Read the Snowden Documents From the NSA

Here Uppdrag granskning [Mission: Investigation] the documents leaked by Edwards Snowden and retrieved from Glenn Greenwald that are the basis for the report about Sweden's collaboration with the NSA and the GCHQ.

**SE status in the intelligence community** [https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/894385-se-status-in-the-intelligence-community.html]

An excerpt of a larger document showing Sweden’s status as a closely allied “Third-party partner”, along with several other countries. In addition, Sweden has bilateral agreements with the NSA and the British GCHQ dating back to 2004, establishing an even more in-depth collaboration – this is several years before the Swedish Riksdag passed the FRA Law, which expanded the FRA’s authorisation to conduct signals intelligence gathering.

**NSA internal PM on FRA and Sweden relations**: [https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/894384-nsa-internal-pm-on-fra-and-sweden-relations.html]

In an internal, top-secret document dated 18 April this year, the NSA summarises its relations with Sweden. The document states that since 1954 Sweden has been a part of an intelligence collaboration with what is often called “The Five Eyes”, UKUSA, which refers to the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This is despite the fact that Sweden was officially neutral, an image that has been maintained outwardly for decades by multiple governments of different political persuasions. The document also states that the UKUSA contract was discontinued in 2004 and replaced with bilateral agreements for signals intelligence and
wiretapping. As of 2011, the Swedish FRA provides its American partner with extensive access to data from its cable collection.

**Legal issues UK regarding Sweden and Quantum**


An internal NSA document from April 2013 that describes the status of the relationship with a number of partners. It takes up a three-party agreement regarding the hacker programme Quantum, between the Swedish FRA, American NSA and British GCHQ, initiated by NSA chief Keith Alexander. The document shows that the project has so far resulted in a “proof of concept” – i.e., the system works, but it has not yet generated any substantial intelligence results. It also shows that the GCHQ are doubtful about continuing in the project because of restrictions in British legislation, but that the NSA’s intention all along has been to carry out the project with the Swedish FRA rather than GCHQ.

**SE=XKeyscore Ingvar Åkesson/DIRNSA meeting 2013**


This document is an internal NSA memo ahead of an annually recurring summit meeting between NSA chief Keith Alexander and the FRA chief. The meeting took place on 24–26 April 2013. Six people from Sweden were to participate in the meeting, including then FRA Director-General Ingvar Åkesson and Deputy Director-General Christina Malm.

Among other things, that document shows that:

* The FRA wants an update on the Quantum project Winterlight (see the article on Quantum), and wants to know when they will receive reports from hacking attempts and intelligence from them.

* The FRA has been given access to XKeyscore, which is one of the NSA’s most powerful search tools in its enormous databases of wiretapped material.

* The Swedes update the NSA that a change in Swedish legislation makes it legal for the FRA to share intelligence with the Swedish Security Service.

* Since January 2013, the NSA has a counterterrorism analyst placed in Stockholm.

* In the Quantum project, in which the FRA collaborates with the NSA and the British GCHQ, individual computer users are rerouted through specially tailored “links” to false attack servers, whose “shots” against the user’s computer allow spyware to be installed on the computer. In March 2013, the NSA received a report from the FRA that Quantum gave the British GCHQ 100 targets, which led to five of them being rerouted to the British Quantum servers. The goal is that the FRA will lead in the targets to the NSA’s Quantum servers instead of the GCHQ’s.

* The NSA wants to continue working with the FRA for access to fibre-optic cables. This collaboration has already resulted in unique access to high-priority targets (123 reports so far,
under this “budget year” alone). The FRA continues to expand its access to new cables and telecom operators, resulting in greater access for the NSA to potentially valuable targets even beyond Russia.

* The NSA shared with the FRA information about a hacking attempt in November 2012 against/by the Israeli Embassy in Stockholm. They agreed that Israel could be informed about the discovery of the hacking attempt.

* The FRA provides the European Cryptologic Centre in Darmstadt, Germany with Swedish linguists to analyse terrorism-related material in Swedish.

