<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mo_Day</th>
<th>Speaker sponsored by First Defence (Sir Geoffrey Pattie, Pres.)</th>
<th>Speaker Title</th>
<th>Topic_of_Speech</th>
<th>Venue</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Nov 23</td>
<td>Tobias Ellwood MP</td>
<td>Author of COIN Ops: Bridging the Gap Between Military and Civilian Affairs on the Modern Battlefield</td>
<td>Post conflict reconstruction; how to win in Afghanistan</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 16</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>Oct 06</td>
<td>Liam Fox (Dr.)</td>
<td>MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence</td>
<td>Defending Our Interests; Making the Case for Defence</td>
<td>Manchester Central Room Charter 2, Conservative Party Fringe Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Jul 14</td>
<td>Douglas Carswell</td>
<td>MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence</td>
<td>The Next Strategic Defence Review: Options for Change, or Options for Cuts?</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>May 12</td>
<td>Geoffrey van Orden</td>
<td>MBE, MEP, Conservative Spokesman on Defence and Security in the European Parliament, Vice Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee</td>
<td>Compting Needs, National, NATO and European: Resolving the competition for defence resources</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Jan 20</td>
<td>Chris Donnelly</td>
<td>CMG, TD, Senior Fellow The Defence Academy of the UK, Director of the Institute for Statecraft and Governance</td>
<td>Forecasting Future Conflict: From the Cold War to Hot Peace</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 5</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>Sep 30</td>
<td>Liam Fox (Dr.)</td>
<td>MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence</td>
<td>Resurgent Threats: Terror, Russia and Iran?</td>
<td>Hall 5 Birmingham International Conference Centre, Conservative Party Fringe Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Sep 30</td>
<td>Jack Caravelli (Dr.)</td>
<td>Visiting Professor UK Defence Academy [Central Intelligence Agency, the White House National Security Council Staff from 1996-2000, and then as deputy assistant secretary at the Department of Energy from 2000-2003]</td>
<td>Resurgent Threats: Terror, Russia and Iran?</td>
<td>Hall 5 Birmingham International Conference Centre, Conservative Party Fringe Meeting</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>Mar 19</td>
<td>David Kilcullen (Dr.)</td>
<td>Senior counter-terrorism advisor to the US Secretary of State</td>
<td>Counter-Insurgency in Principle and Practice</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 6</td>
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<td>Mar 19</td>
<td>Julian Lewis (Dr.)</td>
<td>Senior counter-terrorism advisor to the US Secretary of State</td>
<td>MP, Shadow Defence Minister</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Oct 23</td>
<td>Jorge Mendonca</td>
<td>MBE, DSO</td>
<td>Trust Our Armed Forces: The Realities of War</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 12</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Oct 02</td>
<td>Liam Fox</td>
<td>MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
<td>Spanish Hall of the Wintergardens, Blackpool, Party Conference Fringe Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Oct 02</td>
<td>Charles Garraway</td>
<td>Professor, CBE, Chatham House</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
<td>Spanish Hall of the Wintergardens, Blackpool, Party Conference Fringe Meeting</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>Oct 02</td>
<td>Allan Mallinson</td>
<td>Writer, Journalist, Former Commander 13/18th Hussars</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
<td>Spanish Hall of the Wintergardens, Blackpool, Party Conference Fringe Meeting</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>Jul 18</td>
<td>Jack Caravelli (Dr.) Former National Security Adviser, Bush White House; Visiting Professor UK Defence Academy (Central Intelligence Agency, the White House National Security Council Staff from 1996-2000, and then as deputy assistant secretary at the Department of Energy from 2000-2003)</td>
<td>Resurgent Russia - Unwrapping the Riddle</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Apr 23</td>
<td>Bill Kincaid Editor, RUSI Defence Systems</td>
<td>More Bang for our Buck?</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Mar 19</td>
<td>Mark Harper MP, Shadow Minister for Veterans’ Affairs</td>
<td>They Fight for Us, Do We Fight for Them?</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 7</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>Mar 19</td>
<td>Andrew Cumming Maj. Gen, CBE, Controller SSAFA</td>
<td>They Fight for Us, Do We Fight for Them?</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Mar 19</td>
<td>Mark Cann Chief Executive, British Force Foundation</td>
<td>They Fight for Us, Do We Fight for Them?</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Oct 03</td>
<td>Liam Fox (Dr.) MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence</td>
<td>The future of Britain’s nuclear Deterrent</td>
<td>Tregonwell Hall Bournemouth International Center, Fringe Meeting</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Jun 22</td>
<td>Geoffrey Van Orden MEP, Defence and Security Spokesman for the European Conservation Group</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy - a fact or a fantasy?</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 6</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>Jun 22</td>
<td>Graham Brady MP, Shadow European Minister</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy - a fact or a fantasy?</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>Mar 21</td>
<td>Liam Fox (Dr.) MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence</td>
<td>Overstretch</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Mar 7</td>
<td>Lord Astor of Hever Shadow Defence; Spokesman, House of Lords</td>
<td>The Drayson Review: Industry's last hope - or best chance?</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 11</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>Mar 7</td>
<td>Francis Tusa Journalist; Editor of Defence Analysis; Editor-in-Chief, Military Logistics International</td>
<td>The Drayson Review: Industry’s last hope - or best chance?</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>Nov 21</td>
<td>Julian Lewis (Dr.) MP, Shadow Defence Team and Partilimentary Chairman of First Defence</td>
<td>Do we need a Nuclear Deterrent?</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 9</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>Nov 21</td>
<td>Kate Hudson (Dr.) Chair, CND</td>
<td>Do we need a Nuclear Deterrent?</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Nov 09</td>
<td>Rupert Smith (Sir) General</td>
<td>The Utility of Force - Why do we use military force to solve our political problems?</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Oct 05</td>
<td>Michael Ancram (Rt. Hon.) QC, MP,</td>
<td>What are we defending: Sovereignty, the Realm or the National Interest?</td>
<td>Spanish Hall of the Wintergardens, Blackpool, Party Conference First Defence First Fringe Meeting</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>Oct 05</td>
<td>Bob Stewieart (Col.)</td>
<td>DSO</td>
<td>What are we defending: Sovereignty, the Realm or the National Interest?</td>
<td>Spanish Hall of the Wintergardens, Blackpool, Party Conference First Defence First Fringe Meeting</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>Oct 05</td>
<td>Bruce Anderson</td>
<td>Joiurnalist</td>
<td>What are we defending: Sovereignty, the Realm or the National Interest?</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>Jun 27</td>
<td>Peter Ricketts (Sir)</td>
<td>Ambassador, KCMG, UK Permanent Representative on the NATO Council</td>
<td>The Future of NATO: New Threats and New Missions</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 15</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Mar 07</td>
<td>Lord Boyce</td>
<td>Admiral, Former Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
<td>The Challenges Facing the UK Armed Forces</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Jan 17</td>
<td>Tim Collins (Col)</td>
<td>Former Commander 1st Batallion, Royal Irish Regiment, Iraq</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 5</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Oct 06</td>
<td>Nicholas Soames (Hon.)</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>The Conservative Vision for Defence</td>
<td>Purbeck Lounde, Bournemouth International Centre, Fringe Meeting at the Annual Conservative Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Oct 01</td>
<td>Geoffrey E. Pattie (Sir)</td>
<td>Founder, President, First Defence; (Founder, Strategic Communications Laboratories Limited)</td>
<td>Briefing visit for Shadow Defence Team</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Sep 23-24</td>
<td>Geoffrey E. Pattie (Sir)</td>
<td>Founder, President, First Defence; (Founder, Strategic Communications Laboratories Limited)</td>
<td>Briefing visit for Prospective Candidates</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Mar 15</td>
<td>Scott Ritter</td>
<td>Former UNSCOM weapons inspector</td>
<td>Intelligence as a Policy: How the process failed in Iraq</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Jan 27</td>
<td>Paul Mead</td>
<td>Dir. Business Dev. For MBDA (missle manufacturer merged from elements of Marconi, BAE, Aérospatiale-Matra)</td>
<td>Who needs Missle Defence? Sponsored by MBDA</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 20</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Jan 27</td>
<td>Damian Leader</td>
<td>Political Section, US Embassy</td>
<td>Who needs Missle Defence? Sponsored by MBDA</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Jan 13</td>
<td>Nicholas Soames</td>
<td>MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence</td>
<td>The Political and Business Implications of the Defence White Paper</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Jan 13</td>
<td>John Weston</td>
<td>CBE, former CEO of BAE Systems</td>
<td>The Political and Business Implications of the Defence White Paper</td>
<td>House of Commons, Committee Room 17</td>
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</table>

Post conflict reconstruction; how to win in Afghanistan

Speaker:
Tobias Ellwood MP

Author of COIN Ops: Bridging the Gap Between Military and Civilian Affairs on the Modern Battlefield

Conservative Party Fringe Meeting

“Defending Our Interests; Making the Case for Defence”

Speaker:
Dr. Liam Fox M.P.
Shadow Secretary of State for Defence

“The Next Strategic Defence Review: Options for Change, or Options for Cuts?”

Speaker
Douglas Carswell M.P.

Sash Tusa
Defence Analyst and writer

"Competing Needs, National, NATO and European: Resolving the competition for defence resources"

Speaker:
Geoffrey van Orden MBE MEP,
<table>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Forecasting Future Conflict: From Cold War to Hot Peace&quot;</td>
<td>Tuesday, 20th January 2009, House of Commons Committee Room 5</td>
<td>18.30 – 20.00</td>
<td>&quot;Forecasting Future Conflict: From Cold War to Hot Peace&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Speaker: Chris Donnelly, CMG, TD Senior Fellow The Defence Academy of the UK. Director of the Institute for Statecraft and Governance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative Party Fringe Meeting</td>
<td>Tuesday, 30th September 2008</td>
<td>12.30 – 14.00</td>
<td>Hall 5 Birmingham International Conference Centre</td>
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<td>“Resurgent Threats: Terror, Russia and Iran? ”</td>
<td>Speaker(s): Dr. Liam Fox M.P. Shadow Secretary of State for Defence and Dr. Jack Caravelli Visiting Professor UK Defence Academy</td>
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<td>This event is sponsored by EADS</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Counter-Insurgency in Principle and Practice&quot;</td>
<td>Wednesday, 19th March 2008</td>
<td>18.30-20.00 (entrance by St. Stephen’s Entrance)</td>
<td>&quot;Counter-Insurgency in Principle and Practice&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. David Kilcullen, Senior counter-terrorism advisor to the US Secretary of State and Dr. Julian Lewis M.P., Shadow Defence Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRUST OUR ARMED FORCES: THE REALITIES OF WAR</td>
<td>Tuesday, 23rd October 2007</td>
<td>18.30-20.00 (entrance via St. Stephen’s Entrance)</td>
<td>TRUST OUR ARMED FORCES: THE REALITIES OF WAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col. Jorge Mendonca M.B.E., D.S.O.</td>
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</table>
Fringe Meeting

Speaker are: Dr. Liam Fox MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence, Prof. Charles Garraway CBE, Chatham House, Allan Mallinson, writer, journalist and former Commander 13/18th Hussars.

This event is sponsored by EADS

Resurgent Russia – Unwrapping the Riddle

Dr. Jack Caravelli
Former National Security Adviser, Bush White House and Visiting Professor UK Defence Academy

More Bang for our Buck?

Lewis Page, Author of "Lions Donkeys and Dinosaurs", Defence Commentator and former Royal Naval Officer

Bill Kincaid, Editor, RUSI Defence Systems

They Fight for Us, Do We Fight for Them?

Mark Harper M.P., Shadow Minister for Veterans ' Affairs
Maj. Gen. Andrew Cumming C.B.E., Controller SSAFA
Mark Cann, Chief Executive, British Forces Foundation

Fringe Meeting with Dr. Liam Fox MP Shadow Secretary of State for Defence

"The future of Britain's nuclear Deterrent"

Sponsored by EADS

In advance of this meeting you may care to look at the award winning essay by First Defence Chairman Dr. Julian Lewis M.P. 'NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT VERSUS PEACE IN THE 21st CENTURY'
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>Thursday 22nd June</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy - a fact or a fantasy?</td>
<td>Geoffrey Van Orden MEP, Defence and Security Spokesman for the European Conservative Group</td>
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<td>Graham Brady MP, Shadow Europe Minister</td>
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<td>Tuesday 21st March</td>
<td>Dr. Liam Fox MP Shadow Secretary of State for Defence - &quot;Overstretch&quot;</td>
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<td>&quot;The Drayson Review: Industry's last hope - or best chance?</td>
<td>Speech</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Speakers: Lord Astor of Hever, Shadow Defence Spokesman, House of Lords; Speech</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Francis Tusa, journalist, Editor of Defence Analysis, Editor-in-Chief, Military Logistics International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monday 21st November</td>
<td>Do we need a Nuclear Deterrent?</td>
<td>Debate between Dr. Julian Lewis M.P., Shadow Defence Team and Parliamentary Chairman of first defence vs. Dr. Kate Hudson, Chair of CND.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday 9th November</td>
<td>&quot;The Utility of Force&quot;</td>
<td>General Sir Rupert Smith</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Why do we use military force to solve our political problems?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wednesday 5th October</td>
<td>Conservative Party Annual Conference</td>
<td>first defence Fringe Meeting</td>
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<td>&quot;What are we defending: Sovereignty , the Realm or the National Interest?&quot;</td>
<td>Speech</td>
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<td>Monday 27th June</td>
<td>Ambassador Sir Peter Ricketts, K.C.M.G, UK Permanent Representative</td>
<td>&quot;The Future of NATO: New Threats and New Missions&quot;</td>
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<td>on the NATO Council</td>
<td>REPORT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monday, 7th March</td>
<td>Admiral the Lord Boyce, Former Chief of the Defence Staff.</td>
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<tr>
<td>18.30 - 20.00</td>
<td>Committee Room 8, House of Commons</td>
<td>&quot;The Challenges Facing the UK Armed Forces&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monday, 17&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; January 2005</td>
<td>18.30 - 20.00</td>
<td>Committee Room 5, House of Commons, entrance via St. Stephen's Entrance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wednesday 6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; October, 2004</td>
<td>13:00 - 14:10</td>
<td>Purbeck Lounge, Bournemouth International Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO and SHAPE</td>
<td>October 1st 2004</td>
<td>Briefing visit for Shadow Defence Team</td>
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<td>September 23rd-24th 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td>Briefing visit for Prospective Parliamentary Candidates</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monday 15&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; March, 2004</td>
<td>18:30-20:00</td>
<td>Committee Room 10, House of Commons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tuesday 27&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; January, 2004</td>
<td>18:30-20:00</td>
<td>Committee Room 20, House of Commons</td>
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<td>Tuesday 13&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; January, 2004</td>
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[first defence] [our mission] [who we are] [elevator briefs]
The above companies support the work of first defence, but do not necessarily endorse all opinions expressed by First Defence. The views expressed by first defence on this website, are in no way directly attributable to the Conservative Party, or Conservative Party Policy.

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first defence website development by Netlab - the Internet Research Laboratory
In the closing stages of the Second World War, a series of terrible blows rained down on the Japanese homeland. City after city was attacked and civilian casualties were measured in the tens of thousands. Still, the Japanese did not surrender – any more than had the Germans, under a similar weight of bombardment, until overrun by the Allied armies. When the atomic bombs were used against two more Japanese cities, however, the shock effect on the country’s rulers was decisive, even though initially the numbers of casualties were no greater than those inflicted by the conventional attacks against Tokyo and elsewhere. The real change brought about by the atomic bomb was not the scale of the destruction it could inflict, but the absolute certainty that that destruction would be inflicted and could not be avoided.

By contrast, when the thousand-bomber raids had been launched against German and Japanese cities, a whole variety of possible outcomes might have resulted. At one end of the spectrum, the mass bomber formations might have achieved their aim, destroyed their target and returned to base with very few losses. At the other end of the spectrum, the bombers might have been intercepted and attacked, diverted from their target, which remained unscathed, and forced to suffer very heavy losses themselves, as happened on the infamous Nuremberg raid.

There was no way of knowing in advance how such encounters would work out – prior to the coming of the atomic bomb. Let us imagine that the Germans and the Japanese had known in advance that their potential victims, the democracies, would develop nuclear weapons before the end of the wars they were about to unleash. Is it likely that they would have proceeded to do so in the certain knowledge of total destruction? The theory that they would not had already been formulated before the atomic bomb was tested. In a report for the Chiefs of Staff in June 1945, Professor Sir Henry Tizard concluded that the only answer which he and other senior
defence scientists could see to the atomic bomb was to be prepared to use it in retaliation:

A knowledge that we were prepared, in the last resort, to do this might well deter an aggressive nation. Duelling was a recognised method of settling quarrels between men of high social standing so long as the duellists stood twenty paces apart and fired at each other with pistols of a primitive type. If the rule had been that they should stand a yard apart with pistols at each other's hearts, we doubt whether it would long have remained a recognised method of settling affairs of honour.[1]

This argument was only the latest in a long line of similarly hard-headed but hopeful views. The motto: 'If you desire peace, be prepared for war' was essentially the same, as was the statement in the early days of aviation: 'When German bombers can destroy London and British bombers can destroy Berlin, Germany and Britain will never again go to war'. Alfred Nobel – of Peace Prize fame – was likewise convinced that his invention of dynamite would make war too destructive for countries to contemplate.

Why the Tizard scenario of peace through the threat of mutual destruction stood the test of time better than the earlier arguments was because of the factor of certainty (or 'assuredness') which atomic weapons for the first time guaranteed. Earlier explosives, like dynamite, and earlier means of delivery, like manned bombers, still left the outcome of the encounter in doubt. Even where both sides were similarly armed, there remained enough of a chance that one of them would suffer total defeat whilst the other enjoyed total victory to make the gamble of waging war seem worthwhile. There was, in short, too much uncertainty as to what the outcome would be.

The Ethical Paradox

The dawning of the atomic age was thus accompanied by what seemed to be an extreme ethical paradox: peace could apparently best be maintained by the possession of, and the threat to use, weapons which could obliterate tens of thousands of people in an instant. Simply because nuclear weapons, if used, would cause hideous destruction and loss of life, it has often been argued that there is something immoral in their very possession. Yet no weapon is moral or immoral in itself. Ethics enter the equation only when one considers the motivation for possessing weapons and the uses to which they are put.

