leaders all unworthy. They are not as Zola. For them it is *Le Désastre*, with its possibility of hope, not *La Débâcle*, demanding a sullen resignation to the inevitable as the only possible attitude. The Marguerittes have lived to justify their faith that France would draw sword again when she had learnt her awful lesson; for they believe in a God just even when terrible.

Les Tronçons du Glaive and the rest of the series have interest, merit, and no despair, but they hardly succeed in individualising the soldier for us with the rare lightning flash of intuition of Alphonse Daudet. It is, indeed, only necessary to revert to the war stories of his evergreen *Contes du Lundi*, to find soldiers with whom we are at once and gladly intimate. Daudet is single-minded. Fervent patriot as he is, he chiefly longs to convince us that there were those of the rank and file of 1870 deserving more than the well-meant compassion hard to endure. His pride revolts from pity; he claims the admiration not to be withheld from such as 'Le Porte-Drapeau.' In his few vivid pages he makes a hero of that very simple ignoramus, Sergeant Hornus. He proves to us what desperate valour shone like a star through the smoke and the carnage.

'On se fusillait à quatre-vingts mètres. Les officiers criaient: "Couchez-vous," mais personne ne voulait obéir.' If this splendid disobedience is against our own tradition, 'Theirs not to reason why,' we forgive it as we breathlessly watch the swaying colours. Again and yet again their bearer fell; again and yet again the cry was heard: "'Au drapeau, mes enfants!'" Aussitôt un officier s'élançait vague comme une ombre dans ce brouillard rouge, et l'héroïque enseigne redevenu vivante, planait encore au-dessus de la bataille.' Twenty-two times it happened before the one honour of his life fell to Sergeant Hornus. Even in enforced retreat he clung to his tattered, blood-stained treasure, and at night the Colonel said to him "'Tu as le drapeau, mon brave; eh bien, garde-le.'" Et sur sa pauvre capote de campagne, déjà toute passée à la pluie et au feu, la cantinière surfila tout de suite un liséré d'or de sous-lieutenant.' In the dumb fury of Hornus, when ordered to surrender that flag at the Arsenal at Metz, Daudet makes us realise what was the rage of that baffled army of a hundred and fifty thousand doomed to peace with dishonour. He himself acts as 'Porte-Drapeau,' and we respect him with all our hearts.

He had an immense tenderness for the humble, to which he gave noble expression in the righteous indignation of *La Partie de Billard* against the ruling powers of the gimcrack Second Empire. The Marshal, elegant in full uniform, plays billiards in a superb château after an admirable dinner. He can attend to no business, give no orders till the adroit young Major with whom he is playing has let him win, with such diplomacy that he is complacently deceived. Within all is light, warmth, luxury, laughter. Without, in the pouring rain, 'Le vent leur chasse, la pluie et la mitraille en pleine figure. Des bataillons entiers sont écrasés. . . . Maintenant, un grand silence. L'armée est en pleine déroute. Le Maréchal a gagné sa partie.'

Daudet is too astute to try to make us believe the impossible in heroics merely because he deals with his compatriots, and loves France. In *Le Mauvais Zouave* he paints a full-length portrait of a coward. Sick of the misery of defeat, his young Alsatian deserts. When he creeps homeward in his shame, his mother sighs and, woman-like, forgives him. 'Ce sont des lâches, des renégats . . . mais c'est égal! Leurs mères sont bien heureuses de les ravoïr.' But the stern father might have been one of Cromwell's Ironsides. His despair that this should be his son is conveyed in a few words stinging like a whip. He has to make atonement to his country, and after a night of anguish his inspiration comes. The strong blacksmith stands by the bed of the miserable Christian and takes from him his sullied uniform. It has to be given back, and there is another duty to be paid. With cold scorn the old Lory leaves Christian, the house, the sunny garden, the beehives, the vineyard. 'Tu as sacrifié ton honneur pour ces choses, c'est bien le moins que tu les gardes. Te voilà maître ici. . . . Moi, je pars. Tu dois cinq ans à la France, je vais les payer pour toi.' A few days later a volunteer of fifty-five was enrolled at Sidi-ben-Abbès. We do not need to be told in Daudet's memoirs that he used facts for fiction when he dealt with the Terrible Year.

The frolic fun of the defence of Tarascon, with its soldiers of words, not deeds, is as real to those who know the Midi, and, with all its faults, love it still, as the tragedy of the *Siège de Berlin*. The old invalid Colonel, who has never known defeat, believing to the last in victory, is heart-piercing in his reality. To aid his recovery his devoted granddaughter hides all, and lets him believe it is not the Prussians, but his own beloved army which is to enter Paris victorious. Bed-ridden and helpless, the doctor and the poor child deceive him till he is happy. They starve to feed him, until, inspired by a strength almost super-human, he manages to elude their vigilance, to put on his uniform and go to the balcony to see the conquerors pass. In one

appalling instant he learns the sinister truth, and falls dead as the bands break out with their insolent martial message. Never does the magic of Daudet's silver-clear style make a surer appeal than in these plain tales, written in blood and tears. They should be read again now, for they help us to understand the steadfastness of the present by searchlights thrown on the desperate past. In *Le Turco de la Commune* he touches the fringe of that other conflict, all a tangle of misconception. Algerian Kadour does not even understand the language of the country for which he has fought and is eager to fight again. He has been long in hospital in Paris, 'triste et patient comme un chien malade.' When he comes out hopefully upon a lilac-scented spring morning, he has no idea that a new era has dawned. He believes the barricading is against the barbarian Prussians, and rushes eagerly into the hottest corner he can find. 'Il voulait faire parler la poudre.' The little army of the Communards is soon silenced. Kadour is convicted by his hands black with powder. They place him against the wall to be shot, and he smiles still. 'Il est mort sans avoir rien compris,' and who denies the truth of his own words: 'Bono Francèse'? It is perhaps in his silences the eloquence of Daudet touches us most nearly. He is a true master of the difficult art of military portraiture. He is also master of that supreme art our Dickens learnt but imperfectly—of knowing when to stop.

If we wish to see the irony of that forlornest of human hopes, the Commune, crystallised in a single obscure victim of its tragedy of errors, there is Anatole France to tell us what came of *Les Désirs de Jean Servien*. The biography begins with an exquisite cameo of the young mother in the shabby room behind the second-hand book shop, dreaming her rainbow dreams of the future of the tiny, delicate baby who shall be a king among men. The words of her soft lullaby sound very sweet as, all forgetful of poverty and pain, she looks down radiantly upon the little face. For she sees her Jean victorious in gorgeous uniform upon a prancing charger.

En attendant, sur mes genoux,
Beau Général, endormez-vous.

She does not linger on earth to know her child unhappy in his vague and ever-unsatisfied yearning for something afar from the sphere of our sorrow.

War breaks in upon the visionary inner life of the feeble lad. He is no soldier born, the 'beau Général.' He hates the service, and grudges doing his share of duty to France because of his supreme contempt for her rulers. He spells out the classics in the intervals of going on guard in a besieged Paris daily approaching the ordeal of proving that a house divided against

itself cannot stand. Jean Servien at his unwilling task is a dismal illustration of the dreariest side of enforced military service. He wants to be let alone; to be quit of all this useless coil, until he finally finds a reason which kindles the lust for conflict, and causes it to burn a steady flame. He lends a greedy ear to the syren voice of La Commune, till he becomes the loyal lover of his perfidious mistress. She even teaches him patriotism when he rejoices in the new, dazzling chimera by which he has at last learnt to hope. 'Il faut déposer les traîtres et les incapables qui nous gouvernent, proclamer la Commune, et marcher tous contre les Prussiens.' He becomes brave, resolute, ready with the best to 'flash his soul out with the guns.' And what is the fate in store for this new-born manhood? He is shot by a woman in a back street, and lies stark and livid, mute witness of a futile creed.

Les Désirs de Jean Servien is not one of the most famous of the books of Anatole France. But the student of the soldier will find a peculiar interest in its pages, with their strange, elusive atmosphere. For Jean Servien stands out clearly as a type of the martyrs who, from all time, have surrendered life to illustrate the ruthlessness of false ideals. There is perhaps no one living or dead who could have made us understand him better than the man whose wonderful novels everyone praises and few or none love.

It is refreshing to turn from the blighting pessimism of Anatole France to a group of temperate optimists who reveal to us something of the character of those who stand to-day shoulder to shoulder with us in the close-knit fraternity of a righteous cause. Different in all else, they reveal in certain instances the common attribute of a deep sense of religious reality. They admit morale as the dominant factor it is in the making of good soldiers.

René Bazin has achieved a popularity in England as wide as it is well deserved. He supports the recent theory of an *Edinburgh* reviewer that French contemporary literature proves France to be recovering from the shock which shook her very foundations. Like Daudet, he is admirable in the *conte* which properly takes the high place in French fiction. Mr. Kipling lately obliged us to concede reluctantly to the short story.

Le Guide de l'Empereur is a tale of two soldiers, one French and one German by cruel force of circumstances. The old Capitaine Audouin passes the empty years after 1870 in a dream set to the music of the drums and bugles of Toul. His withered arm compels him to inactivity, but in his long solitary walks there is a vision splendid to bear him company. To him vengeance is a daily nearing certainty, not a mere fiery fantasy.

And when the Prussians arrive they shall recognise him by his abnormally tall figure, although his breast bears no decoration. Then, on a stormy night, comes an Alsacian mother eager to abandon her little son for the sake of his German father. His own good daughter coaxes him to an adoption for which all her starved maternal instinct cries out. 'Take him, make him a soldier for France,' she cries. The plea is irresistible, and happiness follows charity. Capitaine Audouin preaches his military gospel to a devoted disciple, as the boy grows up willing, obedient, simple, and strong. Then, when the education of Charles is accomplished at the price of intense self-sacrifice, comes a bolt from the blue. The parents reappear, with the law upon the side of harsh injustice. They are prosperous, and they desire their son. Véronique is left to weep and pray; the Captain to face the grim fact that he has trained a good soldier for the accursed Kaiser, that he has added another to the horde of Huns ready to inundate France.

From this poignant situation there can be but one deliverance for Charles, the martyr to the duty he performs fortified by sorrowful resignation to the will of God. Upon the day of a great review at Strassburg, in the depth of winter, the Kaiser comes incognito to feast his eyes upon his troops. It falls to the obscure private to guide to the parade ground the haughty yet condescending stranger at whose identity he guesses. He runs rapidly beside the horse, and, breathless and overheated, lingers to watch the review from which he has been imperially dispensed. The result is a telegram at Toul to bid those there who love him come quickly to the military hospital to say good-bye. Véronique sends her father alone. She is too poor to obey the summons which has broken her brave heart.

Capitaine Audouin, with his gaunt shoulders bowed with grief, commands a puzzled respect among his enemies by reason of his undeniable dignity. The dying lad turns to his protector with his two petitions: 'N'accusez pas l'Empereur. Quand je serai mort, vous direz que tout a été bien dans ma vie.' When the doctor gently tells the Captain it is time to go there is an impressive pause: 'Quelque chose de supérieur à la vie ordinaire et à toutes les séparations qu'elle crée, réunissait les deux officiers. . . . Ils admiraient la noblesse de ce soldat qui allait mourir, inconnu, une mort sans gloire.' A few days later a wreath tied with the German colours, sent by the highest in the Empire, is placed on a new-made grave—the grave of a soldier made in France.

In the miniature comedy of *Le Soldat Fréminet* Bazin gives a pleasant little picture of friendly relations between a very homely private and his superior. When Fréminet goes fowl-

stealing in Madagascar for his invalid officer we at once know him for the good-natured, brave fellow he really is. An admirable cook, we hope he may have met Mr. Thomas Atkins and inducted him into those culinary secrets never more valuable than on campaign.

Monsieur Paul Bourget has been regarded by most of us chiefly as 'a lion amongst ladies,' a dissector of hearts insurgent. Yet he, too, has given us a fine soldier in *L'Emigré*, because his spirit was deeply stirred by what to him was religious persecution. The history of Lieutenant Landri de Claviers Grandchamp is a singular inversion of the accepted meaning of 'Noblesse oblige.' For when he has started on his career, bred in the aristocratic tradition of an aristocrat of the 'vieille roche,' chance proves to him that he is not the son of the man who believes himself his father. To him the renunciation of his name would be scarcely a trial; he is weary of the past and the dead weight of its claim. But he is silent for the sake of the man who has loved and cherished him, and sails away to the New World, leaving him the precious delusion that honour is intact.

This is a side-issue. The chief incident of a book full of ideas is the surrender of the sword of Landri for conscience' sake. The vivid opening scene where he breaks in a vicious horse for one of his men is an agreeable assurance of the cordial relations between himself and his regiment. His whole soul is in the service; his dearest aspiration the advent of the day of reckoning which has dawned since then. Catholic more by tradition than by conviction, Landri is startled from his casual indifference when the order comes for him to command a troop sent to destroy the symbols of religion after seizing what is of value among them. It is a page of French history the most bigoted may well dislike to contemplate. Captain Despois, devoted 'bien pensant,' utters his thanksgiving for the fact that not to him falls this hateful order. He may keep his commission with an unsullied conscience. Landri rides through the twelve hundred villagers, chanting their psalm as they strive vainly to bar the way of these who come to violate their sanctuary. Not one workman can be found to help the soldiers in their hateful work. 'Fanatisés par les curés,' grumble the sous-officiers, longing to have an end to this vile business. Then comes a dramatic surprise, as Landri makes his resolve. Upon the very steps of the church his great and costly renunciation takes place: 'Je suis Chrétien, voilà ma gloire.' But when an effort is tactlessly made to encourage him comes the quick, soldierly rebuke, pregnant with his pain: 'On ne félicite un officier d'avoir brisé son épée.' 'Un noble, cela s'explique,' say the cynical when the amazing news is told. They have found their reason, and they are satisfied. The loyal Landri does not undeceive them.

In *La Peur de Vivre* we are all well aware that Henri Bordeaux wrote a fine novel with a fine purpose. If one of the best-drawn mothers in fiction is its heroine, her son is worthy of her, and essentially worthy of admiration. Marcel Guibert is a captain at twenty-eight, and has brought back decorations and renown from Madagascar. He is quiet, simple, and very modest when he comes home to the beloved Savoy of which the clean, keen mountain air has made him what he is—a 'very perfect gentleman.' In one short sentence Monsieur Bordeaux explains the national change since 1870 : 'La France aujourd'hui, loin de les étaler, cache ses jeunes gloires.' He himself does not over-analyse, far less over-praise, his hero of the few words. Jean Berlier is nothing but a merry flâneur enjoying his butterfly flirtations, till he learns his lesson from the death of Marcel. For Marcel soon leaves Savoy to fall heroically in a distant land, and to the reader his life may at first seem a wasted sacrifice. That this is far from the illuminating truth is made clear very beautifully during the scene at the gay dinner party where the news is carelessly broken by a careless, pleasure-loving lad.

The splendour of the things that matter, the flimsy tawdriness of luxury, are brought out strikingly under the rosy lights shading the groups of orchids. For Alice, the lovely weakling, realises too late what she has lost because she lacked the courage to give up her wealth. 'Elle a peur de vivre ; nous ne sommes pas de la même race,' had been Marcel's sad comment upon the ending of the tragi-comedy when his poor mother goes, after the strange French fashion, to the opulent Madame Dulaurens to offer his hand to the slight girl to whom he has given the passion of a great heart. But he does not die in vain ; he buys happiness for one dear to him. His death makes Jean Berlier perceive the difference between the true and the false. Not to the alluring Isabelle, eager to betray her millionaire husband, does he turn, but to the strong, sweet Paule, the sister of his friend. 'Ce printemps sort des funérailles.'

Marcel Guibert bears little resemblance to the soldier of France as we used to see him. But we know now that Monsieur Bordeaux, one of the 'jeunes gloires' France has no wish to hide, has drawn him from the life. Brave to a fault, sincere, steadfast, his comrades of flesh and blood have won the respect and affection of England in a momentous struggle since his story was written. Every day gives fresh evidence that the friendship between the two nations is founded upon a rock. Even the French soldier of French fiction cannot pass unregarded. Our interest in his brothers-in-arms is far too strong. Already the imagination thrills at the thought of the many who have won the right to step out into the limelight of literature. The French novels of the future need not lack soldiers—or heroes.

II

From Barry Lyndon to Beyerlein.

It becomes daily more difficult to avert the inward eye from the varied aspects of the strange new Germany we explore with an eager curiosity quickly metamorphosed to a surprised repulsion. The olden gods have been cast down from their pedestals of flawless marble. The altars of Goethe and of Schiller have not merely been profaned but usurped by Treitschke, Polish Nietzsche, and their evil horde of disciples. For the bread of life they offer gross materialism; for the starry spirituality of pure religious faith, the total eclipse of a pessimism without one ray of the light divine. Grinning dwarfs, from grotesque gargoyles imagined by distorted fancy, replace statues of noble form and severe beauty. Militarism is regnant, and thus the German soldier becomes a topic of curious interest. His place, whether in the sun or the shadow, is of intense importance, and well may he dominate our anxious thoughts.

With the German soldier in fact we have been fiercely confronted; it cannot, therefore, but be interesting to see how he is regarded in fiction. Even the casual survey of this wide field, which alone is possible, shows singular paradoxes, for, by a grim irony, the modern German is never more odious than when drawn by himself. Even Zola and the brothers Margueritte, in their lurid reflections of the disasters of the Terrible Year, are far less plain-spoken than the notorious Lieutenant Bilse, who lowered the German flag and stirred up a hornets' nest in one disreputable little book unredeemed by any sign of literary ability. That there is 'something rotten in the state of Denmark' has been long the conviction of many Germans concerning the constituents of the most wonderful machine-made army the world has ever seen.

It was not thus yesterday. Mr. Laurence Binyon's recent verses *To Goethe* remind us of that profound thinker's noble creed:

Goethe, who saw and who foretold
A world revealed
New-springing from its ashes old
On Valmy field
When Prussia's sullen hosts retired
Before the advance
Of ragged, starved, but *freedom-fired*
Soldiers of France,
What think you, Sage?
Are these the armies of the light?

Schiller was himself one of those Bavarian Hussars the Kaiser longed for our 'contemptible little army' to meet. To his

dramatic trilogy extolling Wallenstein the world awards the laurel due to a masterpiece. He wrote of war with authority, whether as the author of one of the driest histories ever penned, or with the 'fine frenzy' of an inspired poet captivated by a vanished martial picturesqueness. Yet in the roughest swashbuckler of the camp of Wallenstein there is a certain gleam of right conception of true glory, a recognition of the higher ideals of conflict. The things that matter are never quite lacking in these phantom forces to which Schiller gave vivid reality; they were, indeed, foemen worthy of the best steel. If the chivalrous Max Piccolomini uses words which have a bitter meaning to-day, they were originally written with Schiller's own single-minded honesty. Like our immortal Vincent Crummies, he 'was not a Prussian,' and a campaign of 'honour rooted in dishonour' did not come within his ken. Max exclaims:

Es braucht der Feldherr jedes Grosse der Natur . . .
 Das Orakel in seinem Innern, das lebendige,
 Nicht todte Bücher, alte Ordnungen,
 Nicht modrigte Papiere, soll er fragen.

The 'scrap of paper' of which we wot was not 'mouldy,' yet surely Schiller would have burnt with shame to see its torn, soiled fragments flung to the four winds.

It is noteworthy, again, that when Prussia-hating Heine wished to create a grand ballad, born of drum-taps, he sought his heroes in his adopted country. For his 'Grenadiere' were Frenchmen, as all the world knows, including the illustrious German composer who set their story to imperishable music. Thackeray had an honourable love for Goethe and Schiller, and an admiration for Heine which led him to add superfluously to the long list of those who have failed to imprison the exquisite melody of the *Buch der Lieder* in an alien tongue. There is solace in the thought that, if we feel called upon to renounce German genius, we may keep its pearl, for Heine was the salient justification of the saying 'Le Juif n'a pas de pays.'

Heine was stretched upon his mattress-grave in Paris when Thackeray wrote a book misunderstood of a short-sighted generation. It is unnecessary to discuss his treatment there of Ireland and the Irish. That he heightened his effects by exaggeration is not a crime in a novelist. To take fiction over-seriously shows a sorry lack of humour. It is absurd to expect Thackeray to be as accurate as was Schiller dealing aridly with the Thirty Years' War—and as he was not when he wafted Sainte Jeanne d'Arc heavenwards without her pillar of flame. But Thackeray, whatever liberties he took with his own imaginary portraits, admittedly set them in backgrounds and foregrounds studied closely from the life. It would have been a task for Carlyle, toiling at his

tremendous biography, to have refuted all scampish Barry Lyndon's accusations against him he soon ceased to admire—'The Protestant hero, as we used to call the godless old Frederick.' He might have liked to remind Thackeray that it was Frederick's father who forced the King of Poland to make him a present of the twenty-four tall Grenadiers he coveted.

Thackeray went to veracious sources for his brilliant sketch of the methods by which Prussian arms wrought their 'feats of derring-do.' A singular parallel may be drawn between the convictions of Barry Lyndon and Herr Beyerlein, when their common opinion of the dismal cruelty practised towards the German private is compared. That the one deals with an active campaign, the other merely with the mimic warfare of manœuvres, makes an uncomfortably slight difference. Barry Lyndon described Prussian conduct to the conquered during the Seven Years' War, to show it perhaps less shameful than that which has made the defamers of desecrated Rheims and Louvain bywords among the nations. Herr Beyerlein wrote *Jena or Sedan?* a little too soon to give us his opinion of such an ugly peace episode as the treatment meted out to the villagers of Zabern. Von Förstner, striking the crippled cobbler with the flat of his sword, would have been perfectly at home with the German officers in *Barry Lyndon*. Recent grim stories of weary, disheartened troops commanded to 'Sing, sing,' recur to the mind whilst Thackeray speaks insistently of 'old, unhappy, far-off things' which have become strangely, sadly near by sinister analogies.

The life the private soldier led was a frightful one to any but men of iron courage and endurance. There was a corporal to every three men, marching behind them, and pitilessly using the cane; so much so that it used to be said that in action there was a front row of privates, and a second rank of sergeants and corporals to drive them on. Many men would give way to the most frightful acts of despair under these incessant tortures; and among several regiments of the army a horrible practice had sprung up which for some time caused the greatest alarm to the Government. This was a strange, frightful custom of child murder. The men used to say that life was unbearable, that suicide was a crime; in order to avert which, and to finish with the intolerable misery of their position, the best plan was to kill a young child which was innocent, and therefore secure of heaven, and deliver themselves up as guilty of the murder.

Even Frederick was scared at this appalling idea, but it did not mitigate the terrors of what was falsely called discipline.

The punishment was incessant. Every officer had the liberty to inflict it, and in peace it was more cruel than in war. . . . I have seen the bravest men in the army cry like children at the cut of the cane; I have seen a little ensign of fifteen call out a man of fifty from the ranks, a

man who has been in a hundred battles, and he has stood presenting arms and sobbing and howling like a baby whilst the young wretch lashed him over the arms and thighs with a stick.

It is with these shocking instruments that your great warriors and kings are doing their murderous work in the world; and whilst, for instance, we are at the present moment admiring the 'Great Frederick,' as we call him, and his philosophy, and his liberality, and his military genius, I, who have served him, and been, as it were, behind the scenes of which that great spectacle is composed, can only look on it with horror.

Nurtured in such traditions, the rulers of Prussia plainly strive to emulate the deeds of the 'good' old times—nor do they entirely fail. Thackeray's may be ranked among the many great minds to which the ethics of the Prussian gospel were abhorrent. He admired and respected what was best in the vanished Germany our descendants will probably believe to have been a mythical Utopia. He loathed the Prussian exaltation of the arrogant officer caste, to which we owe the Bernhardis, with their misleading cuckoo cry 'Deutschland über alles,' correctly translated 'The army first, the rest nowhere.' General von Bernhardi, in *The Next Great War*, includes an amount of fiction amply justifying a claim he does not urge, to be regarded as one of the leading novelists of the century. If we read him as fiction, we may find amusement; if we read him for instruction, his views already appear woefully out of date. Had Thackeray lived to discern the after-effects of the victory of 1870, he might have given us a new yet more sardonic Barry Lyndon, impressed, however, with most of the convictions of his splendid, outrageous ancestor.

Herr Beyerlein is not a Thackeray; he has striking gifts but no genius. Yet we owe him a debt of gratitude for writing of his own countrymen with absolute, fearless candour. His search-lights carry far. 'The great general got the glory, and the poor soldier only insult and the cane' is Barry Lyndon's conclusion to the whole matter of the Prussian military system. Is Herr Beyerlein's intrinsically different? Is the flat of the sword, which to-day replaces the lithe cane, a satisfactory exchange? It is a question the German prisoners among us could answer, unless their patriotism enforces silence.

That Barry Lyndon was a rascal does not whitewash the conduct of the royal tool Galgenstein, who went about kidnapping men to make 'cannon fodder' for the 'Protestant Hero.' His behaviour was brutal. Having lashed his victim with the inevitable cane, he summoned two sergeants to stun him with blows. Barry Lyndon fought with true Irish intrepidity, but he was overpowered. When he regained consciousness his purse was stolen, his face was bleeding, and his hands tied behind him. Thus was recruiting practised in the realm of Frederick, though

it may be conceded that it has not yet been suggested that big foreigners should be seized to make reinforcements for the Kaiser.

A considerable gulf of years divides Barry Lyndon from Herr Beyerlein and *Battery Six*. During that time a second English novelist of the first distinction concerns himself with the German officer in some detail. It was left for George Meredith to find an English gentleman masquerading as a German warrior when that king of pretenders, Richmond Roy, impersonated the missing bronze statue of a hero prince, and for one breathless moment deceived half a province by his perfect acting. This madcap escapade took place in the romantic Germany of a later Zenda, for which the breezy *Adventures of Harry Richmond* prove Meredith to have had an affection. His liking did not, however, extend to the German officer, judging by those in *The Tragic Comedians*. The aristocratic General von Rüdiger is here depicted thoroughly coarse-minded, and obstinate as a mule. Wiser men have objected to a genius for a son-in-law, but his way of objecting is eminently characteristic.

The General chattered and shouted. . . . He dragged Clotilde indoors muttering of his policy in treating her at last to a wholesome despotism. This was the medicine for her—he knew her! . . . he knew the potency of his physic. . . . With a frightful noise of hammering he himself nailed up the window-shutters of the room she was locked in hard and fast, and he left her there and roared across to the household that anyone holding communication with the prisoner should be shot like a dog. ‘You girls want the lesson we read to skittish recruits. You shall have it,’ he blurts out to his exquisite daughter. ‘Write “He is as nothing to me.” You shall write that you hate him if you hesitate. Why, you unreasonable slut. . . .’

And his subsequent conduct is consistent.

Even the exemplary Colonel von Tresten, the friend of the jilted Alvan, is an unpleasing person, wooden and a martinet. Poor Clotilde ‘could have shrieked under his hard military stare. . . . The rigid face and glacier eye.’ Her lover’s ostensible advocate, she yet felt him to be treacherous. ‘He had frozen her.’ Von Tresten was essentially machine-made, yet Meredith convinces us he drew from a model, not a lay-figure.

With Austria the ally of Germany, mention may fitly be made of Captain von Weisspriess of the ‘White Coats,’ in *Vittoria*. Himself one of the devoutest lovers of Italy, Meredith was unlikely to make a hero of an Austrian. And once again he uses his rare creative power to force home his certainty that machines, not men, result from the military system common to both nations. Von Weisspriess, champion duellist, dies in an obscure duel. He is unfortunate in his bar sinister, in love, and in war. His friends were brother officers ‘with

perhaps that additional savour of a robust immorality which a Viennese social education may give.'

This word 'robust' merits an instant of reflection. Neither Thackeray nor Meredith was afraid of the bare truth. Yet the rascality of Barry Lyndon, the craft of Weisspriess, the bestiality of old Rüdiger, never have the singular taint of unwholesomeness clinging like a miasma about the barracks of Beyerlein. Had it been there then, certainly our two great writers would have said their fearless say of its insidious danger.

Sharply contrasting with the sheer modernity of von Rüdiger and the rest, is the miniature painted with delicate skill by Mr. Thomas Hardy in *The Melancholy Hussar of the German Legion*.

So far from being as gay as its uniform, the regiment was pervaded by a dreadful melancholy, a chronic home-sickness. The worst sufferers were the younger soldiers who had not been over here long. They hated England and English life; they took no interest whatever in King George and his island kingdom, and they only wished to be out of it and never to see it any more.

This passage, referring to George the Third, is a quotation apt for the reign of his latest namesake, as many a German prisoner here would probably agree. Mr. Hardy, like the author of that admirable page of history, *The Subaltern*, is of the opinion his pathetic heroine expresses. For 'Phyllis used to assert that no such refined or well-educated young man could have been found in the ranks of purely English regiments, some of the foreign soldiers having rather the graceful presence of our native officers than of the rank and file.'

Other times, other manners, we may say without being vain-glorious. 'Kultur' may teach its regiments to sing part-songs in admirable time and tune; the performance may be vastly superior to a ragged rendering of *It's a Long Way to Tipperary*. But the butchers of Aerschot and Termonde would have seemed uncongenial comrades to the 'Melancholy Hussar.' He would, albeit he came from Saarbrück, have been more at home before a British camp fire. If *The Subaltern* proves Mr. Hardy's miniature to be an excellent likeness, both offer dismal evidence of the decadence of the German soldier of to-day.

Few popular novelists have been forgotten more quickly than William Black. The very defects of his qualities made for ephemeral success and rapid oblivion. *The Strange Adventures of a Phaeton* could make no appeal to a generation nurtured on Kiplings and Bennetts. But it enchanted the average reader soon after 1870, and it made the sentimental German all the fashion for a season. Black's Count von Rosen, who dropped into poetry with the pertinacity of a Silas Wegg, was much

admired by the Victorian ladies, influenced by royal leaning to all things German. The Count had a pretty taste in the choice of verse, and was what the Germans themselves would have called 'love-worthy,' but he was nevertheless decidedly a bore.

Black was devoid of humour, though he spent a long literary life convinced to the contrary. But when he made von Rosen his *jeune premier*, he possibly suggested to two clever ladies the idea that there were plenty of jests to be made at the expense of the wasp-waisted heroes of the Teutonic *Backfisch*.

We are happy to reflect that the witty 'Elizabeth' was English-born, despite her German Garden. When she wrote *The Caravanners* she gave us in her Baron a most laughter-provoking sketch of a typical German ex-officer. She does not deal with his military attributes. We only see him making a lamentable failure of an effort to live the simple life with a band of well-bred English folks, aghast at their frank pleasure in sheer discomfort. His attitude towards his wife is, however, quite an adequate index of the way he would have behaved to those beneath him in the regiment he once adorned. His naive amazement when the last sausage available is pressed upon that Patient Griselda instead of himself is an abiding delight. His abominable greediness is a salient point, like his conviction that he has only to stoop to conquer the most charming of English-women. 'Elizabeth' pokes her sly fun at him until the reader chuckles. If we looked for a moral in such a merry tale we should find the old, old story of the materialism of the modern German, and of his conceit of himself.

The author of *German Home Life*, and of many novels showing an amused tolerance for the Germans with whom she is entirely familiar, gave us one short story with a ludicrously clear impression of this megalomania of the military caste. A well-bred, well-educated family of German Jews went beside itself with rapture because an ignorant booby of a lieutenant—a 'von,' no less—deigned to call and to dine. His finances required desperate measures, and, though he could not, of course, bow to his hostesses in public, he was perfectly ready to drink the best wines and smoke the best cigars of Herr Papa in private. Even his aristocratic mother shrugged her plump shoulders at his unlucky necessity which had no law. But a pretty English cousin arrived, to be properly indignant at the way this young boor insulted her relatives. She vowed a vengeance for which she could not hope in a tiny German town, hide-bound with narrow prejudice. She let the Herr Lieutenant know that she was an heiress to an extent almost deciding him to drop his well-born pocket-handkerchief at her small feet. Then she

vanished, leaving him to follow her to London in highly unbecoming mufti. What did he find? The expected meek and blushing maiden overwhelmed with blissful confusion at her own good fortune? Nothing of the sort. He encountered instead a brilliant leader in a society where a badly dressed foreigner was just tolerated, thanks to her gracious intervention. She was engaged to someone his superior in rank, and obviously laughing at him in her very chic sleeves. Mrs. Sidgwick makes it what our enemies would call 'Kolossal komisch,' if they used the right phrase, which possibly they would in this instance fail to find.

In 1888 most of us read and enjoyed *Die Familie Buchholz*. These sketches of middle-class Berlin life were heralded by a laudatory letter from Bismarck when the forty-ninth edition appeared, and maintain their popularity in this year of his centenary. He justly praised an absolute fidelity to nature no Berliner has ever denied. If the Frau Buchholz then was typical of her class, it is rather singular to notice her indifference to patriotism, militarism, and imperialism. She just glances at the possibility of the admirer of her Betti looking well in a sergeant's uniform, or even a lieutenant's. But as the youth jilts poor Betti for the sake of a bigger dowry and a plainer bride, we hear no more of him. The Frau Buchholz is well-to-do. Her jaunts and junkets are many. Not once do they lead her in the direction of a review, nor does she so much as allude to the uniformed princes who are ever plenteous as asparagus in May 'Unter den Linden.'

This book had the immense success its undoubted humour warranted. There was surprise when it became known that its observant writer was a member of the Reichstag, for the feminine standpoint was maintained with real adroitness. By the light of later events it seems to point to the conclusion that in 1888 Berlin had settled down to peace and prosperity, and was chiefly concerned in profiting by both. The conquests of 1870 were being enjoyed, and the conquerors perhaps fading into forgetfulness. There was no ship-shaped collecting-box on the mantelpiece of Frau Buchholz to help towards building Dreadnoughts which, like the broom of stout Martin Tromp, should 'sweep the English from the seas.' There is no sign of virulent race hatreds. The Frau Buchholz is, indeed, more inclined to pick a quarrel with her own Kaiser for awarding the Order of the Eagle to the father of 'that woman Bergfeldt,' though she found comfort in reminding her that it was 'only of the fourth class.'

To turn from jest to sober earnest is to meet with another surprise in the imperishable pages of Alphonse Daudet's *Contes*

du *Lundi*, to which previous reference has been made. War pictures for the most part written with the trace of the anguish of the cruel hour of defeat, it might be expected they would show the iniquities, the crimes of the Germans as they appeared to the tear-stained eyes of a passionate patriot. Yet, with the exception of *Le Prussien de Bélisaire*, the German soldier is conspicuous chiefly by his absence. Bélisaire goes back to his little summer cottage by the river from surrendered Paris. 'Il y avait trop de casques pointus sur la route. . . . Et insolents ! Il fallait se tenir à quatre pour ne pas taper dessus.' Poor Bélisaire waxes indignant when he finds his property ruined. He is a big, powerful joiner. 'One of William's soldiers' swears at him when he enters his own domain. He loses his head, strikes out blindly, kills his man, and is sorry when he has done it. Bélisaire is not captured. He hides what he is almost shocked to find a corpse, and steals back by night to set it floating down the river. Daudet makes us realise that the good, honest fellow regrets his deed of violence. Bélisaire is no machine, but intensely human.

L'Empereur Aveugle is more a sermon addressed to Napoleon the Third than the study of an amiable, learned Bavarian Colonel it professes to be. It contains some mordant reflections upon the short-sightedness of France in believing Bavaria would be her ally in arms as in religion in 1870. That is ancient history nowadays, but the fact remains, perhaps, that Daudet rightly insists upon.

Malgré nos sottises patriotiques, nos vanités, nos fanfaronnades, je ne crois pas qu'il y ait en Europe un peuple plus vantard, plus glorieux, plus infatué de lui-même, que le peuple de Bavière. . . . A Paris nous n'avons qu'un arc de triomphe ; là-bas ils ont dix.

Yet he turns aside to touch with the kindness of genuine liking his old Colonel von Sieboldt, with the flair for all things Japanese.

If we wish to find an example of dignified self-restraint in dealing with the German soldier by one to whom his presence in those beloved 'pays annexés' is an abiding pain, we have only to return to the short story by a high-minded Christian gentleman. *Le Guide de l'Empereur* is the tragedy which has had a long, long run upon the French stage. The grievous tale is of a French heart beating true to France beneath the German uniform, its hero is a German soldier in name only, and his place is not here. But further attention should be drawn to Monsieur Bazin's treatment of the officer in supreme command, for he chances to be the Kaiser himself. There is no vituperation, no caricature. The Emperor stands out plainly, all eager-

ness to show his noble condescension towards the lowliest of his invincible army! 'Es ist eine alte Geschichte, doch bleibt sie immer neu.' Heine would have felt the force of his own words thus applied; imperial funeral wreaths have stripped many a laurel of its branches.

The transition is abrupt to the daring work of the daring Herr Beyerlein which sent a thrill of hope through France ten years ago. Its English translation merely attracted the attention of a few keen critics then. The comments of the *Spectator* are appropriately quoted upon the now familiar cover of the ubiquitous cheap new edition of *Jena or Sedan?*

Herr Beyerlein's theme is the decadence of the German Army. That it is decadent he has no doubt at all, and he is a close and not unfriendly observer. . . . Symptoms of decay in the Army point, therefore, not only to possible disaster abroad, but to demoralisation at home.

The book is not milk for babes. In several instances it more than hints at things we consider unmentionable. It evinces the curious lack of spirituality to which the novelists of modern Germany have accustomed us, although it is refreshingly permeated with honest sympathy for the oppression of the rank and file, and just anger against the petty tyranny of their so-called superiors. 'Any small spark of liking for the soldier's life must be quenched by the deadly monotony of eternal parade drill.' Herr Beyerlein has been regarded with respect as a prophet in his own country since the Crown Prince was fortified for going to see his spirited problem play, *Zapfenstreich*, and failing to learn its admirable lesson. It had a briefer career than it deserved in London as *Lights Out*, because, happily for themselves, the pit and gallery understood nothing of the dire need for such a trenchant attack on the duelling system.

German critics protested loudly when they found England devouring the unclean, scandalous chronicle of *Eine Kleine Garnison*. They objected with some show of justice to the mis-translation which entitled the British version *In a Garrison Town*. They pointed out that the evils shown up in lurid colours by the unliterary Bilse were only to be found in the little garrisons where misdemeanants from crack regiments were exiled to reflect over their shortcomings. They insisted that these things were not, except in isolated instances. Yet to read *Jena or Sedan?* is to perceive at once that the atmosphere of the two books is identical in unhealthiness, that the grave moral charges brought with clumsy flippancy by Bilse as to a large percentage of officers, and a still larger percentage of their wives, are urged with arresting sternness by Herr Beyerlein. His peasant hero is a thoroughly good fellow until he is made reckless by a bully whose actions make our blood boil. 'A mad resentment surged

up in him. He would not obey this idiot at any price. He raised his head and looked the officer in the face with eyes full of open mutiny.'

The pity of it is that Franz Vogt had endured almost to the end, thanks to his friendship with Klitzing, whose fine brains are quite unrecognised, and whose weak body is callously overworked and tortured until he dies a martyr's death, to help his comrade in a scuffle with drunkards. Franz, sullen and rebellious, as well he might be, was dragged to prison when his deliverance from the thralldom of the service was imminent. Directly the rest were set free,

the drill which had been thrashed into them was forgotten. It was as if a spirit of revolt had taken possession of the men. . . . It dawned upon them how the little they, as soldiers, were obliged to learn had been made quite unnecessarily difficult for them. They stripped off, like a troublesome strait-waistcoat, the superfluity of petty rules to which they had been subjected, and the recognition of the needless compulsion they had so long endured produced as its inevitable consequence a violent reaction.

Vogt goes back to his bit of land to find his fine old father dead from grief at the injustice of his son's sentence. He looks on the green fields almost with the sullen sense of injury with which Zola shows Jean Macquart in his birthplace after the 'Débâcle.'

To glance at the Colonel in command is to find that he is a good fellow in the main. He bases his philosophy on the safe if uninspiring aphorism that 'It doesn't do to think too much,' but even this resolution cannot quite banish doubts. The rain of Iron Crosses of to-day gives point to his fears that

This deluge of orders showered on the China expedition leads to a lot of self-delusion. It magnifies an insignificant event to an unnatural degree. Trivial successes stand out as if they were great victories, and cause exaggerated notions of individual infallibility.

It is significant, too, that ten years ago this Colonel was uneasy over the 'undoubted superiority of French artillery.' He enters into this matter at some length, and is not reassured by the airy flippancy with which most of his officers regard apprehensions we now know to be well grounded. 'All this unctuous outward show in religion is detestable' is another of his conclusions which will find few dissentients; and, indeed, neither he nor his poor little Iphigenia daughter, a typical German *Mädchen*, is unlikable or despicable.

But when we are expected to pity Senior Lieutenant Reimers for his utter moral shipwreck, we are harder at heart than his superiors. Reimers is introduced as just back from a tour of observation of the South African War, and is begged to 'Fire

away with leaves from the diary.' 'What he had seen and gone through among the Boers was still in his own mind a dim chaos of impressions, and it was repugnant to him to touch on it even superficially.' It should in fairness be noted that neither here nor elsewhere is there any expression of the virulent hatred towards the English that Herr Beyerlein may be too just to have felt without reason. Reimers went to South Africa because 'I wanted to see something of the serious side of my profession'; he returns to a wild orgy of drinking and gambling, ending by a 'Can-can' danced by a senior engaged on the shameful task of ruining a miserable boy. Rather prematurely, he 'thanked God he was a man, and his ideal Germany still stood out clear and definite, dwarfing mere personal aims.'

His collapse is sudden and degrading, due to the eternal feminine in its time-dishonoured aspect. It is necessary to pause a moment over the women of this garrison, if the resulting note cannot be one of admiration. For in all ranks they are nearly all miserable alike, either through their own sins or the sins of others making them victims. Well may the Frau von Stuckhardt regret the convent she had thought of entering when in an evil hour she accepted her cousin. She, at least, was good and pure, but 'she believed that she had defrauded the Church, and felt her conscience constantly oppressed by this grave offence.' The beautiful Hannah von Grüpphüsen is a poignant study of despair, ending in a dramatic suicide. The wives of the non-commissioned officers imitate those above them in a coarser and more flagrant wickedness. But it is small wonder their husbands and themselves 'do as their betters (?) do.' Even the duel, zealously supported by the Kaiser, is now practised by these non-commissioned emulators of high fashion. Herr Beyerlein gives two examples, one in which the best of his characters escapes scot-free, as, with his frank detestation of the system, he deserves. The other ends a sordid *drame passionnel* with inevitable fatality.

There are only two entirely pleasant people in *Jena or Sedan*?—the clever, shrewd Captain Güntz, who ultimately leaves the service from sheer disgust, and the sensible wife who is eminently welcome in the dreary society of her peccant sisters. Güntz also has been away, and tells his friend Reimers that he 'was sick of the way people went on in Berlin.' Unlike the Colonel, he is always thinking, and uttering home truths as the fruit of his reflection. 'Do you think it gives me any pleasure that so many of our superiors and comrades do not merit the respect which as officers they command? . . . They would all like to idle under a sot.'

'It is possible I am right in my fears. Of that I cannot bear to think,' he bursts out on another occasion. 'What fears do

you mean?' asks Reimers. 'I can't help myself. I'm often forced to remember we have had a bad time before.' 'Before when?' 'Before Jena.'

Misgivings, unrest, a certain vague dissatisfaction—all these things are ten years old in the army of the enemy, if we are to believe this brilliant novelist even in part. 'Want of patriotism is the most significant inward danger of the present military system,' is another of his remarkable allegations. He looks back to the men of '70 with a keen regret. 'A good part of that modest, quiet devotion to duty was still alive in the army, but was not the new-fangled, shallow, noisy bustle of show and glitter every day displacing the good old feeling that recognised its power without any big words?'

It is instructive to place in juxtaposition with what is nominally fiction, the stern truth of a letter found in the pocket of a dead fighter in the ghastly Flanders trenches, heaped with the slain: 'Our poor, stupid people, dazzled by the loud, empty speeches of our rulers, are unconsciously rushing into an abyss which will prove far deeper than that dug for us in 1805.'

It lay beyond the power even of him who profanely arrogates to himself the name of 'Most Exalted' to fortress this free thinker who surely spoke the truth. The time has come when Herr Beyerlein's many questions will have their answer, the answer, it may be, of a most terrible affirmative. His doctrine is not the oft-reiterated doctrine of the Prussian, 'Might is right.' It may be at heart he holds with us that it is the exact converse. 'Right is might' is the faith by which we hope to conquer, the faith making a Crusader of the lowliest combatant in the ranks of the Allies. Is there not significance in the fact that where the Briton makes his farewell a curtailed 'God be with you,' the Frenchman his more solemn 'Adieu,' the German wish is material: 'Lebe wohl'?

LILIAN ROWLAND-BROWN
(*Rowland Grey*).

LOUIS QUATORZE THE SECOND

'I SEE, I see, the German bullets are blunter than ours—which is quite what one might have expected, by the bye.' A wounded Belgian was showing us his gleanings from the Yser.

'Yes, and the clips which hold the brutal things together in fives—hands of fate, fists sinister, cinquefoils of Dis from the fields of Essen—are coarsely made, I see; which is just what one would expect from Westphalia.'

Meanwhile a contralto voice was singing *Die Beiden Grenadiere*; 'Nach Frankreich zogen zwei Grenadier' rang passionately out, in the hearing of three subalterns of the Buffs, the universal Buffs that our regiments are to-day, and such dolour sounded in the 'mein Kaiser, mein Kaiser gefangen' that the trees of the Surrey garden, looking in and listening, may have suspected treason.

But French voices also utter that ballad passionately; it is only nominally German. Germany has had to borrow her national emotions—she marries into them, so to speak, the Vaterland is more of a stepfather-land than a genuine parent; Germany's one and only true poet was a Jew, and Schumann's use of the *Marseillaise* gives his ballad its musical rapture. Of such loans or larcenies are German poems made; the true native voice is the *lied*, I think—the ditty of lackadaisical love and death.

I daresay the Muse of History shakes with mirth when she sings of German patriotism; but for her dignity as a gentlewoman she might hold her sides, then slap her raised knee and guffaw. For she knows that German patriotism has always been an alternation of servility and truculence; the bumptiousness of Suabians, Saxons, Prussians, and Franconians soon 'falls a victim to the hereditary lack of common consciousness' again, and being 'forced back into the old submission,' licks the chastising hand, as Professor Kuno Francke admits. The Muse of History remembers that, twice or thrice since Charlemagne, the brutal bombast of Germanic 'patriotism' has had to be trounced into meekness again, by various nations; and she sees that even to-day the 'common consciousness' of the Imperial Germans is little

better than a huddling around the strongest and the brag of a pedantic self-conceit.

Nay, not for these *parvenus* yet the quick flush, the sudden lump in the throat, the instinctive rapture of the heart which the heirs of ancient patriotisms feel, at sight of the flag, at sound of the national chaunt; *amor patriae* in Germany is made of buckram. Like the German kind of wisdom, it is half-baked, *halbbildung*. The great manner is missing. Can a people seldom free, who have never truly striven to be domestically free, feel true patriotism? Servile at home and boastful abroad, they give honest races offence. Europe cannot like them; tactless, graceless, unseemly, as a people they compel dislike. Learned but obtuse, bookish but loutish, they sprawl in Europe, as the hobble-dehoys of civilisation, the freshmen of art and letters, the card-indexers of science, the bagmen of trade.

Besides, they are so atheistical against realities, so sceptical towards hard facts. Anything can deceive them, any house of cards can seem solid to them, and therefore, and also because the real and permanent seem hollow to them, their plans and policies fail. Their lack of any decent sense of humour, too, (decent humour) has left them ignorant of themselves even, for it is out of humour, I suppose, that the faculty of self-criticism is born. The French can jest at themselves, we English can laugh at ourselves, but the Germans can only admire themselves, and they gaze into mirrors endlessly, with the obstinate vanity of the plain. Do they even begin to suspect that Europe less hated them than ridiculed them? Before the War, I mean; we have a right to regard them with detestation now. Do they even yet guess why in peace-time, when they descended upon the shores of Lake Garda or the Italian Riviera, the clans of the leisured from other countries fled? Not even yet can they understand why. For generations yet they will pose sincerely, self-conscious models of what people and a People should be, unless they are now trounced to the very soul.

They are so conscientiously didactic, too, they so long in their hearts to schoolmaster the world; they are such libraries in breeches, text-books and manuals bound in such ugly, ill-fitting cloth. As fanatics of system they can sympathise with nothing which their systems do not include. French gaiety of heart, the large Russian untidiness, the calm English individuality they cannot understand, and whatever they cannot comprehend they have to hate. If they could but laugh at eccentricities! If they could laugh at anything but tragic comedies of pain, or Rabelaisian filth! *Simplicissimus* is now the true mirror of their nature; in England the best, in Germany the worst, comes out in time of war. Jealousy and envy turn sourer in Germany than else-

where, it seems, and why? Because freedom, fairness, and magnanimity are there least known. 'Live and let live' was never a German proverb, fair play is no jewel at Berlin, and these dark defects are racial, they are inbred. Class for class, the cosmopolitan traveller, comparing them with the French and the British, finds the Germans inferior. Not sportsmen, seldom gentlemen—the Kaiser himself was defined by a familiar of his as 'not quite a gentleman'—they have always struck below the belt and played offside; what is 'not cricket' is the only game they know. And '*C'est la guerre, mais ce n'est pas magnifique*' describes the anti-chivalry of their wars.

If we used to look up to them, it was because we are simple, trustful, rather thoughtless people, and also because our own natural pedants, Carlyle and his successors down to Professor Cramb, making capital out of a knowledge of the German language, persuaded us to take *pro magnifico* a race now seen to be, as a whole, not more truculent or callous than base.

'This was the officer's Mauser pistol, was it? Two hundred bullets, had he? You did actually see him shooting some of his men to encourage the others?' The Belgian was still displaying trophies, and the rich voice still rang on. '*Then seizing my musket, I'll rush from the grave, to share in my Emperor's glory.*' The song wails off into silence, in minor chords; for Schumann—they *used* to have great musicians in Germany—would not incorporate the weak last strophe of the *Marseillaise*, that ends with a twizzle, like a pigtail.

Von Hindenburg is their Napoleon now, it seems; they used to compare their Kaiser with the Corsican. Louis Napoleon was nearer the mark, but I think the true parallel lies with Louis Quatorze. Wilhelm the Second and he made much the same 'howlers' in statecraft. Each came to a throne made illustrious by others—Louis to the France of Richelieu and Mazarin, Wilhelm to the Prussia of Bismarck and Moltke. Wilhelm dismissed Bismarck; Louis would have done as much to Mazarin if death had not prevented it. But for the same reason Louis would have behaved as badly to his father as Wilhelm did, in the all but parricidal Hohenzollern fashion. The young Louis did actually behave badly to his mother; so did the young Wilhelm to his. Each made himself a hero to his valets by means of many wardrobes. Louis had an extensive spy-system set up; Wilhelm elaborated one. Both were ruthless and ferocious in war, the Palatinate suffering then as Belgium does now.

Both strove for colonies and sea-power, both built big fleets, and both made the Gargantuan mistake of going to war with Britain and mainland nations at the same time. Like Wilhelm's,

Louis Fourteenth's was a squinting policy, one eye on the Lowlands and one on the Atlantic; therefore Louis invited into existence a Triple Alliance against him, as Wilhelm did the Triple Entente. During both reigns manufactures and commerce flourished, but in both cases national failure followed, Louis leaving his realm in a ferment and his dynasty doomed, as it seems likely that Wilhelm will do. It used to be understood that books by Admiral Mahan were the Kaiser's favourite reading, but he can never have pondered much upon the following passage :

When Louis the Fourteenth took the government into his own hands, in 1661, there began to be seen an astonishing manifestation of the work which can be done by absolute government ably and systematically wielded. That part of the administration which dealt with trade, manufactures, shipping, and colonies was given to a man of great practical genius, Colbert. He pursued his aims in a spirit thoroughly French [thoroughly German, we should say now]. Everything was to be organised, the spring of everything was to be in the Minister's cabinet. To organise producers and merchants as a powerful army, subjected to an active and intelligent guidance, so as to secure an industrial victory for France by order and unity of efforts; to obtain the best products by imposing on all workmen the processes recognised as best by competent men; to organise seamen and distant commerce in large bodies, like the manufacturers and internal commerce; and to give as a support to the commercial power of France a navy established on a firm basis, were Colbert's aims. Here then was seen power, absolute, uncontrolled power gathering up into its hands all the reins for the guidance of a nation's course, and proposing so to direct it as to make it, among other things, a great Sea Power.

Is not the parallel with the Kaiser's aims and practice marvellously exact?

But Colbert's method was further described by Admiral Mahan :

In building up the power of the State this very great man looked not to any one of the bases on which it rests to the exclusion of the others, but embraced them all in his wise and provident administration. Agriculture and manufactures; internal trade routes and regulations, by which the exchange of products from the interior to the exterior is made easier; shipping and customs regulations tending to throw the carrying trade into French hands, and so to encourage the building of French shipping, by which the home and colonial products should be carried back and forth; colonial administration and development, by which a far-off market might be continually growing up, to be monopolised by the home trade; treaties with foreign States, favouring French trade, and imposts on foreign ships and products, tending to break down the trade of rival nations; all these means, embracing countless details, were employed to build up for France (1) Production; (2) Shipping; (3) Colonies and Markets, in the systematic, centralising French way.

But 'this wonderful growth, forced by the action of the Government, withered away like Jonah's gourd,' under the breath

of ambitious war. A war of aggression then, as now, intended to extend great power, brought it to ruin. 'The agricultural classes, manufactures, commerce, and the colonies, all were smitten, and the order established in finances was overthrown.' No, the Kaiser can never have rightly read Mahan.

For even in naval war-making the parallel holds. Under Wilhelm, as under Louis, sea-captains were ordered to confine their fighting to 'affairs of circumspection.' Under Louis 'the orders given to the squadron chiefs were to keep the sea as long as possible, without engaging in actions which might cause the loss of vessels difficult to replace,' a system of defensive naval war which Pitt proclaimed to be the forerunner of certain ruin. 'Too often our squadrons left port with the intention of avoiding the enemy,' wrote Jurien de la Gravière, the French naval historian, 'as if to fall in with him would be a piece of bad luck'—the force of comparison can hardly further go. Yet it continues.

A false policy of extension swallowed up the resources of the country and was doubly injurious, because by leaving defenceless its colonies and commerce it exposed the greatest source of wealth to be cut off. The small squadrons that got to sea were destroyed by vastly superior force; the merchant shipping was swept away, and the colonies fell into England's hands.

The Muse of History does repeat herself; she plagiarises from the past. But her excuse for that is the persistence of the human folly which she records. German editors and professors repeat to-day the angry accusation first penned by French gazette-writers under Louis the Fourteenth, that Britain is perfidious; yet the Muse of History knows Britain to have been not perfidious but fortunate, fortunate in having megalomaniac but short-sighted monarchs for foes. Colbert would never have gone to war as Louis did; Bismarck warned Wilhelm against what he has now done. The crowned head is the fool in the tragedy; Louis the Fourteenth was the unwilling architect of our Empire, which Wilhelm is consolidating for us. No, Albion is not perfidious, or it could not be fortunate; for perfidy is foolish and ruinous, as Louis lived to learn, and as Wilhelm will, *die waren in Russland gefangen*, and schoolmastered by men of the Blues and the Buffs.

J. H. YOXALL.

‘THE WATCHER’ AND HIS FEATHERED FRIENDS

THERE is no entertainer like a good teller of stories, and of all fascinating story-tellers surely Edward Hart, of Christchurch, ranks among the first. Not Pawpukeewis himself could more thrill and entrance his audience than he when he embarks on his wonderful tales of the feathered folk, their loves and laws, their mysterious gifts and powers. And Mr. Hart has this great advantage over Hiawatha's friend—that his stories are true, every word.

As you enter the door of Hart's Museum in the old-fashioned High Street of Christchurch, its presiding genius, with his genial, kindly face, spare, alert figure, and humour-twinkling eyes, opens for you his storehouse of wonders as he leads you from one group to another, showing, in this Westminster Abbey of the birds, how his heroes and heroines looked and acted in life.

You want a love story—a tragedy as overwhelming and inevitable as any Sophocles has told? See these figures here. The glass case shows a bit of sandy seashore and a group of fine-plumed Ruffs of the sandpiper family, the centre figure a magnificent fellow with proud crest, ruffle and epaulettes of snow white panached with black, long, spearlike beak and a vizor of orange-coloured granules, the latter worn for the protection of the eyes in battle. This was the story:

It was the great day of the year. The cocks were out in all their bravery to parade before the quiet, sober little hens, who, after cool and critical inspection, were to choose their mates for the season.

For three weeks past the gentlemen had been preparing with the keen excitement, infinite thought and pains, of a *débutante* making ready her toilette for the conquests of her first ball. But how vastly more subtle and effective are both methods and result in the case of the feathered male! Like the human female, he thinks out his most becoming colours and design; but in his case there is no recourse to dressmaker or jeweller, robbing of other folk, either sheep or silkworm, to supply him with material. No; he rises superior to all outside aid, and

triumphantly demonstrates the mighty and mysterious power of mind over matter by working out his sudden transforming change of costume entirely from his own internal resources. And in this family the courting dress is not only a change of colour, but added feathers of infinite variety—no two costumes being ever alike. This latter fact was the cause of the tragedy. For the splendour of our hero's apparel, as he paraded his charms before the critical sex, drew upon him the admiration and approval of no less than four ladies, thereby transferring the obligation of final choice to the proud object of this distinction—a reversing of the social law which ordains that the mother-bird shall select the father of her children.

'Madam is supreme in this kingdom,' says Mr. Hart; 'she orders all, and her one great care is the children.'

And again, when you remark on the wonderful beauty of this gentleman's coat, of the stripes of exquisite colour decorating another's beak: 'Madam ordered it; she wished for just that kind of ornamentation, just that mixture of colour. Madam is the cause of all the beauty in the world,' he tells you with quiet conviction.

But to return to our tragedy—our most human tragedy—for not even in a community where Madam, the mother, is given her proper sphere of influence can you keep out the tragedies that spring from love and jealousy in male and female breast.

The proud White-crested One selected the lady of his love by walking up to her, and rubbing his beak against hers. Why he chose her rather than one of the other three, he probably could not for his life have told his dearest friend. Her coat was no glossier, she was no finer, her eye no brighter than those of her sisters. Possibly she made him in some subtle manner feel her will more strongly than they, and he obeyed this silent impelling. One has seen such a thing before, in communities where the male fondly imagines he always does the choosing. Doubtless also, according to custom of aspirants, he had been for some time past laying at her feet the trophies of the chase, sprats and tit-bits, which the selfish bachelor never dreams of denying himself for any lady.

The bride selected stepped firmly to her partner's side, and then the trouble began.

With one look of outraged pride the three neglected ladies hurried off. Quickly selecting each one a mate, not so much for beauty of costume—though they possessed this also—as for strength and size of limb, length and sharpness of beak, they returned to our white-crested hero and his bride. Fully realising what lay before them, the latter attempted no evasion but calmly faced the inevitable.

All the rules of the duel were scrupulously observed. No hysterical emotion and falling of three upon one—we leave that to humans. One by one the challenge was offered by the mates of the offended ladies, who stood by like stern Fates to see justice done, as one by one the offender was forced to take on his adversaries in a fight to the death.

The first duel did not last long. A few desperate rounds, and the long spear of White Crest pierced suddenly between the vizor of orange granules and his foe fell dead, his beautiful epaulettes rolled in the sand.

Number two advanced thereupon, a fierce fellow of dashing appearance. The fight was desperate. Again and again they met in a death grip. At last down went number two, and the white plumes waved victoriously over a second corpse. The two widowed brides stood silently watching to see the finish, their eyes dry and glittering with desire for vengeance.

The third challenger now advanced, the rules of the inexorable game allowing no breathing space for White Crest. He asked for none. But the two previous duels had exhausted him, and though he made a gallant fight for his life he fell in the end, pierced through the brain—the same deadly thrust he had previously dealt his foes.

At this heavy cost of life, honour was avenged. Three widows went off to choose new mates, with sober and saddened but dignified mien. The remaining couple flew off, triumphant.

The Watcher then came forward from his hiding-place, and, picking up the dead, he performed the funeral rites and bore the bodies of the fallen heroes home to their resting-place in his Museum. Here they are again put on their feet. With crests raised high, they parade their beautiful courting suits before the admiring eyes of countless ladies of the human species. Let us hope this proves some consolation for their untimely end. Had they survived, those gorgeous courting suits would all have been put off within a fortnight of the wedding day. For in his capacity of husband and father the Ruff realises that such showy apparel would be not only useless but a source of danger. He shares with his mate the arduous duties of home-making, hatching and guarding the eggs; and for these duties his costume must be, like hers, as inconspicuous as possible, the sea coast on which the young birds first open their eyes lying in full sight of many foes.

So, within two weeks, he moults his beautiful courting feathers and appears in the same coat as he wore in his bachelor days. In the case of birds whose courting suit consists in colour pigment only, the colour is withdrawn at this time. It is to be noted that the bachelor never under any conditions changes his suit

when once arrived at maturity. In the case of the Gannet this stage is 'prolonged for five years, before which time no male is permitted to mate. If a three or four-year-old has the temerity to present himself as an aspirant, the lady looks him over and instantly demands where are his good conduct stripes, i.e. the markings which show the five years' growth, his coat becoming whiter every year. Quickly the youngster is sent about his business :

'You the father of a family? I require a full-grown mate of experience and wisdom. Be off!' says Madam. Five years is a long time to wait, and he thought perhaps she might not notice that lingering dark patch in the wing where it ought to be white. But Madam always notices everything.

When four eggs are laid the hatching begins. Madam Ruff limits her family to four, and this tribe being fierce fighters, and males meeting frequently with a violent death at each other's beaks, Madam, the far-seeing law-maker, provides against an undesirable preponderance of one sex over the other by laying three cocks to one hen. With the males it is a case of the survival only of the fittest; none of the small or weakly have a chance of mating.

Among the hawk tribe, the female being the larger bird, and custom and nature making her the fighter and aggressor, Madam in this family puts three females to one male into the nest. Like the eagle, she allows herself the delight and luxury of dainty, white-clad babies, and for the same reason. These robbers and brigands respect each other's homes and hearths—'Honour among thieves' is their motto.

Mr. Hart points to a nestful of white, fluffy balls in the cranny of a jagged bit of rock, over which hovers a magnificent mother eagle, her eye lit with a lofty, arrogant pride quite absent from the watchful fear ever on the alert in the mother of inferior physique beset by dangers to her young.

'Every mother would like to see her babies dressed in white,' says Mr. Hart; 'but she chooses, for obvious reasons, their first coats to match the ground on which they are born. She trims the baby to match the cradle, and she places the cradle as near as possible to the larder.'

To illustrate this, he shows us various families of young. Here, for instance, we have the Stormy Petrel, with her babies exactly like small muffs of seaweed—a casual observer could never tell the difference.

Then, again, here is the Great Plover, with her small family of squatting balls, their little brown beaks marked exactly to match the cracks of the dry soil on which they are born. 'And observe,' says the Watcher, who has observed every detail so

carefully himself, 'these babies never sit at right angles to the cracks in the soil. They sit in line with them, so that they are continuous with the markings on their bodies. This is in obedience to Mother's order.'

This lesson of obedience is learnt very early. A baby of two days old will remain for five or six hours immovable as the pebbles on which it is squatting in obedience to the warning cry of the parent obliged for safety to fly to a distance. All danger is averted. In some cases the lesson is taught even before the baby has broken through the shell. In proof of this amazingly precocious intelligence, Mr. Hart shows another scene.

This time it is a pebbly beach, on it lying a pathetic little form half-emerged from a broken eggshell. This was the sad little tale :

From his vantage point the Watcher had noted for days past a sitting Gull and her mate. The time for hatching off was approaching : already the mother was speaking to her children. Well the Watcher knew the language—so well that he could speak it without even a foreign intonation.

Some sound startled the mother. She rose in the air. The Watcher cautiously approached the nest. The eggs so perfectly matched the pebbles around that to distinguish them would have been impossible for ordinary eyes of man or bird. Gently the Watcher took in his hand one warm egg, murmuring words of motherly assurance as he did so. The egg throbbed and moved slightly as it lay in his hand. But presently a cry of anguish sounded overhead, an imperious command in response to which the egg suddenly rolled out of the Watcher's hand and fell with a crash to the ground. The command had been to crouch. The baby in the egg was on his back, and tried, therefore, to turn over. In doing this he met his death. The poor mother, in a moment of distraction, had spoken without due thought.

Sadly the Watcher picked up the little corpse and bore the young martyr to obedience to the place of honour he had won in the Museum.

Besides the marvellous and precocious intelligence of his little friends, Mr. Hart tells of psychic gifts which, were they found in human beings, would excite the interest of all the learned professors of psychology and psychical research.

Here, for instance, is the Curlew. He points to the graceful little bird, with his pretty, dark travelling suit, the waistcoat of a lighter colour, all in perfect taste ; nothing in his build indicating the extraordinary powers of endurance and muscular force latent in the slight frame. For Mr. Curlew is a great traveller. His winter quarters are in New Zealand, and every year he stops

at Christchurch and the country round, on his way up to Northern Siberia. At this half-way house he enjoys a pleasant sojourn in the English springtime, courts his mate in the lanes and meadows, and awaits the signal from his northern home. It is a fact, says Mr. Hart, proved and attested beyond dispute, that the evening the Curlew leaves Christchurch is invariably the day on which the ice breaks in the north, at least two thousand miles distant. He performs the flight in one night. Birds always travel by night. By day they feed and store up the fuel needed for their long journeys, averaging a rate of two hundred and eighty miles an hour. Mr. Wilbur Wright and M. Blériot, you are still a long way behind the feathered folk's flying machine!

And in spite of a two thousand miles' flight Mr. Curlew will be as fresh as a newly opened daisy when seen, the morning of his arrival, picking up his breakfast in Christchurch meadows.

On reaching Siberia the Curlews set to work to build their summer homes and raise their families. The first brood hatched off, the young are instructed in all necessary knowledge to fit them for life. This point is generally attained by the time they reach the age of two months. The parents then despatch them south, bidding them stop at the same half-way house to rest where they themselves had sojourned and had such a pleasant courting time in early spring.

No guide goes with these young ones. Off they start one summer's night, and make the same two thousand miles' flight as their parents made some months before, alighting in the morning at Christchurch, where the Watcher is found awaiting his little friends.

The mother transmits to her young a psychic faculty inherent in a physical substance—the perilymph found in a small duct behind the ear. All that Mother knows and holds within her experience becomes the possession of her offspring. She knows Christchurch, so the baby can find the way there. But without the perilymph this sixth sense is as completely absent as sight without the eye.

In proof of this assertion, we were shown a poor, forlorn youngster perched on a desolate bit of rock on the west coast of Scotland, where some natives of that land were advancing upon him menacingly. Mr. Hart had come upon him just as the latter had done him to death. Poor fellow! He had lost his friends and lost his way, and could give no account of himself when he strayed into a foreign land where he had no business.

Mr. Hart picked up the poor victim's body, and on examining him found, as he suspected, that the canal behind the ear was undeveloped, and the bird had no perilymph, and, in consequence, no sixth sense.

When asked whether the human race had ever possessed this

invaluable lymph, Mr. Hart expressed the conviction that in the early days of the race they had done so, as there are signs of it still in primitive peoples inhabiting the wild and uncultivated parts of the earth. These have often been observed to possess this sixth sense, and unquestionably there are traces of the duct behind the human ear.

Another illustration of how far we are behind our little brothers the birds is shown by the Great Plover. He has, for the soundest of all possible reasons—i.e. the procuring of his food—brought the sense of hearing to a fine art; and since his breakfast in drougthy weather often lies eight inches below the surface of the ground, he has, with God's help, evolved a nose the same length as his piecrust. Unlike us poor humans, who, when boring for oil, water, or coal, repeatedly do so in the wrong place, the Great Plover never makes a bad shot. Neither has he recourse to dowsers. Here, again, he has developed what he required out of his own internal resources, and, because the obtaining of his breakfast necessitated very acute hearing, he has multiplied the drums of his ear, and instead of one evolved five. Thus equipped, he is able to hear the slow, sinuous movement of the worm in the soil, eight inches below the hard-crusted surface.

'Now, the Lapwing has another method of getting his worms.' The Watcher points to a pretty, intelligent-looking bird of much shorter bill, with one leg raised in the attitude of a dancing-master, and presents Mr. Lapwing with 'Here's a cunning fellow, if you like!'

And, in truth, the sharpest of solicitors and the subtlest of serpents are not ahead of Mr. Lapwing in his devices. He has no need of five drums in his ear, nor yet of such an encumbrance as a nose eight inches long. Instead of digging for his breakfast, he makes his breakfast come to him, even when, after a long drought, it lies buried many inches deep.

Being a keenly observant bird, Lapwing has noted that at the first sound of pattering rain upon the ground friend Worm wriggles up through his little passage to the surface. Oh, yes; each worm has his own little hole, just like the mole or the rabbit, for that matter. You don't notice it from the top? Well, of course not—we are not quite stupid in Wormland, though we can't pretend to cope with the Machiavellian intellect of Mr. Lapwing. But we do know enough to shut the front door, and this we do with any bit of old leaf or rubbish found handy. Just leave a few tiny scraps of paper on the lawn one evening, and look for them next morning. Look carefully, and you will find them rolled up neatly at the mouth of imperceptible little worm-holes in the grass.

Now, the Lapwing having noted the fact of pattering rain drawing the worm to the surface, when a prolonged drought has sent his breakfast below the length of his bill, assembles some hundreds of his family, and, selecting a promising spot, they commence to drum with one foot on the hard ground while standing erect on the other. It is so perfect an imitation of the rain that before long up comes poor, unsuspecting Master Worm, eagerly welcoming the water for which he is dying of thirst. Alas! his joy is short-lived. Skilfully and swiftly he is drawn up and dispatched. And since no worm ever returns to tell the tale of this base deception, generation after generation fall victims to the cunning Lapwing.

How the feathered folk would smile could they hear and read man's fatuous discourses on the intrinsic superiority of the human brain and intelligence. Mind, thought, reason, all these he arrogates to himself, and when brought face to face with the same thing, in essence if not degree, in his brothers the birds and the beasts, he tosses his head contemptuously and calls it 'instinct.' N.B.: Without attempting to define or justify this word, for which he might just as well substitute 'abracadabra.' Man sets traps and snares, prepares flies for the fish, builds a Mont Cenis tunnel, and erects a skyscraper and a cathedral, and then vaunts himself on the achievements of the human brain—the marvellous human brain. But when he finds the Mont Cenis of the ant, the cell of the bee, the submarine palaces of the coral insect, and all the wonderful works of the birds, he pronounces this 'Only instinct!'

The evidences of heart are dismissed in the same summary fashion, seeing that to concede these little brethren love involves reason and intelligence of the higher order. We even try to lower human mother-love by calling it 'instinct,' because we find it shared with the partridge and the lioness. But it is not only mother-love that we have to account for. Was it 'instinct' that made Sir Walter Scott's dog die on his master's grave? Or was it love such as the Elder Brother of us all described as 'Greater love hath no man'?

Instinct, always instinct. Well, it is a pity, then, that we do not turn our attention to cultivating some of this same instinct. It might assist us in dealing with some of our social evils. Take the housing problem, for instance.

Mr. Hart has a case which shows two charming, wise little Owls' heads peering out of a hole in the trunk of a tree, the watchful mother sitting by. Like many a human home, there is just room for two children at a time in this house—no more. So the mother arranges accordingly. Under the two babies

she is rearing she places two eggs, which are thus ready to hatch off by the time the young ones are fit to fly. She times it all to a nicety, and repeats this programme, till by the end of the summer she has reared quite a large family, but without any of the discomfort and evils of overcrowding.

Is it instinct, mind, or what force that we have not yet tapped, which enables the Cuckoo to vary the size and colour of her egg, according to the nest for which she destines it?

In Mr. Hart's Museum is a case containing a hundred and eighty-seven Cuckoo's eggs, each one different, varying in colour, size, or shape, in order to match the eggs of the nest in which it was surreptitiously laid. Only with seven eggs out of this number had Mrs. Cuckoo failed to match her egg properly with those of the foster-mother selected for her baby. But imagine the infinite capacity of the mind for acting on matter displayed in those hundred and eighty eggs! The nest of the little Wren is so constructed that the entrance leaves the eggs in obscurity, the wily Cuckoo therefore never troubles to match her egg in this instance.

It must be noted besides that this unscrupulous though interesting bird invariably secures the best position in the nest, for the interloper, by making her egg just a little larger than those of the foster-mother, knowing well that the heaviest egg will go to the centre. Bearing in mind also that, though arithmetic is not a strong point with her feathered sisters, still they can count up to three, she never places her egg in any nest where there is not already that number. Should any careless Cuckoo fail to observe this precaution—and there are, of course, exceptions to every rule—the owners of the nest promptly turn out the intruder. Or should the Cuckoo fail to match her egg properly in colour and size, out it goes with much indignant protesting and strong language.

In one case another method was resorted to. This was because the construction of the nest made ejection impossible, the rim turning inwards.

The nest was that of a dainty little pair of Reed Warblers, whose mating the Watcher had noted with interest, and also the dexterous construction of their home built on the edge of the stream among the reeds, and hung to the latter by little side rings which, as the tide rose or fell, enabled the nest to slip up and down, remaining always above the water. It was built about eight inches above the normal tide; but, bearing in mind that at full moon the tide will rise as much as two feet, long reeds were selected. The swaying of the reeds in the wind was also remembered; so, lest the eggs should roll out of the nest

when the wind blew strong, the nest of the far-seeing little Reed Warbler was finished off with a neat little inward-turning rim.

The small pair under the Watcher's friendly eye had already three eggs, when he observed one day a prowling Cuckoo stealthily drop a fourth into the pleasant little home. But Madam Cuckoo had failed this time to match her colours, and in her arrogance she had made her egg conspicuously larger.

Presently, home flew Mrs. Reed Warbler. She gave a cry of surprise and displeasure at the sight of this addition to her family, and called loudly to her husband :

'Come and look at this! Do you know anything about it? Did *you* lay this monstrosity?' she demanded, in a state of rising excitement.

Mr. Reed Warbler swiftly flies to his spouse. He disclaims all knowledge of the stranger egg and pecks at it with aversion. 'Turn it out!' he cries. 'Turn it out at once!'

But this is easier said than done. For hours the pair endeavour to get the obnoxious egg out of their nest. Every time they succeed in pushing it up to the brim, back it rolls to the bottom of the nest.

At last they look at each other in despair. The sun is setting, and they know that soon the darkness will cover them. The two take earnest counsel together. One thing is certain: on no account will they hatch off that enemy in the home. Better to sacrifice their own offspring than incur such a danger. So away they fly, poor things, to spend the night in suspense and troubled thought on some wayside bush, instead of in their warm nest.

The Watcher determines to see the thing through and let them find the way out, instead of playing the *deux ex machina*. So he also spends the summer night outside his bed under the stars.

At early dawn, the very earliest sign of dawn, back come his little friends.

'One more effort,' says Mr. Reed Warbler.

'No use, I tell you,' replies she, but lends a shoulder—again, however, only to be baffled by the inward-turning rim.

Another excited conclave.