* It is noted that the FRA, after four years’ temporary interruption, can now legally (sic) collaborate with the Swedish Security Service (the British GCHQ has previously congratulated the FRA on circumventing the previous ban on taking assignments from the Swedish Security Service).

* The FRA’s access to fibre-optic cables through Sweden has led to unique access to intelligence about the civilian energy sector, among other things.


A document dated 6 June 2006 states that Sweden has been a part of the intelligence collaboration under the UKUSA agreement between the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, since 1954. That is to say, at the same time that Sweden’s official stance was neutrality in peace as well as in armed conflicts. According to the document, the UK was Sweden’s contact regarding wiretapping and Internet monitoring, while the US was the contact for the monitoring of technical signals such as radar.

In 2004 – several years before the Swedish Riksdag finally passed the so-called FRA Law by the smallest possible margin, giving the FRA authorisation to listen to fibre-optic cables – the American NSA, the British GCHQ and the Swedish FRA signed an agreement allowing the NSA to collaborate directly with the FRA regarding wiretapping without first needing to go through the GCHQ. As a result of this agreement, the signals intelligence collaboration between Sweden and the US has grown rapidly. The NSA classifies the information about this agreement as top-secret with reference to Sweden’s “political neutrality”.

X-Keyscore slide with Swedish example [https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/894389-xkeyscore-slide-with-swedish-example.html]

This screenshot shows an image from the NSA’s extensive spy program X-Keyscore, demonstrating, as a teaching example, a search on “everyone in Sweden” who visits a web forum for “extremists”.

“Baltic region” [https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/894390-baltic-region.html]
This screenshot shows a part of the document from the NSA discussed in file 5 above. The text is about the growing relationship with the Swedish FRA, as an “extremely competent” partner. In 2011, the FRA gave the NSA access to “unique” material from its cable collection regarding, among other things, Russia and the Baltic region.

**Accomplishments - from NSA doc dated circa April 2013**:  

Slides from a presentation in April 2013 that the NSA held for its closest partners in Canada, the UK, New Zealand and Australia. It discusses Sweden’s work with the Quantum hacker project.

**FINAL Agenda SWEDUSA** [https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/894403-finalagendaswedusa.html]

Detailed list of points and participants in the summit meeting between the top brass of the FRA and the NSA in April 2013.

**Quantum - from GCHQ documents dates October 2012**  

Portion of a document from the NSA’s British equivalent, the GCHQ, in which Sweden is not mentioned, but it describes an example of how Quantum has been used to attack computers in an African country where the users have visited extremist websites. See the separate article on Quantum here.

**NSA slides** [https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/894406-nsa-slides-xkeyscore.html]

Images from the NSA’s training presentations for analysts who will be working with the NSA’s most powerful search tool, X-Keyscore. It indicates, among other things, that the NSA’s analysts have unique access to an extremely large amount of data. For example, the goal is to store all data traffic to which the NSA has access for up to five days, in order to “slow down the Internet” and give the analysts time to go back and find interesting information they might otherwise miss. Information that the NSA finds interesting can be redirected to permanent storage in the PINWALE database.

**X-keyscore Sources** [https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/894407-xkeyscore-sources-dated-2008.html]

This document gives an overview of the sources that the NSA and its spyware program X-Keyscore utilise:

- **FORNSAT** – data from satellites (Echelon) Overhead (uplink) – probably refers to traffic between mobile phones and base stations.

- **Special Source** – information collected through Special Source Operations, the special division of the NSA that works with American mobile phone operators.
Tailored Access – information retrieved through the NSA’s hacker division, Tailored Access Operations.

F6 – surveillance carried out by Special Collection Service, SCS, a joint NSA–CIA division. It often carries out operations including espionage on foreign diplomats and leaders.

FISA – surveillance carried out as a part of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which can include monitoring of data and telephone traffic of US citizens. Corresponds to the decisions that the Swedish Defence Intelligence Court makes on what the FRA is allowed to monitor.

3rd party – information collected through a “third party” – that is to say, countries such as Sweden, France, Germany, Italy and Spain.