If the consequence of possessing a lethal weapon is that nobody uses lethal weapons, whilst the consequence of not possessing a lethal weapon is that someone else uses his lethal weapons against you, which is the more moral thing to do: to possess the weapons and avoid anyone being attacked, or to renounce them and lay yourself open to aggression? The central problem which has to be faced by those who argue that the mere possession of, or the threat to use, nuclear weapons in retaliation is morally unacceptable, is the extreme level of destructiveness which conventional warfare had reached before the atomic bomb was invented. If it is the case that possessing a deadly weapon or being willing to threaten to use it in retaliation will avert a conflict in which millions would otherwise die, can it seriously be claimed that the more ethical policy is to renounce the weapon and let the millions meet their fate? Even if one argues that the threat to retaliate is itself immoral, is it as immoral as the failure to forestall so many preventable casualties?

This is, in reality, a variation on the argument against absolute pacifism which the late Leonard Cheshire illustrated when such issues were being debated twenty years ago. He set out the scenario of a security guard who is the only person in a position to prevent a terrorist from opening fire on a queue of passengers in an airport lounge. According to most people's
values, not only is it morally correct for him to shoot the armed terrorist, it would be profoundly unethical for him to decline to do so. This is without prejudice to the fact that the security guard might well be right to feel that it was a tragedy that he had had to take anyone's life at all. Moral choices are, as often as not, choices to determine the lesser of two evils. In the case of possessing and threatening to use a horrifying weapon, or renouncing it with the result that such weapons are actually used against one's own society, only the purest pacifist can be in any doubt as to which course to follow.

**Predictability**

Many who oppose Britain's retention and replacement of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century also advocated unilateral nuclear disarmament, despite the level of the Soviet threat, during the Cold War. There are, however, significant numbers who believe that what was necessary then no longer applies now. This brings us to the central problem of predictability.

From time to time wars break out in circumstances which were anticipated; but, more often than not, they arise totally unexpectedly. The Yom Kippur War in 1973 took even hypersensitive Israel by surprise. The Falklands War, nine years later, took Britain by surprise. The invasion of Kuwait in 1990 took everyone by surprise. And the attacks of 11 September 2001 took the world's only superpower by surprise. There was nothing new in any of this – as a detour into the archives strikingly illustrates: from August 1919 until November 1933 British foreign and defence policy was hamstrung by a prediction that the country would not be engaged in a war with another major power for at least a decade. This had a dangerously adverse effect on necessary rearmament when the international scene darkened. Arguing against the continuation of this so-called 'Ten Year Rule' in January 1931, when Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Sir Maurice Hankey, observed:

> As a nation we have been prone in the past to assume that the international outlook is in accordance with our desires rather than with the facts of the situation...We are also apt to forget how suddenly war breaks out. In 1870, a fortnight before the event, we were not in the least expecting the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War. The same was true in 1914. A fortnight after the murder of the Austrian Archduke, a debate took place in the House of Commons on foreign affairs. The European situation was hardly referred to at all. More attention was given to the preparations for the next Peace Conference!...There was no statement made on the subject of the European crisis in Parliament until July 27...We really had, at the outside, not more than ten days' warning.***

The onset of armed conflicts is inherently unpredictable. This is why it makes sense to keep in being an army, a navy and an air force during long periods of peace. The same applies *a fortiori* to the nuclear deterrent. Investment in armed forces in apparently peaceful times is analogous to the payment of premiums on insurance policies. No one knows when the accident or disaster may happen against which one is insuring; if one did, one could probably avoid it and save oneself the cost of the premiums.

With the benefit of hindsight, the Second World War is often regarded as a disaster predetermined by mistakes made at the end of the First World War. Yet in the decade of the 1920s, there was so little sign of an obvious enemy that each of Britain's three Armed Services prepared its hypothetical contingency plans against an entirely different potential enemy. In those days, the choice of possible enemy would seriously affect the nature of the defence policy designed to meet the threat. Fortunately, the British strategic nuclear deterrent is less dependent than conventional armed forces upon the correct identification of the enemy in advance. Any country which
emerges as a potential aggressor with mass-destruction weapons, in the next three or four decades, will be vulnerable to retaliation from Trident or its successor – and this is the sort of time-scale which we have to consider.

Each generation of the strategic nuclear deterrent functions for a period of thirty years or more. The actual replacement of the Trident system, if it occurs, will not even begin for at least another fifteen years. No one can possibly foretell what dangers will face us between the years 2020 and 2050, just as the threats facing us today would have seemed bizarre to politicians and military planners at the height of the Cold War. During periods of peace, democratic states naturally tend to scale down their conventional fighting services, but they try to do so in a way which is reversible should the international scene deteriorate. This option does not apply to the nuclear deterrent, which has always been set at the minimum level regarded as essential for credibility. There can be no more assurance that a nuclear or major chemical or biological threat will not arise in the next half-century than that major land, sea or air threats will not have to be faced. If it is right to insure against the latter, it is essential to insure against the former.

New Threats

Apart from those who have always opposed British nuclear weapons, irrespective of the level of threat, some politicians, some churchmen and commentators, and even some military figures who used to support it, have now changed their minds. This is primarily because the Cold War is over, America appears to be the dominant world power and the principal threats today emanate from rogue regimes and stateless terrorist groups. Let us consider each of these in turn.

First, the ending of the Cold War removes the danger of nuclear confrontation with Russia for as long as that country continues to tread, however hesitantly, the democratic path. Indeed, it is striking to note that many prophets of nuclear doom during the 1970s and 1980s have been all but silenced by the change in East-West relations, even though enough nuclear weapons remain in US and Russian hands to destroy the world’s main population centres with many warheads to spare. This illustrates the fact that it is not the weapons themselves which we have to fear but the nature of the governments that possess them. As soon as Russia turned away from totalitarianism, the main concern about her nuclear arsenal shifted from those devices under the control of the Kremlin to those which might leach out from Russian stockpiles and fall into the hands of other regimes which remained more hostile.

One concept which advocates of nuclear disarmament have traditionally ignored is the propensity for dictatorships to go to war with dictatorships, and for democracies and dictatorships to clash, whilst few – if any – examples exist of liberal democracies attacking each other. This suggests that it is quite right to have fewer qualms about the possession of deadly weapons by democracies, though regarding their possession by dictatorships as wholly unacceptable. There is no comparison between the two, and it is a constant failing of the disarmament lobby to try to ascribe values of reasonableness, tolerance, goodwill and peaceful intent to states under the control of despots, fanatics and dictators.

Secondly, the current period of America’s solo superpower status in no way diminishes the case for an independent British deterrent. Nuclear weapons, by their very nature, have devastating potential even in very small numbers. Quite apart from the prospect of unpredictable major threats in the longer term, the current enmity towards Britain by near-nuclear regimes like Iran suggests that unilateralism would be fraught with danger. It used to be pointed out that the British Polaris fleet had done nothing to deter Argentina from invading the Falkland Islands. Certainly, there was never a prospect of
democratic Britain threatening to use its ultimate weapon except in response to a mortal threat against the cities of the United Kingdom. What would have been the case, though, if the Argentine junta had possessed even a few atomic weapons or other mass-destruction devices? Without a nuclear force of her own, would Britain then have dared to respond to the occupation militarily, despite her superiority in conventional forces?

Time and again, the United Kingdom and the United States have stood side by side in international conflicts. If this pattern continues, the prospect could arise of a nuclear-armed enemy regarding it as safer to threaten or attack the smaller of the two allies. The danger would then arise of a possible miscalculation by an aggressor thinking that the US would not respond in kind to an attack with mass-destruction weapons on British cities. If this were a miscalculation, the attacker would discover it only when it was too late for all concerned, instead of having been deterred at the outset by the knowledge that Britain could respond in kind on her own behalf.

These considerations clearly bear on the third issue: that of rogue regimes. Several of them are already nuclear powers or on the verge of becoming so. The notion that they will abandon such a course indefinitely in response to unilateral British nuclear disarmament is totally unrealistic. Those who subscribe to it continually make the error of projecting civilized values onto extremist governments which actually hold them in contempt.

Turning, fourthly, to the current emergence of non-state terrorist groups, it is absolutely correct that strategic nuclear weapons are of no relevance whatsoever. Neither are aircraft carriers, main battle tanks, guided-missile destroyers or any other heavy-weight military equipment. The presence of a serious terrorist threat is clearly an argument in favour of expanded counter-insurgency forces and security and intelligence services. It is no argument at all for the abolition of those military capabilities which are designed to meet other types of threat which this country has faced in the past and may well face again in the future.

**Utopian NPT Obligations**

Does proliferation make Britain’s continued possession of nuclear weapons unethical? There might be a case for arguing this if it could be shown that there were a causal link between our continued possession of a strategic nuclear deterrent and the decision of one or more identifiable countries to acquire nuclear weapons. During the Cold War era, the proliferation argument was often used by one-sided nuclear disarmers in their campaign against Polaris, Trident and the deployment of cruise missiles. Yet, whenever asked to name a specific nuclear or near-nuclear country which would be likely to abandon its nuclear ambitions if we unilaterally renounced ours, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and its fellow travellers were notably unforthcoming. Countries make the decision whether or not to seek to acquire mass-destruction weapons according to hard-headed calculations of their own strategic interests. A quixotic renunciation by democratic Britain is not very likely to encourage any undemocratic state to follow suit. On the contrary, it is more likely to encourage any such state which views Britain as a potential enemy to redouble its efforts to join the WMD club, given that we would no longer have the means to threaten retaliation against nuclear, biological or chemical aggression.

What does the Non-Proliferation Treaty actually commit the United Kingdom to do? Article VI of the NPT is often referred to, but seldom quoted in full. This is what it states:

> Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and
on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

There are thus three obligations, only the first of which is time-limited. This is to end ‘the nuclear arms race’ at ‘an early date’. Given that the United Kingdom – and, for that matter, France and China – have never engaged in a nuclear arms race, their policy of each having a minimum strategic nuclear deterrent does not fall foul of this provision. None of these countries has ever sought to match the nuclear stockpiles of Russia or the United States. Each has been content to possess a much smaller nuclear capability, provided that it is adequate to threaten an unacceptable level of retaliation if attacked. The same would apply to any replacement system for Trident.

It is true that Article VI aspires to both ‘nuclear disarmament’ and ‘a Treaty on general and complete disarmament’ as well – but this is nothing more than a double aspiration for the indefinite future. What it amounts to is nothing less than a world completely disarmed of all weapons of every description ‘under strict and effective international control’. This utopia would require several things to happen: the creation of a World Government; the establishment of foolproof methods of preventing clandestine rearmament; and, above all, a revolution in the minds of men so that warfare became redundant.

Conclusion

During the inter-war years, the process of disarmament was taken to new heights of complexity, but it achieved only this: the peace-loving democracies disarmed each other and themselves, while the rogues, the villains, the bandits, the dictators and the tyrants re-armed in secret, threatened democracy and destroyed the peace of the world. After the final defeat of the Nazis, the democratic states faced a new challenge and a variation on an old dilemma. The challenge was that of confrontation with Soviet communism; the dilemma was whether to try to defuse it by disarmament or to contain it by deterrence.

The fact that the Third World War did not break out is not, of itself, conclusive proof that containment by deterrence was successful. It is of the nature of deterrence that, whenever it works, its opponents can always argue that the war would not have happened in any case. Yet the fact that there were so many small but deadly wars fought between client states of the superpowers (but not between the superpowers themselves) strongly suggests that the mutual threat of nuclear annihilation had something to do with the restraint exercised by the superpowers themselves.

The purpose of the British nuclear deterrent remains what it has always been: to minimize the prospect of the United Kingdom being attacked by mass-destruction weapons. It is not a panacea and it is not designed to forestall every type of threat. Nevertheless, the threat which it is designed to counter is so overwhelming that no other form of military capability could manage to avert it. The possession of the deterrent may be unpleasant, but it is an unpleasant necessity, the purpose of which lies not in its actual use but in its nature as the ultimate ‘stalemate weapon’ – and, in the nuclear age, stalemate is the most reliable source of security available to us all.


Between 1981 and 1985, he was a leader of the anti-CND campaigns waged by The Coalition for Peace Through Security, and by the Conservative Party. He briefed many politicians during the nuclear weapons debate and was Conservative Parliamentary Candidate for Swansea West in 1983. He was elected to Parliament in May 1997 and re-elected in June 2001.

Julian served for four years as Secretary of the Conservative Parliamentary Defence Committee. He was one of four MPs in the RAF’s programme for the 1998 Armed Forces Parliamentary Scheme, as one of two MPs in the RAF’s 2000 AFPS graduate programme, and as one of four MPs in the Royal Navy’s 2004 AFPS graduate programme.

In February 2000 Julian was appointed as one of the three Conservative Members of the Select Committee on Defence. The following month he was elected Vice-Chairman of the Conservative Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee and European Affairs Committee, in succession to the late Michael Colvin. He stepped down from these posts on joining the front bench in 2001.

Following the election of Iain Duncan Smith as leader of the Opposition in September 2001, Julian was appointed as an Opposition Whip. He was promoted to become a Shadow Defence Minister in November 2002.
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Speech by Dr. Liam Fox MP
Shadow Secretary of State for Defence  21/03/06

First Defence has done sterling work in recent years to keep defence as an issue alive in the body politic. This has not been an easy task in a political environment increasingly obsessed with personality and trivia. Even the threat of global terrorism does not seem to have shaken some out of their complacency about our future security. It is essential that we keep defence and security issues up the political agenda, and that is my task in the coming months.

I’d like to begin with a few facts and a quote.

First, the facts. This year we will spend only 2.2% of our GDP on defence. This is the smallest proportion of our national wealth that we have spent on defending our country since 1930.

By the time we finish the new Wembley Stadium, we will be able to seat the ranks of the whole of the British army inside it. The Royal Navy will be smaller than the French navy. And the RAF Museum at Hendon will have more attack aircraft than the RAF does now.

And now the quote: “A strong defence capability is an essential part of Britain’s foreign policy … By 1999 defence spending will have fallen to 2.6% of GDP … The people who have had to bear the burden of these cuts are our servicemen and women, overstretched and under strength as never before. The strain on our Armed Forces is huge. We have a continuing commitment in Northern Ireland. Our forces operate in the Gulf, the Balkans, Africa, the Falklands, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Gibraltar, Germany and other parts of the world all at once.” This was Tony Blair in February ’97, in full pre-election flow.

And what have we had from the same Tony Blair in government? Further commitments overseas in Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan with cuts in our armed forces of almost 40,000. The Army down 9,000. The Royal Navy down 10,000. The RAF down 16,000.

And yet there is little focus on Labour’s neglect of our defence forces. The lack of general debate about defence and security policy – rather than domestic affairs – is doubly strange given the varied locations in which British troops are currently serving. Afghanistan and Iraq are the two most notable deployments, but British forces can still be found in the south Atlantic, the Balkans and West Africa. Our global commitment amounts to some 15,000 troops – not including those permanently stationed in places like Cyprus and Germany. Their task, wherever they serve, is not an easy one and as a nation, we are rightly proud of them.

Yet our armed forces have equally never been under such a strain. They have never been asked to do so much with so little of the national wealth at their disposal. Therefore there is an urgent debate for this country to have. Do we reduce our commitments to match the size of our defence budget or do we increase our defence budget to match our commitments?

Part of the problem is that there is little strategic thinking about our foreign policy and so our defence policy has constantly to play catch up to overseas commitments that respond to the latest summit. An ad hoc foreign policy based on the latest summit communiqué is no basis for a sound defence policy for the United Kingdom.

Under David Cameron’s leadership William Hague and I are determined that the Conservatives will have a properly integrated foreign and defence review so that the size and shape of our armed forces will properly reflect the strategic interests and defence requirements of this country. That is what our policy group on national and international security, and the work we will do once it reports, is designed to do.

Just look at the size of the task.
A report from the Public Accounts Committee just the other week makes clear just how overstretched our armed forces are. The level of defence spending is designed to provide for, at most, no more than one small-scale operation and two medium-scale operations at any one time. Since 1999, though, British armed forces have been operating over and above the Government’s own Planning Assumptions in every year but one. Gordon Brown has trimmed the defence budget time and time again as the Government has asked our soldiers to do more and more.

Worse still, £310 million has been diverted last year from the Royal Navy to the Army and Royal Air Force to make up the gaps. It may have kept the Army moving and Air Force flying, but the Navy’s operational ability has been compromised. Our drugs operations in the Caribbean, for example, are being reduced despite some headline-grabbing successes for the Navy in the region. In the 2005 NAO Report on Military Readiness, the Government actually confessed that “the material state of the fleet will degrade, along with its ability to undertake high readiness tasks”. What an appalling indictment.

Iraq

But the existence of overstretch does not mean that we can avoid our commitment to deploy troops in theatres such as Iraq. Undoubtedly the war in Iraq provoked controversy. I resent the way we were mislead, in my view wilfully, over the non-existent weapons of mass destruction. And I greatly regret some of the post war mistakes, not least the lack of planning, and especially the premature disbanding of the police and army. Our government and the American government have certainly made mistakes there, mistakes many readily admit to.

But I still believe it is right to want people to determine for themselves who governs them. It has to be right to help people to enjoy free speech and a legal framework that they themselves design. It has to be right to free them from a vicious and bloody tyrant who used chemical weapons against his own people. And it has to be a good thing to see the end of a regime that had started two wars, a regime that was almost certainly sanctions busting and attempting to gain nuclear technology.

Those who take a contrary view need to explain why Iraq, the Middle East and the rest of the world would be better off with Saddam still in control.

Like everyone else here I want to see our troops come home as soon as possible, but that can only be done when we are confident that the Iraq we leave behind is a functioning, stable nation. To depose a brutal dictator only to leave behind a failed state would be a terrible legacy. Worse still, it would see Iran left standing as the regional superpower – a situation US and British foreign policy has spent almost thirty years trying to avoid. If we leave Iraq prematurely the answer to the question “who won the Iraq war?” will be: Iran. That would be the worst answer of all.

