“New threats require new thinking.

We must never again be unprepared”

Iain Duncan Smith  October 2001

first defence is ...

a policy group of practical thinkers whose purpose is to put national defence and security back at the top of the political agenda

bringing together those in military, political and government circles

publishing policy papers, challenging conventional thinking

ESDP What: Why: Why not?

Review by first defence of European Security and Defence Policy

United we stand? NATO’s future in an uncertain world

Policy Points by first defence, reviewing options for NATO’s future.
first defence's mission

first defence aims to bring together practical thinkers interested in making defence and security a first priority. We aim to both challenge and inform conventional thinking.

first defence is a policy group which recognises that the defence debate is not as polarised as it was during the Cold War years and that there are areas of agreement between the main political parties.

However there are some important issues which have to be addressed, and which may require a “leap of faith” from whichever side of the political divide they may come.

We are therefore committed to reaching out beyond our predominantly Conservative ranks.

first defence brings together people from the centre-right with military, political, NATO and governmental experience.

first defence aims to stimulate that debate by the following means:

- On our first defence website at www.firstdefence.org
- Through the publication of Policy Papers on topics of immediate relevance;
- By the electronic production of monthly Elevator Briefing Papers providing short, clear insights into a range of defence and security issues;
- By arranging specialist seminars and briefings for wider audiences;
- By the development of an Armed Forces Network bringing together in a non-political environment younger senior officers in the armed forces.
our mission

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The Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Pattie - President

Sir Geoffrey is currently the Senior Partner of Terrington Management, a government relations consultancy based in Westminster, London. Sir Geoffrey has a military background, having served with the Queen's Royal Rifles (now 4th Royal Green Jackets TA) from 1959 to 1966, achieving the rank of Captain. Since January 1996, he has been Honorary Colonel of the 4th Royal Green Jackets.

Having entered the advertising industry in 1959, he became a Director of Collett Dickensen Pearce, one of the country's leading advertising agencies, from 1966 to 1979 and was Managing Director from 1969 to 1973. He was elected Member of Parliament for Chertsey and Walton from February 1974 until April 1997. Following the General Election of May 1979, he was appointed Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence (RAF) then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence Procurement, and from January 1983 until September 1984, Minister of State for Defence Procurement. He was then Minister of State for Industry, responsible for information technology, civil aviation, space, biotechnology and advanced research until June 1987. In that capacity, he carried through the privatisation of British Telecom in November 1984. In January 1987 he was made a Privy Counsellor and in the same year he was knighted.
Caroline Flynn-MacLeod is a partner in Terrington Management, a public affairs practitioner and political campaigner with twenty years experience gained from working in multinational organisations and businesses in South East Asia, Australia and Europe.

Caroline has served on NATO's International Staff as Director of the Briefing Programme for politicians, diplomats and journalists during the four years following the fall of the Berlin Wall (1990-1994).

Subsequently she worked as Director of the Regional Resources Office for the US Information Agency, at the US Embassy in London. From 1997-1999 Caroline was Senior Business Analyst and Head of Parliamentary Affairs at GEC plc where she developed productive relations between the GEC defence businesses and NATO, as well as the governments of Central and Eastern European countries.
Mark Prisk was elected to the House of Commons on June 7th 2001, as the Member of Parliament for Hertford & Stortford. Before becoming an MP Mark worked in the property & economic development markets, and was a director of a large practice. In 1991 he formed his own strategic marketing and communication consultancy, serving professional firms in both the UK and overseas.

Defence and foreign affairs are of particular interest to Mark Prisk, who is Secretary of the Conservative Party Defence and International Affairs Policy Group. Mark has been at the forefront of campaigns supporting NATO, and against the anti-nuclear movement, first as vice chairman of the Federation of Conservative Students and then as the founding chairman of the cross-party Youth for Peace through NATO.
Nick Watts is a freelance International policy and strategy advisor. Since 1999 he has worked on a variety of projects with an international and European dimension. He was Secretary to the Commission on the Commonwealth, set up by Francis Maude MP from June 2000-March 2001.

He was previously Director of the cross-party “Future of Europe Trust”, based in the House of Commons from 1991-99.

As Director of FET, he travelled extensively in central Europe and Russia, meeting many of the current generation of political leaders as they progressed up the career ladder. He has written numerous articles on International and European topics. Prior to his period in Westminster, he worked as a Lloyd’s broker in the City of London.
European Security and Defence Policy  **ESDP What: Why : Why not?**

15th April 2002

**United we stand?**  **Nato’s future** in an unknown world

June 2002

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events


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Recent Debates on Defence and Security Issues In Parliament

The main aim of first defence is to keep defence and security issues at the top of the political agenda.

In order to follow the most up to date defence and security issues being discussed in Parliament, the first defence web site has links to online Hansard. Here you will find recent oral questions to the Secretary of State for Defence, Statements, debates from the floor of the Commons chamber, Westminster Hall, and the House of Lords. These links will be updated fortnightly.

We hope that these links to Hansard will ensure that those interested in defence and security issues are well informed of current Government position and policy.

Please select the Debate you wish to view from the list below:

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20/06/2002 Armed Forces Westminster Hall
18/06/2002 European Affairs
18/06/2002 Disabled Ex-service Men; westminster Hall
17/06/2002 Defence Questions
10/06/2002 India / Pakistan
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16/01/2002 National Missile Defence; Westminster Hall Debate
11/01/2002 Defence Questions

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WHAT?