PUBLICERAD: 11 december 2013 20:54

Gunnar Rensfeldt

 Gunnar.Rensfeldt@svt.se [mailto:gunnar.rensfeldt@svt.se]
* (S//SI//REL) SSEUR members are the Five Eyes nations (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States) and the following Third Party partners: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden. All Third Party nations in SSEUR sent students to the training, as did the UK.
Subject: NSA Intelligence Relationship with Sweden

Introduction

NSA’s relationship with the Swedish SIGINT service, Forsvarets Radiokommunikasjonstjeneste (FRA), was established in 1954 under the UKUSA agreement. At that time it was agreed that GCHQ would take the lead for the exchange of COMINT information and that NSA would take the lead for the ELINT exchange. As of April 2004, NSA, GCHQ and the FRA agreed to dissolve this part of the UKUSA agreement and hold bilateral exchanges on both COMINT and ELINT.

NSA’s relationship with the FRA, an extremely competent, technically innovative, and trusted Third Party partner, continues to grow. The FRA provided NSA with access to its cable collection in 2011, providing unique collection on high-priority Russian targets such as leadership, internal politics, and energy.

FRA’s efforts against counter-terrorism (CT) targets continue to expand, and new legislation enacted in January 2013 has improved its ability to work directly with the Swedish internal security service (SÄPO). NSA’s Data Acquisition is actively engaged with the FRA, which has numerous collection sites and is proficient in collecting a wide variety of communications.

Key Issues

The FRA continues to place more emphasis on cyber. NSA’s National Threat Operations Center (NTOC) and FRA analysts have an ongoing exchange discussing malware topics. The FRA is positioning itself to become the cyber defense authority in Sweden and hopes to receive the Swedish government mandate in the near future.

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20320108
What You Wanted to Know

Review SID’s goals for this quarterly.

Note that just about all of the accomplishments we are presenting respond to some aspect of SID’s strategies for the foreign partner. The few that don’t involve those niche partners for whom our strategy is to simply maintain a viable relationship that we can rely on should we need it in the future. And that these are only some of the accomplishments for FY13...there are way too many to address in just an hour.

When it comes to discussing the challenges and roadblocks that we believe are going to make it difficult if not impossible to accomplish specific items, the causative factors are divided between NSA and partner budget cuts, legal and policy impediments on the partner side, and in a few cases partner unwillingness to cooperate or meet their obligations to us.

............

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Select Accomplishments: Production (second slide)

(TS//SI//NF) Sweden: This is the DIRNSA-initiated Quantum trilat between NSA, GCHQ, and FRA. While the overall success rate has been low, the effort can be considered a success in terms of proof of concept. Continued GCHQ involvement may be in jeopardy due to British legal/policy restrictions, and in fact NSA’s goal all along has been to transition this effort to a bilat with the Swedish partner.
VISIT PRÉCIS

SWEDUSA 2013 STRATEGIC PLANNING CONFERENCE (SPC)

MR. INGVAR ÅKESSON
DIRECTOR GENERAL
FORSVARETS RADIOANSTALT (FRA)
SWEDEN
24-26 APRIL 2013

GEN A Opening Remarks: 24 April 2013/0800-0815
GEN A Hosted Discussions: 24 April 2013/1130-1200
EXDIR Hosted Lunch: 24 April 2013/1200-1245 - Canine Suite
GEN A Hosted Dinner: 25 April 2013/1830 - Quarters
Accompanying Senior: Mr. James M. Cusick, Director Foreign Affairs (DIRFA)

BACKGROUND:
- (S//REL TO USA, SWE) Mr. Ingvar Åkesson (OH-kes-son) has been the FRA Director-General since 2003. He was slated to retire last August, but was extended until August 2013. He will be accompanied by Ms. Christina Malm, D/DIR, FRA. The remainder of the delegation includes:
  
  Ms. Lena Nyberg, SIGINT Director, FRA
  Mr. Mats Nordqvist, Technical Director, FRA
  Mr. , Strategic Advisor Chief Studies and Development, FRA
  Ms. , Chief Foreign Relations Officer, FRA

PURPOSE OF THE VISIT:
- (S//REL TO USA, SWE) Each year a high-level FRA delegation visits NSA/CSS to attend the SWEDUSA SPC. Discussions will center on topics of mutual interest and future areas of collaboration. It also presents an opportunity for NSA/CSS leadership to reiterate their commitment to the Swedish partnership.