Afghanistan

Our deployment to Afghanistan also remains essential, therefore, in a wider regional strategic context. The failure of the Karzai government would both strengthen Iran further and turn Afghanistan once more into an incubator of global terror. In any case, the invocation of the mutual defence clause of the NATO Treaty obliges us to support the Americans in the first place, something we willingly did for our closest ally.

But whilst we support the deployment, this does not mean our support for the Government is unqualified. Many are rightly fearful of the problems this deployment will face. The devil, in Afghanistan, is more than ever in the detail. We are expected to be able to manage Helmand province, a territory twice the size of Wales with just 3,300 troops. They will be engaged in a wide range of tasks, not all of which are clearly defined. The Government themselves admit the security situation in Helmand is very tough. They seem to me, and many of the Military I have spoken to, to be dangerously complacent about the lack of back-up. We may be part of a NATO force, but who is going to come to the rescue of British troops if the need occurs?

It is a source of great worry that our deployment is under-strength for the many and varied tasks assigned to it. We are asking our troops to patrol one of the most dangerous provinces in one of the most dangerous countries in the world. Yet we lack the manpower and the lift capacity to guarantee success.

For example, you might recall a few weeks ago UK troops coming to the aid of some Norwegian troops attacked in Afghanistan in protests against the Danish cartoons. Because the British were so short of aircraft, two round trips had to be made to deliver the troops required. We should be grateful the situation did not become more critical, as we would have
been overwhelmed.

To add to the burden, I also believe we are facing a strategic mismatch in the mission which could have grave consequences. We are seeking to assist the Afghan government in poppy eradication, at the same time as seeking to pacify the province and expunge any remnants of the Taliban. Both aims are valid – though questions over the precise details of both could keep me here all night. However, in the recent past, the Taliban and the poppy warlords have been in opposition. What we are now doing is giving these two a common cause for the first time. By joining up against us, the complexity of our task is all the greater. And because we are only supporting the Afghan government’s poppy eradication and stabilisation programmes, rather than directly executing the measures, we are unable to guarantee the success of either anyway.

We strongly support British participation in the war on terror in Afghanistan as it is strategically in our national interest, and our membership of NATO commits us to it. But it is highly questionable given the security situation and a mismatch of strategic goals between stabilisation and poppy eradication, whether we are sending enough troops to meet the Government’s ambitious success criteria, or to guarantee their own safety. Only time will tell. And if it does go wrong, who is there to back us up? That is the question.

The Changing Nature of War

One fact rarely alluded to in all the discussion on Afghanistan is that the stabilisation mission there is likely to last another decade in some form or other. Given our Army’s skills, we are likely to play a role throughout this period. This demonstrates how the war on terror has changed the nature of military deployments. We had become accustomed to interventions being sudden, short, using overwhelming force and usually airborne. No longer. Instead, they have become expeditionary in nature, and thus more lengthy.

The strategic goal of most operations now is not solely to correct the behaviour of another state, or punish it for some transgression. Increasingly, the goal is to replace the vacuum of a failed state with a stable, functioning and representative government. The boundaries are rapidly blurring between military and civilian activities, meaning deployments become more lengthy in any case.

Whilst we do not seek to deprive nations of their sovereignty in an imperial manner today, the ability of under-developed states to manage and enforce their sovereignty in an age of global terror is open to question. That these states may collapse through internal conflict, and thereby become breeding grounds for terrorists, is a genuine security threat.

The recent Australian mission to its neighbour Papua New Guinea is a thought-provoking example of the future direction military deployment might need to take. This Pacific nation has been teetering on the brink of collapse for almost a decade due to civil unrest. It has developed an international reputation for money laundering at the same time. A failed Papua New Guinea would risk becoming a terrorist haven, since it adjoins Indonesia which has already seen many incidents. 260 Australian police and legal mentors are now helping to rebuild civil society in the country by ensuring peace and stability and then working to build an economic and legal framework to underpin that.

This may sound similar to the work of ISAF in Afghanistan, but the great difference is that the security environment in PNG is much safer. Additionally, the decision was taken as part of Australia’s own strategic needs as expressed in their foreign and defence policy – precisely the approach I am calling for in the UK.

Such interventions may be less military in scope than the ‘traditional’ models of intervention, since they are less militaristic, and more focused on the building, or rebuilding, of civil infrastructure. But they seek to achieve the same goal which is that of security.

An Uncertain Strategic Posture

Although this may be where we are now, there is no certainty that a strategic environment which focuses on the war on terror and state stabilisation will endure.

“Vae victoribus” or “Woe to the victors” was the warning that French intellectuals sent to Bismarckian Germany in 1870, reminding them that the seeds of France’s defeat and collapse in that year was sown in its triumphs of the Napoleonic era. A similar warning could have been issued to the United States, the UK and other western powers in the aftermath of ‘victory’ in the Cold War. The era of globalisation has brought the era of global threat. No-one seriously expected or indeed predicted the attacks of 9/11. It is nigh on impossible to predict the challenges we may face in the years to come.
The strategic direction of China is hard to fathom, for example, but we can be certain it will become a major regional force at the very least. The Asia-Pacific region will be central to world economic growth but also central to potential conflicts. The tensions between North Korea and Japan and between China and Taiwan are the most prominent. We must ask ourselves whether a China which seeks to act with growing confidence at a regional level is a potential threat or a genuine one or, indeed, whether it is a threat at all.

Even now, we should be developing better links with Japan as part of an over-arching global security package. Indeed, I was in Japan earlier this month discussing this very issue in a country ever more awake to both its dangers and responsibilities.

There are potential dangers nearer home too. We may express concerns about the state of democracy in Russia under President Putin, yet we may find he is succeeded by presidents even more inclined to re-assert Russia’s position on the world stage, using its natural resources as a weapon in foreign policy, as it has already done with the Ukraine. What is very clear is that Russia has been developing new ballistic missiles and nuclear capability with a defence budget that has quadrupled in the past four years.

Those who misguidedly keep thinking we have reached the ‘end of history’ find themselves proved wrong time and time again. Why, then, do we not now make allowances for the unexpected in our strategic thinking? Might it be because there is little or no strategic thinking within government?

Iran

One looming potential crisis is, of course, Iran. Much is still unclear. But uncertainty is never an excuse for inactivity, when dangers on this scale threaten. To permit a state in this volatile region to develop a nuclear weapon which it has the evident capability to deliver against a range of targets would be to take a huge risk. When that state is under the control of a regime whose leader has called for Israel to be wiped “off the map” - a regime which is already destabilising neighbouring Iraq – that is a risk too far. Iran is already finessing the Shahab-3 rocket which can reach Turkey and Israel, and developing a longer-range Shahab 4 and 5 with North Korean help.

Clearly, the diplomatic route must continue to be pursued. It is right for Iran to have been referred to the Security Council. Every pressure must be brought. But it was wrong for the European Union’s foreign affairs spokesman, Javier Solana, to rule out the use of force. It is wrong for Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, to echo him. Frederick the Great once observed that diplomacy without arms was like music without instruments. And though the methods of Frederick the Great are not otherwise to be commended, he was certainly right about this. We must keep all options open if we are to stand any chance of achieving a diplomatic solution to the Iranian crisis.

Nuclear Deterrent

Whilst Iran proceeds to construct a nuclear arsenal, at a time when the North Korean nuclear arsenal remains in existence, and when we cannot predict what new threats we may face by 2025, we cannot afford to leave ourselves exposed and vulnerable.

Given such uncertainty, it is a strategic imperative that we replace our nuclear deterrent, Trident, when the time comes. I remain to be convinced that any alternative to a submarine-based system is a credible option but it is an issue that we will consider in our policy review.

All history tells us that the outbreak of conflicts is seldom accurately anticipated. Therefore, the onus must be on the nuclear abolitionist, not on the believer in deterrence, to explain why one can be confident that no nuclear, or major chemical or biological threat will be posed to the United Kingdom during this long period so far ahead. I doubt if any such explanation will carry much conviction.

The identification of a potential enemy once shaped the nature of our armed forces – the two power standard for the navy, for example. With our nuclear deterrent, we enjoy a much greater degree of versatility. Intercontinental ballistic missiles like Trident are sufficiently flexible, given their range and invulnerability, to deter any state which may seek to use or threaten the United Kingdom with mass-destruction weapons at any time in the future. In short, it would not have mattered which was the real threat out of the three different potential enemies identified in the 1920s. Each would face unacceptable retaliation from a modern strategic missile system like Trident.

The versatility of a policy of minimum strategic nuclear deterrence makes up for our inability to anticipate future enemies or predict future threats. Conversely, any decision to deprive...
ourselves of the deterrent would leave the country open to future aggressors whom we would be able to identify only when it was too late to try and rebuild our nuclear forces so recklessly discarded. Needless to say, any attempt to re-acquire a nuclear deterrent once a threat was beginning to emerge, would immediately generate storms of protest on the basis that it would constitute an arms race and make a tense situation even more febrile.

Conclusion.

In Britain today we are weakened by the fact that the current Labour Government does not have a coherent foreign and defence strategy. With an increasingly threatening international environment the response of Blair and Brown has been to spend the smallest share of GDP on defence since 1930, cut the size of the army, navy and airforce while overstretching our service men and women, their families and their equipment. When soldiers die in battle because their government failed to give them the protection they needed, we are witnessing the most grotesque failure of the duty of care. And if Blair and New Labour have failed our service personnel so they have failed this country. As Tony Blair himself once said “Britain deserves better”. At least he got something right.
first defence seminar

Wednesday, 9th November
General Sir Rupert Smith

“The Utility of Force”

Committee Room 6
House of Commons 18.30 – 20.00

Why do we use military force to solve our political problems? And why do our forces win the military battles but this still fails to solve these problems?

From Iraq to the Balkans, and from Afghanistan to Chechenya, over the past fifteen years there has been a steady stream of military interventions that have not delivered their promise for peace, or even political resolution.

Why not? What is this anomaly at the heart of the international system? Can force only work if it has utility? Where should we go from here? These are challenging times for the military who are being seen by many as an instrument of a foreign policy with which they do not agree, and public support for their efforts increasingly goes unacknowledged.

first defence is delighted to host General Sir Rupert Smith and we look forward to hearing a bold new vision of the role of the armed forces in resolving conflicts and confrontations.

General Sir Rupert Smith retired from the British Army in 2002. His last appointment was as Deputy Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe 1998–2001 covering NATO’s Balkan Operations, including the Kosovo bombing, and the development of the European Defence and Security Identity. Prior to that he was the general Officer Commanding in Northern Ireland, 1996–99; Commander UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, 1995; the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff Operations, 1992-1994; and General Officer Commanding 1(UK) Armoured Division, 1990-1992, including the Gulf War.

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Lord Astor

AoH MT 11 First Defence Speech

Address by the Lord Astor of Hever D.L.,
Shadow Defence Minister in the House of Lords
to the First Defence Seminar held on 7th March 2006 entitled

“The Drayson Review:

Industry’s last hope – or best chance?”

When Lord Drayson, the Minister for Defence Procurement, made his Statement to the House of Lords presenting the White Paper I responded for the Opposition by saying, after complimenting him on getting this important White Paper out on time, that I did not want

“to snap back at it immediately with detailed questions, careless endorsements or knee-jerk reactions; but rather to take it away, go go through it carefully, compare it with our own ideas, discuss it with representatives of industry—who are, I know, standing by to examine the implications for them of these proposals in detail—and then come back for a prepared debate”

We have now had the opportunity to embark on giving the White Paper that sort of detailed examination. I am therefore very grateful to First Defence for organising this occasion this evening. This gives me the opportunity to share with you some of our initial reflections – from the point of view of the Official Opposition - and to hear what Francis Tusa has to say about it. I know that this will be well informed, interesting and sharply expressed.

I look forward also to our broader discussion which I am sure will generate a number of valuable and insightful points.

Let me begin therefore by giving you some initial, fairly cautious, general observations on the Strategy.

I will then go on to give you my own response to the several specific and highly pertinent questions formulated by First Defence in their invitation to this seminar.

So, first: How should we in the Conservative Party see this strategy? How do we see it?

Our starting point has to be the fact that

how best to provide the Armed Forces with

the right equipment

at the right price

at the right time,
is a seemingly intractable combination of objectives.

It is an intractable combination because there is no easy scope for trade offs between these three different objectives.

The result has all too often been that in the search for the best the equipment has been late in coming into service and there have been cost over-runs.

To work towards a satisfactory solution is of the greatest importance to the management of the defence budget and defence finances generally—issues to which we in the Opposition, in our role as a prospective government, are bound to give considerable thought of our own.

As in the case of earlier major statements about Defence put out in recent years by the present Government there is much which we can readily endorse in their general analysis of the problems.

It is entirely in accordance with the principles enunciated by David Cameron that we should welcome this – and that we should say so.

The trouble is that the Government’s response to its own analysis has been – and is - seriously inadequate.

That is clear from the facts.

Numbers of trained soldiers are well below target.

Numbers of reserves are falling.

Numbers of ships at sea, available to enforce international law and order are going down and down.

More arguably the planned numbers of fast jet fighters – the sharp end of air-power - are reducing.

Demonstrably we have not got

the airlift and the

air-to-air refuelling capabilities

that are needed to give ourselves the undoubted global reach that is the essential element in the Government’s expeditionary strategy.

When I questioned the Government yesterday as to whether the RAF had sufficient appropriately equipped aircraft to deliver, support and eventually repatriate the forces we are now committing to Afghanistan the answers showed that we have not.

"RAF aircraft will be supported by land and sea transportation" I was told - sea transportation to Afghanistan, just fancy that – and that “charter aircraft will be used to provide additional airlift capacity, primarily for freight”.

Are we to assume that these chartered aircraft will be provided with the defensive aids and suites which, we have been told in other earlier answers, are now regarded as essential for all aircraft flying in and out of Afghanistan?

In considering the general thrust of the White Paper I suggest that we need to reflect on three main themes about which it is built namely

(1) The Guiding principles as set out at the start of the Paper
(2) Partnership and

(3) Operational sovereignty

There is of course much further important material in the sixty or so pages of Part B of the White Paper which look in turn at twelve distinct, but in some cases overlapping, “Industrial Sectors” and “Cross-cutting capabilities”.

Of these I will say simply that the assumptions and proposals which they contain are in some cases acceptable, in others questionable and indeed in some cases – such as fixed wing aircraft capabilities - highly questionable.

In all cases they have large elements of unfinished business – a point Lord Drayson himself has made in expounding and debating the strategy and calling it a Framework for Action.

Guiding principles

The principles by which the present Government claims to be guided are stated in Paragraphs A 1.21 to A 1.27 inclusive of the White Paper.

We should look with particular caution at the last and most questionable of these - the intended move away from competition as the best route for securing value for money.

It is not, I fear, a matter for fine-tuning these guiding principles. It is rather a matter for defining our own. The first of these – our own guiding principles - must be that defence industrial strategy has as its over-riding purpose how best to harness the resources of industry to the needs of defence rather than how to apply the defence budget for the benefit of industry.

Partnership

In my initial response to the Strategy I said that

- “we welcome the creation of a partnership between Her Majesty's Government and industry. We hope that they really can work as a team. The Minister must be congratulated on this change of heart and particularly on ending the trench warfare between Her Majesty's Government and BAE, Britain's biggest defence contractor.

- It will be [relatively] easy to change attitudes in industry.

- The challenge for the Minister will be to drive these improved relations past his civil servants and the DPA.”

Operational sovereignty

While it is still far from clear exactly what the Government means in practical terms by this express aspiration, we welcome it, as an admirable intention in a general sense, and as a form of words.

It is essential that we retain within the United Kingdom the skills and capabilities to fulfil Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) when we commit our armed forces to urgent action and that never again do we find ourselves dependent, for instance, on a reluctant and non-compliant Belgium for necessary ammunition as we did at the time of the first Gulf War.

But true operational sovereignty goes wider than that. It must mean that – if push comes to shove - we can undoubtedly fulfil all our planning assumptions.
It is sadly clear that, again for instance, in the matter of heavy air lift to which I have just referred we cannot do so.

On page 141 the White Paper records the importance – and I quote - of “making the Defence Industrial Strategy more than simply words”.

But words are, it has to be said, all that the Strategy is at the moment. I have an anxious concern that so far as the concept of operational sovereignty is concerned things are more than likely to remain that way – a comfortable phrase rather than a commitment to necessary action.

Let me move on then to the questions posed. The first of these was **Does the White Paper represent a coherent strategy on which industry can plan and develop, or is it just a tactical wish list?**

To that I would say that the White Paper is considerably more than just a tactical wish list. In this respect it compares very favourably with its predecessor MoD Policy Paper No 5 entitled *Defence Industrial Policy and published in October 2002*.

I would however remind you that Alan Johnson MP was the co-author of that Paper, in his then capacity as Minister of State for Employment Relations, Industry and the Regions, and that he re-appears in the more elevated position of Secretary of State for Trade and Industry as a main contributor to the current White Paper.

Alan Johnson is a Trades Unionist and a Socialist. It is unsurprising therefore that, as a response to any identified problem, he should favour – as this White Paper does - more centrally directed and managed action by the state.

In contrast David Cameron has made it clear that Conservatives look to devolve responsibility for the more efficient delivery of public services downwards to those doing the job. This must apply in the case of Defence procurement as much as in any other public service.

On the strategy disclosed by this White Paper I will therefore willingly accept that it is internally coherent and consistent in the line that it takes.

The trouble is that this line is also consistently flawed by its adherence to the fundamental fallacy that Socialist ‘big government’ works best.

We can, if you wish, return later to this particular argument.

What I will say now is that we – and industry – should therefore be extremely cautious in allowing ourselves to be carried away by the internal logic of a case built on false premises. The second question posed was **How will UK defence contractors respond to the Strategy now propounded?**

It is clear that there is a range of propositions within the White Paper to which UK Defence Contractors – and particularly some of them – will respond favourably. Indeed they are doing so.

But it is clear too that there are also propositions – particularly those related to exclusive partnerships - with which others, perhaps the majority, will find quite serious difficulties. That is apparent from the reservations which the Defence Manufacturers Association has expressed in its evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee.

The difficulty lies, it seems to me, in the way in which an intention to help all emerges as what may be a bonanza for some, but exclusion for others.
The White Paper and its exponents have the usual kind words, of course, for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises – the SMEs.

But in practical terms the regime which the White Paper propounds will push the SMEs - and the entreprenurial vigour which they can contribute – back into a rather remote distance, from which their contribution can only be filtered in via friendly prime contractors.