The EU has created a “European security and defence identity”, as part of the “Common Foreign and security policy”. ESDI was first mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty [Art.J4] calling for a framework to manage CFSP and ESDI.

Practically, ESDP dates from the Cologne European Council of June 1999, but several elements brought it to the fore:

- EUROCORPS-Franco German force established in 1992
- Petersberg tasks-derived from a WEU meeting in June 1992
- Amsterdam Treaty-laid the basis for developing operational elements of ESDP 1997
- St. Malo Anglo-French summit; Britain agreed to consider European operations, where NATO does not take the lead. December 1998
- NATO 50th Anniversary summit; Alliance agreed to make its assets available “for use in EU led operations” April 1999.

Petersberg tasks:

- Humanitarian and rescue tasks
- Peacekeeping tasks
- Crisis management including peacemaking tasks

Actors

- “Mr. PESC” ESDI falls under Pillar II in the EU system-intergovernmental, rather than “community” based. The Amsterdam Treaty [Art.18] created the position of “Mr. PESC” the High Representative.
- PSC: Political and Security Committee. Composed of national representatives at senior/Ambassador level. Similar to COREPER on matters relating to ESDI. It will exercise political control and strategic direction of military operations in a crisis.
- MC: Military Committee. Composed of Military delegates-will give military advice and make recommendations to PSC. The MC gives directions to the Military Staff.
- MS: Military Staff. A resource of military advice and support for EU led military crisis management operations.
At the Helsinki Council of December 1999, the EU committed itself to the goal of being able, by 2003, to deploy a military force of up to 60,000 for Petersberg tasks, within 60 days and sustain it for up to a year. [Allied to this was a civilian goal of supplying up to 5,000 Police officers for missions led by the UN or OSCE].

**Neutrals**

For traditionally neutral countries, such as Ireland, Sweden, Finland and Austria, the new Defence and Security architecture poses interesting dilemmas. One alleged reason for the Irish rejection of the Nice Treaty, is that there are “security” elements in it, which could prejudice Ireland's neutrality.

**WHY?**

**Drivers**

The end of the cold war removed the threat of Nuclear war and of invasion by the Warsaw Pact, but did not bring peace and stability. The lessons of the Balkans and the continuing tension between Greece and Turkey have created a need for internal security. Frequently voiced criticisms from the US of European failures to solve their own problems add to calls for greater burden sharing.

Rationalisation in defence budgets after the end of the cold war has highlighted the need for forces that can respond to fluid security environments. The meagre European contribution to the Kosovo operation demonstrated that few European countries could participate in crisis situations. “Paper armies don’t win wars”.

**US Point of view**

The Clinton administration was ambivalent about the development of ESDP. The Bush regime has veered from mild hostility to curious scepticism about the ability of Europe to get a serious capability together. The lack of any strategic transport is one reason, possible duplication another.

**Relations with NATO**

The Nice Presidency report makes clear that ESDP is intended to be autonomous, but does not represent the creation of a “European Army”. ESDP is only intended to act where NATO as a whole does not choose to do so. “NATO remains the basis of the collective defence of [EU] members. Questions arise over the modality of planning and co-operation between SHAPE and EU structures.
France alone among EU members sees ESDP as a possible springboard to a greater European role on the world stage. Since DeGaulle’s era, France has resented US involvement in European affairs. Germany remains wedded to the NATO concept, as are most of the existing European members of NATO. There is no sign of any European state increasing its defence budget to pay for the Satellite and other expensive equipment which would result from not using NATO assets.

The Turks

Turkey sits astride the EU-NATO policy nexus, as a candidate member for EU membership-whose candidacy has been slow tracked because of, among other things, human rights concerns as well as the Cyprus dispute. Turkey has been difficult in the area of EU access to NATO assets and planning staffs. This sort of linkage has characterized European decision making recently.

WHY NOT?

Dangers of Duplication [spending on equipment or systems which is not interoperable]

- De-coupling [of the US from Europe]
- Discrimination [between EU and NATO]
On 15 April 2002 first defence published it's first policy paper 'United We Stand? NATO's Future In An Uncertain World'. To request a printed copy just email your name and postal address in this pop-up form or download the paper in .pdf format.

The key policy points in the paper are as follows:

POLICY POINTS

- The world NATO was formed to secure has passed, yet the Alliance has not adapted to the new world disorder. The Prague Summit must be the moment when NATO nations seize the initiative.
- The dangers to our security have changed and new threats require new thinking. Military and security thinking in NATO and its members must change, if the Alliance is to avoid becoming the Maginot Line of the 21st Century.
- In a world where pre-emptive action may become more relevant than deterrence, how can Article 5 be made to work in practice?
- At Prague NATO should enlarge in a "Big Bang" and invite all current applicant members to join, provided they meet the membership criteria.
- Membership criteria should from now on include a commitment to spend at least 3% of GNP on defence and security.
- The lack of Alliance interoperability is severely hampering NATO. The technological and capability gap between Europe and the USA needs to be faced up to. This may mean acknowledging that only the US can and will be able to undertake certain missions. The contributions of others needs to be defined and enforced.
- NATO needs to take the lead in interoperability by ensuring members work towards full DCI capabilities to a timetable, identify specialist roles which smaller nations can reasonably develop and hold them to it.
- NATO should be more proactive in co-ordinating equipment manufacture and procurement standards to improve basic interoperability.
NATO needs to take the lead in raising military training standards and encourage greater intelligence co-ordination.