'Better leave the nest and build another,' cried he, thoroughly out of patience, and flying off a few paces to suit the action to the word.

'Come back!' calls his spouse imperiously. 'It's bad enough to have to abandon my three eggs; I am not going to leave the nice little home we took such a lot of trouble to build.'

Another conclave.

He suggests spiking the interloper. His beak is all ready if she will speak the word.

'Silly!' says his wife. 'A nice mess you'd make—a nice sort of cradle for my babies! Why, they'd all be addled! Do think before you speak!'

'I fear they are all dead and cold as it is,' he tweets, sadly contemplating the three eggs, of which both had been so proud.

'Of course they are. No use tweeting over cold eggs,' rejoins practical Mrs. Reed Warbler.

Then suddenly she got an idea. They chattered so fast and so excitedly that the Watcher could gather nothing but the fact that they had a new scheme. What it was, he soon knew, however; for off flew the pair, presently returning with pieces of fibre and moss, as though collecting material for a new nest. But no; this idea had been discarded, and the new material, he observed, was being used inside the old nest. Before the end of the day, on peeping discreetly, the Watcher found a thick mattress had been laid over the four eggs and the nest thus prepared for a new family. In due course this arrived, and was successfully hatched off without any further mishap.

On the old home being abandoned for their winter quarters in the autumn, the Watcher took possession of the little nest, and there in his Museum it may be seen, slung gracefully to the reeds by the edge of a stream.

In defence of the Cuckoo, Mr. Hart maintains that she is not quite the heartless mother she would appear. One duty towards her young she never delegates to another bird, and that is teaching her babies their note. At the age of two months—just the time for beginning to speak—the young Cuckoo leaves his foster-mother. The ungrateful fellow has always had more than his share of her care and food, and more often than not pushed his foster-brothers out of the nest with his strong young wings, thus causing their untimely death; but, arrived at the age when he would naturally begin singing lessons, he abruptly quits the home of his youth, and, guided by perilymph, he flies one night across Europe to a certain chosen spot where his mother awaits him in Arabia. There he has been traced sitting beside his mother on an olive branch, and learning from her to say 'Cuckoo!'

How is this known?

Ask the Watcher. He knows this, as he knows all his other wonderful facts, as the result of thirty-seven years' close intercourse with his feathered friends, and that infinitely patient yet keen observation of which genius alone is capable. He possesses also an ingenuity of resource which shows him true

elder brother of the feathered tribe, and a brotherly love which proclaims him lineal descendant of St. Francis of Assisi.

Round the leg of Mother Cuckoo was found, by a fellow Watcher in correspondence with Christchurch, one of Mr. Hart's little stamped rings, and round the leg of the young one another which marked him as her own son.

These little rings have done good service, and are widely used by the confraternity of scientific observers, among whom Mr. Hart is a veteran chief. It was by means of his stamped rings that the Watcher found out where his Christchurch Swallows spent the winter. He marked no less than eighty birds with rings round their legs, and all were found next winter in Cape Colony. The Swallow has received a good deal of his affection and attention. One pair he knew intimately for many years. Like the Nightingale, the Swallow mates for life. This particular little Darby and Joan for fifteen consecutive years returned to the same spot to build their nest and bring up their family, arriving invariably on the same day of the year—the 11th of April. They also were among those observed wintering in Cape Colony. The winter resort is always chosen with a view of finding the same climate and food as in the summer.

The Nightingales, though just as faithful to their mates, consider it advisable to go their separate ways for the winter. Madam has often been observed wintering in India, while her husband generally goes no farther than Persia.

This temporary separation in no way weakens their affection or tempts them to contract fresh ties, as it might in the case of frail humanity. One pair of Mr. Hart's Nightingales kept their tryst year after year on the same day of the month, meeting, as true lovers have ever been wont to meet, on a stile leading into a wood. Philomel, like all birds who can sing love-songs, does not change his coat when courting—such devices are only for less gifted birds. But Mr. Hart's little friend showed the depth of his devotion by always arriving a week before his lady, to prepare for her by tidying up the old place, and clearing away the débris of last year's nest. He then sat awaiting her on the day and at the place appointed.

Needless to say, the Nightingales never separate till the children are grown up and started in life. Whatever the customs of birds, the young are never allowed to suffer. They are always the first consideration. For their sake the father puts off his beautiful courting dress and dons his sombre suit; for the sake of their babies, either parent will unhesitatingly fling himself into the jaws of a terrible death. In the service of their

young they develop strategy and resource worthy of any human heart and brain.

Who has not seen the ruse of the broken wing? A sitting Partridge will see a dog approaching, and instantly fly to meet him and lure him to the farthest end of the field by flying a few paces in front of him, flapping an apparently broken wing. The dog all but snaps her every minute; she escapes as by a miracle, till she knows that he is successfully side-tracked and her young ones safe.

Self-sacrifice and devotion, fidelity in love, self-control and obedience, prudence and forethought, wisdom and resource—innumerable examples of all these qualities may be seen in the making and in achievement at Mr. Hart's wonderful little Museum.

CONSTANCE ELIZABETH MAUD.

W. G. C. GLADSTONE

HE had not been a member for a full period of Parliament : for he entered at a bye-election, and he died before a House of Commons had completed its shortened course under the Parliament Act. His name was associated with no sensational legislation, and he was probably personally unacquainted with the majority of the members. Yet I doubt if the news of the death of any member, short of the few actual leaders of the nation, would have caused such a poignant sense of shock and sorrow as the news of the death of W. G. C. Gladstone. And no member of that assembly at least will feel any exaggeration in Lord Bryce's verdict that 'of all the infinitely sad things in this War none is sadder' than the passing of such as he.

It was not physical charm, such as some persons possess in abundance, which made him a general favourite in the House of Commons. He was large-built, awkward, shy, and possessed little of that physical attraction which makes some persons awake the desire amongst all at once to be friends. I should rather say that there were two qualities which he exhibited, without ostentation, in conspicuous degree—an absolute sincerity of mind, and a grave courtesy of manner which never failed him. He came into the House of Commons enormously handicapped by his name and the reputation of his grandfather. I remember innumerable expressions of commiseration, before he commenced to speak, at the fact that he was called 'Gladstone' and was the heir of Hawarden. Everyone of all parties—such is the generosity of the House of Commons—desired him to do well, and everyone was afraid that he would be a failure. I remember, when he was moving or seconding the Address to the Crown, meeting a prominent statesman in the lobby, and finding that he had deliberately abstained from attendance in the Chamber just for that reason—that he was afraid of the result being so remote from any possible expectations. Yet he did well, and even with the name of Smith or Jones would already have been conspicuous as a personality; and it is personalities which Parliament seeks for and to which Parliament will listen. He always spoke in the region of ideals. He never I think took interest in

that which is nine tenths of the business of the House—the discussion of solid concrete material things, taxes on tea or the details of the commercial life of the nation. Yet he never indulged in vain rhetoric and he never lacked an audience. He was popular amongst all parties, especially amongst the representatives from Ireland, where his name and his hereditary devotion to Home Rule enlisted a real respect and affection—he never became and I doubt if he ever would have become a ‘House of Commons man.’ He remained detached, mingling with its members and always courteous and even seemingly interested in the conversation of the obscurest of them. But somehow one felt that this was not his real interest. Hawarden and his home and strong family affection counted for so much more in his life. One who was present at his coming-of-age celebrations has told me of the excellence of bearing and speeches—and a series of very trying speeches were necessary—which even at the age of twenty-one he displayed. And the great demonstration at his funeral—heightened of course by the tragedy of so early a death earned so entirely by a sense of inevitable duty—was but a symptom of the affection which he had inspired in that historic place where he had lived from a child, which he had come to own, and to which they brought him from the battlefield abroad to rest for ever at the end.

He was educated deliberately for politics from youth upwards, as others are dedicated to the Church or to the learned professions; and the shortness of time in which that education bore fruition is one of the great tragedies of his early death. He accepted that education with the modesty and grace which was his dominant characteristic: never rebelled: studied politics at Oxford and became President of the Union there: realising that this was to be his career. He was in the position, never a very easy one, of that of his grandfather, a Liberal and a strong Churchman. Long before he entered Parliament I remember as a visitor at the Oxford Union assisting him to carry a motion in favour of Welsh Disestablishment, despite the counter eloquence of Lord Robert Cecil: and amid the consternation of the ‘Church Party’ who took themselves, as undergraduates do, with immense seriousness, and thought that such a vote in the very *arcana* of Church and State at Oxford would bring the whole Establishment tumbling to the ground. That was the first time I met him; and I was impressed then by a defence he made of his grandfather, who had been attacked by some jovial, cynical soul: a defence full of seriousness and loyalty. Yet I should be entirely wrong if I gave the general impression of sombreness or failure to enjoy what life can bring. I think that he got from his short existence an immense happiness. He enjoyed Hawarden and

being squire of it. He enjoyed the House of Commons although he was (as I say) not typically 'of it.' He threw himself with zest into everything he undertook—whether motoring or dancing, or advocating a cause or cultivating the personal affection of those whom he loved. I believe that he enjoyed even the rough work of electioneering in so difficult a collection of scattered boroughs as Kilmarnock. I am sure that his success in the House pleased him, because it gave pleasure to those who for years and almost for decades had hoped that this success would come. It was curious that he seemed unable to throw himself heartily into some of the causes of the welfare of humanity which were surging all around him. But I think that this was part of his intellectual sincerity. He was not convinced that these efforts at Social Reform would necessarily make for the increased welfare and happiness of the human race: and until that conviction came it was impossible for the personal intellect to take fire.

He never had the experience of defeat. It was a career with no checks in it, and all the kind of successes which even a modest man may rejoice in—honour at Oxford, an early return to the House of Commons, and there general respect and friendship from members of all parties. Behind that stood affections which were almost sacred in their intimacy, and a family pride in a personality which seemed to be achieving all that had been for so long passionately desired. 'It is not the length of existence that counts,' he wrote to his mother from the Front, 'but what is achieved during that existence, however short.' If the promise was more than the actual achievement, we can at least see that all was done which could be done, and the rest was the decision of a Providence whose path is in deep waters and whose footsteps are unknown.

A well-known Conservative member of Parliament, who served with him on a Committee, has told me how the first prejudices on account of ancestry and party were destroyed by personal intercourse, until he came to regard him as one of the few interesting figures in the House of Commons, and with an interest altogether apart from the name and tradition which he necessarily carried about with him. He characterised Mr. Gladstone as no politician, and certainly as belonging to no party: only inspired with a strong sense of Duty, first to throw himself into the political career for which he had been trained from childhood, and second to adhere to the causes represented in history by the great name which he bore. He found in him a naturalness—an aloofness—almost the spirit of a child—which sharply divorced him from the world of compromise and competition which makes up the political arena. He noted a com-

plete absence of intellectual passion : the very quality which his grandfather possessed in superabundant degree ; yet combined with this absence a great gift of concentration and stern conviction which no appeal could change. At first he was repelled by an austerity and a pedantry which hardly seemed fit company with youth ; afterwards he found these amounted to a shyness and reserve, and a detachment from the genial, not too intellectually scrupulous ways of political life. Fresh, simple and full of vision, was his judgment upon him before the end. Meeting him in the street he would fling out impulsively, almost as a child, a graceful gesture and greeting. He was not the born politician. He was much too indifferent about what he said or did so far as its effect was operative upon others—upon what others would think of such careless utterances. In many conversations with him he noted an extraordinary independence of mind, and a refusal to be tied up by rule or precedent ; a combination of a rare urbanity with a curious firmness and decision. He tried to please not by modifying the substance of what he had to say but by endeavouring to put that substance in the most acceptable form. He would never, that is to say, simply to please, have compromised his conviction. He possessed the character of, and was capable of becoming an Inquisitor or a Martyr : in either case without passion : an austere, angular, grave, visionary nature. This is the impression made upon a political opponent. The conditions of party controversy in Parliament are such that no such impression can be anything but one-sided. Yet the testimony reveals at least, for a man under thirty who had been in the House of Commons so short a space of time, a personality which might have developed, on its own independent lines, into a character and temper remarkable in its effect upon the political changes of the years to come.

He had from the beginning in his speeches in the House itself that most difficult of all tasks laid upon him by his sense of duty and conviction : open opposition to a policy to which his party was committed, and concerning which (as a religious question) many of them felt an intense conviction. No task is supposed to be easier, no task in reality is harder, than to carry on a campaign against your own party, amid the applause of the Opposition, whose every cheer excites bitterness in the hearts of those you are opposing. Yet no assembly so unerringly as the House of Commons can detect the reality of belief, the flawlessness of temper, or the actual motives of those who thus attack Governments they were elected to support or policies with which they were supposed to be in agreement. The history of the Chamber itself is strewn with the dead memories of those who have thought that for personal advantage, an easy advertisement,

or a way to the front bench, the quickest course is to reveal independence by voicing criticisms which they do not really feel. The House itself, with extraordinary precision and insight, judges, approves, or condemns: the self-advertiser disappears, the man who really speaks from sincerity and conviction finds that he loses nothing by doing so. With Mr. Gladstone and the Welsh Church Bill it was the case of a man who cared nothing for reputation, office, or fame endeavouring to argue with an intensity of conviction for what he thought to be right. I remember listening to a speech—punctuated by Opposition cheers while the Liberal Party kept silent—demanding terms for the Welsh clergy which we were not prepared to give. There was no eloquence about it, little distinction of phrase, the gestures were awkward, often there were long pauses between the sentences. Yet a certain intensity of sincerity held a crowded house, and at the end all parties felt as kindly disposed towards the speaker as at the beginning, although the bitterness was marked towards others who were advocating exactly the same policy. He managed to convey an impression of sincerity—transparent and unchallengeable—in his speeches; and that was a quality the House of Commons most readily appreciates, and whose existence intensifies its sense of loss to-day. There was an instinctive feeling that this was not done for personal gain, that if, indeed, things had been otherwise and he had had a firm offer of high promotion in return for silence, the offer would have been unfalteringly rejected.

Yet I doubt if he was ever really at home in Parliament—whether he would ever really have been at home in Parliament. His mind seemed to work much more on the lines of John Bright, who was perpetually astonished at the motives which drove men to get elected and the things they wanted when they were members, than on those of his own grandfather, who so heartily enjoyed the whole Party system and utilised the desires and longings of men. A famous critic has declared that Parliament in debate is the most responsive to ideal appeals, and outside debate the most cynical assembly of any intelligent body in the world. And there is some truth in the utterance. Listening to the gossip of the lobbies and the smoking-rooms, you would think sometimes that nothing but the crudest business egotism or the appeal to motives of pure personal aggrandisement would command attention in the actual public discussions. And yet there is no assembly in the world more generously responsive to any speaker who, with genuine and not artificial emotion, will lift the argument into a region of great ideal issues. It is possible that Mr. Gladstone, had he lived, would have recognised and tolerated this divergence. But in his short political career he was perplexed and disturbed by it. And I remember discussing with

him, and doing what I could to explain, this seeming dichotomy. I think it had a deterring influence upon his desire to speak, and prevented him from (as I have said) becoming a 'House of Commons' man. It kept him detached from the normal life of the member of Parliament, and in consequence gave him that appearance of pedantry, almost of priggishness, which only his conspicuous and unfailing courtesy overcame. He never accepted the whole institution as it stood, a perpetual and fascinating revelation of human nature. I think he would have liked to think that every member, like himself, was only there inspired by an entirely disinterested desire to work for the common weal.

And yet his enthusiasms were curiously limited. Home Rule of course came first: that was part of the family tradition and upbringing; and to bring Home Rule to Ireland I believe he would gladly have given his life. But, as I have said, he seemed to take no particular interest in all the new Social Reform movements and discussions which filled so large a place in public affairs before the War came and turned men's minds to other things. I cannot remember him making any speeches on that class of question which has come to be known as 'the Condition of the People' problem—wages, employment, housing, land questions, and all similar problems which were fermenting all the time he was in Parliament. Here, as always, he went his own way, detached and quite indifferent to the atmosphere which surrounded him. He spoke for Home Rule because he desired it; he criticised Welsh Disestablishment because, until they were amended, he considered some of the clauses unjust; on other subjects he voted, often for measures of advanced Radical and Socialistic Reform; but they did not move him intellectually to special enthusiasm; and it was quite impossible for him to feign an enthusiasm which he did not feel.

Would he have made a 'political career'? That is a difficult question to answer. On a modest scale, indeed, it is easy to assert an affirmative. The kind of life which so many who enter Parliament enjoy was his almost for the asking. An Under Secretaryship, a minor post in the Cabinet, in due time a Colonial Governorship or some similar opportunity of service would of course have awaited him had he cared thus to spend the effort of his days. But by a 'political career' I meant rather something of the same kind, though not of the same degree, as that of the great statesman whose name he bore—a fury of spirit against some remediable wrong which would have driven him into leadership of some great cause. Here again the absence of intellectual passion seemed to show that this was not his destiny. On the other hand, I have heard that on the Irish Home Rule question—especially in a speech delivered in Dublin—he became transformed, and revealed himself as a man who with his whole

energy and being threw himself into something which he believed to be a just cause. In any case judgment must of necessity be suspended. He was only twenty-nine, and late in developing ; no man's future can be predicted at such an age, least of all a politician's, as he entered Parliament at least a decade before most politicians appear on the floor of the House of Commons. His grandfather at thirty was an amazingly different personality from the same figure at eighty-four. 'From the contagion of the world's slow stain, He is secure' are the lines which naturally rise to the mind, when one thinks of how entirely 'unspoilt' he went to his death : of how family affection, a high sense of conviction, transparent sincerity and scrupulous honour had hitherto kept him entirely from that infection which among so many converts gradually the man of ideals into the man of the world.

He was not a soldier at all, and the particular military instincts were quite deficient in him. He had nothing of that boisterousness and desire for adventure and good-tempered bellicosity which has flung so many hundreds of thousands of our people into France and Flanders. Indeed, in a curious sense it was just because of the absence of that impulse that he was determined to go ; that he convinced himself that he could do no otherwise. Young, of military age, unmarried, with no dependants on him, Lord Lieutenant of his county, he could see no possible alternative to that of offering his services at the seat of danger. He seems to have had from the first a conviction that with his services he was offering his life : that there was never any question of his returning home with honour and glory. With one of those premonitions which are not uncommon to men of his temperament, even in the weeks preceding his departure, he seems to have been conscious that this was an end ; and the end came speedily and fortunately without suffering. There are some who appreciate the glory of the linking of such a name in sacrifice for a righteous cause ; who can almost rejoice that a Gladstone has died on the borders of a little nation which had appealed to this country for help, and had not appealed in vain. There are others, however, to whom the thought of the tragic loss is still too dominant to enable them to feel any such disinterested consolations. For the vision of Gladstone's heir and grandson, the only son of his mother and she a widow, a life on which had been concentrated so many hopes and prayers and longings, prepared so assiduously for political effort, and having earned, not through hereditary fame but from his own personal characteristics, a particular reputation in Parliament, suddenly destroyed by a chance bullet, when still under thirty, is a vision which exhibits, in its most concentrated form, the clumsy brutality of war.

CHARLES MASTERMAN.

THE HAGUE AND OTHER WAR CONVENTIONS IN SPIRIT AND IN PRACTICE

To understand the bearing of the Hague and other international war conventions fully the reader will have to put up with some preliminary explanations and distinctions which may appear at first sight as a digression from the title of this article. They are necessary, however, to place the conventions in question in their proper light.

War involves the different sections of the population of a country in different ways. There are, first, the statesmen and directing officials who carry out and give effect to the policy which they regard as in the national interest. Every Foreign Office, moreover, has its traditional attitudes. The *vis inertiae*, which necessarily permeates a more or less unchecked autocratic authority, often results in the continuance of an attitude after its object may have dwindled into insignificance. There is also the class tendency due to the jealousy with which the intrusion of outside views is regarded by those already *dans la place*, and there is a certain kind of conventional or official knowledge which consists of being well-informed about the traditions and prejudices of other Foreign Offices. The sparring between Foreign Offices through their respective diplomatic agents is a frequent source of factitious international irritation which does not necessarily respond to any realities of national feeling. Thus, when the Fashoda incident brought England and France to within an inch of war, Lord Salisbury had to issue a White Book in hot haste to stir up national interest in a matter of which the British public could not see the vital importance. Thus again, Bismarck had to mutilate a telegram to excite the Germans over an incident which he had to magnify as an excuse for his warlike attitude.

Diplomatists and statesmen are just as liable to error as other average citizens, and conflicts can arise just as much through their mistakes as in spite of their wisdom.

To these statesmen, diplomatists, and officials are confided the destinies of nations, but when war breaks out the whole population of the countries involved, whether they approve of it or not, are plunged into its throes and, at the present moment,

millions of men are engaged in a work of gigantic carnage the objects of which are probably a mystery to the vast majority of them. Not only may they be exposed to wounds inflicted by the cruellest instruments of torture yet devised, but they may be left on the field to suffer the agony of untended injuries or be carried off into bondage in a country where their wounds may be neglected while those of native troops are being nursed. And they are not the only sufferers. There are also the civilians whose lands are invaded, men too infirm or too old to fight, women and children among whom invading troops, subject to panic like the rest of mankind, apprehend danger at every step, and against whom on the slightest of symptoms they rush to take inhuman reprisals.

There are, it is seen, two distinct currents of action in relation to war : the motives and determination of the governing bodies and classes who decide whether there shall be war or not, and the more or less willing or unwilling obedience of the nation who do the actual fighting. The antagonism between the two currents is submerged in the initial excitement, but the sufferings of the soldier and other victims of war and the mercy the soldier fighting for his life shows to his opponent when overcome survive the war, and former belligerents and neutrals alike then think of endeavouring to attenuate its horrors. To these feelings of pity and mercy, barely conscious to the public mind while the combative emotions absorb all its energies, we owe the different international conventions entered into for the purpose of attenuating the cruelty of war to the soldier and its hardships for civilians brought into immediate contact with invading forces.

This humanitarian object underlies not only the conventions signed at Geneva and St. Petersburg, but mainly also those signed at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. When, therefore, non-combatants and civilians talk lightly of retaliation by non-observance of these conventions they overlook their true character, which is that of a pronouncement by civilised mankind in favour of the individual soldier, whose life and limbs through no fault of his own are at stake.¹

I

The alleviation of the cruelties of war only began to attract effective public attention in Europe after Henri Dunant published in 1862 his famous pamphlet *Un Souvenir de Solferino* regarding what was witnessed at the battle bearing that name.

¹ The proviso inserted in the Hague Conventions that the articles thereof are only applicable as between contracting Powers and only if the belligerents are *all* parties to any Convention does not apply to the principles set out in the preambles. As regards the articles all the belligerents but Serbia have ratified the Conventions, and not one as yet has even suggested that Serbia's non-ratification releases the others.

Owing to Henri Dunant's efforts an unofficial international Conference, held at Geneva in 1863, was followed by an official one called by the Swiss Government the following year, and the Red Cross Convention known as the 'Geneva Convention' for the amelioration of the condition of wounded and sick soldiers of armies in the field, which was overhauled in 1906, was adopted. To maritime warfare it was adapted by one of the Hague Conventions of 1899, which in turn was overhauled in 1907.

About the same time a demand for law and order as well as mercy in the prosecution of war manifested itself in the United States. There civil war was raging, and the officers had nothing to guide them but their varying common sense. Dr. Lieber, a distinguished American writer on public law, was requested to draw up a code of 'instructions for the government of the armies of the United States in the field.' His draft was submitted for revision by a committee of officers, and, on being ratified by President Lincoln, it became a 'manual of war,' which served afterwards as a basis for subsequent international effort in the same direction.

In 1868 came the St. Petersburg Convention.

In the Franco-Austrian War accusations of the use of needlessly cruel bullets were brought by the one side against the other. The French were accused of using the bullet now known as 'dum-dum' and the Austrians of explosive bullets, the sufferings from which were the subject of indignant comment at the time. The strong public feeling caused by the needless cruelty of this latter projectile led Governments to consider the question, and the Czar, in response to it, called an International Conference at St. Petersburg to consider the subject. The deliberations of the Conference resulted in the Declaration of St. Petersburg forbidding the use of the bullets in question.

The war of 1870 brought private initiative again into activity, this time on a larger scale than before.

Both the Institute of International Law and the International Law Association owed their origin to a movement of revolt against the series of wars which culminated in the worst of them. M. Gustave Moynier, a distinguished Genevese closely connected with the Red Cross movement with which his native city became identified; Dr. Lieber, the American publicist above referred to; and M. Rolin-Jacquemyns, an eloquent Belgian statesman, simultaneously conceived the idea of reducing not only the rules of war but international usage generally to a precise and agreed uniformity. M. Rolin-Jacquemyns, who had just founded the *Revue de Droit International*, took the lead; and the *Institut*, a body composed of sixty members and sixty associates, all specialists in the subject, has ever since steadily grown in

influence, its rulings having the prestige due to the exclusive and expert character of its membership. About the same time (1873) was founded the more popular and philanthropic Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations for the displacement of war by pacific methods of settling international disputes. It, too, under its more recent title of International Law Association has grown in prestige, and its more popular methods have undoubtedly spread a greater interest in and respect for law and order in international relations among the professional classes of Europe and America generally. It has had no small influence, moreover, in popularising the ideas which matured in the Hague Conferences.

While private initiative was championing the right of citizens of different lands to the protection of law and order not only in war but in their intercourse in time of peace with one another, another society, founded in France in 1872, was dealing specifically with the question of the treatment of prisoners of war. It was owing more to the energy of this society than to any other cause that the Czar Alexander the Second again called a Conference, this time to examine the subject of the conduct of war generally. This Conference, which was held in 1874 at Brussels, resulted in the drafting of a Code of Rules based largely on Dr. Lieber's *Instructions*. It was not, however, ratified. The Institute of International Law, after an exhaustive examination of the Brussels *projet*, drew up the well-known *Manual of the Laws of War on Land*, adopted at their Oxford meeting in 1880, and known ever since as the *Oxford Manual*. These different codes and drafts formed the raw material of the *Regulations* for the conduct of war on land adopted at the Hague Conference of 1899, and readopted with only a few alterations at the Conference of 1907.

At both Hague Conferences other conventions and declarations dealing with cognate matters for the alleviation of the sufferings due to war were adopted. At that of 1899, besides the convention relating to the laws and customs of land warfare, there were adopted a convention for the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention and three declarations relating to methods of slaughter—viz. for the prohibition 'of the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons or by other similar new methods'²; 'of the use of projectiles the only object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases'³; and 'of the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the

² This was adopted for a period of five years, and was re-adopted at the Conference of 1907, but has not been ratified by any of the Great Powers except Great Britain and the United States.

³ Ratified without duration.

human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope, of which the envelope does not entirely cover the core, or is pierced with incisions.'⁴

All these agreements were submitted for revision at the Conference of 1907, which added, among others which do not here concern us, the following to the list of conventions relating to the conduct of war after it has been declared: As regards land warfare, a convention concerning the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in case of war on land; and as regards naval war, conventions relating to (a) the régime of commercial vessels at the opening of hostilities; (b) the conversion of commercial vessels into men-of-war; (c) the placing of automatic submarine mines of contact; (d) bombardment by naval forces in time of war; (e) restrictions on the exercise of the right of capture in maritime warfare; and (f) the rights and duties of neutral Powers as regards maritime warfare generally.

The object of all these efforts, official as well as unofficial, and of all these international conventions has been essentially philanthropic. To forbid useless injury to the combatant, insist on respect for order and law even amid the violence and carnage of battle, to lessen the rigours of war for its civilian victims was the deliberate purpose of the Governments which signed and have ratified the different conventions in question, as they testified in the preambles to these conventions.

II

All the conventions referred to above contain preambles stating their intent and object. In international agreements, as in ordinary contracts, a preamble not only affects the scope of the agreement as a whole but it binds the parties to a corresponding construction of each provision individually. It would not be there at all if it did not express the object of the signatories and were not intended to be read in conjunction with every one of the provisions. I am not stating this as a legal maxim, but merely as something inseparable from the nature of human reasoning itself.

To obtain a clear impression of the official view of the objects of the conventions in question we cannot do better than follow their preambles in their chronological sequence.

The first of them in order of date, the Geneva Convention of 1864, states that the Powers signing it were animated by 'the desire within the measure of their ability of mitigating the evils inseparable from war, of suppressing its useless hardships, and of

⁴ *Ibid.*

ameliorating the condition of wounded soldiers on the field of battle.'

It was overhauled in 1906, when a new preamble added that the revised convention was intended to 'improve and complete' that of 1864. Carrying out the object of the preamble, it prescribes that 'officers and soldiers and other persons officially attached to armies' shall be taken care of as prisoners of war 'without distinction of nationality,' and that after each engagement the commander in possession of the field shall take measures to search for the wounded and prevent any maltreatment or pillage. Every provision of the convention, in fact, is concerned with the interest of the individual soldier. The Convention of 1899-1907 for the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention reaffirms that the Powers are 'alike animated by the desire to diminish, as far as depends on them, the evils inseparable from warfare.'

The next Convention in order of date is the Declaration of St. Petersburg (1868), which sets out that an International Military Commission had assembled at St. Petersburg 'in order to examine into the expediency of forbidding the use of certain projectiles in time of war between civilised nations,' and that it had 'by common agreement fixed the technical limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity'; that the Governments represented considered 'that the progress of civilisation should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war; that the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; that for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men; that this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their death inevitable, and that the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of humanity.' The Declaration therefore forbade the employment of explosive projectiles of a weight inferior to 400 grammes.

The preambles to the three above-cited Hague Declarations of 1899 set out that they were inspired by the principles laid down in that of St. Petersburg. The Powers represented at the two Hague Conferences therefore declared to be on a level with the use of explosive bullets not only the use of dum-dum bullets and of 'projectiles which diffuse asphyxiating gases,' but 'the discharging of projectiles and explosives from aircraft.'

To 1899 and 1907 belong also the Convention and Regulations relating to war on land. The Powers, says the Convention, in drawing up the Regulations, were 'animated by the desire to serve the interests of humanity and the ever-increasing requirements

of civilisation'; they thought it 'important with this object to revise the laws and general customs of war, either with the view of defining them more precisely or of laying down certain limits for the purpose of modifying their severity as far as possible.' Their provisions; it says, 'have been inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, so far as military necessities permit, and are destined to serve as general rules of conduct for belligerents in their relations with each other and with populations.' Though it had not been possible to agree forthwith on provisions embracing all the circumstances which occur in practice, it was 'not intended by the High Contracting Parties that the cases not provided for should, for want of a written provision, be left to the arbitrary judgment of the military commanders,' and until a more complete code of the laws of war was issued the High Contracting Parties thought it right 'to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilised nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience.' Article 3 of the Convention adds by way of further emphasis to the preamble that 'the belligerent party who violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall be bound, if the case arises, to pay an indemnity, and that it is responsible for all acts done by persons forming part of its armed forces.'

Of the fifty-six articles composing these Regulations barely a dozen do not relate to the protection of the individual soldier or civilian. They are based, as the preamble says, on the 'interests of humanity and the ever-increasing requirements of civilisation.'

In the same way the Convention of 1907, relating to bombardment by naval forces in time of war, states that the Powers considered it was of 'importance to subject bombardment by naval forces to general provisions guaranteeing the rights of the inhabitants and ensuring the preservation of the principal buildings by extending to this operation of war, as far as possible, the principle of the Regulations of 1899 with respect to the laws and customs of war on land'; and that they were 'inspired by the desire to serve the interests of humanity and to lessen the rigours and disasters of war.'

Lastly, as regards the 'employment of submarine mines acting automatically by contact,' the Convention of 1907 on the subject upholds 'the principle of the freedom of sea routes open to all nations,' and declares that 'if in the present state of things the use of submarine mines with automatic contact cannot be forbidden, it is important to limit and regulate their use in order to restrict the rigours of war and to give, as far as possible, to

peaceful navigation the security it has the right to claim in spite of the existence of a war.'

It is abundantly seen from these preambles that the motives of the Conventions I have cited are humanitarian, and that the general outcome of them is to render as humane as possible the anomalous barbarism of war.

There are two kinds of cruelties involved in war : the one is the collective cruelty necessary to effect its purpose—viz. the defeating and capture of the enemy's armed forces, the isolation and starvation of the enemy population to prevent it from obtaining means to continue the struggle, and in general the doing of such things as are calculated to break down the resistance of the enemy and force him to accept or sue for peace. In a previous article⁵ I have shown how the German General Staff regarded the conduct of war, how it inculcated that humane considerations —' that is, the sparing of human life and property—can only come into play in so far as the nature and object of war permits,' and that ' a warring State may employ all methods which promote the attainment of its object, subject only to such restraints as it imposes on itself in its own interest.' In the present War we have seen this view of warfare amply realised. We have seen floating mines strewed over ' sea routes open to all nations ' without any attempt ' to limit or regulate their use or restrict the rigours of war or give peaceful navigation any security '—far from it. We have seen naval forces bombarding sea-coast towns without any attempt ' to guarantee the rights of the inhabitants or to ensure the preservation of the principal buildings,' or any trace of a desire ' to serve the interests of humanity or lessen the disasters of war.' We have seen bombs dropped from aeroplanes over harmless villages and peaceful civilian populations, which, instead of ' alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war,' have vastly increased them. And, in general, we have seen no vestige of the dominating idea expressed in all these Conventions of ' serving the interests of humanity and the ever-increasing requirements of civilisation,' or of modifying in any sense whatsoever the ' severity of war,' in response to ' the requirements of the public conscience.'⁶

III

No one who has seen the hospitals of France, seen the ghastly shrapnel wounds, seen jaws wrenched off by the mere splinter of a shell not larger than a little-finger nail, seen gangrene and

⁵ 'Ruthless War and Forbidden Methods,' *Nineteenth Century and After*, December 1914.

⁶ The traditional spirit of the British soldier has long been one of proud disdain for vindictive methods. In this connexion it is a pleasure to read Col. F. N. Maude's articles on the present war.

tetanus, seen deaf wards and blind wards, can have the hard civilian heart which in its ignorance regards the soldier as a mere automaton and the treatment he receives as a mere matter of business bargaining. The soldier's wounds and fate are a matter for the solicitude of mankind. The soldier merely fights as a matter of duty or discipline or in his own defence. Political hatred, if he ever has any, soon vanishes after he reaches the fighting line, and thenceforward he only feels for the wounded man and the prisoner a comrade's pity. If his imagination is capable of roaming, his pity includes the mourners at home for sons and brothers and parents, for the boys themselves dragged from their homes, their workshops, their fields, their studies, their careers, full of hope and health and energy, to be artificially destroyed, artificially maimed for life, artificially made blind, deaf and dumb. Surely pity for the soldier who is sent to fight for the ambition of those who sit at home should rouse the world against the gratuitous horror of the present War. The work of the Conferences at which the different Conventions, dealt with in this article, were signed was prompted by this deep sense of pity for the victims of war.

The upholding of the Hague and other Conventions of which I have spoken in this article is not only a belligerent interest but an interest of mankind in general. They were drawn up in time of peace on behalf of all the nations of the earth; they are under the protection of these nations, and Neutral Powers have as much a right to their observance as the Powers in conflict. Have any Neutral Powers protested against their violation? . . . Yet not to take steps to place on record infringements of them, not emphatically to condemn every evasion of their obligations, is to condone practices they have deliberately declared to be banned from civilisation, and avow the despicable hypocrisy of their lofty appeals to humanitarian principles.

THOMAS BARCLAY.

'SELF-APPOINTED STATESMEN.'

To the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER.

SIR,—If in his letter published in your last number Mr. Wells had been content to empty his vials of personal and somewhat petulant abuse upon myself for having drawn attention to the pernicious nature of his recent writings on political subjects, I should not trouble you for permission to reply. My article on 'Self-Appointed Statesmen,' published in your March number, was not written for the purpose of criticising or abusing the gifted romanticist, to whom the British people owe no small debt of gratitude. It was written in the sincere and serious belief that

the effect of the political articles with which Mr. Wells has been flooding the American press for the past six months is calculated seriously to prejudice the cause for which Great Britain is fighting. In correcting the crudities and emphasising the impossibilities of his views on international politics and peace-making, I endeavoured to place those views in such a light that Mr. Wells himself might be led to perceive that his genius as a romantic idealist incapacitates him from writing usefully, or even coherently, on these subjects.

When Mr. Wells denies the validity of my criticisms on the ground that I have resided in China, he is merely irrelevant; but when he charges me with having 'quoted from American papers the abbreviated and garbled phrases of cabled despatches as if they were his weighed and deliberate sentences' he compels me to reply. The five quotations which I gave from his writings in the *New York World*, the *Chicago Tribune*, and other American papers, were taken directly from the columns of those journals; that is to say, they accurately reproduced the text of articles contributed by him to those papers over his signature. If they do not represent his opinions, if they represent in fact anything but that which he wrote and intended to publish, can he say that he has ever repudiated them in the United States? If his present statement means anything at all, it means that his opinions have been habitually garbled, and his sentences altered in their meaning, in the American papers for which he works. If this be so, Mr. Wells had the remedy in his own hands months ago; but pending evidence of the fact, I challenge him to prove that any single one of the quotations from his writings, which were given in my article in the *Nineteenth Century*, is anything but his own work, published to all intents and purposes as he originally wrote it.—Yours very truly,

J. O. P. BLAND.

*The Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY cannot undertake
to return unaccepted MSS.*

THE
NINETEENTH
CENTURY
AND AFTER



No. CCCCLX—JUNE 1915

A DISHONoured ARMY

(1)

*GERMAN ATROCITIES IN FRANCE: WITH UNPUBLISHED
RECORDS*

IN November of last year I was commissioned by the Secretary of State for Home Affairs to undertake the investigation in France into the alleged breaches of the laws of war by the German troops, the inquiries in England being separately conducted by others. The results of my investigation were communicated to the Home Office, in the form of confidential reports and of depositions, diaries, proclamations, and other *pièces justificatives*, and were in turn submitted to the Committee appointed by the Prime Minister and presided over by Lord Bryce. The Committee made liberal use of this material, but, owing to the exigencies of space and the necessity of selection, some of it remains unpublished, and I now propose to place it and the conclusions I draw from it before the public. Some part of it, and that part the most important—namely, that which

establishes proofs of a deliberate policy of atrocity by responsible German officers—came into my hands too late for use by the Committee. Moreover, the Committee felt that their first duty was to Belgium, and consequently the portion of the inquiry which related to France, and in particular to outrages upon British soldiers in France, occupies a comparatively small place in their publications. In this article I therefore confine myself to the latter branch of the inquiry, and the reader will understand that, except where otherwise stated, the documents here set out are now published for the first time.¹

My investigations extended over a period of four or five months. The first six weeks were spent in visiting the base hospitals and convalescent camps at Boulogne and Rouen, and the hospitals at Paris; during the remaining three months I was attached to the General Headquarters Staff of the British Expeditionary Force. In the course of my inquiries in the hospitals and camps I orally interrogated some two or three thousand officers and soldiers,² representing almost every regiment in the British armies and all of whom had recently been engaged on active service in the field. The whole of these inquiries were conducted by me personally, but my inquiries at headquarters were of a much more systematic character. There, owing to the courtesy of Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray, the late Chief of the General Staff, I had the assistance of the various services—in particular the Adjutant-General, the Provost-Marshal, the Director of Military Intelligence, the Director of Medical Services and their respective staffs—and also of the civil authorities, within the area at present occupied by the British armies, such as the sous-prefets, the procureurs de la République, the commissaires de police, and the maires of the communes. In this way I was enabled not only to obtain corroboration of the statements taken down in the base hospitals in the earlier stages of my inquiry, but also to make a close local study of the behaviour of the German troops towards the civil population during their occupation of the districts recently evacuated by them.³ In pursuance of this latter inquiry I visited every town and commune of any importance now in our occupation and lately occupied by the Germans, including places within a few hundred yards of the German lines. As regards the conduct of the German troops in the earlier stages of the campaign

¹ It is, however, impossible to include within the limits of this article the whole of the unpublished material at my disposal.

² The term 'soldier' is used throughout this article in the sense adopted in the Army Annual Act, i.e. as meaning N.C.O.s and privates.

³ The outrages committed in the districts now in the occupation of the British armies have not been reported upon by the French Commission, and the ground so traversed in this article is therefore new.

and in other parts of France, I confined my inquiries to incidents which actually came under the observation of our own troops during or after the battles of Mons, the Marne, and the Aisne, and did not extend them to include the testimony of the French civil authorities, as I did not consider it part of my duty to attempt to do what was already being done by the Commission of Inquiry instituted by the President of the Council. But I freely availed myself of opportunities of corroboration of English evidence from French sources where such sources were readily accessible and, by the courtesy of the French Ministry of War, who placed a Staff officer and a military car at my disposal, I was enabled to go over the ground to the north-east of Paris covered by our troops in their advance to the Aisne and to obtain confirmation of many incidents already related to me by British officers and soldiers. It was also my privilege frequently to meet M. Mollard, of the French Commission, and to examine for myself the depositions on oath and *pièces justificatives* on which the first Reports of the Commission are based, and which are as yet unpublished. In these different ways I have been enabled to obtain an extensive view of the whole field of inquiry and to arrive at certain general conclusions which may be of some value.

METHODS OF INQUIRY

My method of inquiry was twofold—I availed myself of both oral evidence and written evidence. As regards the former, the evidence taken at the base hospitals was wholly of this character. The method which I adopted in taking it was as follows :

I made it a rule to explain to the soldier or officer at the outset that the inquiry was an official one, and that he must be prepared to put his name to any testimony he might elect to give.

I allowed the soldier to tell his story in his own way and in his own words, but after or in the course of the recital I always cross-examined him as to details, inquiring in particular (1) whether he directly witnessed the event himself ; (2) what was the date and place of the occurrence—to establish these I have frequently gone over the operations with the witness with the aid of a military map and a diary of the campaign ; (3) whether, in the case of hearsay evidence, he heard the story direct from the subject of it, and, in particular, whether he was versed in the language employed ; (4) whether he could give me the name of any person or persons with him, particularly officers, who also witnessed the event or heard the story.

After such cross-examination I then took down the narrative, if satisfied that it possessed any value, read it over to the soldier, and then obtained his signature. This, however, was often only the first stage, as I have not infrequently been able to obtain confirmation of the evidence so obtained by subsequent inquiries at General or Divisional Headquarters, either among members of the Staff or from company officers or from the civil authorities. For example, hearsay evidence of rape (and I always regarded such evidence as inconclusive of itself) tendered to me by soldiers at the base hospitals received very striking confirmation in the depositions of the victims on oath which had been taken by the civil authorities at Bailleul, Metteren, and elsewhere, and which were subsequently placed at my disposal. Personal inquiries made by me among the maires and curés of the communes where particular incidents were alleged to have occurred resulted in similar confirmation. So, too, the Indian witnesses whom I examined at the base hospital were at my request subsequently re-examined, when they had rejoined their units, by the Intelligence Officers attached to the Indian Corps, and with much the same results. Corroborative evidence as to a policy of discrimination practised by the German officers in favour of Indians was also obtained from the record of statements volunteered by a German prisoner of the 112th Regiment and placed at my disposal by our Intelligence Officers.

The general impression left in my mind by these subsequent inquiries at headquarters as to the value of the statements made to me earlier by soldiers in hospital is that those statements were true. There is a tendency in some quarters to depreciate the value of the testimony of the British soldier, but the degree of its value depends a good deal on the capacity in which, and the person to whom, the soldier is addressing himself. In writing letters home or in talking to solicitous visitors the soldier is one person; in giving evidence in an official inquiry he is quite another. I have had opportunities when attending field courts-martial of seeing something of the way in which soldiers give evidence, and I see no reason to suppose that the soldier is any less reliable than the average civilian witness in a court of common law. Indeed, the moment I made it clear to the soldiers that my inquiry was an official one they became very cautious and deliberate in their statements, often correcting themselves or referring to their diaries (of which they usually take great care), or qualifying the narration with the statement 'I did not see it myself.' It need hardly be said that these observations as to the credibility of the soldiers apply no less to that of the officers. And it is worthy of remark that, apart from individual cases of corroboration of a soldier's evidence by that of

an officer, the burden of the evidence in the case of each class is the same. Where officers do not testify to the same thing as the soldiers, they testify to similar things. The cumulative effect produced on my mind is that of uniform experience.

I have often found the statements so made subsequently corroborated; I have rarely, if ever, found them contradicted. I ascribe this result to my having applied rigid rules as to the reception of evidence in the first instance. I have always taken into account the peculiar receptivity of minds fatigued and overwrought by the strain of battle to the influences of 'suggestion,' whether in the form of newspapers or of oral gossip. It sometimes, but not often, happened that one could recognise the same story in a different investiture, although appearing at first sight to be a different occurrence. Or, again, it may happen that a story undergoes elaboration in the process of transmission until it looks worse than it originally was. So, too, a case of apparent outrage may admit of several explanations; it may happen, for example, in the case of a suspicious use of the white flag that the act of one party of Germans in raising it and of another party in taking advantage of it were conceivably independent of one another. Cases of the shelling of 'undefended' places, of churches, and of hospitals, I have always disregarded if our men or guns were or lately had been in the vicinity; and it may easily happen that a case of firing on stretcher-bearers or ambulance waggons is due to the impossibility of discrimination in the midst of a general engagement. Wherever any of these features appeared to be present I rejected the evidence—not always nor necessarily because I doubted its veracity, but because I had misgivings as to its value.

OUTRAGES UPON COMBATANTS IN THE FIELD.

Lord Bryce's Committee, with that scrupulous fairness which so honourably distinguishes their Report, have stated that :

We have no evidence to show whether and in what cases orders proceeded from the officer in command to give no quarter, but there are some instances in which persons obviously desiring to surrender were nevertheless killed.

This is putting the case with extreme moderation, as the evidence at the disposal of the Committee, showing, as it did, that such barbarities were frequently committed when the German troops were present in force, raised a considerable presumption that they were authorised by company and platoon commanders at least, if not in pursuance of brigade orders. But after the Committee had concluded its labours, and, unfortunately, too late for its consideration, I succeeded, as the result of

a long and patient investigation, in obtaining evidence which establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the outrages upon combatants in the field were committed by the express orders of responsible officers such as brigade and company commanders. The nature of that evidence (which is here published for the first time) I will disclose in a moment. But before doing so I will present the conclusions I had previously arrived at by a process of induction from individual cases. It will then be seen how the deductive method of proof from the evidence of general orders confirms the presumption raised by the evidence of particular instances.

A German military writer of great authority⁴ predicted some years ago that the next war would be one of inconceivable violence. The prophecy appears only too true as regards the conduct of German troops in the field; it has rarely been distinguished by that chivalry which is supposed to characterise the freemasonry of arms. One of our most distinguished Staff officers remarked to me that the Germans have no sense of honour in the field, and the almost uniform testimony of our officers and men induces me to believe that the remark is only too true. Abuse of the white flag has been very frequent, especially in the earlier stages of the campaign on the Aisne, when our officers, not having been disillusioned by bitter experience, acted on the assumption that they had to deal with an honourable opponent. Again and again the white flag was put up, and when a company of ours advanced unsuspectingly and without supports to take prisoners, the Germans who had exhibited the token of surrender parted their ranks to make room for a murderous fire from machine-guns concealed behind them. Or, again, the flag was exhibited in order to give time for supports to come up. It not infrequently happened that our company officers, advancing unarmed to confer with the German company commander in such cases, were shot down as they approached. The Camerons, the West Yorks, the Coldstreams, the East Lancs, the Wiltshires, the South Wales Borderers, in particular, suffered heavily in these ways. In all these cases they were the victims of organised German units, i.e. companies or battalions, acting under the orders of responsible officers.

There can, moreover, be no doubt that the respect of the German troops for the Geneva Convention is but intermittent.⁵

⁴ Von der Goltz.

⁵ One might go further and say that the Geneva Convention, which has hitherto been universally regarded as a law of perfect obligation and which even the German Staff in the German War Book affects to treat as sacred, is perverted to an instrument of treachery. The emblem of the Red Cross was used to protect waggons in which machine-guns were concealed. And since this article was written a German hospital ship, the *Ophelia*, has been condemned,

Cases of deliberate firing on stretcher-bearers are, according to the universal testimony of our officers and men, of frequent occurrence. It is almost certain death to attempt to convey wounded men from the trenches over open ground except under cover of night. A much more serious offence, however, is the deliberate killing of the wounded as they lie helpless and defenceless on the field of battle. This is so grave a charge that were it not substantiated by the considered statements of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, one would hesitate to believe it. But even after rejecting, as one is bound to do, cases which may be explained by accident, mistake, or the excitement of action, there remains a large residuum of cases which can only be explained by deliberate malice. No other explanation is possible when, as has not infrequently happened, men who have been wounded by rifle fire in an advance, and have had to be left during a retirement for reinforcements, are discovered, in our subsequent advance, with nine or ten bayonet wounds or with their heads beaten in by the butt-ends of rifles. Such cases could not have occurred, the enemy being present in force, without the knowledge of superior officers. Indeed, I have before me evidence which goes to show that German officers have themselves acted in similar fashion. Some of the cases reveal a leisurely barbarity which proves great deliberation; cases such as the discovery of bodies of despatch-riders burnt with petrol or 'pegged out' with lances, or of soldiers with their faces stamped upon by the heel of a boot, or of a guardsman found with numerous bayonet wounds evidently inflicted as he was in the act of applying a field dressing to a bullet wound. There also seems no reason to doubt the independent statements of men of the Loyal North Lincs, whom I interrogated on different occasions, that the men of one of their companies were killed on the 20th of December after they had surrendered and laid down their arms.⁶ To what extent prisoners have been treated in this manner it is impossible to say—dead men tell no tales—but an exceptionally able Intelligence Officer at the headquarters of the Cavalry Corps informed me that it is believed that when British prisoners are taken in small parties they are put to death in cold blood. Certain it is that our men when captured are kicked, robbed of all they possess, threatened with death if they will not give information, and in some cases forced to dig trenches. The evidence I have taken from soldiers at the base hospitals on these points is borne out by evidence

on irrefutable evidence, by our Prize Court as having been used for belligerent purposes. Such things throw a very lurid light on the German conception of honour.

⁶ Similar evidence has been supplied to me by a French officer attached to the Fifth Division of the British Expeditionary Force.

taken at the Front immediately after such occurrences by the Deputy Judge-Advocate General, an Assistant Provost-Marshal, and a captain in the Sherwood Foresters, and in the opinion of these officers the evidence which they took, and which they subsequently placed at my disposal, is reliable.

THE PROOFS OF POLICY

The question as to how far these outrages are attributable to policy and superior orders becomes imperative. It was at first difficult to answer. For a long time I did not find, nor did I expect to find, any documentary orders to that effect. Such orders, if given at all, were much more likely to be verbal, for it is extremely improbable that the German authorities would be so unwise as to commit them to writing. But the outrages upon combatants were so numerous and so collective in character that I began to suspect policy at a very early stage in my investigations. My suspicions were heightened by the significant fact that exhaustive inquiries which I made among Indian native officers and men in the hospital ships in port at Boulogne, and at the base hospitals, seemed to indicate that experiences of outrage were as rare among the Indian troops as they were common among the British. The explanation was fairly obvious, inasmuch as many of these Indian witnesses who had fallen into German hands testified to me that the German officers' seized the occasion to assure them that Germany was animated by the most friendly feelings towards them, and more than once dismissed them with an injunction not to fight against German troops and to bring over their comrades to the German side. For example, a sepoy in the 9th Bhopals testified to me as follows :

I and three others were found wounded by the Germans. They bound up our wounds and invited us to join them, offering us money and land. I answered, 'I, who have eaten the King's salt, cannot do this thing and thus bring sorrow and shame upon my people.' The Germans took our chupattis, and offered us of their bread in return. I said, 'I am a Brahmin and cannot touch it.' They then left us, saying that if we were captured again they would kill us.

There was other evidence to the same effect. Eventually I obtained proofs confirming my suspicions, and I will now proceed to set them out.

On the 3rd of May I visited the Ministry of War in Paris at the invitation of the French military authorities, and was received by M. le Capitaine René Petit, Chef de Service du Contentieux.

The German officers spoke Hindustani. Doubtless they knew, as I have found they often know, the identity of the British regiments opposite their positions and were attached there for the express purpose of dealing with Indians. But in no case, so far as I know, were their attempts to seduce our Indian troops successful.

who conducted me to the department where the diaries of German prisoners were kept. I made a brief preliminary examination of them, and discovered the following passage (which I had photographed) in the diary of a German N.C.O., Götsche, of the 85th Infantry Regiment (the IXth Corps), fourth company detached for service, under date 'Okt. 6, 1914, bei Antwerpen':

Der Herr Hauptmann rief uns um sich und sagte: 'In dem Fort, das zu nehmen ist, sind aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach Engländer. Ich wünsche aber keinen gefangenen Engländer bei der Komp. zu sehen. Ein allgemeiner Bravo der Zustimmung war die Antwort.

(The Captain called us to him and said: 'In the fortress [i.e. Antwerp] which we have to take there are in all probability Englishmen. But I do not want to see any Englishmen prisoners in the hands of this company.' A general 'Bravo' of assent was the answer.)

This malignant frenzy against British troops, so carefully instilled, is borne out by a passage in another diary, now in the possession of the French Ministry of War, which was found on the 22nd of April on the body of Richard Gerhold, of the 71st Regiment of Infantry of the Reserve, Fourth Army Corps, who was killed in September at Novron:

Auch hier kommen ja Sachen vor, was auch nicht sein darf, kommt aber doch vor. Grosse Greultaten kommen natürlich an Engländern und Belgiern vor. Nun da wird eben jeder ohne Gnaden niedergeknallt, aber wehe dem armen Deutschen der in ihre Hände kommt. . . .

(Here also things occur which should not be. Great atrocities are of course committed upon Englishmen and Belgians; every one of them is now knocked on the head without mercy. But woe to the poor German who falls into their hands.)

As regards the last sentence in this diary, which is one long chapter of horrors and betrays a ferocious credulity, it is worthy of remark that I have seen at the French Ministry of War the diary^a of a German N.C.O., named Schulze, who, judging by internal evidence, was a man of exceptional intelligence, in which the writer refers to tales of French and Belgian atrocities circulated among the men by his superior officers. He shrewdly adds that he believes the officers invented these stories in order to prevent him and his comrades from surrendering.

A less conclusive passage, but a none the less suspicious one, is to be found in a diary now in my possession. It is the diary of an Unter-offizier, named Ragge, of the 158th Regiment, and contains (under date October 21) the following:

Wir verfolgten den Gegner soweit wir ihn sahen. Da haben wir machen Engländer abgeknallt. Die Engländer lagen wie gesäht am Boden.

^a This diary is now in the possession of my friend the Marquis de Dampierre, who is about to publish it and numerous others, together with facsimiles of the originals.

Die noch lebenden Engländer im Schützengraben wurden erstochen oder erschossen. Unsere Komp. machte 61 Gefangene.

Which may be translated :

We pursued the enemy as far as we saw him. We 'knocked out' many English. The English lay on the ground as if sown there. Those of the Englishmen who were still alive in the trenches were stuck or shot. Our company made 61 prisoners.⁹

So far I have only dealt with the acts of small German units—i.e. companies of infantry. I now come to the most damning proofs of a policy of cold-blooded murder of wounded and prisoners, initiated and carried out by a whole brigade under the orders of a Brigadier-General. This particular investigation took me a long time, but the results are, I think, conclusive. It may be remembered that some months ago the French military authorities published in the French newspapers what purported to be the text of an order issued by a German Brigadier-General, named Stenger, commanding the 58th Brigade, in which he ordered his troops to take no prisoners and to put to death without mercy every one who fell into their hands, whether wounded and defenceless or not. The German Government immediately denounced the alleged order as a forgery. I determined to see whether I could establish its authenticity, and in February last I obtained a copy of the original from M. Mollard, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who is a member of the Commission appointed by the French Government to inquire into the alleged German atrocities. The text of that order was as follows :

Befehl (Armee-befehl) vom 26. Aug. 1914, gegen 4 Uhr nachm. wie er von Führer der 7 Komp. Reg. 112 (Infant.) bei Thionville, am Eingang des Waldes von Saint-Barbe, seinen Truppen als Brigade- oder Armee-befehl gegeben wurde :

Von heute ab werden keine Gefangene mehr gemacht. Sämtliche Gefangene werden niedergemacht. Verwundete ob mit Waffen oder wehrlos niedergemacht. Gefangene auch in grösseren geschlossenen Formationen werden niedergemacht. Es bleibt kein Mann lebend hinter uns.

(Army Order of 26 Aug., 1914, about 4 p.m., such as was given to his troops as a Brigade or Army Order by the leader of the 7th Company of the 112th Regiment of Infantry at Thionville, at the entrance of the wood of Saint Barbe.

To date from this day no prisoners will be made any longer. All the prisoners will be executed. The wounded, whether armed or defenceless, will be executed. Prisoners, even in large and compact formations, will be executed. Not a man will be left alive behind us.)

Taking this alleged order as my starting-point, I began to make inquiries at British Headquarters as to the existence of any infor-

⁹ The passage suggests that our wounded were killed, but it is not conclusive. 'Noch lebenden,' i.e. 'still living,' would appear to mean the wounded found in our trenches and unable to escape with the others. The fact of some prisoners being taken does not dispose of the suspiciousness of the passage.

mation about the doings of the 112th Regiment. I soon found that there was good reason to suspect it. Our Intelligence Department placed in my hands the records of the examination of two men of this regiment who had been captured by us. One of them volunteered a statement to one of our Intelligence Officers on the 23rd of November to the effect that his regiment had orders to treat Indians well, but were allowed to treat British prisoners as they pleased. This man's testimony appeared to be reliable, as statements he made on other points, i.e. as to the German formations, were subsequently found to be true, and his information as to discrimination in the treatment of Indians entirely bore out the conclusions I had already arrived at on that particular point. The German witness in question further stated that 65 out of 150 British prisoners were killed in cold blood by their escort on or about the 23rd of October on the road to Lille, and that the escort were praised for their conduct. Other German prisoners have, I may add, also made statements that they had orders to kill all the English who fell into their hands.

The evidence of this man of the 112th Regiment was as explicit and assured as it could be. But the matter did not stop there. At a later date an officer of the same regiment fell into our hands, in whose field note-book we found the memorandum 'Keine Gefangene' ('No prisoners'). He was immediately cross-examined as to the meaning of this passage, but he had a plausible explanation ready. It was to the effect that his men were not to make the capture of prisoners a pretext for retiring with them to the rear; but, having disarmed them, were to leave them to be taken back by the supports.

But at the end of April—too late, unfortunately, for use by Lord Bryce's Committee—one of our Intelligence Officers placed before me the following entry in the field note-book of a German prisoner, Reinhart Brenneisen,¹⁰ reservist, belonging to the 4th Company, 112th Regiment, and dated in August (the same month as appears on the face of the order in question):

Auch kam Brigadebefehl sämtliche Franzosen ob verwundet oder nicht, die uns in die Hände fielen, sollten erschossen werden. Es dürfte keine Gefangenen gemacht werden.

(Then came a brigade order that all French, whether wounded or not, who fell into our hands, were to be shot. No prisoners were to be made.)

This, I think, may be said to put the reality of the brigade order in question beyond doubt.

The cumulative effect of this evidence, coupled with the statements of so many of our men who claim to have been eye-witnesses of wholesale bayoneting of the wounded, certainly confirms

¹⁰ Brenneisen is now a prisoner in England. The diary was a most carefully kept one.

suspensions of the gravest kind as to such acts having been done by authority. Neither the temperament of the German soldier nor the character of German discipline (*furchtbar streng*—‘frightfully strict’—as a German prisoner put it to me) makes it probable that the German soldiers acted on their own initiative. It would, in any case, be incredible that so many cases of outrage could be sufficiently explained by any law of averages, or by the idiosyncrasies of the ‘bad characters’ present in every large congregation of men.

TREATMENT OF CIVIL POPULATION

The subject-matter of the inquiry may be classified according as it relates to : (1) ill-treatment of the civil population, and (2) breaches of the laws of war in the field. As regards the first it is not too much to say that the Germans pay little respect to life and none to property. I say nothing of the monstrous policy of vicarious responsibility laid down by them in the Proclamations as to the treatment of hostages which I forwarded to the Committee and which I left to the Committee to examine ; I confine myself to the practices which have come under my observation.¹¹ Here it is clear that the treatment of civilians is regulated by no more rational or humane policy than that of intimidation or, even worse, of sullen vindictiveness. As the German troops passed through the communes and towns of the arrondissements of Ypres, Hazebrouck, Bethune, and Lille, they shot indiscriminately at the innocent spectators of their march ; the peasant tilling his fields, the refugee tramping the roads, and the workman returning to his home. To be seen was often dangerous, to attempt to escape being seen was invariably fatal. Old men and boys and even women and young girls were shot like rabbits. The slightest failure to comply with the peremptory demands of the invader has been punished with instant death. The curé of Pradelle, having failed to find the key of the church tower, was put against the wall and shot ; a shepherd at a lonely farmhouse near Rebais who failed to produce bread for the German troops had his head blown off by a rifle ; a baker at Moorslede who attempted to escape was suffocated by German soldiers with his own scarf ; a young mother at Bailleul who was unable to produce sufficient coffee to satisfy the demands of twenty-three German soldiers had her baby seized by one of the latter and its head dipped in

¹¹ What follows refers principally to the portion of Northern France now occupied by the British troops. The case of Belgium has been sufficiently dealt with by the Committee.

scalding water; an old man of seventy-seven years of age at La Ferté Gaucher who attempted to protect two women in his house from outrage was killed with a rifle shot.

I select these instances from my notes at random—they could be multiplied many times—as indications of the temper of the German troops. They might, perhaps, be dismissed as the unauthorised acts of small patrols were it not that there is only too much evidence to show that the soldiers are taught by their superiors to set no value upon human life, and things have been done which could not have been done without superior orders. For example, at Bailleul, La Gorgue, and Doulieu, where no resistance of any kind was offered to the German troops, and where the latter were present in force under the command of commissioned officers, civilians were taken in groups, and after being forced to dig their own graves were shot by firing parties in the presence of an officer. At Doulieu, which is a small village, eleven civilians were shot in this way; they were strangers to the place, and it was only by subsequent examination of the papers found on their bodies that some of them were identified as inhabitants of neighbouring villages. If these men had been guilty of any act of hostility it is not clear why they were not shot at once in their own villages, and inquiries at some of the villages from which they were taken have revealed no knowledge of any act of the kind. It is, however, a common practice for the German troops to seize the male inhabitants (especially those of military age) of the places they occupy and take them away on their retreat. Twenty-five were so taken from Bailleul and nothing has been heard of them since. There is only too much reason to suppose that the same fate has overtaken them as that which befell the unhappy men executed at Doulieu. I believe the explanation of these sinister proceedings to be that the men were compelled to dig trenches for the enemy, to give information as to the movement of their own troops, and to act as guides (all clearly practices which are a breach of the laws of war and of the Hague Regulations), and then, their presence being inconvenient and their knowledge of the enemy's positions and movements compromising, they were put to death. This is not a mere surmise. The male inhabitants of Warneton were forced to dig trenches for the enemy, and an inhabitant of Merris was compelled to go with the German troops and act as a guide; it is notorious that the official manual of the German General Staff *Kriegsbrauch in Landskriege* condones, and indeed indoctrinates, such breaches of the laws of war. British soldiers who were taken prisoners by the Germans and subsequently escaped were compelled by their captors to

dig trenches, and in a field note-book found on a soldier of the 100th Saxon Body Grenadiers (XIIth Corps) occurs the following significant passage :

My two prisoners worked hard at digging trenches. At midday I got the order to rejoin at village with my prisoners. I was very glad, as I had been ordered to shoot them both as soon as the French attacked. Thank God it was not necessary.

In this connexion it is important to observe that the German policy of holding a whole town or village responsible for the acts of isolated individuals, whether by the killing of hostages or by decimation or by a wholesale *battue* of the inhabitants, has undoubtedly resulted in the grossest and most irrelevant cruelties. A single shot fired in or near a place occupied by the Germans—it may be a shot from a French patrol or a German rifle let off by accident or mistake or in a drunken affray—at once places the whole community in peril, and it seems to be at once assumed that the civil inhabitants are guilty unless they can prove themselves innocent. This was clearly the case at Armentières. Frequently, as the field note-book of a Saxon officer testifies, they are not allowed the opportunity. Indeed there seems some reason to suppose that the German troops hold the civil inhabitants responsible even for the acts of lawful belligerents, and, as my inquiries at Merris and Messines go to show, a French patrol cannot operate in the vicinity of a French or Belgian village without exposing the inhabitants to sanguinary punishment or predatory fines. There is not the slightest evidence to show that French civilians have fired upon German troops, and in spite of the difficulty of proving a negative there is a good deal of reason to reject such a supposition. Throughout the communes of the region of Northern France which I have investigated notices were posted up at the mairie requiring all the inhabitants to deposit any arms in their possession with the civil authorities, and the orders appear to have been complied with, as they were very strictly enforced.

In this matter of holding the civil population responsible with their lives for anything that may prove 'inconvenient' (*génant*), to quote a German Proclamation, to the German troops, the German commanders seem to have no sense of cause and effect. At Coulommiers, so the Mayor informed me, they threatened to shoot him because the gas supply gave out. In a town which I visited close to the German lines (and the name of which I suppress by request of the civil authorities for fear of a vindictive bombardment), the Mayor, who was under arrest in the guardroom, was threatened with death because a signal-bell rang at the railway station, and was in imminent peril until it was

proved that the act was due to the clumsiness of a German soldier; and an exchange of shots between two drunken soldiers, resulting in the death of one of them, was made the ground of an accusation that the inhabitants had fired on the troops, the Mayor's life being again in peril. Where the life of the civilian is held so cheap, it is not surprising that the German soldier, himself the subject of a fearful discipline, is under a strong temptation to escape punishment for the consequences of his own careless or riotous or drunken behaviour by attributing those consequences to the civil population, for the latter is invariably suspect.

OUTRAGES UPON WOMEN—THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF BAILLEUL

When life is held so cheap, it is not surprising that honour and property are not held more dear. Outrages upon the honour of women by German soldiers have been so frequent that it is impossible to escape the conviction that they have been condoned and indeed encouraged by German officers. As regards this matter I have made a most minute study of the German occupation of Bailleul. This place was occupied by a regiment of German Hussars in October for a period of eight days. During the whole of that period the town was delivered over to the excesses of a licentious soldiery and was left in a state of indescribable filth. There were at least thirty cases of outrages on girls and young married women, authenticated by sworn statements of witnesses and generally by medical certificates of injury. It is extremely probable that, owing to the natural reluctance of women to give evidence in cases of this kind, the actual number of outrages largely exceeds this. Indeed, the leading physician of the town, Dr. Bels, puts the number as high as sixty. At least five officers were guilty of such offences, and where the officers set the example the men followed. The circumstances were often of a peculiarly revolting character; daughters were outraged in the presence of their mothers, and mothers in the presence or the hearing of their little children. In one case, the facts of which are proved by evidence which would satisfy any court of law, a young girl of nineteen was violated by one officer while the other held her mother by the throat and pointed a revolver, after which the two officers exchanged their respective rôles.¹² The officers and soldiers usually hunted in couples, either entering the houses under pretence of seeking billets, or forcing the doors by open violence. Frequently the victims were beaten and

¹² After the outrage they dragged the girl outside and asked if she knew of any other young girls ('jeunes filles') in the neighbourhood, adding that they wanted to do to them what they had done to her.

kicked, and invariably threatened with a loaded revolver if they resisted. The husband or father of the women and girls was usually absent on military service; if one was present he was first ordered away under some pretext; and disobedience of civilians to German orders, however improper, is always punished with instant death. In several cases little children heard the cries and struggles of their mother in the adjoining room to which she had been carried by a brutal exercise of force. No attempt was made to keep discipline, and the officers, when appealed to for protection, simply shrugged their shoulders. Horses were stabled in salons; shops and private houses were looted (there are nine hundred authenticated cases of pillage). Some civilians were shot and many others carried off into captivity. Of the fate of the latter nothing is known but the worst may be suspected.

The German troops were often drunk and always insolent. But significantly enough, the bonds of discipline thus relaxed were tightened at will and hardly a single straggler was left behind.

Inquiries in other places, in the villages of Meteren, Oultersteen, and Nieppe, for example, establish the occurrence of similar outrages upon defenceless women, accompanied by every circumstance of disgusting barbarity. No civilian dare attempt to protect his wife or daughter from outrage. To be in possession of weapons of defence is to be condemned to instant execution, and even a village constable found in possession of a revolver (which he was required to carry in virtue of his office) was instantly shot at Westoutre. Roving patrols burnt farmhouses and turned the women and children out into the wintry and sodden fields with capricious cruelty and in pursuance of no intelligible military purpose.

PRIVATE PROPERTY

As regards private property, respect for it among the German troops simply does not exist. By the universal testimony of every British officer and soldier whom I have interrogated the progress of German troops is like a plague of locusts over the land. What they cannot carry off they destroy. Furniture is thrown into the street, pictures are riddled with bullets or pierced by sword cuts, municipal registers burnt, the contents of shops scattered over the floor, drawers rifled, live stock slaughtered and the carcasses left to rot in the fields. This was the spectacle which frequently confronted our troops on the advance to the Aisne and on their clearance of the German troops out of Northern France. Cases of petty larceny by German soldiers appear to be innumerable; they take whatever seizes their fancy, and leave the towns they evacuate laden like pedlars. Empty ammunition waggons

were drawn up in front of private houses and filled with their contents for despatch to Germany.

I have had the reports of the local commissaires of police placed before me, and they show that in smaller villages like those of Caestre and Merris, with a population of about 1500 souls or less, pillaging to the extent of 4000*l.* and 6000*l.* was committed by the German troops. I speak here of robbery which does not affect to be anything else. But it is no uncommon thing to find extortion officially practised by the commanding officers under various more or less flimsy pretexts. One of these consists of holding a town or village up to ransom under pretence that shots have been fired at the German troops. Thus at the village of Merris a sum of 2000*l.* was exacted as a fine from the Mayor at the point of a revolver under this pretence, this village of 1159 inhabitants having already been pillaged to the extent of some 6000*l.* worth of goods. At La Gorgue, another small village, 2000*l.* was extorted under a threat that if it were not forthcoming the village would be burnt. At Warneton, a small village, a fine of 400*l.* was levied. These fines were, it must be remembered, quite independent of the requisitions of supplies. As regards the latter, one of our Intelligence officers, whose duty it has been to examine the forms of receipt given by German officers and men for such requisitions, informs me that, while the receipts for small sums of 100 francs or less bore a genuine signature, those for large sums were invariably signed 'Herr Hauptmann von Koeppenick,' the simple peasants upon whom this fraud was practised being quite unaware that the signature has a classical fictitiousness in Germany.

OBSERVATIONS ON A TOUR OF THE MARNE AND THE AISNE

My investigations, in the company of a French Staff Officer, in the towns and villages of our line of march in that part of France which lies north-east of Paris revealed a similar spirit of pillage and wantonness. Coulommiers, a small town, was so thoroughly pillaged that the damage, so I was informed by the Maire, has been assessed at 400,000 francs, a statement which bore out the evidence previously given me by our own men as to the spectacle of wholesale looting which they encountered when they entered that town. At Barcy, an insignificant village of no military importance, I was informed by the Maire that a German officer, accompanied by a soldier, entered the communal archives and deliberately burnt the municipal registers of births and deaths—obviously an exercise of pure spite. At Choisy-au-Bac, a little village pleasantly situated on the banks of the Aisne, which I visited in company with a French Staff Officer, I

found that almost every house had been burnt out. This was one of the worst examples of deliberate incendiarism that I have come across. There had been no engagement, and there was not a trace of shell-fire or of bullet-marks upon the walls. Inquiries among the local gendarmerie, and such few of the homeless inhabitants as were left, pointed to the place having been set on fire by German soldiers in a spirit of pure wantonness. The German troops arrived one day in the late afternoon, and an officer, after inquiring of an inhabitant, who told me the story, the name of the village, noted it down, with the remark 'Bien, nous le rôtirons ce soir.' At nine o'clock of the same evening they proceeded to 'roast' it by breaking the windows of the houses and throwing into the interiors burning 'pastilles,' apparently carried for the purpose, which immediately set everything alight. The local gendarme informed us that they also sprayed (*arrosé*) some of the houses with petrol to make them burn better. The humbler houses shared the fate of the more opulent, and cottage and mansion were involved in a common ruin. It seems quite clear that there was not the slightest pretext for this wanton behaviour, nor did the Germans allege one. They did not accuse the inhabitants of any hostile behaviour; the best proof of this is that they did not shoot any of them, except one who appears to have been shot by accident.

A visit to Senlis in the course of the same tour fully confirmed all that the French Commission has already reported as to the cruel devastation wrought by the Germans in that unhappy town. The main street was one silent quarry of ruined houses burnt by the hands of the German soldiers, and hardly a soul was to be seen. Even cottages and concierges' lodges had been set on fire. I have seen few sights more pitiful and none more desolate. Towns further east, such as Sermaizes, Nomeny, Gerbevillers, were razed to the ground with fire and sword and are as the Cities of the Plain.

Before I leave the subject of the treatment of private property by the German troops, I should like to draw the attention of the reader to some unpleasant facts which throw a baneful light on the temper of German officers and men. If one thing is more clearly established than another by my inquiries among the officers of our Staff and divisional commands, it is that châteaux or private houses used as the headquarters of German officers were frequently found to have been left in a state of bestial pollution, which can only be explained by gross drunkenness or filthy malice. Whichever be the explanation, the fact remains that, while to use the beds and the upholstery of private houses as a latrine is not an atrocity, it indicates a state of mind sufficiently depraved to commit one. Many of these incidents, related to me

by our own officers from their own observations, are so disgusting that they are unfit for publication. They point to deliberate defilement.

The public has been shocked by the evidence, accepted by the Committee as genuine, which tells of such mutilations of women and children as only the Kurds of Asia Minor had been thought capable of perpetrating. But the Committee were fully justified in accepting it—they could not do otherwise—and they have by no means published the whole. Pathologists can best supply the explanation of these crimes. I have been told by such that it is not at all uncommon in cases of rape or sexual excess to find that the criminal, when satiated by lust, attempts to murder or mutilate his victim. This is presumably the explanation—if one can talk of explanation—of outrages which would otherwise be incredible. The Committee hint darkly at perverted sexual instinct. Cases of sodomy and of the rape of little children did undoubtedly occur on a very large scale. Some of the worst things have never been published. This is not the time for mincing one's words but for plain speech. Disgusting though it is, I therefore do not hesitate to place on record an incident at Rebais related to me by the Mayor of Coulommiers in the presence of several of his fellow-townsmen with corroborative detail. A respectable woman in that town was seized by some Uhlans who intended to ravish her, but her condition made rape impossible. What followed is better described in French :

Mme. H——, *cafetière à Rebais, mise nue par une patrouille allemande, obligée de parcourir ainsi toute sa maison, chassée dans la rue et obligée de regarder les cadavres de soldats anglais. Les allemands lui barbouillent la figure avec le sang de ses règles.*

It is almost needless to say that the woman went mad. There is very strong reason to suspect that young girls were carried off to the trenches by licentious German soldiery, and there abused by hordes of savage and licentious men. People in hiding in the cellars of houses have heard the voices of women in the hands of German soldiers crying all night long until death or stupor ended their agonies. One of our officers, a subaltern in the sappers, heard a woman's shrieks in the night coming from behind the German trenches near Richebourg l'Avoué; when we advanced in the morning and drove the Germans out a girl was found lying naked on the ground 'pegged out' in the form of a crucifix. I need not go on with this chapter of horrors. To the end of time it will be remembered, and from one generation to another, in the plains of Flanders, in the valleys of the Vosges, and on the rolling fields of the Marne, the oral tradition of men will perpetuate this story of infamy and wrong.