It is a pity that the SMEs cannot be assured of fair direct access to MoD work. This is another example of how expressed good intentions, in general terms, can be frustrated in practical application in detail.

Third then **How will foreign defence contractors view the UK defence market in the light of the government’s latest pronouncements?**

They are bound to welcome it, I believe. They should be encouraged by the inclusive definition of “the UK Defence Industry” cited in a footnote on Page 16 of the White Paper as including “both UK and foreign owned companies”, albeit that definition is hedged with some important caveats including the residence of intellectual property.

This leads us into the fourth question – very much a two-parter. Part I, also further divisible

**Is this strategy an encouragement to British defence contractors to invest in the leading edge technology our armed forces need if they are to win the battles of tomorrow?**

And the second part

**Or, will it encourage our Defence Contractors to put up the “for sale” sign and sell themselves to the highest bidder?**

Looking at Part I first: It is too early to see what the answer will be to the first subdivision of that question – the encouragement to invest - and I am inclined to put a question mark against the assumptions underlying the second subdivision – relating to the pre-emptive benefits of “leading edge technology”.

To me it is more important that the equipment of our armed forces should be

- well suited to purpose
- entirely reliable in all combat circumstances
- and that our people should be able
to learn all necessary skills in using it
- than that it should always be
- on the axiomatically unproven leading edge of technology.

What I do know is that the technology development cycle moves forward considerably faster than do the cycles of design, development and installation which are required to incorporate those technological advances into working operating systems in the hands of the Armed Forces.

Thus we can, all too easily, find ourselves in a position where a system specified to what is, at that stage, state of the art is in fact obsolescent by the time it comes into service.
Many would argue that the Eurofighter Typhoon is a classic example of that. We may well be confronted with similar problems in the case of Watchkeeper.

The Government would argue I believe that an answer to this lies in ‘incremental’ or ‘spiral’ acquisition – adding new capabilities to platforms as you go along rather than fitting them all as precondition of acceptance into service.

To this I would note that there is a counter-argument that continuously adding new capabilities can well result in demands for the continuous re-training of those who are to use the platforms and systems.

As to the second main part of this question:

**Or, will it encourage our Defence Contractors to put up the “for sale” sign and sell themselves to the highest bidder?**

Put in those terms I fear that the answer will be “yes” and that the Strategy will have the effect of reducing UK Sovereignty in our defence industrial base.

Defence contracting will become like the proverbial tins of sardines – an asset to buy and sell rather than a supply of goods for use.

This brings me to the last – and, to me, by far the most important - of the questions First Defence has posed: **What will this latest policy pronouncement really mean for our armed forces?**

I have to say that I am filled with deep anxieties. I believe that in its emphasis on providing platforms and their kit it will contribute dangerously towards investment decisions – resource allocations within the Defence Budget - which value the technology and the ‘toys’ above that of people – whereas on a realistic view it is actually the opposite that should be the case.

You will have gathered, I believe, from what I have said that I view the Defence Industrial Strategy with some hope, but also with considerable caution as to whether or not – and how far – it will work out in practice.

The Strategy is indeed a Framework for Action and if it is to succeed there has to be a lot more action to come.

The Opposition will follow closely, supportively but not uncritically the necessary further steps as they emerge

and we shall also – I hope – develop our own distinctive thinking.

That thinking must be along the lines of:

- thinning out the layers of oversight – rather than adding to them as the White Paper does,

and of putting real weight behind two concepts which the White Paper only mentions in passing

- Single Points of Accountability to ensure that all costs throughout the life of a particular project are robustly estimated and correctly monitored

- giving a reality to the role of the Single Responsible Owner.
The Conservative Vision for Defence

What we are defending: Sovereignty, the National Interest and the Realm

The Rt. Hon Michael Ancram QC MP
Shadow Secretary of State for Defence

5th October 2005   The Spanish Hall Winter Garden, Blackpool

There is an understandable tendency in defence debate to talk about the specific, the detailed and the immediate at the expense of the broader canvas. We have a habit almost of discussing capabilities and future procurements in isolation from the wider concept of why we need Defence. Too often we spend time examining the pixels and forget the whole photograph. Today I want to somewhat widen the traditional scope of such talk at Conference to ask – and hopefully answer – the question as to what as Conservatives we seek to defend and why.

I will therefore range somewhat widely and I will trespass on the realms of Foreign Affairs. But then war is diplomacy pursued by other means, and the national interest which must be at the heart of our defence must also be at the heart of our foreign policy. Defence and foreign affairs are twins joined at the hip – or at least so they should be. Therefore make no excuse for approaching this talk in that light.

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During the Cold War our security environment had the appearance of predictability. We knew our adversary, his aims and his capabilities. Mutually Assured Destruction created an eerie but enduring equilibrium. We were thus able to understand the threat and to develop what proved to be an effective strategy to deter and ultimately to defeat it.
We are often told that the change in the nature of the threat occurred on September 11th 2001 – ‘the day that the world changed’. In fact that change came much earlier with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the ending of the Cold War.

And in fact, even before that horrific massacre of 9/11, fundamentalist terrorism had been present for some time. It affected not only us in the West but those living in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. It was just that the intensity of the Cold War disguised the immediacy of that fundamentalist terrorist threat – except ironically to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. As a result, we in the West were slow to react. We were too slow to understand that what appeared a distant happening would come back to bite us at home. That one day it would turn upside down our daily lives.

The enfranchised terrorism of the Al Quaeda type does not recognise borders. In a particularly chilling development, we in Britain this summer have seen citizens of our own country, born and bred in our neighbourhoods, with our rights to vote and to free speech, become fundamentalist terrorists - allying themselves with forces that aim to destroy the very fabric of the society within which they were raised.

This and the sheer number and breadth of terrorist attacks have chillingly indicated a further development. Al Qaeda the shadowy disciplined network has become Al Qaedism by mutating into an even more ephemeral and non-molecular worldwide political movement, with growing numbers of followers eager to adopt its methods and advance its aims.

These new terrorists share the theme of either reflecting the aims of al Qaeda or professing some sympathy with radical Islamic fundamentalism. Those inspired by Al Qaeda are every bit as dangerous as Usama bin Laden's other organised terrorist cells such as al Zaqawi’s in Iraq, because they create a sporadic, spontaneous, and almost unpredictable outbreak of violence that is often totally decentralized and untraceable. They are al Qaedistic, demonstrating terrifying symptoms of "al Qaedism." In the true Greek meaning of the suffix "-istic" they simulate and empathise with the real thing.

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While this is the most immediate area of challenge and threat to our security and national interest there are already and will be others. We have to be ready to meet them all. In order to do so we need resolutely to shape our foreign policy so it is clearly prioritised, governed by our national interest and most importantly supported by a military doctrine and capability strong enough to sustain it.

How do we define the British national interest? We believe in democracy, in human rights, in capitalism and in the Rule of Law. Essentially we believe in freedom. These were the values which won the Cold War. These are the values, which if we are to build the world we want to see, we must continue to promote. It is in our national interest to do so.

I hold that the British national interest is based on six pillars; the protection of the citizen, the defence of the realm, the pre-emption of threats, the forestalling of crises, the defence of key resources and the promotion of trade.

How do we protect them? Pre-emption has been seen by some as a controversial doctrine. Yet given the new challenges we had to face, a pre-emptive policy to tackle such unpredictable threats before they are realised may well become a rule rather than an exception. I should stress however that pre-emption is not solely a military option. There can be economic and political and diplomatic pre-emption. Sometime it is a mixture of them all that is required

The Cold War doctrine of containment and deterrence, which was inherent in the concept of opposing blocs, worked well within that concept and there are still situations within which it can and will have relevance again. I believe that Iran is one.

However the post-Cold War world is of necessity more about pre-emption - or as the UN Commission Report described it ‘prevention’. The United States has already recognised this reality and moved from containment and deterrence towards a policy of pre-emption. Their shift of direction was early and thus inevitably somewhat raw in concept. We can now work with the US and help shape it and refine it.
We need to work together. The threat posed to international stability by terrorism cannot be combated unilaterally. We have no option but to be fully and deeply involved. We have a direct and immediate interest in the outcome of this fight. And it is one to which we can bring considerable experience and expertise.

Furthermore we also have obligations that stem from our permanent membership of the UN Security Council, our place as the leading European member of NATO and of the European Union, and as the current chairman of the Group of Eight, the world’s most powerful economies. All these provide us with a unique means of disseminating our ideas and influencing events, as well as promoting our national interests.

The scale of the deployments of our Armed Forces reflects these responsibilities and interests. Only last Christmas more than 50,000 British troops were serving away from their homes. We currently have troops deployed or stationed in Germany, Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Sierra Leone, The Gulf Region, Gibraltar, Belize, Kenya, Canada, The Falkland Islands, Cyprus, Brunei and Afghanistan.

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Yet the irony is that while our forces have never been so busy, the overall size of the armed forces and indeed of many of their capabilities are in unacceptable and potentially terminal decline.

Since 1997 the numbers and equipment of our armed forces have gone into reverse. By 2008 the Navy will be down by 9000, the Army by 7000 and the RAF by 16000. Today surface ships are down by a quarter, tanks by one fifth and by 2007 the RAF will have lost 130 aircraft.

Yet according to the Government’s own analysis the level of military operations has far exceeded those envisaged by the 1998 SDR, and they expect this increased tempo of operations to be the pattern for the future. We need increased manpower, better equipment, more training and more investment in defence, not less. The Government has culpably failed to recognise this.

The most recent NAO report exposed “critical or serious weaknesses” in the ability of large sections of the Armed Forces to meet their readiness targets. At the same time the capabilities of the Royal Navy and the RAF are being further “degraded” as money is diverted to the Army for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Government has also been responsible for a catalogue of failures in procurement. In the last year, forecast costs for major procurement projects have increased by £1.7 billion, a 4% increase, and at the same time vital projects, such as the Aircraft Carriers, and FRES have failed to materialise. How exactly can the concept of Network Enabled Capability be sustained without FRES? How can the expeditionary warfare be executed as the fundamental concept whereby military campaigns are conducted overseas, in a totally self-contained, durable, protracted, robust, aggressive and sustainable environment if we do not have Aircraft Carriers?

Losses and special payments have risen relentlessly under this Government, £116 million in 2001/02, £260 million in 2002/03 and £559 million in 2003/04; the cost may well top £1 billion in 2004/05. This wasted money could instead have been used to avoid some of the damaging cuts to the manpower capability and resources of all three services.

The squeeze on the defence budget has had a devastating impact upon training with a progressively damaging effect on fighting power and ethos. While heavy commitment to operations can offset some of these disadvantages, particularly in respect of command training, reducing activity levels for field force units that are not committed to operations is a self-inflicted wound.

Individual soldiers are less skilled than they were; training standards are too low; gunnery and field firing camps are cancelled; training between infantry, tanks, engineers and those parts of the Army that may have to co-operate and fight together rarely takes place.

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There are those who claim that numbers do not matter any more. But while the nature of war has changed, there is a constant – men and women remain the “centre-point” of our Armed Forces. The Government has failed to recognise this. The recent White Paper on defence, (Delivering Security in a Changing World - Future Capabilities) calls for a “shift
away from an emphasis on numbers of platforms and of people to a new emphasis on effects and outcomes, and on the exploitation of the opportunities presented by new technologies and network enabled capability."

The central theme of this offering is that of rebalancing and transformation. It is clearly important to use the best technology in the most useful way we can both to enhance our ability to project power and to influence events. There is also a need for rebalancing to meet the demands of the more likely operations: the Armed Forces do need to be more agile and more usable; we need to ensure that our forces are broadly specialized for fighting low-tech guerrilla wars, confronting terrorism and handling less conventional threats. Yet at the same time they must retain their traditional and irreplaceable skills in the ability to fight the high intensity battle and then revert to the peacekeeping role and for these operations we may need more rather than less people. There is a need for transformation both at home and abroad, but the balance of forces, skills and capabilities must be right.

America’s ‘new way of war’, which includes concepts like ‘effects-based operations’ and ‘network-centric warfare’ should not cloud the fact that whilst a new technology can be a crucial asset at a tactical level it should not be confused with ensuring that our Armed Forces have sufficient manpower and equipment to carry out the tasks they will be required to fulfil on the ground.

As we have seen from the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq – most recently in Basra, intense war fighting, the conducting of peace support operations and providing humanitarian aid can all take place in the same theatre of operations, in the same province, or indeed in the same town in a very short period of time.

It is therefore essential to retain a balance of forces with a balance of capabilities that are constructed in such a way as to enable our troops to go from high intensity warfare to low level type operations sometimes within a matter of days.

The defence of our country depends on the people who serve in the Armed Forces. We ask a lot of them: ultimately we ask them to risk their lives. These demands do not stop at the front line but affect their families too. Yet those who send our Armed Forces to war, very often fail to provide the necessary support.

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As I have already indicated we cannot fight the modern threat on our own. Therefore we have no option but to be fully and deeply involved. Some ask if European and American security are really indivisible. I have no doubt of that. NATO embodies the vital partnership between Europe and North America. The Alliance is deeply rooted in the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. Those values, embodied in the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Washington Treaty, underlie the unique character of the transatlantic relationship. Nothing must be done to weaken that link. A crisis at NATO like that over Iraq or Darfur, or the most recent disagreement over the chain of command for the operation in Afghanistan, is a dangerous development.

We have been warning against this scenario ever since 1998 when the St. Malo Declaration along with the Helsinki and Nice Summits all laid the ground for institutionalised rivalry between the EU and NATO. The creation of an autonomous military arm outside NATO was bound to duplicate scarce and already overstretched resources. This has been accompanied by the dilution of NATO, the decoupling of North America from EU allies, and the inevitable creation of a recipe for stalemate caused by political disagreements. The inherent dangers of these are obvious and we must strive to repair them. The broader the Alliance the more effective it is. And in this the US is not an optional extra. She is key.

Our first aim must be the promotion of political and economic stability in all or any of the areas that are vital to our resource supplies. The second should be to help them defend themselves from external aggression by supplying them with arms or direct military assistance. The third must be a preparedness and ability to use sanctions – not excluding military sanctions - to dissuade or prevent states from using our need of their energy supplies or supply routes to blackmail us. In most of these cases we will have a joint national interest with other countries. Unilateral action would be unlikely but not unthinkable.
Many of our essential resources come from regions that are potentially vulnerable to
domestic or regional instability. Many of our energy needs will in the future be met from
either the Middle East or Central Asia. Neither region is presently stable.
As a result, energy prices are highly volatile. We need to promote the stability which will

It would be imprudent in this context for us not to place on the world stage
and its future military power. China looms large in the strategic landscape by virtue of its
size, complexity, and political sensitivities. The recent Sino-Russian military exercises are a
clear signal of the evolving strategic picture in the region. We know that China is arming
herself hand over fist, and indeed is assisting others to likewise. We need urgently to
consider and assess why. China has a different view of the world order from those of us in
the West. We can agree on terrorism. We will not agree on tyranny in Africa. And Taiwan
remains a fault line in an increasingly geopolitically seismic world.
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In defence terms we must constantly look forward. We need to analyse the changing world
patterns and predict the emerging tensions and threats. And then we must seek to protect
ourselves against them. That is the overarching purpose of Defence. The future can be
and is currently obscure. What is not obscure is the folly of cutting back on defence at this
time.

The British Armed Forces have a reputation of excellence and skill at arms that is unrivalled
throughout the world; indeed they are the benchmark by which all other armed forces are
judged. Of all the great institutions in this country they have proved time and time again at
all levels to be the most adaptable and flexible, certainly the most successful and they have
never let us down.

They have continued to fulfil the tasks given to them they must therefore be given the
support needed to complete their tasks to deal with the 21st century challenges they now
confront on our behalf.

It is inevitable in the light of developing circumstances that our defence forces must
change. What is essential is that they are not short-changed!
Summary of the discussion on the future of NATO in the view of Sir Peter Ricketts

hosted by first defence on the 27th June 2005

Nato is changing rapidly, a fact not appreciated by the public. In order to maintain interest in the alliance it is essential to have parliamentary support.

15 years ago the purpose of Nato was clear, collective security. Though collective security remains at the heart of Nato, with the disappearance of the Soviet threat Nato has had to evolve quite rapidly.

Sir Peter identified that Nato has a number of uses that take it out of its traditional sphere.

Peacekeeping

Manufacturing an Atlantic consensus

Partner hip programme

Twice Nato has demonstrated that it can adapt, the reaction to the troubles throughout the 1990s in the Balkans and the recent Nato mission to Afghanistan have forced Nato to rethink. Currently Nato’s most important mission is Afghanistan, but the involvement in Darfur is one that the alliance could never have envisaged. The partner hip programme, which is Nato’s most unsung, is also one of Nato’s great successes. Started in 1994, it has enabled countries affiliated to Nato modernise their armed forces, and has offered counter terrorist help. The scheme has enabled a dialogue with Russia that would otherwise have been unworkable, and put pressure on Russia to stop its interference in the recent elections in Georgia and Ukraine. The programme has encouraged Gulf countries to approach Nato for reform. The second Bush administration has been eager to use Nato to place pressure on the international community to resolve the Darfur issue. There however remains dispute over the precise role of both Nato and the EU in the region. New members to the alliance are certainly pulling their weight; recent Lithuanian operations demonstrate this.

In describing what Nato might want to do in the future, Sir Peter identified some possibilities.

Nato might want to reconstruct a consensus on its precise role.

Nato should only operate when there is critical public support.

Nato should not become a world policeman; it does not have sufficient resources.
There is absolutely no reason why Nato and Europe should not be able to cooperate and work out a clear division of labour. Bosnia proved difficult, Darfur is proving almost impossible. Much of the problem lies in that some members of the alliance wish to see a big Nato and a small EU, whilst others wish to see a powerful EU and a dormant Nato. The British presidency of the EU ought to be a golden opportunity to ensure reconciliation. Nato can be used to improve wider world dialogue between the EU and the USA. In Nato, those member states of the EU habitually hostile to the USA can meet as allies and settle problems.

Finally Nato is in need of some further transformation, especially in the area of buildings and structures. There is turmoil over further enlargement and Ukraine is likely to be the main issue to dominate the debate over the next few years. Nato has now taken on more, and there is still angst over Iraq and the precise role it ought to take.