NATO members must adhere to minimum standards of border security and the practice of civil defence procedures.

The Alliance must modernise its command and control procedures. The "Red card" system should not be permitted above the very lowest peace enforcement missions. Consensus must remain for all missions.
UNITED WE STAND?

NATO’s future in an uncertain world

NICK WATTS
Foreword

This pamphlet is the first in a series of occasional booklets designed to highlight some of the key issues which need to be debated by defence and security experts.

First Defence is a newly formed policy group of practical thinkers interested in making defence and security policy a first priority. We aim to both challenge and inform conventional thinking. We bring together people with military, political, governmental and NATO experience.

We recognise that the defence debate is not as polarised as it was during the Cold War years and that there are areas of agreement between the main political parties. However, some important issues have to be addressed, and may require a “leap of faith” from whichever side of the political divide they may come. First Defence is therefore committed to reaching out beyond its predominantly Conservative ranks.

First Defence aims to stimulate debate in a variety of ways through publications, seminars and briefings and I very much hope that is pamphlet will do just that. “United We Stand? NATO’s future in an uncertain world” reflects the views of the author, Nick Watts and myself and in no way represents the views of the Conservative Party.

Caroline Flynn-MacLeod
Director, First Defence
May 2002
NICK WATTS: is a freelance international policy and strategy advisor. Since 1999 he has worked on a variety of projects with an international and European dimension. He was Secretary to the Commission on the Commonwealth, set up by Francis Maude MP from June 2000-March 2001. He was previously Director of the cross-party “Future of Europe Trust,” based in the House of Commons from 1991-99. As Director of FET, he travelled extensively in central Europe and Russia, meeting many of the current generation of political leaders as they progressed up the career ladder. He has written numerous articles on International and European topics. Prior to his period in Westminster, he worked as a Lloyd's broker in the City of London.
POLICY POINTS

● The world NATO was formed to secure has changed, yet the Alliance has not adapted. The Prague Summit must be the moment when NATO nations seize the initiative.

● The dangers to our security have evolved and new threats require new thinking. Military and security thinking in NATO and by its members must change, if the Alliance is to avoid becoming the Maginot Line of the 21st Century.

● In a world where pre-emptive action may become more relevant than deterrence, the wording of Article 5 must be reviewed.

● At Prague, NATO should enlarge in a “Big Bang” and invite all current applicant members to join, provided they meet the membership criteria.

● Membership criteria should from now on include a commitment to spend at least 3% of GNP on defence and security.

● The lack of Alliance interoperability is severely hampering NATO. The technological and capability gap between Europe and the USA needs to be addressed with urgency. This may mean acknowledging that only the US can and will be able to undertake certain missions alone. The contributions of others needs to be defined and enforced.

● NATO needs to take the lead in interoperability, by ensuring members work towards full Defence Capabilities Initiative [DCI] standards, to a timetable and identify specialist roles which smaller nations can reasonably develop.

● NATO should be more proactive in co-ordinating equipment manufacture and procurement standards to improve basic interoperability.

● NATO needs to take the lead in raising military training standards and encourage greater intelligence co-ordination.

● NATO members must adhere to, and promote, minimum standards of border security and the practice of effective civil defence procedures.

● The Alliance must modernise its command and control procedures. The “Red card” system should not be permitted above the very lowest peace enforcement missions. Consensus must remain for all missions.
The summit at Prague in November 2002 was always going to be an important event in the history of NATO. The Alliance needs to resolve the issue of its long discussed further enlargement. The events of September 11th 2001 and their after effects have given this summit added moment. For the Alliance this is not going to be just business as usual, the world NATO was formed to secure has passed, yet the Alliance has not adapted. A structure that successfully protected Western Europe against a potential threat from the Warsaw Pact is not the same structure that will protect us against potential threats in the future. The Atlantic Alliance should not allow itself to become the Maginot Line of the 21st century.

The Atlantic Alliance needs to show itself capable of adapting to the changed world order, post September 11th. This is not an incremental change, it is a radical leap. If it does not do so, the odds are that the US, its largest partner will lose interest. Is the Alliance up to the challenge? NATO has up until recently been able to rest on its laurels, as one of the most successful security alliances in contemporary history. The end of the Cold War has not rendered it obsolete, but it now needs to move beyond its previous Cold War structures. The Alliance's continued existence is testimony to the need for a Euro-Atlantic security architecture, however, there are a number of inherent weaknesses, which need to be resolved.

Political leaders should be constantly re-evaluating their policy options as circumstances change.

- Does the USA see NATO as the way to contribute to its security?
- Can NATO afford to ignore the EU's developing European Security and Defence Identity?
- Should the Alliance enlarge incrementally or with a "Big Bang"?
- Can Alliance members develop specific speciality roles, to meet capability shortfalls?
- Will NATO be able to resolve its relations with Russia?
- Can NATO adapt to US requirements for credible war fighting structures?
- Can NATO manage the evolving process of technological advance?
- Can Alliance members commit themselves to the levels of expenditure required to keep NATO's forces credible?
- What will be the future of NATO's strategic forces?
- Will there be a "Premier League" of big powers, with a "Nationwide League" for the rest of the current members, with new entrants kept in a "Conference League"?