I should say that in the above summary I have confined myself to the result of the inquiries I made at General Headquarters and in the area of our occupation, and have not attempted to summarise the evidence I had previously taken from the British officers and soldiers at the base, as the latter may be left to speak for itself in the depositions already published by the Committee. The object of the summary is to show how far independent inquiries on the spot go to confirm it. The testimony of our soldiers as to the reign of terror which they found prevailing on their arrival in all the places from which they drove the enemy out was amply confirmed by these subsequent and local investigations.

It will, of course, be understood that these inquiries of mine were limited in scope and can by no means claim to be exhaustive. For one thing, I was the only representative of the Home Office sent to France for this purpose; for another, I did not become attached to General Headquarters until the beginning of February, and before that time little or nothing had been done in the way of systematic inquiry by the Staff, whose officers had other and more pressing duties to perform. By that time the testimony to many grave incidents, especially in the field, had perished with those who witnessed them and they remained but a sombre memory. The hearsay evidence of these things which was sometimes all that was left made an impression on my mind as deep as it was painful, but it would have been contrary to the rules of evidence, to which I have striven to conform, for me to take notice of it.

Two things clearly emerge from this observation. One is that had there been from the beginning of the campaign a regular system of inquiry at General Headquarters into these things, *pari passu* with their occurrence, the volume of evidence, great though it is, would have been infinitely greater; the other, that, as there is only too much reason to suppose that with the growing vindictiveness of the enemy things will be worse before they are better, the case for the establishment of such a system throughout the continuance of the War is one that calls for serious consideration.

Although I have some claims to write as a jurist I have here made no attempt to pray in aid the Hague Regulations in order to frame the counts of an indictment. The Germans have broken all laws, human and divine, and not even the ancient freemasonry of arms, whose honourable traditions are almost as old as war itself, has restrained them in their brutal and licentious fury. It is useless to attempt to discriminate between the people and their rulers; an abundance of diaries of soldiers in the ranks shows that all are infected with a common spirit. That spirit

is pride, not the pride of high and pure endeavour, but that pride for which the Greeks found a name in the word *ἴσπης*, the insolence which knows no pity and which feels no love. Long ago Renan warned Strauss of this canker which was eating into the German character. Pedants indoctrinated it, Generals instilled it, the Emperor preached it. The whole people were taught that war was a normal state of civilisation, that the lust of conquest and the arrogance of race were the most precious of the virtues. On this Dead Sea fruit the German people have been fed for a generation until they are rotten to the core.

J. H. MORGAN.

A DISHONOURD ARMY

(II)

THE REPORT OF LORD BRYCE'S COMMITTEE

THE Report of the Committee appointed to consider German Atrocities shows a finding, inevitable from the evidence, that the German invasion of Belgium and the conduct of their campaign there had been attended by an amount of brutality which would possibly have seemed incredible to a person who had not had the opportunity of considering the evidence. Perhaps many persons even after reading the Report and the appended evidence will find themselves unable to believe the grossness of the case. I think I should have been one of them if I had not been afforded the opportunity of hearing the evidence direct from a large number of witnesses.

But even without such opportunity, without even having heard a single word of the British, French, or Belgian version of the history, from such fragments of it as I heard in Germany itself from the Germans during the first seven weeks of the War, I had formed the opinion that the German army had laid itself open to grave charges in Belgium. Though corroboration of one's own word by some other words of one's own is not the most convincing kind of corroboration, I will mention that I had not got many yards across the frontier when—the absence of expediency in speaking before will perhaps be conceded—I expressed this opinion to Germans in the railway carriage and was strenuously supported by a Dutchman. I had formed the opinion from conversation with German soldiers sent back, slightly wounded or otherwise ailing, from the Front to the place where I was detained. I have already mentioned in this Review that these soldiers, of whom there were several hundreds, appeared while there to be well behaved. Nearly all of those with whom I had any conversation seemed civil, respectable fellows.

A soldier returned from Louvain stated that he and his regiment were kept rigorously locked up in barracks the night of

the beginning of the trouble there—a fact which tended rather to excite suspicion in one's mind—and he could not from personal observation say anything as to the cause of it or as to the shooting by townspeople, but stated from hearsay the current German tale. If a preconcerted attack by the townspeople on the Germans had broken out as alleged one would think that a regiment might have been usefully employed instead of being kept locked up in barracks. If, on the other hand, the German troops were firing on each other, there might have been good reason for keeping a regiment safely locked up. A very respectable, quiet young fellow, an ambulaner, told of the shooting of a curé, of course, as having joined in a *franc-tireur* attack on German soldiers, and on the same occasion of the shooting of civilians. A few other conversations, rather more by the tone and disposition of mind displayed as regarded the attitude of the Belgian civil population towards the Germans than by actual facts related, tended to create in any inquiring mind a suspicion that the German army was dealing in an alarmingly rough and ready fashion with Belgian civilians.

But two items of more direct evidence were acquired during a train journey on the way back to England. They have already been related in this Review,¹ but it may be well to repeat them. A respectable middle-class man, a civilian, of apparently about fifty years of age, and of sober, staid appearance and manner of speech, opening conversation with the passengers, most of whom were wounded soldiers, stated that he had recently returned from a journey through Belgium. The obvious feeling of horror and pain in which the impression made by the visit still left him was almost as striking as the facts which he mentioned. He said that he had been up to Namur and that the whole country through which he had passed was one sickening, melancholy sight. In one church he had seen the priest hanging from the roof by his feet. But he said, by way of justification, how could it have been otherwise since the civil population had fired on the German army? He did not attempt to explain how, even assuming the full truth of this latter assertion, it could ever justify the particular mode of execution of the priest in his church. One of the wounded soldiers related how he had seen a little Belgian girl of some twelve or thirteen years of age about to fire on an officer, and how he had sprung up to her and ripped her open with a downward and cross cut which he illustrated with a motion of his hand.

Some resemblances to his impressions as told by the civilian

¹ 'Some Experiences and Impressions of a Civil Prison of War,' by R. S. Nolan, *Nineteenth Century and After*, October 1914.

will be found in extracts from diaries of German soldiers, a large number of which are set out in the Appendix to the Report, notably that of Eitel Anders at p. 161 and that of a Saxon officer quoted at p. 181. Many other of the extracts seem to show a conception of war which, if not resulting in a recorded commission of acts such as that of the soldier in the train, unfortunately bear strong proof of the state of mind from which such acts, without any compunction of conscience, proceed from normal German men in war. Moreover, the Report will be found to contain a dismaying number of instances of brutality towards children. Let the reader turn, for example, to p. 52 of the Report. The Committee there express themselves unable to determine whether such excesses were part of the general scheme of terrorisation. Indirectly at least they would seem to be so, because the evidence fails to show any effort by the military authorities to except the children. On the contrary, at Taminex we find children included in the general slaughter. We find no exception of mothers with quite young children, so as to spare the latter, from harsh measures, such as the locking up overnight in churches, long marches like that from Aerschot to Louvain; and many witnesses say that young children were sometimes kept locked up for long periods without any food. Moreover, if the toleration of brutality of the soldiers was a passive part of the system of terrorisation, their brutality to children becomes included.

Thus, having, before arrival in England and hearing there the multifarious tales of German atrocities, formed the opinion that the German army had laid itself open to grave charges in Belgium, not only did I not accept these multifarious tales, but I also did not believe that the German brutality was one hundredth part as gross or as extensive as, from personal interviews with the victims of or witnesses to it, I am now quite convinced that it was. That one did not attach much credence to the stories of German atrocities rampant in England is not the fault of the Germans but of the English. The acceptance of the happening of atrocities depends less on the amazingness of them than on the nature of the evidence vouchsafed in support of them. The stories rampant in England of German atrocities were told, either originally or merely in repetition, with such a looseness and want of consideration as to facts, details and circumstantiality that they tended to create a general scepticism as to their existence at all. There was the multiform story of the child with both wrists cut off, in the next street or moved down to Bedfordshire or at least always elusive. There was nothing inconceivable

in the fact of a child's wrists having been cut off, but the particular derivation alleged for the story and the rendering of it were calculated to excite only scorn and ridicule.

There can be little doubt that that attitude of mind is the commendable one which refuses to believe atrocities until sufficient evidence of them is adduced. Moreover, personally I should not have thought that the Germans as a nation made up of individuals were of a cruel temperament, and in spite of all that has happened I should still hesitate to say that cruelty is a national characteristic with them. Of course, in a large country like Germany, the development of some of whose constituent parts has varied greatly, character must also vary a good deal. Although theirs is a citizen army, one would pause before accepting the brutal acts of numerous soldiers forming part of an army in the field as representative of the populace. This seems to be also the disposition of mind of the Committee, as expressed at page 44 of the Report, even after the consideration and acceptance of a mass of damning evidence.

But it seems to me that this may be affirmed : the systematic cruelty coming from above, the organised terrorism, may be taken as not merely the work of the immediate authors or directors of it, but of that predominant class in Germany which may be called its governing element. Sometimes Prussian Junkerthum is spoken of in England as if it alone comprised that class. But this is far from being so. The class is immeasurably more extensive and includes the great manufacturers and merchants, who have increased so largely both in numbers and wealth in recent years, and a very considerable proportion of the other bourgeoisie and the official classes. There is notably in Prussia, and governing Prussia has now more or less infected the States throughout the Empire, a large prevailing element throughout which is a strain of a ruthless, overbearing, unscrupulous disposition of mind where national aggrandisement is concerned. With regard to the nation there remains the fact that their political system is not one imposed upon them by aliens or by internal tyrants, but is one which fits in with and is accepted by the national disposition without encountering any greater opposition than is encountered by all political systems from some elements in the peoples in which they prevail. As it has been on a previous occasion sought to point out in this Review,² by virtue of this coincidence Germany's system of concentration makes her the more formidable foe in war. On the other hand, the German nation as a unit cannot in view of the many brutal administrative acts and evidence of administrative cruelty, which this

² 'Germany at Peace and at War,' March 1915.

Report amply shows, escape liability to the charge, in common accuracy of language, of being a cruel nation. They are sufficiently advanced educationally and politically to alter their present political system if they chose to do so. If you trust your conscience to a keeper you must be content to be judged by that keeper's acts.

The individual German character itself makes the individual subservient to the State. Thus when we consider acts committed in Belgium which are evidence of a system of terrorisation, if we come to the conclusion that the system is proved, and, as we most certainly shall do, consider it blameworthy, the German nation, as one of the family of nations, cannot escape from the blame. The German of the type sought to be specified above and many another German, even if considering the system to have been proved, would yet not consider it blameworthy. For him it would be a State measure executed in a State interest, and thus his, amongst Germans quite normal, moral sense would be satisfied. If he should happen to come to the conclusion that the acts were excessive in number or sometimes in nature, that would not alter his position, as it would simply mean excess beyond what was required for the subsidiary purpose of terrorisation. Thus for him war is a suspension of the moral sense of the rest of mankind. It is submitted that the above statement will be found not to be exaggerated if the evidence attached to this Report is carefully studied. The tenor of it will be found to run through many of the diaries, diaries of various average Germans engaged in war. The criminal classes of a country do not, as a rule, keep diaries, unless possibly for professional purposes, and it would be puerile to call these soldiers criminals in the usual sense of the word by reason only of the admissions contained in their diaries.

Nevertheless, for the nation, the great masses of the people, it must be admitted that their minds are deliberately kept inflamed by false stories, just as the rank and file of the Army appear to have been deliberately incited by the military authorities by false stories of ill-treatment of German soldiers by Belgian civilians. Frequently injuries sustained by soldiers otherwise than in some definite battle direct from an opposing army were put down to the account of Belgian civilians, without any evidence whatsoever of their having so come. In this connexion reference might be made to diary No. 29, at p. 179. evidently that of a lieutenant in command of a platoon :

23rd October, 1914—Some aviators flew over us and several infantry bullets whistled over our heads. It was assumed that they came from *francs-tireurs*. A house was burnt down and some people locked up. In advancing I saw a terrible picture. In the meadow lay a man and a

woman dead—evidently the parents of a child about five years old wandering about wounded. I should have liked to have taken the poor little mite into safety, but duty called me to lead my men on. All the houses round about us were burning, and probably its home too.

Stories of the cruel outrages by the Belgian civil population were spread in great mass and with great vigour amongst the nation and were fully accepted by even sober, respectable persons. Similarly stories were spread about ourselves and sedulously nurtured by the authorities. There is a remarkable contrast between the attitude of the authorities here and those in Germany, regarding official statements of misconduct, which one cannot but approve, even though the attitude of the German authorities is designed to an end and very successfully so. Hence the great and lasting benefit of the Report of a Commission such as this, which will have put on record a finding couched in language moderate, judicial and impartial after a very careful consideration of a vast mass of evidence.

One must admire the very fair, almost lenient, way in which the Committee comment on the significance of the outrages by individual soldiers. Seeing the vast number of soldiers who were engaged in the campaign in Belgium, there is no evidence that the majority were actual participants in such outrages. It would be hard to calculate what proportion they were, but the actual evidence probably would not include a numerically large proportion amongst the actual authors. But even more than by reason of their heinousness, the importance of these individual outrages is great by reason of the practically irresistible presumption arising from their number, and other evidence in regard to them, that they must have been to a very large extent tolerated by the officers within the cognisance of the soldiers. There can be little doubt that the toleration was intentional, and that thus a large number of civil inhabitants were for strategical purposes abandoned to mutilation, rape, and various kinds of torture and murder at the hands of brutal soldiers.

Though of course a campaign fought in their country, no matter how conducted, was bound to be a grievous upsetting of the life of the population, this particular conduct of it by the Germans has produced consequences which are consternating. As pointed out by the Report, the mere fact that such vast numbers have fled is in itself evidence which cannot be disregarded. It is very remarkable that so many of these persons who have gone through such dreadful experiences have seemingly remained so unmoved. Undoubtedly the fact adds vastly to the value of their evidence, but it was an astounding fact to the person who came to examine them. The majority whom I

interviewed showed an almost unhealthy absence of animosity. They showed little emotion of any kind and were rather an unimaginative type. They had, largely in consequence of the War itself, grown quickly accustomed to an abnormal life, and did not seem to understand that others hearing them had not yet acquired the same degree of accustomedness. They would sometimes begin their story by saying 'Well, we had visitors that day and we were all sitting in the cellar, etc.,' as if it were quite the most natural place in which a family and their guests would ordinarily foregather. Not only was their stolidity remarkable in the telling of the story, but in many cases it had apparently been just the same when the events were happening. There was a singular absence of sensationalism about them, and the great majority, both of civilians and soldiers, showed varying degrees of reluctance to give evidence at all. As no powers of compelling evidence were conferred on us, in a few cases all effort to extract it failed. In one place where there were a large number of refugees, I chose the moment when they were all assembled at dinner in a large hall to interrogate them in order to ascertain what their knowledge or experience was, so as later to take the evidence of those who should have any to give. I gave instructions that all should be prevented from leaving the hall before I had questioned them for the purpose mentioned, and this was made known to them all. But as, unfortunately, there were four doors leading out of the hall, the great majority eluded me. Sometimes witnesses were distrustful of giving evidence and, for this reason, in some a disposition to understate was distinctly noticeable.

When one beheld the tragic consequences, the domestic life of a nation suddenly and ruthlessly torn asunder, their stolidity was the more remarkable. The separation of husband and wife, each ignorant of the other's whereabouts and even continued existence, a few occasionally resigning themselves with fortitude to a widowerhood or widowhood which may prove to be unfounded, was borne with an equanimity which surprised one less than that with which the separation of parents and children and young members of a family was borne. Whole families had been rent asunder, often within a few hours' time; a husband and son taken off captives on their way back from home to work, a mother and child stabbed to death for no cause while hurrying through the streets to their home, the other children having fled from the house in terror in different directions and still divided. Thus, in a few hours' time the life of a perfectly peaceful family in no way participating in the War was broken for ever by a ruthlessly selfish foreigner who, in the belief of a possible indirect

utility to his national greed, cynically overrode all private rights.

The results afford often a pitiable sight. In Appendix A will be found the deposition of a business man, an educated member of the middle class, whose home, consisting of himself, his wife, a little girl of seven and a little boy of five, had been in Tamines. On the day of the German entry into Tamines his wife had, after dinner, gone out with the little girl to visit her sister-in-law while the husband and little boy remained at home. The next day the husband found the bodies of his wife and little girl, after they had been extricated from a great mass of bodies of civilians who had been murdered by the Germans in the public square. The wife's body bore marks of stabs in the head and breast, and the little girl's body had a stab in the neck. The husband, whose distress was pathetic to witness, is now a refugee with a little boy of five years to care for.

A brother and sister tell the following story which is repeated from recollection and somewhat abbreviated. The brother, who is an exceptionally intelligent lad of rather superior education, is the principal relator: 'The Germans came to our village on the evening of ———. They were shouting out, for the villagers to hear, "Be good and we will be good." They ordered my brother George and me to go with them in different directions, knocking at the houses and telling the inhabitants in Flemish to come out. I knocked at the houses telling the people as I had been ordered to. When I got back home I found soldiers in my house. My parents and sisters were fetching water for them and giving them food. They paid for what they had. Shortly after, they took off my father, who is over sixty years of age, my eldest brother Francis, twenty-five years of age, and George and me to the church. Other men and youths of the village were also taken there, and we were kept locked up there under charge of a guard the whole night. At 12 the guard was changed. One of the German soldiers going off guard crossed himself and went on his knees in prayer in the church, and the other soldiers and the villagers all burst out laughing. The next morning at 6 an officer said that those not within a certain age might leave. He stood at the door judging our ages from our appearance, and gave instructions as to who were to stay back. My father, George, and I were allowed to leave. Twenty-one were kept back. Francis was one of them. When we got home, my father told my younger sister, Julie, to take Francis something to eat. She went up to the church with bread and ham and the guard at the door let her in. Francis asked for something to drink, and she came back and went again with some coffee. This time the guard said she could not go in

and told her to come back later. She went again later and found the church empty. She went to one of the houses near by and asked the owner what had happened. He said that fourteen of the twenty-one had been brought across to a stable and had been made to lie down on the ground and keep turning from one side to the other while soldiers stood over them holding revolvers close to them, and after a little time of this, they were allowed to get up. The seven had been taken to a place a little further away and shot. Francis was one of the seven. Julie came home crying and told us. Father fell down in a faint. About five or six o'clock that day I met father in the village; he had gone to look for Francis' body and to bury it. The twenty-one men who had been kept in the church had been put standing against a wall and every third man was marked off. Francis was one. One of the twenty-one whose name was —— told us this the next day. The seven men were led out to a place where there was a newly built house. They were put standing against the wall of the house and shot. A woman of the village who told us that she had seen the shooting told us this. Father was told of the place, and he went there and fetched Francis' body and put it on a wheelbarrow and buried it that evening. I saw the body.

'Francis was a burgher, he had never been a soldier. He had never borne arms at all, and he possessed no firearms. He had done nothing to deserve this death. No one in the village had fired upon the Germans. They had done nothing to them. Before the Germans came the villagers had been ordered to deliver up any arms which they had, and all arms had been delivered up. The Germans came back again several days later. I fled the day they came back.' Here the sister continues the story. 'The Germans took us all, father, mother, my sister Julie, my brother George, and me to the church. We were kept locked up there all night with the other inhabitants of the village. We were given nothing to eat. We were afterwards taken to ——, and the women and children were locked up in the school there. We have not seen our father or brother George since. We were told they were taken away as prisoners to Germany. We believe mother and Julie made their way into France.'

The story was told with remarkable simplicity and objectivity. Young persons if intelligent and straightforward are often the best witnesses to facts. Their instinctive powers of observation are often greater, and they are less inclined to weigh the bearings of their answers. Notwithstanding the tragic shooting of their brother, for whom they both wore deep

mourning, these young persons did not show a trace of animosity or any hysterical feeling.

Other witnesses speak as to the main incidents of the story. It would seem from their evidence that the Germans alleged that they had been fired on in this village. From their proclaiming on arrival the words 'Be good, and we will be good,' one would expect that, if their words were meant sincerely, no ill-treatment would have been received from them unless they received provocation. I confess this point weighed very much with me so that I interviewed these young persons again subsequently in order to press them on this point. They declared—it is the boy's evidence that counts mainly—emphatically and with apparent straightforwardness that no firing of any kind had been done by the villagers. If the boy were not truthful and had desired to make a case against the Germans, he would not have volunteered the evidence of these words having been spoken by them, nor probably would he have volunteered the story of the soldier going on his knees in the church, as the boy apparently from his surroundings was himself a religious Catholic, having been brought up at the school of some Order. Apart from the abundant evidence that the villagers had been commanded some time before by the local authorities to deliver up any arms which they might possess, it is exceedingly improbable that in a small village like this they would have dared to provoke the Germans. What is then the explanation of the Germans proclaiming these words and yet treating the villagers in this harsh fashion and shooting seven of them? There is a very likely one. It is a noticeable feature throughout these gruesome records that because some complaint, whether with or without foundation, was made of the conduct of the Belgians in one place, many other entirely distinct places suffered. The village in question was only about a mile distant from a town in which the Germans alleged that one of their officers had been shot by Belgians that same evening. The Germans had entered that town earlier that day, and by the afternoon there was much drunkenness amongst the soldiers and much reckless firing by them in consequence, and there is good ground from the evidence for believing that in so firing they hit one of their own officers. If any disturbance had occurred in the small village itself it must necessarily have been known almost at once throughout the village. Yet we find the soldiers being peaceably provided that evening with food and drink in the house of these witnesses. If the Germans' promise to be 'good' was to be kept, needless to say they should have left all these villagers quietly in their homes that night. Instead, without any disturbance in the village itself, we find a number of the male population taken off early

that night and locked up in the church. It is clear that there was a continued communication that evening between the soldiers in the town and the village close by. In the town a large number of residents were put to death by the Germans. Can there be much doubt why the village also suffered notwithstanding the German promise?

One of the many egregious features of the Germans in their campaign has been their indifference to the most elementary prompting of justice at least to attempt to measure and appropriate punishment. But there is only too much ground for coming to the conclusion that the apportionment of punishment, according to even the loosest rule of justice, was not an object sought by the German Higher Command at all. Their motives would seem to have been mainly two: Firstly and principally to check resistance and expedite their passage by terrorising, and, secondly, mere rancorous fury at Belgian resistance. In estimating the conduct of governing bodies whether of States or Armies, one is always slow to impute it to any feeling of passion, naturally seeking rather merely some fancied motive of expediency, which, undoubtedly, was also here the main motive. But governing bodies consist of conglomerations of human beings, and temper may run so high and so wide as to sway even majorities in councils.

A refugee Wallon curé, obviously a man of intelligence and discernment, my acquaintance with whom did not spring from and was in no way connected with my labours in taking evidence for the Committee, informed me that he was taken prisoner by the Germans and brought before certain superior Staff officers. Almost their first words, impetuously spoken, to him were: 'This is the fault of your King! This is the fault of your Government! Why didn't they let us pass?' He told me of an instance in the early days of the War in Eastern Belgium, where it was alleged that in a certain place someone had shot a German soldier. The charge was never brought home to any of the inhabitants of the place, but by a rough and ready method of award execution was carried out amongst inhabitants of another part of the same area. The only atrocity which the curé had ever personally partly witnessed was in the same neighbourhood, and apparently the reason alleged for it was the same. Four men had been plunged up to the shoulders in a dung heap and then shot. He saw the victims still in that condition after they had been shot, and observed the marks of the bullets which had passed through their heads on a level with them on a wall behind the dung heap.

Though probably the vast majority of opinion approves the

action taken by the Belgian authorities in the early days of the War, in ordering the delivery up by civilians of all arms in their possession, I have heard more than one Belgian speak disapprovingly of it and express the opinion that, if the order had not been given and followed, the population would probably have suffered less, as the Germans, in many cases, would then have feared to commit the excesses which they committed. There is probably some substance in the latter part of that remark. This curé told me that, though in almost all cases in the entire area from which he comes the arms were in fact delivered up, in one small town the inhabitants kept their arms with the intention of using them if any provocation were offered. The priest of the town was taken as a hostage, a fact which in no way acted as a provocation upon the townspeople. As was their custom, German officers solemnly warned the priest that if a single shot were fired on their troops in that village they would shoot him. The priest, with much presence of mind, replied 'Messieurs, you would thereby be doing my townspeople a pleasure, because they are all red-hot socialists and anti-clericals.' The Germans are said to have been made aware of the fact that the townspeople had kept their arms and refrained from any provocation.

The majority of the Belgian witnesses whom I examined were Flemish, of the labouring class, peasants, or business people in a varyingly modest way of business. The majority of the soldiers whom I examined were Wallons, some of them being men of a comparatively high standard of education. They showed as a rule an equal absence of any animosity, a remarkable fairness, and a rigid disinclination to make any statement beyond their personal knowledge, and sometimes an almost cynical objectivity. The like entire absence of any eagerness to give evidence—in fact, a general reluctance to do so—were noticeable amongst our own soldiers. In them, too, one rather wondered at the absence of any prejudice. An admirable spirit of fairness was general amongst them.

Probably many readers of the depositions will wonder at the frequency of certain classes of outrage alleged and, perceiving no reason in human nature for the commission of such outrages, may be disposed to reject the allegations entirely. Take, for instance, the repeated evidence of the cutting or stabbing of women's breasts. It may seem incomprehensible why even the most brutal or depraved soldier should, sometimes without any further outrage, indulge in this wanton cruelty. But it is not altogether rare to find that a brutalised nature sometimes exerts itself in a form of mere cruelty specially directed to sex, exercising its ferocity with such special aim. The particular violence

occasionally sought to be committed by some of the lowest and most violent criminals in large towns when resisting arrest would seem, in different circumstances, to bear some analogy.

There are certain other instances of extreme horribleness and cruelty which are referred to by the Committee on page 6 of the Report, but omitted by them if depending on the evidence of only one witness. The Committee say : ' Many depositions have thus been omitted on which, though they are probably true, we feel it safer not to place reliance.' Unfortunately in some such instances from the impression made by the witness there is the very strongest probability of truth, though the course followed by the Committee is sure to commend itself generally as being another example of the extreme caution with which they have exercised their judicial functions.

Corroboration is, of course, one of the elements most studiously considered, as has been done here, by any tribunal or committee whose duty it is to sift and weigh evidence. But if all the available corroborative evidence had been set out here, the Appendix would probably have been so unwieldy as to receive less likelihood of being studied. Probably beyond a certain measure even juries, and far more the general public, feel that corroboration becomes a surfeit. There was a superfluity of it, for instance, as regards the Sempst atrocities. Eighteen depositions relating to them are set out in the Appendix, but they do not by any means complete the list. The second of those set out is that of a mere onlooker, a most intelligent man, not a native of Sempst, who neither in himself nor his family suffered anything from the Germans, except through fear of them, fleeing from his home later on the 25th day of August. He did not display even the very faintest objection to them. The third, who had been through the trying scenes of the morning of the 25th, is corroborated by another, who is referred to as X in the depositions of the third. X and his family were hiding in their cellar on that morning early, when they saw two neighbours, father and son, being thrust by soldiers towards a pit in their back yard. The soldiers shoved the father and son back into the pit. The father exclaimed ' Oh, myn Heer, waaroom moeten wij hier sterven ? ' (Oh, sir, why must we die here ?) The soldiers fired at them in the pit and also bayoneted them. X had previously seen two officers seated in the street near their neighbours' house ; it was alleged that the father and son were soldiers, but they were merely civilians. Apparently the order to kill them had proceeded from the officers. X was discovered accidentally, and had had no intimation that his evidence would ever be asked for. He and the other deponent had only seen each other once since

they settled in this country, and did not even know each other's address.

The deponent's wife had to stand amongst the other women on the road that morning of the 25th for a period of a couple of hours with her hands above her head. Notwithstanding that she had with her a baby only two weeks old, the soldier told her she must hold up her hands, so that she had to hold the baby in her apron, catching the corners of the apron between her teeth, resting herself by slipping on to the ground whenever the soldier was not looking.

These records will serve not only to perpetuate amongst Britons of the future a hatred of the deeds which they relate; but have they not also the immediate and more important purpose of inspiring now amongst all of us of the present a determination to bar the progress and success of such deeds and to avenge them, a purpose without the fulfilment of which the practicability of the other suggested may perhaps be questionable? We must avenge them in the only way in which they can be fittingly avenged, that is nationally, by our inflicting such a defeat on the nation which has committed them through its Government, that we shall be able to exact appropriate retribution from the nation. What we must seek to lay low for ever is that governing element, concentrated solely on what it conceives to be national aggrandisement, which is the international peace-breaker.

The records should surely inspire in us a crusade-like fervour to exact retribution for the outrage on justice and humanity which they show. Unfortunately, from experience, I must say that in the early weeks of the War there was in the nation in Germany more of the surging spirit of a mighty crowd closely welded with common intent than one noticed here. The one was an entire nation wholly at war: the other was a nation taking some part in a war. There all things were directed solely to the War, a condition which the Briton coming home from there was forcibly reminded of, by way of contrast, on his arrival here. The expediency of it seemed to him at least very arguable, and he thought that much of it might usefully be introduced into his own country. Most of what is desirable in it might be obtained through national organisation. But it is difficult to see what more likely or, indeed, what other medium can be got for that national organisation than the Government. Objections are sure to be urged on traditional grounds of individual liberty. Indeed, so far as in this War we are fighting not merely for national preservation against gravely threatened national extinction, but, in addition, for a principle, it is probably mainly that of individual liberty. But the disadvantage of a rigid adherence in very special

times to special principles is that you may eventually not be left to enjoy the practice of your principles.

Let us hope that this Report will inspire the whole nation to a new conception of the great moral cause for which we have to fight. Apart from the justice of our cause itself against the Germans, as contrasted with the injustice of theirs against us, it would, in itself, be a defeat of justice in the human control of affairs, if any cause were suffered to succeed by such means.

R. S. NOLAN.

FREDERICK THE GREAT AND WILLIAM THE SECOND:

A REVELATION AND A LESSON IN STATECRAFT

MANY British historians, statesmen, and publicists have endeavoured to explain to us the hidden causes of the present War. They have dwelt on the warlike and bombastic utterances which William the Second has made ever since he came to the throne, and have traced the conflagration to two powerful influences: to the boundless ambition and conceit of the German Emperor and to the support which he received by the teachings of German jingoes of the military and of the professorial variety, from Treitschke to Bernhardi. They have compared the Emperor to Bismarck, Louis the Fourteenth, and Napoleon the First. However, nothing is easier than to establish superficial but entirely misleading historical parallels. Unfortunately, the British Universities, while devoting much time to abstract economic theory, miscalled political economy, and to the dust and dry bones of history, have completely neglected statesmanship, that most important of all sciences, in its practical and historical aspects. Before the War mediæval Germany was assiduously studied by the professors, but modern Germany was disregarded and was scarcely known. Militarily and intellectually Great Britain was equally unprepared for Germany's attack, and those who unceasingly tried to warn the nation, as the writer of these pages has done in the *Nineteenth Century* and elsewhere during fifteen years, were treated as alarmists, cranks, and anti-Germans. After the outbreak of the War British soldiers and statesmen hastily began to organise a national Army, and British professors endeavoured to explain to the public modern German history and German statesmanship, two subjects with which they are deplorably ill acquainted. When it was too late, scraps from the political writings of Treitschke and his disciples were published in translation for the information of the public, and now everyone who has read some extracts from Treitschke and Bernhardi believes that he fully understands Germany's character and policy.

The rash policy of William the Second in no way resembles

that of Prince Bismarck, nor is it comparable with that of Louis the Fourteenth and Napoleon the First. In an article 'Bismarck—and William II. : A Centenary Reflection,' which I was allowed to contribute to the April number of this Review, I showed that William the Second, soon after his advent, threw Bismarck's policy and teaching to the winds, and that the Iron Chancellor spent the last eight years of his life in strenuous opposition to the Emperor's reckless policy, and foretold that it would lead to Germany's ruin. William the Second has certainly not acted in accordance with Bismarck's views and methods. His world-embracing ambitions may resemble those of Napoleon the First, and his attitude and his absolutist pronouncements no doubt remind us of Louis the Fourteenth's celebrated *l'état c'est moi*. He has not, however, taken Frenchmen for his model, but one of his predecessors, Frederick the Great. The Emperor bears in many respects a most remarkable resemblance to his great ancestor. Modern German statesmanship is not Bismarckian but Frederickian. Treitschke and Bernhardi are not innovators but imitators. They are merely expounders of the methods of Frederick the Great. A study of Frederick's policy is not only interesting at the moment, but it should prove of very considerable practical value to the statesmen of the nations allied against Germany. Such a study will reveal to us the hidden causes of the War and of Germany's conduct before and during the struggle, and it will give us an excellent insight into the traditional methods of Prussian statesmanship. It will show us how Prusso-Germany rose from insignificance and poverty to greatness and affluence, and it will at the same time teach us the way by which alone the Entente Powers can bring the War to a successful conclusion.

The British Universities, while publishing at great expense editions and translations of the writings of remote antiquity, which are entirely useless for all practical purposes, have paid no attention to the most important foreign political writings with which every well-educated Englishman ought to be acquainted. For Bismarck's statesmanship those who do not read German have to rely mainly upon his badly translated *Memoirs*, which contain chiefly personal matters, and upon Busch's chatter; while for that of Frederick the Great they have to turn to the roman-cings of Carlyle and Macaulay. Frederick the Great's most valuable political writings are as unknown in this country as are Bismarck's. Frederick wielded a most prolific pen. His general writings fill thirty moderate-sized volumes, and his political correspondence, of which so far only part has been published, forty very large ones. He wrote only in French, and the large majority of the extracts from his writings and letters given in the following pages have not previously been published in English.

The Germans are stolid and one-sided people. William the Second strikingly resembles his great ancestor by his un-German vivacity, his restlessness, and his great versatility. The Emperor poses as an authority on all things human and divine, and endeavours not only to direct in person the Army, the Navy, the Church, and all the Departments of State, but all the arts and sciences and the economic activities of Germany as well. Similarly, Frederick the Great was the Government. He was his own Commander-in-Chief, Minister of War, Chief of the Staff, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, of Commerce, and of Justice, etc. His assistants were mere clerks. In addition he was an excellent economist, historian, and musician. He wrote a good deal of indifferent French poetry and philosophy, and he patronised and endeavoured to direct all the sciences and arts and the entire business of Prussia. William the Second, like Frederick the Great, is a consummate actor. Frederick the Great posed before the world as a philosopher, a friend of man, and a freethinker. William the Second poses as a devout and deeply religious man. Both Frederick the Great and William the Second have acted with the greatest hypocrisy, unscrupulousness, and heartless brutality. Both have successfully deceived the world in the early part of their career by their frequently made fervent protestations that they loved peace and public morality, and condemned injustice, tyranny, and war, and both have attacked their unsuspecting and unprepared neighbours after having lulled them to sleep by their pacific and generous utterances.

Before studying the views and policy of Frederick the Great we should cast a glance at his immediate predecessors, for thus we shall be able to follow the progress of Prussia since the time when it became a kingdom.

Frederick's grandfather, the first King of Prussia, who was crowned a king in 1701, was despicable as a man and a monarch. Frederick the Great has drawn a terrible picture of him in his *Mémoires de Brandebourg*, published in 1751. He wrote :

Frederick the First was attracted by the pomp surrounding royalty. He was actuated by vanity and self-love. He liked to exalt himself above others. His acquisition of the royal crown was caused by a common and childish vanity. In the end it proved a political master-stroke, for the royal dignity delivered the House of Brandenburg from the yoke of the House of Austria. The crown became a spur and a challenge to his posterity, and he seemed to urge his heirs: 'I have acquired for you a great title. Make yourselves worthy of it. I have laid the foundation of your greatness. It is your duty to accomplish the work which I have begun. . . .'

The armies marching through Prussia, in the time of Frederick the First, had spread disease throughout the country, and famine had

increased the effect of the pestilence. The King abandoned his people in their misfortune, and, while his revenues did not suffice for the magnificence of his expenditure on vain pomp, he saw in cold blood more than 200,000 of his subjects perish whose lives he could have saved by timely action. . . .

To obtain the royal crown he sacrificed the lives of 30,000 of his subjects in wars made on behalf of the Emperor. The royal dignity appealed only to his vanity and his love of dissipation. He was open-handed and generous, but bought his pleasures at a terrible cost. He sold his subjects as soldiers to England and Holland like cattle to the butcher.

He wasted the wealth of the nation in prodigal and vain dissipation. His Court was one of the most magnificent in Europe. His favourites received large pensions. Nothing could equal the magnificence of his palaces. His fêtes were superb. His stables were filled with horses, his kitchens with cooks and his cellars with wine. He gave an estate worth 40,000 thalers to a servant for shooting a large stag. He intended to pawn his domains at Halberstadt in order to buy the Pitt diamond from Louis the Fifteenth. . . . His favourites were overwhelmed with gifts; and while his Eastern Provinces perished through famine and pestilence he did not lift a finger to help them.

Frederick the First died for the good of his country in 1713, and was succeeded by his son, Frederick William the First, the father of Frederick the Great. Frederick William the First reduced the expenditure of the Court to a minimum, introduced the most rigid economy in the country, and employed the national resources exclusively for creating a large army and a great war chest. He converted Prussia into an armed camp and militarised the whole nation. His character is drawn as follows by Frederick the Great in the *Histoire de mon Temps* :

The late King Frederick William the First strove to make his country happy, to create a well-disciplined army, and to administer his finances with order and wise economy. He avoided war in order not to be diverted from this worthy aim, and thus he advanced his country unostentatiously on the way to greatness without awakening the envy of other States.

In Frederick's essay *Des Mœurs, des Coutumes, de l'Industrie* we read :

Under Frederick the First Berlin had been the Athens of the North. Under Frederick William the First it became its Sparta. Its entire government was militarised. The capital became the stronghold of Mars. All the industries which serve the needs of armies prospered. In Berlin were established powder-mills and cannon-foundries, rifle factories, etc. . . .

Frederick William the First strove less to create new industries than to abolish useless expenditure. Formerly, mourning had been ruinously expensive. Funerals were accompanied by extremely costly festivities. These abuses were abolished. Houses and carriages were no longer allowed to be draped in black, nor were black liveries to be given to servants. Henceforward people died cheaply. The military character of the Government affected both customs and fashions. Society took a military tone. No one used more than three ells of cloth for a coat. The age of gallantry passed away. Ladies fled the society of men, and these compensated themselves with carousals, tobacco, and buffoonery.

Frederick William the First died on the 17th of May 1740, and was succeeded by his son, Frederick the Second, the Great. As Frederick loved the French language and French elegance, was devoted to poetry, music, and art, and hated the army, he was despised by his coarse and brutal father. He seemed to him a fop and a degenerate, another Frederick the First. Men in Prussia and abroad who had suffered under the harsh and parsimonious Government of Frederick William the First hailed Frederick's advent with joy. They thought that the rule of the martinet had come to an end, that life in Prussia under the new Sovereign would be pleasant and peaceful.

Frederick was twenty-eight years old when he came to the throne, and he had done his best to deceive the world as to his real character. He was believed to be witty, genial, and peaceful, if not unmilitary. In 1737, three years before he ascended the throne, he published a book called *Considérations sur l'état du corps politique de l'Europe*, which concluded with the words : 'It is a disgrace for a ruler to ruin his State ; and to attempt to obtain territories to which one has no justified claim must be branded as criminal injustice and rapacity.' Two years later, in 1739, Frederick the Great wrote his celebrated book *The Anti-Machiavel*. It was published in 1740, the year when he came to the throne. In it he stated with the greatest emphasis that policy should be based upon morality, and laid down the remarkable doctrine that ruler and subjects were equals, and that the Sovereign was the first servant of the State. In the first chapter of the *Anti-Machiavel* we read : 'A Sovereign, far from being the absolute master of the people, should only be the highest official (*le premier magistrat*).' In another edition of the same book that expression was replaced by 'Le premier domestique.' In the *Mémoires de Brandebourg* he stated that a ruler should be 'le premier serviteur de l'Etat.' Frederick the Great, in his *Anti-Machiavel*, laid down the duties of kingship as follows :

Rulers ought to be exclusively occupied with the duties of study and of government in order to be able to act with intelligence and in the fulness of knowledge. Their business consists in thinking correctly and in acting in accordance with their intelligence and convictions.

In the *Anti-Machiavel* Frederick utterly condemned the policy advocated by the great Florentine statesman. He castigated the boundless ambitions of rulers and urged that the action of Sovereigns should be animated by philosophy, by a lofty idealism, by love of mankind, by virtue, and by love of peace. We read in the Preface and in Chapter VI. :

While Spinoza undermined the foundations of faith, Machiavelli undermined those of statesmanship. . . . I venture to take up the defence

of humanity against that monster which strives to destroy humanity. and would oppose reason and justice to sophistry and crime. . . . Floods which overwhelm the land, the fire of lightning which reduces towns to ashes, and pestilences which depopulate entire Provinces are not as terrible to the world as the dangerous morals and the unbridled passions of kings. The celestial inflictions last only for a time. They rage only over a limited space, and Nature makes good the destruction they caused, but for the crimes of kings entire nations suffer for a very long time. . . .

I would tell the kings that their true political interest consists in outshining their subjects in virtue. I would tell them that it is not enough for them to establish for themselves a great reputation by means of brilliant and glorious actions, but that on their part actions are required which will promote the happiness of the human race.

Of all the sentiments which exercise a tyrannic influence over our minds, none is more fatal, more contrary to humanity, and more pernicious to the peace of the world than unrestrained ambition, an unquenchable desire for false glory.

No terms were strong enough for Frederick with which to brand a conquering prince, who to him was merely a crowned villain. He told the world in his *Anti-Machiavel* :

Heroes and highwaymen possess the same courage and the same skill. The only difference between them is, that a conqueror is an illustrious thief and that a highwayman is an obscure one. The former is rewarded for his deeds with a laurel wreath, and the latter with the rope.

The *Anti-Machiavel* is a paean of peace. Peace is described as the greatest blessing and war as the greatest crime. The book significantly ends with the following powerful sentences :

I feel convinced that if monarchs would fully realise the miseries which a declaration of war inflicts upon their peoples I should not appeal in vain to their better feelings. But their imagination is not sufficiently strong. They do not appreciate the evils of war; they do not know them, and they are protected against war's horrors by their exalted position. They do not feel the taxes and imposts which crush the people, the loss of the youth of the nation enrolled in the Army, the infectious diseases which decimate the troops, the horrors of battles and sieges, the sufferings of the wounded and of the mutilated, the sorrows of the orphans who have lost in their father their only support, the loss of so many useful men who have been cut off before their time. Sovereigns who see in their subjects merely their slaves will sacrifice them without pity and see them perish without regret, but princes who see in other men their equals and consider themselves as the soul of the body politic, of the people, will carefully preserve the precious blood of their subjects.

As government should be based on virtue and on the love of mankind, it should be carried on with scrupulous honesty, the more so as honesty is not only a virtue but an advantage to those who possess it. Treaties should be observed most religiously and be broken only in case of direst need. We read in the *Anti-Machiavel* :

Both honesty and worldly wisdom demand that sovereigns should religiously observe the treaties which they have concluded, and that they should scrupulously fulfil all their stipulations. . . .

A ruler is sometimes compelled by disagreeable necessity to break his treaties and alliances. However, he should part with his obligations like an honest man. He should advise his Allies in time of his intention, and he should before all never take such an extreme step unless the welfare of the people and absolute necessity make it inevitable. . . .

Looking solely at the interest of rulers, I assert that it is very bad policy on their part to act like rascals and to deceive the world. They deceive only once, and then lose credit everywhere.

According to the *Anti-Machiavel* Frederick's ideal form of government was a limited monarchy on the English model :

It seems to me that if we look for a model among the Governments of the present time we find it in England. In England, Parliament stands between the King and the people. The English King has the greatest power for doing good but none for doing evil.

The *Anti-Machiavel* is not merely an expression of the purest and most praiseworthy sentiments, for it contains at the same time many exceedingly shrewd and practical political observations. Frederick the Great utterly condemned entrusting the forces of the country to Ministers or Generals, to underlings. In his opinion, the ruler should command the Army in person, and should be supported by an able general if he did not possess the necessary military gifts :

A ruler should command his troops in person. His army is his home, his interest, his duty, his glory. Being the defender of justice, he ought to be the defender of his subjects, and as this is one of the most important objects of his office, he ought not to entrust it to anyone else. Besides, his presence with the army abolishes misunderstanding among his generals and differences between them which are harmful to his interests and to those of the army. His presence creates order in the matter of magazines, ammunition and warlike provisions, without which even a Julius Caesar would be helpless. As the ruler orders battles to be fought, he should also command in battle and should by his presence increase the courage and confidence of his troops and animate them by his example.

Although Frederick censured in the strongest terms war in the abstract, he very sensibly recognised the necessity of war against oppression and against the overweening ambitions of another nation. He justified only wars of defence, and he laid down the theory of the balance of power in the following sentences :

Sometimes Sovereigns are wise in undertaking wars of precaution. Such wars are technically wars of attack. Nevertheless, they are just. When the excessive strength of a State threatens to overflow its boundaries and to engulf the world, wisdom commands us to oppose dykes and to arrest thereby the torrent while it can still be controlled. When we see clouds arise on the horizon and when lightning announces to us the coming storm, the threatened Sovereign who cannot weather it alone will, if he is wise, combine with those who are threatened with the same danger and who have therefore the same interests. If the kings of Egypt, Syria, and Macedonia had allied themselves in time against the power of Rome, Rome

would never have been able to overthrow them. A carefully devised alliance and an energetically conducted war would have prevented Rome from achieving its aims and enslaving the world. It follows that a ruler will act more wisely if he embarks upon a war of aggression while he is still master of his destiny, while he can still choose between war and peace, than if he should sit still and wait until times have become desperate, for then a declaration of war on his part would serve no purpose except to delay his enslavement and ruin for a little while. It is an excellent maxim that it is better to surprise than to be surprised in war, and all great men have taken advantage of it.

The *Anti-Machiavel* was an act of self-revelation on the part of Frederick. At the end of the sixth chapter we read the remarkable words: 'Let Caesar Borgia be the model of those who admire Machiavelli. My model is Marcus Aurelius.'

We have listened to Frederick's profession of faith publicly made in the year 1740, when he came to the throne. His book created an immense sensation throughout Europe, and impressed rulers and peoples with the idea that a mild, generous, and peaceful Sovereign had ascended the Prussian throne. However, the world was deceived. While Frederick seemed to be devoted to peace, art, beauty, and all the virtues, he was devoured by an insatiable thirst for glory. He was determined to win renown either by fair means or by foul, and was prepared to use the worst methods described by Machiavelli to fulfil his ambitions. He was ready to bring about a war which would cost countless lives, and which might end in the utter destruction of his country and of his dynasty.

The Emperor Charles the Sixth had no son. He desired that his hereditary rights, after his death, should fall to his daughter Maria Theresa, and had endeavoured to guarantee her peaceful succession by treaties with nearly all the Powers, the so-called Pragmatic Sanction, to which Prussia also had adhered. Although Prussia had signed that solemn act which guaranteed Austria's integrity, Frederick resolved to claim under the flimsiest of pretexts from Austria four duchies of Silesia which had been in Austria's undisputed possession ever since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. We shall learn Frederick's motives for attacking Austria partly from his correspondence, partly from his *Histoire de mon Temps*. The latter is an historical document of the very greatest importance. It is true its style is occasionally flippant. However, it was written by Frederick for the guidance of the future rulers of Prussia, and is therefore an invaluable supplement to his political and military testaments. Its author told us in the Preface:

I wish to transmit to posterity the principal events in which I have taken a part, or of which I have been witness, for the guidance of those who will rule Prussia after me. Thus they may learn the reasons of my

actions, the means which I employed, the enterprises of Prussia's enemies, the course of diplomatic negotiations, etc.

While in his *Anti-Machiavel* Frederick described love of peace and morality as the greatest virtues of a ruler, and condemned ambition, love of glory, and love of conquest in unmeasured terms, he revealed his true character in the Preface of the *Histoire de mon Temps*. There he revealed the fact that love of glory and conquest was after all a virtue and his principal motive. He stated :

The true merit of a good prince consists in being sincerely attached to the public welfare—to love his country and to love glory. I mention glory because that happy instinct which arouses in men a strong desire to acquire a good reputation is the mainspring which incites them to heroic actions. The love of glory is the power which awakens the mind from its lethargy and causes us to embark upon useful, necessary and praiseworthy enterprises.

The Emperor Charles the Sixth, a naturally strong and healthy man, died suddenly and rather unexpectedly on the 20th of October 1740, at the early age of fifty-five. Frederick was at the time in the country, at Rheinsberg, and he immediately wrote to Jordan and other friends of his that he would make use of the opportunity and attack Austria in order to acquire glory, that he wished to employ the powerful Army which Frederick William the First had created and the war treasure which he had accumulated by his thrift. On the 1st of November 1740 Frederick wrote to his principal Minister, von Podewils :

. . . I give you a question to solve. When one has the advantage, should one make use of it or not? I am ready with my troops and with everything else. If I do not use them now I keep in my hands a powerful but useless instrument. If I use my Army it will be said that I have had the skill of taking advantage of the superiority which I have over my neighbours.

Frederick made war upon Austria in 1740, not because Prussia had any serious and valid claims to Silesia, but merely because the young King was eager to acquire glory and had a strong and ready Army, while Austria was disorganised, was totally unprepared for war, and was likely to prove an easy prey. The Austrian Government had fallen into the hands of a young and inexperienced woman, who lacked good advisers and generals, and other Powers were likely to follow Frederick's example, dispute the Austrian succession, and endeavour to seize part of the Austrian heritage. The King has told us with great candour—or should one call it cynicism?—In his *Histoire de mon Temps* :

After the conclusion of the Turco-Austrian War [in which Austria was badly defeated] the Austrian Army was completely ruined. . . . The

larger part of the Austrian troops remained in Hungary, but they numbered only 43,000 combatants. No one thought of reorganising and completing the army. Besides these, the Austrians had only 16,000 men in Italy, at most 12,000 in Flanders, while five or six regiments were distributed in the Hereditary Lands. Instead of being 175,000 men strong, the Austrian effectives did not reach 82,000. . . . Notwithstanding her disorganisation and hidden weakness, Austria was, in 1740, still reckoned among the most formidable of European Powers. People thought of Austria's vast resources, and believed that a man of genius might put everything right. Meanwhile, Austria replaced strength with pride and she sought comfort for her recent humiliation by thinking of her glorious past. . . .

Prussia had a national income of only seven million thalers. The Provinces were poor and backward owing to the devastation of the Thirty Years' War and were unable to furnish adequate resources to the sovereign. Hence the ruler had to rely for financing a war on the economies made in the past. The late King Frederick William the First had accumulated a war treasure. Although it was not very large it sufficed. One could make use of one's opportunities. However, matters had to be managed with prudent care. One had to avoid a long-drawn-out war, and to hasten a decision.

It was most awkward that Prussia had no regular shape. The Provinces of the country were small in size and were spread all about Central Germany from Poland to Brabant. Her geographical position gave Prussia many neighbours, more than she would have had if her territory had been rounded off and formed a solid block.

As matters stood, Prussia could go to war only if she was supported either by France or by England. One could march hand in hand with France, for that country thirsted for glory and desired to humble the House of Austria. From the English one could have obtained nothing except subsidies, which they would pay only for the promotion of a policy favourable to British interests, while Russia had as yet not sufficient weight in the balance of European power.

After the death of the Emperor, Austria was in a most difficult position. The national finances were in confusion. The army had fallen to pieces and was disheartened by its failure in the War with the Turks. The Ministers were disunited. At the head of the Government was a young woman without experience [Maria Theresa, who was only twenty-three years old] who had to defend a disputed succession. Hence the Austrian Government did not appear redoubtable. The King of Prussia was certain that he was able to obtain allies. Frederick's determination to make war upon Austria was confirmed by the death of the Empress Anna of Russia. Through her demise the Russian crown fell to the youthful Grand Duke Ivan, a son of a Princess of Mecklenburg and of Prince Anton Ulrich of Brunswick, and the latter was Frederick's brother-in-law. To all appearances, Russia would therefore, during the minority of the young Czar, be more interested in maintaining order in the interior of the Empire than in defending the Pragmatic Sanction in Austria. . . . Marshal Münnich, who had caused the elevation of the Prince of Brunswick and of his Mecklenburg consort, was the most eminent personage in Russia. He wielded for all practical purposes the sovereign power during the Grand Duke's minority. The Prince of Brunswick was weak and unintelligent. His wife was capricious and she possessed all the faults of an ill-educated woman. Under the pretext of congratulating the Prince of Brunswick and his wife, the King sent Baron Winterfeld on a mission to

Russia. His real reason for sending Winterfeld was to gain over Marshal Münnich, who was Winterfeld's father-in-law. He wished to induce the Field-Marshal to favour the designs which Prussia was on the point of carrying out. The success of Winterfeld's mission was as great as could be desired.

Although every precaution was taken to disguise the intended expedition against Austria, it was impossible to accumulate perishable provisions, to establish magazines, to assemble artillery and to move large bodies of troops without attracting attention. The public began to suspect that some enterprise was about to be undertaken. The Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, Damrath, advised his Court that a storm was brewing which might sweep over Silesia. The Council in Vienna replied: 'We will not and cannot believe your news.' Nevertheless, the Austrian Court sent the Marquis Botta to Berlin nominally with the mission of congratulating King Frederick on his succession, but really in order to find out whether the Austrian Ambassador was right or whether he had given a false alarm. . . .

Although King Frederick was firmly determined upon his policy, he thought it useful to make an attempt at arriving at an agreement with Vienna. With this object in view, Count Gotter was dispatched to Vienna. He was to declare to Maria Theresa that King Frederick would assist her against all her enemies if she would cede Silesia to him. As that offer was likely to be rejected, Count Gotter was authorised to declare war on Prussia's behalf. However, the Prussian army travelled more quickly than the Prussian Ambassador. It entered Silesia two days before Count Gotter arrived in Vienna.

Twenty battalions and thirty-six squadrons were directed towards Silesia and these were followed by six battalions who were to besiege the fortress of Glogau. Although that number was quite small it seemed sufficient to seize an undefended country. . . .

On the 23rd of December 1740 the Prussian Army entered Silesia. On their march the troops distributed everywhere proclamations in which were shown the rights which the House of Brandenburg had to Silesia. At the same time manifestoes were distributed in which it was stated that the Prussians took possession of Silesia in order to defend that country against attacks from a third Power. Thus it was hinted with sufficient clearness that Prussia would not abandon Silesia without fighting. At the same time, in consequence of these proclamations, the nobility and people of Silesia did not look upon the Prussians who entered their Province as hostile invaders but considered their arrival as an endeavour on the part of a neighbour and ally to assist in the defence of that Province against third parties.

Frederick the Great has told us in his *Guerre de Sept Ans* :

If Sovereigns wish to make war they are not restrained by arguments suitable for a public proclamation. They determine the course upon which they wish to embark, make war and leave to some industrious jurist the trouble of justifying their action.

Frederick's intention to attack Austria without cause surprised and scandalised even his best friends. His intimate friend Jordan wrote to the King from Berlin on the 14th of December 1740 :

Les critiques croient la démarche présente directement opposée aux maximes renfermées dans le dernier chapitre de l'*Antimachiavel*.

To this the King replied :

Laisse parler les envieux et les ignorants ; ce ne seront jamais eux qui serviront de boussole à mes desseins, mais bien la gloire. J'en suis pénétré plus que jamais, mes troupes en ont le cœur enflé, et je reponds du succès.

On the 1st of November 1740 Frederick had expressed to his Minister, von Podewils, as we have seen, his determination to attack Austria. Five days later, on the 6th of November, he requested Professor von Ludewig, who during forty years had collected material showing Prussia's claims to four Silesian duchies, to send him a memoir for his justification. Although Frederick had in his *Anti-Machiavel* recommended honesty and straightforwardness in diplomatic negotiations he acted with incredible unscrupulousness. Writing on the 15th of November to his Ambassador in Vienna, he stated that the position in Europe had become so critical, and that the balance of power in Europe, the preservation of the German Empire and German liberty were so much endangered, that he was forced to employ violent remedies. Hence he had resolved to invade Silesia, partly in order to prevent that Province being seized by another State, partly in order to be able to support and save Austria from the ruin with which she was threatened. He dwelt on the purity of his motives, and stated that he was ready to guarantee the Austrian possessions against all comers and to conclude an alliance with Austria if that country would cede Silesia to Prussia.

Very naturally, his ' offer ' was declined.

Frederick invaded Silesia before Count Gotter, the bearer of his ultimatum, had arrived in Vienna. The Province stood open to the Prussian troops, and was entirely undefended. In order to disarm resistance on the part of the inhabitants, Frederick informed them by a Proclamation, dated the 1st of December, that, as the Emperor had died without leaving an heir male, the Austrian succession had been challenged, that there was a danger that other Powers might seize Silesia, and that he occupied that Province with his troops, ' not at all in the intention of insulting Her Majesty, Maria Theresa, but, on the contrary, in order to manifest his friendship with the house of Austria, to promote its true interests, and to contribute to its preservation ; that no hostility was to be expected from the Prussian troops, and that he hoped that the inhabitants would act like good neighbours.'

That Proclamation singularly resembles the one addressed to the inhabitants of Belgium at the beginning of the present War.

Wishing to deceive the other European Powers as to his intentions as long as possible, Frederick sent, on the 6th of December 1740, a declaration to the principal Embassies, according to

which the invasion of Silesia was not intended to be a hostile attack, for it was worded as follows :

Le Roi, en faisant entrer ses troupes en Silésie, ne s'est porté à cette démarche par aucune mauvaise intention contre la cour de Vienne et moins encore dans celle de vouloir troubler le repos de l'Empire. Sa Majesté s'est cru indispensablement obligé d'avoir sans délai recours à ce moyen pour revendiquer les droits incontestables de sa maison sur ce duché, fondés sur des anciens pactes de famille et de confraternité entre les électeurs de Brandebourg et les princes de Silésie, aussi bien que sur d'autres titres respectables.

Les circonstances présentes et la juste crainte de se voir prévenir par ceux qui forment des prétentions sur la succession de feu l'Empereur ont demandé de la promptitude dans cette entreprise, et de la vigueur dans son exécution. Mais si ces raisons n'ont pas voulu permettre au Roi de s'éclaircir préalablement là-dessus avec la reine de Hongrie et de Bohême, elles n'empêcheront jamais S.M. de prendre toujours les intérêts de la maison d'Autriche fortement à cœur, et d'en être le plus ferme appui et soutien, dans toutes les occasions qui se présenteront.

In a letter sent to the King of England on the 4th of December, he stated that he had invaded Silesia in order to guarantee Germany's liberty and to protect Austria, and that he was acting in Austria's true interests. He wrote :

Monsieur mon Frère: La grande confiance que j'ai dans l'amitié de Votre Majesté, et nos intérêts communs dans les conjonctures critiques d'à présent, m'obligent à Lui communiquer sans réserve mes sentiments sur les mesures à prendre dans la situation épineuse des affaires où l'Europe se trouve maintenant, et à Lui faire part en même temps de la démarche à laquelle j'ai été obligé de recourir, pour remédier promptement au danger dont l'Europe entière, la liberté de l'Allemagne, et le système de l'Empire sont menacés également.

La maison d'Autriche, en butte à tous ses ennemis, depuis la perte de son chef et le délabrement total de ses affaires, est sur le point de succomber sous les efforts de ceux qui font ouvertement des prétentions sur la succession, ou qui méditent en secret d'en arracher une partie ; et comme par la situation de mes Etats je me trouve le plus intéressé à en empêcher les suites et à prévenir surtout ceux qui pourraient avoir formé le dessein de s'emparer de la Silésie, qui fait la sûreté et la barrière de mes provinces limitrophes, je n'ai pu me dispenser de faire entrer mes troupes dans ce duché, pour empêcher que d'autres, dans les conjonctures présentes, ne s'en emparent à mon grand préjudice et à celui des droits incontestables que ma maison a eus de tout temps sur la plus grande partie de ce pays-là, comme je ne manquerai pas de le manifester en temps et lieu.

Mon intention en cela n'a d'autre but que la conservation et le véritable bien de la maison d'Autriche.

Je me suis même expliqué sur cela par mon ministre à la cour de Vienne d'une manière que, si elle entend ses véritables intérêts, elle ne balancera pas un moment à y donner les mains. . . .

In striking at unprepared Austria Frederick had well calculated his chances. Austria and all the other Powers were unready for war. The King tells us in his *Histoire de mon Temps* in tones of satisfaction :

Towards the end of 1740 all the Powers discussed, negotiated, intrigued, and strove to come to some arrangement, to form alliances. However, none of the European Powers disposed of troops ready for immediate action. None had had the time to accumulate magazines and stores. So King Frederick made use of this state of affairs in order to carry out his great plan.

Frederick no longer considered his subjects as his equals whose lives should be cherished, as he had done in the *Anti-Machiavel*. He wrote callously in this *Histoire de mon Temps*: 'When Kings play for Provinces, men are merely gambling counters.' Summing up the events of the first Silesian war, the King stated:

The acquisition of Silesia increased Prussia's revenues by 3,600,000 thalers. The greater part of that sum was used to increase the army. In 1741 it consisted of 106 battalions and 191 squadrons, and we shall presently see the use which Frederick made of these troops. . . .

Silesia was united to Prussia. A campaign of two years had sufficed for conquering that important Province. The War Fund which the late King had collected was nearly exhausted. Still, it is very cheap to acquire States when they cost only seven or eight million. Chance helped in carrying through the enterprise successfully. It was necessary that France should allow herself to be dragged into the War with Austria. . . . The principal cause of the successful conquest of Silesia was the army which had been formed in the course of twenty-two years by an admirable discipline and which was superior to the troops of all the other States of Europe. Besides, the Prussian Generals were true citizens. The Ministers were wise and incorruptible, and the whole enterprise was accompanied by that good fortune which often favours youth but shuns old age. If that great undertaking had failed King Frederick would have been called a foolish prince. He would have been reproached for having begun an enterprise that was beyond his strength. Owing to his success he was declared to be lucky. Indeed, Fortune makes one's reputation. Fortunate men are praised and unfortunate men are blamed.

Silesia was to be merely a stepping-stone towards further conquests. Describing the events of the year 1744, Frederick the Great significantly wrote in his *Histoire de mon Temps*: 'The acquisition of Silesia had given new strength to Prussia. Hence Prussia was now able to carry out with energy the plans of the ruler.'

Frederick's calculations had proved correct. His excellent and well-led army defeated the slowly gathering Austrian troops. Other States desired to take advantage of Austria's weakness and to share in the plunder. France was made to play the same part by Frederick the Second which Austria-Hungary has been made to play by William the Second. In May 1741 Frederick concluded at Nymphenburg with France and Bavaria an alliance against Austria. In June 1742 a peace was made between Prussia and Austria at Breslau which gave to Prussia all Silesia. Its possession increased Prussia's population by no less than one half. France and Bavaria, Prussia's Allies, continued the war against

Austria. Gradually Austria gathered strength and defeated her two opponents. Fearing that Austria, having defeated France and Bavaria, might retake Silesia, Frederick resolved to recommence the war and to attack her before she had become too strong. He concluded some alliances and in 1744 once more acted as the aggressor. Again he strove to deceive the world as to his motives, and endeavoured to justify his conduct in an 'Exposé des motifs qui ont obligé le Roi de donner des troupes auxiliaires à l'Empereur,'¹ which concluded with the words: 'En un mot, le Roi ne demande rien, et il ne s'agit point de ses intérêts personnels; mais Sa Majesté n'a recours aux armes que pour rendre la liberté à l'Empire, la dignité à l'Empereur, et le repos à l'Europe.'

Once more Frederick the Great was victorious, but as his position had become precarious he made peace with Austria at Dresden. That peace merely confirmed the peace previously made. No territorial gain rewarded Frederick for the second war. He was no doubt disappointed, for his ambitions were by no means satisfied by the conquest of Silesia. In 1752, four years before the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, he wrote a political testament in which he urged upon his successors that they should conquer Polish Prussia, Swedish Pomerania, and especially Saxony, which country he considered a particularly valuable and desirable possession. In his political testament of 1776, the *Exposé du Gouvernement Prussien*, Frederick wrote:

De nécessité il faut s'emparer de la Saxe. . . . S'il s'agit des vues politiques d'acquisition qui conviennent à cette monarchie, les Etats de la Saxe sont sans contredit ceux qui lui conviendraient le mieux, en l'arrondissant et lui formant une barrière par les montagnes qui séparent la Saxe de la Bohême. . . . Cette acquisition est d'une nécessité indispensable pour donner à cet Etat la consistance dont il manque. Car, dès qu'on est en guerre, l'ennemi peut avancer de plain pied jusqu'à Berlin sans trouver la moindre opposition dans son chemin.

Meanwhile the world had no longer any illusions as to the character of Frederick the Second. It had recognised that the king was not merely a poet, a philosopher, and a champion of all the virtues, but that in him were combined unscrupulousness with craft, and craft with power. The nations around saw in Frederick a danger to the peace of Europe, and their alarm was increased by the fact that Frederick's diplomacy was feverishly active in every quarter, and that his army was constantly increasing in strength. Very naturally his neighbours wished to protect themselves in time. Austria and Saxony concluded an alliance in 1745, and Russia joined it. Through the bribery of some officials, Frederick had become acquainted with these

¹ This Emperor, who disputed Maria Theresa's succession, was Charles the Seventh, Elector of Bavaria.

arrangements which were to restrain his aggression. He was annoyed, and in 1756 he resolved to embark upon a third war of attack and he began it by invading coveted Saxony in August of that year. As usual he made a surprise attack ; when, in July, the Saxon Court became seriously concerned at Prussia's military preparations, the King wrote on the 10th of that month to his Ambassador at Dresden :

I find it somewhat extraordinary that Saxony has become alarmed at my so-called military preparations, and that I should be believed to be organising three armies for war. You must positively assure those who speak to you on the subject that no army is being formed, that only some regiments are being moved according to the ordinary routine as they are in other countries, such as Austria.

The following month Frederick invaded Saxony with a large army, ostensibly on the ground that necessity compelled him to attack Austria by way of Saxony, because Austria intended to strike at Prussia. Saxony was thus made another Belgium. On the 26th of August the King wrote to his representative at Dresden in tones of unctuous rectitude :

The unjust proceedings and dangerous plans of Austria are forcing me to violent measures, which I should like to have avoided out of love of peace and of public tranquillity. Circumstances compel me to march my army into Saxony in order to reach Bohemia. . . . In making this declaration in a most polite and tactful manner to the King, you should impress upon him the fact that necessity compels me and that the Vienna Court is solely responsible for these hard and disagreeable consequences.

The British Ambassador Mitchell reported on the 27th of August to his Government a conversation with Frederick the Great in which the King had stated that he was compelled to forestall the Austrians and that 'nothing but the absolute necessity of his affairs made him take that step.' We are reminded of the German declaration made at the beginning of the present War that France's intention to attack Germany by way of Belgium compelled her to invade that country in self-defence.

Having occupied Dresden, Frederick had the archives searched. The defensive treaties between Saxony, Austria, and Russia and much correspondence were discovered, and these were published and described to the world as a vile conspiracy against Prussia. William the Second merely repeated at Brussels the performance of his ancestor at Dresden.

Having invaded Saxony Frederick explained his conduct to the world in the usual way. The war had been forced upon him. Once more he was the innocent victim. In his celebrated *Mémoire Raisonné*, justifying the invasion, which was distributed in thousands of copies in all countries, and which may be found in Hertzberg's *Recueil*, we read :

Les raisons, qui ont mis le Roi dans la nécessité de prendre les armes contre la Cour de Vienne et de s'assurer pendant cette guerre des Etats héréditaires² du Roi de Pologne, sont fondées sur les règles les plus exactes de l'équité et de la justice. Ce ne sont pas motifs d'ambition ni des vues d'aggrandissement. C'est une suite de projets, de complots et de trahisons de la part de ces deux Cours qui ont obligé Sa Majesté de songer à sa défense et à sa sûreté. Les découvertes qu'Elle a faites sur cette importante matière mettent cette vérité dans tout son jour et forment une espèce de démonstration de la justice de sa cause et des mauvais procédés de ceux, qui l'ont forcée d'en venir à ces tristes extrémités. . . .

In German and even in English histories may be read the fable that a European Coalition had been formed with the object of despoiling Prussia, that Prussia was forced into the Seven Years' War. Yet Count Hertzberg, who wrote the *Mémoire Raisonné* at Frederick's orders, and who conducted the Prussian Foreign Office in Frederick's time during more than two decades, admitted himself in a paper read before the Berlin Academy in 1787, the year after Frederick's death, that in 1756 there had been no conspiracy against Prussia and no plan to attack her; that combined action had been planned by Austria, Saxony, and Russia only if Prussia should be the aggressor. A full account of his lecture may be found in Schoell's *Histoire Abrégée des Traités de Paix*. The Prussian historian von Raumer more recently stated that 'Frederick had not proved, and could not prove, that a formal offensive alliance against him had been concluded between Austria, Russia, and Saxony.'

Frederick the Great, like Napoleon the First, kept his own counsel. We do not know for certain why he invaded Saxony in 1756. As he was not threatened by a hostile coalition as he alleged, as the second Silesian War had not brought him the hoped-for territorial increment, and as in 1752³ he had, in his political testament, urged his successors to acquire Saxony, one may safely conclude that he went to war in the hope of acquiring that country.

Germany's assertion that a conspiracy was formed against her by King Edward and Sir Edward Grey finds its exact counterpart in Frederick's assertions made in 1756.

The peculiar attitude of modern Germany towards treaties, which are treated as scraps of paper if they are inconvenient to her and as sacred undertakings if she can benefit by them, is based on the precedents set by Frederick the Great and upon his teachings. In his *Anti-Machiavel* the King urged that honesty was the best policy, that faith should be kept by rulers, that

² That is to say, Saxony. Frederick Augustus the Second, Elector of Saxony by inheritance, was, like his father, the elected King of Poland.

³ As we have seen, he also urged the acquisition of Saxony in his later political testament of 1776.

treaties should be religiously observed, as will be seen by reference to the extracts given at the beginning of this article. These views soon changed when a change was deemed advantageous. In the Preface of the *Histoire de mon Temps* we read :

Posterity will perhaps see with surprise in these *Memoirs* accounts of treaties which have been concluded and broken. Although examples of broken treaties are common, the author of these *Memoirs* would require better reasons than precedent for explaining his conduct in breaking treaties. A Sovereign must be guided by the interest of the State. In the following cases alliances may be broken :

- (1) When one's ally does not fulfil his engagements ;
- (2) When one's ally wishes to deceive one and when one cannot by any other means prevent him ;
- (3) When necessity (*force majeure*) compels one ;
- (4) When one lacks means to continue the war.

By the will of Fate wealth influences everything. Rulers are slaves of their means. To promote the interest of their State is a law to them, a law which is inviolable. If a ruler must be ready to sacrifice his life for the welfare of his subjects, he must be still more ready to sacrifice, for the benefit of his subjects, solemn engagements which he has undertaken if their observance would be harmful to his people. Cases of broken treaties may be encountered everywhere. It is not our intention to justify all breaches of treaty. Nevertheless, I venture to assert that there are cases when necessity or wisdom, prudence or consideration of the welfare of the people, oblige Sovereigns to transgress because the violation of a treaty is often the only means whereby complete ruin can be avoided.

To me it seems clear and obvious that a private person must scrupulously observe the given word even if he should have bound himself without sufficient thought. If a private person breaks his contract the damaged person can have recourse to the protection of the law, and however the decision may go, only an individual suffers. But to what tribunal can a Sovereign appeal if another Sovereign breaks his treaty? The word of a private person involves in misfortune only a single human being, while that of Sovereigns can create calamities for entire nations. The question may therefore be summed up thus : Is it better that a nation should perish, or that a Sovereign should break his treaty? Who can be stupid enough to hesitate in answering this question?

In other words, advantage was to decide whether a treaty was to be kept or broken. Frederick broke his treaties shamelessly. He abandoned his ally, France, because it suited him, as he frankly admitted in his *Histoire de mon Temps*. The King wrote :

We must now touch the reasons which led to an armistice between Prussia and Austria. This is a delicate question. The policy of the King was wrongful and shady (*scabreuse*). . . .

The object of the War, as far as King Frederick was concerned, was to conquer Silesia. He concluded alliances with Bavaria and France only with that object in view. However, France and her Allies looked upon the object of the alliance in a different way. The Cabinet at Versailles was convinced that Austria had arrived at the hour of her destiny and that her power would be destroyed for all time. The downfall of Austria was

incompatible with the liberty of Germany and did in no way suit the King of Prussia, who worked for the elevation of his dynasty, and who did not intend to sacrifice his troops in order to create new rivals to himself. . . . Had King Frederick too strenuously supported the operations of the French troops, their success would have been dangerous to himself. From an Ally he would have become a subject of France. . . . Queen Maria Theresa stood at the edge of a precipice. An armistice gave her breathing time and the King could break the armistice at any moment convenient to himself.

France learned the meaning of the saying 'travailler pour le Roi de Prusse.'

In deserting France Frederick explained his conduct in a letter written on the 10th of June 1742 to Cardinal de Fleury, the principal Minister of France, in which he stated :

L'avenir ne m'offre que des perspectives funestes, et dans une situation aussi critique (quoique dans l'amertume de mon cœur) je me suis vu dans la nécessité de me sauver du naufrage et de gagner un asile. Si des conjonctures fâcheuses m'ont obligé de prendre un parti que la nécessité justifie, vous me trouverez toujours fidèle à remplir les engagements dont l'exécution ne dépend que de moi.

These mendacious professions of impotence to continue the war glaringly contrast with the real reasons for abandoning France given by the King in his posthumously published history.

Although Frederick readily broke treaties which were not advantageous to himself, he condemned in the strongest terms those nations which failed to fulfil their engagements towards Prussia. To the end of his days he expressed hatred and contempt for England because she had broken her treaty with Prussia towards the end of the Seven Years' War. Modern Germany was justified in breaking her treaty regarding Belgium, but Italy acted criminally in refusing to participate in the Belgian crime.

Bismarck induced Italy to join the Austro-German Alliance, as he repeatedly stated, not so much in the hope of obtaining her support in time of need, but in order to keep her neutral in case of a great war. Herein he followed Frederick's teachings, for the King wrote in his *Anti-Machiavel* :

It is frequently asserted that treaties are useless because their stipulations are hardly ever fulfilled, and that men are no more scrupulous now than they were in former ages. To those who argue thus I would reply that although both in ancient and in modern times rulers have failed to fulfil their treaty obligations, it is always advantageous to conclude treaties. An ally is an enemy the less, and if your ally does not come to your aid, you induce him by means of an alliance to remain neutral—at least for some time.

Sham alliances were highly valued by Frederick. He wrote to his Minister von Podewils on the 1st of June 1742 :

For the future security of Prussia's new possessions I rely upon a good and numerous army, a large war treasure, strong fortresses and sham

alliances, that is upon alliances which at least will make some impression upon outsiders. . . .