Questions & Answers

With regard to Darfur, it is not a fully-fledged military operation; Nato is providing support to the African Union. EU and Nato having to cooperate through a single cell in Addis Ababa, to try to resolve logistical issues.

On the topic of Nato being without boundary, this is still very much part of the ongoing debate within Nato. Before further enlargement we will need to look at the benefits for the UK and other existing members. Also if Nato takes on more members they will have to conform to the established standards.

On intelligence, it is now clear that a European intelligence agency is off the agenda. Within the alliance itself there is not a strong intelligence assessment division however operational intelligence handling is strong. The alliance is very much dependent on intelligence provided by member countries.

Regarding Uzbekistan there is already an international inquiry underway. It is proving difficult to put pressure on them. Their representatives refuse to turn up to Nato meetings. The USA has indicated that it wishes to hold its own inquiry.

In response to other questions, the idea of a EU seat at Nato would be abhorrent and contrary to the national interest. Nato has in the event of a terrorist strike the ability to engage itself in anti biochemical work. Nato is ready to meet the upsurge in violence in Afghanistan.
Lord Boyce joined the Royal Navy in 1961. He qualified as a submariner, and in the course of his time in that specialisation commanded two conventional submarines, a nuclear attack submarine and the Submarine Training Squadron. He also became an Anti-Submarine Warfare specialist.

Away from the underwater world, amongst other duties, he commanded the frigate HMS BRILLIANT, was Director of the Naval Staff and had the role of Senior Naval Officer Middle East. He was promoted to the Flag List in 1991 and was subsequently Flag Officer Sea Training; Flag Officer Surface Flotilla; Commander in Chief Naval Home Command and Second Sea Lord; and Commander in Chief Fleet.

During this period he was knighted and also held a variety of senior NATO Commands. He became First Sea Lord in 1998, Chief of Defence Staff at the beginning of 2001 and retired in May 2003. He was appointed to the Board of W S Atkins plc in May 2004; and the Board of VT in July 2004.

Lord Boyce was elevated to the peerage in June 2003 and was appointed Lord Warden and Admiral of the Cinque Ports and Constable of Dover Castle in July 2004. He is a Freeman of the City of London, Younger Brother of Trinity House, Knight of St John, Deputy Lieutenant of Greater London and Colonel Commandant of the Special Boat Service.

He is also involved in a number of charities and associations, including being: President of St John Ambulance (London District); Patron of the Submariners Association; President of the Officers’ Association; Council Member RNLI; Council Member White Ensign Association; Patron Sail4Cancer; Patron Trafalgar Woods; Board of Directors Naval & Military Club; President RN Squash Rackets Association; and Governor Alleyn’s School.

He is a keen sportsman, on and off the water, and follower of opera and ballet.
The Hon. Nicholas Soames MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence, addressed the First Defence fringe meeting on a "Conservative Vision for Defence" at Conservative Party Conference in Bournemouth on the 6th October 2004

See text below

Introduction

No speech on defence could possibly commence without the warmest tribute to our Armed Forces and their families and all who support them.

The British Armed Forces have a reputation for excellence and skill at arms that is unrivalled throughout the world; indeed they are regarded as the benchmark by which all other armed forces are judged. Of all the great institutions in this country they have proved time and time again at all levels to be the most adaptable and flexible, and almost certainly the most successful and they have never let us down. We salute them.

And to show our unswerving commitment to our Armed Forces and in recognition of detailed assessment of their now urgent requirements, as well as the necessary modernisation of our Armed Forces, a few days ago we announced plans for increased defence spending.

What will this announcement mean for our Armed Forces when we are in power?

- £2.7bn in cash more than Labour on new capability for the front line between now and 2008.
- Reversal of cuts in overstretched frontline announced by the Government.
- Modern and efficient logistics services and equipment.
- A stronger frontline and better security for the UK.
- Continuing the necessary military transformation programme.

Security issues today

It goes without saying that in the last decade the most astonishing changes have taken place. The policy and security environment that I dealt with as a Defence Minister in the mid 90s and the times we live in now could scarcely be more different.
During the Cold War, our security environment had at least the appearance of some predictability. We knew our adversary, his aims and his capability. We understood the threat and developed an effective strategy to deter and eventually to defeat it.

But now, in the great fog of uncertainties that marks 21st Century, the threat is not nearly as well defined.

We live in an age of great unpredictability and considerable danger where the proliferation of WMD, international terrorism and regional instabilities combined with civil strife, represent the new security challenges with which we wrestle and for which we must plan. And we must bear in mind that the war against terrorism is unquestionably a war of attrition.

And when I speak about this new security background I see it as a common framework for all. Not, as some would describe it, an American projection of an American national view.

Indeed, in its deeper sense, it is the common security backdrop not just for Britain and the United States, but for all nations and people concerned with world order.

It is this background that has defined the war on terrorism, a war that knows of no front-lines, knows of no boundary and no rules.

It is against this scenario that our Armed Forces have to operate and plan.

**Our Armed Forces**

In a world where cynicism, pessimism and ignorance seem to govern the news agenda we would do well to remember the crucially important role that Britain plays in the wider world.

We are permanent members of the UN Security Council.

We are the leading European member of NATO.

We are one of the most important members of the European Union.

We are a member of the Group of Eight most powerful economies in the World. Our Queen is head of the Commonwealth which, incidentally, comprises one-third of the people living on this earth, a grossly underestimated asset for using our influence around the world.

All these provide us with a unique means of disseminating our ideas and influencing events, as well as promoting our international interests and trade. The deployment of our Armed Forces reflects these responsibilities and interests.

The definition and range of Britain's interests over the last 6 years has continued to widen beyond even that foretold in the SDR and with it the military tasks demanded of our Armed Forces have become more and more intensive.

We have looked at these assumptions with the greatest care and see little prospect in doing any less and every likelihood of being asked to do more.

After all we have been involved in 4 wars in 5 years. The Armed Forces have standing home commitments including homeland defence, standing overseas commitments, and contingent operations overseas. Indeed the Government appears to be hyper interventionist.

And whilst our forces have never been so busy with deployments coming thick and fast the overall size of the armed forces and indeed of some of their capabilities is in unacceptable decline.

The recent White Paper on defence, entitled Delivering Security in a Changing World - Future Capabilities, calls for a "shift away from an emphasis on numbers of platforms and of people to a new emphasis on effects and outcomes, and on the exploitation of the opportunities presented by new technologies and network enabled capability."

The central theme of this offering is that of rebalancing and transformation.

There are indeed some good initiatives in the White Paper and those we will support. It is clearly important to use the best technology in the most useful way we can both to enhance our ability to project power and to influence events.
There is also a need for rebalancing to meet the demands of the more likely operations: the Armed Forces do need to be more agile and more usable; we need to ensure that our forces are broadly specialized for fighting low-tech guerrilla wars, confronting terrorism and handling less conventional threats. Yet at the same time they must retain their traditional and irreplaceable skills in the ability to fight the high intensity battle and then revert to the peacekeeping role.

There is a need for transformation both at home and abroad but the balance of forces, skills and capabilities must be right.

As Admiral Giambastiani, of Allied Command for Transformation told a conference the other day: “If you do not like transformation, you will like irrelevance a hell of a lot less”.

So it does matter. But boots on the ground matter too.

Accordingly when speaking about Network Enabled Capability, for example, it is essential its advantages and capabilities are most carefully balanced with manpower considerations.

Network Enabled capability plus fewer ships is most emphatically not an improvement in capability.

America's 'new way of war', which includes concepts like 'effects-based operations' and 'network-centric warfare' should not cloud the fact that whilst a new technology can be a crucial asset at a tactical level it should not be confused with ensuring that our Armed Forces have sufficient manpower and equipment to carry out the jobs for which we assess they are likely to be.

As we have seen from the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq intense war fighting, the conducting of peace support operations and providing humanitarian aid can all take place in the same theatre of operations, in the same province, or indeed in the same town in a very short period of time.

It is therefore essential to retain a balance of forces with a balance of capabilities that are fixed in such a way that will enable our troops to go from high intensity warfare to low level type operations sometimes within a matter of days.

The reduction in the size of the Army in general therefore, and the infantry in particular from a manpower target of 108,500 to the present size of 103,500 and a proposed established strength of 102,000 (a cut of 6500 men) seems to me to be deeply foolish.

Nicholas Soames: Action on Defence and Security

"May I first introduce my excellent Defence Team; Keith Simpson, Gerald Howarth, Andrew Robathan and I want to acknowledge special help from the great Dr Julian Lewis and Patrick Mercer.

"On Sunday, 6th June this year Michael Howard and I had the honour to be present when the Sovereign took the salute at the march past of her Normandy Veterans in the town square at Arromanches.

"No-one who saw it will ever forget the rank upon rank of veterans parading before their Queen, to give due honour to worthy pride and still, in many cases, unforgettable sadness at the loss of their comrades who fell on D Day and beyond, during the greatest feat of combined operations ever undertaken.

"All of us will have reflected then at the supreme gallantry and astonishing endurance of the D Day Veterans in circumstances which are today almost beyond the call of modern imagination.

"For it is today the successors of that wartime generation, in the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force who are grappling with the dangerous and highly volatile circumstances of counter insurgency operations in Iraq, where 68 British servicemen have given their lives:

who are deployed in Afghanistan; in Bosnia; in Kosovo; in Cyprus; in Northern Ireland and elsewhere, and whose professionalism, courage and fortitude we salute, and to whose families of whom these days to much is being asked and who keep the home fires burning, this conference sends our warmest good wishes.

“In Southern Iraq this afternoon throughout the British area of responsibility supported by the pilots and groundcrew of the Royal Air Force, the Princess of Wales’ Royal Regiment and its Battle Group in Al Amarah, who have greatly distinguished themselves in a very tough and demanding deployment; the Battle Groups of the Cheshire Regiment, the Royal Horse Artillery, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the Black Watch together with squadrons of the Household Cavalry and Queen’s Royal Lancers supported by the Sappers, the REME, the logisticians and of course very importantly our intelligence people, together with their absolutely indispensable and highly professional comrades in the Territorial Army, are doing wonders for the name and fame of Britain, and are every day proving what a magnificent asset for this country are the Armed Forces of the Crown.

“The modern British serviceman and woman, like their forebears, have a reputation for excellence that is unrivalled throughout the world.

“And I want this afternoon to give you an absolute assurance; under the next Conservative Government they will no longer be taken for granted as they are today by an ungrateful and shamefully ignorant Labour Government.

“For the Armed Forces have never let Britain down. In the last few years, quite apart from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, they have quite literally saved Sierra Leone from certain self-destruction: they helped to secure peace and good order in East Timor: and they brought freedom to Kosovo.

“At home they have bailed out the Government over its dismal failure and astonishing incompetence in dealing with the foot and mouth epidemic and the fire strikes.

“And what has been the Government’s big reward for all that they have most loyally and efficiently delivered?

“It has been to axe manpower from the Army……. and ships, aircraft and men from the Navy and the Air Force.

“It is to the eternal shame of a thoroughly complacent and pedestrian Secretary of State that he has been totally incapable of standing up for the Armed Forces and is simply too wet to take on our dysfunctional Chancellor in the Services’ interests.

“Both Geoff Hoon and the Ministry of Defence have been severely criticised by the Defence Select Committee, by the Public Accounts Committee and by the National Audit Office for persistently ignoring the lessons learnt of previous operations, and for unforgivably failing to address serious shortcomings in equipment, procurement and logistics.

“In particular Hoon stands guilty of not ensuring that service personnel received the equipment that they needed on operations including in Iraq, desert boots and combat kit, flak jackets, and most shamefully given the threat adequate chemical and biological protection equipment and other critical items.

“This was an abject failure on the part of Ministers and in Government we will never again permit it to happen. If troops do not get the equipment they need when they put their lives on the line, then Ministers, senior servicemen and officials will be held fully accountable.

“Ladies and Gentlemen, on Hoon’s watch each of the services has declined to a size lower than ever before.

“The frontline fighting strength of the Royal Navy is now set to fall below that of the French fleet for the first time since the 17th century.
“The Government plans to decommission 3 destroyers and 3 frigates, one of them only eight years old. They are also taking out of service all the Naval Sea Harriers thus denying our aircraft carriers essential protection.

“He calls it rebalancing, we call it cuts.

“On Hoon’s watch 4 of our great infantry battalions are to be axed and the unique strength of our regimental system which has given so much in war and peace will be eroded. We will fight this every step of the way in Parliament and in the country because it is the wrong thing to do.

“Hoon calls it restructuring, we call it cuts.

“On Hoon’s watch the RAF will lose all its remaining Jaguar squadrons, a squadron of air defence Tornados, and Nimrod aircraft.

“He calls it modernisation, we call it cuts.

“Indeed Ladies and Gentlemen, the latest round of defence cuts announced in July of this year are the seventh since this Government came to power. Five wars – seven rounds of cuts ....... what an abysmal record.

“With all the operations that the Armed Forces are undertaking, with all the deployments required of them, they are today significantly undermanned, severely overstretched and under funded.

“So when we take office we will put this right.

We will increase defence spending by £2.7 billion more on frontline services than Labour’s planned expenditure over the next three years.

“We will increase our resources to match our commitments, and we will streamline the whole business of defence and exploit to the full the potential of the new defence technologies.

“For months it has been Labour’s big lie that we will cut defence. After this announcement that lie can never be pedalled again.

“Thanks to the work of the James Review on Public Expenditure, and to the support for our Armed Forces by Michael Howard and Oliver Letwin, we will be able to transfer savings from other departments into the defence budget as well as making major savings in the vast and inefficient bureaucracy of the Ministry of Defence.

“As a result of this settlement we will retain the infantry regiments that Labour propose to do away with, thus ensuring that we will have enough boots on the ground to meet our demanding commitments.

“We will restore the military training programme decimated by Labour but so vital for the safety and effectiveness of our servicemen.

“We will review sustainability and put in place a modern and efficient system of logistics across the three Services.

“The First Sea Lord has said, “No matter how good a ship is it can only be in so many places at any one time”.

“We agree with that.

“We will therefore keep the three Type 23 frigates: Grafton, Marlborough and Norfolk, which are to be axed by Labour thus restoring essential capability at a time of heightened threat.

“We will exploit and encourage our cutting edge defence expertise and research, and seek to develop a genuine and much more effective partnership with Britain’s
highly successful defence industry and thus improve the whole process of procurement.

“Ladies and Gentlemen, in the great fog of uncertainty that marks the 21st century, unlike the Cold War, the threats to our country and to our interests overseas are not nearly so well defined.

“The architects of these new threats seek no armistice: they have no territory to defend, no population to answer to and a very large pool in which to fish.

“You may be absolutely assured that an incoming Conservative Government will pay the premium on the most important insurance policy that our country can have – the policy which enables us to deter or defeat those who wish to do us harm.

“Our Armed Forces, by their everyday excellence, by their bravery on operations, by their steadiness in the most difficult and hostile circumstances, by their determination and above all by their humanity, have proved again and again how irreplaceable and how important they are in our national life and for our international interests.

“Thus, Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen it will be for us an article of faith that when we come to power again, as surely we will, we will reaffirm by our actions that our Party regards the defence of the realm as the first duty of Government and that we will do right by our superb Armed Forces.”

ENDS

For further information, please contact David Hart on 07951 574 137
Speaker: Scott Ritter, former UNSCOM weapons Inspector  
Monday 15th March 18 30 20 00  
“Intelligence as a Policy: How the process failed in Iraq”  
Committee Room 10, House of Commons

Scott Ritter was the UN’s top weapons inspector in Iraq until he resigned in 1998, claiming that the failure of the UN Security Council to back weapons inspectors in the face of ongoing Iraqi obstruction, combined with the manipulation of the inspection process by the Clinton administration, had made it impossible for him to complete his disarmament mission.

For the past eighteen months, both prior to and during the Second Gulf War, he has been saying that while Iraq has not yet been found to be in compliance with its disarmament obligation, there was no evidence that Iraq continued to possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or was seeking to reconstitute any of its past WMD programmes, and that inspections were an effective means of dealing with Iraq’s WMD.

Mr. Ritter was one of the most aggressive inspectors and was the Chief Inspector for most of the major confrontational inspections in Iraq during the 1990’s, earning the ire of the Iraqi government.

In recent time, however, Mr. Ritter has been the most outspoken critic of US policy in Baghdad and has published many articles in the US and UK media saying that the inspection team was used by the US and UK intelligence services for purposes other than mandated by the Security Council, thus compromising his mission, and that the Iraqis had been fundamentally disarmed for nearly a decade prior to the March 2003 invasion.
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Netlab - the Internet Research Laboratory
The Political and Business Response to the Defence White Paper


Speakers: Hon. Nicholas Soames MP, Shadow Defence Spokesman;

- John Weston, CEO Spirent Technology, former CEO BAE Systems.

Nicholas Soames: Began by saying that the Conservative Party accepted the underlying threat assessment as presented in the White Paper and the original Strategic Defence Review. The problem the current Government faced, however, was that the original SDR was never fully funded. The Iraqi experience showed that the Tank is still very much alive and well, for all the government’s rhetoric about new technology.

What was also evident was that numbers count, both in terms of personnel as well as equipment. It was probable that while the White Paper did not presage any direct cuts in numbers, cuts would emerge unannounced in the months ahead. For example it is estimated that up to 5 infantry battalions may be cut as a “peace dividend” arising from the Northern Ireland peace process. Sea Harriers are being retired early. One of the Aircraft Carriers is expected to be sold to India, and the fleet of Challengers reduced to 120.

It is important that British forces are trained and equipped to operate in a high intensity role, and then adapt to peacekeeping, rather than the other way around. There are currently 10,000 Troops in the Basra
region. It would be wrong to assume that light forces were the solution to every problem. It is wrong to state that the UK will *only* ever undertake high intensity operations with the USA. We must not mortgage our future capabilities.

On the equipment side, a pressing question is where funding for future research and development is coming from. There is very little clarity on this and Network Enabled Capability will require considerable sums. It is reported that the MoD is already £1bn overspent on existing projects, and every procurement project is late.