VISITOR REQUESTED:
- (TS//REL USA, SWE) FRA requested a WINTERLIGHT (Quantum project) update and asked to hear about our plans for sharing reports on Quantum tipping or intercepts from the Quantum tipping. FRA plans to start the conference by giving an overview of its SIGINT Roadmap, to include Russia,
  
  . It will also provide a Cyber update--specifically briefing NSA on its new cyber division, its active and passive sensors and tradecraft collaboration with NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center (NTOC); updates on the special

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 30320108
project and NAPA-3; and a discussion of how new legislation has helped improve the FRA-Swedish Security Service (SAPO) relationship.
CDR/DCDR/DDIR GUIDANCE: (U) N/A

PREP SESSION GUIDANCE:
- (U) Due to the nature of the visit, no specific guidance has been conveyed to other participants.

NSA/CSS REQUESTED:
- (U//FOUO) Further Cyber Security/Defense Cooperation;
- (S//REL TO USA, SWE) Future CT cooperation (value of CT Deployed Analyst);
- (S//REL TO USA, SWE) Status of relationship between FRA and SÅPO under the new legislation;
- (TS//REL TO USA, SWE) Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) Update;
- (TS//REL TO USA, SWE) Update on special project;

CYBERCOM REQUESTED: (U) N/A

COMMON THREADS:
- (S//REL TO USA, SWE) Emphasize the value of the NSA-FRA partnership.

KEY TAKEAWAYS:
(S//REL USA, SWE) Recommend General Alexander and D/DIR emphasize the following points:

Quantum Operations:
- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, SWE) Acknowledge the success that NSA, FRA, and GCHQ have had on WINTERLIGHT. Last month, we received a message from our Swedish partner that GCHQ received FRA QUANTUM tips that led to 100 shots, five of which were successfully redirected to the GCHQ server. The Foreign Affairs Directorate (FAD) confirmed with Tailored Access Operations (TAO) that this validates the "proof of concept" that was originally trying to be accomplished. Additionally, FAD, TAO, and Enterprise Information Technology Services are still working through the technical solution to have FRA tip directly to NSA. S3 Data Acquisitions' goal is to have a solution for a direct tip to FRA operational by this summer. The Quantum effort motivated the recent XKEYSCORE installation. FRA is currently evaluating it for use to support their SIGINT Development work.

Cable Access/Reporting and Analysis:
- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, SWE) Highlight that NSA/CSS would like to continue to collaborate on FRA's cable access program, which has resulted in unique SIGINT reporting on a variety of high-priority SIGINT topics (123 reports thus far this fiscal year). FRA continues to gain access to more data from additional telecommunications companies, making the cable access potentially lucrative for NSA/CSS for targets beyond Russia.
Cyber:
- (TS//REL TO USA, SWE) Stress that NTOC is ready to seriously engage with FRA on cyber defense. Mr. Åkesson has reviewed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and has no changes; therefore, we would like to have an official signing during the 24 April 1130-1200 discussions.

- (TS//SI//NF) NTOC shared some information with FRA about a Swedish intrusion in November 2012. FRA came in with questions in February 2013 that led NTOC to do more analysis. Subsequently, NTOC reached the same conclusion as FRA, that it involved the Israeli Embassy in Stockholm. FRA asked if it could alert Israel and NTOC agreed that it could tell Israel about the intrusion. Israel’s identity was never compromised.

Secure VTC Capability
- (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Encourage FRA to set up its equipment soonest to allow for secure VTC capability. That capability already exists with Norway and Denmark and has shown benefit in expanding analytic collaboration on a myriad of issues. FRA’s technology directorate is just waiting on requirements from its SIGINT directorate to be able to finalize the set-up and installation.