1999 Summit & New Strategic Concept
At its 50th Anniversary Summit held in Washington DC in April 1999, NATO was looking forward as much as it was celebrating its past. NATO leaders recognised
that with the end of the Cold War, new thinking was needed. The fact that NATO had not gone out of business after the demise of the Warsaw pact was a reflection that it still had a role to play, but what role? It is the only credible forum for the discussion of trans-Atlantic security issues. To demonstrate that the continued existence of the Alliance was not just the result of bureaucratic inertia, NATO leaders created a new strategic concept based on its essential mission to safeguard the freedom and security of its members.

The Prague Summit of 2002 is of equal moment; September 11th has changed everything. What had previously been a leisurely debate has become an urgent one. September 11th highlighted the fact that the USA was in a different league when it came to war fighting. Also that US involvement in and effective military leadership of NATO comes with a political premium, namely an expectation that it meets their requirements of an Alliance as an asset, not a handicap. The game has changed completely from the old Cold War certainties. NATO is in danger of being seen by the US as irrelevant to its security needs. The political will to prosecute a war against the perpetrators of the September 11th attacks is in marked contrast to the European reaction, which was one of caution. The invocation by NATO, of Article 5 was seen by the Europeans as “significant” and by the Americans as nothing less than good manners.

Is the future pattern for NATO mirrored in how the Alliance has responded to the September 11th attacks? The language in Washington is of the mission defining the coalition. The new strategic concept launched at Washington was designed to take all of the pre-September 11th changes into account. It addressed the purpose and tasks of the Alliance, the evolving strategic environment, the approach to security in the 21st Century and went on to address items like the principles of Alliance strategy and the missions of Alliance military forces. The new concept has not been discarded by NATO as a whole, after September 11th, but other issues such as the missile defence question have forced themselves onto the agenda, and changed the discussion about enlargement and its future purpose. In this environment NATO and its members need to rise to the challenge, not hide behind agreed positions on paper. Most pressing, if the war against terrorism is to have any meaning, are the questions of capability, forces and above all budgets. New members cannot be a burden. If they want the Article 5 guarantee, they must bring something to the table. As the Secretary General Lord Robertson said “..paper armies don’t win wars.”

Can the future of NATO be built on the process unveiled in 1999 in unreconstructed form? At the Prague Summit, the Alliance cannot be content to advance in an incremental manner, it must begin to stake out the role it will fulfil in the new century. The Kosovo campaign was a success, but it signalled serious problems in the way the Alliance does business. NATO’s future relevance will lie in its utility as a vehicle for managing the defence and security
relationship between North America, Europe and Russia. It will also be expected
to deal with the unexpected, in terms of international terrorist threats and
evolving risks arising from asymmetric warfare.

**NATO: a vehicle for managing US-Europe-Russia relations**
Crucial to the health of the Atlantic Alliance will be a good two-way
communication process on key policy issues. To prevent an upsurge in US
isolationism, Washington will need to be convinced of the utility of NATO, in
dealing with defence and security matters. The principal challenges on NATO's
agenda in the future, will include:

- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- Threat assessment/Article 5
- European Defence Identity
- Relations with Russia
- Partnerships
- Terrorism

**Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**
This matter will be an urgent issue for the Prague Summit to address. The end of
the Cold War seemed to put the threat of global nuclear war to rest. Now we live
in an era where regional or sub-strategic nuclear conflict has become more
likely. NATO is well equipped to address the nuclear weapons issue, as it has
developed within its institutional structure a nuclear planning apparatus, which
is well established. At the end of the Cold War the NATO-Warsaw Pact structure
had developed the basis for a verifiable weapons inspection regime. This was
part of the confidence and security building architecture, which included an
inspection regime similar to the one applied by the UN to Iraq.

The threat posed by sub-strategic missiles to the interests of NATO nations needs
to be addressed in the context of the Article 5 guarantee. The potential for nuclear
blackmail has increased, particularly where the interests of, for example US oil
companies exploiting the Caspian basin might be concerned. The suitcase bomb
scenario should be re-visited and NATO should have clear contingency plans in
place to deal with such threats. The lessons of deterrence theory should not be
forgotten, they should be applied on a micro as well as on a macro level.
Sub-state actors, such as al-Qaeda or other groups who might hope to hide
should be put on notice that the use of weapons of mass destruction will invite
retaliation. States who harbour such groups, willingly or unwillingly should
similarly receive a visit from an appointed NATO representative, probably the
Secretary General, and made aware of the position they are in.
The Theatre Missile Defence initiative represents a common sense solution to an evolving threat scenario. The US and Russia have more to gain by co-operating in this area, than by resorting to the old Cold War mindset. Just as in the Cold War, however, NATO must be united and resolved to pursue this policy and deploy the systems when they come on line. Currently US troops deployed in an area of potential conflict will enjoy a measure of protection by Theatre Missile Defence systems, other forces will need to rely on these systems, unless and until they develop or purchase their own. A common NATO doctrine in this area will do much to clarify relations between NATO and Russia. It will also allow a joint approach to be taken towards other states such as China who might seek to exploit Russia’s sense of insecurity, as well as preventing Russia from transferring technology to third world countries.

NATO could also provide weapons inspection teams to international agencies such as the UN, to assist in the verification process. The Iraqi impasse has shown the importance of a clear mandate robustly enforced. It also enables new members who may have expertise in this area, to contribute. It would also be a useful vehicle for NATO to bring its expertise into a global arena, in a non-threatening way. Weapons of Mass Destruction pose more of a threat to civilian populations than conventional weapons. Large scale civilian casualties exceeding those of September 11th are the aim of sub-state actors, such as terrorists. In the post 9/11 world NATO and its members must have credible answers to these threats.