The easiest way to neutralise a powerful country and a possible future enemy seemed to the King an alliance with that very State. Therefore we read in his *Exposé du Gouvernement Prussien* :

One of the first political principles is to endeavour to become an ally of that one of one's neighbours who may become most dangerous to one's State. For that reason we have an alliance with Russia, and thus we have our back free as long as the alliance lasts.

During the last two centuries all the Russian Czars except one married German princesses. German princesses—the supply is very large—have sat upon many foreign thrones and often influenced the policy of nations in Germany's favour. Prusso-Germany's matrimonial policy was established on a broad basis and most highly developed by Frederick the Great. In order to influence Russia's policy in Prussia's favour he strove in 1744 to direct Russia's policy through German influence in the ruling family as he had done in 1740. The King told us in his *Histoire de mon Temps* :

Nothing would have been more opposed to Prussia's interests than to allow the formation of a matrimonial alliance between Russia and a Saxony hostile to Prussia. At the same time, nothing would have seemed more unnatural than to sacrifice a Prussian princess of the blood royal in order to dislodge the Saxon princess whom the Saxon Court wished to give to the Grand Duke to wife. Another expedient was necessary. Of all the German princesses of marriageable age none seemed more suitable for Russia and none seemed more likely to serve the interests of Prussia at the Russian Court than the Princess of Zerbst.

With the object of supplanting the Saxon Princess by the Princess of Zerbst, complicated intrigues were entered upon and they proved completely successful. The Russian Czarina was prevailed upon to consent, and the Princess of Zerbst, known to history as Catherine the Second, the Great, went to Russia and influenced Russian policy in Prussia's favour. By making similar use of family influences, Frederick the Great strove to direct, in Prussia's favour, the policy of Sweden which then was still a very important State. Frederick has told us in his *Histoire de mon Temps* :

When the Russian Czarina had agreed to it that the Princess of Zerbst should marry the Grand Duke, her son, matters were made easy for marrying Princess Ulrike of Prussia to the new Crown Prince of Sweden. Prussia founded her security upon these two family alliances with Russia and Sweden. A Prussian Princess close to the Swedish throne could not possibly be hostile to her brother King Frederick, and a German Princess married to a Russian Grand Duke, a princess who had been brought up and educated on Prussian territory and who owed her

elevation to the action of the Prussian King, could not desert him without ingratitude.

Describing the events of the year 1773, King Frederick stated in his *Mémoires depuis la Paix de Hubertusbourg* :

By careful management and intrigue the King succeeded in inducing the Russian Czarina to choose the Princess of Darmstadt, the sister of the Princess of Prussia, as a wife for her son the Grand Duke Paul. In order to have influence in Russia it was necessary for Prussia to place there persons who were likely to favour Prussia. It was to be hoped that the Prince of Prussia, when succeeding King Frederick, would be able to draw great advantage from the fact that his wife's sister had married the Russian Heir to the throne.

Bribery, corruption and spying have been among the most conspicuous characteristics of the policy of modern Germany. German money is lavishly spent abroad for influencing opinion and the action of foreign Governments, and according to apparently reliable reports the German Emperor himself has taken a strong and personal interest in the more seamy side of the German Secret Service. If these reports are true, he has acted as a faithful disciple of Frederick the Great. In his time spying, corruption, and bribery were brought to the highest perfection. We have seen in the beginning of this article that Frederick, when intending to attack Austria for the first time in 1740, sent to Russia Baron Winterfeld. He was to influence his father-in-law, Field-Marshal Münnich, who at the time was all-powerful in Russia, and he was to resort freely to bribery. On the 6th of December 1740 Frederick wrote to his Ambassador at Petrograd :

You must use all your skill to gain Field-Marshal Münnich to my interests, and must spare neither compliments nor promises of gratitude. You can assure him that if, by employing his authority and credit, he induces the Regent to support me, I will give him and his posterity in perpetuity the estate of Biegen, which has a yearly income of more than 5000 thalers, and I shall give him as well the County of Wartenberg in Silesia. . . .

As both the properties mentioned were in Silesia, which Frederick was about to overrun and conquer, Münnich was directly interested in the success of Frederick's piratical expedition.

Two days later he wrote in the instructions for Count Gotter, who was sent to Vienna with that celebrated ultimatum to Maria Theresa which arrived two days after the Prussian Army had invaded Silesia :

If the Cabinet in Vienna can be gained to Prussia's interests by bribery my Ambassador, von Borcke, had instructions given him on the 7th of this month to offer up to 200,000 thalers to the Grand Chancellor, Count Zinzendorff, and 100,000 thalers to the Secretary of State Toussaint.

If others have to be bribed Count Gotter should let me know and I will give my orders.

On the 11th of January 1741 Frederick wrote to his Ambassador in Petrograd, von Mardefeld, that if the estates which were to be offered to Field-Marshal Münnich by his son-in-law, Count Winterfeld, Prussia's special envoy, should not suffice to gain him over to Prussia's interests, Winterfeld could dispose of 100,000 thalers as well. In 1745 Herr von Mardefeld was ordered to offer 40,000 thalers to Count Bestucheff if Russia would remain neutral during the second Silesian War.

Frederick the Great achieved his master stroke in corruption during the period of peace which preceded the Seven Years' War, when men in the Austrian and Saxon Diplomatic Services whom he had bribed delivered to him the most important secrets of State. The King tells us in his *Guerre de Sept Ans* :

A man named Weingarten, who was secretary to La Puebla, the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, allowed himself to be used by King Frederick and furnished the King with the most secret correspondence which passed between the Austrian Ambassador and the Court of Vienna and the Court of Petersburg. This man, whose services were exceedingly important, at last became suspected by his master. He was lucky enough to notice it in time. He escaped from the Embassy and claimed the King's protection. He was withdrawn with difficulty from the prosecution which the Austrian Ambassador set on foot, was hidden and sent to Kolberg, where he changed his name. Although that source of information was thus cut off, there was another channel by which the King received reliable information regarding the plans of his enemies. He was well served by an employee of the Secret Chancellery of Saxony at Dresden. That man handed every week to the Prussian Minister to Saxony the despatches which the Dresden Court received from Petersburg and Vienna, and he also supplied him with copies of all the treaties deposited in the Dresden archives.

The employee of the Foreign Office at Dresden mentioned by the King was the notorious Friedrich Wilhelm Menzel. He was engaged not by one of the King's underlings without his knowledge, but by the direct orders of Frederick himself, and the King settled all the details regarding this man in a letter sent on the 8th of April 1752 to von Maltzahn, his Ambassador in Dresden. We read in it :

Quant à celui que le sieur Rehnitz vous a amené [Menzel] je vois, par les échantillons que vous m'avez marqués de son savoir-faire, que ce sera un sujet bien utile et dont nous saurions tirer des connaissances très utiles. C'est aussi pourquoi vous devez vous arranger et prendre les concerts qu'il faut avec lui. J'ai résolu de lui faire payer une pension jusqu'à 2000 écus par an, selon que vous conviendrez avec lui, et mon conseiller privé Eichel a mes ordres de vous faire parvenir cet argent en tels termes que vous le désirerez, soit par des exprès ou par des remises en argent, tout comme vous le jugerez convenable. Pour vous mettre aussi en état de faire d'abord des largesses à cet homme, j'ai fait

ordonner par le conseiller privé Eichel au banquier Splitberger de vous remettre la somme de 500 écus sous le prétexte d'un argent qui lui avait été remis par vos parents, afin de vous le faire payer à Dresde. Au surplus, vous vous garderez bien de ne rien communiquer au département des affaires étrangères des avis que vous tirerez de ce canal, sans mes ordres exprès parceque je veux, pour être d'autant mieux assuré du secret, que tout ceci ne passe que par mes mains seules. C'est aussi pourquoi vous ne me ferez autrement vos rapports à ce sujet que par le chiffre immédiat dont vous êtes en possession. Quant au sieur Rehnitz, comme je crains tout comme vous qu'il ne gâte par sa conduite imprudente et inconsidérée toute cette affaire vous tâcherez à le disposer de partir le plus tôt possible de Dresde en l'assurant que ses affaires particulières qu'il a là, n'en souffriraient pas, et que je lui saurais gré, s'il voulait faire un tour dans le pays de Saxe pour engager et m'amener ici quelques *Parchentmacher* que je voudrais bien établir dans ce pays-ci. Je remets tout à votre dextérité et prudence et attendrai votre rapport sur la manière que vous aurez tout arrangé.

FREDERIC.

Between 1752 and 1756 Menzel betrayed the diplomatic secrets of Saxony and of her Allies to Frederick. How greatly the King was interested in Menzel's activity will be seen by the fact that he is mentioned or alluded to in no less than thirty-six of the King's published letters. Frederick cherished him like the apple of his eye, and frequently had enjoined care upon him, sent him on holidays, etc. Frederick was the most thrifty of monarchs in all matters except bribery and corruption. Professor von Ludewig, mentioned in an earlier part of this article, when set to work to prove Prussia's historic claims to Silesia, was paid three thalers (9s.) a day for his labour, and he was remunerated for his forty years' activity in collecting the necessary material to support the King's claim 'with a little wind that costs nothing,' in the shape of a title, as von Podewils put it.

Frederick the Great, like William the Second, endeavoured to produce dissension within the Governments of countries the activities of which he desired to cripple. Immediately after his first attack upon Silesia, on the 6th of January 1741, he wrote to his Ambassador at Petrograd :

You will skilfully throw an apple of discord among the Russian ministers so that we can carry out the principal aim which we have in view. I leave you full liberty to employ not only flatteries and promises, but as much money as you think necessary, and Major von Winterfeld can draw on the offices of the Company.

Frederick the Great was absolutely unscrupulous. He deliberately brought about three wars and he employed unhesitatingly the worst methods of Machiavelli. Nevertheless, like Shakespeare's Richard the Third, he posed habitually as an injured innocent. In his *Guerre de Sept Ans* he described his great and good opponent as follows :

King Frederick had, in the person of the Empress Maria Theresa, an ambitious and vindictive enemy, and she was all the more dangerous as

she was a woman who stuck obstinately to her opinions and was implacable. Devoured by ambition, Maria Theresa wished to pursue glory in every way.

When, soon after the beginning of the Seven Years' War, France and Sweden joined Austria, Russia and Saxony against Prussia, and when Frederick began to experience serious defeats, he cried to Heaven about the wickedness of his opponents. On the 13th of July 1756 he wrote despairingly to his sister Wilhelmine :

I am in the position of a traveller who is surrounded by a number of rascals and on the point of being murdered because these robbers wish to divide his goods among themselves. Since the League of Cambrai there has never been an example of a conspiracy similar to that which that criminal triumvirate has engineered against me. It is infamous, a disgrace for mankind, and a crime against morality. Has the world ever seen three powerful princes forming a plot to destroy a fourth who had done nothing to them? I have never had any differences with France or with Russia, and still less with Sweden. Three men acting thus against a neighbour would be condemned by the law. Nevertheless, we see three monarchs giving such a horrible example to their subjects. I am a king and believe that I should think like a king. It has always been my principle that to a Sovereign his good name should be more precious than his life. A conspiracy has been hatched against me. The Court at Vienna has insulted me and I should have considered myself dishonoured had I borne the insult. Thus the war was begun and a band of rogues attacked me from all sides. That is my story.

In the introduction to his *Mémoires depuis la Paix de Hubertusbourg*, the arch deceiver among Kings protested : 'During my whole life I have never deceived anyone. Still less shall I deceive posterity.'

Modern Germany, like Frederician Prussia, loudly protests her innocence. Her alliances were legitimate, and were purely defensive. Those of her opponents were meant for aggression, were a conspiracy against Germany. According to her protestations, Germany has never deceived or attacked any Power. She is a peaceful State and the other nations have fallen on her without any cause, desiring to destroy Germany and German civilisation.

During the Seven Years' War, Prussia, supported by England, successfully resisted the united forces of Austria, Russia, France, Saxony and Sweden. More than once she suffered serious defeats. Yet she was not overwhelmed. The causes of her successful resistance to nearly all Europe should be of particular interest at the present moment when Germany is engaged in a similar and apparently hopeless struggle. In the Seven Years' War Prussia fought against three Great Powers. Now, Germany fights against three races, the Latin, the Slavonic, and the Anglo-Saxon race. The highest authority on the causes of Prussia's successful resistance is undoubtedly Frederick the Great

himself. In 1759 Prussia suffered a number of most disastrous defeats, and the King's position seemed to be desperate. In commenting on the campaign of that year the King wrote :

That campaign was perhaps the most disastrous of all, and Prussia would have been lost if her enemies, who knew how to defeat her, had known equally well how to take advantage of their victories.

How Prussia weathered her greatest defeat may be seen from the Battle of Kunersdorf. At that battle the Prussians lost a large number of guns to the Russians, and an enormous number of killed, wounded, and prisoners. At the end of the day scarcely 10,000 men of Frederick's Army remained, and these were a flying mob. Commenting on that disastrous battle the King wrote :

Had the Russians known how to take advantage of their victory, had they pursued the discouraged Prussian troops, Prussia would have been lost. Owing to their inaction they gave King Frederick time to make good his losses. Nearly all the Prussian generals were wounded. Prussia's enemies had it in their power to end the war. They need only have given their defeated enemy the *coup de grâce*. But they stood still and instead of acting with vigour and energy, as the occasion demanded, congratulated each other on their success and praised their good fortune. Prince Soltikoff explained the reason of his inactivity. When Marshal Daun, the Austrian general, urged him to continue his operation with vigour he replied : 'I have done enough during this year. I have won two battles which have cost Russia 27,000 men, and before going into action once more I wish to wait for a couple of Austrian victories. It is not right that the Russian troops should bear the brunt and do all the fighting.' Only with difficulty could the Austrians induce the victorious Russians to cross the river Oder.

Writing on the campaign of 1761-62, Frederick the Great told us :

At the end of the last campaign in the opinion of all statesmen Prussia was lost. She was saved by the death of a woman and was supported and saved by the help of that Power which had been most eager to destroy her. In a similar manner Madame Masham saved France in the War of Succession by her intrigues against Lady Marlborough. How vain are all our calculations ! The smallest accident influences and changes the fate of Empires. Chance makes a plaything of us, laughs at the vain wisdom of us mortals, elevates some and overthrows others.

Frederick the Great was saved from annihilation, as he himself admitted, through the mistakes of his opponents, and especially through their lack of unity. When all seemed lost Fate saved the King by the death of the Empress Elizabeth of Russia. Her son, Peter the Third, a blind admirer of Frederick, not only made peace with Prussia but concluded an alliance with her.

When matters were desperate with Prussia Frederick tried to divide the Allies against themselves. Writing of the year 1760, he told us in his *Guerre de Sept Ans* :

From day to day the war became more difficult and the risks and dangers constantly increased. Although the Prussians were fortunate, Fortune betrayed them several times. Nothing could be hoped for from Italy, and Turkey had so far not seemed inclined to let it come to a breach with Austria. Therefore the only resource left consisted in dividing or separating the Powers which had formed the anti-Prussian Alliance. With this object in view negotiations were entered upon both in France and in Russia.

As we have seen, the negotiations with Russia proved successful in the end through the death of the Czarina.

In the *Guerre de Sept Ans*, Frederick summed up the causes of Prussia's successful resistance as follows :

In 1757, during the second year of the Seven Years' War, it seemed impossible that Prussia would be able to resist the attack of the Powers arrayed against her. If we carefully examine the causes which led to so unexpected an issue, we find that the following reasons prevented Prussia's downfall :

(1) The lack of agreement and harmony among the Powers which formed the Anti-Prussian Alliance; their different interests which prevented them agreeing with regard to the military operations which were undertaken; the lack of unity among the Russian and Austrian generals which made them over-cautious when opportunity demanded that they should act with energy and destroy Prussia, as they might easily have done.

(2) The over-artful policy of the Court at Vienna. That Court made it a principle to ask Austria's allies to undertake the most difficult and the most dangerous operations so that at the end of the war Austria should possess a better and stronger army than that of any of the other Powers. The pursuit of this policy caused the Austrian generals to act with over-great caution. Hence they abstained from giving the *coup de grâce* to Prussia when Prussia's position was absolutely desperate.

(3) The death of the Russian Czarina, with whose demise the Russo-Austrian Alliance died as well; Russia's desertion of the anti-Prussian Alliance and her alliance with King Frederick, which was concluded by her successor, Peter the Third.

Frederick the Great summed up the losses caused by the Seven Years' War as follows :

Prussia had lost by the war 180,000 men, and in addition 33,000 people had died owing to the ravages of the Russians. According to estimates the Russian troops lost 120,000 men. The Austrians estimated their loss at 140,000 men, the French theirs at 200,000 combatants, the English and their Allies lost 160,000 men, the Swedes and the troops of the German Circles 23,000 men. The French Government had lost all credit and the French commerce with both Indias had been destroyed by the English. Sweden was on the point of becoming bankrupt. Prussia had suffered most, for the Austrians, French, Russians, Swedes, and the troops of the Circles under the Duke of Wurtemberg had ravaged the country.

Before his advent to power, Frederick the Great had posed as a philanthropist, a lover of peace, and a friend of virtue. Animated by insatiable ambition and recognising that he could easily conquer Silesia, he attacked Austria in 1740, little heeding

the consequences. That reckless and criminal attack led to two further wars, and Prussia would have been lost had not chance saved her at the most critical moment. 'The Seven Years' War alone cost more than a million lives; and, according to Frederick's own statement, 'the state of Brandenburg, after the Seven Years' War, resembled that caused by the 'Thirty Years' War.' Frederick the Great had declared in his *Anti-Machiavel* that his model was Marcus Aurelius, while that of the admirers of Machiavelli was Caesar Borgia. Frederick himself, like his imitator William the Second, was in many respects another Borgia; but William the Second has improved upon his ancestor. Like Borgia he has resorted to poison and assassination, weapons which Frederick disdained and condemned.

The Seven Years' War inflicted terrible sufferings upon Prussia and all Europe, but it laid the foundation of Prussia's greatness, of modern Germany. By his conquests Frederick nearly doubled the national territory, increased Prussia's population from 2,250,000 to 5,500,000 inhabitants, and made her one of the Great Powers. Besides, Prussia's successful resistance to nearly all Europe enormously increased her prestige. It enabled Prussia to weather her defeats of 1806, and the remembrance of the Seven Years' War is now encouraging Germany and inspiring her with a firm hope of a final victory.

The history of the Seven Years' War suffices to show that it will not be an easy matter for a great European Coalition to triumph over the Germanic combination of Powers. The experience of the Seven Years' War and of many other wars proves that Coalitions suffer from serious disadvantages, that disunion is liable to appear in their ranks, and that a dictatorship, such as that which exists permanently in Germany, has enormous advantages over Governments less well organised for war. In the time of Frederick the Great lack of energy and of initiative in warfare lamed the power of the Coalition. After all, it is only natural that amateurs who co-operate with difficulty are at a disadvantage in contending against perfectly drilled and organised professionals, that a military State which absolutely obeys a single will enjoys enormous advantage over several non-military States. Modern war is conducted by armed nations. Exactly as the command of an army cannot safely be entrusted to a committee, but only to a single Commander-in-Chief, the guidance of a nation at war is best entrusted to a single man, to a dictator. That was clearly recognised by the ancient Romans, the most fervent republicans the world has seen, and the modern democracies that are fighting for their liberty may do well to learn from Rome's example.

Austria suffered grievously at Prussia's hands in the time of

Frederick the Great and of Prince Bismarck. Is she willing to be ruined completely by William the Second, who has dragged her into the present War, or will she remember her sufferings and turn at the most critical moment against her ancient enemy as Bismarck foreshadowed? He wrote in his *Memoirs* :

If in Austria anti-German tendencies, whether national or religious, were to gain strength, and Austria leagued herself with Germany's enemies for the purpose of making a clean sweep of the results of 1866, no words are needed to show how greatly aggravated would then be the peril of Germany. This idea is pessimistic, but no means chimerical. . . . If, then, changes were to occur in the political situation of Europe of such a kind as to make an anti-German policy appear *salus publica* for Austria-Hungary, public faith could not be expected to induce her to make an act of self-sacrifice. . . . In taking account of Austria it is even to-day an error to exclude the possibility of a hostile policy such as was pursued by Thugut, Schwarzenberg, Buol, Bach, and Beust. May not the policy which made ingratitude a duty, the policy on which Schwarzenberg plumed himself in regard to Russia, be again pursued towards another Power? We cannot abandon Austria, but neither can we lose sight of the possibility that the policy of Vienna may willy-nilly abandon us.

In disclosing the existence of the Re-Insurance Treaty with Russia, and foretelling the present War, and the breakdown of the Triple Alliance, in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* of the 24th of January 1892 (the full text will be found in the April number of this Review), Bismarck wrote :

No one can tell whether Austria's historic resentment will not reawaken and endeavour to find satisfaction at Germany's cost if the pressure of European events should weigh upon us. Notwithstanding her fidelity to treaty, Austria may be disinclined to bear the supremacy of the new German Empire.

Germany's defeat would mean Austria's annihilation. Germany's victory would make her a German vassal State. It seems not impossible that at the critical moment the allied Powers might approach Austria and offer her compensation for the losses which she is bound to suffer in the East and the South, by giving Silesia back to her and joining the chiefly Roman Catholic South German States once more to the Dual Monarchy. Austria might recover the great position which she held in Germany and revenge herself upon Frederick the Great at the cost of William the Second. The present Emperor may have rashly destroyed not only the lifework of Bismarck but that of his great ancestor as well.

J. ELLIS BARKER.

THE RESILIENCY OF RUSSIA

It is no more than natural that here in England and throughout the Empire general attention should be centred in the Western rather than in the Eastern Theatre of the War, for it is in Flanders and in France that by far the largest numbers of British soldiers are engaged, and therefore our interest in everything taking place in that field is at once intense and intimate. Since Turkey joined forces with the Germanic Powers British troops have indeed taken part in the Eastern side of operations—in the region of the Persian Gulf, in Egypt, and in European Turkey, and our concern in all that has occurred or is occurring in these areas has the same eager and deeply personal character; but with the exception of the struggle for the possession of the Dardanelles these campaigns have at most little direct bearing on what is usually termed the Eastern Theatre, an expression which connotes the gigantic contest between the Russians on the one hand and the Austro-Germans on the other. To say truth, the vast majority among us have found it decidedly difficult to follow and understand the colossal conflict along this immense front, which extends to something practically not far short of a thousand miles, or, to put it in another way, is about half as long again as the line held by the Allies in the Western Theatre. Our chief sources of information have been the official Russian *communiqués*, which have been published sufficiently frequently if sometimes they have been somewhat limited as to the amount of information conveyed; but they have often contained place-names that, apparently uncouth in themselves, almost impossible of pronunciation by us, and not easy to find even on the best maps, have had a most baulking effect, particularly when several of these intimidating words have been strung together, as has repeatedly been the case, in one dauntingly formidable combination. And it must be added that before the War began the British, as a rule, were very ignorant about Russia in spite of the marked development of her industrial life and her splendid contributions to literature and music, any real knowledge being confined to a few who had acquired it for special reasons. Notwithstanding that the Entente had existed for several years, the

fact is that to the bulk of our people Russia was as foreign a country as any in the world, and that we should fight with, instead of against, her among the strangest of strange things. At the outset current notions of her strength as a military Power were extremely vague, and were coloured sombrely by recollections of the unfortunate issue of her war with Japan. In brief, Russia was to an extraordinary extent an unknown quantity in almost every respect to most of our population. The first weeks of the tremendous struggle, however, did not pass without bringing about a curious, not to say fatuous, spirit of optimism as to the enormous influence she would immediately exert on the course of the whole vast conflict.

Now that we are realising, albeit with exceeding slowness of comprehension, the resources, skill, unscrupulousness, and determination of Germany, that optimism, which was not unshared by any class in the community, seems well-nigh incredible. But the rapid, unexpected, and remarkable success of Russia's first invasion of East Prussia, as the result of which nearly all that province, so dear to the heart of the Kaiser and his Junkers, was conquered and occupied by the Russians within about a fortnight last August, created the profoundest impression in this country. Although the astounding progress of the Germans in Belgium and France, which took place during much the same short space of time, was of far more vital importance, it was thought and said in not a few quarters in England that owing to the surpassing power and might of our Eastern Ally the War would be brought to a triumphant conclusion far sooner than anyone in his most sanguine moments had ventured to anticipate. The prodigious numbers of Russia's actual and potential fighting men were placed in the foreground of every forecast of what soon was about to happen; she was invariably likened to a gigantic steam-roller moving forward with irresistible mass and momentum to crush out of existence everything that stood in the path of its onward sweep; and frequent references were made with obvious satisfaction to the statement of the German Chancellor that she possessed an inexhaustible supply of men as confirmatory of this all too pleasing view. To many the road to Berlin appeared to be open and easy and inviting, and that city itself only a few days' march away. In a word, hope swelled high. The great War was to be a short war. Nor was this quite illusory optimism readily dispelled. When at the beginning of September German official messages announced that the Russians had suffered a disastrous reverse, involving the loss of some 70,000 effectives, at Tannenberg, in East Prussia, and had been compelled in consequence to abandon the vanquished territory and beat a hasty retreat to and well within their own borders, the news was scarcely

credited, though the silence of Russia that suddenly dropped like a veil on the subject was significant. Further, this information, suspect because of its origin and therefore belittled, was in any case more than counterbalanced at the moment by authentic reports of the genuinely magnificent victory which the Russians achieved at Lemberg, in Galicia, on or about the same date. A few weeks later the Germans, who, in their repulse from East Prussia of its invaders, had advanced to the line of the Russian defences on the Niemen, were themselves in retreat, being thrown back in their turn to and beyond their frontier. But meanwhile the truth with respect to the fate of that first Russian incursion had gradually become known, and as the German claims proved to be justified, there were to be noted in our midst indications of a feeling that Russia had disappointed expectations, and of a tendency to under-estimate what she had done; in some instances, just as an exaggerated value had been attached to the Russian success, so an equally disproportionate importance was attributed to the Russian failure.

The same may be said with regard to the other operations of Russia in the Eastern Theatre. While the Russians in the first half of October were thrusting back the Germans from Russian territory in the north and thereafter reoccupying portions of East Prussia, they were also engaged in the infinitely more formidable effort in the south of checking and then of repelling the advance of large Austro-German armies which had marched across the great plain of Poland that is encircled by the Vistula, and had approached to within a very few miles of Warsaw and, higher up the river, of Iwangorod. But prior to this Germanic invasion of Poland the Russians had driven the Austrians out of nearly the whole of Galicia, and had appeared to threaten Cracow so pressing that our optimists asserted that its fall was imminent, the vastly important strategic position of the fortress-city, as the 'gate' to Vienna on one side and to Berlin on the other, supplying themes for numerous disquisitions of a congratulatory character. Nor did these seem so much amiss at the time, for the Austrians had endured what looked like such unmitigated and almost immitigable disaster that the speedy dissolution of their 'ramshackle Empire' was predicted with considerable confidence, which was increased, moreover, by a Russian raid into Hungary. Hope again swelled high. The steam-roller was working magnificently! The end of the War could not, after all, be so very far away! Tannenberg was forgotten. Then had come the Austro-German counter-stroke (October), and, to the dismay of those who had held these opinions, the Russians, after offering comparatively little resistance to this new hostile advance, retired in Poland to the Vistula and in Galicia to the San. While the

most was made of the fact that they still maintained a firm hold of a great part of Galicia, there was no disputing what also was the fact, that their menace to Cracow had passed, at least for the time, and some fears found utterance that Warsaw itself might fall into the hands of the enemy. Again there were signs among us of the feeling that Russia was a disappointment. The steam-roller theory went to a heavy discount, so to speak, in the market, and something not far removed from pessimism took the place of the old optimism. There was a wonderful rebound, a marvellous change to the latter, when the fourth week of October beheld another swing of the mighty see-saw in the Eastern Theatre in the defeat of the Austro-Germans, followed by their retreat from Warsaw and their positions farther south. This time the victorious Russians raided into Posen, and not long afterwards reached in some force to within four or five miles of Cracow. The figure of the steam-roller was revived and, as it were, decked out afresh; it seemed an excellent simile, for the Russians had done great things in Poland, while, to quote from a speech made by Lord Kitchener in the Lords in January, 'in Galicia at the end of November Cracow was being bombarded, and the Russian advanced forces had penetrated nearly to the plains of Hungary.'

In spite of previous disappointments, expectancy as to Russia's decisive and speedy effect on the whole course of the War ran as high as or higher than before. By winning the battle of Ypres the Allies in the Western Theatre had in the meantime stayed the advance of the Germans, and had kept them from Calais and the 'coast.' It was known that the enemy had suffered severely in that desperate adventure, and the swelling hope was that while he was held up in Flanders and in France he would be pounded to pieces, or, to continue the metaphor which had come into popularity again, rolled out flat in the Eastern Theatre; yet even then the see-saw in that field was swinging, unfortunately, in a direction that completely falsified this fond and flattering anticipation. For days obscurity hung over the new German offensive which began about the 12th of November from the frontier between the Warta and the Vistula; but presently it became manifest that this movement and others in support of it were being pressed on in great force, with immense energy, high military skill, and no small success, disclosing as they proceeded a second attempt on Warsaw, but much more formidable than the first had been, and compelling the Russians, though they fought with their accustomed 'stubbornness,' to retreat well into Poland. Next followed the series of bitter and sanguinary conflicts in December, of which Lodz and Lowicz were the centres, and the retirement of the Russians from both. The occupation of each of these towns by the Germans was acclaimed as a great victory for

them; after Lowicz the two Kaisers exchanged telegrams of congratulation; General von Mackensen, who, under Marshal von Hindenburg, had been in chief command, was promoted and decorated; and Berlin and other cities of the Vaterland made themselves gay with banners and flags. Russian official communications, however, placed these 'victories' in a decidedly different light. It was explained that by the direction of the Grand Duke Nicholas the positions had been evacuated for strategic reasons, and that he was taking up a better line. But as it was apparent that the net result was that the enemy had progressed farther towards Warsaw, his objective, fears were once more expressed in England that the Polish capital might be captured, and there was a return of depression observable—a depression which was not lessened when, under pressure of the attack on Warsaw and of large Austro-German armies in the south, the Russians in West Galicia retired from Cracow to the Dunajec, some forty miles away, and were forced out of some of their positions in the Carpathians which they had won earlier in the long and terrible struggle for the possession of the passes across the mountains. Yet the front, west and south, occupied by the Russians on the opening day of this year, after five months of fighting that was often desperate and always hard, was not unfavourable, nor would it have been thought unfavourable if the estimates formed in the first weeks of the War of the power of the steam-roller had not been excessive and misleading. The Russian line started in the west on enemy soil in East Prussia, lay close to the German frontier in the region north of the Lower Vistula, in the great plain of Poland within the Vistula was more than thirty miles west of Warsaw and stretched southwards almost straight to the mouth of the Nida, a northern affluent of the Upper Vistula, while across that part of the mighty river it ran along a southern tributary, the Dunajec, up into the ranges of the Western Carpathians, and again on enemy soil. On the south it passed eastwards among the mountains, practically all Galicia and a considerable part of the Bukovina, both of which had been Austrian territory, lying behind it. As a matter of simple fact, Russia had done very well indeed; during these five months she had gained victories and sustained defeats; but if she had not crushed the enemy everywhere, as had been predicted by our optimists, the balance was certainly on her side.

January began with a brilliant success for Russia, which, though it was not won in the Eastern Theatre, and had not been so much as thought of by us in England, was none the less splendidly typical of what the Russian arms were able to achieve even in the most forbidding circumstances. This was the *débâcle* of the Turks which she brought about in the Caucasus by as fine

qualities of soldiership, in the face of exceptional difficulties, as the world has ever seen. The Caucasus, of course, was but a very secondary war area, and general attention was soon again concentrated on the scene of the main operations undertaken by the Germans against the Russians, because of the prodigious and persistent efforts of the enemy to break the lines of our Ally and capture Warsaw. Often rising to a pitch of ferocity and desperation, these attacks were incessant all through January and on into the first week of February, and it was from no lack of courage or determination, of men or guns, that the Germans did not prevail. But all their assaults were barren of result, the Russians stood firm, and Warsaw did not fall. Farther south in Poland the enemy, whether German or Austro-German, was equally unable to break the Russian front, the magnificent resistance of the soldiers of the Czar holding and then repelling him at every point. The offensive of von Hindenburg, tremendous, well-directed, and victorious as it had been for a time, ended in failure. And it was a costly failure, the loss of the Germans alone in Poland being placed by competent authorities at upwards of a quarter of a million of men. On the other hand, the splendid defence of Warsaw revived confidence in the staying powers of Russia. While the Russians were keeping in check the Germans in Poland they were constantly and strenuously engaged on their southern front, in Galicia, with the Austro-Germans, who were prosecuting with all the strength they could put into it at the time the new offensive which they had started in the middle of December. And here, in and about the snow-clad mountains, almost daily the red tide ebbed and flowed, the Russians retiring or advancing according as they withdrew before or drove back the hostile forces arrayed against them.

The checking by our Ally of the Germans in Poland, his continued occupation of some of the passes of the Carpathians with the possession of most of the country north of the chain, and his swift overrunning of the Bukovina during this same month of January, coupled with the prospect of the immediate intervention of Rumania on behalf of the Entente Powers, once more raised great expectations of some decisive success in the Eastern Theatre, which, as subsequent developments showed, were no more destined to be realised than the others that had been cherished before. Larger reinforcements were thrown into the southern field by the enemy; the Russians, who had not been in a position to retrieve the ground they had lost near Cracow, now yielded a slice of territory in Eastern Galicia and had to abandon the Bukovina. It was plain, in fact, that they were being seriously pressed on their whole long southern front. And it was at this juncture—that is, in the first and second weeks of February—

that the startling news was published that they were being as seriously pressed in East Prussia, and were again being forced to retire from that province. Exultant reports from Berlin of a sweeping German victory in Masurenland, which was declared to have resulted in the annihilation of the Russian Tenth Army, recalled painfully the disaster that had overtaken our Ally in the same region six months previously, and caused, it would be absurd to deny, much disappointment and no small anxiety in both England and France. German newspapers openly jeered at the 'poor old steam-roller,' as they phrased it. The steam-roller! The Petrograd correspondent of a French journal gravely discarded the simile, and substituted for it that of the threshing-machine, explaining that the supreme function of the Russian armies was to keep on threshing out the lives of as many Germans as possible, and that, as there were far more Russians than Germans, this process would in time infallibly achieve the desired result! One had only mentally to compare the numbers of their respective populations, do a small sum in arithmetic, and the appositeness of this metaphor was demonstrated to admiration!

It is worth while to devote some space to a short study of Russia's two East Prussian campaigns, as her action in them indicates and illuminates the part she has played and must for some time longer play in the War. It is a great part, but there is shade as well as light in it. It will be well if the idea of the steam-roller should disappear—at any rate for the present; from the outset it gave a false notion of Russia, and those who made it prominent did a real disservice, no doubt quite unintentionally, to the common cause by leading the peoples of the West, and more particularly of Great Britain, to dream of something that in her circumstances was impossible in the first months of the conflict, and still is unlikely of any early realisation. Some preliminary considerations must be stated—not because they have any novelty now, but because it is necessary in view of present occurrences in Western Galicia to set them forth again.

While the mobilisation of Russia was speedier than had been expected by friend or foe, it yet was slow; and while it is true, comparatively speaking, that her vast population affords an inexhaustible supply of men, it is true, without any reservation whatever, that these men, however numerous or even well trained, are of no military value unless efficiently armed. When the War broke out Russia had no immense stock of munitions such as had been accumulated over a lengthy period by the Germans, nor did she possess arsenals and factories as large, or anything like so well equipped, for producing war material expeditiously on a great scale; she had millions of men, but she

had not the corresponding quantities of big guns, shells, maxims, rifles, and cartridges. This was, and still is, her severest handicap, but it may be hoped that this summer will see an end of it, her ports being free from ice or, even more advantageous for her swift munitioning, the Dardanelles open to her ships and those of the other Allies. Further, she was heavily handicapped by inadequate systems of railways, operated never very quickly in times of peace and bound in times of war to be much strained, in a country of absolutely enormous extent, whereas her opponents had taken care to provide themselves with an abundance of railroads which had been scientifically designed to subserve strategic purposes. In brief, Russia was as unprepared, relatively to Germany, as were the other Allies, and suffered accordingly. It was not that she was caught napping exactly; ever since her war with Japan she had been reorganising and developing her military resources, and would have been in a far stronger position if the War had been delayed for two or three years longer, but Germany was well aware of this fact, and this was one of the determining reasons why she precipitated the War just when she did. Russia was also handicapped by the vulnerability of her Polish frontier; Poland within the Vistula formed a big salient jutting into German territory, and as it was undefended by fortifications was a source of weakness to her, a weakness of which the enemy has not been slow to take every advantage, and which accounts for much of his success. And added to this must be the by no means unimportant matter that the probable action of her own Poles was uncertain at the beginning of the War. Only ten years before there had been a rising which Russia had suppressed, and there was a not unnatural apprehension that they might throw in their lot with the Germans; the event, however, proved the contrary; they elected to stand by Russia in spite of the blandishments of Germany who, prior to the War, had intrigued to gain their support and, after it had begun, exhorted them as a 'friend' to take up arms to 'expel the Russian barbarians from their beautiful country.' For one thing, they knew that the Poles in Germany were undoubtedly in no better case than themselves—Russia had been hard, but Germany had been harder; and for another, they received a striking object-lesson in German methods very early in the War in a savage and brutal attack by the Germans on Kalisz, where, on a much smaller scale but with similar circumstances of horror, they saw reproduced the most dreadful features of the Belgian tragedy—deadly sins against our common humanity, but at the same time acts on the part of the Germans of the greatest political stupidity. The resolve of her Poles not to side with Germany had a great effect on Russia and the course

of the struggle. In the first place, it led to the issue of the proclamation in which, in the most eloquent and moving terms, the Grand Duke, on behalf of the Czar, solemnly promised that Poland shall be 'born again, free in her religion and her language.' In the second place, the Russian Poles threw themselves into the conflict with indescribable enthusiasm. It was something more than a coincidence that the publication of the Grand Duke's noble appeal to them was immediately followed by the vigorous offensive the Russians undertook in East Prussia, to whose boundary the march lay through North Poland, and in Galicia, which is largely Polish.

Germany's original plan of campaign was the containment of the Russians within their own country until the Allies in France and Belgium had been decisively vanquished, but the scheme failed in both the Western and Eastern Theatres. In the opening week of the War collisions took place at various points on the Russo-German frontier, and Russia began her assault on East Prussia by a raid on Johannesberg, the occupation of Eydtkuhnen, and the capture of Stallupönen. Nearly a fortnight then elapsed, the Russians beating off the enemy, and gaining time for the coming up of an army from Vilna under General Rennenkampf, the Manchurian veteran. Farther south another Russian army, which was commanded by General Samsonoff, who had also distinguished himself in the war with Japan, had entered the border district of Masurenland, stormed Lyck, and taken Lötzen after desperate fighting. It may be doubted if the Germans expected a serious invasion of East Prussia, which is difficult country, and easier of defence than of attack. For the most part it is a region of swamps, lakes, and woods, with few roads, and these generally indifferent, particularly in bad weather, thus rendering the success of a hostile incursion, when stoutly resisted, extremely problematical. Besides, it contains several important fortresses—Königsberg in the north, and Thorn, Graudenz and Danzig on the line of the Vistula, two of these being on the Baltic, a sea controlled by the German fleet, which therefore could throw forces into them at any time even if they were invested by land. How little the Germans anticipated that this area would be heavily assailed is attested by the fact that it was protected mainly by troops of the second class, nearly all of their first line being engaged in the Western Theatre. It may also be doubted whether at first the Russians intended a serious invasion of East Prussia, for, from the beginning, they unquestionably regarded their incursion into that province as of very subordinate interest as compared with their great campaign in Galicia, of which a tentative commencement was made synchronously with operations in

the north. At any rate, it was not till past the middle of August that the general order for the Russians to advance was issued, and by that time the attitude of the Russian Poles had been unmistakably defined. Meanwhile, in the Western Theatre the Germans were sweeping over Belgium and were getting ready to counter the French offensive in Lorraine. It was on the 20th of August that Rennenkampf's army came up at Gumbinnen with the German East Prussian forces, whose commander was General von Francois, and the battle which ensued and lasted for two days resulted in the complete defeat, with very considerable losses, of the Germans; furthermore, their right flank was threatened by the army of General Samsonoff, who had beaten the German 20th Army Corps at Frankenau, and they hastily retreated in disorder, leaving thousands of prisoners and huge quantities of stores in the hands of the Russians. With the exception of the battle of the Jadar, sometimes called Shabatz, in which the Serbians routed the Austrians, Gumbinnen was the first great victory of the Allies; if the date of the former battle be taken from the closing stages of that *débâcle* imposed by gallant little Serbia on Austria, that is, the 23rd of August, then Gumbinnen ranks before it in point of time.

Immense were the immediate effects of the Russian victory locally in East Prussia, throughout the rest of Germany, and on public opinion everywhere. In the province itself Insterburg, the centre of the German northern strategic railways, was at once occupied by the Russians, and Tilsit was isolated. The routed army divided, one portion making for Königsberg and the other for Allenstein, while the victors, detaching troops to invest the fortress, took Tilsit, and marched on to the Alle in pursuit of the enemy. The whole of East Prussia east of the line Königsberg-Alenstein, by far the larger part, that is, of the country, passed to the Russians, and at the moment it certainly looked as if the rest of it and West Prussia to the Vistula might also be conquered, an impression which was strengthened when the Germans were forced to retire west of Allenstein. Nor was it possible for the German authorities to keep the news of what had happened from their people. From every part of East Prussia multitudes of fugitives had fled in terror as the Russians had advanced; a quarter of a million are said to have poured into Danzig alone, and thousands of panic-stricken men, women, and children appeared in the streets of Berlin, where their bitter cry could not possibly go unheeded by the Government or by the populace who, until these living evidences of the Russian triumph were seen, had never dreamed of defeats or of invasion. From the west had come only stories of swelling German victories, but here was something very different, and

Berlin for the first time may perhaps have felt the cold grasp of fear. Strong reinforcements were quickly despatched from various parts of the Vaterland to the Eastern Theatre; the 'barbarians,' who, by the way, had waged war with no more barbarity than war usually entails, must be driven from the sacred soil and severely punished! In other lands, especially in those of the Allies on whom dark and terrible days had fallen in the Western Theatre, the Russian success was magnified into something enormously more important than it was; it was then that the idea of Russia as the steam-roller sprang up and flourished exceedingly. But from Allenstein the Russians did not succeed in advancing much nearer the Vistula. About a week went by in a strange silence from Petrograd so far as anything vital was concerned, and then was flashed from Berlin the news that the tide had turned against the Russians, one of whose armies had not only been defeated but annihilated. The Allies, sore bested in the west, were incredulous, but the thing was practically true.

Von Hindenburg, whom the War has shown, it should frankly be acknowledged, a leader of high ability, had effected a formidable concentration of troops in a strong position near Osterode, south-west of Allenstein, on the edge of a typical Masurenland district of woods and swamps. Skilfully manœuvring the Russians under Samsonoff on to this area in the neighbourhood of Tannenberg, he enveloped them on three sides, drove them into the marshes, and nearly destroyed them utterly. It was more of a massacre than a battle; Samsonoff and other Russian generals were among the slain, and a mere remnant of the Russian army made good its escape under cover of night. This severe reverse meant nothing less than the end of the Russian campaign in East Prussia. Allenstein had to be evacuated forthwith, and all the rest of the province was soon freed from the Russians. What was left of Samsonoff's army retreated towards the Narew, while in the north Rennenkampf, whose communications were threatened, retired to the Niemen, after fighting rearguard actions. The Germans crossed the frontier in pursuit, and advanced to the line of the Niemen where Rennenkampf had determined to make a stand; meanwhile they occupied and administered the government of Suwalki as if they were going to stay there for ever, but their conduct of affairs did not precisely endear them to the Poles who inhabited it. In the fourth week of September German forces tried to get across the Niemen, which is the great natural barrier to an invasion of Russia from East Prussia, but their attempts failed; southwards they bombarded Ossowiec without much result; all along this front they were held in check, and were unable to accomplish anything

of importance. A Russian counter-offensive, promptly initiated by Rennenkampf, who had been reinforced, caused the Germans to fall back along their whole line; defeated at Augustowo and elsewhere, they were compelled to retreat into East Prussia, suffering heavy losses which in the aggregate reached a high figure. And then they were pressed over their frontier, the Russians again capturing Lyck and establishing themselves on the eastern side of the Masurenland Lakes. This was the position in January; to quote again from the speech of Lord Kitchener already alluded to: 'In East Prussia the situation has undergone but little change since the Russians succeeded at the end of November in driving the German army from its prepared positions within the German frontier.'

It will thus be seen that while the Russians met with a great disaster at Tannenberg, had to abandon East Prussia, and were forced to retreat to the Niemen, they recovered themselves and renewed the struggle with very marked success, being in possession of a part of the province again at the close of the second phase of that first campaign. In this field, as in that of Poland within the Vistula in October when she held and repulsed the Germans from Warsaw and the Austrians from Iwangorod, Russia splendidly exhibited that quality of resilience which has come to be recognised as characteristic of her. The Germans later said that their thrust at the Niemen was nothing more than a raid, a sort of punitive expedition—if so, it cost them dearly, but their administration of Suwalki suggested that their occupation of that government was believed by them to be of a permanent nature.

It is impossible to say that, taken by itself, Russia's first campaign was a failure, though there was an impression, caused doubtless by the Tannenberg disaster, that it was. But the campaign cannot be taken by itself; it must be viewed in a far broader light, and considered together with the other operations of Russia and also of the Allies in the Western Theatre. There is great need here, as indeed in the whole conflict, east or west, of getting a proper perspective; this is not exactly a very easy matter, because we are prone to live from day to day on the official *communiqués*, and to attach too much importance to the incidents and episodes of the moment. To start with, East Prussia, it may be repeated, was to the Russians a field of military action of unimportance as compared with Galicia; it was upon the latter, as much more vulnerable and presenting surer prospects of success, that, once the friendly attitude of the Poles was ascertained, they concentrated their principal armies. Accurately gauging the fighting value of the Austrians, who were not so well prepared in every way for a great war as were the

Germans, the Russians invaded East Prussia for the purpose mainly of distracting Germany and of preventing her from sending assistance to Austria, who Russia believed, and rightly believed, as the sequel proved, would require and demand help from her friend. The victories of the Russians in East Prussia tempted them too far afield, and they paid a heavy penalty in consequence, but they were completely successful in drawing vast numbers of Germans into that area and in keeping them from being sent to reinforce the Austrians; not even the Germans—their clever strategic railways notwithstanding—can be in two places at the same time. As a matter of fact, the Austrian invasion of South Poland in August was not backed up by the Germans in the strength which had been expected of them, and this came about because of their absorbing pre-occupation in East Prussia; later, the same absence of German reinforcements contributed to the magnificent success of the Russians which culminated in the capture of Lemberg and the speedy conquest of nearly all Galicia. Whatever their loss in East Prussia, it was far more than compensated for by their gain in Galicia.

But it has been asserted that this East Prussian campaign had another object behind it. At this time the Allies in the Western Theatre were being very severely tried. The day before the issue was decided at Gumbinnen saw the Germans in Brussels and the serious defeat of the French in the battle of Metz, while the days immediately following witnessed the retreat of the French and the British after Charleroi and Mons to the Somme and the Aisne, and then to the Marne—it was during this retreat that the battle of Tannenberg was fought and lost by the Russians. It has been said that the Russians prosecuted their campaign farther than it ought to have been in order to reduce the pressure on the Allies in the west; one writer has gone so far as to allege that the whole East Prussian campaign was 'not war, but a chivalrous enterprise,' designed for the relief of the Allies, and that it secured this relief by compelling the transfer of German army corps from the west to the east at the critical time when every man was necessary to consummate the advantage gained by the rapid march on Paris. But all this falls to the ground because, it is now certain, no German troops were moved from the one field to the other, von Hindenburg getting his reinforcements from the interior of Germany. These reinforcements were very considerable, and to this extent Russia, by attracting them to East Prussia and North Poland—that is, by exerting this pressure on Germany—did lessen pressure elsewhere. After their defeat at Lemberg the Austrians begged the German Kaiser for help, and when he responded by sending several German army corps to them, this again kept in the Eastern Theatre large numbers of

soldiers whose presence otherwise might materially have increased the pressure on the Allies in the Western.

The second of Russia's East Prussian campaigns began inconspicuously in the third week of January. For many weeks the Russian entrenchments in the district on the east of the Masurenland Lakes, which they had reoccupied after the repulse of von Hindenburg from the Niemen, faced those of the Germans, and the position was that of stalemate, as, though fighting went on, no appreciable gain was made by either side. The Russians however, had seemed so settled in the country that the Petrograd correspondent of the *Times*, in a despatch to that journal, said 'The Germans despair, and rightly too, of ever returning thither. Our Allies have come to stay'—the last sentence is one of the numerous prophecies made by our optimistic journalists in Petrograd which have not been fulfilled. This part of the Eastern Theatre had almost dropped out of the official *communiqués*, and most people had forgotten about it altogether; they were therefore all the more startled when suddenly an announcement came from Berlin that the Russians had suffered a severe defeat in that region, and were again retreating in hot haste to their defensive lines of the Niemen and the Narew before the victorious Germans, whose official messages stated that they had taken upwards of 60,000 prisoners and many guns, and jubilantly declared that they had annihilated the Russian army in that area. These despatches, tricked out with every circumstance and detail that was likely to make them more effective, were meant to impress not only the Germans but the world in general. But the Russian *communiqués* soon showed how exaggerated were these claims, and even suggested that the retirement of the Russians from East Prussia had taken place in accordance with a plan that had been thought out beforehand by the Grand Duke, who had a very definite object in view. The carrying out of this scheme was, however, marred to some extent by a disaster to one corps of the four that composed the Russian army in East Prussia; it was afterwards learned that this unfortunate occurrence had been brought about by the basest treachery on the part of an officer who had not been proof against German bribes. The Grand Duke's object in the second East Prussian campaign was the same as that which had inspired the first—namely, to attract to and keep busily engaged in that portion of the Eastern Theatre as many Germans as possible. The Austro-German offensive that had been undertaken in December had been unable to effect any very remarkable result in Galicia, and the Russian invasion of the Bukovina in January was regarded as so formidable a menace by the Hungarians, the more deeply interested partners in the Dual Monarchy, that they made the most anguished appeals to

the German Emperor for substantial additional reinforcements. The Russians knew perfectly well that this was the case; hence this second campaign of theirs in the north which was nothing more than a feint, though at the outset they gave it a different complexion by leading the Germans to believe that their purpose was nothing less than the envelopment of the German army *vis-à-vis* of their own in Masurenland.

Included in von Hindenburg's grand design for the capture of Warsaw, which he began to put into execution with the famous rush from the Warta-Vistula gap in November, was the advance of a German army from Soldau and Willenberg in East Prussia on Ciechanow and Przasnysz, two towns some fifty miles north-west of the Polish capital. This army appeared on the scene in December; one column struck at Mława a few miles south of Soldau, took it, and marched on to Ciechanow, while a second column captured Przasnysz. But after several battles in the neighbourhood the Russians forced both columns back into East Prussia again. The Germans reformed their army, returned, and reoccupied Mława, their line stretching southward and westward from it on Russian soil to the north bank of the Vistula. The Russians began their second campaign by attacking this line, and by an assault at the same time of the German positions in Masurenland; towards the end of January they were fighting vigorously also in the north of East Prussia near Pilkallen. These combined operations were so pronounced as to indicate a strong attempt to surround and destroy the German army in this province. All Germany was alarmed; von Hindenburg hurried to the field, as did the Kaiser later; and fresh troops in great force were rapidly concentrated by the German strategic railways to meet this new menace. This was exactly what the Grand Duke had played for, and when the German offensive developed the Russians were ordered to retire before it, and did retire, but suffered considerable loss, as stated above. Shortly afterwards the Germans published the preposterous statement that 'in the winter battle in the Mazurian Lakes district' the Russians lost seven generals, over 100,000 men, and more than 150 guns. How little reliance could be attached to the assertions of the enemy was evinced by the fact that of the army which had been described as 'annihilated' three out of its four corps effected the prescribed retirement, and took part in the Russian counter-offensive, based on the line of the Niemen and the Narew, with which the Grand Duke replied to and repulsed the German attack, and this within a fortnight of its appearance. On the 28th of February the Russians inflicted a signal defeat on the Germans at Przasnysz. The whole was a striking exemplification of Russian resiliency. There is still a good deal of uncertainty

as to the strength of the German forces employed at this time in East Prussia and North Poland, the figure being variously estimated at from twelve to eighteen corps, but as the higher estimate is nearer the mark it is evident that the Grand Duke succeeded in what was his real object. And if the German offensive be considered as another attempt on Warsaw it must be said to have failed.

March saw the fruition of the Grand Duke's strategy in the fall of the great Austrian fortress, Przemyśl, in Galicia. At the beginning of that month the Russians in West Galicia stood on the right banks of the Dunajec and its tributary, the Biala, their position from north to south extending from the Vistula to the Dukla Pass with other passes adjacent thereto, while eastward their line stretched from the Dukla, which they occupied, for some distance among the mountains, and then north of them through South-Eastern Galicia and along the northern frontier of the Bukovina to their own territory. The Austro-Germans for ten or eleven weeks had put forth the most desperate and tremendous efforts to relieve the beleaguered town—the pronunciation of whose name intrigued and baffled our English tongues. The garrison had co-operated by several sorties, all of which, however, were of no effect. And though the enemy succeeded in driving back the Russians in East Galicia, and in recovering the Bukovina, he was finally held up, and thus failed of his purpose. In the first days of March the Russians assumed the offensive in East Galicia, and on the 4th recovered Stanisław, an important centre which they had been forced to abandon a short time previously. The enemy retorted by a raid into Bessarabia, but this was soon checked. All the while fighting, in which the Russians generally held their own or improved their position, was going on in the Carpathians; they scored several victories in the region of the Lupkow Pass, and made a distinct advance. These mountain engagements took place in cold and bitter weather, the soldiers often being up to their waists in snow; perhaps the severe climatic conditions rather favoured the Russians, but they must have told heavily on all the combatants. In the meantime the Russians had delivered a series of assaults on Przemyśl which had brought them close to its northern front, and it speedily became evident that the fate of the fortress was sealed. Its defenders tried a last sortie which came to nothing; though scarcely reduced to extremities, they despaired of succour from their friends who had made no real progress towards relieving them, and they surrendered the place on the 22nd of March. Thus Russia won this great prize, one of the greatest in the War; she did not realise just how great it was until she discovered that its garrison consisted of some 120,000

men—about equivalent to three army corps; among the spoils were upwards of 1000 guns, many of which were in good order. News of the fall of Przemyśl was held back at first in Germany, but the truth could not long be concealed; in Austria-Hungary there was the deepest depression. The Allies of the Entente hailed the event as typical of the satisfactory ending of the whole War, and certainly no one dreamed that Russia's possession of the fortress would be seriously challenged within a couple of months.

One of the immediate results of the capture of Przemyśl was the setting free for other purposes of the Russian forces which had been investing it, but before this addition to the field strength of Russia could be brought to bear on the struggle in the mountains the Russians had made splendid advances. In the first week of April they stormed and occupied the Rostoki Pass, conquered the whole district lying between Mezö Laborcz and the Uzsok Pass, and established themselves on the southern slopes of the great barriers of Hungary, upon the rich plains of which they threatened to descend. In an official statement issued at Petrograd about the 12th of April an account was given of the Russian offensive in the Carpathians from the 19th of March to that date, and the losses of the enemy during that short period were placed at 70,000 men, including 900 officers, more than thirty guns, and 200 machine guns. The Russian success was so striking that a correspondent in Petrograd began his telegram to the London journal which he represented with the sentence 'A *débâcle* has begun in the Carpathians.' The *Bulletin des Armées*, the French military organ, published about the same time a long review of the work of the Russian Army during the eight months of the War, and spoke with enthusiasm of the efforts of the Russians, eulogising their successes. Referring to the Austro-Germans, it said that their position now appeared to be most precarious, and that the balance of the operations in the Eastern Theatre was incontestably in favour of Russia. This, in fact, was the general view among the Allies. A farther Russian invasion of Hungary was predicted as imminent and of so complete a nature that it was likened, the old figures of speech being dropped for the nonce, to the irresistible action of a glacier. But the Austro-Germans were not vanquished; there had been no decisive battle, and heavy fighting still went on which was to become much heavier in a little while. Thoroughly impressed by the danger which the Russian advance into Hungary had created, the Germans threw large bodies of fresh troops into the arena, the direction of the operations was taken over by the Germans, and the German Kaiser himself hastened to Cracow to be near the scene of action. The Russians did not advance,

partly no doubt because of the melting of the snows which rendered progress difficult, but partly also because of the presence of strong enemy forces attacking them persistently and not always unsuccessfully. For about a fortnight nothing of special interest occurred; then the Germans sprang a new offensive upon an area which had not hitherto been touched by the War—the Baltic provinces of Russia. Petrograd explained that this movement was devoid of military significance, but at all events it was symptomatic of fresh developments of German activity with the coming of open weather.

It was to be expected that Germany, having organised during the winter all the troops, new and old, at her disposition, and having manufactured vast quantities of war material of every kind, should look round for the weakest spot in the fronts of the Allies, and launch a strong offensive against it with all possible speed. According to a congratulatory telegram from the German Kaiser to von Falkenhayn, his War Minister and the Chief of the German Staff, whom he credited with the discovery, this particular spot was found on the Dunajec in West Galicia. Be this as it may, a powerful German army advancing from Cracow, and working in combination with an Austrian army, attacked and took the Russian defensive positions on that river in the first days of May. The Germans far outnumbered the Russians—by three to one, it is said; and the artillery of the enemy, in both the number and calibre of his guns, greatly surpassed that of our Ally. In this quarter the Russians had their Third Army, a comparatively small force as armies go in this war of multitudes, acting as a screen to their operations further east; from the Dunajec it retired to its second line of defence, the Wisloka, but had to abandon it on the 7th of May when it took up a position on the Wislok, and made a determined stand, which, however, did not succeed in checking the German onrush, the result being that it had to retreat to the San. The rapidity of the German advance, which in ten days covered a distance of about 130 kilometres, recalled that of August in Belgium and France, and must be considered a most remarkable performance. It had notable and immediate results in the withdrawal of the Russians from the Western Carpathians and their retirement from their fortified position on the Nida on the other side of the Vistula. The Russians everywhere fought with the greatest courage and resolution, inflicting losses on the enemy which are put at 100,000 men, but their own losses were, as they admitted, very heavy. Their real trouble was not so much their numerical inferiority, though that, too, must have told, but their lack, it may be taken as certain, of guns and shells: 'munitions, more munitions, and still more munitions,' to quote General French, are the open

secret of success in this War. The enemy, as was to be anticipated, made the most of his victory, and there is no need for us to minimise it, or allege that it was gained merely to impress neutrals, for it was a very substantial achievement. On the other side of the account there is this to be said : the retirements of the Russians before sudden incursions of Germans in greatly superior numbers have hitherto invariably ended in these advances being checked and repulsed, and we may reasonably believe that it will be the same in this case.

Russia has done and is doing her very best in the midst of almost insuperable difficulties ; she never was the steam-roller of our optimists, but was conditioned from the start by the same unpreparedness as ourselves. What she can do, she does, and does it with all the strength of her great heart. Even when she was being driven back from the Dunajec to the San she was striking a mighty blow at the enemy in East Galicia. This article may fitly conclude with the following statement taken from the Russian *communiqué* of May 15 :

On May 14 the whole of the Third Army deployed on the San, and, in conformity with this fact, we were also obliged to proceed to a rearrangement, which is already nearing completion, to enable the adjacent armies to unite. Although we were obliged to do this to fall back from the Carpathians, we simultaneously made a decisive offensive in Eastern Galicia, by which we realised results very essential to our left wing, and inflicted a severe defeat on the Austrians on the Dniester along a front of over 150 versts (100 miles). In five days, beginning May 9, we captured in this region about 20,000 prisoners and forced the enemy to retreat in disorder across the Pruth.

These words exemplify the whole spirit of Russia, her power, and her unshakable confidence in her destiny.

ROBERT MACHRAY.

THE COMING OF CONSCRIPTION

As to the final result of the War there can, of course, be no two opinions : the ultimate triumph of the Allied Forces is a certain and foregone conclusion. There are, however, problems, closely associated with that result, offering no such easy solution, and chief amongst these is the duration of the War itself. On this point views, widely divergent, have been expressed, and, depending as the issue does on so many conditions and circumstances, it is hardly surprising that opinion should change as time passes on.

For instance, last September we were led by the Prime Minister to believe that the country must be prepared for a struggle extending over some years. True, no period was fixed or even suggested, but the fact that men were asked to enlist for three years or the duration of the War gave support to the belief that 1917 would be far advanced before terms of peace were actually settled. A few months later Mr. Asquith doubted whether the War would 'last as long as many people originally predicted,' while at the Westminster Palace Hotel on the 4th of May he assured us that we are even now only at the beginning of the campaign. At least, that would seem the logical conclusion to draw from the Prime Minister's 'message to the nation' on that occasion : 'You have made a magnificent beginning ; you have stemmed the tide of aggression ; you have shown a spirit and strength worthy of the best traditions of your race. Proceed in the same direction and in the same temper.' I mention these variations of statement, not by way of criticism, but rather to show how extremely difficult it is, even for one possessing the fullest possible information, to make any pronouncement, carrying with it the weight of positive assurance, with regard to the duration of the War.

Yet, after all, the immediate problem we have to solve is not how long the War will last, but how soon it can be finished. In this connexion two factors stand out above and beyond all others : the question of munitions and the question of men. I place munitions first, not because I propose to discuss that phase of the War at any length, but because, however large and well trained

our fighting forces may be, we must of necessity enter the conflict at a disadvantage unless these forces are not only fully and adequately equipped, but able to depend on a constant and ever-increasing supply of ammunition. Recent events seem to show that the Government did not sufficiently realise this aspect of the military situation. It is, however, but fair to say this view is not accepted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who went out of his way, when introducing the Government proposals regarding the sale of alcoholic liquors, to inform the House of Commons that from the first he was convinced 'this was a war of munitions and material even more than that of men.' But if we are to assume that all along the Government possessed this knowledge, surely it was for them to see that the output of munitions was at all times 'equal to our necessities.' Yet no specific action seems to have been taken to secure this end until Lord Kitchener himself called public attention to the matter, and Sir John French made the significant announcement that 'the ball is at our feet, we could kick it if we have the munitions.'

During the last fortnight this appeal of the Field-Marshal has received startling corroboration from the military correspondent of *The Times*, who, writing under date of the 14th of May, after an attack by our troops on the German position, pointed out that 'the want of an unlimited supply of high explosives was a fatal bar to our success.'

I should like to make a few comments on the explanation put forward by the Government as to the causes of the deficiency. This is attributed to scarcity of labour and slackness on the part of certain sections of workmen. To traverse the second cause is hardly necessary in view of the fact that it has already been the subject of much public discussion. Moreover, it would be premature to examine too closely the evidence contained in the White Paper laid before Parliament, as that evidence is now being sifted by a Committee specially set up for the purpose. Scarcity of labour, however, comes under another head. There the remedy was always in the hands of the Government. Yet they exercised no hold either on operatives or mechanics, all were free to enlist as and when they liked; not till after the horse was stolen was any attempt made to close the door. Hence Lord Kitchener's statement that the best way of staving off conscription is to fill the shops with the necessary supply of labour for the production of munitions of war; hence the official mission to Canada for the purpose of securing the help necessary to work the factories and workshops to their fullest extent.

Not long since I met a young man who had enlisted near Newcastle. He was a highly skilled mechanic and, with many others similarly situated to himself, had joined the Colours early

in the campaign. Imagine the loss of energy, say, to an armament factory such a condition of things would, of necessity, bring about. Yet it was not until the War was far advanced that the Government awakened to a sense of their responsibility in this respect. Realising, at last, the seriousness of the position, efforts were made to retrieve the men, and I believe I shall not be far wrong if I say that some 10,000 mechanics and operatives have been released to return to their original or kindred occupations. Now if from the beginning of the War the Government had followed, as they should have followed, the course indicated by the Prime Minister at the Westminster Palace Hotel to the effect that the nation's duty was to 'mobilise and organise,' nothing would have been heard about scarcity of labour, nothing about slackness. Moreover, the appeals of Lord Kitchener and Sir John French would not have been made, and the disquieting message from Northern France never penned.

No one doubts that the Government honestly believe they have done everything that could be done to prevent the situation arising which has arisen, but they must not feel surprised or call it unpatriotic if, in the light of events, there are some amongst us who think that in the matter of munitions they have been lacking in foresight and wanting in system. It is, however, satisfactory to know that the mistakes of the past are not likely to occur again. Recent debates in Parliament have done much to clear the air, and the new powers taken can scarcely fail to find reflection in increased production. It is useless to deplore time and opportunities lost, and it is earnestly to be hoped that the steps that have now been taken will ensure a supply of munitions, irrespective of kind, equal, and more than equal, to meet any demand that may be made.

Let us now pass on to the question of men. It is, of course, satisfactory to hear from the Prime Minister that the new armies are 'fast reaching our most sanguine hopes,' but as the country has not yet been taken into the Prime Minister's confidence the 'most sanguine hopes' of the Government do not afford the people much information. Are we obtaining men as fast as they are wanted? Are we getting the right kind of men? What number of men ought to join but have not joined? What percentage of volunteers have been rejected as unfit? These are some of the questions the country wants to see answered. In short, let the Government tell us something about their policy in regard to recruiting. So far that policy remains unexplained. I do not mean that the Government should give the numbers of our voluntary army or say how many men are required to make that army complete; there are obvious reasons against either course, but I cannot help thinking—and I am not alone in this—

that a little more straight talking, a little more confidence would give greater satisfaction and secure better results.

When bringing in the Army Estimates on the 22nd of April, Mr. Tennant announced on behalf of Lord Kitchener that 'the results of recruiting during the last few months had been most satisfactory and gratifying.' And he added, at the express wish of the Secretary of State, that 'when he [Lord Kitchener] called to the nation for more men he felt quite confident that the nation would respond with that readiness, promptitude, and decision which they had learned to look to with gratitude, and by which they were able to gauge and estimate the determination of our people.' Exactly what was intended by 'this addition it would be difficult to say. Most of us thought that Lord Kitchener had been calling for 'more men' since last August. Certainly in November he told us 'I shall want more and more men, and still more until the enemy is crushed.' As the enemy is very far from being crushed at the present moment, it is hardly too much to assume that the Secretary of State for War still requires recruits and more recruits. That being so, it is a pity that the Government do not say so, and say so with an emphasis and determination that leave no room for hesitation or doubt.

Somehow or other Government spokesmen always consider it necessary to express superlative satisfaction whenever the question of recruiting is raised. Even the Prime Minister is no exception to this rule. He is for ever telling us that the Government 'see no reason to be other than satisfied.' What prompts so optimistic a view passes understanding, especially in the light of the new scheme which is pushing recruiting into the ranks of industry with a pressure never before contemplated. It may be that the Government believe optimism is helpful to those engaged in recruiting work; if that be so, they are mistaken in their conclusion. It is always harmful to overstate a case, and many of us think this is what the Government are doing in the matter of recruiting. I do not speak for myself alone when I say few people were sorry to see that the Lord Provost of Glasgow, as President of the Glasgow Territorial Forces, had written to Lord Kitchener pointing out that since the statement made on his behalf by the Under Secretary of State for War in the House of Commons, 'recruiting in Glasgow had fallen very flat.'

So pertinent a reminder was not lost on the Prime Minister, and in his speech at the Guildhall on the 19th of May he answered the Lord Provost with the statement that the call was still as it was when he addressed the citizens of London in the first week of the War, namely, 'for more men.' Proceeding to explain why more men were wanted, Mr. Asquith pointed out they were required to take the place of the fallen, to increase our effective

force both for aggression and for defence, to place outside the region of uncertainty or speculation the complete and decisive victory of our cause. Lord Kitchener also was not slow to put in his rejoinder, being careful, at the same time, to come to the assistance of his Under Secretary. Characteristically terse and logical, Lord Kitchener avoided explanations of any kind and contented himself with the simple but nevertheless effective statement 'I have said that I would let the country know when more men should be wanted. The time has come, and I now call for 300,000 recruits to form new armies.' Here we have a statement that anyone can understand. On the other hand, Mr. Asquith's explanation that more men are wanted 'to place outside the region of uncertainty or speculation the complete and decisive victory of our cause' strangely conflicts with his previous announcement that the Government 'see no reason to be other than satisfied.' To the uninitiated it would appear that the Prime Minister was trying to blow hot and cold, always a dangerous game to play. If one might hazard a suggestion it is that the Government should lose no time in coming down on one side of the fence or the other. Their present attitude is most ambiguous. We should all like to know more exactly where we are. No good ship minds a rough sea, but no ship can sail or steam any pace or travel any distance in a fog.

If the Government feel so satisfied with the progress of recruiting, why are new posters issued week after week appealing to men to join the Colours and threatening the 'stay-at-homes' with every conceivable moral penalty if they fail to come forward and do their duty? Indeed, the Government posters are becoming more and more outspoken, so much so that some of the latest productions are regarded as being the last word in the voluntary system. Why, too, if all is going so smoothly, are speakers for ever tramping up and down the country addressing recruiting meetings? Why the much heralded and widely advertised campaign in London? Why, indeed, this continual banging and thumping of the big drum when, if what the Government tell us about recruiting represents the facts, the services of a few clerks ought to meet the situation? The truth is, recruits take a deal of getting, and one is forced to the conclusion that if the number of 'stay-at-homes' within the enlistment age is to be materially reduced some other and more effective means than those now employed must be adopted.

I shall, of course, be told that means conscription. Not necessarily, although if all else fails to awaken the young men not yet enlisted to a knowledge of the duty they owe their King, their country, and themselves, I would gladly accept conscription. True, there was a great rush to join the Colours

last summer, but that was due not to any exertion on the part of the authorities, it was due to the wave of patriotism that swept over the country. No one expected that rush to be continued, and over and above the large number that have enlisted there remains a considerable surplus of young men whose feelings of patriotism have yet to be awakened. Again, it is a great mistake to suppose that the present methods are, at every centre, bringing in the right kind of men. Only the other day a medical officer employed by the War Office to inspect recruits told me it was heartbreaking to see the kind of men coming forward as volunteers in a particular district. He could not understand how they passed the doctor, and placed their presence in the ranks at the door of the Commanding Officer, who in his anxiety to complete his unit had invited medical men not to be too strict. These recruits, he added, could not be made fit for twelve months or more, and many of them would soon be in hospital. If this state of things be anything like general, no wonder recruiting figures go up. What is wanted in the New Armies are not the weaklings, but strong, able-bodied men, of whom thousands have been seen walking about the streets and attending football matches and race meetings; in short, leading exactly the same life as they did in times of peace.

At Lord Kitchener's request, the Government have at last taken steps to secure the organisation of industry in such a way that every man who can possibly be spared shall be free for enlistment, or for employment in the manufacture of munitions of war or other indispensable national service. Committees are being set up to deal with particular industries, and the Shops' Committee has been appointed to consider this matter in so far as it concerns the wholesale and retail distributing trades. From investigations made by that body one learns that of shop assistants proper some 260,000 have joined the Forces, leaving some 220,000 coming within the limits of military age unenlisted. If clerks, commercial travellers, and other miscellaneous employment in connexion with shops be included, these figures mount up to 430,000 and 360,000 respectively, showing a surplus of young men immediately available for fighting purposes more than double the size of the British Expeditionary Force that fought at Mons. Employers as a rule have been most generous, both in allowing their assistants to enlist and in making provision for their wives and families, but no one can deny after the figures I have given that there still remains a very large contingent of young men following daily occupations in connexion with shops whose services might, in these days of stress and strain, be more profitably employed in the service of the country.

The Government have rendered useful service in compiling

a Register of Women for War Service. Already the places of men who have gone to the Front have been filled in many cases by capable women, and the reorganisation of business on these lines is rapidly advancing. Railway companies are employing women as ticket collectors, and the introduction of women conductors on the tram services in certain localities is already under consideration by the authorities. Women commissionaires are also making their appearance. If an employer does not wish to increase his female staff or, as in the heavier trades, the services of men are to some extent indispensable, he should employ men over military age or men who have failed to pass the medical test required for the Army. It is no secret that the Government have begun to press these reforms on the wholesale and distributing trades, and similar steps will be taken with regard to the cotton trade in Lancashire, biscuit manufacturers, the hotels, and other special forms of industry. The procedure adopted is for a conference of employers to be called, when a member of Parliament attends to explain the Government views. That being done, an official form is posted from the office of the local Labour Exchange, and every employer asked to fill it up and return it within seven days. The following are the questions asked :

Men of military age (nineteen to thirty-eight) still employed?

Number that could be released?

Would you require substitutes? If so, whether

(a) Women?

(b) Men over military age?

Are you willing to guarantee reinstatement, if it is desired, to enlisted men?

The forms are then collected together and handed to the recruiting officer. No pressure is put on individuals to enlist, nor is any attempt made to collect names of men from employers, but they are informed the Government consider it of vital importance that men enlisting should have their reinstatement guaranteed. As a rule an undertaking of this kind is cheerfully given and gratefully accepted. I think, however, that in some cases this guarantee will be mere wastepaper, not that the employer will fail to redeem his promise, but it is hardly likely, after leading an open-air life for a year or so, that every young man will care to return to the routine of the counter or the desk. I cannot help thinking many will seek the freer atmosphere of the Dominions Oversea.

But the Government are not only appealing to employers, they are also appealing to the general public to assist the employers. Housekeepers will be expected to do all in their power to meet the new arrangements which in many cases it will doubtless be necessary to call into being. For instance, under the

new conditions it may be impossible for a shopkeeper to continue his present system of deliveries, customers therefore must modify their demands and give their orders with consideration. Calling for orders may, in some cases, have to be regulated, if not altogether suspended, and in smaller shops it may even be necessary to close the premises during the dinner hour. Already an Early Closing Bill is foreshadowed. The public have become so accustomed to 'business as usual' that at first the new situation may prove irksome, but it is confidently anticipated that everyone will soon fall in with the altered circumstances and, irrespective of class distinction, work together for the common good.

Speaking the other day at a meeting of employers, I was asked what seemed to me a most pertinent question. It had reference to the position of young men employed in Government and other public offices. I believe I am right in saying that in many cases, both as regards Government departments and municipal offices, a considerable number of young men have joined the Forces. At the same time, in view of the fact that the number of males of all ages engaged in Government work exceeds 2,000,000, I do not feel at all certain that these resources have been sufficiently explored. For instance, one would have liked to see a more definite statement made than has yet been made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to the number and duties of clerks still retained in the Land Valuation Department. Then I believe there are a number of young men employed as clerks in the Army Pay and Record Offices, as well as in Labour Exchanges, who might possibly be spared and their places taken by women. Everyone knows that of recent years much expensive legislation has been placed on the Statute Book, requiring the addition of many thousands of young men to the ranks of the Civil Service. Is it really necessary during this crisis in our country's affairs that all this legislation should remain effective? I cannot help thinking that a good deal of it might be left in abeyance till the War is over, and if this were done it would doubtless release much useful material for recruiting purposes.