Counterterrorism:
- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, SWE) NSA/CSS’ Counterterrorism (CT) analysts and FRA continue to cooperate and collaborate on CT threat-related activities in Europe. Several analyst-to-analyst meetings have taken place and European Cryptologic Center (ECC) in Darmstadt, Germany, is formally coordinating a Staff Processing Form (SPF) to have Sweden assist NSA/CSS with high-priority CT Swedish language traffic that ECC is currently unable to fully analyze. In January 2013, CT established its first CT deployed analyst position in Stockholm. Also in January, FRA and SÄPO were legally allowed to collaborate after a 4-year hiatus.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, SWE) Encourage increased collaboration on CT threat streams.

Russia:
- (S//SI//REL TO USA, SWE) Thank Sweden for its continued work on the Russian target, and underscore the primary role that FRA plays as a leading partner to work the Russian target, including Russian leadership, energy, , and counterintelligence. FRA’s cable access has resulted in unique SIGINT reporting on all of these areas.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, SWE) Encourage continued collaboration and sharing of reporting on Russian topics.
VISIT FORMAT:

- (S//REL TO USA, SWE) GEN Alexander’s opening remarks will set the tone for a productive conference.
- (S//REL TO USA, SWE) FRA will provide briefings on FRA’s SIGINT Roadmap; its new cyber division; its relationship with the Swedish Internal Security Service, SÄPO; and updates on the special project and NAPA-3.
- (U//FOUO) NSA Participants: SID DIR, DIRFA, Associate D/DIR for CT, GCM, Russia Production Center, GCM, Office of South Asia, GCM, Office of China/Korea, NTOC, NCSC, SSO, Special Projects Office (LEGEND).

PREVIOUS VISITS AND RESPECTIVE TOPICS:

- (S//REL TO USA, SWE) Mr. Åkesson last visited NSA/CSS for SWEDUSA in May 2012.

POTENTIAL LANDMINES: (U) None.

OTHER INFORMATION: (U) None.

RECENT PRESS INDICATIONS: (U) None.
Based on a 1954 agreement between NSA and GCHQ (later ratified in the 1956 UKUSA accords), GCHQ had the lead with Sweden for COMINT matters. NSA had the lead for ELINT and, as things evolved, technical SIGINT issues for both COMINT and ELINT. In 2004 we mutually agreed that our 50-year-old arrangement was no longer operable since we

Therefore, we drafted a paper that was signed by NSA's Principal Director for Foreign Affairs, GCHQ's head of Foreign Relations, and the Director General of Sweden's SIGINT Service (FRA), allowing NSA to deal with the FRA on COMINT issues without pre-coordination with GCHQ. The paper also requires both of us to keep the other informed as to what we are doing with the FRA, and requires the FRA to dedupe if both GCHQ and we are separately asking for the same or similar exchanges. As a result of this change, our COMINT relationship with the FRA has burgeoned on both sides. The relationship with Sweden is protected at the TOP SECRET level because of that nation's political neutrality.
1. If you know the particular website the target visits. For this example, I’m looking for everyone in Sweden that visits a particular extremist web forum.

Search: HTTP Activity

- Query Name: HTTP_in_Sweden
- Justification: SwedishExtremist website visitors
- Host: *.com
- Country: SE

Scroll down to enter a country code (Sweden is selected)

The website URL (aka “host) is entered in with a wildcard to account for “www” and “mail” other hosts.

To comply with USSID-18 you must AND that with some other information like an IP or country.
NSA’s relationship with the FRA, an extremely competent, technically innovative, and trusted Third Party partner, continues to grow. The FRA provided NSA with access to its cable collection in 2011, providing unique collection on high-priority Russian targets such as leadership, internal politics, and energy. Other topics Russia and the Baltic region include countering foreign intelligence and military. FRA’s efforts against counter-terrorism (CT) targets continue to expand, and new legislation enacted in January 2013 has improved its ability to work directly with the Swedish internal security service (SÄPO). NSA’s Data Acquisition is actively engaged with the FRA, which has numerous collection sites and is proficient in collecting a wide variety of communications.