European Defence Identity
At Prague, NATO ministers and applicant members need to re-commit themselves to the wording of the North Atlantic Council of 12th June 1997 which spoke of European defence arrangements being “separable, but not separate”. The bottom line for any defence and security structure must be efficacy. NATO has set the benchmark for 50 years in terms of inter-operability, co-operation and procedures. It should continue as the paramount organisation in terms of equipment standards and policy co-ordination.

The US expects that its European allies possess an adequate military capability, and that North Americans should be able to speak to the Europeans about defence and security matters in a language and through structures that they all understand. Any new structure should not detract from this and it should aim, as a minimum, to deliver the same standards of capability. Budgets are at the heart of this issue as much as equipment. Nevertheless, if ESDI is here to stay, it is imperative to work out, at an early stage, a durable means for co-operation. Enlargement of NATO in a “Big Bang”; at the Prague Council should not distract European policy makers from the need to address the capability question. By any measure, either by the NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative [DCI] yardstick or the
ESDI Headline goal, Europe is underperforming. ESDI-NATO co-operation structures are a priority to avoid the “3Ds” - dilution, duplication and discrimination, which could lead to a fourth, “decoupling”.

The war in Afghanistan has highlighted the disparity between the USA and Europe both in terms of defence budgets and the quality of forces. The US has invested heavily in new technology and is looking at the next generation of battle fighting systems. The Europeans are still stuck with a lot of equipment that derives from Cold-War missions, and do not seem prepared to make the necessary investment in new technology. Across the Atlantic, close partners are beginning to talk a different language. The US is talking in terms of “network centric warfare”. Europe does not understand the vocabulary. Previous pronouncements about burden-sharing and levels of defence expenditure are now coming back to haunt NATO, as the US has finally run out of patience with its European cousins and shows signs of going its own way.

For their part, the European members of NATO, are beginning to recognise that US involvement in Europe has a price. Some do not like the implications, and bridle at being told what to do by the “hyper-power”. Europe's own efforts to define itself, in terms of its defence identity and policy have been evolving incrementally. This process has been lead by a debate about institutions rather than capabilities. The Alliance's enlargement debate complicates this equation even further. NATO needs to resolve this dilemma fast. Policy makers should be driven by two overarching principles: first, the need to enlarge is accepted by all, Russia having no veto over this process. Second, the aspirant member must meet the agreed requirements which have been set out in their own Membership Action Plan. The MAP lays down a series of criteria, which embrace civic society, democracy and military measures.

NATO enlargement and the Defence Capabilities Initiative should be the driving forces, which shape European thinking on its defence and security. The Alliance is the sum of its parts, unless there is a commitment from all, NATO will degenerate into an amorphous club. The aim of the Alliance is security and defence. Arguing about equipment is of no value if the prime threat is cyber terrorism or city centre bio-attacks. The equipment which NATO members invest in should be capable of rapid effect, as much as rapid response.

No serious European military action can take place without some measure of US involvement. The requirement for strategic lift, satellite surveillance technology and intelligence gathering are all areas where US input can act as a force multiplier for European forces. Currently the Defence Capabilities Initiative calls for 140 capabilities for a coherent force. The European members can only muster around 100.
Force capability commitments should be re-visited and published every year, so that we can all see where they are matching or falling short of their commitments. Governments are very good at signing declarations but very poor on following through on them. Only by keeping this matter in the public eye, will the issue stay at the top of the agenda.

**Relations with Russia**

One area where NATO will remain the pre-eminence is the future of the relationship between the USA, Europe and Russia. Much has changed since 11th September 2001, but much was already changing in this sphere. President Vladimir Putin has made friendly noises towards the USA and the G-8 in the name of the war on terrorism. Russia’s Chechen problem, and the potential for de-stabilisation in the Caucasus and in Russia’s southern republics, requires him to put down a strong marker about terrorism. This way he can deal with them in the same unilateral way they see the USA dealing with its terrorist problem. The west has gone quiet on Chechnya lately, but it should not give Russia a carte blanche to human rights violations.

The nature of the US-Russia relationship has evolved considerably since the end of the Cold War. NATO’s role in this process has been as a channel for including the Europeans in what was essentially a bilateral super-power nuclear disarmament process. At the same time, it has been a good way for the Russians’ fears about NATO enlargement to be allayed. A new forum for including Russia in NATO’s discussions has been created. President Putin has been doing as much as he can, post September 11th to create friendly mood music, in his dealings with western powers. Foreign Minister Ivanov recently stated that he saw no need for Russia to join NATO as a full member. The real test for the future of this relationship is the extent to which President Putin can bring his military, and the political establishment with him in his new approach to the west.

All of these elements can be codified into an architecture, which serves to deepen the links between NATO and Russia, so that they are not all tied to the fate of one man. Russia for its part will want to use its membership of the NATO-Russia Council “at 20” to demonstrate its international bona fides. It also allows it another platform to advance its view of the world and another diplomatic lever, should it need it. A win-win situation. Russia should not be allowed a vote and a veto on questions of general NATO policy, but a solid body of agreements and negotiating structures will enable the future development of security related matters to be dealt with within recognised parameters. Moreover as NATO enlarges, it must be conscious of the regional sensitivities of some of the former Warsaw Pact members. Improving relations with Russia must not be allowed to damage the national interests of aspirant applicants. A subsequent leader of Russia, or any latent power cliques must be clear where NATO stands on issues such as Baltic security, the future of Kaliningrad and the Caucasus.
Partnerships
NATO represents one of the most successful “brands” of the late 20th Century. It kept the peace in Western Europe while its members got on with the business of delivering to their citizens an improved standard of living. Once its principal competitor, the Warsaw Pact went out of business, all of its members applied to join NATO. Partnership for Peace [ PfP] became a halfway house for aspirant members, as a means of managing the sudden demand. The Mediterranean dialogue has begun to enable links with North African countries to be forged. Like all “brands”, however, NATO needs to ensure that it manages the quality control.