As regards the municipalities, here again there are far too many young men sitting at desks and doing clerical work which could be done either by older men or men unfit for service, or by women. At a time like this every young man must be freed who can be freed, and it must be brought home to him as well as to those set in authority over him that his services are wanted at the Front. It is stated that the City of London Corporation still employs 230 men of military age. There may be, of course, excellent reasons for these young men remaining at their posts, but I notice that, following close upon the Prime Minister's recent

visit to the Guildhall, a resolution was carried setting out the desirability of refusing war bonuses or allowances to employees of the Corporation of military age, unless properly certified as unfit for service. I commend this action on the part of the City of London to the governing bodies of provincial corporations. It is a step in the right direction and should not fail to produce useful and quickening results. Another resolution deserving of commendation has been passed by the Bishop of London's Ordination Candidates Council. It runs thus: 'That no application on behalf of any candidate be considered unless the candidate proves to the satisfaction of the Council that he is unable to serve in the War.' This tightening of the net is beginning none too soon, but it is satisfactory to find it is beginning. It shows the direction in which public opinion is turning. There is evidently a desire all round to make it as uncomfortable as possible for the single man who stays behind.

I recall another question put to me after addressing a meeting of local shopkeepers in an important provincial city. Objection was taken to the spending of a large sum of money on the construction of new schools in London when, at the request of the Local Government Board, all public works not of an urgent character were being held up in the provinces. The sting of the question, however, lay not so much in the expenditure as in the fact that unless these operations were postponed a number of young men engaged on the work would be prevented from enlisting. It was suggested I should reply that the last thing the Government ought to do was to penalise future generations for present emergencies. I declined the suggestion, however, on the ground that the War itself is being fought for the benefit of the future generations, and to attain success every penny is required, every recruit wanted. We have but one task before us, and that is to beat the enemy and bring the War to an end as speedily as possible. Everything that lessens the accomplishment of this purpose must go by the board.

As to the view entertained in the country on the question of conscription, I am perhaps in a rather more favourable position than most people to form an opinion, seeing that I have not only spoken at recruiting meetings all over England, but have made constant inquiries on my own account. My experience tells me that in many quarters the expectation of conscription is not unfavourably received. A considerable number say, and not without reason, that single men should go first. Others appear to be held back by their parents not always from the standpoint of family ties, but to keep the farm, the business, or the workshop going on something like a profitable footing. Then there is a very large division eager to serve their country but

not willing to see their places taken by others less patriotic than themselves.

Quite a common answer to the question 'Why are you not in khaki?' is 'If they want us they will fetch us!' The fact is a very considerable number of young men have not yet grasped the gravity of the position. The War has not been to them what it has been to the people of Belgium and France. No doubt the recent raids will act as a stimulant. Bombs and shells bring the atmosphere of war nearer home than anything else can do. Once it is grasped by every man in the country that he must do his bit either at the Front or in the workshop, recruiting will proceed at a very much faster rate than it is now doing. I spoke not long ago to a mechanic who often works fifteen hours a day, seven days a week, and has two boys with the Colours. His experience was that thousands of young fellows never give a thought to the War, much less realise what is required of them. In his opinion the position should be fully explained to them individually and each man given a fortnight to think things over. If at the end of that period they did not line up, then, he thought, they should be fetched. 'But,' he added, 'most of them will volunteer.'

On the broad line of justice there is a good deal to be said in favour of conscription. We should then get the army we want, and get it without any question as to who was to go and who to stay behind. At the same time all possibility of industries being depleted of labour would pass away. At one stroke we should secure a sufficiency of men, and men of the proper stamp, for the fighting line as well as for the factories and the workshops. Probably there has been no more determined opponent of conscription than Lord Haldane; yet, speaking in the House of Lords on the 3rd of May, we find him saying 'We are fighting perhaps the most tremendous war of history—we are fighting for our lives. Even though we may think that under ordinary conditions in time of peace the voluntary system is a system from which it would be most difficult to depart, yet we may find that we have to reconsider the situation in the light of the tremendous necessity.' Commenting upon this remarkable statement by so highly placed a member of the Cabinet, Lord Lansdowne said:

The Opposition has heard with great satisfaction the momentous announcement made by the Lord Chancellor that he and his colleagues are prepared to consider the whole situation with regard to recruiting in view of the tremendous necessities which surround us. Many Members of this House have held for a long time that an announcement of this kind ought to be made, and they hope the announcement made by the Lord Chancellor may be taken as an indication that this very grave problem is engaging the attention of himself and his colleagues.

Of course, neither of these statements, pregnant as they are with suggestion, must be taken as indicating any immediate change in the Government policy. But read together they imply that the vital question of conscription has at last entered into the arena of practical politics, and that in the case of necessity arising both parties of the State would be prepared to adopt it. That opposition to conscription will die hard may be gathered from the reply of the Under Secretary of State for War to Sir Ivor Herbert's motion on the adjournment for the Whitsuntide recess. Mr. Tennant was conscious of 'two feelings,' that equality of service was desirable, that the voluntary system had achieved very remarkable results. But when it came to conscription 'it was necessary also to reflect whether it was possible or desirable to ask men who had of their own free will come forward, spurred by patriotism, to serve side by side with men who had been driven into the Service. Those were considerations which he would ask the House to weigh well before they came to the conclusion that there was no alternative but to embark upon a policy which was foreign to the British opinion, British character, and the genius of our people.' The statement was received with Ministerial cheers, and evidently expressed the views held by his colleagues in the Government. Continuing, Mr. Tennant deprecated embarking on a policy of compulsion, seemingly oblivious of the fact that his party forced compulsion on the country in the matter of National Insurance. One would have imagined that if compulsion were so necessary to carry a measure of social reform it could hardly be regarded as an impossible obstacle when the issue at stake is our national existence. Mr. Tennant asks for an alternative to conscription, but he makes no effort to supply one; and no wonder, for the simple reason there is no alternative. I quite appreciate the point about a conscript army serving side by side with a voluntary army, but that is no insuperable barrier. Naturally there would be certain differences in the privileges and emoluments of the conscript from those attaching to the volunteer, but these matters would easily right themselves.

Chief amongst the reasons that have led me to support the demand for conscription is the failure of the voluntary system to bring home to the single men that it is they who should first answer the call. Instead of that being the case the single men are staying behind and the married men are enlisting, and I cannot help thinking that with the extension of the age limit to forty the proportion of married to single men in the New Armies will mount still higher. Not only can married men be less easily spared than single men, but their participation in the War in large numbers involves the State in very heavy financial obligations in the way of pensions and allowances. The slackness of

the young men was never more forcibly borne in upon me than at Brighton on Easter Monday. I spent the early part of the afternoon at the Royal Pavilion, which has been converted into an Indian Hospital during the War. There amid the Oriental splendour of that historic building were housed some hundreds of wounded Indian soldiers, men who had come thousands of miles to fight and, in many cases, die for their King and the Empire to which they were so proud to belong. Outside how different was the scene! On the sea-front a huge holiday crowd was trooping up and down, a crowd that included many hundreds of grown men of military age, laughing, talking, and smoking, all bent on pleasure. I do not wish to call these young men shirkers, but I thought, and many others did the same, that if conscription had been in force these young men would not have been there. They would either have been training in the camps at home or fighting in the trenches abroad. One and all except the medically unfit would be taking their part in the life-and-death struggle with which we are faced.

Now let us look at some of the influences which have handicapped and to a certain degree are still handicapping recruiting. From the first the Government made the cardinal mistake of failing to realise that recruiting is a human and not a mechanical movement. With a little more thought much of the vexation caused by the haphazard treatment meted out to the recruits in the earlier stages of the War could have been avoided. I readily allow the task thrown on the War Office was tremendous, but things would have gone much more smoothly if local assistance had been invited. On this point I recall a letter from a gentleman who takes a considerable interest in the Young Men's Christian Association movement. 'I wish,' he said, 'to bring to your notice the way in which the health and happiness of recruits, reservists, and Territorials are neglected in the camps,' and he proceeded to specify his complaints. By way of reform he pointed out that it was not possible for the War Office to undertake so gigantic an operation alone; he suggested that the aid of the civil population be invited, and 'committees appointed to assist the commanding officers in detail.' At the time I thought the suggestion an excellent one and am still of the same opinion. Had it been accepted I feel sure the break in recruiting might have been staved off to a far later stage.

The War Office has had too much on its hands, and closer touch with the civil side would have avoided many pitfalls. However, it is a long lane that has no turning, and it is satisfactory to find that at length the benefit of co-operation has been grasped, and that several committees have been formed on which civilians possessing expert knowledge are serving. At first it was

thought these committees owed their origin to the Board of Trade. That, however, would appear to be a mistake; the committees are War Office committees, and whoever may be the man of 'push and go,' the moving spirit in the matter is the Secretary of State for War.

Then a long time elapsed before the Government grasped the fact that, however deep a man's patriotism might be, in many cases he was under obligations to dependants which it was the duty of the Government to meet and to meet generously. Not until after Parliament had risen in September did the first decision as to the separation allowances make its appearance; a still longer interval elapsed before anything was heard of dependants other than wives. For months a period of chaos reigned throughout the country due to the lack of proper organisation in the payment of these allowances, and not a little indignation arose amongst the men's wives owing to the want of tact on the part of many fussy although well-meaning ladies. It is somewhat unfortunate that even at this time of day the matter of pensions is not finally settled. As an instance of the result of this delay, I would mention that in reply to a question addressed by me to the Government some time ago I was informed that men blinded in the War would receive the highest pension. Yet I know of several blind men to-day who can only draw their pensions on the old scale, which provides no allowances for children. Of course, all this will be altered when the new scheme comes into existence, but it is a pity the matter has been delayed so long. All this has its effect on recruiting.

Here, perhaps, I should mention that no pension system will really meet the situation that does not allow additions to be made in cases where necessity arises. Many young men earning their four and five pounds a week have enlisted in the New Armies, while others drawing salaries still higher have also joined the Colours. To meet these cases special provision must be made. It is the same with the blind men. It is not sufficient to award them the highest pension: they must be given an extra sum to pay for an attendant. Some new arrangement, too, must be made as to the allowances of widowed mothers or mothers whose husbands are beyond work and without means of subsistence. In all such cases the mother should as a dependant receive an allowance equal to the minimum allowance now given to a wife without children.

The Select Committee appointed to consider the question of pensions and grants as well as the existing scheme of separation allowances have recommended that a Statutory Committee of the Royal Patriotic Corporation (reconstituted in accordance with

the provisions of a Bill to be presented to Parliament) be appointed, and that their functions should be :

First. To decide questions of fact in regard to pensions payable out of public funds to dependants other than wives and children. The scale of payment to such dependants will be determined by the finding of the Committee, and the payment itself will be made, as in the case of separation allowances and all other pensions payable out of funds provided by the State, direct by the Naval and Military Authorities. The Statutory Committee may use the local advisory bodies to collect information, and to make recommendations, but will retain final responsibility for the decision in every case.

Second. In proper cases to supplement out of voluntary funds of a national character the separation allowances and pensions paid by the State. The scale of supplementary grants should be fixed in accordance with settled principles, uniform over the whole country. When convenient these grants may be paid through local committees.

Third. To decide in a judicial capacity questions relating to forfeiture and claims to pensions and separation allowances which are in dispute between two or more claimants.

The first and second functions cover the points I have raised, provided, of course, sufficient funds are available. It would seem the Committee expect the voluntary funds to be sufficient to meet any extra expenditure involved. This I doubt, and I cannot help thinking that it will not be very long before it becomes necessary to ask Parliament to set aside a sum of money annually to meet the deficiency.

Another matter that seems to have entirely escaped notice by the Government is the fact that the success of the recruiting movement depends on enthusiasm ; as that wave ebbs and flows so the number of recruits rises and falls. But enthusiasm can only be kept up by feeding, and if it is to last for any length of time the feeding must be constant and the food nourishing. Now the feeding policy of the Government has not only been intermittent, but the food provided not always digestible. For example, much has been done in the way of enthusing by public meetings, but in many instances far too much attention is paid by speakers to orating on the more abstruse questions connected with the War. All this is wasted energy. Often the actual appeal for recruits, for which the meeting has been called, is relegated to a side show, and is not always a good one at that. A recruiting speaker if he wishes to succeed in his mission should aim at arousing enthusiasm in his audience, not give personal opinions. He should tell of the sacrifices made by India and the Dominions, and recite the views of men at the Front on the slackness at home. Let him recall the letter from a private in which the writer says 'I sometimes wonder what the boys at home are thinking about; if they only knew, I feel sure they

would come.' Another from an officer: 'It beats me how anything in trousers can stay at home while our lads are sticking it, sticking it, sticking it, waiting for them to come and finish the job.' Let him preach from the text of the soldier who writes: 'It is only when one gets out here that one realises that every able-bodied man is wanted'; and never let him forget to enforce the lesson taught by that true Englishman who, writing home, said 'I should like to place all the young men of fighting age in some of the ruined Belgian villages to look around for a few hours. If they didn't leave wives, mothers, fathers, sisters, and sweethearts to do their bit, they would not deserve to bear the name of Britons.'

For a considerable time, instead of route and parade marches being accompanied by bands, the recruits were left to enthuse themselves by whistling and singing popular airs. At last these disadvantages became so obvious that steps were taken to secure the assistance of bands. Whether this reform owes its origin to the War Office or to private effort I do not know, but in any event the appeal for subscriptions met with a ready response. Here again, however, we find the usual absence of method, and in many cases the bands are wasted. For instance, a band played every morning in a prominent place in London without a single recruiting sergeant moving about amongst the people, so that the only result attained was to provide an attraction for passers-by. Perhaps, however, the worst case of the kind was that of Trafalgar Square, where several bands played for weeks morning and afternoon to the great delight and pleasure of a thousand or more lookers-on, many of whom came within the enlistment age. Frequently I asked policemen on duty if they could point me out the recruiting officers, and the reply was always the same: there are none. Later on, however, I saw a young man in uniform standing on the refuge facing Parliament Street with ribbons in his cap; he was a good way from the band, it is true; but it is possible that at last the authorities had awakened to the fact that it was useless, if recruiting be the object in view, to provide bands merely for the amusement of loafers and the general public.

But perhaps the greatest mistake the Government have made is in the silence of the Press Bureau. It is astonishing how little the man in the street really knows about the War. I will not say the public is told nothing, but that the information which percolates through the Press Bureau is scanty and scrappy cannot possibly be denied. Moreover, the information provided—I except of course the brilliant and realistic despatches of Sir John French—is not exactly of the right kind. It may suit the requirements of the cultured person, but it fails to satisfy the

wants of the people. The attempt to feed the public by the aid of scribes appointed by the Government is no doubt a praiseworthy attempt to meet the exigencies of the situation; and certainly the letters written by Eyewitness are both able and useful screeds, but they leave the man in the street cold. I do not say that the Government should abandon the curb and ride the country on the snaffle; that would be most injudicious and be going to the other extreme. At the same time, I cordially endorse Mr. Chamberlain's warning that 'Any Government which tries to ride the country in blinkers will never get the best out of its mount.'

There is a great deal to be said for the view that many young men are holding back because they do not know. Not that they are blind to the fact that their services would be acceptable, but they take refuge in the thought that enlistment is no immediate or pressing necessity. They do not appreciate the true inwardness of the position, and the term 'life-and-death-struggle' is to them merely a phrase, nothing more. The suggestion I would like to make is that the Government should take the people a little more into their confidence about the War. Let them abandon the collective principle and pay more attention to the principle of individualism. Bring the nation more closely into touch with the actualities of the campaign. Make the young men realise the responsibilities they owe one to the other. Feed them from sources like these, and the result will be far more beneficial to the State than the present policy of keeping them on a diet which does not assimilate with their constitutions.

When Mr. Churchill announced in the House of Commons the intention of the Government to inaugurate a Press Bureau, he failed to tell the House that for all practical purposes it would be a deaf and dumb machine. Now and again exceptional bravery on the field is recorded, but seldom are any names given; the people at home are left in ignorance as to who it was that performed the brave act. Now and again a regiment has been named, but, as with personal acts of valour, the names of regiments are seldom disclosed. All this is absolutely and entirely wrong, and throws a wet blanket over recruiting. Every incident that goes to the credit of a soldier or a sailor, a regiment or a ship, and can be made known, should be made known. The methods of the Press Bureau in these respects do not correspond with English feeling and English sentiment. It is useless to say these were the methods practised by Japan and Japan was victorious. So shall we be victorious, but the Government must remember that our victory will very largely rest on a volunteer army, and volunteers like and expect appreciation.

Nothing stimulates like emulation, and the sooner the Government make themselves acquainted with this fact the better for recruiting, the easier Lord Kitchener's task will become.

In my opinion, the lack of enthusiasm shown by the public is in no small measure due to this conspiracy of silence on the part of the Government. It is passing strange to see no notice taken of recruits as they march along the streets of the metropolis, not a cheer raised nor a handkerchief waved. How different in Paris! A little while ago I saw a picture in a morning paper representing a regiment of French Colonial infantry on the march, in which a Frenchwoman is shown carrying her husband's rifle, to which was attached a tricolour. No such sight has ever been seen in this country since the War began, yet imagine what enthusiasm an incident of this kind would create! Regiment after regiment marches to the station whence they are to take their departure without a cheer of any kind being raised, at least by the public. This forgetfulness—it would be wrong perhaps to call it apathy—on the part of the public has at last attracted the attention of foreign writers; thus we find a neutral correspondent just back from Berlin writing to the *Evening News* on the 15th of May:

I saw 10,000 soldiers marching off for the Front amid tremendous acclamations. Their helmets were decked with flowers, the crowd pressed cigars upon them, and parties of women marched alongside cheering and encouraging the men. Between the rousing send-off in Berlin when soldiers leave and the silent send-off in London there is a difference indeed. Why is it that you Londoners cannot raise a cheer for men who are ready to go out and lay down their lives for you?

It is not long since I saw a trainful of bluejackets passing through Exeter; the men were shouting themselves hoarse with enthusiasm, but the people on the platform went about their daily occupations as if nothing unusual was happening, no one gave an answering cheer.

I readily allow we have in being an Army of which any nation may be proud, and in criticising the attitude of the Government towards recruiting I do not desire in any way to belittle what has been accomplished. As Lord Haldane says, 'Our voluntary system has given us an Army which for quality compares with anything any of the Powers have put into the field.' As Mr. Asquith says, 'We are obtaining from the manhood of the nation not only by far the largest but by far the finest body of men who have ever followed the Colours.' But we must not stop at that, we have to go on. More and more and still more men are wanted 'until the enemy is crushed.' To obtain these men our Government must adopt more decisive methods and proceed with a more definite programme. One thing certainly

ought to be done, and without delay, and that is to take a census of the men of military age and class them as married and single. It is often said that the national needs have only to be made known, in a way that will bring these needs home to every individual, for the national spirit to rise worthily to the occasion. The Government have certainly done their best in this direction, yet they have failed to awaken the national spirit in many sections of the community. What then is the next step? I leave it to the new Cabinet to decide.

So much for the recruiting problem as it affects munitions and men, but there is a third and still larger aspect of recruiting to be considered, one that, so far, has received little or no attention. I refer to the recruiting of the nation's personnel outside men of military age. A few public men and a number of experts have been called into council and done excellent service, but that is all. At a time like the present the services of every capable man and woman possessing administrative experience and ability should be utilised and organised. Instead of that being done it is a case of go-as-you-please or not go at all. Some are taken, many left. The only policy, if there be a policy, is that of drift. What I suggest is the formation of a National Committee, possessing very full powers to mobilise and organise employment. As things are, good men are throwing themselves away on jobs which could be done, and probably better done, by others, and in some cases incapables are filling posts which should be occupied by better men. And so one might go on, but my purpose is not to point to what has been left undone, but to press upon the Government the urgency of enlisting in the service of the nation that great outside body of men and women, able and willing to work but at the present moment compelled to remain in the ranks of the unemployed.

CLEMENT KINLOCH COOKE.

HOW TO CELEBRATE THE CENTENARY OF WATERLOO

MORE than twenty-two years had elapsed between the outbreak of war against Revolutionary France and the return of Napoleon from his exile in Elba. During those years the British people had been compelled to wage a series of fierce and sanguinary campaigns by land and sea against the mightiest military Power the world had seen since Julius Caesar overran Gaul, and had waged them successfully. Although the triumph of 1814 was achieved by the combined States of Europe in the final stage against the personal adherents of the Emperor Napoleon, yet there was a critical period after the Treaty of Tilsit and another after the battle of Wagram, when Britain alone maintained the contest against France and the resources of almost the whole Continent. That she did not flinch at these two appalling disasters, but stubbornly carried on the war until the brilliant mistakes of the enemy made it possible to turn the tables upon him, has given our country immense prestige and influence, which have served to find her friends in spite of the decline of her military strength in the nineteenth century. It also served to accelerate that decline by inspiring the nation with a false confidence in its invincibility and immunity from dangerous attack.

When the Hundred Days took place not only the Revolution had spent its fury, but the military monarchy founded by the conqueror of Europe had also succumbed. The return of Napoleon was but an incident internationally, and it is doubtful whether the final military effort which deposed him a second time was to the interest of England. Had the escape from captivity been put off for another year it is not unlikely that our policy would have been different. In fact the second deposition of Napoleon defeated the chief object of its authors, which was to found a permanent régime in France. The Empire might have taken root in peace and remained, but the Bourbons had already proved themselves impossible. The Emperor was so sure of this that up to the final catastrophe in 1814 he refused to believe that the Allies would be so foolish as to dethrone him, and he counted upon their recognising his throne as indispensable to the equilibrium of Europe. The personal enmity of the Tsar Alexander

the First and the profound mistrust engendered by Napoleon's frequent breaches of good faith, however, drove the Allied Governments to the extreme measure. It had the considered support of Russia and Prussia, but was regarded as of doubtful wisdom by the Austrians, and the subsequent weakness of France has not been to our national advantage.

When once all Europe resumed its hostile attitude against France nothing but a series of military miracles could have saved the Empire, but no one expected the rapid and dramatic destruction which overtook its army at the very first trial of strength. While the legions of Russia, Austria, and South Germany raced one another to take an important share in the campaign, England and Prussia promptly assembled their forces in the Belgian provinces of the new kingdom of the Netherlands, and Wellington took command of the Dutch, Belgian, Hanoverian, Brunswick, and Nassau contingents in addition to the British Expeditionary Force. The Prussian army consisted of four army corps, about 125,000 troops. Wellington's command, including units guarding the line of communication with Ostend and Antwerp, was less than 100,000 strong. The French Emperor led six army corps over the frontier—about 120,000 combatants. He had a powerful artillery and a numerous cavalry, but the latter was mounted on remounts or cart-horses; the staff of the army was ill-assorted and consequently inefficient.

The controversies which have arisen on the Waterloo Campaign and which have amused generations of theorists are very numerous. The best known centred round the distribution of the Allied Armies, and particularly the skill of Wellington's dispositions for holding in check the impetuous rush which might be expected from Napoleon's known methods. Next, Wellington's decision to fight at Waterloo, without any reliable information as to the state of the Prussian army or its ability to co-operate on the 18th of June, has been called in question. The decision to leave the strong detachment a day's march west of the British right at Hal, and, finally, the respective shares of the British and Prussian armies in the final overthrow of the French have also provided material for endless discussions.

Napoleon chose the worst of all the routes open to him from a strategical point of view for tactical reasons, and in order to effect a surprise, which succeeded. Wellington gave him credit for intending to strike at his right and rear, and the Anglo-German army was disposed accordingly. Nevertheless its rapid concentration on the general line at Quatre Bras on the 16th of June and its successful defence of the cross-roads attested the excellence of the British general's arrangements and the accurate working of his staff. The decision to fight a defensive battle on

the Waterloo ridge while the Prussians marched to the assault of the enemy's right flank and rear was extremely bold, but it brought about the great victory. It might have led to defeat, but such a defeat would not probably have been disastrous to Wellington's army, or more disastrous than must have been the abandonment of the Belgian capital and of the close connexion with Blücher which a further retreat would have entailed. To have fallen back a few more miles promised no considerable advantage. Wellington has been accused of forgetting all about his detachment at Hal, and it is certainly difficult to defend the inaction of this strong division during the critical hours of the 18th of June, but the general policy of preserving his alternative line of retreat to Ostend was unquestionably sagacious.

Finally, what were the respective merits of the British and Prussian armies and commanders?

Military glory is a doubtful asset; generals who have achieved distinction in overcoming heathen spearmen and rebel peasants have enhanced their laurels by publishing scathing criticisms on the careers of Wellington and Napoleon. In the writer's opinion these two commanders have never been even distantly approached by any General who has exercised high command since their day, not even by General von Hindenburg. Two possible exceptions among leaders who have had the opportunity of exercising high command occur to the memory. Sir Charles Napier, the conqueror of Scinde, the victor of Meeanee, is one, and perhaps Stonewall Jackson might have rivalled them in performance, if fate had reserved for him supreme command in several campaigns instead of the glorious finale in the wilderness of Virginia. No other leaders in the century which has elapsed displayed the intuitive perception of what troops can do, of what the battlefield means, and what surprises it holds in store. Blücher was a gallant, a stubborn and a loyal leader, but lacked tactical skill. His unskilful deployment at Ligny invited the defeat which Wellington foresaw directly he beheld the Prussian line of battle. 'Old Blücher will be damnably licked,' said he, as he rode back to his own troops.

The share of the Prussian troops in the victory of the 18th of June will always be a matter of dispute between British and Prussian authorities, but the British can at any rate point to the undisputed facts. Our troops, intermingled, it is true, with Hanoverians and other Germans, repulsed the French attacks for eight hours before the Prussian advance in combination with ours settled the fate of the day. For four hours our army was quite unsupported, and exposed to the fire of a very superior artillery. The tardy appearance of the Prussian columns gave opportunities to the enemy which were not contemplated by our

commander when he agreed to fight at Waterloo; fortunately Napoleon delayed his attack until 11.30 A.M. Had he struck four hours sooner the strain might have been too great for us, particularly if the French reserves had been more skillfully employed. The Emperor fought the battle carelessly. He indulged in a contempt for his foe which was far from being justified by the history of 1812, 1813 and 1814. Stubbornly as the Prussians fought, the achievements of their troops on the battlefield itself fell far short of the astonishing defence, counter-attack and final assault of the British, though an impartial comparison is difficult. The British troops had profound confidence in their ability to defeat superior numbers of French troops, and they were not a whit impressed by the fact that Napoleon was in command. The Prussians, on the other hand, had been routed by him too often during the last wars not to dread his presence on the battlefield. The mighty tournament was highly honourable to both armies as well as to the gallant foe, who was outnumbered and vanquished. Intense as was the strife, it was fought out chivalrously and loyally, a contest of soldiers, not of banditti and poisoners.

The Plain of Waterloo narrowly missed being the scene of a great battle at the opening of the present War, between the same armies but differently arrayed. If the German advance had been delayed a few days longer they must have encountered the Anglo-French forces of the left wing athwart their path, and resting on Brussels. The battleground of 1815 affords the finest arena for a great cavalry duel which it is possible to imagine. Two divisions of French cavalry offered battle to the German horse on the 20th of August 1914 between Ligny and Mt. St. Jean, but the Teutonic cavalry has behaved with marked caution and restraint every time it has had a chance of a mounted combat. On the 20th of August it hugged its infantry and artillery, nor could it be tempted to deploy across the wide plain.

Almost the only authority who correctly explained the cause of the complete British victory was the Emperor Napoleon himself. Hardly one of the innumerable writers about the Battle of Waterloo perceived that the Prussian attack, which was held in check by the French right and right rear, could not possibly have been the cause of the panic which at a given moment suddenly overtook the French left and centre. The troops in that part of the field could not possibly tell what was happening some two and a half miles away, and the approaching night gave good grounds to the French staff for hope of at any rate effecting an orderly retreat. The disaster began with the charge of the British cavalry. Two brigades of fresh cavalry in reserve, supported by several brigades who had been fighting hard all day, were suddenly launched in pursuit of the retreating columns of

the Imperial Guard, after the fury of our infantry counter-attack had spent itself. This mass of cavalry, skirting the Hougomont enclosures, wheeled into line and hurled itself upon the shaken ranks of the French infantry in successive echelons. These fiery attacks threw the French centre into wild confusion, prevented the Imperial Guard from rallying or from covering the general retreat. Then the French right, alarmed by the disaster in the centre and the Prussian enveloping attack, which was rapidly progressing, also gave way, and the disaster became complete in fifteen minutes. The relentless Prussian pursuit was also a fine performance after the hard marching and hard fighting of the day.

The lessons of history should be studied for the profit they can convey, and the stirring tale of Waterloo should make us pause and reflect over two principal points to-day. Although the kingdom of Prussia placed 100,000 soldiers into line on the final battlefield and Great Britain had less than 40,000 of her native soldiers on the same theatre of war, yet the British Forces had become contemptuous of their enemy by reason of repeated success. The British cavalry was incontestably superior to any other, and the skill and accuracy of the British leaders and staff far surpassed the Prussian, or any other of the European armies in the field at the time. After the war our people and our Army became stupefied with arrogance and self-complacency; they thought that the conquerors of Napoleon had no one to fear then or in the future. It was not necessary to take precautions or to train the youth of the nation to arms. Material profit was all that mattered, and the making of money absorbed the souls and bodies of the entire nation for a hundred years. The roughly equipped legions of the starveling kingdom which fought by our side, however, became the nucleus of expanding national forces which trained the whole youth of the nation, and which two generations later consolidated the German Empire. Between 1870 and 1914 the Germans deteriorated in manners and morals, but the military system founded after Jena and cemented by the final triumph over Napoleon has proved its unrivalled superiority from a purely military standpoint, while the proud host of Great Britain dwindled away, and in the decisive hour could only appear in diminutive representation by the side of its hard-pressed Allies.

The other reflection is not less suggestive. In 1815 the end was reached of an appalling era of war. It was then said and believed in England that war, or at any rate European war, was a thing of the past, and we acted as a nation on this fatuous assumption. All wars are followed by a great reaction against war and its horrors. All wars end for certain people in abolishing war, and the severest strain is imposed upon the guid-

ing statesmen of any nation by the conclusion of any general peace after a sanguinary war is finished. It is then the duty of the leaders of a nation to resist the natural impulse to disarm, economise, and shirk the self-denial required by military service, unpopular as the task generally is. As regards economy—what a ghastly economy the petty savings of our military budgets have been of late years! It is impossible yet to forecast even approximately the cost of the War, but if the two million sterling a day rate continues for even two years only, it will form a melancholy monument of national economy.

The fact, too, of Britain changing sides from Prussia to France is dramatic and instructive. Evidently national alliances depend on no natural law or personal preference; they are dictated by the exigencies of a given period. The ally of to-day may be the deadly foe of to-morrow, and *vice versa*. When we took up arms against our ancient rival in the Waterloo campaign her sovereign was already doomed to defeat. Our victory was an easy one from the national standpoint, although the short, sharp contest on the battlefield was exceptionally brilliant and honourable to our troops and to the great General who commanded them. The result, as it happened, has exercised a bad effect on our national character ever since, for we gradually relapsed into a fool's paradise and dropped out of the community of armed nations. A miracle of good luck has given us the chance of regaining our former rank and restoring our ancient fame. The vicissitudes of European politics and the aggressive policy of one nation after another, whenever its strength and prosperity seemed to justify expansion, should warn us that we cannot stand out of the race, and that nothing but our own strength can preserve English independence in the future, for our former inaccessibility has passed away. The organisation of our Land Forces according to modern standards and requirements will not only safeguard these realms and the honour of the nation, but will make possible the pursuit of wealth, the be-all and end-all of existence to so many, by restoring real—not false—security.

By far the best way of celebrating the centenary of the Battle of Waterloo will be the enactment of Conscription in the United Kingdom, thus restoring it to the position which it held among the European States one hundred years ago, and which has been lost in the interval by suicidal apathy and indifference to our national interests.

CECIL BATTINE.

WHY ITALY WENT TO WAR

SIGNOR SALANDRA's speech to the Italian Chamber on the 20th of May, and the publication of the Green Book relating to the diplomatic negotiations between the Central Empires and Italy, permit one to trace, with some degree of assurance, the rôle she has played in the now annulled Triple Alliance, and her position in Europe.

One fact stands out uncontrovertibly from the data mentioned, and is indirectly corroborated by Germany and Austria, namely Italy's full right to denounce the treaty and affirm her complete liberty of action. It is scarcely necessary to repeat that the Triple Alliance had for its *raison d'être* the equilibrium and peace of Europe. In the words of Bismarck, it was a 'strategic position' in European politics taken up with a view to guaranteeing to each of the parties a certain minimum of safety, without the one having actually to depend upon the others for the defence of its interests. That Italy until now has fulfilled the letter and the spirit of this conception has been proved by past events. Indeed, if any accusation can be brought against her, it is that of not having been sufficiently firm and energetic when Austria attempted to bully her. As Signor Salandra said a few days ago, the policy of moderation and peace which Italy set herself necessitated many sacrifices. In view of recent events, thinking Italians, far from regretting it, may well be proud of the honourable accomplishment of this end.

Austrian policy with regard to Italy has been one of treachery and deceit. The outbursts in the official and semi-official Press and the openly aggressive military preparations during the Tripoli war; the constant persecution and provocation of the Italians, under the pretext of a non-existent irredentism; the unceasing and secret work of expansion in the Balkans are instances of Austria's disregard for her ally's interests. Not only did Germany show no disapproval of this, but the Tangier and Agadir incidents proved that the Central Empires had embarked upon an aggressive policy essentially contrary to the defensive nature of the Triple Alliance, endangering the diplomatic position of Italy. It is useless to discuss now the reasons which

led to the last renewal of the Alliance in 1912. Suffice it to say that it remained unchanged in character, and that no provision was made for Italy in the new developments in European policy. The statements made above are in themselves sufficient to disprove any accusation of treachery which Austria or Germany may bring against Italy. These facts, coupled with the former country's anti-Slav policy in the Balkans which led up to the war against Serbia in 1914, all moral considerations apart, justified Italy's declaration of neutrality. It is also well to remember in this connexion that Bismarck himself said that a Government could not guarantee 'to use the forces of a country to help a friend if the popular conviction did not approve . . . the *ultra posse nemo obligatur* cannot lose its force owing to any clause in a treaty, as soon as the text as first interpreted no longer answers to the interests of the signatory.'

Austria's declaration of war against Serbia, without due notice having been previously given to Italy as prescribed (a prescription rigorously adhered to by Italy in the Tripoli war), followed by the invasion of Serbia, not only did not constitute a *casus foederis*, but was an open violation of the 7th Article of the treaty, making it imperative that an exchange of views should take place with the object of settling the question of immediate compensation. According to the article in question, any action in the Balkans, whether temporary or otherwise, and independently of territorial advantages, was to be notified in advance, and entitled Italy to compensation. In the case of the Tripoli war, Austria had given her veto to certain military operations, a veto which Italy had respected. Thus a precedent had been set which Italy had the right to follow. On the other hand, any verbal assurance given by Austria as to the integrity of Serbia, or as to *future* compensations to be guaranteed by Germany, were rendered valueless by the fact that Austria had actually invaded Serbia and appointed a governor at Belgrade, thereby running counter to the veto imposed by Italy.

All through the course of negotiations Austria and Germany have deliberately ignored the new situation created by the War. They have insinuated that the offers made were generous, so as to cause Italy to appear as being bribed. The proposals and counter-proposals advanced have never once revealed a sincere and straightforward desire to reach a just agreement. Italy has been represented as grasping and extortionate. If, however, one compares the obligations towards Italy assumed by her ex-allies, with the facts of the case and the position in which they have placed her, the ridiculous inadequacy of the offers of compensation and the strict honesty and legitimacy of her demands become apparent.

Leaving aside the equilibrium in the Mediterranean, and turning to that of the Adriatic, two things will be clear; the first, that the *status quo* in that sea largely depends on the *status quo* in the Balkans, and the second that upon it the safety of Italy and her future as a Great Power depend. As it has been already remarked above, Austria's policy in the Balkans has not been conducive to the furtherance or the maintenance of that *status quo*. While insisting that Italy should cease to interest herself in all matters, however vital, relating to the Italians in the Trentino, Trieste, Istria and Dalmatia, Austria did all in her power not only to reawaken and intensify any latent antagonism, but actually accused Italy of creating and supporting anti-Austrian movements. This has been repeatedly disproved by facts known to everyone. Again, a Slav danger as such, given the cordial relations between Russia and Italy and Serbia and Italy, does not exist except in so far as artificially provoked by Austria to aid her *Drang nach Osten* policy. The fact that Serbia is entitled to an outlet in the Adriatic, a fact which Italy has always recognised and supported, instead of being a menace would help Italian commercial interests. As an Italian deputy pointed out, 'There is only one Slav danger that we have to fear in the Adriatic, and that is the kingdom of a Greater Croatia, created by Austria to protect herself; the kingdom of those Slavs who, removed from their natural centre of attraction, are thrown out to destroy the Italians. We only fear those Slavs who are instruments of Vienna's policy.'

This has been the policy of Austria-Hungary for the past fifty years, a policy which has largely contributed to the destruction of the Balkan equilibrium. The creation of an autonomous Albania was another step in the same direction, i.e. to the detriment of the Balkan States. Italy's interests in Vallona, which are admittedly and exclusively of a strategic nature, were represented as political in order to drag her into the orbit of Balkan politics and to create a friction with Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria which Austria herself would eventually use to her own advantage. It was inevitable that Austria's disintegrating policy in the Balkans should react upon the Adriatic. The balance of power in that sea has been, since the battle of Lissa in 1866, inclined in favour of Austria. Italy was practically ousted from it. Trieste, Pola, the Dalmatian Islands and littoral have been used as naval and submarine bases, and were a constant menace and danger to the undefended western coast. So long as an ally was in possession of them the compromise could be allowed to subsist; but no sooner had the *status quo* been disturbed by action such as that against Serbia in 1914, than a new situation was created, and Austria not only compromised herself but made

it necessary for Italy to seek for some other means of re-establishing the equilibrium, or for compensation.

A casual glance at a map of the Adriatic and the most superficial knowledge of history will prove the truth of this assertion. The possession of at least a portion of the eastern shores of the Adriatic or its strategic equivalent—that is, its possession by a strong ally—is a *sine qua non* of the safety of Italy implied by the strategic domination of the Adriatic. The maintenance of the Italo-Austrian agreement in Albania suggested by Baron Burian was therefore valueless. Not only did it not include the recognition of Italy's complete sovereignty over Vallona and Austria's disinterestedness in Albania, but in no way did it compensate for Italy's dangerous position in the Adriatic. Vallona has a strategic value of a negative kind—that is, Italy could not allow any other Power to occupy it without running the risk of having in the Lower Adriatic a situation similar to that in the upper part of that sea. Consequently, at the present juncture, it could not be regarded in any way as ensuring even a minimum programme essential to her safety. Moreover, none of the proposals guaranteed the interests of Italians under Austria. Even the territorial cessions proposed were inadequate from a strategic, ethnic or national point of view, and were to come into operation only at the end of the War. To accept such proposals would have been to betray the country, not merely from a sentimental but from an actual and practical point of view.¹

The Italian counter-proposals are perhaps the clearest proof of Italy's desire to come to a settlement. It must also be remembered that they were formulated by a triplicist, Baron Sonnino. The proposed cession of territory affects only a portion of those territories historically, racially and geographically Italian: the Trentino according to the boundaries of the kingdom of Italy in 1811; a rectification of frontier on the eastern border, including Gradisca and Goritz, and ending on the sea between Monfalconi and Trieste, near Nabresina; the Curzolari islands, Curzola, Lissa, Lesina, Lagap, Lagosta, Cazza, and Meleda. As to Trieste and Istria, these were to form an independent State. The alleged Austrian offer of Trieste as a free city under Austria would have been practically equivalent to its continuing in its present condition.

The accusation brought against Italy that since the death of the Marchese di San Giuliano forces have been at work in Italy to provoke a rupture, and that Italy's demands 'far exceeded what Italy herself could claim for the satisfaction of her national

¹ The further territorial offers referred to by Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag were made by Austria after the time limit imposed by Italy had expired. Their acceptance would have been therefore incompatible with Italy's status as a Great Power.

aspirations,' is manifestly without foundation. Indeed, those who have followed with attention the development of the Italian crisis will be able to form an opinion as to the moderation and the patience of the people and the Government. It must also be remembered that the situation was not sought for, caused or wished by Italy. To the necessity for defending her vital interests, and not to a foreseen and planned revindication of national aspirations at the expense of her ally, the period of military activity and preparation preceding her declaration of war was due.

The Italian Government has clearly shown that it would not be party to anything but the strictest adherence to the spirit and the letter of the Triple Alliance so long as this lasted. It did not force impossible terms upon its allies. Throughout the period of conversations it strove in every way to find a means of compromise which, while safeguarding its most elementary national and strategical interests, should be acceptable to Germany and Austria. Notwithstanding the difficulties and dangers, both present and future, involved, and the obstacles placed in her way, Italy waited until the very last moment consistent with her national dignity to denounce the Triple Alliance as null and void. Only then did she approach the Entente Powers with a view to discussing her future position.

Should anyone still question why she has delayed until now, we can answer with Signor Bissolati: 'The determination of a State such as Italy assuredly cannot manifest itself in a sudden *élan*. Preparation includes all the activities displayed by the nation in developing and co-ordinating her economic powers so as to make them capable of bearing the utmost tension necessary to an external effort in order to spread and strengthen the consciousness of the State, so that it may be able to resist any thrust from outside.' This has been the self-imposed task and the meaning of Italy's nine months of neutrality. Italy, having fulfilled to the utmost all her obligations, with clean hands and a pure heart enters into the War by the side of her new Allies, to whom she has always been bound by common interests and common ideals. This is not a Cabinet war. It is the war of a single-purposed and united nation determined at all costs to defend its sacred rights, and those of Belgium, Serbia, and Poland, in the name of honour, justice, and freedom.

ARUNDEL DEL RE.

THE ECONOMIC STRAIN ON ENGLAND AND ON GERMANY:

A COMPARISON

IF any psychologist were able to analyse the feeling with which the country greeted the Budget speech of Mr. Lloyd George on the 4th of May, we should possess a most illustrative and interesting picture. Amazement at the magnitude of the figures would be tempered only by the Englishman's difficulty in being amazed at anything. Pride would find a place in having 'done a record,' and (vide *Punch*, for instance) in being able with apparent ease to shoulder so stupendous a burden, but it would be a pride sobered by apprehension of taxation, present or to come. Similarly many must have been impressed by the exhortations to economy delivered with equal sincerity and power—the more striking as coming from a Chancellor of the Exchequer whose practices in the past have not been wholly in accord with his precepts for the present. It has been said that the figures betoken taxation. That is true, and so much, of course, is recognised by everyone. But, apart from this knowledge, the figures convey a feeling of aloofness to the ordinary reader. The non-supply of sufficient ammunition can be easily, if not fully, appreciated by anyone, as also its effect on the fortunes of the battle and on the lives of our fellow-countrymen at the Front. But this question of finance and economics seems remote. There is a gulf fixed between it and the facts of everyday life. Ought a man, in view of Mr. Lloyd George's speech, to order his daily life differently? If 'business as usual' was a good motto in the first week of August 1914, is it a good motto in the first week of June 1915? Such are the questions that are raised, and yet are questions which many find it difficult to answer. Yet the problem in economics is simple. Indeed, an apology almost seems necessary for discussing it. But if simple, it is also most important. It affects the proper conduct of the daily life and expenditure of everyone in the kingdom. It is connected with the question of recruiting, and with many others on which success in the War depends. Far better, therefore, that too much attention should be given to it than too little.

The actual figures involved are few, but they are worth recapitulation. They serve to emphasise the fact that direct

expenditure on the War is only the half of the economic problem. The indirect burden, caused by the diversion of so many men from their ordinary productive industry, is of equal rank in importance.

1. DIRECT EXPENDITURE UPON THE WAR

<i>Amount Expended.</i>			
Financial year (1914-1915)	£360,000,000
Financial year (1915-1916) if the war continues for twelve months	922,500,000
			£1,282,500,000
<i>How Defrayed.¹</i>			
Exchequer balances	£10,500,000
Taxation	75,000,000
By borrowings	1,197,000,000
			£1,282,500,000

2. EFFECT ON INDUSTRY

The full data do not exist² for determining with any precision the total effect on the economic life of the nation. Production for home consumption is the most important part of industry. At present there are no estimates to show how far it has been affected, though it is possible that fairly reliable inferences might be drawn by statistical methods. But the totals of our export trade for the first four months of the year are an indication how serious is the falling off, even though latest returns indicate some recovery.

Exports of Produce and Manufactures of the United Kingdom.

—	1913	1914	1915	Decrease compared with 1914	Decrease compared with 1913
Exports : January-April	170,361,000	173,533,000	116,770,000	33 p.c.	31½ p.c.

¹ The above is the simplest form of statement possible. But it is indeed too optimistic. The amounts represent the cash expended but not the burden imposed on the State by the enhanced rate of interest. Thus 332 millions cash were produced by the issue of a War Loan of 350 millions bearing interest at 3½ per cent. redeemable at par in 1929. The present value of that Loan—i.e. the net burden on the State—is about 350 millions. The rest of the expenditure has hitherto been met by the issue of Treasury Bills. If and when any funded debt is created, the burden on the State will be affected by the rate at which the money can be raised. *Exchequer Balances.*—The high Exchequer Balances on April 1, 1914, have been treated as applied to War expenditure. They are themselves, of course, only the product of taxation or borrowings in the past. *Taxation.*—The estimate of the Chancellor of the Exchequer has been taken as a basis, and the cost of concessions deducted. The actual receipts largely exceeded the estimates, but can hardly be given without making allowances for forestalments and the like.

² A provisional estimate up to the end of 1914 is given by Mr. W. T. Layton, of the Board of Trade, in the *Quarterly Review* for January 1915.

It will be seen that exports have fallen by nearly one third, and though it is not likely that the shrinkage in production for home use has reached so high a proportion, yet, without question, it is very considerable.

What is the significance of these figures? The problem is one both of finance and of economics, but primarily of economics—if, in the absence of more suitable terms, such a distinction can be made. It can be said that economics are concerned, *inter alia*, with the great potentialities of producing and of consuming articles; that finance provides the machinery which makes those potentialities operative. Economic power may be compared to the vital force, finance to the nerves that let that force operate; or, again, economic power to the electricity generated, finance to the wire which enables the current to pass and do its proper work. In the present crisis there is a general tendency to regard the question of means too exclusively as one of finance, the form of loans, the difficulties of issue, and the like. Such a view was true of the financial crisis in the United States in 1907. The economic potentialities were unimpaired, but the financial mechanism was imperfect. So, too, the temporary dislocation last August was financial only. In other words, the machinery of credit and currency were labouring under a very sudden strain. But the present problem goes much deeper than that. The financial machinery is working smoothly enough—it is the sufficiency of the underlying economic power and the best method of conserving that power that are in question.

The essence of the matter lies in the power of producing, and in the need for consuming the articles which we use, whether in warfare or in ordinary life. The general process in the world at large is susceptible of being stated without technical terms and broadly, yet at the same time with adequate accuracy. The world continues to produce articles and continues to consume them. But material progress consists in this, that all the while it consumes rather less than it produces, putting by the surplus in a form which increasingly facilitates future production. This ensures that in the future it can either produce the same articles with less effort, or else more or better goods with the same effort. Such is really the sum and substance of material progress as a whole, apart from social questions which deal with the proportions in which the articles shall be distributed among different individuals or classes of individuals.

As with the world, so with a nation, but with a difference. The world is a self-contained whole, while each nation within it is not self-contained, as though it were a watertight compartment. Each nation itself consumes the bulk of what it produces and *vice versa*, but yet by no means all. It exchanges a

proportion by means of foreign trade, and this proportion differs in the case of each nation. The exports of the United States are calculated only to form approximately one fifteenth of the whole production; of Germany one seventh. In the case of the United Kingdom the proportion has increased until it is now nearly one fourth. The first point to note then is the importance of the comparative dependence on foreign trade, and at the same time the capacity to engage in it. With this consideration in mind, it is true that each nation continually produces more than it consumes and saves up the surplus, just as is the case with the world as a whole. But again the existence of nations within the world as a whole is most important, and thus it is that the savings of the United Kingdom are invested, not only in the United Kingdom, but all over the world, and more especially in newer countries such as the United States, British Dominions, and South America. On these savings interest is payable to us each year over and above the annual exchange of articles, interest of which we can either take payment or else which we can re-invest. In terms of money the figures were given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his speech, and, of course, they are well known. Broadly speaking, we exchanged in 1913 articles to the value of 535,000,000*l.* Over and above that we were owed some 120,000,000*l.* to 150,000,000*l.* worth in return for our services as ocean shippers, and some 200,000,000*l.* as interest on our investments abroad, or a sum approaching 350,000,000*l.* in all. But we only took 134,000,000*l.* of this, leaving the balance to be added to our existing investments.

Such was the state of affairs in 1913, as measured approximately in terms of money. The triteness, indeed, of the statement is such as that it must appear ludicrous to economists. Yet there need be no apology for making it. What is important are the facts of production and consumption that these figures represent: what is vital is our position in 1915, *vis-à-vis* of Germany, as compared with 1913. Turn from the figures to the facts on which they are based. In 1913 we produced a large amount of articles which we consumed. We produced yet more which we put by. But not only so; we were creditors of foreign countries for a very large sum. That interest is due on this sum means that in addition to the articles we exchange with them they are bound to supply us with a vast amount more—an amount indeed so vast that we did not take it all, but let much of the products (or more strictly productive energy) be reinvested abroad. We were indeed in the happy position of consuming largely and yet of laying by. Compare then the position in 1913 with that of the present year. Owing to the War, quite inevitably, our consumption has increased enormously. Again, owing to the War and equally inevitably, our production has decreased enormously.

These are the facts of which the figures given above are the outward sign. Furthermore, if the War is to be prosecuted successfully, much of the increased consumption must continue, and, indeed, must increase; much, too, of the decrease in production must continue, and it may perhaps decrease yet further. What then is the nature of the consumption and of the production involved? Why are the present tendencies towards increase of the former and decrease of the latter? What are the difficulties which arise and how can they best be met?

As regards consumption, the general facts are patent, though the detailed figures can only be known to the Government. The demand for artillery and rifles and for ammunition of all kinds is enormous. Yet each fresh piece of reliable news from Flanders or from the Dardanelles, each lesson from Galicia or Poland, is a convincing proof that much more is needed. If artillery and ammunition jump at once to notice, no less real are the huge quantities of the cloth, the leather, and the like that are required for equipment, of food for the use of troops, of vehicles for transport on the field, of hutting for training camps—and in fact of the whole subject-matter dealt with on the commissariat side of the Services. Repairs, again, to the Navy are stupendous in amount, and in the same category of additional consumption (from this point of view) are the requirements of the War Office and Admiralty for means of conveyance by land and by sea.* No doubt there is a good deal to enumerate as a set-off to the above. If food is supplied to the soldiers, it may be said that some saving is effected of the food formerly eaten by them at home. So too with clothes. Other economies are less obvious, but none the less take place. If the Government buy more rifles, say, from the Birmingham Small Arms Company, the public buys fewer motor cars and bicycles. The same works which made steel pens now make small-arm ammunition, and the consumption of such pens is largely economised, and not merely supplemented by importations. All this is true, and yet the economies so far are only a small fraction as compared with the increased expenditure.

This increase in consumption would be serious enough even if unaccompanied by a decrease in production. But when the two are taken in conjunction the problem is one of the greatest gravity. Many men are transferred from their previous trades to some new form of output to meet War requirements. The result in their case will be analysed later. But an immense number of our best workers, not less than 2,000,000, and probably nearer 2,500,000, have been withdrawn from productive industry altogether by the unexampled recruiting for the Army and the Navy.

* It will be remembered that, according to the statements made in the House of Commons on February 11, the merchant vessels employed for naval and military purposes alone represented 10 per cent. of the shipping of the world.

When we consider that in the case of any country, even under the greatest stringency of conditions, large numbers must be retained for the primary purposes of production of necessities and of distribution,* the importance is the more apparent of the withdrawal of 2,500,000 of our most active workers. Indeed, the shrinkage of our exports by one third is proof, if proof were needed.

It is at this point that a correct view is necessary of our relations with foreign countries. The old circumstances of 1913 are completely changed. We must get warlike equipment of all kinds, but above all of shells, wherever we can. The Government therefore are buying large quantities from abroad, and these quantities will grow and ought to grow. In the second place, the rightful transfer of so many men from making other articles to turning out ammunition means that the other articles go unmade. In many cases we go without them. We may not use so many pens. We may not replace machinery or buildings. But many of the articles otherwise made at home we are now importing. Then, thirdly, besides the increase in imports, there is the drop in exports already described. What does this all amount to? A complete summation is impossible. But a shrinkage in exports at the present rate is alone nearly sufficient to counterbalance the whole of the 200,000,000*l.* which hitherto we reinvested annually abroad. To this, however, and to the increase in imports shown in the returns must be added the vast purchases by the Government abroad, which quite rightly are kept out of the returns, and yet again the financial help we must—and again rightly—give our Allies. Such is the present situation. What will it be if the War lasts another twelve months, and what if another twelve beyond that? As a nation, we shall be living more and more 'on tick,' and like any individual the nation will do so at increasingly great cost.

What then is the best course of behaviour? It is no good exaggerating the difficulty. Germany is faced by similar problems. In any case we are bound to 'see the business through.' The whole question is as to the best method of doing so. The first guiding principle is that the more our consumption outruns our production, the greater not only is the quantity of goods, but the price of each article which we buy from outside. Obviously, therefore, it is of the very first importance to limit all consumption that is not absolutely necessary either for the prosecution of the War or for the maintenance in bare physical vigour of the population. This truth applies to all alike—Government Departments in their administra-

* What a surprisingly large proportion this is can be gathered from a survey of the Census figures of occupations of a large city like Manchester.

tion and private individuals in ordinary life. If the Admiralty must keep a ship waiting, or if the War Office have necessarily to keep trains on a siding for an emergency, it is a proper expense for the War. But if they do so unnecessarily, it is a waste. Production has been diminished. That ship or train might have been at work accelerating the delivery of coal, of wood, or of iron either for general production or possibly for the Government's own munitions; or if these were sufficiently provided (which is unlikely), the train could be economised altogether. If the work of any Civil Department of Government can be postponed it should be postponed. As with the State so with individuals. If they buy new motor cars or bicycles it is in all probability a waste. The men who make them had better be making something else, and what is true of motor cars and bicycles is true of everything that is not necessary either for the prosecution of the War or for maintaining people in bare physical vigour. Such is the bare truth, unpalatable as unattainable; a counsel of perfection. But the nearer we approach to it the better for the conduct of the War.⁵ 'Business as usual' was a very sound motto at a time of temporary financial dislocation. It is an entirely unsound motto now.

But if it is wise to limit consumption, it is equally wise to increase production by any method that is economically justifiable. Of such methods, a continued period of overtime is not one. For a week, for perhaps a month, the output may be increased, in the aggregate at least, by a large amount of overtime. But beyond a certain point overtime is a most wasteful method, and even the aggregate output is diminished. What is wanted is to utilise for immediate production all persons capable of work but not normally employed, and that even though this utilisation might be a social evil if continued under normal conditions. It is better to endure bad things for a year than worse may not come upon us for a decade. For these reasons the outcry against the use of women for agricultural work, or of boys and girls wherever possible, is absurd and misguided at a time like the present, however right it may have been a year ago, and it may be, we hope, a year hence.

This necessity of maintaining production was in the mind of

⁵ One reservation will, of course, at once be made by the economist. Labour is not completely mobile. Cessation of demand, therefore, for one article may result not in the workers who make that article being able to make some other article, but in their being thrown out of work. Better, then, it may be said, that they should go on producing the original article (or performing the original service) than be idle and supported by charity. This is true, but all returns show that while isolated cases of this kind exist, the general demand for labour is so great that unemployment is at a minimum and the danger is hardly real. So far as it exists at all it affects women more than men.

the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he indicated a doubt that Great Britain could put a great army in the field on a par with Continental armies, and at the same time preserve command of the sea and finance the Allied countries. But such a doubt seems clearly wrong. It is clear, from what has been said, that the more men that join the Army, the more that are transferred from making other articles to manufacturing munitions of war, the worse for our foreign trade and for our financial position for the time. But an increase in our forces, and above all their proper equipment, ensures success and an earlier success in the War. Finance will tell more and more as the War proceeds, but above all men and munitions are the decisive factor. We know it from the lesson alike of the Dardanelles, and of Ypres. The choice between the two alternatives is a balance of disadvantages. But it must always be remembered that a saving gained at the possible expense of prolonging the War may be a very false economy.

But when all is said and done the War is competitive, and it is important to consider not only what our position is in itself, but also how we stand *vis-à-vis* of Germany. For this purpose it is necessary to understand how differently a country is affected which can be more or less self-supporting, temporarily or permanently, from a nation which depends largely on foreign trade. A country can be self-supporting, under stress of war conditions, in one of two ways. It may be able to make its production continue to meet its consumption, despite the absorption of men into the ranks, and despite their diversion to meeting new and unaccustomed requirements in the shape of munitions of war and equipment. In such a case there is no economic reason why such a country should ever give way under the strain of war. It will be said that she may become exhausted through the destruction of her soldiery, but this merely means that through that destruction she ceases to be self-supporting because her producing population at home is drawn upon to fill up the gap created on the field of battle. A nation, however, and this is the second of the two alternatives, may be temporarily self-supporting. She may for an indefinite time forego making capital replacements in industry. She may for the time being be able to supply herself with necessities and yet keep up the supply of men and munitions to the army. But a country in this condition is really like a bear living on its own fat. It may so continue for a shorter or a longer period, but sometime the stores of fat will come to an end and it will be forced to go for its sustenance to outside sources. The moment that this occurs the economic situation changes, and with it the financial. So far as a country is self-supporting, financial difficulties cannot

in the nature of the case be insuperable or cause a breakdown—provided that the temper of the people is attuned to the need for sacrifice. Under such circumstances the whole mechanism of raising loans is really nothing else than a matter of domestic accounting as between the various individuals within the nation. Internal trouble may arise if discontent, or a sense of insecurity, is caused by the manner in which the finance is carried out. But apart from such possibilities, so long as a nation is self-supporting, the difficulties of financing a country need never lead to a breakdown. But the moment that a country is not self-supporting: the moment either that its consumption of articles for the time outruns its production, or that it needs certain articles which it cannot produce itself and which it cannot fully pay for by exports, then the economic change is reflected by the increasing difficulty of financing operations.

As for the comparison between Germany and this country, German statistics are not now published, but what is material are the broad lines of difference. Firstly, while the foreign trade of Germany is next in volume to our own, yet Germany can be more nearly self-sufficient than is possible with us. Even so, her self-sufficiency is and must always be very far from complete. There are important groups of articles which she must needs import, and other groups which it is very desirable for her that she should be able so to procure. Thirdly, while she has accumulated a considerable amount of foreign investments, they are not comparable to ours in amount. These are the fundamental conditions on which the circumstances of the War have been superimposed. Her trade with foreign countries has been cut off in preponderating measure. But though this is true, she yet manages to procure large quantities of certain materials through adjacent neutral countries—Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland—of which copper is one of the best known instances. While, however, she manages to procure them, she has to pay a very high price for them. But at the same time that she suffers these disadvantages she has economised in every way compatible with efficiency in her direct expenditure on the War, both by organising production and the saving of wasteful consumption. By such economies she renders herself more able to meet the economic and financial difficulties which she has to face.

The comparative position, then, is as follows. At the present moment we are in any case obliged to import large quantities not only of munitions of war but of many other articles, and we shall be obliged to import more, while possibly we may export less in payment for them. Our wasteful methods hitherto, in private as well as public expenditure, make the balance against us greater than need otherwise be the case. On the other hand,

our accumulated investments abroad are so large and the position with which we started so strong, that we have been able and can continue to stand the strain for a considerable time. Contrasted with ourselves Germany has been infinitely more economical. Her war expenditure is considerably greater than ours in the aggregate, but much less in proportion to the number of men engaged, and in this she is, of course, helped by the fact that during years of preparation for war she has already accumulated many of the capital requirements which we are now providing. At the same time, she is not self-sufficing, and, despite the utmost economies, she will grow less and less so. Not only so, but while she does manage to get supplies of some necessary articles, the interference with her supply and the enhancement of price which she has to face is out of all proportion to what we have to suffer by high freights and submarine attacks. In addition her foreign investments are less and her credit is lower. The economic strain, therefore, of the War, as it continues, ought to tell more heavily on Germany than on England, even though our obligation is not only to ourselves but to our Allies. That this will be so is indicated by the course already taken by the foreign exchanges of the two countries.

What, then, is the lesson to be drawn? No answer can be given without regarding the spirit of the two countries. Experience has shown that, when engaged in a war, a country will continue the struggle despite financial straits that any prophet might have said would paralyse it. But in all cases the extent of endurance in economic matters on the field depends on the temper of the people. And in this connexion a real economic organisation probably exerts a twofold effect. Not only does it make the most use of given resources, but it helps to spread an appreciation of the War and so create a temper that will better bear straitened conditions. From all points of view, therefore, it is well to be glad of our advantages, but to recognise that the supreme need is for resolute organisation. What is required is a comprehensive survey of the whole forces of the nation, not only to supply the Army and the Navy better than heretofore with men and with munitions, but also to order the economic life of the nation, and the individuals within it. It is only by such a policy that the strain on the national resources may be minimised, that the temper of the people may be more and more attuned to bear the strain, and that thereby our whole conduct of the War may gain alike in intensity and the sustained character of the effort.

ARTHUR STEEL-MAITLAND.

MCCARTHY OF WISCONSIN

THE CAREER OF AN IRISHMAN ABROAD AS IT APPEARS AND APPEALS TO AN IRISHMAN AT HOME

Not long ago a London club, whose members belong to the literary professions, did me the honour of making me the guest of the evening at one of their intellectual feasts. They asked me to open a discussion, preferably on literature and life. I replied that, while I knew something of life, especially Irish life, I knew little about literature, and I suggested as an alternative title, which they accepted, 'Is Ireland worth while?' I was intentionally vague as I did not mean to allow these literary folk to prepare ammunition for my destruction. My fears were unnecessary, for the discussion had not gone far when those who disagreed with my estimate of my country's worth were fallen upon by a member of the club—an Irish novelist. Their standards, he told them, were false; they had neither the knowledge nor the imagination to comprehend the issue I had raised; and he proposed to discuss a question it would be good for them to consider, namely, whether England was worth while. The evening which I had dreaded passed pleasantly enough. In this article I am in danger again of stirring a hornets' nest. The *littérateurs* of my country too often suffer from political hyperaesthesia, a disease easily diagnosed by the excess of pepper in the Attic salt, and some of them may discover an insidious design which does not appear in my title. My subject is the career of a remarkable Irishman in the United States. If my story is of any special interest to my countrymen, it will be for the light it throws upon one of the most searching questions people are asking about us—a question it were well we asked, honestly and fearlessly, about ourselves.

In the middle of the last century, John McCarthy came to a New England manufacturing town—one of those Irelands which the great famine had transplanted. This branch of the McCarthys, once known as the Macaura Spanaugh, inhabited the hilly country on the borders of Cork and Kerry, and had

contributed largely to the ranks of the Wild Geese. Repeated rebellions at home, and service given impartially to England's enemies abroad, had sadly depleted the stock. About the time he emigrated, there landed also in Boston his future wife, Katherine O'Shea, who came from the same district. She was strong, healthy, brave, resourceful, and, above all things, kind-hearted. Coming from Kerry, we may believe her contemporaries who say she was a beautiful woman. Her family were evicted after the famine, and she faced the New World not penniless, for she had one shilling in her pocket, which she gave to a poor woman, who, she said, did not appear to be able to manage as well as she could without money.

When John McCarthy married Katherine O'Shea he was working in a shoe factory in Brockton, Massachusetts. The father's memory recalls the seamy side of the still raw industrialism and the fierce strikes of the oppressed workers. In the resulting distress his wife, who kept a boarding-house for the shoemakers, took a leading part in protecting and housing the women and children. Three children were born to them, but Charles alone survived the insanitary conditions of the crowded community in which he spent his early years.

John McCarthy was fond of books and had no difficulty in imparting his taste to his son and heir. The mother, as we have seen, was fond of people. At the age of fourteen the son, registering a secret vow that he would some day do his part in improving the conditions of the workers among whom he had been brought up, left, or, I think more correctly, ran away from home. The boy knew that the schooling he had would not take him far, but he was confident that he could earn a surplus above bare subsistence for further education. Between fourteen and twenty he occasionally took a holiday to attend the High School at Brockton. He accepted any kind of employment; he went to sea before the mast; he worked around docks, in factories, on the land. His first rise in life was when he got a job at scene-shifting in a theatre. From this he advanced to scene-painting, and ultimately to stage management of plays.

This youth's career furnishes a good illustration of Irish-American life—I mean the ease with which an Irishman develops a versatility commensurate with the infinite variety of American opportunity. Our proverbial wisdom about rolling stones the typical Americans regard as sheer nonsense. Perpetual motion, if they could remould their scheme of things to their heart's desire, would be their law of life. Even in their religious room has to be found for the 'live wires' among the pious. Shakers and Jumpers I had known, but recently I came across the Holy Rollers, who, I presume, literally as well as metaphorically,

gather moss. I remember how, in my first letter home from the Land of Promise in 1879, I told my father that I was in a country where nobody could keep still for a moment. Even their chairs were on rockers instead of legs, and they took meals as we take pills. A crude judgment, even at the time, and wholly untrue of to-day. But the condition indicated—the hustle of American life—has, I doubt not, been a powerful stimulant to the action of Irishmen set free from whatever it is that paralyses them at home.

A well paid job at a theatre in Providence, Rhode Island, enabled the truant boy to attend lectures at the Brown University—a Baptist institution. Here he met John D. Rockefeller, jun., and this strangely assorted pair have remained fast friends ever since. I happened to meet them together not long ago in connexion with a social service project, and it was pleasing to find that they were still John and Mac to each other. It is more than probable that such a character and capacity would have been gladly utilised in one of the multifarious services which go to make and spend the greatest fortune the world has ever seen. A less altruistic young man would have discerned in this chance acquaintance a tide to be taken at the flood; but the Irish missionary spirit cast prudence to the winds. The son of Katherine O'Shea could do without money.

At his first University the boy distinguished himself in athletics, for which he had a full Irish taste and aptitude, and was given a cup as the best all-round football man. Economics and political science, with the necessary grounding in modern languages, were his subjects of study. He was made a special student in recognition of his fine educational zeal. With a preparation so wholly inadequate he did not look for a degree; but to his surprise the University gave him one although he had passed no entrance examination—a concession, I believe, never made before or since. Some twenty years later, more in accordance with academic custom, they conferred upon him the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters.

When the Spanish War broke out, McCarthy, leaving economics, politics, and even football, set out for the field of battle. Characteristically waiving the usual preliminaries, he betook himself to a regiment which happened to be mainly Irish. It was in one of the fever-stricken camps down South, and he was laid low with malaria before he was actually enrolled. This was the greatest disappointment of his life, the only consolation being that he escaped the title of colonel for which he had more than qualified.

By the time he was convalescent the War was over, and being devoid of means, he took the post of football coach at his second

seat of higher learning, the University of Georgia. There, incidentally, he studied law, and did some very creditable economic research work in the Southern States, *inter alia* making a special study of the cost of slave-holding. He then moved to his third University, which was also to be his last, because there he found what he was looking for—a teacher of the ideas struggling to the front in his own mind.

At the State University situated at Madison, Wisconsin, Richard T. Ely, a pupil of Carl Knies and Wagner, was preaching economic doctrines which were then regarded as socialistic and dangerous to progress—or, at any rate, to getting rich quick—in the United States. This was early in the 'nineties when Socialism was more than suspect. A sort of academic court-martial sat upon the Professor. He was, however, brilliantly acquitted, the Regents of the University saying in their public statement :

In all lines of investigation . . . the investigation should be absolutely free to follow the paths of truth, wherever they may lead. Whatever may be the limitations which trammel inquiry elsewhere, we believe that the great State of Wisconsin should ever encourage that continual and fearless sifting and winnowing by which alone the truth can be found.

For the present it is enough to say of the Professor's theories that out of them grew a great movement of democratic thought and the life-work of his remarkable pupil.

The institution at which the hero of my story has now arrived needs a brief explanation to readers, many of whom may feel that the very term 'university' is a misnomer when applied to this new type of American State university. It is true that some of these institutions were formerly called Colleges of Agriculture and the Mechanic Arts, and that the modest liberal arts courses introduced were hardly sufficient to justify a more ambitious title. In the particular case of Wisconsin the fullest claim to be included in the fellowship of higher learning is amply made good. But I would justify a very wide use of the term on the ground that many of these institutions, whatever their technical shortcomings, fulfil one essential condition better than some of the old and famous universities. If the national value of education be tested by the intimacy of its relation with the life of the community it serves, the Wisconsin University need not fear comparison with—perhaps I had better say—Oxford or Cambridge.

During the three years at the Madison institution (with football again financing, if not invoking, the Muses) the career I am tracing increasingly illustrates the versatility and resourcefulness of the Irish abroad. Specialising in comparative law and jurisprudence, McCarthy managed to win a prize awarded

annually by the American Historical Society for the best essay on American history, and the University of Wisconsin conferred upon him the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. While he was at the University he was constantly at the Capitol, especially when the Legislature was in session. In all his study of political science he kept a critical eye upon the legislation and the administration in process beside him, and prepared himself for his future work of training the young men of the State for the higher duties of citizenship. But at this point I must say a few words about the people of Wisconsin, the State which has given most to and received most from this constructive thinker.

Wisconsin is a Middle Western State, lying north of Illinois. Of its history little need be said. Under French domination from 1634 to 1760, and then under British until 1783, it had the usual experience of military and religious attempts to bring the blessings of civilisation to the natives, commercial considerations dominating questions of strategy and, possibly, having no little bearing upon those of faith and morals. In 1846 the Territory was granted by the Federal Congress the rights of Statehood, and thus with the adoption of a constitution in 1848, that year of revolutionary ideas, begins the modern political history of Wisconsin. The still young State furnished no less than 91,000 troops to the Northern army in the Civil War, and the quality of the contingent was as remarkable as the quantity.

The population of the State is to-day, roughly, two and a half million, some three-fifths being foreign-born. Of these one-half are German, fifteen per cent. Scandinavian, and something less than five per cent. Irish. There is only one large city in the State—Milwaukee—containing, with its suburbs, a population of half a million, and famous for the manufacture of lager beer—an industry the localisation of which is plainly ethnical. The city has had a Socialist mayor. Even with Milwaukee included, the population of the State is sixty per cent. rural, and its staple industries, including the lumber business, are agricultural. For American farmers they farm well, especially in dairying and tobacco-growing. Agricultural co-operation, brought from Germany and Scandinavia, is being applied to local conditions, partly through the advice given by Irish rural economists in exchange for no less valuable suggestions we have received from McCarthy and his fellow-workers.

The constitution of Wisconsin is, in its main lines, of the usual North American pattern. But the distinctive feature of its government—and it is this peculiarity which gave to Dr. McCarthy the opportunity of his life—is its relationship with the State University, which is financed chiefly by the Legislature and is governed by a Board of Regents appointed by the Governor.

Nearly all the agricultural functions of government are discharged by the agricultural college attached to the University. It may be due to this fact that the agricultural policy of Wisconsin is world-famed. It was for this reason that, when I was chiefly responsible for setting to work our Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction, I had to go to Madison and see for myself what Ireland could learn from the most advanced thinkers upon rural economies in the Western Hemisphere.

Until recently Dr. McCarthy's active brain was too much occupied by the general politics of Wisconsin to concentrate his work, as he is doing now, upon its rural economy. In the wider field his part cannot be accurately defined without some reference to Wisconsin's foremost citizen, Senator Robert La Follette, at one time a prominent candidate in the 1912 Presidential election.

'Wisconsin,' wrote Dr. Frederic Howe (in his book, *Wisconsin, an Experiment in Democracy*), 'is a State-wide laboratory in which popular government is being tested in its reaction on people, on the distribution of wealth, on social well-being.' This judgment becomes the more remarkable when in the next sentence, speaking of his country as a whole, he writes: 'the American State is probably our most conspicuous political failure.' If writers who agree with Dr. Howe were asked to account for this national reproach, they would probably attribute it to the crippling restrictions of an outworn constitution and the Anglo-Saxon addiction to *laissez faire*. Be this as it may, Senator La Follette's early political career is the story of a triumphant victory, after many a fight which looked like a forlorn hope, over the forces of organised wealth.

Twenty years ago Wisconsin, emerging from its pioneer stage, was having the usual experience of the young States. The boss, using the forms to defeat the substance of democracy, was serving the interests of railway, lumber, and other business magnates. 'Politics,' says Dr. Howe, 'was a privileged trade into which ambitious men entered only when approved by the State machine. . . . The Press was indifferent or controlled. The great fortunes of the State had been made from timber taken from Government lands, from railroad and franchise corporation promotion, and from building contracts identified with these interests. Privilege was woven into every fibre of the State, as it was in most of the States of the Union.' La Follette set himself to substitute a system of 'direct primaries' for the delegates and conventions through which the boss managed to fool all the people most of the time, and most of the people all the time, so that appointments to office, supposed to be made by popular choice, were absolutely controlled by the caucus. Having thus

won his first battle against the machine, he gained a position of influence in the State which enabled him, more especially during his three terms as Governor, to initiate and secure the passing of the unique social and economic legislation for which Wisconsin is chiefly famous.

I have no space here for the astounding variety of radical laws through which the people of Wisconsin attained their own. The most typical measures are those controlling the relations between railroad companies on the one hand and their patrons and employees on the other. The laws regulating passenger and freight rates are as striking a departure from *laissez faire* as was the fixing of fair rents in Ireland. State control of all public services and of insurance companies, industrial legislation affecting woman and child labour, employers' liability and the safeguarding of workers in factories—all conceived with chief regard to the welfare of the masses of the population—have been passed through the biennial sessions of the Legislature with a bewildering rapidity. In constructive legislation the chief place must be given to the measures taken for 'aiding and developing agriculture,' to use the term describing a principal function of our own Development Commission. It may safely be said that the most numerous body of Wisconsin's workers are now well served by the State. But whether it be protective, regulative, restrictive or constructive, the most interesting thing about Wisconsin legislation is, I must repeat, the relationship between the Government and the University, the establishment of which is due, more than to any other cause, to the statesmanship of Senator La Follette. You may regard an experiment in government based upon knowledge as Utopian. It was not so regarded by Dr. McCarthy, to whose story I now return.

The democracy of Wisconsin insists that its University should provide direct expert advice to the Government and to the Legislature whenever it is needed. There are men serving the University and the State, sometimes remunerated by one, sometimes by the other, sometimes by both. Among these, Dr. McCarthy works for the University as lecturer on political science without compensation. He has a modest salary in a Governmental post to which reference will be made presently. As the result of this arrangement University professors serve on various Government commissions dealing with railroads, taxation, fisheries, forestry, hygiene and so forth. This part of the plan is, I think, largely German, but it has not made Wisconsin, or any other State which has followed its lead, a 'land of damned professors.' The academic big-wig does not sport a cocked hat and sword or enjoy a princely salary to support the dignity. The University has preserved its independence and the

faculty of psychology has not been set to work upon the political machine for the purpose of increasing the remuneration of the learned servants of the State. The damned professor of military bureaucracy becomes the academic statesman of democracy.