(U) Key Issues
Sweden: Realization of DIRNSA-proposed trilat to work Quantum.
DATE/TIME OF VISIT: (U) 24-26 April 2013
24 April 2013 // 0745-1600;
25 April 2013 // 0845-1545;
26 April 2013 // 0800-1300

VISITOR: (U/FOUO) MR. INGVAR ÅKESSON

TITLE: (U) Director General

COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: (U/FOUO) Sweden/Forsvarets Radioanstalt (FRA)

EQUIVALENCY: (U/FOUO) Director, NSA

ACCOMPANIED BY: (U/FOUO) MS. CHRISTINA MALM
D/DIR, FRA
MS. LENA NYBERG
SIGINT Director, FRA
MR. MATS NORDQVIST
Technical Director, FRA
MR. (25 and 26 April only)
Strategic Advisor Chief Studies and Development
MS.
CH Foreign Relations Officer
MS.
Special Liaison Officer (SLO)

INTERPRETER: (U) No.

PREVIOUS VISITS: (S//REL TO USA, SWE) Mr. Åkesson’s last visit to NSA/CSS was in May 2012 for the SWEDUSA Conference.

CLEARANCES: (U) TS//SI

ACCOMPANYING NSA/CSS SENIOR: (U/FOUO) MR. JAMES M. CUSICK
Director Foreign Affairs (DIRFA)
PHOTOGRAPHER: (U) No.

MEMENTO PRESENTED: (U) No.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY: (U) GEN A: Class B; D/DIR and Guests: Business Attire.

PURPOSE OF VISIT: (S//NF) SWEDUSA Strategic Planning Conference. This conference will give the Directorate the opportunity to assess the state of the relationship and discuss other areas of mutual cooperation such as joint collection initiatives, cyber defense and security and Quantum (TAO) operations.

JUSTIFICATION FOR DIRECTORATE INVOLVEMENT: (U//FOUO) Level of the visitor justifies Directorate involvement.

EXPECTED OUTCOME: (U//FOUO) Another year of close, expanded cooperation on a number of fronts with one of our most trusted partners.

Chief of Protocol
and Corporate Events
NSA/CSS Protocol Office
### SWEDUSA/Mr. Mr. Ingvar Åkesson

**24 April 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Presentation Title and Presenter</th>
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<tr>
<td>0745</td>
<td>(U//FOUO) Welcome</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mr. Ingvar Åkesson</td>
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<td>Ms. Christina Malm</td>
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<td>Ms. Lena Nyberg</td>
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<td>Mr. Mats Nordqvist</td>
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<td>0800-0815</td>
<td>(U//FOUO) Directorate Opening Remarks</td>
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<td>GEN Keith B. Alexander, U.S. Army, DIRNSA/CHCSS</td>
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<td>Mrs. Frances J. Fleisch, EXDIR</td>
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<td>0815-0915</td>
<td>(U//FOUO) Forsvarets Radioanstalt (FRA) SIGINT Roadmap Discussions</td>
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<td>Mr. Ingvar Åkesson</td>
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<td>0915-0930</td>
<td>(U//FOUO) Office of China-Korea Discussions (OCK)</td>
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<td>Ms. , Global Capabilities Manager (GCM), OCK</td>
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<td>0930-0945</td>
<td>(U) Break</td>
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<td>0945-1015</td>
<td>(U//FOUO) Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID) Courtesy Call</td>
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<td>1015-1030</td>
<td>(U) Break</td>
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<td>1030-1125</td>
<td>(U//FOUO) Russia Production Center Discussions</td>
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<td>Mr. , GCM, Office of Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1130-1200</td>
<td>(S//REL) Directorate Hosted Discussions (10)</td>
<td>2B8036</td>
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<td>GEN Keith B. Alexander, U.S. Army, DIRNSA/CHCSS</td>
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<td>Mr. Mats Nordqvist</td>
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Met and escorted by Mr. James M. Cusick, DIRFA, CDO; and Protocol Officer.

**Location**

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20380301

TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
Mr. James M. Cusick, DIRFA
Ms.

NOTE: A memento will not be presented.
A photographer will not be present.