An alliance of 16 members which was initially focussed on a credible threat, and configured to deal with it, risks diluting the formula which has made it so successful. Partnerships, especially with North African and other countries, should be developed as a means to share expertise, but with no guarantees implicit in the arrangement. PfP has worked because all of the participants have seen it to be in their interests to make it work. Once the current round of enlargement is complete, PfP should be the umbrella for all of NATO's remaining external programmes. It should not be an Article 5 club, but it can act to export stability.

Terrorism
The Prague Summit must address the question of terrorism. September 11th showed that conventional forces are no defence against an asymmetric attack. The Alliance must not allow itself to feel that either enlargement, or Ballistic Missile Defence systems constitute an adequate measure against current or future threats. Credibility lay at the heart of the “old” NATO’s deterrent posture. The “new” NATO must be ready to respond to unconventional attacks. The earlier allusion to the Maginot Line, calls to mind the failure of an earlier generation of military thinkers to recognise the consequences of technological change. As Iain Duncan Smith said “New threats require new thinking”.

One immediate area where partnerships might be mutually beneficial is in the area of dealing with terrorism. Under the umbrella of a partnership programme NATO would be able to share expertise on defeating terrorism. This would have to be subject to civil society requirements, and weighed on a case by case basis. The quid pro quo would have to be that NATO members could expect co-operation in pursuing terrorists in the territory of the partner, or could expect some other co-operation, such as temporary basing rights, to prosecute action against terrorists in a neighbouring state. As a minimum, Alliance members should look at a closer integration of their intelligence sharing capabilities.

NATO’s expertise in the realms of biological and chemical warfare training, as well as its surveillance technology [much of it American] should be a strong
resource to bring to bear in this equation. As well as large scale field manoeuvres Alliance members should step up the practice of civil emergency procedures. NATO must guard against stretching its resources too far. The US in particular would be wary of being drawn into, say, a counter-terrorist campaign in Algeria. The more that NATO can achieve in advancing security, through this sort of “light” partnership, the better. By doing so, however, NATO may become more of an International Gendarme. This is an area, which has yet to be addressed formally and the Prague Summit should do so.

**Article 5 & Threat assessment**

If it is understood that new threats require new thinking, the Alliance must re-visit the applicability and relevance of Article 5. Along with the principle of consensus, it is accepted that an attack on one member is an attack on all. New members must understand the implications of this. The Alliance as a whole must re-visit its threat scenarios, as part of the review of NATO’s role.

**Staying in business: Making NATO relevant.**

The Prague summit must recognise that NATO has an urgent task on its hands, if it is to remain in business. It will have to address and successfully resolve, the following matters:

- Enlargement
- US reaction to the Kosovo campaign & Balkan lessons
- Decision making/war fighting
- Going global to deal with terrorism
- Procurement/industry issues

**Enlargement**

This area touches on all others. NATO has had several previous waves of enlargement during its history. What is significant about this enlargement, as with EU enlargement, is that it changes the nature of the organisation. At the Prague Summit NATO must go for a “Big Bang” enlargement, and open the door to all the aspirant European applicants. The test should be that they meet the requirements and can contribute. In effect NATO should say the door is open and here is the entry price. The entry price has been set out in the various partnership agreements and Membership Action Plans (MAP). Albania, Croatia and Macedonia are currently furthest from reaching MAP criteria.
Lessons from Kosovo and the Balkans.
The US did not enjoy its Kosovo experience. Once again, the US had to bail out its European allies, both in the diplomatic and in the military fields. The actions taken by the US in its war against terrorism, following the attacks of September 11th are instructive. It has chosen to put together a coalition of the willing, rather than use a NATO style structure. Afghanistan is definitely “out of area” as far as NATO is concerned, as was Bosnia in 1994 and 1995 but more to the point is the fact that the Kosovo experience has given the US good reason to be wary of its friends. Trumpeted as a triumph of Alliance solidarity it was in fact a near run thing. The differing perspectives each member brought to the campaign served to hamstring the effectiveness of its ultimate aim, which was to halt ethnic cleansing by Serbia of the Kosovars. The US was initially reluctant to get involved in any military action, then only to the use of air power. The UK advocated a ground force option but several other allies were reluctant to commit troops on the ground, unless the US puts its troops in. Bombing targets had to be cleared at the political level by each alliance member.

The consequences for NATO are considerable. The US now feels that it cannot rely on its European partners. While they can muster large numbers of military force, the Kosovo exercise showed that the Europeans do not possess the necessary equipment to do serious fighting. The US did most of the bombing and European land forces were used to finesse the process once the Serbs had agreed to withdraw. The Alliance must show that it has seized the importance of effecting change in its structures and capabilities. The nature of future warfare is likely to be at the high-tech end of the spectrum. Europe has not invested enough and unless this picture changes, the Alliance will lose credibility.