It is in this capacity that Dr. McCarthy has made his two principal contributions to the public life of Wisconsin. In neither case does he himself claim exclusive parentage, but the testimony of those who know leaves no doubt as to where the chief credit belongs. He was the chief builder of the University extension system which is now imitated in many other States. Its distinguishing feature is the democratic recognition that those to whom the University would have to go were as important as those whose circumstances enabled them to come to the University. Instead of getting tired professors to give up a part of their holiday to a few sporadic lectures, a sum of \$125,000 (25,000*l.*) is provided to enable the very best members of the faculties to pay regular visits to selected centres where help in such subjects as engineering, mathematics, drawing, business administration, and even languages, would improve the industrial outlook and brighten the lives of mostly rural communities. Further, these scattered peoples were brought into touch with the State centre of thought through an elaborate system of correspondence.

The next greatest achievement of Dr. McCarthy is much better known. His government employment was in the Free Library Commission in the Capitol. While he was at work there legislators and administrators were constantly coming to him for information to enable them to give effect to their ideas or to discharge their duties. This experience convinced him that a library which specialised in legislation and administration, actually attached to the centre of government, would meet a real and urgent need. Dr. McCarthy now occupies the position of Librarian to the Legislative Reference Library, which is generally regarded as the creation of his own brain.

I cannot possibly do justice here to this institution. Sir Courtenay Ilbert, whose authority will not be questioned, has given to it and its founder a due meed of praise in an article on 'The Wisconsin Idea' in the *Contemporary Review* for February 1914, from which I take the following sentences :

The object of Dr. McCarthy's legislative reference department is to supply the needs of the amateur legislator in the least possible time. A farmer legislator finds his way from the adjoining legislative chamber into the rooms of the department. He explains that he is not satisfied with the state of the law about, say, the adulteration of seeds, and that he would like to improve it. He says that he has consulted his attorney about drafting a Bill, but doubts whether he can get much help from him. Besides, the fee charged is prohibitive. An obliging attendant

goes to the proper set of pigeon-holes, looks under the proper head—under 'A' for adulteration or agriculture, or under 'S' for seeds—and produces a card giving a list of books and pamphlets on the subject. She goes further—for it will presumably be a 'she'—and brings a book in which are neatly pasted a number of newspaper-cuttings bearing on the same subject, and purporting to represent technical or popular opinion about it. . . . Well, the farmer ruminates, and, either then or on a later day, makes up his mind about the lines on which he would like to have a Bill prepared. He is asked to give his instructions in writing and to sign them. He does so, and in due course . . . he receives a Bill with title, numbered clauses, and the usual legislative appurtenances. . . . I was shown some files containing the original instructions, the intermediate stages, and the ultimate draft. The instructions were usually crude and general; but, as far as I could judge, the ultimate draft fairly represented their effect.

Sir Courtenay points out that these 'facilities for drafting' were regarded in the Eastern States as being not an unmixed advantage as they tend to 'make legislation too easy and, therefore, too prolific.' He notes that 'fifty laws relating to the betterment of the Wisconsin schools were passed in the session of 1911,' and he adds 'fifty laws, mark you, not fifty bills. Think of that, Mr. Pease.' I should say Sir Courtenay would be much more shocked at the fruits of such a legislative wisdom-while-you-wait than the British Minister of Education. But he knows that in the conditions of a young and heterogeneous community, abundantly endowed with easily won natural resources, the development of which continuously augments its taxable capacity, experiments may be ventured, and that, in such circumstances, anything is better than stagnation. An institution in which can be studied the doings and strivings, the successes and the failures, the wisdom and folly of legislators and administrators throughout the world, is a great contribution to the education and ultimate steadying of feverish democracy.¹ Some of us social and economic workers for Ireland have not failed to bestow upon this creation of McCarthy's brain the sincerest flattery. We have set up in Dublin a Co-operative Reference Library where the farmers of Ireland—and for that matter of Wisconsin as well—can learn the potentialities of organised self-help just as the resources of governmental activity may be studied in the institution I have described.

Passing from these two definite achievements which I have selected from the record of this remarkable Irish-American, and which I think are sufficient evidence of his constructive genius, I must now take a more general view of his work and aims. This necessitates some personal details, if only to explain the

¹ Since Sir Courtenay Ilbert's article was written Wisconsin politics have entered upon a sharp reaction under an ultra-Conservative Governor, which will probably be short-lived.

point of view from which I commend his work and aims to the thoughtful consideration of his race at home. For five-and-thirty years I have been in constant touch with American life and a close and sympathetic observer of my countrymen's share in it. To me the Irish question in its material aspects is mainly the problem of rural civilisation in these days of urban predominance. The prosperity of the United States likewise, in large measure, depends, it seems to me, upon the ability of the agricultural part of the population, who conduct the most important industry of the country, to obtain their due share in the general progress. The present administration is devoting an immense amount of thought, I happen to know, to the rural problem. Mr. Secretary Houston and the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Vrooman, in the Federal Department of Agriculture, are an ideal combination for the framing and execution of a sound agricultural policy. Mr. Roosevelt was the first President in my time genuinely interested in agricultural affairs. In his second term he launched the movement for the conservation of the natural resources of the United States which were being recklessly squandered by capitalistic enterprise. To the thought which he provoked it soon became clear that the fertility of the soil was the most important thing to conserve, and this required an all-round reconsideration of rural conditions. So Mr. Roosevelt formulated a country life policy, much of which he generously acknowledged he owed to Irish thought.

Dr. McCarthy and I had the honour of being consulted at various times by the President and some of his Ministers in regard to these twin Roosevelt policies of Conservation and Country Life. But we did not meet until some years afterwards, as he was not at Madison at the time of my earlier visits. He never missed a chance of travelling for information, Germany attracting him most, though Japan (whither he conducted a baseball team) was included in his investigations. He had toured Ireland, and knew more about my work than I knew about his. But he did not come to see me, preferring to travel round the country and form his own impressions. So he was only known to me as an Irishman, in peculiarly un-Irish surroundings, who was doing important work and exercising a potent influence, though nobody seemed to know how or why, upon public affairs. I never met a man with whose aims I seemed to have so much in common, and mighty glad I am that we were not destined to be as ships that pass in the night.

Two years ago Dr. McCarthy cleared up the mystery of his influence by writing a book upon *The Wisconsin Idea*. He dashed it off in a few days, and so provided ample material for the baser sort of literary criticism. In this book he conceals,

or rather distributes among others, the credit of his own work, but he, all unconsciously, reveals his own heart and mind. I must say a few words upon the political ideas of a man whose counsel and advice are eagerly sought by the promoters of the most diverse political movements and by Federal and State legislators throughout the Union.

McCarthy had always impressed upon me, and he brings it out very clearly in his book, that the Wisconsin Idea is essentially German, but being made in America it is virtually German efficiency under democracy. It concedes to the State undisputed and comprehensive paternalism. Militarism is, of course, excluded—the will of the people, informed and guided by their institutions of higher learning, is to give the State all the power it needs. He emphatically maintains that ‘the new individualism,’ as he calls it, is the antithesis of Socialism. He scouts the idea that private property can ever be abolished in the United States. But he insists upon such a control by the State as will prevent economic monopolies, with their inevitable creation of every kind of privilege. His aim, as Sir Courtenay Ilbert notes, is ‘co-operation between the individual and the State in the common interests of both.’ The individual must have his efficiency developed, his opportunities safeguarded. There must, writes Dr. McCarthy, be a ‘jealous guarding of the governmental machinery from the invasion of the corrupting forces and might of concentrated wealth, and consequently the shackling of monopoly and the regulating of contract conditions by special administrative agencies of the people.’

Dr. McCarthy’s political work has not been confined to his own State. He was deeply interested in some aspects of the Progressive Party’s policy at the last election, and had a good deal to do with the planning of its platform. He has served on Federal Commissions and has been consulted by more than one President. His name and his work are known by economists, sociologists, and political thinkers in every State in the Union. I once asked him why he did not try to get into some official post which would enable him to get larger action taken upon his ideas. In a reply dealing with his whole attitude towards public life, he wrote :

I think there ought to be one man who will stand through the whole thing without running for office and without asking for honours or emoluments ; content to plan and build and turn it over to others ; content to feel his own reward in his own conscience and not in the applause of the people. I have been steadily plugging along on that philosophy.

I have already intimated that Dr. McCarthy is beginning to concentrate his energies upon agricultural development, which is the chief practical question in Wisconsin as it is in Ireland.

It is natural that with so many Germans and Scandinavians in the State he should be a thorough-going co-operator, and I have had the privilege of assisting him to draft the Co-operative Law (which partly answers to our Industrial and Provident Societies and Friendly Societies Acts) for his State. The Irish idea of rural reconstruction is just now making more headway in the United States than in Ireland, and recently a few public-spirited Americans from several States have formed an American Agricultural Organisation Society on the Irish model. I learned with great satisfaction that they are determined to secure, if they can, Dr. McCarthy's services as its director.

I have said nothing of Dr. McCarthy's private life because I do not know it well enough, and really interesting people do not supply the necessary details to that incubator of reputations, *Who's Who*. He is happily married to a German wife who, I am told, is in hearty accord with the new Germanism which he prescribes for Wisconsin. His soul may be vexed just now, as was that of a late very dear and distinguished literary friend of mine, who had a Dutch wife, at the time of the Boer War. He is naturally reserved in expressing his sympathies, which I think must be with the Allies. But in speaking of the relative merits of the combatants in a military sense he made an interesting comment. As a football coach, he said, he had the highest admiration for the German discipline. He added, however, that, though their organisation was perfect, it might be found that individual initiative had been drilled out of them. In the course of the War he thought it would be shown how much easier it is to graft discipline upon initiative than initiative upon discipline.

Not satisfied to rely entirely upon my own estimate of a man who happens to agree with me in so many of my views, I wrote to ask Lord Bryce, whose judgment upon men and things in the American Commonwealth no man will gainsay, what he thought about my friend. Here is what he says :

Mr. McCarthy's career is a striking instance of the services rendered by the free popular State Universities of America. Through the University of Wisconsin, where he graduated, he became known to the leading men of that great and eminently progressive State, won their respect and confidence, and was able to accomplish a great deal in improving the methods of legislation and creating a sort of legislative bureau for the collection and utilisation of information upon all sorts of economic, educational, and political topics. He is a man of great force, large ideas, and unwearied energy, a credit not only to his State but to the Irish race from which he springs, and which has given to the United States so many capable and public-spirited leaders in many walks of life.

I stated at the outset that the subject of my article was intended to provoke a discussion upon a question people were

asking about us and which it were well we asked about ourselves. Never have I felt the need of such an inquiry more strongly than I do at the present crisis. The achievement of Irishmen abroad is now of small importance compared with their conduct at home, and the numerically powerful body of Irish opinion, which assumes this to be simply a question of political institutions, may find some food for thought in the story of Charles McCarthy. His success is obviously not due to the institutions under which he was born, for these were radically inimical to his whole scheme of reform. But he found in Wisconsin a public opinion ready to respond to the charity, courage, directness and independence which inspired his political activities. With this moral equipment he rose above all traditions and prejudices, scorned all considerations of personal interest, and went straight for the end of righteousness, which, after a wide survey, he found to be attainable in the State of Wisconsin. Some, who are longing to serve Ireland as he served Wisconsin, will ask themselves what chance would McCarthy have had of any similar achievement, if he had been born in Ireland instead of in Massachusetts?

I suppose, among the hills from which his parents came, he would have dreamed dreams and would have had to struggle against the obsession of that awful past which our people seem to think must be undone before we may be permitted to face the present and build the future. And where, then, would he have stood in the world War? Of this I am sure: wild horses could not drag him into civil strife or away from a war in which his country was involved. I like to think that he would have found himself with a small band of men who are working in and for Ireland—men to the spirit of whose ambitions another practical idealist, born and still working in Ireland, has given expression in lines with which this article may fittingly conclude:

We would no Irish sign efface,
But yet our lips would gladlier hail
The firstborn of the Coming Race
Than the last splendour of the Gael.
No blazoned banner we unfold—
One charge alone we give to youth,
Against the sceptred myth to hold
The golden heresy of truth.²

HORACE PLUNKETT.

² *Collected Poems of A. E.* (Macmillan).

THE EVOLUTION OF IMPERIALISM IN GERMAN LITERATURE

THE natural disposition, when the War broke out, of every admirer of Germany was to make a distinction between the mass of the people and a small minority who had, by some vague art, pledged the nation to its great and ghastly adventure. Ten months of discussion and of painful experience have compelled us to abandon this kindly theory. The vast majority of the German people were ready to assent to war whenever it was declared, and, when the summons rang out, they marched to the field, or cheered those who marched, with riotous rejoicing. The legend of the dragging of a reluctant people into the field by a self-interested or mysteriously malignant group of schemers is as remote from the facts of German experience as it is from the facts of English or French or Austrian experience. In the case of Germany that legend is peculiarly foolish. The nation at large did not merely support the action of its Government: it has since supported every grave departure from the civilised standard of warfare, and has abandoned itself to a deliberate cultivation of hatred to which modern history offers no parallel. One of its most authoritative organs, the *Kölnische Zeitung*, has recently (February 10) published an article in which the foul deeds of its army in Belgium are admitted without a blush, and the doctrine of 'frightfulness' is calmly pleaded to cover them.

For the observer who does not suffer himself to be confused by the emotions which these things naturally engender they provide an interesting problem. We have known the German people for several generations, and cruelty is one of the last vices we should have ascribed to them. We have known them as a good-natured, genial, home-loving people: painfully conscious of their new power and prosperity, but priding themselves on their *Gemüthlichkeit*, and exceptionally endowed with such discipline as a rigorous system of education may impart. How have this German people of a few months ago become the ruthless, hate-breathing, strident people of to-day? No doubt the pangs of hunger, the bitterness of thwarted hope, the penumbra of a great national tragedy, explain and extenuate some of the half-hysteric features of which we now read, but the disorder is not

so recent. It has been patent enough from the commencement of the War. For those of us who know Germany, and know that there is no peculiar malignity in the German character, yet are conscious that the whole nation—its professors, its priests, and its peasants—are united in this mood, it affords a psychological problem of some interest.

The average Englishman will reply that certain sinister guides of public opinion named Treitschke, Nietzsche, and Bernhardt have been perverting the better nature of their country, but the student of history cannot easily imagine either the abrupt appearance of such men in a peaceful nation or the extraordinary power which this theory would ascribe to them. An immoralist may have an easier task than a moralist—*facilis descensus*, of course—but so remarkable a triumph would be without precedent. In point of fact, Treitschke and Bernhardt—Nietzsche is but a tributary stream—are merely two names out of a hundred which the accidents of international intercourse have chanced to make known in England. An informed writer like Professor Cramb or Mr. J. Ellis Barker may add half a dozen other names of men who have helped to infuse the spirit of aggressive Imperialism into Germany, yet these also are only a few disparate units in a long and consistent procession. For more than a century the Imperialist tradition, which now approaches its tragic culmination, has proceeded and expanded in the literature of Germany. It has altered its scope with the changing fortune of German history and the continual readjustment of the country's economic and geographical conditions. But those very changes have been of a nature to enlarge its claim and deepen its appeal in each generation, and this hard and extraordinary mood which to-day betrays eminent German *savants* into the use of incredible language is the inevitable outcome of its development. If we would understand as well as condemn, if we would confront the approaching settlement in a judicious and informed temper, and not either waste our energy in a misguided humanitarianism or sow an avoidable crop of troubles for the next generation, we ought to understand how this mood or creed of the German people was developed.

In tracing historical developments there is no real beginning, but I will be content to follow this tradition from the time when it assumes some importance in the first half of the nineteenth century. Its roots, of course, run deep into the life of the eighteenth century. Although Goethe and Schiller and most of the great writers of the *Sturm und Drang* period were cosmopolitans, they had on the artistic side an intense Germanism which is one root of the later growth. Arndt, also, and Fichte said many things in the fever of the liberation-days which later

Pan-Germans have ardently appropriated. And there was the older military tradition of the Prussian monarchy, which Scharnhorst and Blücher and Gneisenau carefully nursed. But the development takes a new form in the first half of the nineteenth century, and it will suffice to begin with this. In the culture of the new Germany after Waterloo history was one of the most conspicuous and successful elements, and it was the great German historians of that time who prepared the way for Heinrich von Treitschke and his colleagues and successors.

As early as 1810 the King of Prussia had established a university at Berlin and attracted to it some of the most distinguished scholars of Germany. Niebuhr occupied the chair of Roman history. Nine years later the most enlightened statesman of the time, Baron von Stein, who sought to raise Prussia to the position of the most enlightened State in Europe, founded an association of historians, and by its means Niebuhr and Savigny of Berlin were brought into living touch with Dahmann of Kiel, Schlosser of Heidelberg, Pertz of Hanover, and other writers and professors. In a group of men belonging to such diverse schools--Liberal and Conservative, Romanticist and Naturalist--no common political creed could be enforced, but Stein's fundamental plan was realised. The historians of Germany generally agreed to regard history as a science with a direct and valuable bearing upon actual life : almost as a branch of sociology. Many of them went further and supported Stein's conception of Prussia as the nucleus round which the nebular material of the petty German States must eventually gather.

In this early phase, which is clearest in the stirring days of the thirties and forties, the fathers of German history, Niebuhr, Mommsen, and Leopold von Ranke, played an important part. Mommsen's contribution to the growing Imperialist tradition was, on the whole, indirect. As a Liberal, he detested the Prussian institutions and the Junkers who guarded them, though he idealised the ancient Germans and the Prussia of Frederic the Great, and, like nearly all the German historians, taught disdain of France. The chief feature of his influence is, however, that he deduced universal laws from the history of Rome. A nation conscious of power and of a destiny must austere-ly fulfil its mission : it must expand, by means of arms, at the cost of its neighbours--in later language, impose its *Kultur* on them. Niebuhr, the other great master of Roman history, taught the same lesson : the expansion of Rome, with all the self-sacrifice it involved, was a grand model for all time. Mommsen had come from Schleswig, Niebuhr from Copenhagen ; and their grave Northern character accorded both with the heroic rise of Rome and the ambition of Prussia. Niebuhr had looked with

disdain on the modern Italians during his stay at Rome from 1816 to 1823, and the renewal of revolution in France in 1830 had moved him to put the French with the Italians in the category of decadent nations. In comparison with them Prussia seemed to him to have the freshness and austerity of the early Roman Republic, and he drew the moral more boldly than Mommsen. Prussia must extend its power and take into its kingdom Schleswig, Holstein, Hanover, and Saxony. It is not without reason that on the monument at Cologne the figure of Niebuhr is associated with those of Gneisenau, Arndt, and Humboldt.

The third historian of international repute, Leopold von Ranke, went even further. In 1825 he became professor of modern history at Berlin, and his cosmopolitan interests, more genial nature—he was from the south (Thuringia)—and Liberal sentiments long estranged him from the political life of Prussia. In 1841 he became the historiographer of the kingdom and fell under the influence of Frederic William the Fourth. The revolution of 1848 completed his separation from democratic ideas, and he became an ardent supporter of the Prussian tradition and an active politician. He wrote a voluminous *History of Germany*, and insisted that Prussia should extend its rule, by force if necessary, over the surrounding States and cities, until all the scattered fragments were gathered under the co-equal powers of Prussia and Austria. He demanded the annexation of Hesse and Hanover, and is said to have startled even Bismarck one day by urging the annexation of Switzerland, so that that nest of Radicalism might no longer disturb the peace of Europe. It is not immaterial to add that he pleaded that the security of German culture required and justified this expansion of Prussia.

But besides these three more famous historians, many others whose names stand very high in the calendar of German letters and who had a profound influence in their time, enforced and expanded the Imperialist tradition long before Professor von Treitschke attained fame. Chief amongst these were Giesebrecht, Wolfgang Menzel, J. G. Droysen, Ludwig Häusser, G. H. Pertz, F. C. Dahlmann, Paul Bötticher (Paul de Lagarde), and Heinrich von Sybel: it is almost the complete list of Germany's leading historical writers and professors down to 1870. Many were Liberals, and regarded the political institutions of Prussia with distrust; though most of them abandoned their Liberalism, as Treitschke later did, when they saw the development of democratic ideas. Scarcely any of them were Prussians, and some of them gave no conscious adhesion to the expanding Prussian tradition. Yet they all contributed to it, most of them deliberately and ardently, and through their university lectures all over Germany, and their endless volumes on German history,

it became an integral part of historical culture long before Treitschke reached Berlin University. Prussia was to be the Wessex of Germany : Prussia was to be what the Isle de France had been in old France. The educated section of the men who fought Austria in 1866 and France in 1870 were thoroughly familiar with that programme ; and at every fresh annexation there were learned historians and philologists to prove that the annexed province really belonged to the German family, and was but returning to its natural parent.

Most of these historians are little known outside Germany, but their influence in Germany was very deep and very extensive. Ludwig Giesebrecht, professor at Stettin, not only recalled the glories of the old Empire in a vivid and lengthy history, but he put his fiery enthusiasm for war and for the Hohenzollerns into poems which circulated freely among the people, and after 1860 he issued a periodical (*Damaris*) for the dissemination of his creed. Menzel also, a Silesian, was both poet and historian, as well as journalist and politician. His historical writings alone gave him a commanding position, and his *Gesänge der Völker* reached the mass of the people. From a moderate Liberal he became, after 1848, a violent Absolutist and supporter of Prussia. His glowing scorn of France brought him the title of 'the Frenchman-eater,' and, like von Ranke, he urged that the strong monarchy of Prussia was the only security of culture. In the feverish days of 1870 he wrote one work to prove that Alsace and Lorraine were German, and another to prove, in view of the approaching design of founding an Empire, that Prussia was 'the nucleus in which the heart beats for all Germany.' Pertz, the Royal Librarian at Berlin, had had to fly from his native Hanover, and his six-volume life of Stein and five-volume life of Gneisenau added to the growing tradition. Dahlmann, professor at Kiel and tutor of Treitschke, one of the most respected members of the academic world, had been banished from Göttingen for his Imperialism. Germany must unite, and the old Imperial dignity must be conferred on the King of Prussia ; and it was from Dahlmann that Treitschke borrowed the fatal or ludicrous idea that this united Germany had a world-mission divinely imposed on it.

The other mid-century historians I have mentioned were not less influential, and were even more strongly Imperialistic. Johann Gustav Droysen, one of the most distinguished professors of the time, is actually quoted by grave German writers as an illustration, in his own development, how 'the nation of poets and thinkers' (a rather foolish description of Germany in Goethe's time) came to build up a great State. His absorption in classical studies during the forties was disturbed by the revolu-

tionary storms of and after 1848, and he turned to modern history and politics. In 1833 he had already, in his *Alexander*, plainly alluded to the parallel between Macedonia and Prussia: Alexander was a great statesman who, in spite of demagogues like Demosthenes, had welded the Greek fragments into an Empire. In later volumes, on the successors of Alexander, Droysen boldly pursued the analogy. The Macedonian expansion had led to the formation of a new Hellenistic world in which the birth of Christianity was made possible. In some of their wilder literature the Pan-Germans of our time are but putting in plainer and more popular language the conclusion adumbrated by the learned Droysen in the forties, and more clearly stated in his twelve-volume *History of Prussian Politics* two decades later. His incisive phrases and fiery paragraphs were quoted everywhere. 'Prussia is Germany in embryo: she must become Germany.' 'To the Hohenzollerns belongs the place that has been vacant since the Hohenstaufens.' 'It is the historical mission of Prussia to become the German Power,' and 'It is not liberty, but Power, that will secure happiness for Germany.' It is almost Treitschke before Treitschke; and Droysen's influence was not less than that of the later Berlin professor.

Equal in authority and similar in message was Ludwig Häusser, an Alsatian who taught at Heidelberg. Like Droysen, and in the general spirit of the Prussian school of history—though not one professor in ten was a Prussian—he insisted that history is worth cultivating only in so far as it bears on the problems of actual life. He took an active part in politics and flayed the Danes who would keep Schleswig and Holstein from Prussia. Extraordinary crowds of students filled his lecture-room, and his four-volume *History of Germany after Frederic the Great* at once ran through several editions, in the early sixties. Even in the academic world his lectures and writings were inspired by a white-hot patriotism, but, like so many professors of the time, he did not confine himself to academic audiences, and lively pamphlets alternated with his learned and ponderous tomes. His chief thesis was, as he put it in a thrilling speech to a vast audience at Berlin in 1850, that 'Prussia is the nucleus on which the crystal of the German State must grow,' and that this united and progressive Germany had a high mission to discharge in the world.

Häusser and Droysen had, in the fifties and sixties, an influence at least as great as that of Treitschke in the seventies and eighties, and with them we must associate, on equal terms, Professor Heinrich von Sybel, who is better known in England. Sybel was a Rhinelander, another Liberal who abandoned his

early political faith in the stress of the democratic struggle and became a warm supporter of Prussia's absolutist ambition. His *History of the Revolution*, in five volumes, added materially to the increasing disdain of France in Germany, and his seven-volume *Founding of the German Empire*, written in the last phase of his political development (1889-1894), coincided with and intensified the new Imperialism of Germany under William the Second. A learned and critical historian, he was not content with the great influence he enjoyed as the successor of Dahlmann at Bonn. He took an active part in politics, founded his famous *Historische Zeitschrift* for the purpose of conveying the message of the Prussian school to the general educated public, and issued numbers of fiery pamphlets. For nearly twenty years he had urged the Hohenzollerns to snatch the leadership of Europe from the 'decadent and immoral' French and the sluggish Austrians. He hailed with enthusiasm the war of 1870, and his continued activity—he lived until 1895—gave great encouragement to the vaster Imperialism propagated by Treitschke.

To these distinguished historians—all the leading historians of Germany between 1820 and 1870—we must add scholars and writers of equal authority in other departments. W. A. Schmidt, professor of history at Jena, had not, perhaps, the great influence of those I have enumerated, but he supported them in the attack on France and in the apotheosis of Prussia. He was one of the many who set out in 1864 to prove that Schleswig and Holstein, and in 1870 that Alsace and Lorraine, really belonged to Germany. In the latter case, at least, it is well known that Bismarck had grave misgivings, and his hand was forced by the army and the public, who had been 'educated' by the German professors of history and political science. The famous German philologists of the period contributed their share—and it was not inconsiderable—to the foundations of the Imperialist creed. Grimm and Boeckh were not insensible of the political aspect of their discovery that half of northern Europe was 'German,' and the son of the latter, Richard Boeckh, urged in 1869 that Prussia should annex Alsace and Lorraine and declare a protectorate over the Poles. In the same year an early type of Pan-German atlas, including Austria, Holland, and Belgium in the 'real Germany,' circulated amongst the people.

Paul de Lagarde (originally Bötticher), almost the only Prussian in this extraordinary group, and one of the most distinguished Orientalists of the time, almost surpassed Häusser and Droysen. He brooded over the cramped position of Germany and the dismembered fragments of the old Empire until he broke into rhapsodies about the glories of war and the need of armed expansion. As early as 1853 he urged the annexation

of Alsace and Lorraine and the general enlargement of Prussia's frontiers; and in 1871 he complained bitterly that Germany had not taken enough from France—while even Bismarck feared that he had taken too much. Yet Lagarde was not merely an able and inspiring poet: he was one of the greatest scholars and most fertile writers of his time.

All these men were, it must be remembered, scholars of the highest academic distinction. In Germany such distinction does not mean, and most assuredly did not mean in the fifties and sixties, that the writer is isolated from the general public. The teaching of these men, on its political side, reached a large popular audience, and one need not linger over the crowd of middlemen and interpreters who conveyed it, in more pointed terms, to a still larger public. Two will suffice. Emmanuel Geibel, the chief lyric poet of Germany at the time, repeated their message with all the fire and exaggeration of a popular bard. The old German blood boiled in his veins: out with the sword, out into the world, restore the ancient German-Roman Empire, was his cry from 1836 until 1884. His poetry is generally tender and sweet, but the Imperialist and sanguinary mood comes over him repeatedly. Treitschke, in one of his most advanced addresses, quotes with complacency a famous couplet of Geibel: 'One day, mayhap, the whole world will recover its health in the German character.' It is the whole pretentious programme of Pan-Germanism: and it is a fair deduction from the teaching of the great historians. Geibel's poems had reached a hundredth edition in the year of his death. At the same time Gustav Freytag, Germany's greatest novelist, lent his powerful assistance to the Liberal side of the movement. A Liberalised Prussia was to unite Germany and lead the world; and the last drop of German blood must, if it be necessary, flow in so exalted a cause.

This earlier and little appreciated phase of German Imperialism is the essential foundation of later Pan-Germanism. One has only to sum up the chief sentiments of this imposing group of scholars and poets to see that they, before the year 1870, set Germany on the path which has led her to the abyss. Some nations have a sacred mission to expand and impose their civilisation, and Prussia is one of those nations: most of the older nations of Europe are decadent and are obstacles to progress: racial unity justifies political unification, and most of the small peoples of northern Europe, from the Baltic to the Bernese Alps, are of the German race: expansion by war is a law of history and of life: the expansion of Prussia since the reign of Frederic the Great is a glorious and beneficent procedure, and the seizure of Schleswig, Holstein, Alsace, and Lorraine

was highly proper and moral. This is more than the foundation—it is, perhaps, more than half the structure—of Pan-Germanism; yet Treitschke had not yet appeared. Bismarck, however, had appeared, and he fully appreciated this condition into which the peculiar political evolution of Germany during that half century had thrown the academic world. By 1870 the nation eagerly awaited the call to arms, and, when the call rang out, flew with joy to settle its long account with 'decadent' France and fulfil the destiny of Germany.

After 1871 Bismarck declared that Germany was 'sated': it had ample territory for its 40,000,000 people, and it dreamed of no further expansion either in Europe or beyond the seas. To many, in fact, it must have really seemed that the demand of the long line of illustrious Imperialists had been fulfilled. But this was an illusion to be entertained only in the few years of repose after the exertions of a great campaign. I regret that it is impossible here to relate all the political circumstances which, rather than any peculiarity of character, explain this fatal development, but they must be noticed very briefly. Germany's frontiers, which had fired Paul de Lagarde, remained profoundly unsatisfactory. Germany's population increased at a prodigious rate and very plausibly justified a new land-hunger. Germany's industries developed phenomenally and sought markets beyond the seas. France, on the other hand, recovered in five years and spoke of 'revenge': England was capricious, and Russia sullen. But these circumstances of the later period are well known, and it is not surprising that they led to a development and expansion of the earlier Imperialism. This later development in German letters is, however, very meagrely known to English readers, and a sketch, at least, of its real proportions will be useful.

Heinrich von Treitschke was assuredly the leading figure of the new school, but it is more informing to conceive him as the connecting link between the new and the old Imperialism. He had studied under Dahlmann, and had been teaching for fifteen years when he accepted the call to Berlin in 1874. The fundamental advance made by Treitschke was to abandon 'history' for 'political science.' This was merely the culmination of the earlier policy of treating history as a guide to actual problems. Treitschke remained an historian, and most of his ideas are taken from the older historians: the glorification of war and of Prussian absolutism, the historical law of expansion, the sacred mission and lofty superiority of Germany, the disdain of England and France, the covetous attention to Holland and Belgium, the sacrifice of Liberalism to the hard requirements of Prussia. He merely developed these ideas and organised them in a system

of statecraft. If he seems to be more or less original in his doctrine of 'the State as Power,' his naked Machiavellism, and his heavy blows at humanitarianism, we must remember that the philosophy of Schopenhauer had now become popular, that Bismarckism needed some defence, and that humanitarianism was a new force in Germany.

It is usual, and quite erroneous, to skip from Treitschke to General von Bernhardi : a practice which gives some encouragement to the amiable apologists for Germany, whose knowledge of that country is generally confined to the reading of a few recent booklets. The German historical and political professors generally maintained the tradition of their chairs, though the actual completion of the Empire in 1871 and the long period of ease moderated their tone. The prevailing note, however, was that the new Germany must maintain and *expand* the Empire it inherited. Professor W. Maurenbrecher, for instance, taught history at Bonn under the inspiration of the maxim that 'the interests of the Fatherland must outweigh all other interests and points of view,' and he closes his learned (and popular) *Foundation of the German Empire* with the words 'It is the task of our successors to maintain and *to expand*, to protect and *to complete*, what the Emperor William and Prince Bismarck founded in those nine great years.' Maurenbrecher included William the Second amongst his pupils, and was not likely to temper the martial zeal and narrow patriotism of that aspiring prince. Professor Hans Delbrück of Berlin, later editor of the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, assisted in the glorification of war and of Germany. 'Blessed be the hand that falsified the Ems telegram,' he said of Bismarck's famous (or infamous) tampering with the King's message on the brink of war; and as early as 1878 we find him writing (*Preussische Jahrbücher*, Bd. 42) that they regard England as 'in the condition of Holland which, without waging a war, sank in a single generation from the position of a Great Power to that of a State.' Felix and Ernst Dahn, Alfred Dove, E. A. Menzel, Baron Detleb von Liliencron, Fritz Bley, Ludwig Wilser, Karl Bötticher, and other writers and professors, sustained and expanded the tradition; and we must remember that Sybel, Droysen, Lagarde, and other of the earlier and great Imperialists were still active.

On the whole, however, the period 1870-1890 showed some relenting of the earlier tradition. The contentment of Bismarck and the old Emperor, the organisation and domestic troubles of the Empire, the general consciousness that the earlier Imperialist dream had been realised in 1871, explain this for the most part. Germany was, moreover, not impervious to the humanitarianism which was growing in other countries, and this period of com-

parative repose gave it an opportunity, as the fierce lunges of the aged Treitschke show. On the other hand, 'Young Germany' was listening to Nietzsche, and the first effect of his teaching was to set them in rebellion against the pseudo-morality of Treitschke and the despotism of the 'enlarged Prussia.' This rebellion was, however, not incurable. Nietzsche's scorn of modern humanitarianism and of ethical tradition, and his insistence on will and struggle, afforded a ground for reconciliation when the occasion should arise.

The many circumstances which occasioned the final and tragic development of Imperialism cannot be recounted here. Suffice it to recall that an enormous increase of population and of industrial production coincided with the accession of a romantic Emperor, and the older idea of the sacred mission of Germany was easily revived. But I must be content to trace here the literary development and leave it to the reader to bear in mind the historical and economic development which conditioned it.

Toward the close of 1890 the Emperor summoned forty-five leading educational authorities to Berlin for the purpose of discussing the reform of education. In a remarkable speech—which is admirably reproduced in Klaussmann's collection of his speeches—the Emperor bluntly informed the educationists that their task was 'to adapt our growing youth to the present needs and the world-position of our country,' and he proceeded to sketch this adaptation or subordination of education to Imperialist purposes. In brief, not 'Thermopylae and Cannae,' but 'Sedan and Gravelotte,' were to be impressed on German pupils. He ruthlessly derided their Greek and Latin culture, demanded that the German language and patriotic German history were to be the great work of the schools, and bade them sacrifice some of the hours of mental culture to the drill-sergeant and the officers from the nearest barracks. Even Imperialist scholars like Delbrück protested against this prostitution of education, but William the Second had not invited their opinions. It was announced that the Conference recommended these 'reforms' of education, and a 'Cabinet-Order' imposed them a few months later. Patriotic histories of Germany, in the Prussian sense, now poured from the Press, and Imperialism revived. In the same year England kindly ceded Heligoland: in 1895 the Kiel Canal was opened: in 1898 fleet-building began in earnest. Navy Leagues, Pan-German Leagues, Colonial Leagues, School Leagues, German Language Leagues, radiated from Berlin to every village, and by the beginning of the twentieth century both pupils and adults were subjected to a drenching flood of Imperialist literature. Of this mass of books and pamphlets I can refer only to a few.

In 1900, when a measure for the enlargement of the fleet was before the Reichstag, a 'Free Union for Lectures on the Fleet' appeared at Berlin and in other towns. Ten of these lectures were published, in two impressive volumes and several editions, by Professors of Berlin University, and may be commended to the reader who thinks that nothing happened in Germany between Treitschke and Bernhardi, or that a stray, irresponsible fire-eater is all that we discover in German literature. The first lecturer was the distinguished Berlin professor, Gustav Schmoller, who demands colonies in Brazil and Bolivia, and urges his countrymen to build a mighty fleet in order to win 'a position in proportion to Germany's might and dignity' and to enter upon 'a national policy of the grand style.' Then the equally distinguished Professor Karl Lamprecht arouses his readers to a proper sense of the need of Germany to take its share in the 'redistribution of the globe,' and predicts that a higher culture will follow upon a 'greater Germany.' Professor Richard Ehrenberg pleads that Germany is destined to lead the nations of the earth in winning from certain other nations—plainly England—the freedom of the sea. Dr. E. Francke calls for the familiar 'world-policy' and 'place in the sun,' and demands that Germany shall no longer breed millions of children to go forth and make the fortune of other nations. Professor P. Voigt (of Berlin University) echoes the need of 'a place in the sun,' and asks them to drop their 'political quietism'; the twentieth century is to witness a mighty struggle, and Germany must be in it or sink to secondary rank. Professor Sering (also of Berlin) holds out the same prospect of a coming 'age of world-empire,' and appeals to every class in Germany to unite and press their interests. Professor Adolph Wagner (Berlin) concludes that Germans 'must maintain, secure, and *further develop* what they won in the nineteenth century.' Professor E. von Halle (Berlin) and Professor H. Schumacher (Kiel) contribute to the same gospel.

This remarkable publication gives a good idea of the kind of work that was being done all over the country by men of academic distinction and responsibility. In the same year Professor Erich Marcks (Munich) warns us in a pamphlet (*Deutschland und England*) that Germany 'must and will expand'; it is 'an absolute need of her existence.' Professor E. Heyck and others were writing for the Pan-German League. Professor Delbrück was telling Germany of the infamies committed by the English in South Africa: putting women and children before their advancing troops, for instance. The South African War, in fact, produced an extraordinary output of books to feed the popular anger against England. Fritz Bley, a very popular

novelist and political writer, wrote a dithyrambic, half-hysterical work, *Die Buren im Dienste der Menschheit*, in which he 'hails the Boers as the deliverers of the world from the yoke of England'; records to our eternal infamy the rapes, mutilations, thefts, etc., committed by the English troops, who, it seems, recognised no law of man or God; contrasts the lofty virtues of the Boers with the utter corruption of England; replies to those who would have Germany lay down its arms, 'No, by the God of German history, arms up'; and concludes that 'Germany is the morning star that rises over England's fading glory.' Some of Bley's fierce booklets ran through many editions, and his influence must not be underestimated. About the same time a Dr. Karl Eisenhart thrilled his readers with a wildly ludicrous forecast of a war in which Germany destroys the English dragon, and he summons Germany's statesmen to be no longer 'hysterical women and children.'

It is neither possible nor desirable to survey this mass of popular literature. By the year 1900 the Pan-German League had about thirty inflammatory booklets (including several by Bley) in circulation; it owned various periodicals, maintained lecturers, had hundreds of thousands of members, and could afford to give 10,000*l.* toward the funds of the League of Sympathy with the Boers. Then there was the Navy League, which rose to a membership of two millions; and every member knew that the fleet was destined to challenge England's supremacy at sea—one of the most common sentiments in the literature of the last fifteen years. There was the General German School Union, which received a subsidy from the Government in its work of preserving the children of emigrants (especially in South America) from losing their German tongue and ideals; and there were the Colonial Society and other organisations. All embodied one or other aspect of the new Imperialism, and popularised it in town and village. So saturated was the public with this feverish patriotism that works of the most eccentric character were welcomed. The extraordinary Germanism of that bewildering English pervert, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, is well known here, but it is not so well known that his *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* passed through ten editions in a few years and was supported in its most ludicrous pretensions by grave men of science. Professor J. L. Reimer, an Austrian, proved in a series of impressive works that Athens was returning to life in the German people, and that German blood had been the true inspiration of Jesus Christ, Dante, Michael Angelo, etc. etc. Dr. Ludwig Woltmann almost surpassed Reimer in his flattering discoveries. Dr. Ludwig Wilser and Privy Councillor Felix Dahn contributed, only a little less soberly, to the glorification of 'the Germans,' the noblest stock of the noble Aryan race.

During the first decade of the present century Germany overflowed with this kind of popular literature, while the imperially directed teachers and professors prepared the appetite of pupils in the schools, and more responsible writers like Dr. Delbrück, Count Reventlow, Baron von der Goltz, Dr. Rohrbach, Dr. von Wenckenstern, Professor Schmoller, Professor Lamprecht, Professor Marks, and others, sufficiently encouraged the campaign. With the completion of the fleet and the apparent collapse of Russia, at the end of the decade, the work went forward with a swing, especially after what was generally regarded as the humiliating failure at Morocco. It was then that General von Bernhardt gave blunt expression to the prevailing sentiment in his *Germany and the Next War*. Dr. P. Rohrbach, a high colonial authority, less bluntly, but with remarkable detail, depicted the contingent struggle in his *Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt*, and insisted that 'England is the fate of Germany.' Dr. Conrad Müller (*Altgermanische Meeresherrschaft*) described Germany as a young giant at length awakened from sleep, laughing at the bonds that jealous rivals had put on it. Paul Friedrich revived the memory and teaching of Paul de Lagarde. Count Reventlow, in one of the chief German works of last year (*Deutschland's auswärtige Politik*), confirmed the familiar legend of jealous Powers thwarting innocent Germany, and pleaded for 'a policy that has character enough to make use of its armaments.'

Professor Cramb states that by that time Germany was producing nearly seven hundred books a year bearing, directly or indirectly, on war. There were not wanting a few sober voices to warn Germany against the madness she was developing, but little attention was paid to them. The despatches of M. Cambon from Berlin in 1913 show that this Imperialist education had done its work, and all classes of the nation, all political sections—not merely army officers and Junkers and makers of cannon—were looking ardently for 'the day.' The picture, which some would press on us, of an innocent nation going about its business while secret diplomatists and ambitious Emperors pledge it to war is leagues removed from the facts. The notion that Treitschke and Bernhardt are isolated cranks to whom we might find parallels in any country is a product of massive ignorance. We shall make deplorable blunders, and sow a fresh crop of horrors for Europe, if we do not understand how the character of Germany has been perverted by its writers and teachers, and do not seek patiently to disentangle the just grievances from the unhappy delusions and the still more unhappy pride of achievement.

JOSEPH McCABE.

THE ORDER OF ST. JOHN OF JERUSALEM IN THE PRESENT AND IN THE PAST

AMID the crash and thunder of the War, conducted as it is with a brutal ferocity that carries us back to the darkest days of barbarism, and has now developed on the part of our adversaries into an appeal to the poisoner's art, it is well to pierce through the black cloud of struggle and suffering to the silver lining declaring that mercy and charity have not abandoned the stricken victims of hate and lust, or the maimed thousands foredoomed

When Murder bared her arm, and rampant War
Yoked the red dragons of her iron car.

This is the most tremendous war of all the ages, whether we judge by the millions of active combatants, the power, range, and precision of the weapons employed, or the world-wide issue at stake—whether right and justice shall prevail, or the world fall under the domination of a Power uninfluenced by moral feeling, but skilled in every destructive art; with whom no promise is binding, and worshipping only the might that crushes all who dare to oppose its desires.

But behind the warring masses we find a great and noble army of men and women who have enlisted under the banner of mercy and are engaged in the splendid work of alleviation of suffering.

Associated with the Red Cross in this great work is the St. John's Ambulance Association, which is a department of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem in England, the oldest body of Knights Hospitallers now in existence.

The origin of the Order may be said to date from the middle of the eleventh century, when some Italian merchants undertook to procure an asylum for European pilgrims to the Holy Land where they might be safe from possible injuries from the Mahometans. These merchants had relations with the Egyptian Caliph, Moustaser-Billah, and by a judicious distribution of presents at his Court they obtained permission to

establish a hospital for Latin pilgrims close to the Holy Sepulchre. A portion of land was assigned on which they built a chapel dedicated to 'St. Mary of the Latins' to distinguish it from the churches of the Greek rite, and there the office was celebrated by the monks of St. Benedict. Near their convent were built two hospitals, one for each sex, where sick and healthy were equally received. Each hospital had its own chapel, the one dedicated to St. John the Almoner, the other to St. Mary Magdalen. The hospitals were supported by gifts of the faithful, their affairs being administered by the Order of St. Benedict.

This was the cradle of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. In 1065 Jerusalem was conquered by the Turcomans, who massacred the inhabitants with a ferocious brutality equal to that recently witnessed in Belgium. But that the Benedictines were not destroyed is shown by the fact that, at the recovery of Jerusalem in the first Crusade by the army of the faithful under Godfrey de Bouillon in 1099, the conqueror was received at the Hospital of St. John by the pious Gerard, a Provençal, who, having visited the holy places and observed the charity exercised by the Hospital of St. John, devoted himself to the service of the pilgrims. Even the infidels who were in need received succour from the hospital to such an extent that Gerard was considered the common father of the poor of the town. Many young gentlemen of the victorious army, fired with charitable zeal, consecrated themselves to the service of the pilgrims and took the habit of the Order.

At this time the work of the Order was the exercise of a religious, non-military charity. But with the accession of this large number of young warriors, who had fought through the Crusade, the Order entered upon the new phase of which it retained the stamp throughout the coming centuries. These young men had fought valiantly and were filled with the fiery zeal that burnt so fiercely in those early days of unquestioning faith, and Godfrey, shrewd soldier as he was, recognised their value as soldiers in defence of the Cross in the inevitable attacks of the Mahometan Powers. He conferred upon the Hospital of St. John the Seignory of Montboire, that had formed part of his domains in France. Most of the princes and great lords followed his example, and in a short time the hospital was enriched by large possessions both in Europe and Palestine.

Up to this time Gerard was a layman, but now, at the request of the brothers and sisters attached to the two hospitals, he, with all the male and female Hospitallers, adopted the regular habit, which consisted of a simple black robe on the left side of which was a white linen cross of eight points, and they took the three solemn vows of religion before the Patriarch of Jerusalem. After

a time the Pope, Paschal the Second, approved of the new institution and conferred upon it special privileges.

On the death of Gerard in 1118 Raymond Dupuy, the new Grand Master—probably one of the soldier adherents of eighteen years before—determined to add to the duties of hospitality the obligation to take up arms in defence of the Holy Places, and to make the Order a military corps engaged in a perpetual crusade against the Infidels, subject to the orders of the King of Jerusalem. This was in accordance with the spirit of the times. The first Crusade with its motley horde of fanatics and adventurers, so vividly described by Gibbon, had surged across Europe, Asia Minor, and Syria, and captured Jerusalem; but the newly founded Christian kingdom was surrounded by Pagan and Mahometan enemies, every sword was of value, and the King rejoiced at the addition to his military forces of a body of Knights filled with religious enthusiasm and strengthened by the austere morality of their daily life.

The Hospitallers were then divided into three classes: the first, those who by their birth and the rank they had held in the armies were destined to carry arms; a second class was composed of preachers and chaplains who, besides their ordinary functions, were obliged to serve as almoners in the war; while those who were neither of noble birth nor ecclesiastics were called serving brothers, and were employed in the personal service of the Knights, or in looking after the sick either in the hospital or with the armies in the field.

The new Order rapidly increased by the addition of many young nobles, who were distinguished from the serving brothers when on service in the field by wearing over the black habit a surcoat of red with the white cross.

The Knights Hospitallers now regarded themselves as the soldiers of the Cross, pledged to war against the Infidels wherever found. They established a character for devoted bravery that was never dimmed during the six centuries of their active military existence; but they never abandoned their primary work as a charitable Order, offering shelter and help to all who were sick and afflicted, especially the pilgrims to the Holy Land.

From the first the Knights Hospitallers were the most trusted defenders of the Holy Land against the attacks of Mahometans. This involved heavy expenditure, but grants and contributions flowed in from every country, and the Order became extremely wealthy. The scarcity of money resulted in the contributions being made in the form of grants of land—indeed, at the end of the twelfth century Matthew Paris asserts that it possessed nineteen thousand manors in different parts of Europe. Himself a Benedictine, he describes the depar-

ture for the East of a body of the Knights Hospitallers. He writes :

There went from the Hospitallers house of Clerkenwell in London a great number of Knights with banners displayed, preceded by brother Theodoric their Prior, a German by nation, who set out for the Holy Land at the head of a considerable body of troops in their pay. These Knights passing over London Bridge saluted with their capuce in hand all the inhabitants that crowded to see them pass, recommending themselves to their prayers.

The two centuries covered by the eight Crusades were a period of incessant fighting that deluged the Holy Land with Christian and Mahometan blood. The period ended in the triumph of the Crescent and the withdrawal of the Knights to Cyprus, in which beautiful island they remained for some years by invitation of its King, Henry the Second. But determined to acquire a territory where their sovereignty would be unquestioned, in the manner of the time they attacked and conquered the island of Rhodes, after a valiant resistance by the inhabitants.

Here for two hundred and thirteen years they ruled, and were known as the Knights of Rhodes. Not only were they available against the rapidly increasing power of the Turks, but the Rhodian navy manned by the Knights waged successful war against the corsairs who then infested the Mediterranean, in which operations many thousands of Christian slaves were rescued from captivity.

Smyrna was taken, and held for thirty years, this unwelcome addition to Rhodian territory being made by order of Pope Gregory the Seventh under pain of excommunication, as its occupation imposed a heavy cost upon the Order. It was ultimately besieged by Tamerlane and taken by assault, the inhabitants being put to the sword. A number of the Knights and soldiers escaped by swimming to vessels lying in the harbour. Tamerlane's mode of attacking a town is thus given by Vertot :

When he had laid siege to a place he hoisted on his tent a white standard signifying that he was disposed to treat with clemency those who surrendered at once. The next day the flag was red, signifying that he wished for blood, and that he would take the life of the Governor and principal officers of the garrison; but the third day a black flag announced that whether the place was taken by assault or surrendered, all must perish and the town must be entirely destroyed.

During the occupation of Rhodes the condition of the Knights for a time changed for the worse. Increase of power brought in its train the vices of ease and luxury, and the conquered inhabitants of Rhodes appealed to the Turks, who readily responded to their invitation. The attack upon Rhodes by the army of Mahomet the Second in 1480 saved the Order from its threatened

decadence, and the successful defence, under the leadership of Pierre d'Aubusson, displayed an obstinate valour worthy of its best days. Pierre d'Aubusson, the Grand Master, is described as a first-rate engineer, a practical chemist, a brave soldier, a skilful general, a good financier, and a clever physician and surgeon in the wards of the hospital of the Order. He showed these qualities during the siege, and at his death in 1503 he left the Order restored to all its first principles of faith and good works, and with a military discipline worthy of the finest soldiers of the age.

But twenty years later the island was besieged by Solyman, and, after an heroic resistance, appeals for assistance to all the European Powers having been made in vain, terms of surrender were arranged, and Rhodes was evacuated.

After many difficulties and delays, in March 1530 the islands of Malta and Gozo, with Tripoli, were granted by the Emperor Charles the Fifth to the Grand Master of the Order of St. John. In the meantime, on the plea that with the loss of Rhodes the Order had ceased to exist, King Henry the Eighth took possession of the English commanderies. On the accession of Queen Mary word was sent to the Grand Master that she intended to restore the English properties. The Priory of St. John, Clerkenwell, was once more occupied by the Knights, but when Queen Elizabeth succeeded the Priory and monasteries were again suppressed.

The Knights now were known as Knights of Malta, and again they held command of the Mediterranean by their fleets. The famous siege of Malta by the Turks in 1565 is one of the turning points of history, for if Malta had fallen the Mahometan domination of the Mediterranean would have followed. Italy and Sicily would have been attacked and their coasts ravaged, extending indefinitely the westward expansion of Turkish power.

The Turkish fleet of one hundred and sixty vessels appeared, with an army of thirty thousand men, and with siege artillery that included guns able to throw a marble shot of one hundred and twelve pounds.

The story of the siege makes thrilling reading. The language difficulties in an Order comprising Knights and brethren from every Christian country had been lessened by dividing the community into seven *langes*, and now to each *lange* was assigned a different portion of the fortifications, while a knight of Auvergne commanded a flying squadron to watch the enemy from the sea and co-operate with the land forces wherever possible.

The siege began in May. In June the isolated castle of St. Elmo was taken by assault at a cost of eight thousand of the Turks, under Mustapha, who, having got possession of the fort, ordered the wounded Knights who yet lived to be tortured and

put to ignominious deaths. Some were flayed alive, others were slashed on the breasts in the form of a cross, and while the heads of the dead were hoisted on poles upon the walls the palpitating bodies of the dying survivors were nailed to huge crosses and launched upon the harbour that the tide might carry them to the foot of the walls of St. Angelo. When later on the Turks, repulsed and dispirited, were escaping to their boats they were intercepted by a detachment that sallied from a bastion. Some, throwing themselves on their knees, begged for mercy; but the victors shouted 'Such mercy as you showed at St. Elmo!' and buried their daggers in their bodies. In September the siege was ended by the total defeat of the Turks, and the Mediterranean was once more commanded by the navy of the Knights, who derived a fruitful revenue from attacks made upon the vessels and territories of the Turks and Moors, whence the fleets usually returned laden with treasure. It is worthy of note that the largest of the Maltese ships was armour-plated, thus forestalling by about three hundred years the modern system of armoured ships begun by the Emperor Louis Napoleon. Twice again was Malta threatened by the Turks, but without result; and in the terrible earthquake that in 1783 laid Messina in ruins the Knights of the Order devoted themselves to the care and relief of the sufferers with the Christian charity that they had practised for six hundred years.

This was a fitting ending to the great militant Order. Times were now changing, and it was no longer the struggle of centuries between the Crescent and the Cross, but the uprising of democracy against the old-established order. The French Revolution swept away the Monarchy and the Church, with all its dependent corporations and associations in France. In 1792 a decree was passed by which the estates and property of the Order of St. John in France were confiscated. Many of the Knights were seized, imprisoned, and executed as aristocrats.

On the 9th of June 1798 the French fleet, with Napoleon on board, appeared before Malta. After some delay the Knights capitulated. The island was declared to be part of France, and the Knights were required to quit within three days. Napoleon sailed for Egypt on the 19th of June, taking with him all the silver, gold, and jewels that could be collected from the churches and the treasury, together with a vast number of trophies and historic relics belonging to the Order, most of which were lost shortly after when the ships that carried them were blown up at the Battle of the Nile.

Thus the ancient Order of St. John ceased to be a sovereign power, and its history as a militant corporation came to an end. But about the year 1827 five of the seven then existing *langes* of the Order, through the Capitular Commission, to which all

the authority of the Order was transferred, decreed its revival in England, with such alterations as were necessitated by the times and conformity to the Reformed religion; and since 1830 its members, united together as an Order for the purpose of performing Hospitaller and other charitable work, have been carrying out their duties in the relief of sickness, distress, or suffering. On the 14th of May 1888, in recognition of the excellent work performed by the members of the Order—especially the establishment of the St. John Ambulance Association, which has done and is doing such widespread and admirable work in the interests of humanity, and the foundation and support of the British Ophthalmic Hospital at Jerusalem—Queen Victoria granted to them a new Royal Charter of Incorporation by their old name and style of 'The Grand Priory of the Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem in England.' Her Majesty was graciously pleased to become the Sovereign Head and Patron of the Order. The first Grand Prior of the Order was the Duke of Manchester, on whose retirement on the Eve of St. John in the same year the Prince of Wales became Grand Prior, and on his late Majesty's accession that office was conferred upon the Duke of Connaught, the present Grand Prior of the Order.

The various grades of the Order are as follows: A Grand Prior, a Sub-Prior, Titular Bailiff of Eagle, Honorary Bailiffs, Commanders, Honorary Commanders, Knights of Justice, Ladies of Justice, Prelates, Sub-Prelates, Chaplains, Knights of Grace, Ladies of Grace, Esquires, Serving Brothers and Sisters, with whom are associated, but not as members, Honorary Associates and Donats.

Selection for admission into the Order or enrolment as Honorary Associate is made to the Chapter-General, with the approval of the Grand Prior; but no person selected can be so admitted or enrolled without the approval and sanction of the Sovereign, after his or her name has been duly submitted by the Grand Prior. It will be seen that in the new Charter of 1888 the good work of the St. John Ambulance Association as a department of the Order was specially commended.

That department had been established nine years previously, and was the outcome of the International Conference of Red Cross Societies held in Berlin in 1869. On the breaking out of the war of 1870 many members of the Order enrolled themselves in the British National Aid, or Red Cross Society, and were engaged throughout the campaign. The experience of the war showed that to secure efficiency in war both the *personnel* and *matériel* must be properly organised in time of peace. It was also felt that some steps should be taken to alleviate the immense amount of suffering caused by the accidents of daily life.

The movement was practically started in 1872 by a donation of 100*l.* by a member, for the purpose of instituting an ambulance service under the control of the Order in the mining and pottery districts. Papers were read in the two following years at the Annual General Assembly, and in 1877 the St. John Ambulance was formed as a department of the Order of St. John, the first centre being at Woolwich, quickly followed by the formation of centres in London, Sevenoaks, Maidstone, and other places.

The movement spread like wildfire. Courses of instruction in first aid were given, hospital nurses trained, appliances of all kinds procured and supplied from a central depot formed at St. John's Gate—bandages, tourniquets, litters, stretchers, splints—everything that could be useful for an emergency in the daily accidents of street, rail, or mine. Instruction was given to the mercantile marine where so many ships sail without a doctor on board, and now the Board of Trade regulations forbid the promotion to certain grades unless a St. John Ambulance first-aid certificate of efficiency be produced. A corps was established for the transport of sick and injured patients, which, originally intended for the poor, is largely availed of by every class.

The practical value of the instruction given at the Ambulance classes was soon realised, and the ramifications of the Association extended with extraordinary rapidity. The St. John Ambulance Brigade was formed, then the St. John Ambulance Overseas Brigades. Branches of the Association are now found in every part of the British Empire. Over a million first-aid certificates have been issued, and the eight-pointed cross, the badge of the Order, may be seen worn proudly by police and others in every continent.

In this world-wide catholicity of effort to assuage the ills of suffering humanity the Order of St. John of Jerusalem has not forgotten the root-charity from which it has sprung over seven hundred years ago. The British Ophthalmic Hospital of Jerusalem established by the Order has brought healing and comfort to scores of thousands of the descendants of those who drove the original founders from the Holy Land. In 1913 the number of ophthalmic cases attended to was 42,773, of whom 1262 were in-patients. Unfortunately the Turkish Government are not inspired with the feeling that impelled the Turcomans to spare the Hospital in 1199, for with the declaration of war the Hospital has been closed; to be opened again, I hope, when this tyranny is overpast.

The outbreak of war has, however, shown the value of the work of the St. John Ambulance Association and its readiness for any emergency. For the past eight months its work has been

colossal, and the Ladies' Committee, of which Her Majesty the Queen is President, Adeline Duchess of Bedford Chairman, and Lady Perrott Lady Commandant-in-Chief of the Women's Voluntary Aid Detachments, has shown a capacity for organisation and unremitting hard work that compels our admiration. Working in co-operation with the Red Cross Society, the receiving and forwarding depot, worked under Lady Sloggit's committee, is a model of efficient management. The St. John Ambulance Brigade has since the outbreak of war supplied the Naval and Military Medical Services with ten thousand hospital orderlies, and one thousand two hundred nurses have been sent out from St. John's Gate. In addition fifty nurses connected with the Order are being sent from Canada, which Dominion is also paying for one ward in the St. John Brigade Hospital going to the Front, in which Canadian nurses will be employed. The St. John Hospital of five hundred beds will be in charge of Sir James Clark, Chief Commissioner of the Brigade, assisted by a staff of eminent physicians and surgeons from England and Ireland. Wards in the hospital are also being subscribed for by the St. John Ambulance Association of India, and beds are being given by Newfoundland and several divisions of the Brigade at home. The Order of St. John Hospital for Indian wounded of five hundred beds at Brockenhurst is continuously full. The Order has one hundred and fifty-two hospitals in England under its auspices and worked by members of the Ambulance Brigade. It has had two hospitals in France entirely maintained by the Order for six months. Two hundred and thirty motor ambulances have been given to the Order and are now engaged upon their important duties.

This record shows that in its latest phase the world-wide works of benevolence and mercy shed a lustre upon the Order of St. John of Jerusalem that will bear comparison with the glories of its past history.

HENRY A. BLAKE

*(Knight of Justice of the Order of St. John
of Jerusalem).*

ON THE ENTERTAINING OF REFUGEES

'I AM sure I do my best, we all do our best, to make these people comfortable,' an entertainer of refugees remarked the other day.

Evidently she had failed, for she spoke with a sigh; and there was a troubled, anxious look in her eyes, the look of one not at peace in her mind.

'Of course I am glad to have them here,' another entertainer declared. 'It is a real satisfaction to me to know that they are being well cared for now, after all they have had to suffer.'

She too seemed depressed, however, her satisfaction notwithstanding. The very ring of her voice, indeed, was plaintive.

'I was delighted to take them in,' a third announced. 'Why, I could not sleep in my bed when I thought of them wandering about homeless! And I should not mind having them one bit, if only I could make them happy. But I cannot,' she added almost resentfully. 'They are as miserable as miserable can be. That is what I find trying.'

All the three are kindly women, hospitable to boot; women of the very sort to find pleasure, one might have thought, in the entertaining of refugees. Yet all the three were evidently in the very Slough of Despond, that day, because of this entertaining; and, to make matters worse, their refugee guests were in the Slough of Despond with them. And they too are kindly folk, folk for whom, being by nature cheerfully inclined, the Slough has no attractions. They were in it none the less; that was a point on which there could be no mistake. Their hostesses knew, every time they gave a glance at their faces, that as entertainers of refugees they were failures. For, as all the world must admit, an entertainer's first duty is to make her guests happy; and theirs were manifestly miserable. Little wonder they felt aggrieved and waxed resentful; for they were providing them with good food to eat, comfortable rooms in which to dwell, and warm clothes to wear. They were, as they claimed, doing their very best for them. What more, indeed, could they do?

It is not always easy, it must be admitted, to make refugees happy, especially refugees of the sort we have now among us. For they have had terribly sad experiences many of them, quite

recently, too : they have gone through great suffering, physical suffering, mental suffering. They have lost those who were dear to them, have been robbed of their household treasures, have been torn up by the very roots, as it were, and cast forth from their homes. After passing their days with their own kin around them, in comfort perhaps, lacking nothing, they are now strangers in a strange land, and in poverty, without a penny of their own, not a few of them, wherewith to pay even for a tramcar ticket, or buy a postage stamp. What adds to their troubles, they are in the midst of people to whom the chances are they cannot speak, who cannot speak to them, who do not understand them or their ways, who know nothing of their likes and dislikes, hopes and fears, or of the keen anxieties to which they are a prey. And all the while they are haunted, many of them, by the memory of the horrors they have witnessed, haunted too by the dread of what the future may have in store for them and for their land. Thus the marvel is surely not that some of them are tryingly depressing, but rather that any of them should be cheerful. And many of them are quite wonderfully cheerful—a strong proof of the grit of the Belgian nation ; while very many more would be cheerful, if only their entertainers could be induced to give them a fair chance.

Paradoxical as it may seem, the better a woman is, the more conscientious and really high-minded, the worse entertainer of refugees she often is. One of the very best women I know managed to make the refugees, with whom she had filled her house, abjectly miserable for weeks, because she would insist on telling them the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. As they could not read English, they were dependent on her for their news as to how the War was going ; and every time a disaster occurred she, in reply to their inquiries no doubt, promptly informed them. Thus they knew at once when Liège fell, when Malines and Antwerp ; they knew too all the details of the laying low of Louvain. She even told them day by day exactly where the Germans were when marching in triumph, as it seemed, on Paris ; and translated for them with infinite care the most sensationally ominous of telegrams. The result was her guests, overwrought women and children with nerves all ajar, simply sat and cried the whole day long.

At that very time, and it was the most trying time that we have had since the War began, the guests of a friend of hers were as bright and cheery as sparrows. They too, as they did not understand English, were dependent on their hostess for their news. She, however, let the official report say what it would, had some little victory to tell of every morning, some success that the brave Belgian soldiers had scored. If no such victory, no

such success, stood recorded, well—*tant pis* for the recorder—she invented one. Her nearest relatives would never have dreamed to hear her talk, in those days, that either Liège or any other Belgian town had ever fallen. On the contrary, the Germans were always just on the point of leaving Belgium, according to her; and, in the course of a very few weeks, her guests would be in their own land again, in their own little homes, with their own goods and chattels around them. This entailed much prevarication, of course, not to say much telling of lies. She went through with it, however, stalwartly, and forced everyone who exchanged a word with her charges to go through with it too. For, she maintained, and with profound conviction, that, in such times as these, it is better to tell lies than to let poor old women be made miserable.

This hostess has, of course, no claim to rank with the morally exalted; whether she has a conscience at all, indeed, is more than doubtful. None the less, as an entertainer of refugees, she is certainly a success. Her guests are a very happy and a very grateful little company. They esteem themselves most lucky in that they have been spared much of the misery which others of their kind have had to endure. For, when the time came that they must be told the truth, there was nothing much in the truth to appal them. The tide had already turned: the Germans were no longer sweeping all before them on their way to Paris.

Then, curiously enough, not only fervent conscientiousness, but fervent patriotism, seems to be a hindrance rather than a help to entertainers desirous of making their foreign guests happy.

'I am very sorry for them, poor people,' one of these entertainers, an enthusiast of the *Britannia über Alles* type, exclaimed sadly, one day last winter. 'It must, indeed, have been a terrible trial for them to have to leave their own land. Not but that it may prove a blessing in disguise,' she added, a moment later, brightening up considerably. 'Think what opportunities they have while here of learning English methods, English ways. When they are in their own land again they will be able to live just as we do. Those who are with me, indeed, live now just as we do. I insist on it, as a matter of duty. I am not sure they like it, but it is very good for them. Why, they will soon be quite English, I tell them; and think of all that that may mean for Belgium!'

Judging by their faces, they did not like it at all, for a more dismal little party I have rarely seen. There was sadness in their eyes, dull weariness. Yet they were sitting in a large handsome room and had regular meals of good solid food every day. They were provided with every comfort, and were treated with the

greatest kindness. 'Were we princes and princesses we could not be better cared for,' one of them remarked; and had they been princes and princesses all might, perhaps, have been well with them. Unfortunately, they were only poor workaday Belgians, to whom English ways did not appeal, and who had no desire to become English. As they had lived in little cottages until they came to England, they did not feel quite at home, they admitted, in their fine large rooms. Still they could have been very comfortable there, they were sure, were it not that the windows were always open. The opening of windows is an English custom of which the Belgian working classes do not at all approve. Life in a draught is not worth living, they hold; nor, if one must have a cold bath every day, is it much worth living either. And, unluckily for them, their hostess, in her eagerness to imbue them with a love of English ways, was as lavish with her baths as with her fresh air. She insisted indeed on superintending personally the bathing of one of her guests—a baby a few months old—to the horror of its mother, who was firmly convinced that the end thereof would be a tragedy.

Then the fare provided for these people, although good, was quite English, and therefore not to their taste. Their hostess, from a high sense of duty, gave them tea twice a day, although she must have known that they loathed it, and were longing for coffee. She gave them also wholesome and expensive beef and mutton, with potatoes boiled in water, instead of the cheap savoury dishes—the soups, sausages, snacks, with piquant sauces and salad—dear to their souls. And all the while she was firmly convinced that she was doing her best to make them not only comfortable, but happy; and was quite at a loss to understand why they looked sad.

Nor is she the blindest of her kind. Another hostess once took me to see her Belgian guests while they were at breakfast, and asked me if I could imagine why they were all so depressed. Never shall I forget the look of unbounded surprise she cast at me, when I ventured to say that I thought it might, perhaps, be because they were so cold.

'Oh no!' she replied emphatically, 'it cannot be that; they are not cold. Belgians do not feel the cold as we do.'

As a point of fact they feel it much more than we do, as they are accustomed to much warmer rooms than we are. These people—an old man and woman, their daughter-in-law and her little children—were paralysed with cold: they were shaking all over. Little wonder either, for it was a glacial morning at the end of November, and they were in a room without even the pretence of a fire.

Then many ladies, who would otherwise succeed as enter-

tainers, fail abjectly because they do not realise the importance of showing deference to social prejudices. They club all their refugees together, quite irrespective of the diverse classes to which they belong. For them a refugee is a refugee; and unfortunately in no country are the people divided into quite so many distinct classes as in Belgium.

I once came across a refugee who was simply bubbling over with indignant wrath at the brutal treatment which had, as she maintained, been meted out to her. Her one wish, she told me, was to shake the dust of England from off her feet, and betake herself she cared not whither. All this because, whereas she was a village school teacher, she had been mistaken for a servant maid; or had, at any rate, been lodged with a party of maids in a house where she had to eat at the same table as they did and share their sitting-room. Her hostess, a charming old lady, who would not willingly have hurt the feelings of the proverbial fly, had cut her to the quick, because she had failed to realise that an unfathomable social gulf lay between her and her companions. Another charming old lady made a bitter enemy for her country, as well as for herself, by treating two refugee guests she had as socially equal, although one was a dentist, and the other a patient of his, 'a lady born.'

To pay heed to petty social distinctions may seem absurd in such times as these in which we are living. Still, heed must be paid to them, if toes are not to be stepped on with results disastrous to the overwrought; and, unfortunately, the paying of it entails a certain amount of trouble. Even hostesses of nice discrimination in matters social have difficulties to contend against, sometimes, owing to the abnormal sensitiveness of their refugee guests. These difficulties are as nothing, however, compared with those they have to contend against owing to the abnormal heedlessness of the authorities responsible for the sending to them of these guests. There are Refugee Committees that seem actually to go out of their way to step on the toes of hostesses and ruffle susceptibilities all round. And then these very committees are surprised when a deaf ear is turned to their appeals for invitations for their charges.

The owners of a *charming* house, having heard that there were quite distinguished personages among the refugees, invited a committee to send a family of gentlefolk to stay with them. Their invitation was promptly accepted, and they were told that their guests were coming at once. Luxurious rooms were soon ready for them, a *recherché* dinner was prepared, and motors were sent to meet them. And when they arrived—there were nearly a dozen of them—instead of being distinguished personages, they were peasants of the roughest and most uncouth type.

The women had shawls over their heads, sabots on their feet; and they were all in such a condition that, had they been allowed to enter the house, every servant would have risen in revolt.

In this case someone had blundered, no doubt; but there have been cases which even blundering can hardly explain. For instance, it would be interesting to know what could induce a committee to send down—as one did—a black woman, who knew no more of civilisation's ways than the jackals in her native Congo, to a somewhat fastidious spinster, who had expressed the wish to have as guest a Belgian whom she could treat as a friend. Another committee, when invited to send a Belgian gentleman as guest to a country house, sent a Congo man who, in his unregenerate days, had been a cannibal; and who is strongly suspected of still cherishing cannibalish tastes!

This was done through heedlessness, of course—one would be loath even to hint that it might be done through fiendishness—but heedlessness of this sort is embarrassing to entertainers of refugees, and handicaps them sorely in their work. It is at the root, indeed, of quite a fair number of the failures there are among them; and, after all, these failures are by no means very numerous. They are much less numerous, indeed, compared with the successes, than they seem; for a failure is easily detected, whereas a success often passes unnoticed. Every failure is, however, a real misfortune, as every failure leads to a falling off in offers of hospitality.

Many ladies think twice, nay thrice, now, before undertaking to entertain refugees; and that for no other reason than because they know someone or other who has played the entertainer, and has failed in the rôle. Yet the chances are more than even that she has failed through some fault of her own or of some committee. And unfortunately, when private hospitality fails, it is the more worthy among the refugees who suffer. The less worthy can make themselves quite comfortable in a huge dépôt, which is, indeed, the best and most suitable place for them. It is the respectable who are miserable when they must linger on there, instead of being made welcome as guests in houses where they would be well cared for, and have the chance of forgetting their troubles. And these refugees are the nation's guests, we must remember; they are here by special invitation; and they, the respectable among them, might all be well cared for in private houses, or in little homes of their own, without any great expense or even any very great trouble, if only a little more thought were taken for them, a little more interest were shown in them individually and their concerns. Of this there is proof; for most of the ladies who have entertained refugees have certainly succeeded in making them not

only comfortable, but, so far as in them lies, happy. They have succeeded, too, very many of them, without any special effort, any lavish expenditure, simply by taking thought and showing interest. Some of them, indeed, scoff at the idea of its being more difficult to entertain refugees than other folk.

According to one of the most successful of these entertainers, the great thing with refugee guests is to let them alone, to leave them to go their own way, providing them of course with necessities the while, and seeing to it that they have always a few pennies in their pockets wherewith to buy picture postcards, *L'Indépendance Belge*, or cigarettes, when the fancy seizes them. Still, she admits that the cuisine in her house is for the time being Belgian, not English; that coffee has taken the place of tea, even in an afternoon; and that it is her guests, not she, who decide when the windows shall be open, and whether there shall or shall not be fires. Another entertainer, who is equally successful, acts on quite different lines. She lavishes courteous attentions on her guests, treating them deferentially as personages of importance; and this they seem to enjoy hugely. They do their best to demean themselves as personages of importance; and, oddly enough, they are as happy as happy can be the while. Yet they belong to the lower middle class, the most difficult class of all to entertain.

Much as hostesses may differ, however, on other points concerning the entertaining of refugees, there are two points on which the successful among them seem all to agree: if refugee guests are to be made even fairly happy, they must not be left to the care of servants, and they must be provided with something to do.

With refugees, as experience proves, there can be no half measures: if they are to live in comfort while they are among us, they must either live with their hostess—or someone of her class representing her—and under her personal care, as her friends as well as her guests, or they must have a money allowance and live quite apart, in rooms of their own, fending for themselves, doing their own cooking, cleaning, and everything else. I have never yet known a case in which refugees were left entirely to the care of servants in a house, or in which they were boarded out with persons who took them in for the sake of the money they had with them, that proved satisfactory.

The average working-class Englishwoman, whether servant or not, has a profound mistrust of foreigners, it must be remembered, a mistrust tinged with dislike and something akin to contempt. She therefore looks askance on these refugees, she watches them as a cat watches mice, and is inclined to resent being required to wait on them, especially if they, as many do,

belong to her own class. Nor is this all. She probably knows that they, on their side, look askance on her, and that they have none of the personal liking for her that they have, as a rule, for her male relatives. For they rarely quite conceal the fact that they think she is extravagant; that she takes life much too easily; and, worst of all, that she has no more idea of cooking than a cow. It is a foregone conclusion, therefore, that when she and they are in close relations there will be friction; that when they are dependent on her for their comfort in life they will fare none too well. Thus, the less they have to do with her the better for them and the better for those who pay for their maintenance. For the average Belgian can feed her family well on very much less than the average Englishwoman. Two Belgian women, who had with them their five children, were scandalised when they heard that, although they were being half-starved, the Englishwoman with whom they were boarded out was being paid 42*s.* a week for their food. 'Give us 25*s.* a week and let us buy our own food,' one of them exclaimed. 'We shall be much better fed than we are now.' The 25*s.* was given to them, and they were much better fed. 'Why, we have everything that is good now!' is their cry.