1200-1245 (U/FOUO) Directorate Hosted Lunch
   Mrs. Frances J. Fleisch, EXDIR (Host)
   (By Invitation Only)

1245-1300 (U) Break

1300-1400 (U/FOUO) Counterterrorism (CT) Production Center Discussions
   Ms. , Deputy SID CT
   Mr. , GCM CT

1400-1415 (S/REL USA, SWE) FRA and Swedish Security Service (SÄPO) Partnership Discussions
   Mr. Ingvar Åkesson

1415-1515 (U/FOUO) Afghanistan Discussions
   Ms. , GCM Office of South Asia (OSA)
   Ms. , Chief of Operations, OSA
   Ms. , Foreign Affairs Officer, OSA

1515-1600 (U/FOUO) SIGINT Seniors Europe (SSEUR) and NATO Advisory Committee on Special Intelligence (NACSI) Discussions
   Mr. , SIGINT Seniors Europe Executive Officer, Foreign Affairs Directorate (FAD)
   Mr. , Jr., NATO Affairs Officer - SIGINT, FAD

1600 (U) Depart

 Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
 Dated: 20070108
 Declassify On: 20380301

TOP SECRET//SI/NOFORN
### SWEDUSA/Mr. MR. INGVAR ÅKESSON

**25 APRIL 2013**

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<th>Presentation Title and Presenter</th>
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<tr>
<td>0845</td>
<td>(U/OFO) Arrival</td>
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<tr>
<td>0900-0930</td>
<td>(S/REL USA, SWE) FRA Cyber Defense Strategy Discussions Mr. Ingvar Åkesson</td>
<td>2B8156</td>
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<tr>
<td>0930-1000</td>
<td>(U/OFO) NSA/CSS Threat Operations (NTOC) Office of Analysis Discussions Ms. , D/CH Cyber Threat Assessment and Attribution Mr. , Lead, Designee Mr. , Enduring Cyber Threat Manager</td>
<td>2B8156</td>
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<tr>
<td>1000-1030</td>
<td>(U/OFO) NTOC Office of Operations Discussions Mr. , D/CH Office of Cyber Operations and Threat Pursuit Mr. , D/Tech DIR, NTOC Office of Operations</td>
<td>2B8156</td>
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<tr>
<td>1030-1045</td>
<td>(U) Break</td>
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<tr>
<td>1045-1130</td>
<td>(U/OFO) Special Projects Office Discussions Mr. , DIR Special Projects, NTOC</td>
<td>2B8156</td>
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<td>1130-1145</td>
<td>(U/OFO) FRA VIVIAN Update Discussions Mr. Ingvar Åkesson</td>
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<tr>
<td>1145-1200</td>
<td>(U) Break</td>
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<tr>
<td>1200-1300</td>
<td>(U/OFO) NTOC Hosted Lunch Mr. DIR Special Projects, NTOC (Host) <em>(By Invitation Only)</em></td>
<td>Canine Suite 2B8156</td>
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<tr>
<td>1300-1400</td>
<td>(TS/SI/REL USA, SWE) QUANTUM and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) Cooperation Discussions Mr. Gregory L. Smithberger, CH TAO Mr. Robert E. Joyce, CH TAO Designee Mr. , Tech DIR, Data Acquisition Mr. , CH Remote Operations Center (ROC) Mr. , CH Special Tactics and Techniques</td>
<td>2B8156</td>
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20380301
1400-1415 (U//FOUO) Global Collaborative Environment (GCE) Discussions
Mr. , Foreign Strategist, Technology Directorate (TD)
CAPT , USN, SIGINT Development (SIGDEV) Strategy and Governance, Foreign Partner Lead
Mr. , Jr., Tech DIR, Partner Solutions
Mr. , Foreign Affairs Officer, TD