Balkan lessons
The Alliance has now gained some experience at low level intensity operations, principally in the Balkans. NATO aircraft flew strike sorties in support of UNPROFOR, during the Bosnian civil war in 1994 and 1995. After Kosovo came the successful and largely unreported operation “Essential Harvest” in Macedonia. In each case there were lessons to be learnt and hopefully applied. “Essential Harvest” achieved its aim and was concluded swiftly. Open-ended missions are symptomatic of weak decision-making at the political level. The Bosnian imbroglio showed that under a weak mandate UNPROFOR could not effectively do its job. It was also a portent of what can happen if a trans-atlantic rift is allowed to open.

Decision making apparatus
As part of its “lessons from Kosovo” exercise, the Alliance must re-visit its command structure. The existing system was never designed to cope with the
level of micro-management which prevailed throughout the Kosovo campaign. NATO’s decision-making capacity must come into line with best practice in 21st century organisations. The issue that needs careful consideration here is the question of consensus, which has been the guiding principle throughout NATO’s history. If member states are committing troops or other assets to a mission, however small, they will feel some ownership of the problem. In the early days of the Kosovo mission, the daily air tasking order for airstrikes was being circulated like any other routine internal e-mail.

NATO needs to evolve a simplified command and control procedure, so that once an activation order has been signed nations relinquish any political right to interfere with the operational commander on the ground. The “Red card” system should be limited to low intensity operations, and not be admissible in major situations. Similarly the North Atlantic Council needs to re-visit its procedures, so that decisions can be speeded up. The Alliance also needs to re-visit the numerous working groups and committees that nestle under its wing. The current handbook for example, lists no less than four standardisation bodies. The civil emergency and disaster relief bodies might usefully be subsumed into one body. And so on.

**Going Global?**
Alliance partners fought together in the Gulf war of 1991. British troops worked with their US counterparts at a very high level of intimacy, as they spoke the same language. This was the product of many years of inter-operational training. Going “out of area” has hitherto meant areas adjacent to NATO territory such as the Balkans. In the light of the campaign against terrorism, NATO should consider when, and how, it would consider undertaking operations which support or protect the interests of Alliance members. This applies especially in the context of the ESDI dialogue. Planning resources should be devoted to contingency scenarios and crisis exercises should be carried out to game through how these matters would be dealt with.

**Procurement & Interoperability**
The lack of Alliance interoperability is severely hampering NATO. The technological and capability gap between Europe and the US needs to be addressed urgently. This may mean acknowledging that only the US can and will be able to undertake certain missions. The contribution of other members needs to be defined and enforced. Defence procurement processes are notoriously cumbersome. Attempts to open the process to competition and alternative sources of equipment have been only partial. Also there is limited scope for technology transfer to the civil sector, to re-coup development costs. The Defence Capabilities Initiative, or the Headline Goal should be the drivers.
NATO members should be measured against this yardstick, to ensure that they are capable of contributing to the capabilities of the Alliance. Equipment should be designed with interoperability in mind particularly where communications and surveillance technology are concerned. Membership criteria should from now on include a commitment to spend at least 3% of GNP on defence and security.

Policy Implications for Alliance members.
To move from the current situation to a position where a future NATO will be a credible security apparatus several elements will need to change. For policy makers the key to maintaining the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance will be managing the following issues:

● Armed Forces-size and shape
Forces must be capable of dealing with an evolving threat scenario. This means that a balance of forces must exist within the Alliance for it to have a credible deterrent at every level, from strategic forces to low intensity operations. The implications would be either a wholesale re-equipment, especially for new members, or a process whereby certain members declared forces to match specialist roles, as defined in the DCI. For example, the UK has a speciality in mine hunting, in the maritime area. This does not imply abolishing the rest of the fleet, but it means that, to borrow corporate jargon, the UK would be the “practice leader” in this area. Newer members could define which areas they could specialise in, logistics, mine clearance, or CBW de-contamination, and be the Alliance’s designated contributor in these areas.

Defence budgets are always under pressure, and nations are reluctant to deny themselves certain capabilities, particularly where this has implications for their own defence industries. NATO members should not feel that large naval fleets or numbers of aircraft represent “defence” or even “security.” What matters is “capabilities.” Unless equipment and forces meet capability needs, they are useless. This applies particularly to applicant members who are still wedded to old style conscript armies. NATO needs to take the lead in raising military training standards.

● Defence Industry Co-operation
Europe’s defence industry has already undergone a measure of re-structuring. Much of it designed to prevent incursion by foreign investors or competitors. European Defence Ministries should not destroy their indigenous defence industries, by buying “off the shelf” from the USA. The process of procurement should be speeded up, and greater use of off-set deals embraced. These allow technology transfer and help retain expertise in European defence industries.
The capability and technology gap between the US and its European allies will not easily be bridged. Closing the gap can and should be a priority for European partners. The US will need to examine its technology transfer policy if it is genuine about keeping NATO credible. European partners should not strain to “re-invent the wheel”. The current A400M imbroglio is instructive in this regard. All of the European partners agree that strategic lift capability is necessary, and yet the ability to take a decision and commit funds to the programme has become a complicated issue of national debate in Italy and Germany. There must be a better way of doing business!

● Interests to defend
NATO needs an over-arching sense of purpose. Without a re-statement of its collective beliefs, it will fade into irrelevance. Both the European and the North American pillars should be able to speak to each other as equals about common interests. There is a real danger that this process is becoming a dialogue of the deaf. The European partners have persuaded themselves that in developing a European Defence Identity they are solving Europe’s security problems. The US has no clear strategy for NATO—other than to promote enlargement. This policy void is dangerous. The Prague summit must see a commitment to a revitalised Alliance.