**The Defence Manufacturer’s perspective.**

[Based on John Weston’s notes]

**The Problem**

Defence funding is insufficient for needs of Britain’s armed forces. It is not surprising that MoD is not keen to invest part of what is available in domestic defence technology.

Defence Industry- is it important in national defence posture?

- · How would Henry V have fared without the craftsmen who built the English Long Bows?
- · How important were the ordnance depots that provided Marlborough and Wellington with their artillery?
- · How important were the Royal Dockyards, who built the hearts of oak in Nelson’s navy?
- · What would the outcome of the battle of Britain have been, without Supermarine or Hawkers?

- ·

**But how relevant in the 21st Century?**

In the 1980’s we had a defence industry working on the key technologies for the future across the board. US strength in defence spending meant they had a lead
in a number of areas but by and large European industry could match it when funded. This is becoming less true today. Britain is in danger of losing our defence industrial capability, but does it matter?

**Why is a national defence industry useful?**

- Defence equipment needs updating.
- We need the ability to modify on the eve of war—particularly EW, weapons etc.
- We need to understand the technology.
- Jobs.
- Exports.

**The case against:**

- US spends 8x more than Europe on defence R&D.
- America is too far ahead technologically, UK can’t keep up.
- Britain will only fight alongside America, so why not buy American?

If we let the British Defence industry die will we be able to get what we want from the US? Or will they then charge us what they like?

History is not too encouraging

- Some good examples: Polaris and Trident.
- Some not so good: Family of Weapons, AMRAAM.

- JSF held up as modern example, BAE has 15% of work. True but 30% of BAE is now in the US (Basically an American Enterprise). The deal on JSF was to share in the production of 3,000 a/c, even 10% of this would support as many manufacturing jobs as a domestic run of 300 aircraft. We contributed VSTOL, control and some stealth manufacturing technology. What have we got back in technology sharing?

Precious little. Britain and the US are still arguing about TAAs. As a result the development work-share has had to be sub-contracted back to Lockheed. UK industry may get access to data at a later date but real technology learning is by doing the development work.
Is there an alternative?

European collaboration shares technology, but is it results orientated and can European programmes be run to schedule and budget? Germany has been a particular problem, Typhoon, A400M and Meteor all ran to German approval timetable, adding cost and delay to UK programmes.

Is the British Defence industry worth saving?

What about all the horror headlines?

Management challenge; Eurofighter example-to manage the inter-dependencies between companies and departments had 500 times as many “dependencies” as the Apollo programme run by NASA!


In January 1988, the Pentagon awarded General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas a contract worth $4.8 billion for full-scale development, including production of eight prototypes. A12 intended to replace the A6 to provide Navy with a stealthy first day of the war attack aircraft.

“Only three years later on a chilly Saturday in January 1991, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney headed to the Pentagon to meet with a small band of senior officials, including Navy Secretary H. Lawrence Garrett III. The capital was in the throes of Persian Gulf war fever, but this January 5 session focused on another crisis: what to do about the Navy's A-12 aircraft, which was at least $1 billion over budget, 8,000 pounds overweight, and eighteen months behind schedule.” The U.S. canned the programme and was sued for $2.3Bn in damages from the contractors, this was later reversed on appeal. Lawyers have been busy for a decade.
“On January 4, 1989, the Defense Acquisition Board, (DAB) recommended full-scale development of the P7 program. The P 7 was an extensively re-engineered P 3 maritime patrol aircraft. The contract had a target cost of $600 million and a ceiling price of about $750 million. In March 1989, the Navy estimated acquisition of125 P-7A aircraft at about $7.9 billion (escalated dollars). Of this total, development cost was estimated at $915 million (escalated dollars).

In November 1989, Lockheed announced a $300-million cost overrun in its development contract due primarily to schedule and design problems. In the following months, Navy and Lockheed officials held extensive but unsuccessful discussions in an attempt to address the contract issues. By letter dated July 20, 1990, the Navy terminated the P-7A development contract for default, citing Lockheed's inability to make adequate progress toward completion of all contract phases.

The lesson learnt was that transferring risk to contractor doesn’t mean that you are not still at risk. Following these disasters US contracting policy now uses fixed pricing only when technical risk is minimal.

UK fixed price, competition. BAES attitude to competition is the need for fair competition. What has happened: cost plus risk transfer fixed price. The MoD attitude is for competition at any price.

Anything to achieve a competition delivers unpalatable alternatives to ministers at the end of the competition process. Ro-Ro ferries a good example, under European Contracting rules, ferries went to E German yards when UK yards are crying out for work. Even when UK industry wins it can be at prices and conditions which are penal.

MoD attitude is that industrial policy is the DTI’s responsibility, but DTI has no funds to level the playing field. It is worth noting that ONLY the UK operates like this. The US, Germany, France and Italy all have industrial policy as an important Defence Department issue. Taxpayers funds-electoral linkage.
What Needs to be Done

The Government needs to decide what defence technology and industrial capability it needs and can afford. Or accept consequences of losing one of the last two industries in which we are generating world competitive levels of R&D.

Defence Procurement and ministers need to choose what capabilities we are going to maintain and to approach each procurement programme with the technology and industrial considerations integral to the procurement strategy. If procuring something we cannot maintain the local capability for, we should not bankrupt local industry trying the impossible we should use the purchasing power to further the industrial aims that we have. This is not popular in the civil service. Not picking winners has become part of the creed.

The Government needs to decide whether we are going to operate as a client kingdom to the US and be US dependent, or whether we are going to work with the Europeans to maintain a local European technology base. Note the US route implies a loss of sovereignty every bit as large as the EU route.

The Government needs to accept that industry cannot bear high tech programme risk without the rewards to go with it. Incentive contracting for industry to manage risk is possible without the punitive regime we currently employ. The current system is also not good for the MoD.

The Government needs a Strategy

- Would need stronger commercial acumen and understanding than in MoD today.
- US answer only if we can secure the security framework we need to share technology, failed so far.
- Particularly procurement strategic factory and decision making timescales line up.
- Probably some of both but we need to decide what we want.
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first defence website development by Netlab - the Internet Research Laboratory
The Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Pattie  President

Sir Geoffrey is currently the Senior Partner of Terrington Management, a government relations consultancy based in Westminster, London. Sir Geoffrey has a military background, having served with the Queen's Royal Rifles (now 4th Royal Green Jackets TA) from 1959 to 1966, achieving the rank of Captain. Since January 1996, he has been Honorary Colonel of the 4th Royal Green Jackets.

Having entered the advertising industry in 1959, he became a Director of Collett Dickensen Pearce, one of the country's leading advertising agencies, from 1966 to 1979 and was Managing Director from 1969 to 1973. He was elected Member of Parliament for Chertsey and Walton from February 1974 until April 1997. Following the General Election of May 1979, he was appointed Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence (RAF) then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence Procurement, and from January 1983 until September 1984, Minister of State for Defence Procurement. He was then Minister of State for Industry, responsible for information technology, civil aviation, space, biotechnology and advanced research until June 1987. In that capacity, he carried through the privatisation of British Telecom in November 1984. In January 1987 he was made a Privy Counsellor and in the same year he was knighted.
Caroline Flynn-MacLeod is a partner in Terrington Management, a public affairs practitioner and political campaigner with twenty years experience gained from working in multinational organisation and business in South East Asia, Australia and Europe.

Caroline has served on NATO’s International Staff as Director of the Briefing Programme for politicians, diplomat and journalist during the four year following the fall of the Berlin Wall (1990-1994).

Subsequently she worked as Director of the Regional Resources Office for the US Information Agency, at the US Embassy in London. From 1997-1999 Caroline was Senior Business Analyst and Head of Parliamentary Affairs at GEC plc where she developed productive relations between the GEC defence businesses and NATO, as well as the governments of Central and Eastern European countries.
Mark Cann

Mark is the Chief Executive (or Director) of The British Forces Foundation (registered charity 1075109) and its trading company, Forces Events Ltd.

Before that he was the Special Projects Director of Firmin & Sons in Birmingham for a short period after leaving the Army in 1999.

Mark’s Army service in The Queen’s Royal Lancer’ lasting 12 years took him on operations to Belize, Mozambique, Bosnia, and Cyprus. He also served in India, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Canada and UK. Before leaving the army Mark reached the rank of Major and was elected for Staff College.

Educated at Repton School, Loughborough University (BA (Hon) in Politics and History) and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

As Chief Executive of The British Forces Foundation Mark specialises in putting on large events that fund the charitable entertainment project. Many of these projects, which he is the Executive Producer of, have been televised and include the BBC 1 2000 Variety Christmas Show, BBC1 2002 ‘Falklands Bound’ and BBC1 2003 ‘Basra Bound’ and many live concerts for example Status Quo, Germany 2001.

Mark is also Director of The Combined Services Polo Association and CU2 Ltd (his own small events and PR company). He is an adviser to SSAFA and the Conservative Party on Foreign Affairs and Defence and Treasurer of the Think Tank ‘First Defence’. He is also Chairman of the Devize Conservative Constituency Association.

Mark is passionate about sport and regularly enjoys skiing, polo and tennis all of which he represented the Army at. He is an enthusiastic but awful golfer. His other passion are watching football (supporting Arsenal), collecting first edition political autobiographies and early twentieth century novels.

Mark is married to Emma a very talented equestrian and has a daughter Emily (born 20/11/01). They live in Patney, Wiltshire.
Mark Prisk MP - Vice President

Mark Prisk was elected to the House of Commons on June 7th 2001, as the Member of Parliament for Hertford & Stortford. Before becoming an MP Mark worked in the property & economic development markets, and was a director of a large practice. In 1991 he formed his own strategic marketing and communication consultancy, serving professional firms in both the UK and over ea

Defence and foreign affairs are of particular interest to Mark Prisk, who is Secretary of the Conservative Party Defence and International Affairs Policy Group. Mark has been at the forefront of campaigns supporting NATO, and again t the anti nuclear movement, fir t a vice chairman of the Federation of Conservative Students and then as the founding chairman of the cross-party Youth for Peace through NATO.
Nick Watts - Policy Director

Nick Watts is a freelance International policy and strategy advisor. Since 1999 he has worked on a variety of projects with an international and European dimension. He was Secretary to the Commission on the Commonwealth, set up by Francis Maude MP from June 2000-March 2001.

He was previously Director of the cross-party “Future of Europe Trust”, based in the House of Commons from 1991-99.

As Director of FET, he travelled extensively in central Europe and Russia, meeting many of the current generation of political leaders as they progressed up the career ladder. He has written numerous articles on International and European topics. Prior to his period in Westminster, he worked as a Lloyd’s broker in the City of London.
“New threats require new thinking.
We must never again be unprepared”
Iain Duncan Smith  October 2001

first defence is ...
a policy group of practical thinkers whose purpose is to put national defence and security back at the top of the political agenda

bringing together those in military, political and government circles

publishing policy papers, challenging conventional thinking

ESDP What: Why: Why not?
Review by first defence of European Security and Defence Policy

United we stand? NATO’s future in an uncertain world
Policy Points by first defence, reviewing options for NATO’s future.

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**first defence’s mission**

**first defence** aims to bring together practical thinkers interested in making defence and security a first priority. We aim to both challenge and inform conventional thinking.

**first defence** is a policy group which recognises that the defence debate is not as polarised as it was during the Cold War years and that there are areas of agreement between the main political parties. However there are some important issues which have to be addressed, and which may require a “leap of faith” from whichever side of the political divide they may come.

We are therefore committed to reaching out beyond our predominantly Conservative ranks.

**first defence** brings together people from the centre-right with military, political, NATO and governmental experience.

**first defence** aims to stimulate that debate by the following means:

- On our first defence website at www.firstdefence.org
- Through the publication of Policy Papers on topics of immediate relevance;
- By the electronic production of monthly Elevator Briefing Papers providing short, clear insights into a range of defence and security issues;
- By arranging specialist seminars and briefings for wider audiences;
- By the development of an Armed Forces Network bringing together in a non-political environment younger senior officers in the armed forces.
45, Great Peter Street, Westminster, London SW1P 3LT.
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who we are

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Profile

Caroline Flynn-MacLeod
Director
Profile

Mark Prisk MP
Parliamentary Chairman
Profile

Nick Watts
Policy Director
Profile

Data Protection Statement
Website published by firstdefence.org
45, Great Peter Street, Westminster, London SW1P 3LT.
The views expressed by first defence on this web site, are in no way directly attributable to the Conservative Party, or Conservative Party Policy.
Sir Geoffrey Pattie is currently the Senior Partner of Terrington Management, a government relations consultancy based in Westminster, London. Sir Geoffrey has a military background, having served with the Queen's Royal Rifles (now 4th Royal Green Jackets TA) from 1959 to 1966, achieving the rank of Captain. Since January 1996, he has been Honorary Colonel of the 4th Royal Green Jackets.

Having entered the advertising industry in 1959, he became a Director of Collett Dickensen Pearce, one of the country's leading advertising agencies, from 1966 to 1979 and was Managing Director from 1969 to 1973. He was elected Member of Parliament for Chertsey and Walton from February 1974 until April 1997. Following the General Election of May 1979, he was appointed Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence (RAF) then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence Procurement, and from January 1983 until September 1984, Minister of State for Defence Procurement. He was then Minister of State for Industry, responsible for information technology, civil aviation, space, biotechnology and advanced research until June 1987. In that capacity, he carried through the privatisation of British Telecom in November 1984. In January 1987 he was made a Privy Counsellor and in the same year he was knighted.
Caroline Flynn-MacLeod is a partner in Terrington Management, a public affairs practitioner and political campaigner with twenty years experience gained from working in multinational organisations and businesses in South East Asia, Australia and Europe.

Caroline has served on NATO’s International Staff as Director of the Briefing Programme for politicians, diplomats and journalists during the four years following the fall of the Berlin Wall (1990-1994).

Subsequently she worked as Director of the Regional Resources Office for the US Information Agency, at the US Embassy in London. From 1997-1999 Caroline was Senior Business Analyst and Head of Parliamentary Affairs at GEC plc where she developed productive relations between the GEC defence businesses and NATO, as well as the governments of Central and Eastern European countries.
Mark Prisk was elected to the House of Commons on June 7th 2001, as the Member of Parliament for Hertford & Stortford. Before becoming an MP Mark worked in the property & economic development markets, and was a director of a large practice. In 1991 he formed his own strategic marketing and communication consultancy, serving professional firms in both the UK and overseas.

Defence and foreign affairs are of particular interest to Mark Prisk, who is Secretary of the Conservative Party Defence and International Affairs Policy Group. Mark has been at the forefront of campaigns supporting NATO, and against the anti-nuclear movement, first as vice chairman of the Federation of Conservative Students and then as the founding chairman of the cross-party Youth for Peace through NATO.
Nick Watts is a freelance International policy and strategy advisor. Since 1999 he has worked on a variety of projects with an international and European dimension. He was Secretary to the Commission on the Commonwealth, set up by Francis Maude MP from June 2000-March 2001.

He was previously Director of the cross-party "Future of Europe Trust", based in the House of Commons from 1991-99.

As Director of FET, he travelled extensively in central Europe and Russia, meeting many of the current generation of political leaders as they progressed up the career ladder. He has written numerous articles on International and European topics. Prior to his period in Westminster, he worked as a Lloyd's broker in the City of London.
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European Security and Defence Policy ESDP What: Why: Why not?

15th April 2002

United we stand? Nato’s future in an unknown world

June 2002

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15 May

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The first official gathering of the first defence armed forces network will meet to discuss future projects.

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11 June

Discussing the problems of recruitment and retention in the armed forces. To be held from 6 - 8pm in committee room 4B, House of Lords, Westminster.

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June

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9th October

first defence will be attending the conference in Bournemouth. Events to include a leading speech by the Hon Bernard Jenkin MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence.

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3rd July

first defence’s armed forces network will discuss the latest chapter of the Strategic Defence Review. Time and Venue to be confirmed. Check personally by email.
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Recent Debates on Defence and Security Issues In Parliament

The main aim of first defence is to keep defence and security issues at the top of the political agenda.

In order to follow the most up to date defence and security issues being discussed in Parliament, the first defence web site has links to online Hansard. Here you will find recent oral questions to the Secretary of State for Defence, Statements, debates from the floor of the Commons chamber, Westminster Hall, and the House of Lords. These links will be updated fortnightly.

We hope that these links to Hansard will ensure that those interested in defence and security issues are well informed of current Government position and policy.

Please select the Debate you wish to view from the list below:

- 20/06/2002 Operations in Afghanistan
- 20/06/2002 Armed Forces Westminster Hall
- 18/06/2002 European Affairs
- 18/06/2002 Disabled Ex-service Men; westminster Hall
- 17/06/2002 Defence Questions
- 10/06/2002 India / Pakistan
- 21/05/2002 Suez Veterans
- 16/05/2002 Afghanistan Statement given by Secretary of State for Defence
- 08/05/2002 Royal Navy Sea Harriers; Westminster Hall Debate
- 29/04/2002 Defence Questions
- 25/04/2002 British - US relations; Westminster Hall Debate
- 23/04/2002 Gulf War Illness
- 11/04/2002 Armed Forces Personnel
10/04/2002 Royal Ordnance Factories; Westminster Hall Debate
20/03/2002 Afghanistan; Opposition Adjournment Debate
18/03/2002 Defence Questions
07/03/2002 Terrorism
14/02/2002 Defence Questions
14/02/2002 Defence Policy Debate
23/01/2002 MOD Site Disposals; Westminster Hall Debate
16/01/2002 National Missile Defence; Westminster Hall Debate
11/01/2002 Defence Questions
ESDP – What : Why : Why not ?

WHAT?

The EU has created a “European security and defence identity”, as part of the “Common Foreign and security policy”. ESDI was first mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty [Art.J4] calling for a framework to manage CFSP and ESDI.

Practically, ESDP dates from the Cologne European Council of June 1999, but several elements brought it to the fore:

- EUROCORPS-Franco German force established in 1992
- Petersberg tasks-derived from a WEU meeting in June 1992
- Amsterdam Treaty-laid the basis for developing operational elements of ESDP 1997
- St. Malo Anglo-French summit; Britain agreed to consider European operations, where NATO does not take the lead. December 1998
- NATO 50th Anniversary summit; Alliance agreed to make its assets available “for use in EU led operations” April 1999.