Important though it may be that refugees should not be left to the care of servants, it is more important, of course, incomparably more important, that they should not be left without employment. Folk whom the Fates are treating well, who are at peace in their minds, may perhaps sit with folded hands for a time and be none the worse for it. But with those whose lines are cast in stony places, who are, as these refugees are, in trouble, worried, anxious, it is far otherwise. For them to sit with folded hands, with nothing to do, nothing to rouse them out of the dull apathy into which their misfortunes have plunged them, nothing to keep them from brooding, spells sure disaster, demoralisation as well as misery. Most of the refugees are working men and women, men and women who, all their lives long, have been toiling with their hands from morning till night, earning their own daily bread. Many of them can speak only Flemish, some can neither read nor write. To leave these people, nervous as they are, for the most part, with nothing to do, is sheer cruelty.

A poor old woman, on whom the Fates had been specially hard, sat and sobbed aloud, refusing to be comforted, the first week she was in England. Then her hostess, at her wit's end to know what to do with her, drew her attention to some rather dull brasses, and asked her if she would like to polish them. Indeed she would, she said, cheering up at once. She would soon make them look very different if they were left to her. And

she did. Never before had they been so bright as they were when she had done her work. And she herself was almost as much changed as they were; for, in her delight at having something to do, she had forgotten half her troubles. She at once took all the brasses and silver in the house under her special care, and spent hours every day polishing them. The result was she soon became quite fairly cheerful, and began to talk of what she would do when again in her own land. And, if women suffer when left with nothing to do, men suffer ten times more, in temper as well as in nerve.

If, last autumn, when the first refugees made their way here, all the men among them had at once been set to work, much misery would have been prevented, much demoralisation too; and, incidentally, we should to-day be much better provided with ammunition than we are. Why, even the nation's food supply would be better than it is; for among the refugees are expert agriculturalists, skilled market gardeners, who would gladly, had the chance been given them, have raised for us the spinach, lettuces, cabbages, and other things green of which we are now in such sore need. At the present time vegetables are so dear that they are beyond the reach of the great mass of the population.

Unfortunately, for months after the War began, the Government seemed to think that what the refugees most required was a little more sleep, a little more slumber, a rest, in fact; and they certainly did what they could to secure it for them. Not content with doing nothing themselves to find work for these men, they actually discouraged others from finding it for them. Local Refugee Committees were given to understand that the employment of refugees was a matter fraught with danger, one, therefore, with which only the Government's own officials were capable of dealing safely. Practically, indeed, these committees were told that they must not find work for refugees, excepting through a Labour Exchange; and the nearest Exchange was perhaps many miles away. Even last January, when some of these luckless people had already been four long weary months in our midst, a Government official looked quite shocked when I chanced to tell him that I had just found work for several of them.

'Every time you find work for a refugee you break the law,' he informed me solemnly, under the impression, as it seemed, that Board of Trade decrees rank as laws in this our day. And, although I tried hard, I could not make him understand that, as a choice of evils, it was better surely that I should break the law, than that these men should live in idleness, when there was work that sorely needed doing waiting for them to do.

Four Belgians came to see me one day to beg me to help them to find work. They were willing to do anything, to go

anywhere, only work they must have. For, as one of them said : ' We have been sitting for three months doing nothing ; and if we go on sitting much longer, we shall never do anything again : we shall lose the wish to do anything.' They were just eating out their very hearts because they had nothing to do. And two of them were metal-workers, men of the very sort for whom, during those same three months, Government officials had, as they said, been ' scouring England.' Since then, and while the ' scouring ' was still going on, I have again and again come across—not in the backwoods, but within walking distance of London—skilled fitters, mechanics, electricians, once even a coppersmith, all of whom had been loafing for months because they had no work to do, and did not know how to set about finding it, as they could not speak English.

Curiously enough, the names and addresses of all these metal-workers, together with their callings, had been sent in on official forms three times, if not four, to one or other of the Government departments which are, or were, supposed to help refugees to find work. These forms are still no doubt in official hands, although whether official eyes have ever read them is another question ; one of no importance, however, for these Departments, their names notwithstanding, have practically nothing to do with work-finding, it now seems. Even the ' Government Commission for Providing Occupation for Belgian Refugees ' does not actually provide occupation either for them or anyone else. This is a point on which its officials are very emphatic. Its function is merely to collect information as to where refugees are living and what sort of work they can do, information which, as it happens, has already been collected officially three times, if not four. Now this information would have been of great use if published months ago, and might be of some use now ; but it passes the wit of woman to see that it will be of any use at all by the time it is published ; as by then the chances are the refugees will have said good-bye to England, and be working again in Belgium.

As for the allied Departments, they cannot even answer questions. I had once to wander about from Department to Department for hours, before I could find out whether some refugees, in whom I was interested, might, or might not, go to work at the Docks. Some of the officials thought the Belgians might go ; others thought they might not ; while most of them frankly confessed they had no idea whether they might go or not. And, oddly enough, to not one of the set did it seem ever to occur that it was his business to know ; or, if he did not know, to try to find out. Yet the matter was one of importance ; for, had these Belgians gone to the Docks, I was informed later officially, the

chances are the result would have been a breaking of heads, or possibly even a strike.

To return to the metal-workers, not only had their names, addresses, and callings been sent to Government Departments, but the men themselves had paid visits to Government Labour Exchanges. They might, however, just as well have paid visits to cinemas for any help they found there in their search for work. For, as a rule, Labour Exchange officials know neither Flemish nor yet French. They cannot, therefore, with the best will in the world 'fix up' workers who, as most of these refugees, speak only Flemish or French. Many of these officials have striven valiantly to do the 'fixing up'; some of them, indeed, have almost worked themselves to death trying to do it; but, let them try as they will, they cannot work miracles; and, to fix up a worker by dumb crambo would be a miracle. Fortunately, certain large employers have Flemish-speaking officials of their own to hunt up and engage for them, nominally of course, through Labour Exchanges, the refugee workers they require. Were it otherwise, Labour Exchange statistics would tell a different tale from that they do tell; and thousands of Belgians, who are now usefully and profitably employed, would be just loafing. As it is, thousands more are actually just loafing. Yet they too, the overwhelming majority of them at any rate, might be usefully and profitably employed, if work were found for them. Find it for themselves they cannot, unless indeed they speak English: that is a point it behoves us to bear well in mind. It could, however, be found for them if local committees, entertainers, Labour Exchange officials and employers would all combine in the search; and Government officials would cease for a time from collecting information and give them a helping hand. It is only a question of taking trouble. If trouble enough were taken, every refugee who is able and willing to work with his hands—and a fair number of the refugees who can work only with their heads—might be at work within a very short time, at trades union wages, too, and without any detriment to British labour, any loss of a job for an Englishman. For there is now, we must not forget, for the first time within the memory of most of us, more work to be done, here in England, than there are hands wherewith to do it.

Although it is almost always possible, it is by no means always easy to find work for refugees, especially when they for whom it is sought are office workers, Government or Communal officials, commercial travellers, tradesmen, publicans, pilots, or, worst of all, *variété* artistes. Still, Belgians are much more adaptable than we English are, much more ready to turn a hand to whatever comes first. I know a Belgian who is to-day doing very good

work as a fitter; yet, until he came to England, seven months ago, he was the managing director of a large company, and had hardly had a tool in his hands. I know also two Belgian engine-drivers who, although they were both suffering from neurasthenia at the time, became expert gardeners, the first month they were in England; and have been earning high wages ever since. Quite a large number of refugees have taken to house-painting since they have been here; and, so far as I can make out, they are doing their work to their employers' satisfaction, as well as to their own profit. Only the other day an employer gave me a written testimonial to the skill with which one of them paints—a man who, until the War began, held a responsible official position. Even the fact of speaking only Flemish, although a bar to finding work, is not an insuperable bar to doing it well when it is found. For a Belgian, who knows neither French nor English, has for months past been earning his daily bread as a gasfitter in an English country town. And the mere fact of having work, no matter what the work may be, makes all the difference in life to these men. For work means money, and it is hard to face the world cheerily with an empty pocket. It means freedom, too, homes of their own if they choose, homes in which they may eat and sleep when they will, and wander about and smoke where they will, without anyone's permission. And freedom of this sort is not to be had in a stranger's house, however kindly the stranger may be.

I once paid a visit to some unemployed refugees whom I found doing nothing, great strong fellows though they were, sitting with their hands before them, not speaking a word. And a miserably depressing sight they were, with their dull, heavy eyes, their hang-dog, weary, hopeless faces. I saw them again a fortnight later, at the end of what had been for them a hard day's work; and I could hardly believe they were the same men, so different did they look, so brisk and alert.

Unfortunately there are many entertainers, and not a few local committees, who are quite scandalised if it is suggested to them that it is just as necessary to provide refugees with employment as with board and lodging; nay, that it is actually better and kinder to provide them with employment, thus rendering them self-supporting, than to provide them with board and lodging. 'You forget that these people are our guests,' is a reproach that has again and again been hurled at me of late. 'Our hospitality as a nation has been offered to them; how can we then, with any decency, ask them to work?' This is the strain in which these people persist in talking, in spite of all the Belgian King's entreaties that his refugee subjects shall not only be asked to work, but shall be given work, and shall be told to do it, to do

it for their country's sake as well as their own. Belgium has a heavy enough burden to bear, surely, without our adding to its weight by manufacturing for her loafers. Yet that is precisely what we are doing, so far as we can, whenever we leave without work a Belgian who could work if work were provided for him.

The four Belgians who, last January, came to ask me to help them to find work, came, as they said, because they were afraid lest, if they went on sitting doing nothing much longer, they would never do anything again : they would lose the wish to do anything. And they had been doing nothing for only three months ; whereas there are refugees among us now who have been doing nothing for more than six months—who have never done a stroke, indeed, since the day they landed at Folkestone.

EDITH SELLERS.

ARE THE GERMANS PIRATES?

WHAT is a Pirate? A robber on the sea, or a sea thief. Piracy is a robbery committed on the sea. Formerly the word 'Pirate' was taken in a good and honourable sense, and signified a maritime knight, an admiral, or commander at sea, as appears by the several testimonies and records cited to that purpose by that learned antiquary, Sir Henry Spelman.¹ It is derived from the Greek *πείρω*, *transire*, *a transeundo mari*. Sir Leoline Jenkins, who was Judge of the Admiralty Court in the seventeenth century, says that a robbery committed upon the sea is what we call Piracy. In his charge at an Admiralty Session for the Cinque Ports in 1668 he says :

You are therefore to enquire of all Pirates and Sea Rovers ; they are in the eye of the Law *hostes humani generis*, enemies not of one nation or of one sort of people only, but of all mankind. They are outlawed, as I may say, by the Law of all Nations ; that is, out of the protection of all Princes and of all Laws whatsoever. Everybody is commissioned and is to be armed against them as against rebels and traitors to subdue and to root them out. That which is called robbing on the highway, the same being done upon the water is called Piracy. . . . When this is done upon the sea without a lawful Commission of War, or of reprisals, it is downright Piracy.²

And again, in his charge to the Grand Jury at the Admiralty Sessions in Southwark, February 18, 1680, he says :

The next thing is robbery, and that committed on the High Sea is Piracy, for piracy at sea is made up of the same ingredients as robbery on land : for it is piracy to assault a ship, carry away a ship, or goods out of a ship, unless it be in necessity ; for upon necessity a man may take victuals or tackle out of a ship if the ship can spare the same, or if payment be made or undertaken.

Judge Story says : ' Whatever may be the diversity of definitions, in other respects, all writers concur in holding that robbery or forcible depredation upon the sea, *animo furandi*, is piracy.'

Piracy is an offence against the Law of Nations, and it is justiciable by the Courts of every nation, because a Pirate is the

¹ *Glossarium*.

² *Law Magazine and Review*, No. 306, p. 29.
³ U.S. v. Smith, 5 Wheat., 163.

enemy of all men. He has renounced all the benefits of society, and has reduced himself afresh to the savage state of nature by declaring war against all mankind. Therefore every community has a right, by the rule of self-defence, to inflict that punishment upon him which every individual would, in a state of nature, have been otherwise entitled to do for the preservation of his person or personal property. It is of course a necessary ingredient that the taking must have been with force and violence, or that the property be delivered to the pirate under the impression of that degree of fear and apprehension which is necessary to constitute robbery upon land. But the great and all-important ingredient of piracy is that the taking be effected without the authority of any King or State.

It is therefore clear that the taking or destruction of British goods, or goods consigned to British consignees, by officers of German ships or submarines cannot be Piracy, even although accompanied by acts of deliberate homicide. Inhuman though the procedure of the submarines has been towards subjects of Great Britain, nevertheless the acts were committed under the authority of a commission from the German Government. The acts were brutal, but do not constitute Piracy.⁴

Now it may be asked, May not the whole German Empire be considered a Piratical State, being guilty of such barbarities in this the twentieth century? This question leads us to the deeper consideration, Can a State be Piratical? It has been said of old that fixed domain, public revenue, and a certain form of government exempt a nation from that reproach.⁵ But Dr. Lushington, Judge of the Admiralty Court, delivering his judgment in the case of the Magellan pirates in 1853, says :

Even an independent State may be guilty of piratical acts. What were the Barbary pirates? What are the African tribes? I am well aware that it has been said that a State cannot be piratical, but I am not disposed to assent to such dictum as a universal proposition.⁶

⁴ The writer has pointed out in the *Times* and elsewhere that there is nothing in the Law of Nations which forbids merchant vessels from being armed for self-protection. There is an erroneous idea that such a course is illegal. The mistake probably arises because privateering is forbidden by the Declaration of Paris, 1856: 'Privateering is and remains abolished.' To this Declaration all the belligerents are parties. But little consideration is necessary to show the immense difference between a vessel being armed for self-defence and *resisting* an attack, and a vessel being armed for the express purpose of attacking enemies, which latter is the duty of a privateer. Many persons who should know better labour under this mistake. Similarly some persons think that because the Powers who took part in the second Conference at the Hague in 1907 declared that merchant ships converted into warships must bear the external marks which distinguish the warships of their nationality, therefore merchant ships armed for self-defence must do so also. But that is obviously nonsense.

⁵ Grotius, 2, c. 18, s. 2.

⁶ Spinks, *Admiralty R.*, p. 83.

And this judgment of the Judge of the High Court of Admiralty is evidently based on considerations similar to those enunciated by Monsieur de Vattel in 1758, who says :

There is another case where the nation in general is guilty of the base attempts of its members. That is when by its manners, or the maxims of its government, it accustoms and authorises its citizens to plunder and ill-use foreigners, or to make inroads into neighbouring countries, etc. Thus the nation of the Usbecks is guilty of the robberies committed by the individuals of which it is composed. The Princes whose subjects are robbed and massacred, and whose lands are infested by these robbers, may justly punish the entire nation. What do I say? All nations have a right to enter into a league against such a people, to repress them, and to treat them as the common enemies of the human race.'

If a nation or its ruler approves or ratifies an act committed by its subjects it makes that act its own. The offence must then be attributed to the nation as the true author of the injury, of which the subject is only the instrument. The country of Usbeck, peopled from Tartary, was renowned for its depredations, although once the seat of a more powerful Empire than that of Greece or Rome. The Tartars, or Tatars, of the Golden Horde, or of Kiptshabi, are well known in history. Batu resided at Great Seraii on the Akhtuba, a branch of the lower part of the Volga and Don, in 1255. After him was Tokbay, whose son, Usbeg, from whom the Usbecks take their name, died in 1340. His descendants became Khans of some Turkish tribes to the east of the Caspian Sea.

The case instanced by Dr. Lushington of the African tribes is still more cogent. Throughout the decline of the Roman Empire, the Mahometan Conquest, and the Middle Ages, piracy always existed by the side of the great strife of peoples and religions. In the course of the fourteenth century, when the native Berber dynasties were in decadence, piracy became particularly flagrant. The town of Bougie was a most notorious haunt of pirates. The Barbary Pirates arose in the sixteenth century. Tripoli, Tunisia, and Algeria were governed by Berber Beys of Northern Africa until 1587. Afterwards they were ruled by Turkish Pashas until 1659, when a military revolt in Algiers reduced the Pashas to nonentities. From that time until 1830 these African provinces, though nominally part of the Turkish

' Enfin il est un autre cas, où la nation est coupable en général des attentats de ses membres. C'est lorsque par ses mœurs, par les maximes de son Gouvernement, elle accoutume et autorise les citoyens à piller et maltraiter indifféremment les étrangers, à faire des courses dans les pays voisins, etc. Ainsi la nation des Usbecks est coupable de tous les brigandages des individus qui la composent. Les Princes dont les sujets sont volés et massacrés, dont les terres sont infestées par ces brigands, peuvent s'en prendre justement à la nation entière. Que dis-je? Toutes les nations ont droit de se liguer contre elle, de la réprimer, de la traiter en ennemie commune du genre humain. (*L'ib.* II. c. vi.)

Empire, were in fact anarchical military republics, choosing their own rulers and living by piracy. Their sailing ships ranged into the Atlantic as far as the Canaries, and northward to Ireland and even to Iceland. All traders whose nations did not pay blackmail in order to secure immunity were liable to be taken at sea. The most powerful States of Europe, including Great Britain, France, and Holland, paid them blackmail and even entered into treaties* with them. Eventually after the Peace of Paris an expedition under Sir Edward Pellew, afterwards Lord Exmouth, proceeded to Algiers and with the help of the Dutch completely destroyed the formidable fortifications of that place. This was a mortal blow against Barbary piracy, which, however, continued on a smaller scale until 1830, when it was extinguished by the conquest of Algeria by France. Here we have an illustration of a Piratical State—a State whose rulers directed acts of piracy and with whom other nations entered into treaties.

We are much inclined to support the doctrine of Monsieur de Vattel and of our own Admiralty Judge (Dr. Lushington). Yet granted that these learned jurists be correct it does not help Great Britain in the present emergency, for the simple reason that, barbarous as the outrages of the German submarines may be, even if they be acts of a Piratical State, they nevertheless are acts of War. So far as Great Britain is concerned the word *War* is sufficient to give the cruel barbarians the right to say they are 'acts of war' against this country. Assuming, however, that the above learned jurists be correct, the question will immediately present itself, What about these outrageous acts offered to neutral Powers? In such case there is no protective word *War* to screen the German brutality. Is Germany with regard to neutrals, therefore, a Piratical nation, *hostis humani generis*, and justiciable everywhere? Probably not Piratical, for the *animus furandi* is wanting; but all the accidentals of a Piratical State exist—namely, the killing of innocent persons with whom their State is not at war (without pity for those whom they make widows or orphans) being persons lawfully navigating the North and neighbouring Seas, and the ruthless destruction of friendly property. Such were among the acts of the Barbary States and the Usbecks in other places. Such a nation may properly be termed, although not a Pirate, *hostis humani generis*, and merits that the Law of Nations should extend the punishment of old-day Piracy to it.

* In the reign of Charles the Second a formal peace was concluded between his Majesty and 'the most excellent Signiors Mahomet Bashaw, the Divan of the most noble city of Tunis, Hagge Mustapha Dei, Morat Bey, and the rest of the soldiers in the Kingdom of Tunis.'—October 5, 1662.

But what of the present Law of Nations? Does it afford no protection against massacres of unoffending citizens and destruction of private property whether on land or by sea? Talleyrand, writing to Napoleon Bonaparte in 1806, says :

According to the maxim that war is not a relation between a man and another, but between State and State, in which private persons are only accidental enemies, not such as men nor even as members or subjects of the State, but simply as its defenders, the Law of Nations does not allow that the right of war, and of conquest thence derived, should be applied to peaceable unarmed citizens, to private dwellings and properties, to the merchandise of commerce, to the magazines which contain it, to the vehicles which transport it, to unarmed ships which convey it on streams and seas—in one word, to the person and the goods of private individuals.

When we consider the terrible slaughter of unarmed and innocent men—British or neutral—the thirst for blood evidenced by the German nation is so excessive that the word *Piracy* pales; a more suitable word is required to designate the diabolical acts continually perpetrated, and being perpetrated, against our common humanity and the Law of Nations. Heine's most truly said of his countrymen : ' By means of their doctrines (the Idealism of Fichte and the system of Naturphilosophie) revolutionary forces have developed themselves, which only bide the day when they can burst forth and fill the world with horror and with wonder.' The Thugs of India in their adoration of the goddess Kali may in some remote degree attain the heights of cruelty evidenced by Germany both by land and by sea towards British subjects and neutrals in the present year.

When a civilised State seeks to make the citizens of another suffer the same amount of evil which the latter has inflicted on the former, it is *Retorsio facti* or retaliation. This should be limited to such punishment as may be requisite for the safety of the State and the good of society; beyond this it cannot be justified. Our Admiralty applied reprisals of the very mildest character in the case of prisoners of war taken from the German submarine U8, only imposing special conditions of imprisonment as a mark of reprobation for their heartless conduct and infraction of the Law of Nations in sinking merchant and passenger vessels, regardless of the lives of non-combatants and of women. Yet we might have justly retaliated in a serious manner. The destruction of the *Lusitania* has provoked a stream of hostility from all countries against our uncivilised foe. But the end has not yet come. Where a State likens itself to Pirates and to Usbecks retaliation need not be confined to individuals.

Unfortunately there is no supreme tribunal to enforce the commands of International Law. Except as above mentioned

* *Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland.*

there is no punishment, in the technical sense of the Criminal Law, which can be inflicted on a State or on its subjects disregarding the Law of Nations. In one word, there is no Sanction. Such a State, however, must and would lose its standing among civilised nations; it would also provoke universal reprobation and moral hostility. A State which has injured another can of course be attacked, as we all know, and if it be subdued may be required to give not only indemnity for the past, but security for the future. The obligations of a State, like the Laws of Honour, are rules of conduct principally enforced by public opinion. A nation which dishonourably refuses to obey its obligations under a treaty, applying to the same vulgar words concerning 'scraps of paper,' or to follow the approved rules of law, ceases to belong to the society of civilised Powers in the twentieth century.

One word more on the Law of Nations. It results, in the first place, from the stipulations of treaties and of rules agreed upon by the contracting States. This is called the Conventional Law. It also consists of the Customary Law founded on the tacit or implied consent of nations, deduced from their intercourse with each other. This becomes obligatory on all nations who are considered as having given their consent to it. It is evident that the Law of Nations cannot be immutable, the same in all ages. The high and lofty principles of the civilised States of the world, excluding of course Germany, are far in advance of the dark days of the Middle Ages. Yet even in uncivilised countries and in unpolished societies there are certain principles of action, a certain distinction between right and wrong, a rule of right reason, which, in the words of Cicero,¹⁰ is

congenial to the feelings of nature diffused among all men, one eternal and immortal law which can neither be repealed nor derogated from, deriving its authority from the Common Sovereign of the Universe, carrying home its Sanctions to every breast by the inevitable punishment which He inflicts on transgressors.

How much the more, then, should not the barbarous and cruel acts of an Empire, which vainly styles itself highly cultured, bring upon itself the deserved and eternal reprobation of all the Powers of the civilised world!

GEORGE SHERSTON BAKER.

¹⁰ *De Republica*, Lib. III. c. xxii.

THE FUTURE OF THE NATIONAL AND TATE GALLERIES

IF for the vital part of the Realm's Defence that concerns its art treasures there were a Distinguished Service Order, it has certainly been earned by Mr. R. C. Witt. The Secretary of the National Art Collections Fund and the author of *The Nation and its Art Treasures* was clearly marked out to be secretary also to the Committee of the National Gallery Board appointed to deal with their protection and with various allied subjects. Mr. Witt has 'established contact' between outside opinion and the authorities at Trafalgar Square; he has found in a committee formed of the junior Trustees men convinced already or open to conviction, and the very full, clear, and precise Report¹ recently issued marks a step won in the region not merely of opinion but of a judgment that will surely be acted upon. Of the various changes called for to render the administration of the National and Tate Galleries more effective which I ventured to advocate in this Review over three years ago² the greater number are now officially endorsed.

RANSOM

Unluckily the step to consent in opinion has been a slow one, and from opinion to action is a slower. It is over ten years since the Chantrey Committee reported and the National Art Collections Fund was founded; it is three and a half since this Committee was appointed. Victory might have seemed at last to be in sight; but while, at this leisurely rate, the protection of our artistic wealth was being considered, the need for a vaster and more urgent Defence has come upon us, that of lands, liberties, and of civilisation itself. In face of that elementary necessity and its pressing calls it may seem to be an impertinence to discuss the case of the arts, and it is no easy thing to command the necessary detachment. Yet in the last analysis what

¹ *Committee of Trustees of the National Gallery appointed by the Trustees to inquire into the Retention of Important Pictures in this Country and other matters connected with the National Art Collections. Report and Appendices and Minutes of Evidence.* Wyman and Sons, Fetter Lane, E.C.

² 'The National Gallery: Its Problems, Resources, and Administration,' January 1912.

we are fighting for is the security of hardly won humanities, the age-long work of the creative imagination, and fine art was the prophet and is the remembrancer of such conquests. For those then who have any freedom for thought it is no ignoble task to plan, in the general effort of defence and reconstruction, the enrichment and better ordering of imagination's treasure houses.

We must put out of our minds, no doubt, for the period of the War, and possibly later, the hope of large State subsidies. Yesterday we were discussing whether the 5000*l.* annual grant to the National Gallery should be increased to 25,000*l.* or to 50,000*l.* To-day it is cut down to nothing, and no one can say when it will be restored. It would be idle at present to examine at length the various expedients rejected or recommended by the Committee, the more so that when this chief occasion of their appointment was seen in its true proportion there was little to discuss. And here it may be well to repeat that it is no part of our hopes or plans to stop all export of artistic treasure, or to safeguard for the public a very large part of it; that would be both too greedy and too costly. The War, among its many lessons, may warn us that in the threat of casual brute destruction now hanging over all Europe we need not regret the removal in some part of our treasures to what may be greater safety across the Atlantic. Our demand for the nation in the matter of Old Masters is the securing of twenty, thirty, or fifty pictures of the first rank still in private hands in this country. That being so, it is clearly preposterous to embark on large schemes for the prohibition of export, or of taxation. The Chairman and Lord D'Abernon ruled out of practical politics a proposal that the Government should set aside a large sum beforehand for this operation, on the two grounds that the House of Commons would never consent to a vote for the purchase of pictures unnamed, and that the fact of a definite sum being publicly voted would inevitably send up the price of pictures when owners were approached. It is not for an amateur in politics to deny the force of the first argument. The House of Commons revenges itself for its inability or want of patience to check the waste in public services by pouncing on definite cases of smaller expenditure where the element of individual taste comes in, and I suppose would resent the placing of a sum to the Secret Service account for such a purpose. That being so, the Committee's conclusion is the right one, that the pictures in question, if they are to be acquired at all, must be acquired by private negotiation, on the one hand, with the owners to secure an opportunity of pre-emption, the advantage being held out of freedom from estate duty on the proceeds of such sale, and on the other hand, special grants from the Government for such purchases. The short list of

pictures could be confidentially agreed upon between the Trustees and the Treasury.

There I must leave the question of Government action towards acquiring those 'necessary' pictures. No Government grants will be obtained during the present distress. But so sudden a check on our plans may very wholesomely stir us up to ask whether there is no other direction in which resources might be found. What if they exist within the Galleries themselves?

Let us approach the subject by way of a previous question—namely, *How many more pictures of the older schools do we wish to see added to the National Gallery?*

GALLERY OR MUSEUM?

The answer to this question will depend on whether we wish it to remain a Gallery or to be, what for some time it has tended to become, a Museum. The ideal of a Gallery is a limited number of master works, each of which gives delight in a high degree by its appeal to the sense of beauty and significance. The ideal of a Museum is an unlimited number of examples of painting in every degree of imaginative force, but claiming a place because they are authentic illustrations of human activity, well or ill directed, in every country and period. This unlimited collection of all sorts to which we are in danger of being committed is a scientific (shall we say a German?) ideal in relation to art; it is opposed to the ideal of choice and rejection, and it involves, as it proceeds, an enormous expenditure, not only for acquisition, but for housing, upkeep, watching-service and administration. What is more, it is based upon a fallacy. A Museum of Natural Science can pursue the ideal of completeness because it deals with examples of genera and species; it does not attempt to collect, for example, all the individual butterflies it could obtain; it deals only with well-marked types and striking departures. But the productions of man have not the relative fixity of Nature, and every painter's work is to an appreciable extent a variation on his 'school,' and each of his pictures a variation from the rest. If we are going to be scientific we must collect them all. But there is another check even on the early stages of such an appalling project. Pictures are among the most costly objects in the matter of exhibition space; a palace is required to show a few hundred. You can show or stow for reference tens of thousands of butterflies or of prints, or of books on the floor and wall space of a room that will take pictures only by tens. Yet the omnivorous British Museum Library has had to protect itself by legislation even in war-time against the threat of having to receive, acknowledge and catalogue all advertisements as well as books and newspapers. We must therefore, with whatever pang to the scientific mind,

give up the dream of a complete museum of pictures and not allow the dream to affect us too much in planning our collection. We might even go further and say that our existing museums, offering as they do to the public with equal respect the most debased and the most noble examples of design, so long as the object represents a phase of history and of technique, are one of the chief instruments in debauching contemporary taste. Such things are very well for the specialist and pathologist; to exhibit them freely is to confuse the Gallery with the Museum, and we see the result in our shop-windows.

I do not pretend that the National Gallery can escape from being to some extent a museum. The really delightful gallery is small, and partial, and even wayward; the old Scottish National Gallery was an example. It consisted of one long room, divided up into bays of rectangular and hexagonal section, and contained a collection that did not attempt to embrace the world of painting, but rather represented strong excursions of private taste. The National Gallery of London cannot very well be private and wayward in its taste, and its Directors have contrived to make it a singularly representative one, up to the modern period. Moreover, in a remarkable number of cases the representation is first-rate; the pictures give us the master at his vivid best; they are not there for the sake of the name, but for their own sake. And further still, of the pictures that stand out even beyond the line 'first-rate of their kind' there is a saving proportion of what I may call miraculous works. It is the possession of even one or two such works that makes a gallery a place of pilgrimage. Thus, to name at hazard three, it is the presence of wonder-working pictures like Paolo Uccello's *Battle of Sant'Egidio*, Botticelli's *Mars and Venus*, Crome's *Moonrise on the Yare* that explains and justifies the building of a national shrine of painting on the finest site in London. By all these tests the National Gallery is fortunate, and the presence of so much that is fine, of so much that is even miraculously fine, disguises the other side of the account. But the removal, under the threat of aircraft attack, of a great many masterpieces, brings this other side into relief, and it becomes evident how much mere boredom and depression (wrought to a high pitch of skill) has found its way into the collection. This element may come in under very great names, and we may always suspect the thin end of its wedge when a critic praises a picture, not as being a beautiful and inspired work, but as being an 'important example.' Thus in the case of Titian the *Bacchus and Ariadne* is a great miracle, and the *Christ and Mary Magdalen* is a minor miracle; but the Cobham *Ariosto* is an 'important example' of his early period. In the case of Holbein, the

Duchess of Milan is a miracle, well worth the ransom that had to be paid for her; the *Longford Ambassadors* is an 'important' example, so important that it would break any museum director's heart to forgo its acquisition; yet no one can pretend that, except in the still-life parts, it is first-rate Holbein. So again with *Mabuse*; the *Magdalen* is a tiny perfection that Sir Charles Holroyd picked up for an old song from a casual caller; the *Adoration of the Kings* is 'importance' in *profundis*.

Here, perhaps, not to shock my readers, I had better stop in my enumeration. I should carry very few people with me if I argued for the exclusion of all pictures that are 'important' rather than great and perfect works of art, and I will not ask for so much; I know too well how easily the acquisitive collector's instinct and the scientific student's interest will affect even the man of strong aesthetic temper once he has to do with the direction of a gallery. I will only ask at this point for the concession that if the decision were to lie on the one hand between acquiring two or three or even half a dozen 'important' works, and on the other hand one 'miracle,' there should be no hesitation about getting the one and forgoing the others; and for the further concession that if the price of such a 'miracle' were the sacrifice of some 'important' works already acquired the bargain would be a good one.

If that is agreed, let us, before drawing any practical conclusion, consider the very great quantity of pictures in the National Collection which are neither great nor even 'important' works of art. There are such pictures in all the schools; the glamour, the general family likeness of Italian pictures conceals for many people the gulf between the fine and the shoddy, but it none the less exists; and anyone who will frankly go through the pictures and ask himself which of them are mere obedient school work or the production of vulgar natures affecting nobility, and which are drawn from living springs of imagination, will be astonished to find how few the genuine really are. It is easier, perhaps, to see the difference at a glance in the case of the Dutch school, because the Italian painter, even when he only repeats a formula, is seldom without one of the fundamental elements in painting, design; whereas it is only the exceptional Dutchman who has more of it than a careful photographer. The great men of the school, even Rembrandt himself, had to work their way out and up from a small dead-alive world of skilful copying, and the number of Dutch painters who reach relative freedom and deserve a place in any national gallery outside of Holland is not great. Yet because of their photographic aim and evident skill of craftsmanship their popularity is remarkable with collectors, while the number of their works makes accumu-

lation easy. Hence in almost every great collection we are wearied by searching through a tangle of small pictures for a possible treasure. The fault of our weariness lies partly, no doubt, in our own conscientious greed in looking at everything; but even when we have learned to skip there is a clogging of movement and clutching at the sight on the part of those hawkers of the tiresomely visible that damages any good things present.

The excess of middling and less than middling Dutch pictures, and also of 'good of their kind' pictures at the National Gallery comes about not so much from single acts of choice on the part of Directors as from the fact that collections have been acquired *en bloc* by purchase or bequest. First came the Peel Collection of fifty-six Dutch pictures, then the Wynn Ellis of fifty-eight, and last the Salting bequest of sixty-five. The result is that along with many pictures that it was desirable on their merits to acquire, we have others that would hardly have been purchased singly, and yet seemed too good of their sort to refuse. For a gallery, if it is apt to fall into the scientific mood of a museum and accept every accomplished picture as a specimen, is also liable to fall into the mood of the collector and accept any accomplished picture as a piece of property. The mood of the hardened collector is a strange one and verges on the maniacal. He begins probably with some enjoyment of the objects of art he collects, but passes from that to enjoyment of the act of collecting. Lord Hertford, the chief maker of the Wallace Collection, first of all furnished his villa, Bagatelle, with old furniture and *objets d'art*; then he filled his houses in London, where he never lived, with pictures, many of them bought on hearsay and left to blacken in the London soot. Then he filled up rooms and stables in Paris with canvases and cases of objects that never found a setting. He probably lost count of his possessions and kept up the purchase of pictures and cabinets and the rest as a form of sport. Or again, there was Mr. Staats Forbes, who bought modern pictures of the French and English schools. He too had vast accumulations with their faces to the wall in store-rooms at Victoria Station. Mr. Charles Butler and Mr. Salting were of much the same type, and Mr. Pierpont Morgan differed only in using public museums as his stores.

Is this an example that public galleries should follow? In the case of Lord Hertford's accumulations, we may see the advantages and disadvantages of the collector's habit of mind. His wide net captured many fine things, but there are instances of the blind habit of acquisition in this and that direction; twenty-one Greuzes where two or three would have given all the little, the misguided little, that the painter had to express, two of

them actually versions of the same picture ; twenty-two Bouchers, thirty-six Boningtons, twenty-eight by Decamps, twenty-nine by Horace Vernet, seventeen by Jan Weenix ! Can any gentleman really want so many versions of the 'Hare and Small Birds,' and if he does ought he, in justice to the many other gentlemen who would like to have one example, to go so far on the way to monopoly ?

So at the National Gallery we have no less than twenty Ruisdaels, eight Hobbemas, fourteen Cuyps, sixteen W. van de Velde, eleven by Philips Wouwerman. If we add in the Wallace Collection examples and those at Dulwich, we have, in public collections in London, fourteen Hobbemas, fourteen Boths, eighteen Berghems, twenty-seven W. van de Velde, twenty-eight Philips Wouwermans (how our grandfathers adored him !), thirty Jacob Ruisdaels, and no less than forty Cuyps. As it happens, we have the chief masterpiece of Hobbema at Trafalgar Square, one of the few pictures he seems to have painted after marrying at thirty a cook, and through her getting a post in the Customs ; there are also two very good Hobbemas at Hertford House. Again, we have a masterpiece of Ruisdael at Trafalgar Square effaced by a plethora of his more ordinary productions. A Cuyt at the National Gallery is a duplicate of one at the Wallace. But I need not pursue the subject. It is obvious that unless we are trying to outdo other galleries in the number of our specimens we have many superfluous pictures in which the same thing is said over and over again, and said less forcibly. If we pass from the Dutch to the British school, in the Turner Collection alone we have a vast superfluity, much more than he intended us to have.

Nor is this all. These pictures, even when accepted as gifts, are, as I have already suggested, costing us a great deal. In a picture collection pure and simple a picture occupies not only the foot or yard or more of space it covers on the wall. Unless we pile pictures two or three deep (and we are giving that up, because few pictures are properly seen unless on the level of the eye), a picture requires all the wall above it and all the floor in front of it to the centre of the room, and the costly section of concrete ceiling above. Therefore the housing of it, in construction, upkeep, and rates, is an appreciable yearly expense. Add the fraction of the services of attendants and police, payments for framing and glazing and cleaning and so forth, and it becomes evident that each picture retained is a pensioner on the limited grant for a public gallery.

Now the Committee does make a suggestion to relieve the walls of some part of this superfluity : they propose that a large number of pictures should be either stored or lent ('loaned' is

the word used ; may I grumble in passing at the Americanism?) I do not deny that in some cases this may be desirable. There are cases also where an exchange might be advantageous with a provincial or other gallery. But where pictures are offered for nothing they are apt to be too readily accepted. Would it not be better to offer them permanently at a reasonable figure to the other galleries, and put those that are not really needed in London or elsewhere on the market? What is superfluous at Trafalgar Square represents a very considerable value in money ; the superfluous Turner drawings alone would be a gold mine, and the money might be employed as a purchasing fund for things we really do need. The Trustees, it seems to me, should obtain powers to deal with all gifts and bequests in this way. Anything bought with the proceeds of such a sale would appear in the Gallery as the gift or bequest of the donor whose picture had been disposed of. In the matter of former purchases the power already exists, and was used in the case of Mr. Gladstone's rash purchase of the Krüger collection ; only four out of sixty-four remain in the Gallery ; most of the remainder were sold at Christie's. The only reason advanced against a freer use of this power is the danger that pictures might be disposed of as the result of a passing whim of taste. But in the cases I have just mentioned no such argument applies. It is not proposed to exclude this or the other artist ; merely to reduce an over-representation, keeping a sufficient proportion of characteristic work.

My own belief is that it would be an excellent rule to lay down that the National Gallery, already somewhat overgrown, should not for a long time to come be further extended, and that for every new work acquired room should be found by withdrawing a picture. The economy in building might be reckoned to the credit of special acquisitions.

THE DIRECTOR AND THE BOARD

Connected with these questions of general policy and economy is that of the function of the Board of Trustees. This is delicate ground, but as all of us who were witnesses were invited to give our views before the Committee, and were keenly and usefully probed by Lord Curzon and his colleagues, it may be permissible to submit some further reflections. Various witnesses urged in their evidence that the Director should have much greater independence in the matter of purchases, thus reverting to the older and successful practice. The Chairman was sceptical as to the advantages of a change, and the subject was ruled out of the scope of the Report, with the intimation that two out of the four members of the Committee were in favour of its inclusion.

Lord Curzon's arguments were two. In his brief experience of the Board he testified that the lead of the Director had almost invariably been followed. If this is to be the case in future, *cadit quaestio*; actual practice is more important than abstract right. I would suggest, however, that there is a difference between the proposals that a Director brings forward if he knows they will be decided by a vote, and those he might bring forward if he knew that decision in the end lay with himself. And I would further submit the probability that the state of mind and the action of a Director who has final responsibility will, from the point of view of prudence and safety as well as of enterprise, be more satisfactory than that of the Director who shares it with a Board. If the decision is to be his own he will be much more careful to be right beforehand, much more anxious to understand and weigh any criticisms that are made upon his proposal, and much more ready to drop it if the criticisms are damaging. In the other case his mind is more apt to be occupied and worried with a calculation of forces than with the pure merits of the business in hand; he may insensibly be driven into fighting out of *amour propre*, or he may even be tempted to back a doubtful scheme that is favoured by the Board in hope of support for a scheme of his own. For these reasons I doubt whether the apparent smoothness of a Committee's working under a voting system is any measure of the results that would be obtained by the other system.

But Lord Curzon used another argument. He seemed to think that it would be difficult to induce men of distinction to serve on the Board if they had no final responsibility for acquisitions. That is surely to do an injustice to the public spirit of such men, seeing that the British Museum Board gives so free a hand to the Keepers, and that the Board at the Wallace Collection has no acquisitions to consider; while both are recruited from the same class of eminent public men. But the injustice is still greater, I submit, to the immense importance of the critical and consultative function that remains when the vote is not insisted upon. An arbitrary and impetuous Director without a Board might easily be a danger to a Gallery. It is right that in an emergency he should be able to act alone, but he would be a foolish man who did not recognise the advantage of being obliged, when time allows of deliberation, to explain and justify his proposals to a critical Committee, all the more if it contains some cautious and conservative minds. What is undesirable is that the final decision should represent a clash of minds and convictions; for the resultant of two opposite and equal forces is nothing, and the resultant of a number of partly opposite forces is a residuum of force; not the whole-hearted movement that a

masterpiece of strong character deserves and demands. Why should pictures, any more than Greek vases or Italian medals, be at the mercy of a vote?

There is something more to be said. The discussion of the uses of a Board centred upon this one matter of fresh acquisitions, and this bulked so largely that Lord Curzon, as we have seen, doubted whether a distinguished Board could be secured if its full powers in this respect were curtailed. But this surely was to overlook a great deal of very important work that calls for supervising and acute criticism; the Report itself, with the wide range of subjects it covers, is in evidence. Indeed, in the concentration of attention on picture-purchasing, other matters, that are not so important but yet vital, may get less than their due. The first thing, of course, is to secure fine pictures. But we have already so splendid a collection that this part of the business is relatively less important than it was, and questions of proportion, limitation, and even elimination begin to come forward. The next thing is to preserve the pictures. To this question the Board of late years has given much attention, in the first instance by having the rooms fire-proofed, and by taking steps against the threats of the Suffragists, and their pupils, the German air-raiders. Then comes the question of framing, to which Mr. Benson properly draws attention in one of many useful appendixes. Other matters, like cataloguing and photographing, are not neglected in the Report. But when all these are seen to, another thing remains, only subordinate in importance to acquisition and preservation, and that is the display of the pictures, the system of arrangement, the design and decoration of the rooms, and the character of the backgrounds the pictures are hung against. The value of a fine collection can be infinitely increased by the taste with which all this art of exhibition is carried out; the value can be hugely diminished by failure under one or another head. Under the first head one great improvement has become possible of late years: increased space has allowed far more pictures to be hung on the level of the eye and with greater elbow-room, and some very happy rearrangements and combinations have been made. But, and here is the sort of general question that invites discussion, are we not falling in this matter, as in the matter of acquisitions, too much under the scientific spell, in the grouping of all the work of a school together, and all the work of a master? A dinner that should be entirely a succession of soups or of joints would not be a good dinner, and to bring out the virtues of a picture, variety, both of subject and of treatment, is required. Unscientifically I hanker for a *Salon Carré*.

The new rooms are built and finished, so the lessons that might be learned from them are not for immediate profit; but wall hangings are changeable things, and there is still a field to explore in that direction. It cannot be held that glazed Lincrusta-Walton, however admirably sanitary, is the last word as a background, and even if 'Jupiter is poor,' he is surely not so poor that he must cast a squalor over his priceless pictures by the material he hangs behind them. Happily a revolt against the dreadful stuff has begun at the Tate Gallery, and some very interesting experiments have been made both in background material and colour and in breaking up the proportions of the wall; even to the Chantrey marbles a factitious charm is lent for a first glance by their setting. Mr. Aitken obtained for these experiments the help of a friendly and gifted architect, and he suggests that it would be well worth while to spend a little money on farther experiments under such advice. It is the hardest thing in the world for a Director to judge what the effect will be of a room covered with a material of which he has only seen a fragment, and how pictures will hang against it. And it might farther be considered whether, for art galleries, the existing departmental machinery, where 'decoration' and also where printing is concerned, is the most likely to give good results.

At present, when 'decoration' or furniture and fittings are required, or printing has to be done, the gallery does not deal directly with the producer. It goes, instead, to two public departments, the Office of Works and the Stationery Office. Now, if I rightly apprehend the idea behind these departments, it is that a Director, or even (I blush to write it) a Board of Trustees, might, in direct contracts with furnishers and printers, be so incompetent and careless, or even so dishonest and corrupt, that it is necessary for a disinterested authority to intervene, give the actual orders, see that the price is the lowest possible, and check the accounts. The Office of Works does not make furniture or carpets or wall hangings, and the Stationery Office does not print. They give out the orders to contractors, and supervise the operations through a hierarchy of officials. I do not know whether any money is saved to the country by this method, or whether the elaborate system of checks costs more than the possible leakage through ignorance or dishonesty on the part of Directors; but it is my private conviction that in their pursuit of the pure ideal of financial integrity these departments have sternly discouraged the exercise of taste within their bounds as a possibly seductive and enervating influence. Look, for example, at the cover of the Report. We may be sure that the contract for printing it was keenly scrutinised; but no one has watched what the printer was doing with his types; and,

after the manner of printers, he has lavished as many founts as he easily could upon a single page, including two of the ugly sort known as 'block' type. Nor is this at all a flagrant example of what the printer can do when on his mettle. So with the Office of Works. As I have said, this department does not manufacture furniture and hangings; it undertakes contracts for them, but it does not supply a critical eye for their design. And it sometimes goes beyond financial control by employing its own architects in the supply of new buildings and fittings. Here again the co-operation of experts in construction and estimates is doubtless valuable, but the style of successive additions to the National Gallery buildings compares badly with that of Wilkins' original rooms, now remodelled.

For our picture galleries the best designers in the country should be employed, but not without control. When the private architect is given his freedom 'art' may easily, in its turn, get out of hand. The designer of the Tate Gallery, thinking chiefly of his 'architecture,' determined to have a central 'feature,' a dome, which has not relation to the uses of the building and obstructs, by a difference of level in its floor and other picturesque accidents, the passage from one part of the building to another; and the designers of our galleries generally, eager for sublimity, forget that few pictures are of great height, and build expensively on the palace scale of the Louvre, or of three-tiered Academy exhibitions.

An architect ought not to be permitted to put pencil to paper for his elevations till he has been cross-examined on the following points: Has he thought out his plans for lighting, natural and artificial; for ventilation and heating; has he considered the size of pictures to be hung and the distance required to view them; has he avoided corridors and dark corners that will add to a watching-staff? Then, and then only, should he put a seemly skin over the humble utilitarian bones. Here is a useful field for a Board's activity.

THE RELATIONS OF THE NATIONAL AND TATE GALLERIES

Under this head the Committee recommends a considerable advance in the status of the Tate Gallery, and improvements in the staff of both Galleries, and makes a proposal, which I mention here because it has a bearing on these matters, for the creation of a Gallery for Modern Foreign Art. They recommend that the Keeper of the Tate Gallery be made Director, that a separate Board be formed for that Gallery, composed of a certain number of Trustees of the National Gallery Board, with the addition of others appointed *ad hoc*; and that the Tate Gallery should have, for the first time, an endowment of its

own; but the Galleries are still to remain one institution in so far that pictures of the British School will be exchangeable; the Tate to include the whole British School, early as well as late; but a selection of British masters to be retained at Trafalgar Square representing that school in its due proportion side by side with foreign schools. As to the Foreign Gallery, it does not yet exist, so that less thought has been bestowed upon it; it is proposed that part of the Millbank site should be devoted to it, but its relation to the National Gallery is undetermined except by the assumption that modern French pictures already belonging to the National Gallery might find a place in it.

All this marks a very important advance, yet I think that the view of the Committee has been too much restricted to immediate convenience, and that the scheme should have taken a wider sweep. I venture therefore to repeat here with some development the scheme advocated in my previous article, and I am glad to find that its general outlines have the support of so authoritative a witness as Sir Sidney Colvin. Let me set out in tabular form the scheme of the Committee and the alternative. Here is the Committee's scheme :


National Gallery	Tate Gallery
Director (for the art side)	Director (art and management)
Director's Assistant	Assistant (learning art side)
Keeper (for management)	Assistant (learning management)
Keeper's Assistant	Board of Trustees, partly composed of National Gallery Trustees, and including the National Gallery Director.
Board of Trustees	
Joint Staff	
Accounting officer for both Galleries	
Typewriting and shorthand clerk	
Expert catalogue superintendent	

It is suggested that other assistants at small salaries might be engaged in training for provincial appointments or for the posts enumerated above.

My objections to this are, in the first place, that while remaining one institution for certain purposes, the two Galleries would now have no single head or governing body; it is not clear even in whom the purchases of the Tate Gallery would be vested, or who as between the two Boards is to decide on the division of pictures between Millbank and Trafalgar Square. There is besides the general objection that this would be a step towards increasing the present chaos in the relation of our Museums to one another. The ideal is to reduce it.

Another objection is that it is neither possible nor desirable to divide up the general responsibility for 'art' and 'administration,' though routine work and secretarial work under the second

head fall naturally to the Keeper. Moreover, though it is quite proper that the accounting and purely clerical branch should be separate, it is not desirable that the Keeper should be merely concerned with management. He has in any case to act as Director's deputy : he should be in training on the art side as well, to help the Director, with the possibility of succeeding him. And with these objects of help and of ultimate succession it is desirable that not one Keeper only, but the Keepers of all the Picture Galleries should be available. Here then is the skeleton scheme I should put against the other :



An accounting department for all four Galleries might be centred at Trafalgar Square ; into the matter of extra clerical help it is unnecessary to enter ; but the Assistants should be qualified in typewriting and stenography. Under 'Secretary's work' I include the routine of loans ; under 'Librarian's work' not only the supply and cataloguing of the libraries, with their books, sale catalogues, prints and photographs, and research for the Gallery catalogues, but also the work, which will become important at the Tate Gallery, of showing water-colours and drawings to students. This Gallery, by the recommendation of the Committee, is to become the National Collection of water-colours, on the Print Room system of portfolios, with occasional exhibition ; it already possesses the large Turner collection and many drawings by Stevens and others. Under this scheme the junior Assistant would begin with the more elementary duties and pass to the more difficult, and the Assistants would form a school for Keepers, as they, in turn, for Directors. The Director, as I have said, would have a band of colleagues who would greatly strengthen him by their combined knowledge and advice. To each of them might be assigned a special province in the wide field of painting, the province indicated by his Gallery. Thus the Keeper of the National Gallery might take over the Italian and Spanish Schools, the Keeper of the Tate Gallery the British School, the Keeper

of the National Portrait Gallery the Flemish, German, and Dutch Schools, since the problems of early portraiture in this country lie chiefly in those directions; the French School would fall to the Keeper of the Modern Foreign Gallery. Each of the Keepers with his sub-committee would decide on purchases out of the special endowments and grants of his Gallery, subject to the Director's approval. To the Director and the whole Board would fall the case of 'Old Masters' at ransom prices, involving appeals to the Government, and this would automatically include by reason of price certain old English masters and French, as well as very costly Italian, Spanish, Dutch, or Flemish. Towards such emergency purchases a portion of the annual grant and of the income of funds like the Temple West might be reserved, following the practice of the British Museum. The Assistant Keepers should be University men of promise and artistic interests, or young men who have shown ability as critics, and they and the Keepers would have further possibilities of advancement to posts in provincial museums. Trained and tried and chosen in this way a Director in London or in the provinces would hold a different position with his Board from a recruit who has to learn his business and win their confidence; his post, as Sir Sidney Colvin says, should be permanent and pensionable. The scale of salaries should be that now existing at the British and Victoria and Albert Museums.

Something like this, I think, is the ideal for the future, and the unit thus formed would link on, when the time comes, to the still bigger reform of combining the administration of all our national museums into one organism. But I have no illusion about the likelihood of all this being done at once; it will perhaps be recommended ten years hence. What I plead for is that any changes in the relation of the National Gallery and Tate Gallery now made should not be inconsistent with that future step. Let the Tate Gallery have its separate endowment, its sub-committee of a Board modified by the inclusion of men specially interested in modern art, and proper salaries for its staff. But let its head remain Keeper, not Director, and its relation to Trafalgar Square be now made a model to which the whole group of Galleries of Painting might ultimately conform.

Here are changes which even in war-time might be carried out. They would involve some little fresh expenditure, but there are directions in which a counterbalancing saving might be effected. In the past the expenditure on the Police Force has been one of the heaviest items in the annual cost of our Galleries. A single constable costs the nation over 200*l.* a year, which is more, by the way, than is given to the Keeper's Assistant at the Tate Gallery. Some reduction has already been made under

this head by the substitution of Police Pensioners for part of the force; possibly a further economy still would be possible. But this is evidently a matter that closely concerns the Board, since theirs is the responsibility.

THE ENDOWMENT OF THE TATE GALLERY AND THE CHANTREY BEQUEST

But the question of endowment remains. An endowment exists, but it is misapplied, and the Director, the Keeper and the Board have at present no say whatever in its application. The Chantrey Bequest was founded to produce a National Collection of British Art at a time when no National Gallery of British Art existed. The machinery set up by the founder has completely failed to obtain what he wanted—examples of the best art available. The best art has, with very few exceptions, been excluded. Properly expended the fund would have secured for us, among other things, a collection of the Pre-Raphaelites, of the leading English water-colour painters, and examples of exceptional artists like Stevens and Whistler. That, so far as it has been done, has been done by private effort, with no aid whatever from the officials of the Bequest. It is therefore time, after thirty-eight years' experience of Academic management, that the nation should secure the benefits intended for it, and that the Trustees of the National Gallery should refuse an indulgence they extend in no other direction, that of accepting pictures and sculptures chosen by another authority. This they now propose to do. If the step they recommend is taken, the Academy, Sir Edward Poynter says, must refuse to act, and it will be for Parliament to reconstitute the trust, making the directorate of the Tate Gallery the purchasing authority.

The sum available, over 2000*l.* a year, is ample endowment for the purchase of art that has not yet reached ransom prices. The Chantrey purchases have been noxious not only in their quality and inflated scale of prices, but in their direction. They have encouraged the idea that in every year's exhibitions there are pictures and sculptures worthy of a national collection. The truth is that in each generation there are only a few artists worthy of that honour. It is no part of the duty of a national gallery to acquire pictures of the year in a hot hurry. It should leave this in most cases to the private collector, and rather pay a somewhat enhanced price for the real masters when enough years have passed to single them out. The National Collection is going on through an indefinite future, and ought to grow slowly, not at the rate the Chantrey collection has encouraged for contemporary art in municipal galleries as well as in London.

A GALLERY OF FOREIGN ART

One more in the remarkable list of new projects encouraged by the Committee is that already referred to for the foundation of a Gallery of Modern Foreign Painting and Sculpture. There are the beginnings of a collection at the National Gallery and at Kensington that have come by way of gift and bequest, but there has been no active policy of acquiring examples of the great modern French masters; indeed painters like Millet, Daumier, Monticelli, Manet, and Degas have appeared to be under a ban, and even Ingres, the greatest pupil of Raphael, has never found a place at Trafalgar Square. It is hard enough to get any of them now; yesterday there was still a chance, for Hugh Lane was with us, and that gallant and open-handed collector might have done the impossible. I feel too deeply and too strongly what we have lost, and what officialism has so sadly mishandled, to dwell upon that subject. The Gallery, it may be hoped, will yet be built and filled, but in the band of those who fight against obstruction to dower the nation with precious and enduring beauty there is a gap that cannot be filled.

SUMMARY: WHAT TO DO NOW

I put forward, then, as the main things practicable at present:

1. That, if, during the suspension of Government aid, a picture it is urgently desirable to secure for the nation should come upon the market, the Trustees might arrange that it should be held for them; the cost to be met from the sale at a convenient moment of superfluous pictures in the collection.
2. That such desirable reforms in the administration and staff of the National and Tate Galleries as the Trustees and Treasury can carry out should be undertaken without delay, including the abrogation of the arrangement with the Chantrey Trustees.
3. That in the near future the project of a Modern Foreign Gallery should be pressed. The National Art Collections Fund might well undertake, as its next task, the encouragement of benefactions to this end. As more than one writer has suggested, we might well mark the conclusion of peace with such a monument to the genius of France.

D. S. MACCOLL.

‘THE PASSING OF THE CHILD:’

A REJOINDER

IN the April number of the *Nineteenth Century*¹ Dr. Binnie Dunlop writes a ‘destructive criticism’ of an article I contributed in March, in which I brought forward reasons for believing that we are within measurable distance of having a stationary population in this country, and that a similar arrest of growth will not occur in Germany until an appreciably later date. I confined myself to considering the effects which limitation of the family has had on the population in the past and is likely to have in the future. But under the form of a reply Dr. Dunlop has seized the opportunity to issue a general defence of Neomalthusianism; and where he does challenge my arguments he bases his inferences upon birth-rates and death-rates, which in most cases are not those given by the Registrar-General.

Neomalthusianism in theory may or may not be desirable, but Dr. Dunlop discusses the question, if I may say so, with but little reference to the facts of the international situation. If we had the good fortune to live in a world in which all nations were permanently in amity, where conscription and armaments had disappeared, and where peaceful progress was the only form of rivalry, restriction of the family might not necessarily be harmful, at least so far as material conditions are concerned. Unfortunately we are far from these Utopian conditions. While one nation can descend upon another without provocation and with disregard of international treaties, so long will the position and strength of a country depend more upon the number of men capable of fighting than upon any other factor. Modern warfare, in which practically the whole adult manhood of a nation are engaged, is, in a sense, simply a development of the primitive tribal conflict, in which all the able men are warriors and go out to fight. Let us by all means strive to replace this terrible condition by more humane and reasonable methods of settling international disputes; but until risk of war has been abolished it is sheer folly not to face the facts, and not to recognise that we may again be called upon to fight for our national existence. If so,

¹ ‘The Truth about Birth- and Death-Rates: a Reply to Dr. Brend,’ by Binnie Dunlop, M.B., Ch.B.

success will depend upon the size of the forces we can command, and no effort should be spared to make the most and best of the population. These conclusions are so generally recognised that I would not have replied to Dr. Dunlop but for the fact that in his eagerness to defend Neomalthusianism he makes some astonishing claims which cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged. A further fall in the birth-rate may be unavoidable, but at least it need not be encouraged by the promulgation of pseudo-scientific assertions as to its national advantages which have no foundation in fact.

Dr. Dunlop adopts frankly the Malthusian hypothesis as to the dependence of population upon food supply. He sees the relation of cause and effect in the more or less simultaneous decline in the birth-rates and death-rates of most European countries during recent years; the fall in the death-rate, in his view, not having been due to Public Health measures, but to diminished pressure on the food supply in consequence of the decline in the birth-rate. Among other arguments, he supports this claim by asking the following question: '*Why has the death-rate risen in those countries where the birth-rate has risen, and why has the death-rate been stationary in those countries where the birth-rate has been stationary?*'² It will be convenient to note first the errors Dr. Dunlop has made in the actual cases which he cites to justify this question, reserving for the moment the general arguments against his views.

Dr. Dunlop says 'There are four countries in which the birth-rate has risen, namely Ontario (from 1895 to 1908), Japan, Ceylon, and Bulgaria. In every one of them the death-rate rose in close correspondence with the birth-rate.' It will be noticed that two of these are extra-European countries, with large native populations and quite different conditions. And what are the facts according to the Registrar-General? In Bulgaria the birth-rate has risen from 34.9 in 1893 to 41.7 in 1910, but during the same period the death-rate *fell* from 27.5 to 23.2. In Japan the birth-rate rose from 28.5 in 1893 to 33.9 in 1910, but the death-rate fell from 22.7 to 21.1. In Ceylon birth-rates and death-rates have jumped up and down from year to year in an exceedingly irregular way, which clearly shows that they have been affected by special circumstances, either prevalence of epidemics or more probably changes in the system of registration. No reliable inference can be drawn from them, though even here we may note that in 1913, while the birth-rate rose to 38.6 from 33.3 in the previous year, the death-rate dropped from 32.4 to 28.4. Ontario is the only one of the four countries in which the figures appear to support his view, and here Dr. Dunlop seems entirely to have

² Dr. Dunlop's italics.

overlooked the very obvious internal evidence that the statistics are quite unreliable. A glance at the yearly population returns would have shown him that while from 1892 to 1900 the average yearly increase was about 22,000, in 1901, the census year, the population appeared suddenly to drop by 141,000. Again, while from 1902 to 1910 the population showed an average annual increase of about 4200, the census of 1911 showed an abrupt rise of no less than 283,000. These sudden and enormous jumps clearly indicate a defective system of registration, and show that no reliance can be placed upon any of the statistics for the intercensal years.

Next Dr. Dunlop informs us that in Russia, Roumania, Jamaica, and Ireland the birth-rates and death-rates have remained practically stationary, though he qualifies this slightly in the case of Russia, and he asks whether I will maintain that in those countries there has been no progress of the kind which in my view should reduce the death-rate. But again I am at a loss to know where he has obtained his information. In Roumania, according to the Registrar-General, the death-rate has fallen from 34.7 in 1892 to 22.9 in 1912; in Russia the death-rate has fallen from 42.1 in 1892 to 28.9 in 1909, the latest year for which figures are available; in Ireland the death-rate has fallen from 18.5 in 1895 to 16.5 in 1912. In Jamaica the statistics show the same marked irregularity as those in Ceylon, and by selecting the years they could be made to support any view.

Finally, Dr. Dunlop calls special attention to Italy. He tells us that in that country the birth-rate and death-rate fell together up to 1901, but that they have 'remained practically stationary from 1901 to 1910!' And he asks 'Why were the doctors unable to reduce the death-rate these ten years?' The answer is that they were working with very good effect, for the death-rate in Italy was 23.8 in 1900, 19.9 in 1910, and 18.2 in 1912. Thus, of the nine specific instances which Dr. Dunlop cites, he appears to have been in error as to the actual figures in six, and in the remaining three—viz. Ceylon, Jamaica, and Ontario—no reliable inferences can be drawn from the statistics. These are very shaky foundations on which to build up his case.

But let us examine now the full meaning of this remarkable claim that the fall in the death-rate has not been due to Public Health measures, but to 'parental prudence.' During the last thirty or forty years unprecedented efforts have been made in this and other progressive countries to improve the health of the people. Housing Acts have swept away slums. Sanitary legislation has provided for the destruction of refuse and has ensured an excellent water supply. Adulteration of food has been checked, meat is inspected, and the quality of milk improved. Accom-

modation in general hospitals has grown to a remarkable extent, and municipal hospitals now provide for the treatment of the more serious infectious diseases. School children are medically examined and treated, and the hygiene of schools has received special attention. Midwives are trained and registered, provision is made for maternity, and infant clinics and consultation centres are coming into existence. But all this activity counts for nothing in Dr. Dunlop's opinion; it is airily dismissed as 'socialistic,' and the lessened mortality which has followed is calmly claimed for Neomalthusianism, although this has been largely restricted to certain sections of the community.

In many cases the direct effect of a particular piece of legislation or administration in bringing about the diminution or disappearance of a specific disease is so obvious that no reasonable person could doubt it. The death-rate from enteric fever has fallen from 236 per million in 1884 to 52 per million in 1912. Was this due to 'parental prudence' or to improved water supply and measures for preventing the spread of infection? The death-rate from diphtheria has fallen from 318 per million in 1893 to 117 per million in 1912; the case mortality in the Metropolitan Asylums Board hospitals having declined from 30 per cent. to 6.5 per cent. since the introduction of antitoxin treatment. Deaths from septic puerperal diseases have fallen from 120 to 62 per million women since 1899. Is any other explanation possible than that greater attention has been given to cleanliness and care during childbirth? These are all conditions to which it has been possible to apply special measures. Measles, on the other hand, is a disease which has only been treated in hospitals for infectious diseases to a very limited extent owing to the large number of cases, and for which no new methods of treatment have been discovered. It causes a high death-rate among the children of the working-classes, which has shown very little tendency to fall. Yet if diminished pressure on the food supply had been the cause of the fall in the general death-rate, this disease above all others should have shown the effect, since good food and care during illness and convalescence are the essentials for recovery. Measles is not in itself a deadly disease, as is shown by its very low rate of mortality among the wealthier classes. It is insufficient food, absence of nursing, or unhygienic surroundings giving rise to bronchitis, pneumonia, or other complications, which sweeps off thousands of children among the poor. These are just the conditions which would have improved with diminished pressure on the food supply and consequent increased ability to provide other necessities. In other cases we cannot directly measure the effects of Public Health activity, but he is a bold man who denies

that clearing of slums or provision of school clinics does not improve the general health of the community.

But the fallacy of Dr. Dunlop's contention also becomes manifest if we consider among what classes Neomalthusianism has flourished. Until recently the practice has been restricted to the more comfortable classes, yet the fall in the death-rate has occurred among all sections of the community, and the decline in infant mortality in densely crowded, poor-class areas has been most marked during recent years. In only one class of artisans—viz. textile workers—is there evidence that the custom of restricting births has attained considerable dimensions. Dr. Dunlop conveniently ignores the remarkable vital statistics in this group to which I called attention. Among textile workers the birth-rate is almost as low as that of the middle classes, and, on the Neomalthusian view, this should show highly beneficial results; yet the fact is that *its infant mortality is twice as great as that of the middle classes*, and its effective fertility at the end of the first year of life is really the lowest of any class in the community.

Dr. Dunlop rejects, as 'paltry,' corrections of vital statistics for age and sex, apparently failing to appreciate the importance of these processes which have been emphasised by Dr. Stevenson, Dr. Newsholme, and other statisticians, and are adopted in the vital statistics of all progressive countries. Without these corrections international comparisons are entirely unreliable. Yet Dr. Dunlop compares one country with another and draws inferences with reckless disregard of their age constitutions. I drew attention to the enormous fall in the proportion of children in this country since 1881, and to the effect this will have on the death-rate in the future. In his last report Dr. Stevenson says 'The fall in the death-rate, which for a number of years had sufficed to compensate for that in the birth-rate, has now ceased to do so, and it seems likely that a period of definitely lower natural increases than those of even the recent past has commenced.' After pointing out that the age constitution in 1901 was more favourable in regard to mortality than in any other census year, he continues: 'Since 1901, however, owing largely to increased proportion of old people in the population as a result of the decreased birth-rate, the age constitution has again become less favourable, and as this change progresses it will, to an increasing extent, tend to increase the crude death-rate, and so to diminish natural increase.' As Mr. J. W. Dixon has pointed out in the *New Statesman*, it is not generally realised how rapidly we are becoming a nation of old people. In the decade 1901-1911 the population of England and Wales increased by 10.9 per cent.; the population over fifty, however, increased by 20.8 per cent. Thus the elder population is increasing twice as fast as the whole population. In 1912 the

emigration-rate was 5.9 per thousand. If this should continue, with a birth-rate of 23 per thousand, we only require a rise of 3 points in the death-rate in order to bring about a stationary population. Dr. Dunlop completely ignores the case of Ireland to which I drew attention. In that country infant mortality is remarkably low, and the death-rates at each quinquennium do not on the whole differ much from those in England; but the general death-rate in 1912 was 16.5, compared with 13.3 in England and Wales, a difference which must be attributed chiefly to the much larger proportion of persons over the age of fifty in Ireland than in England and Wales. In France the death-rate was 17.5, although great efforts have been made to improve public health, and the infant mortality-rate has been reduced to a strikingly low figure. If Neomalthusianism is so beneficial, will Dr. Dunlop explain why the country in which it has been most extensively practised, and for the longest period, should have a death-rate 4.2 per thousand higher than that in this country? In Germany, on the other hand, the census of 1910 shows a very considerable excess of infants and children as compared with our figures for 1911, and although in the last ten years the fall in the crude birth-rate has been rather more rapid than in this country (19.4 per cent. as compared with 16.5 per cent.), the fact that the decline did not begin until a considerably later period will correspondingly postpone the date when its effect on the age constitution becomes most marked.

I pointed out that Germany has much more scope for reducing her death-rate than we have. Since I wrote my article in March the German statistics for 1912 have been published. It is highly significant to note that the death-rate has been reduced in the year from 17.3 to 15.6 and the infant mortality-rate from 192 to 147 per thousand births; while the birth-rate only fell from 28.6 to 28.3. Thus the natural rate of increase in Germany in 1912 was 12.7 as compared with 9.8 in the United Kingdom, and this without making any allowance for the much higher emigration-rate in this country. In view of the probability that a period of definitely lower rates of natural increase has now commenced in England and Wales, the seriousness of the position should be plain to every thoughtful person. It is probably not generally known that the population which the Registrar-General gives each year in his Report is calculated from the rate of increase during the period 1901-1911, the census years, and that no notice is taken of actual changes owing to emigration or immigration. But in the volume just published the Registrar-General points out that the assumptions made in this method of calculation are now open to such serious objection owing to the increase in emigration and the decline in the rate of natural increase since 1911, that in

future years it will be necessary to frame the estimate upon the natural increase of the population and the net effect of migration. *Had the estimate for 1913 been framed upon the natural increase and migration returns, it would have been lower by some 310,000 than that actually adopted in the Report.*

Dr. Dunlop has clearly been impressed with the fact that in many countries the birth-rate and death-rate have declined simultaneously ; and he has jumped to the conclusion that one has been cause of the other, though he claims a higher degree of correlation between these rates than actually exists. In France, for example, the death-rate has only been definitely falling since about 1900, although the birth-rate has been declining for a generation. But there is no mystery about this association. Where you have a large, ignorant, and poverty-stricken population you have a high death-rate because of the adverse environment, and a high birth-rate because the people do not possess knowledge of the means of restricting births, and also because they have not reached a degree of development which leads them to demand the opportunities for education and comfort manifested by the more cultured classes. If pressure on the food supply had led to Neomalthusianism, these are the very classes among whom the practice would have arisen first, whereas the exact opposite is the case, the custom beginning among the wealthier classes and gradually extending downwards. Mrs. Richardson, whose interesting article³ afforded an excellent concrete example to my generalisations, says 'to them [the professional class] comfortable conditions of living, a good education, a circle of congenial friends, art, travel, up-to-date amusements are not luxuries, but as much necessities of life as the working-man's "meat" dinner, gossip at the street corners, public-house, and football match ; and to have to deny these to their children is as bitter as it is to the working-man to see his children ill-clad and ill-fed.' There in a nutshell are the motives which have led to the fall in the birth-rate, while if we go to the Liverpool dockers, general labourers, and costers, among whom pressure on the food supply is greatest, we shall find families of eight, ten, and even more, quite a common thing.

In my article I dealt only with the effects of Neomalthusianism upon population, but there are important moral, social, and physiological questions involved which Dr. Dunlop does not touch upon in his general defence of the custom. Particularly grave are the reasons for believing that there has been a serious increase in the practice of procuring abortion concomitantly with the growth of Neomalthusianism. At the last International Medical

³ 'The Professional Classes, the War, and the Birth Rate,' *Nineteenth Century and After*, March 1915.

Congress Dr. A. J. Hall, of Sheffield, called attention to the growth of chronic lead-poisoning in the Midlands owing to the practice among women of taking lead compounds as abortifacients. Since permanent sterility, paralysis, and death may follow its use, the injurious effects are more far-reaching even than those of Neomalthusianism.

At the present crisis in our history nothing could be more disastrous than to encourage the view that Neomalthusianism is beneficial to a country, or that the practice has either scientific support or statistical evidence in its favour. It is unfortunately true that in all our large cities there is an appalling waste of human life, and that the infant mortality-rate is at least twice as high as it need be, despite its fall in recent years. But the remedy for this state of affairs is not to prevent children from being born, but to provide a healthy environment for mothers, and to ensure that children are born and reared in hygienic surroundings. The enormous value of pure air even among those living in extreme poverty is shown by the experience of Ireland. Sir John Gorst in his *Children of the Nation* writes :

I have seen magnificent children living in hovels condemned as unfit for human habitation in the West of Ireland, models of health and vigour. The explanation was that they lived almost entirely in the open air. The children of gipsies and vagrants who live in tents on commons, though filthy and untaught, are far healthier in their free open-air surroundings than the corresponding class in the slums of the city.

In Connaught infant mortality is only 52 per thousand births—less than half the rate in England and Wales—and the general death-rate is the lowest in Ireland. Yet we may judge how defective is the provision for medical treatment from the single fact that no less than 48.5 per cent. of all deaths in Connaught are uncertified, owing to absence of medical attendance during the last illness. Up to 1911, Public Health legislation, save for the provision of Poor Law medical relief, had been almost entirely of a preventive character. The Insurance Act was the first measure which aimed at providing medical treatment on a large scale, and the experience of it in practice has not been encouraging. When Parliament realises how infinitely greater is the return from preventive than from curative measures, it will not seek to extend medical benefit under the Insurance Act to those at present excluded, in order to patch up defects which should never have arisen, but will rather spend the money in improving general conditions.

Probably the greatest scope for Public Health activity now lies in the direction of improving the quality of the air in towns. For centuries mankind discharged refuse into the rivers, and then drew much of his drinking water from these polluted sources.

Now we have got a wholesome water supply, but we have yet to learn the importance of purifying the air we breathe. We still allow factory chimneys to discharge volumes of smoke and gases in the midst of crowded towns; we permit dust-carts to be loaded in the streets at all times of the day, filling the air with a cloud of filth; we allow refuse heaps to be accumulated on the outskirts of towns, forming breeding-grounds of flies and centres of infection; and there is perhaps something deadly in the mere aggregation of human beings into masses which has yet to be fully understood. The Public Health authorities of the future must try to reproduce in towns as far as possible the healthy conditions of the country. We must have larger playgrounds and more open-air classes for school-children, wider streets, more gardens, parks, and open spaces in cities, and, perhaps most important of all, broad straight roads with rapid trams and increased railways running out into the country in order to encourage the already observed tendency for persons to dwell outside cities and come in daily to their work. At the same time we must redouble our efforts to remove the curses of venereal disease and alcoholism.

It is ridiculous to dismiss these measures as 'socialistic,' and fortunately Public Health questions in this country have not often been the sport of party politics. It is certain that, whether there is a Liberal or Conservative Government in power after the War, improvement of the health of the people will be regarded as the most urgent task of the future. Apart from other important considerations our national safety will demand it as compensation for the falling birth-rate. The War has brought much nearer the establishment of a Ministry of Health, and this step would constitute one of the most beneficial pieces of social legislation which has ever been undertaken.

WILLIAM A. BREND.

POSTSCRIPT.—Since the above was written, Mr. Birrell has stated, in reply to a question in the House of Commons, that the death-rate in Ireland, in 1911, would have been 13.8 per thousand if the constitution of the population as regards sex and age had been the same as that of England and Wales. The crude Irish death-rate was 16.5, the death-rate in England and Wales was 14.6. Thus, when reduced to a comparable basis, the death-rate in Ireland is actually lower than that in England and Wales.