The Alliance must keep its collective mind on the nature of the threat. National interests today are expressed in terms of economic activity, trade and commerce. Those countries that have extensive overseas investment portfolios and commercial interests need to conduct a thorough security review. Alongside military and cyber threats lie political risks, for example the denial of oil or water. A globalised economy relies on open access to markets and information. This is where the threat will be found. Previous military reverses have had their roots in complacency. Deterrence rests on credibility. NATO members in the new millennium need to remain vigilant. If we truly wish for peace, we must prepare for a new kind of war.

Conclusion
NATO is still the principal focus for western security in the new world disorder. It is the Alliance of choice for most western leaders. It must not fail those who put their trust in it.

Existing Alliance members, as well as new ones, must preserve the high standards, which have enabled NATO nations to live in peace for over 50 years. The Prague Summit must harness the experience of older members to the enthusiasm of new members to ensure that the Atlantic Alliance represents the best of democracy and shows that we are prepared to protect it.
First Defence

From Powerbase

First Defence is a right wing defence think tank. It describes itself as:

a policy group of practical thinkers whose purpose is to put national defence and security back at the top of the political agenda.[1]

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Activities

Adam Holloway, MP, a member of the Defence Select Committee, has written a paper, "The Failure of British Political and Military Leadership in Iraq", which is downloadable from the First Defence website.[2] The paper is a critique of the process by which Tony Blair took the UK into war with Iraq and the post-invasion policies.

People

As at October 2007:[3]

- Dr Julian Lewis MP Parliamentary Chairman
- Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Pattie President
- Mark Cann Treasurer
- Caroline Flynn-MacLeod Director
- Mark Prisk MP Vice-President
- Nick Watts Policy Director

As at January 2010:[4]

- Adam Holloway Parliamentary Chairman (May 2009-present) [5]

As at November 2010:[6]
Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Pattie President
Mark Cann Treasurer
Caroline Flynn-MacLeod Executive Director
Mark Prisk MP Vice-President
Nick Watts Policy Director
Adam Holloway Parliamentary Chairman

Funders and supporters

As at January 2010 the following companies "support the work of First Defence":[7]

- EADS
- MBDA Missile Systems

As at November 2010 the following companies support the work of First Defence:[8]

- EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company)
- MBDA (Matra BAE Dynamics Alenia)

Activities

First Defence Activities

- Activities

Events

First Defence's events include one held on the eve of the Strategic Defence Review in October 2010, which was chaired by the Rt. Hon Liam Fox. Other events held by members were:

The War. A War

Speaker: Gerald Howarth M.P. Shadow Defence Procurement Minister Chaired by: Adam Holloway M.P. First Defence Parliamentary Chairman Tuesday, 2nd February 2010, House of Commons

Britain is facing the most significant Strategic Defence Review in a generation. While current economic difficulties constrain expenditure options, Afghanistan seems to dominate doctrinal discussions.

Will all future wars look like Afghanistan? If so should we re-configure our forces to address this type of warfare? Is Afghanistan the war – or just a war?

What are the implications of this conflict for our armed forces? And, if there is to be a reconfiguration of our forces, what will be the implications for the defence sector?

Gerald Howarth MP has been a Shadow Defence Minister since 2002 and holds the Defence Procurement brief. He is at the heart of planning for a Conservative Strategic Defence Review.

Post-conflict Afghanistan

Speaker: Tobias Ellwood M.P. Shadow Defence Procurement Minister Chaired by: Adam Holloway M.P. First Defence Parliamentary Chairman Saturday, 7th Dec 2009, House of Commons.
Tobias was born in New York, USA. He grew up in Bonn, Germany and Vienna, Austria, but returned to the UK to complete his first degree at Loughborough University. He spent five years in the Army with The Royal Green Jackets, and served in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Kuwait, Germany, Gibraltar and Bosnia. On leaving the army Tobias worked as a researcher for the former Defence Secretary, the Rt Hon Tom King MP (now Lord King). He returned to university to complete an MBA at City University Business School. Tobias then moved to the London Stock Exchange for two years where he was a Senior Business Development Manager and, following that, to a similar role for the law firm Allen and Overy.

Tobias was elected as Member of Parliament for Bournemouth East in May 2005.

In January 2006 he was appointed Opposition Whip and in July 2007 was promoted to the post of Shadow Minister for Culture Media and Sport where he is responsible for a portfolio including tourism, gambling and licensing. Tobias completed the senior executive course in National and International Studies at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University in the summer of 2009 and in his role as an MP, continues to take an interest in military matters, specialising in post-conflict operations, and is a frequent visitor to the Middle East, in particular Iraq and Afghanistan. In October 2002 he lost his brother in Bali bomb attacks.[9]

Notes

2. The Failure of British Political and Military Leadership in Iraq (http://www.firstdefence.org/Failure%20in%20Iraq.doc), First Defence website, accessed 12 Jan 2010
3. First Defence Who we are (http://www.firstdefence.org/html/who_we_are.html), accessed 23 October 2007
4. Who We Are (http://www.firstdefence.org/html/who_we_are.html), First Defence website, accessed 13 Jan 2010
6. First Defence Who we are (http://www.firstdefence.org/html/who_we_are.html), first defence accessed 1st November 2010

First Defence Documents

Documents published by First Defence

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