Petersberg tasks:

- Humanitarian and rescue tasks
- Peacekeeping tasks
- Crisis management including peacemaking tasks

Actors

- “Mr. PESC” ESDI falls under Pillar II in the EU system-intergovernmental, rather than “community” based. The Amsterdam Treaty [Art.18] created the position of “Mr. PESC” the High Representative.
- PSC: Political and Security Committee. Composed of national representatives at senior/Ambassador level. Similar to COREPER on matters relating to ESDI. It will exercise political control and strategic direction of military operations in a crisis.
- MC: Military Committee. Composed of Military delegates-will give military advice and make recommendations to PSC. The MC gives directions to the Military Staff.
- MS: Military Staff. A resource of military advice and support for EU led military crisis management operations.
Headline Goal

At the Helsinki Council of December 1999, the EU committed itself to the goal of being able, by 2003, to deploy a military force of up to 60,000 for Petersberg tasks, within 60 days and sustain it for up to a year. [Allied to this was a civilian goal of supplying up to 5,000 Police officers for missions led by the UN or OSCE].

Neutrals

For traditionally neutral countries, such as Ireland, Sweden, Finland and Austria, the new Defence and Security architecture poses interesting dilemmas. One alleged reason for the Irish rejection of the Nice Treaty, is that there are “security” elements in it, which could prejudice Ireland’s neutrality.

WHY?

Drivers

The end of the cold war removed the threat of Nuclear war and of invasion by the Warsaw Pact, but did not bring peace and stability. The lessons of the Balkans and the continuing tension between Greece and Turkey have created a need for internal security. Frequently voiced criticisms from the US of European failures to solve their own problems add to calls for greater burden sharing.

Rationalisation in defence budgets after the end of the cold war has highlighted the need for forces that can respond to fluid security environments. The meagre European contribution to the Kosovo operation demonstrated that few European countries could participate in crisis situations. “Paper armies don’t win wars”.

US Point of view

The Clinton administration was ambivalent about the development of ESDP. The Bush regime has veered from mild hostility to curious scepticism about the ability of Europe to get a serious capability together. The lack of any strategic transport is one reason, possible duplication another.

Relations with NATO

The Nice Presidency report makes clear that ESDP is intended to be autonomous, but does not represent the creation of a “European Army”. ESDP is only intended to act where NATO as a whole does not choose to do so. “NATO remains the basis of the collective defence of [EU] members. Questions arise over the modality of planning and co-operation between SHAPE and EU structures.
France alone among EU members sees ESDP as a springboard to a greater European role on the world stage. Since Mitterand’s era, France has resented US involvement in European affairs. Germany remains wedded to the NATO concept, and most of the existing European members of NATO. There is no sign of any European state increasing its defence budget to pay for the Satellite and other expensive equipment which would result from not using NATO assets.

**The Turks**

Turkey sits astride the EU-NATO policy nexus, as a candidate member for EU membership—whose candidacy has been slow tracked because of, among other things, human rights concerns as well as the Cyprus dispute. Turkey has been difficult in the area of EU access to NATO assets and planning staffs. This sort of linkage has characterized European decision making recently.

**WHY NOT?**

Dangers of Duplication [spending on equipment or systems which is not interoperable]

- De-coupling [of the US from Europe]
- Discrimination [between EU and NATO]
United we stand? NATO's future in an uncertain world.

On 15 April 2002 first defence published its first policy paper 'United We Stand? NATO's Future In An Uncertain World'. To request a printed copy just email your name and postal address in this pop-up form or download the paper in .pdf format.

The key policy points in the paper are as follows:

**POLICY POINTS**

- The world NATO was formed to secure has passed, yet the Alliance has not adapted to the new world disorder. The Prague Summit must be the moment when NATO nations seize the initiative.
- The dangers to our security have changed and new threats require new thinking. Military and security thinking in NATO and its members must change, if the Alliance is to avoid becoming the Maginot Line of the 21st Century.
- In a world where pre-emptive action may become more relevant than deterrence, how can Article 5 be made to work in practice?
- At Prague NATO should enlarge in a "Big Bang" and invite all current applicant members to join, provided they meet the membership criteria.
- Membership criteria should from now on include a commitment to spend at least 3% of GNP on defence and security.
- The lack of Alliance interoperability is severely hampering NATO. The technological and capability gap between Europe and the USA needs to be faced up to. This may mean acknowledging that only the US can and will be able to undertake certain missions. The contributions of others need to be defined and enforced.
- NATO needs to take the lead in interoperability by ensuring members work towards full DCI capabilities to a timetable, identify specialist roles which smaller nations can reasonably develop and hold them to it.
- NATO should be more proactive in co-ordinating equipment manufacture and procurement standards to improve basic interoperability.
NATO needs to take the lead in raising military training standards and encourage greater intelligence co-ordination. NATO members must adhere to minimum standards of border security and the practice of civil defence procedures.

The Alliance must modernise its command and control procedures. The "Red card" system should not be permitted above the very lowest peace enforcement missions. Consensus must remain for all missions.
UNITED WE STAND?
NATO’s future in an uncertain world
NICK WATTS

first defence
Foreword

This pamphlet is the first in a series of occasional booklets designed to highlight some of the key issues which need to be debated by defence and security experts.

First Defence is a newly formed policy group of practical thinkers interested in making defence and security policy a first priority. We aim to both challenge and inform conventional thinking. We bring together people with military, political, governmental and NATO experience.

We recognise that the defence debate is not as polarised as it was during the Cold War years and that there are areas of agreement between the main political parties. However, some important issues have to be addressed, and may require a “leap of faith” from whichever side of the political divide they may come. First Defence is therefore committed to reaching out beyond its predominantly Conservative ranks.

First Defence aims to stimulate debate in a variety of ways through publications, seminars and briefings and I very much hope that is pamphlet will do just that. “United We Stand? NATO’s future in an uncertain world” reflects the views of the author, Nick Watts and myself and in no way represents the views of the Conservative Party.

Caroline Flynn-MacLeod
Director, First Defence
May 2002
NICK WATTS: is a freelance international policy and strategy advisor. Since 1999 he has worked on a variety of projects with an international and European dimension. He was Secretary to the Commission on the Commonwealth, set up by Francis Maude MP from June 2000-March 2001. He was previously Director of the cross-party “Future of Europe Trust,” based in the House of Commons from 1991-99. As Director of FET, he travelled extensively in central Europe and Russia, meeting many of the current generation of political leaders as they progressed up the career ladder. He has written numerous articles on International and European topics. Prior to his period in Westminster, he worked as a Lloyd's broker in the City of London.
POLICY POINTS

- The world NATO was formed to secure has changed, yet the Alliance has not adapted. The Prague Summit must be the moment when NATO nations seize the initiative.

- The dangers to our security have evolved and new threats require new thinking. Military and security thinking in NATO and by its members must change, if the Alliance is to avoid becoming the Maginot Line of the 21st Century.

- In a world where pre-emptive action may become more relevant than deterrence, the wording of Article 5 must be reviewed.

- At Prague, NATO should enlarge in a “Big Bang” and invite all current applicant members to join, provided they meet the membership criteria.

- Membership criteria should from now on include a commitment to spend at least 3% of GNP on defence and security.

- The lack of Alliance interoperability is severely hampering NATO. The technological and capability gap between Europe and the USA needs to be addressed with urgency. This may mean acknowledging that only the US can and will be able to undertake certain missions alone. The contributions of others needs to be defined and enforced.

- NATO needs to take the lead in interoperability, by ensuring members work towards full Defence Capabilities Initiative [DCI] standards, to a timetable and identify specialist roles which smaller nations can reasonably develop.

- NATO should be more proactive in co-ordinating equipment manufacture and procurement standards to improve basic interoperability.

- NATO needs to take the lead in raising military training standards and encourage greater intelligence co-ordination.

- NATO members must adhere to, and promote, minimum standards of border security and the practice of effective civil defence procedures.

- The Alliance must modernise its command and control procedures. The “Red card” system should not be permitted above the very lowest peace enforcement missions. Consensus must remain for all missions.
The summit at Prague in November 2002 was always going to be an important event in the history of NATO. The Alliance needs to resolve the issue of its long discussed further enlargement. The events of September 11th 2001 and their after effects have given this summit added moment. For the Alliance this is not going to be just business as usual, the world NATO was formed to secure has passed, yet the Alliance has not adapted. A structure that successfully protected Western Europe against a potential threat from the Warsaw Pact is not the same structure that will protect us against potential threats in the future. The Atlantic Alliance should not allow itself to become the Maginot Line of the 21st century.

The Atlantic Alliance needs to show itself capable of adapting to the changed world order, post September 11th. This is not an incremental change, it is a radical leap. If it does not do so, the odds are that the US, its largest partner will lose interest. Is the Alliance up to the challenge? NATO has up until recently been able to rest on its laurels, as one of the most successful security alliances in contemporary history. The end of the Cold War has not rendered it obsolete, but it now needs to move beyond its previous Cold War structures. The Alliance's continued existence is testimony to the need for a Euro-Atlantic security architecture, however, there are a number of inherent weaknesses, which need to be resolved.

Political leaders should be constantly re-evaluating their policy options as circumstances change.

- Does the USA see NATO as the way to contribute to its security?
- Can NATO afford to ignore the EU’s developing European Security and Defence Identity?
- Should the Alliance enlarge incrementally or with a “Big Bang”?
- Can Alliance members develop specific speciality roles, to meet capability shortfalls?
- Will NATO be able to resolve its relations with Russia?
- Can NATO adapt to US requirements for credible war fighting structures?
- Can NATO manage the evolving process of technological advance?
- Can Alliance members commit themselves to the levels of expenditure required to keep NATO’s forces credible?
- What will be the future of NATO’s strategic forces?
- Will there be a “Premier League” of big powers, with a “Nationwide League” for the rest of the current members, with new entrants kept in a “Conference League”?

**1999 Summit & New Strategic Concept**

At its 50th Anniversary Summit held in Washington DC in April 1999, NATO was looking forward as much as it was celebrating its past. NATO leaders recognised
that with the end of the Cold War, new thinking was needed. The fact that NATO had not gone out of business after the demise of the Warsaw pact was a reflection that it still had a role to play, but what role? It is the only credible forum for the discussion of trans-Atlantic security issues. To demonstrate that the continued existence of the Alliance was not just the result of bureaucratic inertia, NATO leaders created a new strategic concept based on its essential mission to safeguard the freedom and security of its members.

The Prague Summit of 2002 is of equal moment; September 11th has changed everything. What had previously been a leisurely debate has become an urgent one. September 11th highlighted the fact that the USA was in a different league when it came to war fighting. Also that US involvement in and effective military leadership of NATO comes with a political premium, namely an expectation that it meets their requirements of an Alliance as an asset, not a handicap. The game has changed completely from the old Cold War certainties. NATO is in danger of being seen by the US as irrelevant to its security needs. The political will to prosecute a war against the perpetrators of the September 11th attacks is in marked contrast to the European reaction, which was one of caution. The invocation by NATO, of Article 5 was seen by the Europeans as “significant” and by the Americans as nothing less than good manners.

Is the future pattern for NATO mirrored in how the Alliance has responded to the September 11th attacks? The language in Washington is of the mission defining the coalition. The new strategic concept launched at Washington was designed to take all of the pre-September 11th changes into account. It addressed the purpose and tasks of the Alliance, the evolving strategic environment, the approach to security in the 21st Century and went on to address items like the principles of Alliance strategy and the missions of Alliance military forces. The new concept has not been discarded by NATO as a whole, after September 11th, but other issues such as the missile defence question have forced themselves onto the agenda, and changed the discussion about enlargement and its future purpose. In this environment NATO and its members need to rise to the challenge, not hide behind agreed positions on paper. Most pressing, if the war against terrorism is to have any meaning, are the questions of capability, forces and above all budgets. New members cannot be a burden. If they want the Article 5 guarantee, they must bring something to the table. As the Secretary General Lord Robertson said "..paper armies don’t win wars."

Can the future of NATO be built on the process unveiled in 1999 in unreconstructed form? At the Prague Summit, the Alliance cannot be content to advance in an incremental manner, it must begin to stake out the role it will fulfil in the new century. The Kosovo campaign was a success, but it signalled serious problems in the way the Alliance does business. NATO’s future relevance will lie in its utility as a vehicle for managing the defence and security
relationship between North America, Europe and Russia. It will also be expected to deal with the unexpected, in terms of international terrorist threats and evolving risks arising from asymmetric warfare.

**NATO: a vehicle for managing US-Europe-Russia relations**

Crucial to the health of the Atlantic Alliance will be a good two-way communication process on key policy issues. To prevent an upsurge in US isolationism, Washington will need to be convinced of the utility of NATO, in dealing with defence and security matters. The principal challenges on NATO’s agenda in the future, will include:

- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- Threat assessment/Article 5
- European Defence Identity
- Relations with Russia
- Partnerships
- Terrorism

**Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

This matter will be an urgent issue for the Prague Summit to address. The end of the Cold War seemed to put the threat of global nuclear war to rest. Now we live in an era where regional or sub-strategic nuclear conflict has become more likely. NATO is well equipped to address the nuclear weapons issue, as it has developed within its institutional structure a nuclear planning apparatus, which is well established. At the end of the Cold War the NATO-Warsaw Pact structure had developed the basis for a verifiable weapons inspection regime. This was part of the confidence and security building architecture, which included an inspection regime similar to the one applied by the UN to Iraq.

The threat posed by sub-strategic missiles to the interests of NATO nations needs to be addressed in the context of the Article 5 guarantee. The potential for nuclear blackmail has increased, particularly where the interests of, for example US oil companies exploiting the Caspian basin might be concerned. The suitcase bomb scenario should be re-visited and NATO should have clear contingency plans in place to deal with such threats. The lessons of deterrence theory should not be forgotten, they should be applied on a micro as well as on a macro level. Sub-state actors, such as al-Qaeda or other groups who might hope to hide should be put on notice that the use of weapons of mass destruction will invite retaliation. States who harbour such groups, willingly or unwillingly should similarly receive a visit from an appointed NATO representative, probably the Secretary General, and made aware of the position they are in.
The Theatre Missile Defence initiative represents a common sense solution to an evolving threat scenario. The US and Russia have more to gain by co-operating in this area, than by resorting to the old Cold War mindset. Just as in the Cold War, however, NATO must be united and resolved to pursue this policy and deploy the systems when they come on line. Currently US troops deployed in an area of potential conflict will enjoy a measure of protection by Theatre Missile Defence systems, other forces will need to rely on these systems, unless and until they develop or purchase their own. A common NATO doctrine in this area will do much to clarify relations between NATO and Russia. It will also allow a joint approach to be taken towards other states such as China who might seek to exploit Russia’s sense of insecurity, as well as preventing Russia from transferring technology to third world countries.

NATO could also provide weapons inspection teams to international agencies such as the UN, to assist in the verification process. The Iraqi impasse has shown the importance of a clear mandate robustly enforced. It also enables new members who may have expertise in this area, to contribute. It would also be a useful vehicle for NATO to bring its expertise into a global arena, in a non-threatening way. Weapons of Mass Destruction pose more of a threat to civilian populations than conventional weapons. Large scale civilian casualties exceeding those of September 11th are the aim of sub-state actors, such as terrorists. In the post 9/11 world NATO and its members must have credible answers to these threats.

European Defence Identity
At Prague, NATO ministers and applicant members need to re-commit themselves to the wording of the North Atlantic Council of 12th June 1997 which spoke of European defence arrangements being “separable, but not separate”. The bottom line for any defence and security structure must be efficacy. NATO has set the benchmark for 50 years in terms of inter-operability, co-operation and procedures. It should continue as the paramount organisation in terms of equipment standards and policy co-ordination.

The US expects that its European allies possess an adequate military capability, and that North Americans should be able to speak to the Europeans about defence and security matters in a language and through structures that they all understand. Any new structure should not detract from this and it should aim, as a minimum, to deliver the same standards of capability. Budgets are at the heart of this issue as much as equipment. Nevertheless, if ESDI is here to stay, it is imperative to work out, at an early stage, a durable means for co-operation. Enlargement of NATO in a “Big Bang”; at the Prague Council should not distract European policy makers from the need to address the capability question. By any measure, either by the NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative [DCI] yardstick or the
ESDI Headline goal, Europe is underperforming. ESDI-NATO co-operation structures are a priority to avoid the “3Ds” - dilution, duplication and discrimination, which could lead to a fourth, “decoupling”.

The war in Afghanistan has highlighted the disparity between the USA and Europe both in terms of defence budgets and the quality of forces. The US has invested heavily in new technology and is looking at the next generation of battle fighting systems. The Europeans are still stuck with a lot of equipment that derives from Cold-War missions, and do not seem prepared to make the necessary investment in new technology. Across the Atlantic, close partners are beginning to talk a different language. The US is talking in terms of “network centric warfare”. Europe does not understand the vocabulary. Previous pronouncements about burden-sharing and levels of defence expenditure are now coming back to haunt NATO, as the US has finally run out of patience with its European cousins and shows signs of going its own way.

For their part, the European members of NATO, are beginning to recognise that US involvement in Europe has a price. Some do not like the implications, and bridle at being told what to do by the “hyper-power”. Europe’s own efforts to define itself, in terms of its defence identity and policy have been evolving incrementally. This process has been lead by a debate about institutions rather than capabilities. The Alliance’s enlargement debate complicates this equation even further. NATO needs to resolve this dilemma fast. Policy makers should be driven by two overarching principles: first, the need to enlarge is accepted by all, Russia having no veto over this process. Second, the aspirant member must meet the agreed requirements which have been set out in their own Membership Action Plan. The MAP lays down a series of criteria, which embrace civic society, democracy and military measures.

NATO enlargement and the Defence Capabilities Initiative should be the driving forces, which shape European thinking on its defence and security. The Alliance is the sum of its parts, unless there is a commitment from all, NATO will degenerate into an amorphous club. The aim of the Alliance is security and defence. Arguing about equipment is of no value if the prime threat is cyber terrorism or city centre bio-attacks. The equipment which NATO members invest in should be capable of rapid effect, as much as rapid response.