W. A. B.

SCIENCE AND LOGIC:

A REJOINDER TO DR. THOMSON AND MR. SHELTON

THE study of scholastic logic has many ill-effects upon the student, and one of these I pointed out in my previous article. Another is that it leads him to address, in the manner of a very superior schoolmaster addressing a very ignorant and conceited small boy, any one who ventures to call in question any of its dogmas. Dr. Thomson¹ has not escaped the infection, for he speculates 'how far the nonsense' I write 'is due to ignorance and confusion of thought'; but the malady has touched him lightly, for he writes clearly, and his quotations of what his antagonist says are correct, so that I feel confident that he is not a professional logician, but has only dallied with the subject, and has never allowed it to get any real hold upon him.

He takes exception to my assertion that in two thousand years logicians have not succeeded in defining logic; and he shows that many individual logicians have in fact formulated definitions. As he says, if they have not succeeded, it has certainly not been for lack of trying; but though there are many attempts at defining logic there is no definition of it that is accepted universally, or even generally, among logicians. No two logicians agree as to what logic is; and as long as there is no common definition it is true to say that logicians collectively have not succeeded in defining logic. There is no definition which an outsider can take as authoritative.

'If the mind is the faculty of thought, and if there are thoughts which do not themselves come into consciousness, though the effects of them do, then,' says Dr. Thomson, my equation of mind with consciousness is incorrect. Why, of course it is, but to me his suppositions are on a par with some others that he perhaps has forgotten, but that my juvenility, which he seems to resent, although I can assure him that it is only comparative, enables me to remember. If all the earth were apple pie, and all the seas were ink, why then to suppose that we could refresh

¹ 'Is Logic Effete? a Criticism,' by the Rev. J. E. H. Thomson, D.D., *Nineteenth Century and After*, March 1915; in reply to an article by Dr. Mercier in the February number.

ourselves by a dip at Margate would be incorrect. But supposing, as we have some reason to believe, they are not so? Then any conclusions we may draw from these suppositions would be erroneous, as I think the conclusion Dr. Thomson draws from his supposition is erroneous. It has been a commonplace since the days of Leibnitz that the brain may go on working without any corresponding working of the mind, or of consciousness, for I use these terms, as I think they should be used, as equivalent. When the mind takes up its work again it finds itself at a place in advance of where it left off, and from this it is said that the mind has been working unconsciously. This is what I call a contradiction in terms. What has been working unconsciously is the brain, and no doubt the brain can and does sometimes work unconsciously; but to speak of the mind working unconsciously is not only muddle, but very pernicious and disastrous muddle. It leads to many mistakes and false doctrines and bad practices, among the most pernicious and disastrous of which is the doctrine and practice of psycho-analysis, so called, which is now enjoying such popularity as the latest fashionable fad in medicine. I do not know whether they catch it from the weaker members of the female sex who engage so much of their attention, but for some reason or other doctors are more susceptible to the influence of fashion than the members of any other profession. The day before yesterday, the panacea, the elixir of life, the magic fluid that was to rejuvenate the old and reinvigorate the young, was sour milk. Every doctor ordered sour milk, and every patient took it. Factories were started for the production of sour milk. Rival firms claimed the possession of the only true lactic acid bacillus. A general odour of sour milk pervaded the atmosphere of Cavendish Square and its neighbourhood. Not to take your glass of sour milk in the middle of the morning stamped you at once as hopelessly suburban, or even actually provincial. What is become of it now? Where are the snows of yester-year? Who orders sour milk now? Perhaps the doctors in Labrador or Tierra del Fuego, or wherever cast-off fashions go to. Who now takes sour milk? Perhaps the monks of Thibet.

That was the day before yesterday. Yesterday the fashion was for liquid petroleum. Every doctor ordered liquid petroleum, and every patient drank it. For aught I know, the idle sour milk factories were turned into refineries for the production of potable petroleum. The Old Fogies' club competed with the Megatherium in the excellence of the distillate. Every old foggy had his favourite bin and invited his cronies to partake. In the universities, wine parties gave way to paraffin parties, and Cavendish Square reeked of paraffin. That was yesterday, and the

craze is passing. It is not gone yet, and there are plenty of people who, if they should swallow a yard of lamp-wick, leave the end hanging out of their mouths, and light it, would give light enough to attract a Zeppelin; but it is passing. A doctor who would be thought right up to date would almost as soon order sour milk as petroleum. It may still be given in the suburbs and the provinces, but the young doctor in Harley Street or Wimpole Street who is ambitious of being the very last thing in doctors looks with scorn upon the petroleum that he ordered yesterday, and the sour milk that he ordered the day before, and pins his faith on psycho-analysis. He takes, I suppose, what his grandfather would have called a carminative and stomachic, to keep him from being sick, and reads his Freud until nausea overcomes him. He gets by heart the jargon about 'repressed complexes,' 'unconscious painful ideas,' and so forth, and blossoms out into the full-blown psycho-analyst. With half a dozen stock phrases and a strong stomach, it is as easy as ordering sour milk, and much more profitable. We are now at the height of this wave of fashion, but I doubt if it will last as long as any of its predecessors. For one thing, if they did not do much good, they did no harm; and for another, they were patronised not only by the young, who are more eager to be thought up to date and more avid after the last new thing, but by a fair proportion of the older and more experienced men also. Psycho-analysis, however, is confined entirely to the younger men. You cannot catch an old bird with such very unappetising chaff. Its humbug is too transparent to take in a man of any experience, and its effects are not merely harmless but actively pernicious.

The whole fabric of psycho-analysis rests upon the false conception of the unconscious mind, and upon flimsy evidence which no one with any logical training would kill a flea upon, much less hang a dog upon. This is the kind of evidence by which it is supported. Have you forgotten a word? Then that word is associated in your mind with some painful idea which causes you to thrust the word out of your memory. You say you don't thrust it out, you would rather remember it; but you are mistaken, you have an unconscious desire to get rid of it, because it is painful. But you feel no pain? Of course you don't, the pain is unconscious. And you have no painful association with the word? My dear sir, the very fact that you deny it proves conclusively that it is painful, or why should you deny it? This is the stuff that is taken up and exploited by men who have had a university education, and some of whom have, I believe, passed an examination in logic. Judge, then, of the value of logic 'as she is taught' in enabling men to estimate evidence!

Dr. Thomson's inability to see the humour of my master's

answer, that the pebble I picked up was 'common jasper,' places me in a position of extreme embarrassment. From the way he spells his name, no less than from the revelation that he received his education at Glasgow University, I had already surmised that he belongs to that otherwise intellectual nation that jokes with difficulty. To explain a joke is at the best of times what he himself would call a *sair, sair* task: to explain a joke to a Scotchman is, if my reverend antagonist will pardon the expression, the very deuce: but to expound a text of Scripture to a Doctor of Divinity requires an amount of effrontery that I make no claim to possess. It might discover a remnant of diffidence in the Kaiser himself. In these embarrassing circumstances the utmost I can do is to refer my antagonist to Revelation xxi. 11, and to explain that to give to 'a stone most precious' the title of *common jasper* is a contradiction in terms almost as flagrant as the unconscious pain of the psychoanalysts.

I grieve to find that there are many statements in my article that are difficult for Dr. Thomson to understand. He must kindly make allowances for me on the ground that I have been dabbling in scholastic logic, which may have left upon me some of its evil effects, one of which, as I pointed out before, is to deprive its students of the faculty of expressing their meaning clearly. However, of the many he mentions only two, so I take heart again. He does not understand how a competent logic would have taught Dr. McDougall that the relation between Mind and Body is an insoluble problem, and he says that this competent logic dwells, as yet unrevealed, in my brain; and I had fondly thought that my *New Logic* was as well known to every logician as his Mill or his Fowler! This is disillusionment indeed. In that immortal work it is proved by the strictest canons of reasoning that the problem of the relation between Mind and Body is insoluble; and Dr. Thomson's second difficulty, about the nine or ten quantities that logicians enumerate in propositions, though they declare they are only two, is explained in the same precious volume.

And then Dr. Thomson speculates about me as a 'psychological phenomenon.' I am flattered. I have been called many names in my time, and some of them by logicians too—ignorant, foolish, paradoxical, presumptuous, impracticable, and (by Sir Victor Horsley), vulgar, abusive, and liar—but I was never called such a long name before. What moves Dr. Thomson to this explosion of feeling is that he cannot for the life of him make out what purpose I had in writing the article on Science and Logic to which he replies, and he speculates on this subject until he becomes in wandering mazes lost. It was to pick a bone

with Professor Karl Pearson; it was to get in a dig at the Mendelians; it was to revenge myself on the Medico-Psychological Association for its treatment of my thesis on the punishment of lunatics. No, it was none of these. Dr. Thomson will be astonished: his pastoral experience has given him, I am afraid, a very unfavourable impression of the obliquity of the motives by which the members of his flock shape their conduct; and has taught him that the ostensible motive is never the real motive; but let me assure him that, with all his experience of Caledonian congregations, he little knows the absence of guile in the physician, especially the physician for mental diseases. My motives in writing the article were actually what they purported and pretended to be, no more and no less. They were to draw attention to the absurdities of the old Logic; to show how badly a competent logic is needed, and to illustrate the need by examples; incidentally to clear up a very prevalent confusion as to what is meant by science; and to explain what logic ought to do, and if it were a competent logic, would do.

So far I have noticed those matters only on which I have been unfortunate enough to incur Dr. Thomson's disapproval. It is a pleasanter and more grateful task to notice that there are still many charges that I have made against the old logic in which he does not disagree with me, and these, I find, are quite as grave as, and more numerous than those to which he objects. I now salute him, and with every expression of goodwill and esteem I take my leave of him, and turn to Mr. Shelton.³

Eastern potentates, in their diplomatic correspondence with his Majesty's representatives abroad, are apt to preface their communications with a long recital, both of their own numerous titles, and of their sentiments of esteem for his Majesty, his representative, and all that pertains to them. In telegraphing these documents to headquarters, it is customary, I believe, for the local official to summarise these flowery, lengthy, and irrelevant particulars in the words 'After Compliments,' or even in the letters A.C., and then to give the gist of the matter in full. I trust that I may be allowed to follow this distinguished example, and summarise Mr. Shelton's references to my untruthfulness, plagiarism, inefficiency, disregard of the amenities of controversy, and so forth, in the expression 'After Compliments,' and may proceed at once to the gist of his article.

It now seems that when he entitled his article 'The Logic of Thought and the Logic of Science,' he did not mean, as the title implies, that there is one logic of thought and another and different logic of science, and that thought and science are apart

³ 'Logic and Science,' by H. S. Shelton, *Nineteenth Century and After*, May 1915.

from one another. It seems that he meant no more than what has always been meant by Deduction and Induction. I am sorry I misunderstood him, but I think his expressions lent themselves to misunderstanding and rendered it unavoidable. These two branches of logic have always been distinguished. That which is called Deduction formerly included all that was known of logic : that which is called Induction is of modern growth. Mr. Shelton gives to it the additional titles of Methodology, and of the Logic of Science. It seems to me a pity to give new names to familiar things, unless there is some good reason for doing so ; and that it may be disadvantageous is shown by my misunderstanding. Mr. Shelton says that induction is now generally known as methodology, but I have consulted a dozen of the ordinary text-books, from Mill to Professor Carveth Read's *Logic*, published within the last month, and I find that they all call it Induction : none of them use the word methodology. To call it the Logic of Science is very misleading. It may mislead other people, as it seems to have misled Mr. Shelton, into supposing that there is some mode of reasoning peculiar to the natural sciences, which is not used in reasoning in other subjects.

Of the present state of deductive reasoning Mr. Shelton offers, in his reply to me, no opinion, but from other utterances of his it appears that he has no quarrel with the accepted doctrines, and regards them as satisfactory. In this I differ from him profoundly. In my opinion, the doctrines of Deduction which have been accepted for the last two thousand years are as erroneous as the doctrines of judicial astrology which were accepted for six thousand years. In this opinion I am in agreement with Dr. Schiller, whom Mr. Shelton calls a more consistent and more formidable opponent, and with Mr. Alfred Sidgwick, who exposes the pretensions of the old logic, says Mr. Shelton, more clearly and with greater knowledge. I do not enter into competition with these gentlemen, whose services to the cause of reform I gratefully acknowledge, but there is this difference between them and myself, that, though both of them have attacked the old logic as vigorously as I have, neither of them has proposed any alternative. I have. Both of them are solely critical and destructive. I also am critical and destructive, but I am constructive as well. Not content with showing that the old logic of Aristotle and the schools is wrong, which is easy enough, I propose a logic that I maintain is right ; and is right on these grounds among others : It solves every logical problem, including many that by the old logic are insoluble. It includes every possible form and mode of deduction as well as the very few included in the old logic. Its fallacies are breaches of its rules. The fallacies of the old logic are not breaches of its own rules.

It is impossible to break a rule of the new logic without committing a fallacy : it is possible to break every rule of the old logic without committing a fallacy. It is impossible to perpetrate a fallacy without breaking a rule of the new logic : it is possible to perpetrate any number of fallacies without breaking a rule of the old. On these grounds I submit, not that the new logic should necessarily be accepted, but that it is worth examination. This submission is not allowed. Logicians will not examine the new logic. Mr. Shelton, indeed, professed in his *Quarterly Review* article to examine it, but Mr. Shelton repudiates the title of logician, and his account of the new logic is so erroneous that he must have mixed it up with some of the other books included in his review. So much for Deductive Logic.

Inductive Logic, which Mr. Shelton calls methodology, and the Logic of Science, he defines as the study of scientific method, the attempt to throw light on the methods and processes by which the student can best advance his subject and discriminate between truth and error ; and he seems to regard the attempt as hopeless.

The general consensus of opinion now inclines to the view that the attempt, in the form that Mill made it, is impossible. It is beginning to be generally accepted . . . that induction, unlike deduction, is not a process capable of rigid expression. Nevertheless, few will deny that, even if Mill's philosophical views are erroneous, his account of the process of scientific investigation is an admirable work and a powerful and penetrating study of scientific method.

Well, I am one of the few. I was brought up in that idolatry of Mill which prevailed in the latter half of the last century, and it was with astonishment and consternation that I found, when I came to examine his *Logic* critically, that it is a mass of confusion and self-contradiction. Some of his most important terms, such as Condition, he never defines at all ; those that he does define he defines over and over again in senses that are wavering, incongruous, discordant, and often inconsistent. Of Cause and Causation he gives more than a dozen definitions, all different, some irreconcilable with others, some self-contradictory. His Four Methods of Experimental Inquiry are not four, but five. They are stated in forms so uncouth, so obscure, so cumbrous, of such elephantine ponderosity, that it is most difficult to discover the meaning of some of them, and when the meaning has been laboriously dissected out, it is found to be absurd, and the method impracticable.

In view of Mill's gigantic reputation, these assertions will not be accepted, and ought not to be accepted, without conclusive proof. Such proof it is not difficult to furnish. Take his first and simplest Canon of Experimental Inquiry :

'If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree [why not 'this circumstance?'] is the cause (or the effect) of the phenomenon.'

Apply this to a concrete case, and let the 'phenomenon under investigation' be green colour. Two or more instances of green colour (a bucket, an armchair, and a pool ball) have only one circumstance in common (that they are green); this circumstance (that they are green) is the cause (or the effect) of the green colour.

This booby trap is so obvious that many of Mill's followers have noticed it, and have modified the Canon so that it reads 'have only one *other* circumstance in common.' Let us see how the amended formula works out in practice, and let the 'phenomenon' still be green colour.

If two or more instances (a bucket, an armchair, and a pool ball) of the phenomenon under investigation (green colour) have only one other circumstance (that they are in the same house) in common, this circumstance (being in the same house) is the cause (or the effect) of the given phenomenon (green colour).

Again, take the Method of Residues :

'Subduct [why not subtract or deduct?] from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous induction to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents.'

The classical instance that is given in almost every book is the discovery of Neptune. After all the perturbations of the planet Uranus that were due to the attraction of the known planets had been reckoned, there remained a certain residue of perturbation that was unaccounted for by them; and the detection of this residual perturbation led astronomers to guess that there must be some other source of perturbation, then unknown, and to look for it. But the planet Neptune was not discovered by the Method of Residues, and no cause of anything has ever been discovered by the Method of Residues. All that has ever been discovered by this method is that there is something to account for, something of which the cause is unknown; and then search by appropriate methods, none of which is given by Mill's Canons, has revealed the cause; but the cause has never been discovered by the Method of Residues.

As every writer on the subject cites Mill's Canons, and bases his treatment of the subject upon Mill, it is not to be wondered at that Mr. Shelton should have found that 'during the seventy years which have elapsed since the publication of Mill's *Logic*, they have accomplished practically nothing,' and I venture to predict that they will accomplish practically nothing until Mill's

methods are superseded and rejected, and Mill's influence is abolished. One of Mill's most pernicious legacies to subsequent writers was the notion that the methods pursued in scientific investigation are *sui generis*, and different in kind from the methods in other practical pursuits. 'On the practical side,' says Mr. Shelton, 'no sensible individual can deny that there is a real difference between the ordered systematic structure of scientific knowledge, the careful induction of scientific truth . . . and the chaotic mass of information known as ordinary knowledge.' There is a difference no doubt; but it is a difference of degree only. Knowledge is knowledge only in as far as it is reduced to system. When it is roughly systematised we call it ordinary knowledge; when it is elaborately systematised we call it science. Mill and his followers failed because they looked, as Mr. Shelton looks, for some method in science that is recondite, esoteric, and different from the methods of ordinary life. They have failed to find any such method; and one would have thought that seventy years of such failure would have taught them that they were looking in the wrong place. I wonder if Mr. Shelton ever read the story of the Purloined Letter. The detectives searched the room, sounded the walls, probed the furniture, groped in the chimney, took up the floors, and ransacked the apartment, without finding the letter, that was lying exposed under their noses all the time. The methods of science will never be discovered and formulated until it is recognised that science is nothing more than the application and development of common sense, and the methods of science are nothing but the application and development of the common-sense methods that we all employ daily in our daily affairs.

Astronomers are said to have discovered the planet Neptune by the Method of Residues. In fact they did nothing of the sort. They discovered that, after accounting by known causes for the greater part of the perturbations of Uranus, there was a residue that could not be so accounted for, and this was all that ever has been discovered by the Method of Residues. As I have indicated above, all that ever has been discovered by this method is that there is something unaccounted for by known causes. The astronomer then set to work to discover the cause. He said 'This must be produced by an extra cause that I have not reckoned on. But though it is a new effect it is not a new kind of effect. I am familiar with the perturbations of planets, and I know how they are produced. They are produced by the attractions of other planets. Now, like effects are produced by like causes; hence this perturbation must be due to the attraction of some undiscovered planet, and I must proceed to discover it. To produce this effect the causal agent must have been in a

certain place at a certain time.' Then he investigates, and finds that at that time Neptune was in that place, or in the neighbourhood.

When the cook finds herself short of a pot of jam she proceeds in precisely the same manner. This too is a residual phenomenon. After accounting by known causes for the absence of most of her jam, she finds there is a residue of loss that cannot be so accounted for. She then sets to work to discover the cause of this residual loss. She says 'This loss must be produced by some cause that I have not reckoned on; but though it is a new effect it is not a new kind of effect. I am familiar with the abstraction of pots of jam from my cupboard and I know how it is produced. It is produced by the action of human hands. Now, like effects are produced by like causes; hence the abstraction of this pot must be due to the hands of some undiscovered person, and I must proceed to discover him. To produce this effect the causal agent must have been in a certain place at a certain time.' Then she investigates and finds that at that time the page boy was in that place or in the neighbourhood.

There is nothing new, nothing recondite, nothing esoteric in the method of the astronomer. In finding the cause of the residual perturbation of Uranus he employs precisely the same method as was employed by the cook, and as was employed by Mousterian man when a flint-tipped arrow came through the bush and stuck in his leg. 'Aha!' he said, 'like effects are produced by like causes. Every other arrow that I have ever known to fly was propelled by a man with a bow. *Ergo* this arrow has been propelled by a man with a bow. I will take my flint axe and go after him.'

Nor was Mousterian man ignorant of the Method of Residues, though it is to be hoped that he employed it in a more logical form than that enunciated by Mill. When he reached home after clubbing the archer, he went, no doubt, to the recess in his cave in which he had deposited a slice of mammoth trunk for his dinner, and found the recess empty. No doubt he said to himself 'Part of this phenomenon I know to be the effect of certain antecedents. Mrs. Mouster took the mammoth's foot as a wedding present to our neighbour. Master Mousterkin had the tail for lunch. Subduct these parts of the phenomenon under investigation, and the residue remains to be accounted for.'

The method of identifying criminals by means of their finger marks is acknowledged on all hands to be extremely 'scientific'; but it is precisely the same method as was employed by Robinson Crusoe when he saw the footmark in the sand. 'My gracious!' said Robinson, 'here is an effect having most peculiar qualities; the agent that produced it must have corresponding qualities.'

The qualities of the effect correspond with those of the human foot; depend upon it, a man has trodden here.' In reaching this conclusion he was justified, because he was not a scientific man, and he was not pursuing a scientific investigation.

The police officer pursues precisely the same method. He says 'This thumb mark has peculiar qualities; the agent that produced it must have had corresponding qualities. Bill Sikes! let's look at your thumb. By James! Thou art the man!' This is the mental operation that the policeman performs, but in his case the operation is fallacious and the conclusion is invalid, for he is a scientific man engaged in scientific investigation, and therefore he had no right to come to any conclusion until he had found 'two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation having only one circumstance in common, and two or more instances having nothing in common except the absence of that circumstance.'

Again, Mary, or Gladys, the parlourmaid, drops the sugar basin on the floor and breaks it. How does she know that it was the impact on the floor that broke the basin? Must she experience two or more instances of the phenomenon before she can be sure? But this, Mr. Shelton may say, is common ordinary knowledge, and the method by which causation is ascertained in such trivial matters is not worthy the investigation of the methodologist. Let us take, then, a similar instance from the field of science. A chemist in his laboratory (surely this is scientific!) pours a clear liquid into a beaker containing another clear liquid, and, to adhere strictly to scientific phraseology, a precipitate is thrown down. How does the chemist know that the addition of the second liquid was the cause of the precipitation? Must he suspend his judgment until he has seen two or more instances of the phenomenon? Perhaps he ought to, but he doesn't; and a competent 'methodology' will not require him to, but will explain why he need not. But on what ground does he assume that his addition of the reagent was the cause of the precipitate? Mill does not explain. His followers do not explain. Can Mr. Shelton explain? In any case, the ground for his conviction is precisely the same as that which convinces Gladys that the fall of the sugar basin on the floor was the cause of the breakage. What is the ground? We need not take up the floor or grope up the chimney to find it. It lies open on the table.

'It is interesting to note,' says Mr. Shelton, 'that he (Dr. Mercier) appears to dispute that methodology is a possible or desirable addition to philosophical knowledge. But this is due to his mental confusion.' It is interesting to note that Mr. Shelton can say this after having reviewed^{*} my *New Logic*,

^{*} 'The Logic of Thought and the Logic of Science,' *Quarterly Review*, July 1914

which contains an elaborate attempt to expound a new theory of induction or methodology, which does 'attempt to distinguish between good methods and bad, true arguments and false, in the practical work of current science,' and in the practical work that is not called scientific also. This, I think, disposes of his charge of plagiarism. There is nothing in my previous article in this Review but an application of the principles of the *New Logic*, which Mr. Shelton reviewed to so little purpose in the article that he now accuses me of plagiarising from. A book can scarcely plagiarise from a review of it.

It is pleasant to turn from this difference to matters on which we agree. I endorse and corroborate everything that Mr. Shelton says of the scandalous sloth, inefficiency, and obscurantism of the logical departments of the universities. Dr. Schiller, Mr. Alfred Sidgwick, myself, and it appears Mr. Shelton also, have for years been attacking the old logic, and have publicly and repeatedly accused it of every fault and every sin of which a science could be guilty. I have proposed radical, far-reaching, and drastic reforms in logic. Not one professor of logic in any university has ever taken the slightest notice of any one of these attacks. There are seventeen universities in the United Kingdom and I think each of them has at least one professor of logic, and some have several professors. Dr. Schiller has published several books on the subject, Mr. Sidgwick has published two or three, I have published one; the technical journals, such as *Mind*, *Science Progress*, the *Journal of Mental Science*, have published articles by us, some of them many articles. The world of philosophy resounds with this subject. It has been discussed and rediscussed; but not by the professors of logic. Not one of them has said one word in defence of the subject that he is paid to teach, even when that subject has been publicly branded as an imposture and a sham, as an obstacle to right thinking and a burden and a drag upon learning. When men of science are clamouring for a valid method, and when amateurs like Mr. Shelton and myself are endeavouring, in such leisure as we have, to formulate such a method, what are the men doing who are paid to do such work? They are slumbering in their fat professorships. They are sleeping in their well-stuffed professorial chairs. They will neither enter the Kingdom of Heaven themselves, nor will they suffer them that are entering to go in. They make no attempt themselves to formulate such a method, nor will they assist, even by criticism, even by denunciation, those who are trying to do the work that it is their duty to do, and that they will not or cannot do.

Every year some new subject clamours for admission into the university curriculum, and is kept out by want of the funds

necessary to teach it. Universities are poor, and are looking round anxiously for funds. Why do they not overhaul their professorships? One of these days they will surely do so, and when they find a subject taught that has long been accused of being false from top to bottom and from beginning to end, and have never been able to deny or meet the accusation, they will probably think it time that such a subject should be abolished, and the endowments of the chairs diverted to some other purpose. More unlikely things have happened. Think it over, *messieurs*.

CHAS. A. MERCIER.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE WAR:

A LIBERAL'S VIEW

WHEN the long-drawn agony of this War has ceased, and all that remains is the inevitable inheritance of sorrow to us and inexpiable shame to our foes, in its happy issue we shall reap this great reward—that even as the revolt of the American Colonies established for the Continent of America on an immovable foundation the great principle of constitutional government, which the success of our armies and the prolongation of our control might have postponed for generations, so through the mists of diplomatic intrigue and the storm clouds of war we may discern the rise of a new era in the destruction of political and military despotism and the establishment of parliamentary freedom in the greatest theatre of human affairs.

To this great purpose and the duty of maintaining our Empire and defending our country is added one, which now is perhaps predominant, to exact vengeance from a foe who has violated every law which civilisation or humanity could enjoin.

That our people on the outbreak of war failed to realise or even dimly comprehend its true meaning and object is indubitable, and they have been subjected to reproach for their alleged indifference to the unquestionable duty of every man to play his best and noblest part for the maintenance of the power and glory of his Empire against the assault of a terrible and merciless foe. It is true that hostilities commenced with no manifestation of public enthusiasm, there was no ringing of bells and lighting of bonfires such as signalled Pitt's reluctant declaration in 1793 of war against France. The reason is not far to seek; in the past, great wars have almost always been preceded by prolonged international controversy and menacing incidents, whereas to the uninformed multitude the present great War came with startling suddenness—there was no distant muttering of thunder to presage the storm which rages around us.

It was no case of national honour affronted, wrong done to British subjects, insolent invasion of our rights; such cases as these inflame the public mind, and popular indignation anticipates the formal declaration of war. More than all this, no word

was said by our statesmen to kindle that lofty spirit of national pride and dignity which has never hitherto been evoked in vain. 'I want,' said the Great Commoner on the eve of the Seven Years' War—the war which created a new epoch in English history and transformed her from an insular kingdom into a mighty Empire—to call England out of that enervate state into which 20,000 men from France can shake her'; his glowing eloquence inflamed with patriotic ardour his fellow-countrymen and inspired the courage which animated our soldiers and sailors who fought at Minden and Quiberon.

Not thus did we enter upon this War. Our Ministers indeed addressed the people, but it was to explain 'what the War was about,' and momentarily permit our people to peer through the veil of secrecy which conceals the history of diplomatic intrigue; in silence and darkness the British Army left our shores, and not until after the Continents of Europe and America were apprised of the event did the British public learn that a British Army had landed on the coast of France; in these days of submarines and mines there might have been very sound reason for this course, but, be that as it may, it was not calculated to arouse popular enthusiasm.

In vain however do we seek for even plausible reason for the suppression of all news which would display before the eyes of their admiring countrymen the heroism and fortitude of those who serve in our Army and Navy. The story of the retirement from Mons, one long-drawn battle in which the strategy of our generals shone with no less lustre than the valour of our soldiers, was indeed told in all its terrible truth in the pages of *The Times*, its truth only to be disavowed from the Treasury Bench in terms of bitter condemnation. The story was true, and, months after, it was revealed to the public in the despatch of the Commander-in-Chief, but its tale of heroism came too late to mitigate the anguish of those who mourned for their dead or kindle the fire of emulation in the hearts of those who had not yet answered the call of duty.

For many weary weeks in deadly monotony we read the translation of despatches from French Headquarters that at some, to us unknown, 'sector' an advance was made, an attack repulsed or a retirement effected. By the complaisance of the Press Bureau a censored letter from a soldier at the Front was permitted to be published telling us a soldier's simple narrative of the heroic death of Lieutenant — and Private —, of — Regiment. It is true that even this anonymous record touched our hearts with pride and sympathy, although the picture was in cold black and white, an abstract conception; with what glowing colours would it have appealed to our imagination

if the title of the gallant regiment and the names of the heroic two had been revealed ! When at length for a moment the spell of pedantic secrecy was broken and we were told the story of the charge of the London Scottish, how great was the outburst of popular enthusiasm ! how the young Scots, and those who claimed to be young Scots, crowded to the recruiting stations to gain the honour of serving in the ranks of a regiment which won such high renown !

To appease the indignation of the public at this incomprehensible concealment, we were for some weeks oppressed by the trivialities of an ' Eye Witness ' at Headquarters who confined his information to the description of incidents which for the most part might have been the accompaniment of Autumn Manceuvres on Salisbury Plain.

Lately we have been vouchsafed fuller information of the efforts and achievements of our troops than what we may gather from the terrible roll-call of the dead, and the poignancy of our sorrow for those who have gone subsides in our admiration for the heroism with which they met their fate.

The human intellect fails to comprehend what purposes of strategy or tactics could possibly be served by the impenetrable barrier by which the Government excluded the public from all knowledge of the fortune of the War and the bearing of our troops. Certainly their silence served no other political purpose than to produce disquietude and despondency, for lack of true information was the prolific parent of wild rumours of military reverses and disasters to our Navy ; these unfounded rumours would never have prevailed if full and frank reports, within the general limits which our Commander-in-Chief might define and the military censorship at the Front might sanction, had been permitted. The censorship established in London has been a source of constant irritation to the Press and the public ; it would be ungenerous to speak in disparagement of men who have striven to do their best, but it may well be doubted whether a Chancery lawyer is gifted with those qualities which enable him accurately to adjust the relation between what the public desire and military necessity requires.

It is not the purpose of this article to endeavour to explore the causes of the War, but solely to discuss the political action of the Government in relation thereto. The former would indeed be a hopeless task ; as Lord Rosebery—whose long seclusion from active participation in directing our foreign policy is to be profoundly regretted—in the early days of the War observed, those causes are not within our knowledge. The records of the long catena of causes are enshrined in the cabinets of monarchs and statesmen ; the full story of diplomatic intrigue and sinister

design will not, it is probable, be revealed during the lifetime of this generation.

The call to arms has been responded to by our people to an extent far in excess of the expectation of any reasonable man, and this despite many conditions which were adverse and under circumstances of extreme discouragement. Throughout its long history, despite her participation in many glorious campaigns, England never was a military nation, nor was 'soldiering' ever popular with our people. The methods, even so late as the Napoleonic wars, by which we enlisted our troops, and the harshness, extending to a much later period, with which they were treated, alike during and after service, produced a repugnance to military duty the tradition of which still survives. Further, the vast majority of our population is engaged in industrial pursuits the advantages, economic and social, of which contrast favourably with those pertaining to the profession of arms. Moreover, the War opened with the gloomy warnings of a pessimist Press, while alone among his colleagues the Prime Minister sounded a higher note. He expressed confidence in our cause and reliance on our people, and his speeches instinct with the pride of Empire have recalled to us in some degree the spirit with which our forefathers went to battle. But the confidence of the Prime Minister was reproved as unseemly optimism, and we were enjoined in lugubrious homilies to forsake all social pleasures and concentrate our minds upon devising means successfully to resist the invasion of a German host. Happily our people's good sense has not suffered them to be discouraged by these gloomy vaticinations; they recognise that whatever may be the sorrows of individuals, and they indeed are heavy and grievous, the nation at large should be proud and face with cheerful confidence the task which lies before it. It has done so; not less than 2,000,000 men have responded to the call of their country, they have come from mine, farm, factory, and workshop, from the busy offices of commerce and the secluded homes of our country gentry; and though we may look, mostly in vain, for the familiar names of commercial magnates on the roll of honour, the ancient families of England have maintained with undiminished glory the proud record of their race.

Our confidence in the executive officers who are in command of our Army and Navy is firm and unabated; that confidence causes us to regard with equanimity the bombardment of our coast towns and the destruction of our merchantmen by submarines, and with resignation the terrible losses our Army has sustained. But even if the confidence were less profound and our admiration more tempered, while their work remains unfinished we should refrain from uttering one word which might

impair their confidence or shake their resolution to attain ultimate victory.

Over those acts which are beyond the sphere of their initiative, and for which the Government or a department of the Government is alone responsible, which are acts of policy and not of strategy or tactics, we are entitled to exercise freedom of criticism. Within this category fall the decision of the Government to force by a naval operation without adequate land support the passage of the Dardanelles, and the despatch of a Naval Brigade to Antwerp; yet even in these cases, despite our misgivings, we refrain from criticism. Our knowledge may be imperfect, the reasons urged we may fail to appreciate properly; and above all in these acts of our ministers on which naval or military action is consequential we should refrain from any comment which might breathe the spirit of timidity or hesitation into their counsels. But where criticism does not intrude directly or indirectly upon naval or military operations, it becomes an essential duty of Parliament and the public to exercise with freedom that function upon every act of the Government which is fairly open to question.

One unprecedented feature of the present War was the renunciation by Parliament of all effective control over the conduct of the War, and even over legislation ancillary thereto. For this abnegation of duty the leaders of the Opposition are mainly responsible. The Ministry invited their co-operation in deliberative functions, and they accepted the invitation; with the result that the most precious attribute of a parliamentary Opposition, the power of free and candid criticism, has been materially weakened. Lately, and notably by Lord Curzon, attempts were made partially to resume its legitimate functions; but so long as the principal leaders of the Opposition sat in council with ministers such efforts were bound to be ineffective.

If the Liberal Opposition had adopted this attitude during the South African War it would have found much justification; a large and compact Irish party, aided by auxiliaries in the Liberal ranks, was in direct sympathy with the enemy and indifferent to the means by which it might embarrass the Government and encourage our antagonists; now there is no section of the House of Commons, and hardly an individual, who is not anxious to assist the Government in bringing the War to a successful end.

The Government has, however, now seen fit to make a remarkable change in the relation of ministers to Parliament; despite its unbroken parliamentary majority and its apparent support by the country the Liberal Administration has, subject to the approval of Parliament, terminated its existence and a coalition Ministry is formed, the first in English history since the ill-starred and short-lived Administration of Fox and North.

We have not yet had a very clear revelation by ministers of the object and purpose of this political revolution; a Liberal organ, generally regarded as inspired, suggests that the object is to 'stamp out' the unrestrained criticism, which has recently been prevalent; another somewhat cynical reason advanced is that it is the most convenient means for getting rid of inconvenient men; the most probable explanation is that it is the logical outcome of the arrangement made on the outbreak of the War between the Ministry and the leaders of the Opposition that the latter should co-operate with the Government in the conduct of affairs during the War by consultation and advice; where there is responsibility there also should be power, and the advent of Mr. Balfour, Lord Lansdowne, and Mr. Bonar Law to the Cabinet cannot be regarded otherwise than as an accession of wisdom to the Ministry, and what is perhaps of greater consequence, a source of fuller confidence to the country.

The arrangement undoubtedly has its disadvantages: it liberates the Government from the restrained and moderated criticism of the regular Opposition, and exposes it to the more reckless and dangerous animadversions of individual members or parliamentary groups.

The inclusion of the Labour party in the coalition is of doubtful expediency; that party has, as past events have frequently demonstrated, little control over Labour, which is not homogeneous in relation to its political or economic operations. Official association with the Government by the parliamentary Labour leaders will inevitably, by developing distrust and suspicion among the working classes, impair what measure of authority and influence they possess; the Irish party, which has the true instinct of statesmanship, have always regarded a formal or official alliance with an English party as fatal to their influence over their fellow-countrymen, and similar results will ensue to the Labour party if its leaders occupy ministerial offices.

The Cabinet, or, to speak with more precision, a section of the Cabinet, enjoys the powers of an absolute monarch, and in their exercise even greater, for the actions of a monarch are tempered by fear of the ever-jealous resentment of his subjects, whereas the powers of the Government were freely and ungrudgingly conferred upon them by a democratic Parliament which can but would only in the event of their extravagant abuse, revoke them; their power extends not merely to the control of operations in the War and matters auxiliary thereto, but even to the extent of excluding in no small degree the persons and property of the civil population of the country from the protection of our normal laws.

Parliament with magnificent simplicity of faith has in effect declared to the Government 'we confide in this great crisis of

our Empire's fate all powers which you may deem necessary for ensuring the safety of our people and the success of our armies.'

How marked the contrast between the attitude of this Parliament and its predecessors in the great wars of the past! During our wars with America and revolutionary France, in our supreme struggle with Napoleon, even when, without an Ally and almost without a friend, the fortunes of the State hung trembling in the balance, sometimes by moderate criticism, more often with unmeasured and occasionally unscrupulous invective, successive Governments were attacked, not only on matters of high policy but on every detail of alleged misconduct or negligence in their conduct of the War; neither did Pitt nor other ministers of that day seek shelter from criticism, or excuse for withholding information, in the now well-worn formula that discussion or reply was 'against the public interest.' On the contrary, reliant upon the good sense and patriotism of the House of Commons, they invited rather than discouraged debate, and sought by full information and frank disclosure to satisfy the sceptical and inquisitive.

The policy of this country towards neutral commerce, and the capture of neutral vessels carrying foodstuffs which might be intended for German consumption were, generally, subjects upon which the deliberation of Parliament might usefully have been invited.

Our treatment of neutral commerce provoked the susceptibilities of the Government of the United States, but although we undoubtedly violated a well-established rule of international law in seizing ships carrying to neutral ports conditional contraband which in the judgment of our naval commanders was intended for Germany, the exigencies of the situation fully justified our action, and our undertaking to restore ship, and pay freight and full value of the cargo, removed all just cause of complaint on the part of the United States.

Further, it must be remembered that it was only subsequently to the distribution by Germany of automatic contact mines over the North Sea, and the consequent destruction of many British and neutral merchantmen, that we proceeded to the somewhat extreme course of capturing all ships, whether destined to neutral or enemy ports, carrying foodstuffs which might be intended for Germany. Prior to the Declaration of London, which, not having been ratified, forms no part of the law of nations, but by whose provisions, with profound modifications, the Allied Powers declared they intended to be bound, foodstuffs could with absolute impunity be carried by neutrals to the enemy country, naval and military ports or stations alone excepted. The Declaration of London made this change in the

law : if the cargo of foodstuffs were intended for a ' Government department ' they became good prize. The German Government during the course of the War issued a decree reducing into Government possession all corn and flour which might then or thereafter during the War be in Germany ; our Government thereupon availed itself of the German Government's decree and the article, above referred to, of the Declaration of London, and declared all foodstuffs intended for Germany to be contraband of War.

Whether or no the justification the British sought in their interpretation of the Declaration of London was well- or ill-founded is immaterial. They may have made a technical error in preventing the access of foodstuffs under the law of contraband ; they would have committed no technical error and no breach of the law of nations if in the first place they had availed themselves, as in fact they subsequently did, of the law of blockade in place of the law of contraband. Unhappily Germany availed herself of this technical error as a pretext for justifying, possibly in the eyes of her own people, certainly not of the rest of the world, her submarine warfare against non-combatant ships. It is indeed more than probable that preventing the access of that portion of her food supply which reaches Germany by way of the North Sea would have no appreciable effect upon her population or the result of the War ; it is also more than probable that Germany would have readily discovered some other pretext for what she terms her ' blockade ' of the British littoral.

In this War the Government of the United States has not worthily maintained the majesty and dignity of that great Commonwealth. Her vast territories, her unlimited resources, her great traditions, her lofty standard of civilisation, and the undoubted valour of her citizens, impose upon her alike the right and duty to assert a commanding position in the community of nations. Among the great civilised Powers of the world she alone stands neutral, and her neutral status imposed upon her the obligation, not from narrow motives of self-interest but in the service of human society, to vindicate the principles of humanity, and to maintain that system of international law which by long and laborious process the progress of civilisation has created.

Such has not been her course of conduct when the German Government, in breach of the rules which her delegates assisted to frame at the Hague, sowed the North Sea, an ocean highway of commerce, with automatic mines ; it was not the appeal of outraged humanity but the danger to American commerce which excited her solicitude ; when we exercised our undoubted right of intercepting German commerce, she regarded not our ample justification for a counter-stroke to Germany's ruthless atrocity.

but placed paramount to all other considerations the private interests of her shipowners and merchants; when by a crowning act of atrocity Germany girdled our coasts with submarines, ignoring the sanction which the law of nations and the judgments of her own courts gave to the usage, she sought to deny the momentary display of her flag by vessels menaced with instant destruction; and finally, when in violation of international law Germany committed a crime, an act unparalleled in the history of wars, she suffered her ambassador to remain at the court of the monarch who massacred her citizens.

Our common origin, the sentiment that we are one people in two lands, might justly evoke her sympathy, or at least command her forbearance from insisting upon observance of international rules of maritime war which only for the safety of our State we have technically infringed; she may indeed ignore that claim, but there is a higher claim than that made by a kindred nationality, it is the claim of civilisation and humanity that she should not stand by, the cold and indifferent spectator of the crimes which Germany has committed against the law of nations and the principles of human society.

We do not ask America to be our ally; whatever may be our claims, or might be our necessities, to that course our national pride will ever be an insuperable bar, for throughout our long history, even when alone we confronted the conqueror of Europe, we disdained to invoke assistance; not even from our Colonies have we craved or demanded help; it came as their freewill offering, and by their devotion they have made us feel that in this War we are fighting not under the flag of the United Kingdom but the United Empire.

The public is much disgusted by the tolerance the Government has displayed toward enemy aliens in this country. Among our large alien population there are doubtless some who, through long residence here and the family associations they have formed, have broken all ties of sympathy with their native land and are loyal citizens of the Empire; but the sentiment of patriotism is not easily effaced, nor a new patriotism readily created, and we may justly regard with contempt those who can lightly transfer their affections and loyalty from the country of their birth to that in which they have been fortunate enough to gain honour or wealth. Rather ought we to distrust the professions of those who vaunt their loyalty to England and renounce the State to which they owe allegiance.

All history teaches us that the love of fatherland is one of the most beautiful characteristics of the German people, and history also has taught us, and this War has renewed the lesson, that in fighting for his country the German is an unscrupulous and

implacable foe. There cannot be a shadow of doubt that there are scattered through the countryside and concentrated in our chief cities many thousands of Germans who at the word of command would hasten to the work of destruction of our public buildings, our railroads, docks, supplies of light and water, and our sacred edifices. Human life would be at their mercy, and no watch or ward would in the majority of cases be effective against the enterprise of resolute and reckless men.

If the Germans had pursued the normal methods of warfare we might have spared the civilian alien, as we have done in former wars; but they have not so acted, and we may reasonably conclude that German residents in England are ready to emulate the deeds of those who scatter bombs on defenceless towns or murder peaceful mariners.

The differential treatment of the German submarine officers savoured of the nature of reprisal or retaliation; as such it was bound to be treated by their Government. It was indeed amply justified by the law of nations, which permits the summary execution of spies and assassins, and to the latter category those who lurk in the wake of peaceful merchantmen and by secret agencies of destruction consign their defenceless crews and passengers to death undoubtedly belong; the impulse of indignant resentment naturally impels the outraged countrymen of the murdered to inflict condign punishment on the malefactors; but statesmen should not act upon impulse, and it required small reflection to demonstrate that whatever punishment, and in fact it was very mild, we mete out to the submarine crews would entail a full measure of bitter retaliation upon British soldiers.

The sudden creation of an immense Army imposed upon our Government for the purpose of its organisation and equipment a task which the then existing resources of supply were wholly inadequate to fulfil. Our existing machinery was sufficient to provide arms, munitions of war, clothing, means of transport, and general equipment for the comparatively small military force, regulars and otherwise, which for generations had satisfied the needs of the country; for the requirements of an army of 1,000,000 men on active service that machinery was wholly inadequate, and the Government necessarily sought and obtained from Parliament powers to impress into the service of the State the building plant and material of private persons which might be utilised for that purpose; the public cheerfully acquiesced, and private persons who were subjected to the exercise of these powers had little cause to complain of the treatment they received, which was on the whole generous and considerate.

But though the Government could with facility acquire the necessary machinery for manufacture it was quite another task

to prevail upon the industrial population, who had been long accustomed to short hours of labour and considerable freedom for recreation, to work with the unintermittent toil and feverish haste which the exigencies of the situation demanded; nevertheless their response to the call of duty was generous, long superseded short hours, and overtime entailed severe physical exhaustion; day and night the factories and workshops serving military and naval needs are in full activity. But the energies of our industrial population suffered from the blight of Government reticence, the urgency of the situation was not realised, and only after the belated appeals of Ministers, the plain statement of General French, and the accumulated outrages of the Germans, did our workmen rise to a true conception of the part they had to play in order to bring the War to a successful consummation.

It was alleged, and not without some measure of truth, that intemperance played some part in restricting the output of munitions of war, but the charge was made in the grossest and most exaggerated form, it was regarded by working men as a general imputation of insobriety upon the class to which they belonged, and it was as unjust as it was injudicious.

It is quite true that in works where men collaborate, such as the Elswick factories, the intemperance and consequent neglect of work by a mere fraction of those employed may seriously impede operations and consequently limit production, and it is undoubtedly a very proper proceeding to take precautions by local control and supervision to secure adequate protection against the evil; but to blazon abroad for the delectation of our foes and the humiliation of our people that drunkenness prevents our operatives from supplying munitions of war to our troops was a scandalous blunder. Equally foolish was the attempt to punish the temperate multitude for the fault of the few; the attempt failed, but had Parliament been so unwise as to approve it the effect on the working classes would have been a calamity to the country.

It is not too bold an assertion that democracy has by the voluntary act of Parliament been superseded by a bureaucracy; true the will of Parliament still remains ultimately supreme, and the powers it has delegated it can revoke, but delegation is a more facile act than revocation, which in national emergency only under the pressure of the grossest abuses is likely to be exercised. No sane man can question the necessity in war-time of arming the executive with extraordinary powers; the practice is as ancient as the Roman republic, but wide as was the authority of a dictator, the Roman Senate and people watched and controlled its discharge with incessant assiduity, and never relaxed, even when the enemy was at the gates of Rome, their

jealous vigilance. If extraordinary powers are conferred, the necessity of every specific grant should be carefully considered, and the utmost care should be taken that their employment should be limited to the necessities of the situation. The House of Commons without debate or criticism passed measures at the request of the Government which shattered every constitutional safeguard for the freedom of the Press and the liberty of the subject; in the House of Lords alone was the voice of expostulation heard, but that disabled authority could not regain what a popular assembly had yielded.

Under the Defence of the Realm Act Parliament silently acquiesced in a statute which permitted an Englishman in England to suffer the penalty of death at the hands of a Court Martial. Martial law has never been proclaimed in England, and the reason is obvious; only when the Courts of Law by foreign invasion or civil war are unable to open their doors can any military tribunal usurp their functions, and happily our enemies have not been able to affect in the slightest degree the power of our Courts to decree justice and the ability of their officers to execute those decrees. It was due to Lord Parmoor that public opinion was aroused, and modifications have been enacted which in some measure have restored to Englishmen their constitutional right of being tried for crime by the law of the land.

A free Press no longer exists. By the Defence of the Realm Act the editor or proprietor of a newspaper becomes liable to martial law if he publishes any 'report or statement' which, in the opinion of a Court Martial, whether true or false, would be likely to interfere with the success of His Majesty's Forces or to prejudice His Majesty's relations with foreign Powers. 'These are wide words,' observed Professor Morgan,¹ 'and they make leader writing a perilous pursuit'; but the Act does not stop there, it subjects to trial by Court Martial the editor or proprietor who 'spreads reports or makes statements' likely to prejudice, in the judgment of a Court Martial, the recruiting, training, discipline, or administration of His Majesty's Forces. As the same learned writer observes, and I quote his words in full: 'To comment on insufficient accommodation on Salisbury Plain is quite clearly an offence if the military authorities or a Court of summary jurisdiction desire to regard it as such.'

There is just room for criticism upon other provisions of the Defence of the Realm statutes and many of the regulations thereunder, some of which are probably *ultra vires*, but these provisions to which I have above referred are flagrantly intolerable. The dissemination of false reports should doubtless be prohibited and sternly punished, but to lift the Executive Government out-

¹ *War: its Conduct and Legal Results*. Baty and Morgan. 1915.

side the pale of criticism and grant it extraordinary powers, and punish, by an irresponsible Court Martial, the newspaper editor who presumes to criticise the abuse of those powers, strikes at the root of constitutional government. It may be said we can trust the discretion of our Ministers; there are two conclusive answers to this contention : firstly, laws should contain in themselves the surest guarantees of their justice, not be dependent upon the discretion of the executive for their just application; secondly, the administration of these laws is assigned to military officers or at the best Courts of summary jurisdiction whose decisions admit of no judicial review.

Many other arbitrary powers are conferred upon the Government, several of which are necessary and beneficial. No exception can be taken to the invasion of private rights of property or the restriction of the liberty of the subject in cases of military or naval necessity; the loyal and patriotic citizen, however irksome they may be, submits without a murmur because he knows that the safety of the realm may depend upon his obedience; but that the liberty of the subject and the freedom of the Press should be at the disposal of an Army major sitting at a drumhead Court Martial, and that this should be the result of an afternoon's work of the representatives of the people, is as amazing as it is intolerable.

L. A. ATHERLEY-JONES.

‘THE PARTY SYSTEM BREAKS DOWN’

PERHAPS the present time is opportune for a discussion on the subject of party government and, with the permission of the Editor of the *Nineteenth Century*, I propose to say a few words on that theme. In the existing condition of public affairs—the national peril I may call it—ancient animosities should be hushed and the voice of reason should have a chance, not often found, to make itself heard. Now reason, if we weigh the matter well, is the only rightful lawgiver, the one supreme governor of the State: reason, of which justice is the practical expression: and so the old maxim ‘*justitia fundamentum regni.*’ But political parties, whatever their justification, whatever their necessity in certain conditions of civil society, seldom represent justice, and are rarely the vehicles of reason. They are rather the organs of passions, impulses, emotions, which it must be owned have played a greater part than truth and justice in human history. And our nature being what it is, that this should have been so is not matter for surprise. Man is by definition *animal rationale*. But assuredly it is not *conscious* reason that governs the lives of most of us. I say *conscious* reason: for no doubt we often act from a rational motive without being in the least aware of it. Prescription has been called by Burke a blind form of reason. Precedents have principles for their original foundation. Even shibboleths may be the offspring, legitimate or illegitimate, of syllogisms. And on prescription, precedents and shibboleths political parties largely depend. They represent, moreover, a tendency of human nature which always has been potent and always will be. Sir Henry Maine speaks of them as being ‘probably far more a survival of the primitive combativeness of mankind than of conscious intellectual differences between man and man.’ Unquestionably, man is a combative animal. The disposition to take a side may be seen in every schoolboy, nay, in every nursery. It is the same disposition which in maturer life displays itself

in the form of party. And when a party has once been brought into existence, the next thing is to find a name for it. 'I reckon,' says Swift, in the *Examiner*, 'that these sorts of conceited appellations are usually invented by the vulgar, who, not troubling themselves to examine thoroughly the merits of a cause, are consequently the most violent partisans of what they espouse: and in their quarrels usually proceed to their beloved argument of calling names, until they light upon one which is sure to stick: and in time each party grows proud of that appellation which their adversaries, at first, intended for a reproach. Of this kind were the Prasini and Veneti, the Guelphs and Ghibelines, Huguenots and Papists, Roundheads and Cavaliers, with many others of ancient and modern date.'

So much as to the origin of parties. The employment of them as instruments of government is a recent thing in the world's history. For its beginning in this country, which was the first to adopt it, we must go to the early years of the eighteenth century, or indeed, to speak more correctly, to the accession of the House of Hanover. It is true that Whigs and Tories date from the last years of the Stuart monarchy. But King William the Third, although, naturally enough, he relied chiefly on the political leaders who had raised him to the throne, never concealed his preference for a mixed ministry composed of moderate partisans taken from both sides. Indeed, as Hallam observes, 'he was truly his own minister, and much better fitted for the office than most of those who served him.' Queen Anne leaned to the Tories, but held herself independent of them. Her plan, we are told by Swift's biographer, was 'to keep such a number of Whigs still in office as should be a constant check upon her ministers.' With King George the First, the Whigs naturally came into preponderating power, and the fact that the new monarch, owing to his ignorance of English, could not preside over the deliberations of his ministers—as had been the invariable custom of his predecessors—greatly added to their authority. That was the effective beginning of party government. 'The Sovereign,' writes Lecky, 'was no longer the moderating power, holding the balance in a heterogeneous and divided Cabinet, able to dismiss a statesman of one policy and to employ a statesman of another, and thus in a great measure to determine the tendency of the Government. He could govern only through a political body, which, in its complete union and in its command of the majority in Parliament, was usually able, by the threat of joint resignation, which would make government impossible, to dictate its own terms.'

II

Such was the genesis in our country of that system of party government which is with us to this day, and which other nations have borrowed from us. I need not dwell here upon its vicissitudes during the two centuries of its existence. But in the fact that it soon took root among our institutions, and became firmly established, is an argument that it was suited to the English character and the needs of the nation. The real governing power among us, from the accession of the House of Hanover, has been a junta of politicians whose party commands a majority in the House of Commons. They constitute the Cabinet, a body unknown to the Constitution, unless indeed it be regarded—in strictness it ought not to be—as a sort of Committee of the Privy Council whereof they all are members. Their meetings are secret, and no minutes are kept of their proceedings. They hold their positions in subordination to a First or Prime Minister who has nominated them and who can overrule or dismiss them. But this powerful person had no definite status until, a few years ago, a Royal Warrant gave him formal recognition and fixed his place in the Table of Precedence. He and his colleagues are spoken of as ‘The King’s Ministers,’ and rightly: but they really represent only their own party and its parliamentary majority. It is an arrangement which looks odd upon paper, but it has found a powerful apologist in Burke. ‘Party’ he defines as ‘a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.’ He argues that such ‘connexions in politics are essentially necessary for the full performance of our public duty: because where men are not acquainted with each other’s principles, not experienced in each other’s talents, nor at all practised in their mutual habitudes and dispositions by joint efforts in business, no personal confidence, no friendship, no common interest subsisting among them, it is evidently impossible that they can act a public part with uniformity, perseverance, or efficacy.’ He continues:

Therefore every honourable connexion will avow it is their first purpose, to pursue every just method to put the men who hold their opinions into such a condition as may enable them to carry their common plans into execution, with all the power and authority of the State. As this power is attached to certain situations, it is their duty to contend for these situations. Without a proscription of others, they are bound to give to their own party the preference in all things; and by no means, for private considerations, to accept any offers of power in which the whole body is not included; nor to suffer themselves to be led, or to be controlled, or to be overbalanced, in office or in council, by those who contradict the very fundamental principles on which their

party is formed, and even those upon which every fair connexion must stand. Such a generous contention for power, on such manly and honourable maxims, will easily be distinguished from the mean and interested struggle for place and emolument. The very style of such persons will serve to discriminate them from those numberless impostors, who have deluded the ignorant with professions incompatible with human practice, and have afterwards incensed them by practices below the level of vulgar rectitude.¹

Such are political parties in theory. An eminent German publicist has claimed that they are 'the natural and necessary manifestation and outcome of the mighty inward springs of national existence.' I experience a difficulty in judging of the claim thus made for them as I am not sure that I understand what the Teuton means by 'the mighty inward springs of national existence'; but no doubt they correspond with and represent various types of individual character. Take, for example, Conservatism and Liberalism: each denotes a real habit of mind, the one receptive, the other unreceptive, or shall we say less receptive? It is argued that in public life both these idiosyncrasies should have due play, so that the movement towards the future may respect the past, and thus avoid 'raw haste, half-sister to delay,' which in grasping after ideal advantage is likely to lose achieved good. Again: the late Mr. Chamberlain, in a famous speech delivered at Oxford in 1890, claimed for the party system the merit of 'securing an exhaustive criticism, an examination into all new measures; of affording a stimulus, and even a healthy stimulus, to individual ambition and to the ingenuity of rival politicians.'

III

Such is the party system in theory. Now we will go on to consider what has of late years been its actual working among us. Obviously one great peril ever attending a political party is that it may be so easily perverted from its proper end. Let us recall Burke's definition: 'a body of men united for promoting, by their joint endeavours, the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.' Note 'the national interest.' And he goes on to say that it is their duty to contend for certain situations where they may pursue their aim with all the power and authority of the State. 'Such a generous contention for power,' he adds, 'will easily be distinguished from the mean and interested struggle for place and emolument.' But the great danger, the ever-present and peculiarly insidious temptation, is that place and emolument—in one word office—will be regarded by party politicians as an end—the end—and

¹ *Works*, vol. ii. p. 335.

not as a means. Lofty professions of burning zeal for the national welfare will be made to free and independent electors when the object is to win, by their suffrages, a parliamentary election. But when the election has been won, too often the dominant—the predominant—thought of the triumphant party is to keep the place which they have obtained, and to refrain from any action which might jeopardise their tenure of it. Then the national welfare becomes a secondary object, or is quite lost sight of. The one thing needful is the retention or acquisition of votes. This is a truth which careful observers of every school of thought have noted. Thus M. Louis Blanc writes: 'Petites conceptions, petites manœuvres, petites habiletés, petites intrigues, voilà de quoi se compose l'art de conquérir une majorité dans une assemblée qui dure longtemps. On y arrive à ne plus tenir compte que de ce qu'on a devant soi, autour de soi, et le pays est oublié.' And to the same effect a very different authority, the late Professor Green, writes: 'The question of what really needs to be enacted by the State in order to secure the conditions under which a good life is possible is lost sight of in the quest for majorities, and as the will of the people, in every other sense than the measure of what the people will tolerate, is really unascertainable in the great nations of Europe, the way is prepared for the sophistries of modern political management, for manipulating electoral bodies, for influencing elected bodies, and for procuring *plébiscites*.'²

IV

Let us pursue this matter a little further. What is the end of government? Obviously, to maintain the rights of the nation which it governs. As obviously, the first of those rights is existence. Now war, not peace, is the law of life: and clearly the primary function of government is to maintain, in a condition of efficiency, such fleets and armies, and other preparations for war, as the security of the nation against its rivals demands. How far has that duty been discharged of late, under our system of party government? It is matter of common notoriety that for the last twenty years—to go back no further—the nations around us, notably France and Germany, have been steadily increasing their naval and military equipment. It is matter of like notoriety that our party Governments have displayed extraordinary apathy to the danger thus caused to the British Empire. Conservatives and Liberals are alike open to this indictment. I have just been re-reading an article which I wrote for the *Nineteenth Century* in the year 1900, when we were still in the throes of

² *Works*, vol. ii. p. 388.

the Boer War, although the most anxious period was passed. The nation, thrilled by the colossal blunders which had marked the earlier part of the conflict, had aroused the Government from its torpor. Two of our ablest Generals—one of them, alas! is no longer with us—had been despatched to the seat of hostilities together with the Regular troops which could be collected from all quarters: the Colonies had rallied to our aid: volunteers—the flower of British manhood—had offered themselves and, in spite of hindrances of all kinds from the War Office, had gone to the Front. The tide turned: and a feeling of relief was generally experienced. But the popular feeling in France, just then, gave cause for much uneasiness. Sympathy with the Boers was strong there: and those who knew the country best were of opinion that the madness of the people might, at any moment, plunge it into war with us. There were other causes for anxiety, but of these I need not speak. A widely spread feeling prevailed that England was in a crisis of the utmost gravity. 'Alone with our fleet in the midst of a Europe which has many scores to pay off, and will be only too glad to pay them off'—that was the picture which Lord Rosebery drew: and it was a true one. Public opinion was aroused, and Lord Salisbury's Government felt themselves obliged to do something to allay the anxiety which was gnawing at the hearts of men. Accordingly, on the 12th of February, Mr. George Wyndham, the Under Secretary for War, rose in his place in the House of Commons, and proposed a scheme of which the chief features were as follows:

(i) 30,000 men to be added to the Regular Army—if so many recruits can be enlisted.

(ii) The Auxiliary Forces to be increased by 70,000 men, or at least by 50,000—if so many can be induced to join.

(iii) Officers to be provided for this conjectural augmentation of our military strength, from the reserve of officers, from the Colonies, the universities, the public schools—if they can be got.

This hypothetical addition of 100,000 men to the Regular troops then in the country—whose number was gravely stated at 109,000—would, it was affirmed, together with the Reserves not yet called up, and the Auxiliary Forces, make our total military strength in these islands 409,000 men.

Such was the miserable abortion of a plan of national defence which it was Mr. Wyndham's hard fate to bring forward. The caustic comment made upon it by a wise old warrior was 'It is a simple fraud.' But why did the Government prefer the risk of irretrievable national disaster to a really effective scheme? The answer is that they were afraid of losing votes. They were in alarm that the Opposition would dish them—to use Lord Derby's

celebrated phrase. And so they prepared a Nothing which should look like a Something, and blunt the edge of criticism—as indeed it in some sort did. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, if he did not bless the Government abortion, at all events refrained from cursing it. What he dreaded above all things was to commit himself and his followers—I quote his own words—to ‘any great scheme for the development, the increase, the extension, or the reconstruction of our Army forces.’

V

The months went swiftly on, and before long Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was in a position to give practical expression to his views on the subject of our Army forces. A General Election had placed his party in a great majority in the House of Commons. He became Prime Minister, and one of his first measures—the measure was peculiarly his own—was to reduce our insufficient Army by more than thirty thousand men. Personally, a cultivated and high-principled man, he was, politically, a disciple of Bright and Cobden, and so lived in terror of ‘bloated armaments’ and in expectation of ‘a calico millennium.’ His eyes were blinded by the mists of party to the signs of the times—even the Boer War had failed to open them. And to those who could read those signs, and interpret the warnings which they conveyed, he and his party turned a deaf ear. It was in vain that a great soldier and a great patriot urged upon the Government the duty of realising the true state of the Army, and its unpreparedness for war; that he pleaded the absolute necessity of it being strong enough to ensure our country’s safety; that he adjured those who directed our national affairs not to put faith in arbitration schemes or Hague Conferences, or even in treaties—which he knew well would be regarded by certain belligerents as merely ‘scraps of paper’; that he insisted upon the gravity of the issue as involving nothing short of the future of the Country and of the Empire; that he contended for the obligation of every man to serve his country in arms.³ His appeal was ignored, except indeed by a pert Under Secretary who ventured to rebuke him as one that troubled the Ministerial Israel. Why was this? Not assuredly because the extremely intelligent gentlemen who directed the Liberal Party did not recognise, in their heart of hearts, that he spoke the words of truth and sober-

³ Which, I may observe, was the main conclusion arrived at by the Norfolk Commission: ‘that it is the duty of every citizen of military age and sound physique to be trained for the national defence, and to take part in it should emergency arise.’

ness; no, but because they feared, if they gave heed to them, the loss of the votes of the Little Englanders, the Jacobin Doctrinaires, the Pacificists, the Channel Tunnelists, *et hoc genus omne*, who made up some third of the majority whereby they held office. This indeed Lord Roberts knew perfectly well and frankly testified in writing to *The Times* on the 16th of December 1911. These are his words:

I do not think I overstate the case if I say that the great bulk of members of both Houses of Parliament, no matter to which party they may belong, are in their own minds persuaded that compulsory service is not only advisable but essential to the future greatness and stability of the Empire, and that they are restrained from giving utterance to their views not from lack of conviction but from party considerations.

But like the Patriarch prescient of the doom of the Cities of the Plain, Lord Roberts seemed to the players of the party game 'as one that mocked.' Some sort of answer to him appeared, however, to be necessary, and it was given by Lord Haldane, a master in the art of making the worse reason appear the better. It was as follows:

No one has a greater veneration for the figure of Lord Roberts than I have. He has done great things for his country. He is one of the most distinguished leaders of troops in the field whom we possess. But it is one thing to lead troops in the field and another to be a strategist. Unless a man is a strategist he cannot fashion plans and organisations for the defence of the country. What I miss in Lord Roberts is just that understanding of the point of view of the strategist and of the statesman, which is absolutely vital if we are to make a proper military organisation.

Such was Lord Haldane's perfectly astounding utterance in the year 1912. I leave it *simplex munditiis*. To comment on it would be 'to gild refined gold or paint the lily.' But as a pendant to it I may give a declaration made by Mr. L. V. Harcourt just a year afterwards:

I can conceive no circumstances in which Continental co-operation by our troops would not be a crime against the people of this country.

VI

Turn we now to the fleet. It must be allowed that the Government of Lord Salisbury, and the Government of Mr. Balfour, had shown some sense—I do not say an adequate sense—of their paramount duty in respect of it. But in January 1906 the Liberals came into office and one chief note of their policy was dereliction of this duty. On the 13th of May in that year they received information, open to no doubt, that plans had been

matured by the German Government for enormously increasing the German Navy. This information they concealed from the public for three years—that is till March 1909. On the 21st of June 1906 a deputation of Radical and Labour members urged on Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman the reduction of British naval expenditure. He heard them gladly; and, no doubt as a concession to them, in the next month the Cawdor Programme was abandoned and the number of Dreadnoughts which it provided was cut down from four to three. On the 23rd of October further naval reductions were announced under pretence of a redistribution scheme, the result being a net loss to the British sea-going fleets of ten ships. Such were the achievements of the new Liberal Ministry in its first year, under pressure of its 'advanced' supporters who in the two following years continued their efforts with considerable success. Happily the country, always more solicitous about its Navy than its Army, took the alarm, thanks chiefly perhaps to the grave warning on the 9th of December 1908 by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Gerard Noel, in view of the reduction of the East Coast Defences. Mr. Balfour, the leader of the Opposition, saw his opportunity, and on the 29th of March 1909 brought forward his vote of censure, which did not indeed turn out the Government but which unquestionably alarmed them and checked them on the downward path.⁴

VII

I need not dwell further on this matter. Enough has been said, I think, to explain the condemnation which party government has received from many men of light and leading. One such, the late Bishop of London, Dr. Creighton, wrote to me, shortly before his lamented death, 'The party system is breaking down. People are ceasing to be interested in the way in which the party game is played. The thing is becoming antiquated. Yet we do not face the facts.' I think we are now beginning to face the facts. They have been brought before us with irresistible clearness. One thing which is startling to think of, but which is nevertheless true, is that in a sense, and a true one, we owe to the party system the present terrible war. Had those who were responsible for the government of the country during the last twenty years devoted to its naval and military needs as a Great Power the time and energy which they expended on the party game, the arrogant disruption of the world's peace by Germany would never have taken place. The determining con-

⁴ It is true, and should be counted to Mr. McKenna for righteousness, that in 1909-1910 he had the courage to defy the Little Navyites, who up to then had thought, not without some grounds, that he was altogether such an one as themselves.

sideration which impelled Teutonic militarism on its course of blood and fire was the conviction that England would not intervene for several reasons, one of them being her military unpreparedness. The knowledge that a million, or even half a million of English troops could have been sent to Belgium would have safeguarded that country's neutrality.

But I shall be told that Parliamentary parties are essential to the working of representative institutions; that if you vest supreme power in an assembly of some seven hundred men you must have 'great coherent disciplined organisations'; that if the House of Commons is to retain its present position in the State 'parties are not merely expedient but absolutely necessary'; that 'it might exist without parties, as in fact it did for centuries, if it were merely a legislative body, but that without them it could not be safely entrusted with the virtual government of the country.' That is the defence of Party Government usually made by its more thoughtful apologists, of whom Mr. Lecky—for the argument is his—may be taken as one. To this I reply, first, that it is, on every account, much to be desired that the House of Commons should have a great deal less to do with the virtual government of the country. The true function of Parliament is not to administer but to watch and supervise the administration. Mill has well observed in his book on *Representative Government*, 'It is but a small quantity of the public government of a country which can be well done, or safely attempted, by the central authorities.' Next I would urge that something surely might be devised to raise the rank and file of the House of Commons from the degraded position of simple voting animals to which they are now reduced. Mr. Bonar Law said, on the 12th of May 1914, 'In the view of Ministers the majority of the House of Commons has only one function—and the majority has accepted that view—and that function is to register, obediently, decrees and decisions which have been taken outside the House of Commons.' The ever-increasing development of caucuses and their machinery has assimilated the so-called representatives of the nation to horse and mule which have no understanding: to mere irrational agents driven into the lobby at the crack of the party whip. I use the word 'irrational' advisedly. 'What sort of reason,' asks Burke—the italics are his—'is that in which the determination precedes the discussion?' *Authoritative* instructions, *mandates* issued, which the member is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote and to argue for, though contrary to the clearest convictions of his reason and conscience!

The State, Aristotle tells us, depends upon a common interest in a common morality. But can there be anything more immoral than that a legislator, in order to keep his party in office, should

vote for a measure which he believes to be bad and prejudicial? Such conduct strikes at the very root of the State. Is there any remedy to be found for this gigantic evil? It appears to me that, if not an absolute remedy, at all events a considerable palliative might be found, by giving a certain number of the members of the House of Commons—say fifty—the power of requiring that the voting on any grave question should be by ballot, with stringent regulations to secure its entire secrecy and perfect freedom. Why should this protection which is accorded to our Parliamentary electors be withheld from our legislators who need it much more? ‘But it would upset the existing party machinery in Parliament.’ No doubt; and that is its greatest recommendation. I remember the late Mr. Labouchere—whose observation was as keen as his speech was caustic—remarking, ‘Parties just now do not hang together on principles: they are gangs greedy of office.’ The change which I advocate in the procedure of the House of Commons might do much to break up the gangs, to reinstate principles, and to bring back parties to Burke’s ideal.

Of course any such change must be a matter for the future. Our hands are full enough for the present. I quoted just now the late Mr. Chamberlain’s apology for the party system as possessing the merit of ‘securing an exhaustive criticism, an examination into all new measures; of affording a stimulus, and even a healthy stimulus to individual ambition and to the ingenuity of rival politicians’; ‘but,’ he went on to add, ‘when great national interests are at stake, when the safety of the commonwealth is involved, the party system breaks down.’ That is precisely our experience now. Great national interests *are* at stake, the safety of the commonwealth *is* involved, and the party system *has* broken down. Whether it will ever be restored in its old, and, as I think, outworn form, I much doubt. But speculations on that subject are idle:

Prudens futuri temporis exitum
Caliginosa nocte premit Deus;
Ridetque, si mortalis ultra
Fas trepidat. Quod adest memento
Componere aequus.

Yes: ‘Quod adest memento componere aequus.’ And that is just what we are doing at the moment of my writing. We are endeavouring to substitute a national Government for a party Government, to fill up the great offices of the State with men possessing special qualifications for them, to apply business principles to the great business of the War. This is well, unquestionably well. There can be no doubt that until now Mr. Asquith’s Government has ever had an eye upon the ballot boxes of a General Election. It is as difficult for veteran party

politicians to put aside that habit, as it is for the Ethiopian to change his skin or the leopard his spots. But a Cabinet where the chief occupants of both the front benches sit side by side, will speak with national authority for national ends. As to the choice of men and the allotment of offices, I have but one word to say. The late Queen, at a critical period of the Boer War, is reported to have repeated again and again in her anxiety 'I must have Kitchener.' Such, unquestionably, is now the well-nigh universal feeling of the nation, which rightly regards him as 'our chief of men,' and is as unmoved, as he himself doubtless is, by 'the explosion of the doggeries' against him.* With our armies under such direction we may await the issue in quietness and confidence; strong in the justice of our cause we may humbly hope that the Supreme Moral Governor of the Universe will give us 'victory in the battle,' but on one condition only. What that condition is I find well indicated in words which Carlyle has used as the epigraph to his *Latter-Day Pamphlets* :

Then said his Lordship, 'Well, God mend all!'—'Nay, by God, Donald, we must help him to mend it!' said the other.*

W. S. LILLY.

* 'With a virtual England at his back, and an actual eternal sky above him, there is not much in the total net amount of that. When the master of the horse rides abroad, many dogs in the village bark; but he pursues his journey all the same.'—*Latter-Day Pamphlets*, p. 157.

* Rushworth (*Sir David Ramsay and Lord Rea in 1630*).

'SELF-APPOINTED STATESMEN.'

To the Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

SIR,—I am sorry to bother your readers further with this controversy upon 'Self-appointed Statesmen' which Mr. J. O. P. Bland has raised, but since he talks of 'challenging' me and so forth, I am afraid that an answering silence might be misunderstood. As an authority upon opinion in neutral countries, Mr. J. O. P. Bland displays an amazing ignorance of every condition under which the writings of English authors appear in American periodicals. He writes of the American papers for which I 'work,' and he supposes, apparently, that the articles 'over my signature,' from which he quotes, were set up from MS. sent by me to these imaginary American employers. What really happens in such cases is something quite different. I have written scarcely any articles specifically for American papers since the War began. At the outset of the War I was greatly alarmed at the prospect of a pacifist stampede among the Liberals over here, and, setting all other occupations aside, I did my best, by articles and letters in the *Daily News*, the *Daily Chronicle*, the *Nation*, the *Labour Leader*, and elsewhere, to state the essentials of this conflict plainly. Few of these articles were protected as to the American

copyright. Apart from any other consideration, there was no time for this to be done. In some cases they remained for anyone in America to pick up and use; in some the late Mr. Cazenove, the literary agent, made arrangements by which summaries or extracts were cabled for use in American papers. No doubt these versions were reprinted in some cases with sensational and exacerbating headlines; this was certainly the fate of a letter I wrote to *The Times*, which reappeared over there as an article under—if I remember rightly—the attractive title, ‘Writer Wells Would Lynch all Germans.’ Intelligent Americans know how to discount this sort of thing, and experienced writers learn to ignore and disregard these little accidents. If once one started repudiating every misrepresentation that appeared in the American Press one would have to abandon every other occupation. It is to these sources that Mr. Bland goes for his damning extracts from my writings, and into which he inserts his still more damning ‘(sic).’ ‘The Appeal to the American People,’ which I wrote early in September, is one of the three or four articles I have written definitely for America; it was handed by me to the London representative of an American newspaper, who—I discover first from Mr. Bland’s quotation—cut it down to cable. I gave it to him for nothing on the understanding—which he did not understand—that it would get to America as I wrote it. The article on Holland is the only one of all that Mr. Bland quotes which appears to be untouched as I wrote it. I point out to the Dutch reader that Belgium and France will almost certainly demand territorial compensation for this War. Although I am neither Belgium nor France, Mr. Bland is under the impression that this is ‘foolish self-contradiction’ of my assertion that British opinion is firmly set against the creation of new ‘conquered provinces’ in Europe. For a born rather than a ‘self-appointed’ statesman Mr. Bland seems to me to be unsubtle.—Very sincerely yours,

H. G. WELLS.

*The Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY cannot undertake
to return unaccepted MSS.*

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

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