1415-1430 (U) Break

1430-1500 (U//FOUO) NTOC Directorate Courtesy Call
Mr. , Jr., DIR NTOC

1500-1515 (U) Break

1515-1530 (S//REL USA, SWE) FRA: NAPA-3 Discussions
Mr. Ingvar Åkesson

1530-1545 (U//FOUO) Closing Remarks
Mr. James M. Cusick, DIRFA

1545 (U) Depart

1830 (U//FOUO) Directorate Hosted Dinner
GEN Keith B. Alexander, U.S. Army, DIRNSA/CHCSS (Host)
Mrs. Frances F. Fleisch, EXDIR (By Invitation Only)
## 26 April 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Presentation Title and Presenter</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800</td>
<td>(U//FOUO) Arrival</td>
<td>GH 2B</td>
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<tr>
<td>0815-0845</td>
<td>(U//FOUO) PartnerMall Program to GCE Transition Discussions</td>
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<td>Mr. , Technology Directorate (TD) Foreign Strategist</td>
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<td>Mr. , Jr., Tech DIR, Partner Solutions</td>
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<td>Mr. , Foreign Advisory Officer, TD</td>
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<tr>
<td>0845-0900</td>
<td>(U//FOUO) NSA/CSS Commercial Solutions Center (NCSC)</td>
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<td>Ms. , Manager, Platform Manager, Industry Services Division, NCSC</td>
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<td>0900-0930</td>
<td>(U//FOUO) TURTLEPOWER and Turmoil Discussions</td>
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<td>Ms. , D/CH Computer Technologies Exploitation Applications (CTEA)</td>
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<td>Mr. , D/CH Protocol Exploitation</td>
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<td>0930-0945</td>
<td>(U) Break</td>
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<td>0945-1015</td>
<td>U//FOUO) XKS Sessions and Discussions</td>
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<td>Mr. , Program Technical Director</td>
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<td>Mrs. , Program Manager, WINTERLIGHT</td>
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<td>Mr. , Special Source Operations (SSO) Systems Engineer</td>
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<td>1015-1115</td>
<td>(TS/SI//REL USA, SWE) QUANTUM Discussions</td>
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<td>Mr. , CH Special Tactics and Techniques</td>
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<td>Mr. , Tech DIR, ROC</td>
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<tr>
<td>1115-1130</td>
<td>Break</td>
<td>2B8156</td>
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<tr>
<td>1130-1230</td>
<td>(U//FOUO) Data Acquisitions Hosted Lunch</td>
<td>Canine Suites</td>
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<td>Mr. , Technical DIR, Data Acquisition (Host)</td>
<td>(By Invitation Only)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1230-1300</td>
<td>(U//FOUO) Actions Review and Conference Wrap-up</td>
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<td>Ms. , CDO Sweden</td>
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1300 (U) Depart GH 2B
Met and escorted by Mrs. Office.

NSA/CSS Protocol

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20380301
In order to deploy these stains at scale across machines used by the extremist community in [redacted] it was decided to target machines where the users visited extremist web forums. QUANTUM was the technique used to deliver the stains to each target machine. QUANTUM is CNE’s mechanism that leverages GCHQ’s huge passive SIGINT accesses to deliver CNE payloads to targets. As this is a very new approach to tackling a tough target, it took 12 months for policy, collection, processing and CNE issues to be resolved, but after a lot of hard work by some committed individuals across Benhall, Bude and SOUNDER, successful implementation of staining at scale was achieved.
Logs any identified TOR routers used for anonymizing Internet traffic

- Searchable fields
  - TOR from server
  - TOR to server
  - Router nickname
“Slowing down the Internet”

- XKS goal is to store the full-take content for 3-5 days, effectively “slowing down the Internet” so that analysts can go back and recover sessions that otherwise would have been dropped by the front end.

- Meta-data is saved off longer, with the goal of 30 days retention.

- A lot of analysis can be done through meta-data only (MARINA is meta-data only).
What makes XKS so good at SIGDEV?

- XKS gives analysts unique access to terabytes of content and meta-data.
- Typically sites select and forward to PINWALE less than 5% of the DNI they’re processing.
- The rest of that data used to be dropped but is now being retained temporarily and made available to analysts through X-KEYSCORE.
- As an example, at one our sites XKS sees more data per day than all of PINWALE.
Data Sources

- FORNSAT (downlink)
- Overhead (uplink)
- Special Source
- Tailored Access
- F6
- FISA (limited)
- 3rd party