No serious European military action can take place without some measure of US involvement. The requirement for strategic lift, satellite surveillance technology and intelligence gathering are all areas where US input can act as a force multiplier for European forces. Currently the Defence Capabilities Initiative calls for 140 capabilities for a coherent force. The European members can only muster around 100.
Force capability commitments should be re-visited and published every year, so that we can all see where they are matching or falling short of their commitments. Governments are very good at signing declarations but very poor on following through on them. Only by keeping this matter in the public eye, will the issue stay at the top of the agenda.

**Relations with Russia**

One area where NATO will remain the pre-eminent player is the future of the relationship between the USA, Europe and Russia. Much has changed since 11th September 2001, but much was already changing in this sphere. President Vladimir Putin has made friendly noises towards the USA and the G-8 in the name of the war on terrorism. Russia’s Chechen problem, and the potential for de-stabilisation in the Caucasuses and in Russia’s southern republics, requires him to put down a strong marker about terrorism. This way he can deal with them in the same unilateral way they see the USA dealing with its terrorist problem. The west has gone quiet on Chechnya lately, but it should not give Russia a carte blanche to human rights violations.

The nature of the US-Russia relationship has evolved considerably since the end of the Cold War. NATO’s role in this process has been as a channel for including the Europeans in what was essentially a bilateral super-power nuclear disarmament process. At the same time, it has been a good way for the Russians’ fears about NATO enlargement to be allayed. A new forum for including Russia in NATO’s discussions has been created. President Putin has been doing as much as he can, post September 11th to create friendly mood music, in his dealings with western powers. Foreign Minister Ivanov recently stated that he saw no need for Russia to join NATO as a full member. The real test for the future of this relationship is the extent to which President Putin can bring his military, and the political establishment with him in his new approach to the west.

All of these elements can be codified into an architecture, which serves to deepen the links between NATO and Russia, so that they are not all tied to the fate of one man. Russia for its part will want to use its membership of the NATO-Russia Council “at 20” to demonstrate its international bona fides. It also allows it another platform to advance its view of the world and another diplomatic lever, should it need it. A win-win situation. Russia should not be allowed a vote and a veto on questions of general NATO policy, but a solid body of agreements and negotiating structures will enable the future development of security related matters to be dealt with within recognised parameters. Moreover as NATO enlarges, it must be conscious of the regional sensitivities of some of the former Warsaw Pact members. Improving relations with Russia must not be allowed to damage the national interests of aspirant applicants. A subsequent leader of Russia, or any latent power cliques must be clear where NATO stands on issues such as Baltic security, the future of Kaliningrad and the Caucasuses.
Partnerships
NATO represents one of the most successful “brands” of the late 20th Century. It kept the peace in Western Europe while its members got on with the business of delivering to their citizens an improved standard of living. Once its principal competitor, the Warsaw Pact went out of business, all of its members applied to join NATO. Partnership for Peace [PfP] became a halfway house for aspirant members, as a means of managing the sudden demand. The Mediterranean dialogue has begun to enable links with North African countries to be forged. Like all “brands”, however, NATO needs to ensure that it manages the quality control.

An alliance of 16 members which was initially focussed on a credible threat, and configured to deal with it, risks diluting the formula which has made it so successful. Partnerships, especially with North African and other countries, should be developed as a means to share expertise, but with no guarantees implicit in the arrangement. PfP has worked because all of the participants have seen it to be in their interests to make it work. Once the current round of enlargement is complete, PfP should be the umbrella for all of NATO’s remaining external programmes. It should not be an Article 5 club, but it can act to export stability.

Terrorism
The Prague Summit must address the question of terrorism. September 11th showed that conventional forces are no defence against an asymmetric attack. The Alliance must not allow itself to feel that either enlargement, or Ballistic Missile Defence systems constitute an adequate measure against current or future threats. Credibility lay at the heart of the “old” NATO’s deterrent posture. The “new” NATO must be ready to respond to unconventional attacks. The earlier allusion to the Maginot Line, calls to mind the failure of an earlier generation of military thinkers to recognise the consequences of technological change. As Iain Duncan Smith said “New threats require new thinking”.

One immediate area where partnerships might be mutually beneficial is in the area of dealing with terrorism. Under the umbrella of a partnership programme NATO would be able to share expertise on defeating terrorism. This would have to be subject to civil society requirements, and weighed on a case by case basis. The quid pro quo would have to be that NATO members could expect co-operation in pursuing terrorists in the territory of the partner, or could expect some other co-operation, such as temporary basing rights, to prosecute action against terrorists in a neighbouring state. As a minimum, Alliance members should look at a closer integration of their intelligence sharing capabilities.

NATO’s expertise in the realms of biological and chemical warfare training, as well as its surveillance technology [much of it American] should be a strong
resource to bring to bear in this equation. As well as large scale field manoeuvres, Alliance members should step up the practice of civil emergency procedures. NATO must guard against stretching its resources too far. The US in particular would be wary of being drawn into, say, a counter-terrorist campaign in Algeria. The more that NATO can achieve in advancing security, through this sort of “light” partnership, the better. By doing so, however, NATO may become more of an International Gendarme. This is an area, which has yet to be addressed formally and the Prague Summit should do so.

**Article 5 & Threat assessment**
If it is understood that new threats require new thinking, the Alliance must re-visit the applicability and relevance of Article 5. Along with the principle of consensus, it is accepted that an attack on one member is an attack on all. New members must understand the implications of this. The Alliance as a whole must re-visit its threat scenarios, as part of the review of NATO’s role.

**Staying in business: Making NATO relevant.**
The Prague summit must recognise that NATO has an urgent task on its hands, if it is to remain in business. It will have to address and successfully resolve, the following matters:

- Enlargement
- US reaction to the Kosovo campaign & Balkan lessons
- Decision making/war fighting
- Going global to deal with terrorism
- Procurement/industry issues

**Enlargement**
This area touches on all others. NATO has had several previous waves of enlargement during its history. What is significant about this enlargement, as with EU enlargement, is that it changes the nature of the organisation. At the Prague Summit NATO must go for a “Big Bang” enlargement, and open the door to all the aspirant European applicants. The test should be that they meet the requirements and can contribute. In effect NATO should say the door is open and here is the entry price. The entry price has been set out in the various partnership agreements and Membership Action Plans (MAP). Albania, Croatia and Macedonia are currently furthest from reaching MAP criteria.
Lessons from Kosovo and the Balkans.
The US did not enjoy its Kosovo experience. Once again, the US had to bail out its European allies, both in the diplomatic and in the military fields. The actions taken by the US in its war against terrorism, following the attacks of September 11th are instructive. It has chosen to put together a coalition of the willing, rather than use a NATO style structure. Afghanistan is definitely “out of area” as far as NATO is concerned, as was Bosnia in 1994 and 1995 but more to the point is the fact that the Kosovo experience has given the US good reason to be wary of its friends. Trumpeted as a triumph of Alliance solidarity it was in fact a near run thing. The differing perspectives each member brought to the campaign served to hamstring the effectiveness of its ultimate aim, which was to halt ethnic cleansing by Serbia of the Kosovars. The US was initially reluctant to get involved in any military action, then only to the use of air power. The UK advocated a ground force option but several other allies were reluctant to commit troops on the ground, unless the US puts its troops in. Bombing targets had to be cleared at the political level by each alliance member.

The consequences for NATO are considerable. The US now feels that it cannot rely on its European partners. While they can muster large numbers of military force, the Kosovo exercise showed that the Europeans do not possess the necessary equipment to do serious fighting. The US did most of the bombing and European land forces were used to finesse the process once the Serbs had agreed to withdraw. The Alliance must show that it has seized the importance of effecting change in its structures and capabilities. The nature of future warfare is likely to be at the high-tech end of the spectrum. Europe has not invested enough and unless this picture changes, the Alliance will lose credibility.

Balkan lessons
The Alliance has now gained some experience at low level intensity operations, principally in the Balkans. NATO aircraft flew strike sorties in support of UNPROFOR, during the Bosnian civil war in 1994 and 1995. After Kosovo came the successful and largely unreported operation “Essential Harvest” in Macedonia. In each case there were lessons to be learnt and hopefully applied. “Essential Harvest” achieved its aim and was concluded swiftly. Open-ended missions are symptomatic of weak decision-making at the political level. The Bosnian imbroglio showed that under a weak mandate UNPROFOR could not effectively do its job. It was also a portent of what can happen if a trans-Atlantic rift is allowed to open.

Decision making apparatus
As part of its “lessons from Kosovo” exercise, the Alliance must re-visit its command structure. The existing system was never designed to cope with the
level of micro-management which prevailed throughout the Kosovo campaign. NATO’s decision-making capacity must come into line with best practice in 21st century organisations. The issue that needs careful consideration here is the question of consensus, which has been the guiding principle throughout NATO’s history. If member states are committing troops or other assets to a mission, however small, they will feel some ownership of the problem. In the early days of the Kosovo mission, the daily air tasking order for airstrikes was being circulated like any other routine internal e-mail.

NATO needs to evolve a simplified command and control procedure, so that once an activation order has been signed nations relinquish any political right to interfere with the operational commander on the ground. The “Red card” system should be limited to low intensity operations, and not be admissible in major situations. Similarly the North Atlantic Council needs to re-visit its procedures, so that decisions can be speeded up. The Alliance also needs to re-visit the numerous working groups and committees that nestle under its wing. The current handbook for example, lists no less than four standardisation bodies. The civil emergency and disaster relief bodies might usefully be subsumed into one body. And so on.

**Going Global?**
Alliance partners fought together in the Gulf war of 1991. British troops worked with their US counterparts at a very high level of intimacy, as they spoke the same language. This was the product of many years of inter-operational training. Going “out of area” has hitherto meant areas adjacent to NATO territory such as the Balkans. In the light of the campaign against terrorism, NATO should consider when, and how, it would consider undertaking operations which support or protect the interests of Alliance members. This applies especially in the context of the ESDI dialogue. Planning resources should be devoted to contingency scenarios and crisis exercises should be carried out to game through how these matters would be dealt with.

**Procurement & Interoperability**
The lack of Alliance interoperability is severely hampering NATO. The technological and capability gap between Europe and the US needs to be addressed urgently. This may mean acknowledging that only the US can and will be able to undertake certain missions. The contribution of other members needs to be defined and enforced. Defence procurement processes are notoriously cumbersome. Attempts to open the process to competition and alternative sources of equipment have been only partial. Also there is limited scope for technology transfer to the civil sector, to re-coup development costs. The Defence Capabilities Initiative, or the Headline Goal should be the drivers.
NATO members should be measured against this yardstick, to ensure that they are capable of contributing to the capabilities of the Alliance. Equipment should be designed with interoperability in mind particularly where communications and surveillance technology are concerned. Membership criteria should from now on include a commitment to spend at least 3% of GNP on defence and security.

Policy Implications for Alliance members.
To move from the current situation to a position where a future NATO will be a credible security apparatus several elements will need to change. For policy makers the key to maintaining the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance will be managing the following issues:

● Armed Forces-size and shape
Forces must be capable of dealing with an evolving threat scenario. This means that a balance of forces must exist within the Alliance for it to have a credible deterrent at every level, from strategic forces to low intensity operations. The implications would be either a wholesale re-equipment, especially for new members, or a process whereby certain members declared forces to match specialist roles, as defined in the DCI. For example, the UK has a speciality in mine hunting, in the maritime area. This does not imply abolishing the rest of the fleet, but it means that, to borrow corporate jargon, the UK would be the “practice leader” in this area. Newer members could define which areas they could specialise in, logistics, mine clearance, or CBW de-contamination, and be the Alliance’s designated contributor in these areas.

Defence budgets are always under pressure, and nations are reluctant to deny themselves certain capabilities, particularly where this has implications for their own defence industries. NATO members should not feel that large naval fleets or numbers of aircraft represent “defence” or even “security.” What matters is “capabilities.” Unless equipment and forces meet capability needs, they are useless. This applies particularly to applicant members who are still wedded to old style conscript armies. NATO needs to take the lead in raising military training standards.

● Defence Industry Co-operation
Europe’s defence industry has already undergone a measure of re-structuring. Much of it designed to prevent incursion by foreign investors or competitors. European Defence Ministries should not destroy their indigenous defence industries, by buying “off the shelf” from the USA. The process of procurement should be speeded up, and greater use of off-set deals embraced. These allow technology transfer and help retain expertise in European defence industries.
The capability and technology gap between the US and its European allies will not easily be bridged. Closing the gap can and should be a priority for European partners. The US will need to examine its technology transfer policy if it is genuine about keeping NATO credible. European partners should not strain to “re-invent the wheel”. The current A400M imbroglio is instructive in this regard. All of the European partners agree that strategic lift capability is necessary, and yet the ability to take a decision and commit funds to the programme has become a complicated issue of national debate in Italy and Germany. There must be a better way of doing business!

**Interests to defend**

NATO needs an over-arching sense of purpose. Without a re-statement of its collective beliefs, it will fade into irrelevance. Both the European and the North American pillars should be able to speak to each other as equals about common interests. There is a real danger that this process is becoming a dialogue of the deaf. The European partners have persuaded themselves that in developing a European Defence Identity they are solving Europe’s security problems. The US has no clear strategy for NATO—other than to promote enlargement. This policy void is dangerous. The Prague summit must see a commitment to a revitalised Alliance.

The Alliance must keep its collective mind on the nature of the threat. National interests today are expressed in terms of economic activity, trade and commerce. Those countries that have extensive overseas investment portfolios and commercial interests need to conduct a thorough security review. Alongside military and cyber threats lie political risks, for example the denial of oil or water. A globalised economy relies on open access to markets and information. This is where the threat will be found. Previous military reverses have had their roots in complacency. Deterrence rests on credibility. NATO members in the new millennium need to remain vigilant. If we truly wish for peace, we must prepare for a new kind of war.

**Conclusion**

NATO is still the principal focus for western security in the new world disorder. It is the Alliance of choice for most western leaders. It must not fail those who put their trust in it.

Existing Alliance members, as well as new ones, must preserve the high standards, which have enabled NATO nations to live in peace for over 50 years. The Prague Summit must harness the experience of older members to the enthusiasm of new members to ensure that the Atlantic Alliance represents the best of democracy and shows that we are prepared to protect it.
First Defence

From Powerbase

First Defence is a right wing defence think tank. It describes itself as:

a policy group of practical thinkers whose purpose is to put national defence and security back at the top of the political agenda.[1]

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Activities

Adam Holloway, MP, a member of the Defence Select Committee, has written a paper, "The Failure of British Political and Military Leadership in Iraq", which is downloadable from the First Defence website.[2] The paper is a critique of the process by which Tony Blair took the UK into war with Iraq and the post-invasion policies.

People

As at October 2007:[3]

- Dr Julian Lewis MP Parliamentary Chairman
- Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Pattie President
- Mark Cann Treasurer
- Caroline Flynn-MacLeod Director
- Mark Prisk MP Vice-President
- Nick Watts Policy Director

As at January 2010:[4]

- Adam Holloway Parliamentary Chairman (May 2009-present) [5]

As at November 2010:[6]
- Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Pattie President
- Mark Cann Treasurer
- Caroline Flynn-MacLeod Executive Director
- Mark Prisk MP Vice-President
- Nick Watts Policy Director
- Adam Holloway Parliamentary Chairman

**Funders and supporters**

As at January 2010 the following companies "support the work of First Defence".[7]

- EADS
- MBDA Missile Systems

As at November 2010 the following companies support the work of First Defence:[8]

- EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company)
- MBDA (Matra BAE Dynamics Alenia)

**Activities**

First Defence Activities

- Activities

**Events**

First Defence's events include one held on the eve of the Strategic Defence Review in October 2010, which was chaired by the Rt. Hon Liam Fox. Other events held by members were:

**The War. A War**

Speaker: Gerald Howarth M.P. Shadow Defence Procurement Minister Chaired by: Adam Holloway M.P. First Defence Parliamentary Chairman Tuesday, 2nd February 2010, House of Commons

Britain is facing the most significant Strategic Defence Review in a generation. While current economic difficulties constrain expenditure options, Afghanistan seems to dominate doctrinal discussions.

Will all future wars look like Afghanistan? If so should we re-configure our forces to address this type of warfare? Is Afghanistan the war – or just a war?

What are the implications of this conflict for our armed forces? And, if there is to be a reconfiguration of our forces, what will be the implications for the defence sector?

Gerald Howarth MP has been a Shadow Defence Minister since 2002 and holds the Defence Procurement brief. He is at the heart of planning for a Conservative Strategic Defence Review.

**Post-conflict Afghanistan**

Speaker: Tobias Ellwood M.P. Shadow Defence Procurement Minister Chaired by: Adam Holloway M.P. First Defence Parliamentary Chairman Saturday, 7th Dec 2009, House of Commons.
Tobias was born in New York, USA. He grew up in Bonn, Germany and Vienna, Austria, but returned to the UK to complete his first degree at Loughborough University. He spent five years in the Army with The Royal Green Jackets, and served in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Kuwait, Germany, Gibraltar and Bosnia. On leaving the army Tobias worked as a researcher for the former Defence Secretary, the Rt Hon Tom King MP (now Lord King). He returned to university to complete an MBA at City University Business School. Tobias then moved to the London Stock Exchange for two years where he was a Senior Business Development Manager and, following that, to a similar role for the law firm Allen and Overy.

Tobias was elected as Member of Parliament for Bournemouth East in May 2005.

In January 2006 he was appointed Opposition Whip and in July 2007 was promoted to the post of Shadow Minister for Culture Media and Sport where he is responsible for a portfolio including tourism, gambling and licensing. Tobias completed the senior executive course in National and International Studies at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University in the summer of 2009 and in his role as an MP, continues to take an interest in military matters, specialising in post-conflict operations, and is a frequent visitor to the Middle East, in particular Iraq and Afghanistan. In October 2002 he lost his brother in Bali bomb attacks.[9]

Notes

2. The Failure of British Political and Military Leadership in Iraq (http://www.firstdefence.org/Failure%20in%20Iraq.doc), First Defence website, accessed 12 Jan 2010
3. First Defence Who we are (http://www.firstdefence.org/html/who_we_are.html), accessed 23 October 2007
4. Who We Are (http://www.firstdefence.org/html/who_we_are.html), First Defence website, accessed 13 Jan 2010
6. First Defence Who we are (http://www.firstdefence.org/html/who_we_are.html), First Defence website, accessed 1st November 2010

First Defence Documents

Documents published by First Defence

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Notes

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